The Khedive's Egypt; or, the Old house of bondage under new masters ... With illustrations

Preface

. THE AUTHOR'S APOLOGY. What can anybody have to tell us about the Nile-land that has not already been said or sung ad nauseam ? Painfully conscious of the fact, that the collected bulk of all the writings on Egypt, if laid one above the other, would rival the height and magnitude of one of the smaller Pyramids, the present writer pleads as an apology, for contributing another stone to the tumulus, his exceptional advantages of many years' residence in Egypt in an official capacity, his intimate public and private relations with the last three Rulers — including the present Khedive — and his recent return from that country, which he left in April last. He therefore believes he has much to say about the Khedive's Egypt that is new, and, as he trusts, interesting — not only to the general reader, but to the thoughtful student of man and history as well.

Written in no partisan or partial spirit, this book professes to give a photographio picture of the changes wrought in the old " House of Bondage " by Mehemet Ali and his successors ; and its true condition, social, political, and economical, to-day, when the second dawn of a new civilization seems breaking over that portion of the East which hailed the first, long ere Greece or Rome had emerged from the " double darkness of Night, and of Night's daughter, Ignorance." In this belief he entrusts his book to the tender mercies of the public, and the tougher charities of the critics — admitting in VI European Powers, who had insisted on establishing a control over him, and he was professing the intention of establishing a Constitutional Monarchy, in lieu of the Absolute Government of his predecessors and himself.

The fall of the Nubar Ministry in April 1879, effected through the agency of a military revolt, by which the European Control (then consisting of Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres) was insulted and assaulted, was of the Khedive's contriving ; and is also memorable as being the first occasion which showed the military officers their power in the State. It was then the dragon's teeth were sown, which subsequently have produced such a harvest of armed men : and led to the Military Despotism which now overshadows the country. That action led to the downfall and banishment of Ismail Khedive — not, however, before he had threatened to use the tools he had sharpened, in his own defence, against England and France. But he renounced this purpose, and sullenly surren dered, when Prince Bismarck's iron hand was heavily laid upon him : renouncing the throne, but not the habit of intrigue, which will cease only with his life ; and to which may be traced much of the trouble and turmoil convulsing Egypt to-day.

Yet the first movement of the military, instigated by the arch-plotter for his own personal benefit, had a different origin, and was prompted by different motives, from those which have led to the present crisis, and which only began to show themselves towards the close of the year 1880. To use the language of Sir E. Malet, in his despatch of September last : — " The discontent sprang from the comparative, or rather The Khedive and the Colonels. VII total neglect of necessary reforms in the army, while other branches of the Administration and the country generally, were being cared for. The representations then made instead of receiving due consideration, merely aroused the suspicion of the Government, and the officers who presented the petition were ultimately dealt with in the way best calculated to destroy all confidence in the Khedive (Tewfik) and the Government."

The colonels (since so famous) were trapped, arrested, and imprisoned — and 'liberated by their respective regiments, who had orders from them to do so, should they not return from the Ministry of War, in two hours' time. The Minister of War had to escape through a window, and a few hours later was dismissed by the Khedive, under threats from a riotous soldiery. Riaz Pacha, the then Prime Minister, contrived to weather this storm, and pacify the colonels and army, now assuming'the attitude of the dominant power in the country. A Military Commission was appointed, and remedied some of the grievances about which the army complained — and Arabi Bey, the head and spokesman of the military party, at the end of April 1881, made a loyal speech at a dinner given by the new Secretary of War, breathing reconciliation and peace.

But the truce only lasted until July, when the soldiery again bearded and insulted the Khedive, who had failed to inspire them either with respect or fear — for the terms are synonymous in the East. An artilleryman was run over and killed in the streets of Alexandria. His comrades bore the body to the palace of Ras el Tin, where the Khedive was then residing, to escape the summer heats of Cairo, and forced an entrance, clamouring for vengeance. Severe sentences were passed on the ringleaders, who acted in defiance of the orders of their officers. But the Khedive having pardoned and restored to the active list nineteen officers dismissed by the colonels, an insolent letter was ad dressed by the latter to the Khedive, contrasting this leniency with the severity exercised against their artil lerymen.

