Memoir, written by General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Bart. of his proceedings as connected with the affairs of Spain, and the commencement of the Peninsular War

Front matter

MEMOIR, WRITTEN BY GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART. OF HIS PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN, AND THE COMMENCEMENT OP THE PENINSULAR WAR. LONDON: THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, STRAND. MDCCCXXX. LONDON : MARCHANT, PRINTER, INCRAM-COUKT. The following narrative, as will be seen in the Introduction, ivas originally written by General Sir Hew Dalrymple, as a family record. Circum stances afterwards induced him to adopt the reso lution of printing it, which his last illness alone prevented him from doing. I have therefore thought it a duty I owed to my Fathers memory, to publish what he had prepared ivith much care, exactly as I found it, in his own hand-writing. I have added to the Appendix two letters, one from Brigadier-General Anstruther, the other from Lord William Bentinck, on the subject of the Convention, conveying the opinions of two distinguished Officers on the spot, as to the ivisdom of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal with their Arms and Baggage. ADOLPHUS JOHN DALRYMPLE Park-Street, GrosvcnorSauure, August, 1830.

Introduction

. The first volume of Mr. Southey's History of the Peninsular War had long been before the public, and that of Lieutenant-Colonel Napier's incomparable Work either published or on the eve of publication, when the Marquess of Lon donderry's Narrative appeared. I had early intimation that my name was everywhere unfavourably mentioned in that publication ; but, as the share I had in the transac tions of that period had now become, if I may be allowed to say so, matter of genuine history, I should, probably, have continued to disregard the small measure of justice afforded me in the Marquess's Narrative, had not an octavo edition,

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. VI with an appendix of correspondence, been pub lished. This correspondence contains expostulations from some highly-distinguished officers, against certain statements in the first edition of the Narrative, of which each thought he had just reason to complain ; and the justice those officers sought, was, by the noble author, most hand somely bestowed, by publishing their letters, with his replies, in an Appendix, prefaced by a frank acknowledgement of the deficiency of his Work. A publication which officers of rank and character thus thought it incumbent upon them to notice, it might not be becoming in me to overlook altogether ; and, indeed, I am not wholly indifferent to the renewal of those misre presentations of my conduct and character by which the people of England, twenty years ago, were misled.

But the course pursued by those officers was not open to me, as I could scarcely have proposed to the author so very extensive a revisal of his Work as would have been necessary to do justice, not to me only, but to the minister who, in communicating to me the King's com-

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. VII mands, that I should forthwith proceed from Gibraltar, to take the command of the army, which I eventually found victorious in Portugal, attributed my appointment to His Majesty's high approbation of " the zeal and judgement which -" had marked the whole of my conduct under " the late important events which had taken " place in Spain." Where, in the miscellaneous matter of Lord Londonderry's fourth chapter, in which the early transactions in Andalusia are alluded to, are the examples of that zeal and judgement to be found ? It is true that I am once or twice alluded to as Governor of Gibraltar, and my name is once honoured by being joined to that of Lord Col lingwood ; but I cannot acknowledge much accuracy of statement in those passages where I am thus noticed. On the 14th May, when General Spencer's Corps sailed from Gibraltar, to join Admiral Purvis, off Cadiz, by my authority, and under my sole responsibility, (not " covered by the squadron of Lord Collingwood," but covered by a brig of war,) Lord Collingwood was off Toulon, as His Lordship's published correspondence will shew ; as, also, that, whilst still off that place, it was in consequence of via

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. intelligence received from me of the events that were ripening into maturity in Spain, that His Lordship determined to resume his station off Cadiz, which he had quitted eleven months before. This part of Lord Londonderry's Narra tive is, perhaps, not very clear ; but, when His Lordship speaks of General Spencer's Corps as having been the first British Force which " shewed itself upon the theatre of war," it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is intended to represent this corps as the one which, in the preceding sentence, the reader is told Ministers were determined to send, contrary to the wish of certain deputies from the Asturias, as an efficient nucleus round which larger armies might gather. During all this period the Marquess of London derry must have had access to my official correspondence, as well as that of Lord Collingwood.

He was not only Under Secretary of State for his brother's department (with which it was my duty to correspond), but was actively engaged in the business of the office, as appears by a statement of Sir Henry Burrafd's to the Board of Inquiry, " that, whilst at Portsmouth, he received a letter, " of the 26th July," from the Under Secretary

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. IX of State, " Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, " expressing great impatience on the part of " Government that the armament should pro " ceed," the 18th Dragoons, under the command of Brigadier-General Stewart himself, sailed soon after, as there is a letter in the appendix to the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry on the Con vention in Portugal, (No. 28,) dated the 4th August, in which Lord Castlereagh conveys to that Officer His Majesty's commands to call off Oporto, to receive such instructions as Sir Harry Burrard might have left there for him. Though the circumstance is not mentioned in the Mar quess's Narrative, there is no doubt that His Majesty's commands were obeyed. It is most truly stated in the Narrative, that, " on the 22d of August, I arrived from Gibraltar " to take the command of the Army," by that means superseding Sir Harry Burrard, who had assumed the command during the battle of the 21st ; but I deny that, " before any definite course " had been determined on, an event occurred, " which gave a new turn to the General's deli " berations." Immediately on my first interview with Sir Arthur Wellesley, I gave orders for the march of the Army, the next morning, at day

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. X break, " undoubtedly as soon" (as observed by the Board of General Officers composing the Court of Inquiry in its report) " as it could be " put in motion after his arrival;" and again, " considering the extraordinary circumstances " under which two Commanding Generals ar " rived from the Ocean, and joined the army, " (the one during, the other immediately after, " a battle, and those successively superseding " each other, and both the original Commander, " within the space of twenty-four hours), it is " not surprising that the Army was not carried " forward until the second day after the action." The account given in the Narrative of the social discussions of all Ranks of Officers in their coteries, may afford a tolerable specimen of what those discussions usually are ; but, I strongly object to its being made a vehicle for raising a doubt, what Sir Arthur Wellesley's opinion of the Armistice of Vimiera actually was ; as, also, for inculating a belief, that the Oporto In trigue, in all its circumstances, was well known in the Army " during the period which inter " vened, between the conclusion of the Armis " tice, and the return of the messenger," (namely, " Lieutenant-Colonel, now Sir George Murray,)

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. XI " who carried a copy of the Convention to Sir " Charles Cotton." The Marquess of Londonderry, then Brigadier- General Stewart, joined, at Head-Quarters, on the 24th of August; and, as appears by the correspondence itself, was the bearer of the first of a series of letters, from Brigadier-General the Baron VnDecken, who had recently arrived from England, on a special mission to Oporto. This first letter, received on the 24th of August, con tained the first intimation I received, that, in consequence of Baron VnDecken's own sugges tion, the Bishop of Oporto had consented to take the Government of Portugal upon himself. The transfer of " the executive" (as it is called in the Narrative) to