Carrying out his policy of conciliating his rebellious chieftains, the Khedive again changed his Minister of War, and naturally emboldened the mutineers, who proceeded to make fresh demands — Arabi Bey, on their behalf, presenting the new Minister with a petition containing the most absurd demands. The Khedive, alarmed at the rapid march of military arrogance, made a feeble effort to oppose it. The fear of the colonels for their personal safety drove them into rashness, and on the 9th September of the same year another military demonstration against the Khedive was made at Cairo — where his palace was surrounded by the soldiery, who compelled him to dismiss the Ministry headed by Riaz Pacha, and authorise the formation of another more agreeable to them. The palace was surrounded by artillery, cavalry and infantry amounting to 2500 men, with eighteen guns.

Arabi Bey sent the Minister of War a communication, informing him that the troops in Cairo were going at 3 . 30, that afternoon, to the Abdin Palace, to obtain from the Khedive — 1st. The dismissal of the Ministry which had sold the country to the English. 2nd. A Representative Chamber. 3rd. The execution of the decisions of the Military ( ommission, raising the strength of the army to 18,000. Sceptre versus Sword. IX Sir A. Colvin, the English Controller, and Stone Pacha, an American officer, Chief of the Staff, urged the Khedive to put himself at the head of two regiments said to be faithful to him, and all the military police available, and personally to arrest Arabi. The Khedive, whose character strongly recalls that of Boabdil el Chico, last of the Moorish kings of Spain, whom his stern mother, Ayesha, taunted with " weeping like a woman for that he failed to defend like a man," replied that " Arabi had with him the Artillery, and they might fire."

The scene is thus graphically described by Sir A. Colvin, who accompanied the Khedive, when he went to confront the mutineers, on the square fronting the Abdin Palace, which was entirely occupied by soldiers. " I said to him, ' When Arabi Bey presents himself, tell him to give you his sword, and to follow you. Then go the round of the square, address each regiment separately, and give them the order to disperse.' Arabi Bey approached on horseback. The Viceroy called out to him to dismount. He came forward, with several others on foot, and a guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted. As he came forward I said to the Viceroy, ' Now is your moment.' He replied, ' We are between four fires. We shall be killed.' He then told Arabi Bey to sheath his sword. The order was obeyed, and he then asked him what all this meant.

Arabi replied by enumerating the above three points, adding that the army had come there on the part of the Egyptian people to enforce them, and would not retire until they were con ceded. The Viceroy turned to me and said, ' You hear what he says.' " On Sir A. Colvin's suggestion, he then retired to his palace, leaving him to confer with the mutineers, which he did for an hour until the arrival of X Mr. Cookson, acting Consul-general, an hour later. The latter then continued the conference. Mr. Cookson found Arabi obstinate in the repetition of his formula, and his intention to carry it out, returned to the palace, saw the Khedive, and recommended, as did Mr. Colvin, that the officers should be informed that the Khedive was in com munication with the Sublime Porte as to their demands, and that they should be asked to disperse, until the answer from Constantinople came.

The Khedive accepted this suggestion, but Arabi replied, that they would remain under arms until the answer came : and that, if unfavourable, they would cease to recognise the Khedive, until a Turkish Commissioner came to settle the questions at issue. The Khedive responded to this by offering at once to dismiss his ministers, keeping the other question in abey ance — which Arabi accepted, with the proviso that no member of the Khedive's family should be in the ministry — nor should the minister of war be a Circassian or Turk, as contradistinguished from an Arab. Cherif Pacha was agreed upon as President of the Council, with power to form a new ministry at once. The reading of the Khedive's letter to Cherif announcing this, was received with loud shouts of " Long live the Khedive," and Tewfik, showing himself on the balcony, was greeted with acclamations.

But from that moment he really ceased to reign. Urged by the English and French representatives, Cherif Pacha, though unwilling as he said, to " go before the world as having been imposed on the Khedive by a mutinous soldiery," and conscious of the difficulties of con ceding the demands the soldiers would be sure to make Western Intervention. XI patriotically consented to assume the responsibility. The Chamber of Notables, to the number of 150, summoned by Arabi at Cairo, unexpectedly interposed, guaranteeing to Cherif Pacha the submission of the army to his orders, if he would form a cabinet — to which the military leaders had to accede. And with this convocation of the Notables, and formation of a new ministry by Cherif Pacha, the curtain fell on the first act of this exciting drama. Like the true-hearted patriot he is, and ever has been, Cherif Pacha's first effort was to avoid the interposition of the Sultan in Egypt, well knowing all the consequences that such intervention would entail.

Mr. Cookson on the 14th September, telegraphed to Lord Granville : — " French Agent and I have agreed to our Govern ments' identic telegram in following terms : — Cherif Pacha expresses the desire that England and France will con sent, in case the army shall show itself submissive and obedient, to interpose their good offices with the Sublime Porte, in order to avert from Egypt an occupation by an Ottoman army." Adding : " Does your lordship authorise me to give this assurance to Cherif? " The blue books are silent as to the answer, if any, given to this communication ; but the active and positive intervention of the French Government in this sense rendered it unnecessary, and the Porte sulkily submitted, but determined to send envoys nevertheless. On the 6th October the Turkish envoys arrived at Cairo, and were received next day by the Khedive.

They left on the 18th, after conferring decorations on the Khedive, Cherif Pacha, and other Egyptian officials. Arabi Bey did not see or confer with them, having departed for the Wady, whither his command had been transferred, on hearing of their coming. These envoys first proposed to hold an official inquiry, but did not renew the proposal when Cherif did not countenance it : the latter being determined not to allow the liberties acquired by his country to be infringed on by the Porte. Arabi Bey also, in a conversation with Sir A. Colvin on 1st November, put himself on record to the same effect. He said that the object he and those with him had in view, was, by the progress of reform and proper administration of justice, to do away for ever with the arbitrary government of the Turkish Pachas, under which no man knew what the next day had in store for him.

About this time a new element was introduced into Egyptian politics. The native press, previously disregarded and powerless, came to the front, and commenced a mischievous agitation against the Euro pean element in Egypt. So busy and so mischievous did it become, that Sir E. Malet felt bound to remonstrate with Cherif Pacha on the subject, and ask of him " to exert his authority to prevent the dissemination of ideas, which preach distrust of Christians, and misrepre sent the action of England and France towards their Mussulman subjects." Cherif sent warnings to the native press, and to the foreign also, at the same time, to avoid irritating discus sions — suppressing the French journal L'Egypte for insulting reference to the Prophet, its editor flying from the country through fear of assassination.

The curtain rose on the second act with the opening of the Chamber of Notables by a speech from the Khedive, on the 20th December, 1881, in which the constitutional monarch threw himself on them and the country for support. The joint note of the English and French Governments, drawn up by The A nglo-French Control. XIII M. Gambetta, assuring the Khedive of their determination to support him, was submitted to him on the 8th January, 1882, but on the 5th of same month, Arabi again comes prominently forward as Under-Secretary of War, the Consuls-General and Controllers not opposing the nomina tion, on the ground that they thought it better he " should belong to the Government than be outside of it." About this time the Khedive is reported as "being cheerful in mood, and taking a hopeful view of the situation " — but this serenity was soon disturbed.

The calm was but the lull before the breaking of the storm. The third act opened with the counter drafts of organic law drawn up by the Committee of the Chamber of Notables, in opposition to Cherif Pacha's programme, giving the Chamber the control of the Ministry and the Budget. Cherif Pacha opposed this change, basing his resistance on the Firmans, and on international engage ments. This was a direct blow at the Anglo-French Control, and it was on this issue that Cherif Pacha's Ministry was dissolved, and the Khedive's last anchor torn away from him. This movement was made on the 15th of January. Messrs. Colvin and de Blignieres, the English and French Controllers, drew up and sent to their Govern ments their joint protest against this change, which they declared would seriously affect their functions.

The Consul General took the same view, and expostulated with the Chamber, in vain. On the 1st of February things ha(J come to such a pass that Cherif Pacha expected to be requested by the Chamber to resign ; and thought that the only issue from the situation was the immediate sending of a commission from the Porte, to be followed by a Turkish force — warning the foreign agents at the same time, " that armed European intervention could neither be threatened or effected without the most serious danger to the European population " — a warning which subsequent events have confirmed. On the 2nd a deputation of the Chamber waited on the Khedive, and demanded a change of Ministry. The Khedive asked them to name a ministry, which they at first declined, as that was his prerogative ; but on the 5th of February a new Ministry was named, in which.

Arabi figured as Secretary of War, all his colleagues being of the so-called " National Party " — his fellow plotters. About this time the Sultan protested against the joint Anglo-French declaration, and Lord Granville proposed calling upon the other European Powers, " for an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the affairs of Egypt." The Khedive, on the 8th of February, approved of the organic law of the Chamber — and the powers of the Controllers, from that hour, have been seriously curtailed, if not rendered nominal. Sir E. Malet writing on the 13th of February says : " It becomes a question whether it is useful or dignified for England and France to maintain the controllers, when they can no longer control." England and France apparently have thought it wa**, for neither have withdrawn those functionaries— although the French Government has replaced M. de Blignieres by another, on the ground of his having " taken an exaggerated view of the powers and functions of his office."

The Triumph of Arabi. XV Sir A. Colvin's attitude has been endorsed by his Govern ment. On the 16th of March, the Khedive promoted Arabi Bey to the rank of Pacha, together with promotions of his military friends, to the number of 300. On the 24th of March, the session of the Chamber of Delegates closed, leaving Arabi and his friends undisputed masters of the situation. Having muzzled the Khedive, crippled the Controllers, and defied the Consuls-General, Arabi now turned his attention to his native opponents, the Turkish and Cir cassian officers, who stood in the way of his grand purpose of securing " Egypt for the Egyptians." Forty officers, among whom was his predecessor in the War Office, were condemned to exile for life by a court mar tial, the proceedings of which were secret, and the prisoners undefended by counsel ; the pretext an alleged conspiracy against his life.

The Khedive, after consult ing the Porte and the foreign Consuls-General, hesitated as to ratifying this sentence. The Sultan promptly claimed the right of deciding this question, as regarding Turkish subjects. The Khedive temporised, and on the 9th of May signed a decree of banishment from Egypt against the accused without further punishment. The prisoners were finally sent to Constantinople, where they have since been carefully interned by order of the Sultan. The President of the Council then informed the Foreign Representatives that as the Khedive and the Ministry could not agree, they had convoked the Chamber of Not ables to lay the case before it — thus virtually deposing the Khedive— and with the intention of formally doing so later. All communication between the Khedive and his Mini sters was thus broken off, and M. de Freycinet in the French Parliament declared that " affairs in Egypt had now assumed a revolutionary character — the Ministry in insurrection against the Chief of the State."

The unfortunate Khedive, the shuttlecock between the two battledores — native and foreign — in vain asked aid and counsel from his European advisers, who only talked, while Arabi and the Ministry acted : and finally while " declaring he would ne'er consent, consented " to a reconciliation with his rebellious servants. It was about this time that the unfortunate " naval demonstration," which produced such mighty mischief and so little good, was planned and carried out; its pre sence in Egyptian waters producing the very catastrophe it was intended to prevent. The avowed objects of this " demonstration " were, the support of the Khedive, and the expulsion of the usurping Arabi and his colleagues from Egypt, such having been the chief points in the " ultimatum," or joint note of England and France, which had been so contemptuously disregarded by those to whom it had been addressed, the Porte included.

For the Sultan now began openly to show a lively interest in, and a desire to control Egyptian affairs, and sent his commissioner Dervisch Pacha, with a suite of fifty persons, with his orders to his " governor of a Turkish Province " as he termed the Khedive, with the intention of resuming that absolute control of Egypt which both he and his predecessors had renounced, under guarantee of the European Powers, to the house of Mehemet Ali. But these pretensions neither Europe, nor the Egyptians Autocracy of A rabi. XVII would countenance, and the swelling programme of Der visch's mission dwindled down into the most meagre performances, and finally into full concert with Arabi and the rebellion. Whatever may have been the secret instructions given the Turkish Envoy, who at first attempted to lord it over both the Khedive and the Ministry — whom he finally counselled to coalesce and be reconciled — his subsequent acts, countenanced by the Porte, prove the Sultan's complicity in the revolutionary proceedings of Arabi, and his sympathy with his Moham medan brethren, in their collision with the Christian Powers.

Baffled in the attempt to resume his temporal power over Egypt, the Sultan fell back on his spiritual autho rity as head of Islam, to retain his ascendency over the highway to the holy cities in Arabia — with the secret hope of ultimately regaining his lost land, through the political complications which he had himself assisted to create. While therefore Dervisch Pacha bullied and blustered, and was pretending to put down Arabi, he was really* helping him to build up and fortify his power and in fluence, and coercing the poor Khedive into countenancing and finally embracing the audacious rebel against his authority : until Arabi could truly exclaim, with the French despot, " I am the State ! " The recent investiture of Arabi with the cordon of the Medjidie, by the Sultan's order, has been only the last act of the comedy played by Dervisch in Egypt, where he still remains.

That the Sultan would have repudiated and betrayed Arabi, had the opportunity or the power been given him, no one who knows Eastern diplomacy b can doubt; nor, even at this hour, would any similar treachery be surprising, should Arabi be weak enough to put himself into the power of the Porte under any guarantees, however solemn. But that much of the in spiration for his acts has come from Constantinople is clear as noonday, and he boasts that he holds in his poses sion proofs of it that would compromise the Porte, even in the confiding eyes of its European admirers, so recently its fiercest denouncers. And herein may possibly lie the impunity and coun tenance afforded the impenitent rebel by his Spiritual Chief, in the face of Europe, although the head of the Egyptian tiger cat may yet fall beneath the merciless paw of the tiger of Constantinople, unless he prove to be more " bloody, bold, and resolute " than his Scotch pro totype Macbeth.

But while this comedy was being converted into broad farce at Cairo, a sudden and startling change into tragedy was wrought at Alexandria, by the unprovoked and bloody riots at that latter place on the 11th of June, by whom planned and instigated is as yet unknown, although strong suspicions attach to the old Khedive Ismail, to the opponents of Arabi, and to Arabi's partisans, all of whom have been accused of complicity therewith as accessories before the fact ; although perhaps, after all, the inflamma tory appeals of the native press to the fanaticism, the fears, and the race-hatred of the lower class of Arabs, aggravated by the presence of the European fleet, were the exciting causes of that hideous massacre. For the character of Arabi, as thus far developed, has not indicated either ferocity or cruelty; and it was evident that much harm and no good to him and his party could The Revolt at A lexandria.

XIX result from exciting the anger and vengeance of Christen dom against them. His prompt and effective interposition to restore order and peace after the riots, also plead strongly in favour of his innocence in this regard. But there can be no doubt that this harvest of blood and tears was from the seed which he had planted, and the race-antagonisms on which the " National Patty " was based. To secure " Egypt for the Egyptians " seemed to the brutalised lower class of Arabs, and their accomplices among the police and soldiery, most easily accomplished by the expulsion or extirpation of all European residents^ and, having once lapped blood, the thirst for it became insatiable. Space is not afforded here to tell the sickening and ter rible tale of the riots, which for an entire day made a slaughter-house of the streets of Alexandria, under the very guns of the combined fleet, lying as " idle as painted ships upon a painted ocean :" some of whose officers and men perished in the tumult.

The fanatical fury of the mob must indeed have been great, when they ceased even to respect the Consular em blems of authority, and the persons of the foreign representatives, hitherto held sacred there. Mr. Cookson, the accomplished and intrepid English Consul, while braving death at the call of duty, on his way to the house of the Governor, to compel him to quell the riot, was dragged from his carriage, severely beaten by the Arab mob, and escaped with life only through the devotion of his native guard, or Janissary. His Greek and Italian colleagues were exposed to the same insults and injuries, and Europeans of all nationalities, to the number of 350, are said to have been hunted b XX down and murdered by the native mob : while many who sought the protection of the guard houses and military', met a similar fate.

The mob had free privilege to murder and pillage for fully five hours, before either the military garrison of 6000 men, or the police, raised a finger to protect the Europeans, who, unarmed and taken by sur prise, were slaughtered like sheep by the iron-shod na boots (or clubs), with which the mob were armed. Some execution was done upon these butchers by the knives of the Maltese and Italians of the lower class, those men habitually wearing them ; but how many Arabs were killed is unknown. Since the day of these riots there has been a steady exodus of Europeans of all classes and conditions, with their families, out of Egypt — a panic flight in which all their worldly goods have been left behind : until out of a colony of 100,000 persons of all nationali ties, not more than a remnant remains, and of these all that can possibly manage to escape from a land where they now feel no security for person or property, will swell the tide of emigration.

Yet, when Europe calls upon the Tuik to join in a conference to restore order and the reign of law in Egypt, the insolent answer is given that order has already been restored there through the Sultan's agency, and the reconciliation of the Khedive and the Ministry ; and that the fleet, as provocative of rioting, ought to be withdrawn. And to accentuate this defiance more strongly, Arabi, the head and front of the offence to England and France, is ostentatiously decked out with the highest mark of the Sultan's favour and approval ! While these lines are penned the Conference is in Session at Constantinople with closed doors — and sealed Memoir of A rabi. XXI lips— trying to coax the recalcitrant Sultan into its charmed circle. But what the issue of its deliberations may be, not the most prescient of politicians can even conjecture : although those conferences must be quickened into action by the rapid preparation of English armaments sufficient to crush the life out of the Egyptian Conspiracy against the legitimate sovereign of that realm, as well as against the restoration of Christian progress and civilisation : so suddenly and ruthlessly expelled by fire and sword, to the utter ruin of the survivors of that day of horror.

If England and France, the self-elected champions of Christendom in Egypt, even in submission to the desire of the Conference — accept the lame and impotent conclu sion of these difficulties, pressed upon them by the Porte, and which the Khedive, a State prisoner, is powerless to change — they may resign themselves to the certainty, that although the Suez Canal transit may for a while be kept open through Arab sufferance, and a remnant of the European residents sneak back, to be contemptuously treated by the Arabs — whom they have hitherto lorded it. over — yet they will find that the hand on the dial-plate of Egyptian progress, prosperity and civilisation, will have been put back — never to be put forward again, until better and bolder councils prevail. The maxim of Danton is the key-note of the situation now, even though England be compelled to act alone.

A few words on the personality of Arabi Pacha may appropriately close this prefatory sketch. That an unlettered soldier, ignorant of all foreign languages, supported by an army that has never shown spirit or courage on any battle field, either against Christian legions in the Crimea, or naked and almost un armed Abyssinians — should have succeeded, in rapidly rising almost from the ranks to the highest military and civil distinction, which his own Government and the Sublime Porte could bestow, must surprise Christendom, although the recurrence of a similar phenomenon is not unfamiliar to the Eastern mind. Mehemet Ali's case has been cited as one in point ; but Mehemet Ali was a born soldier, like Napoleon, and carved his way with his sword, while his native sagacity and genius supplied the want of education and culture.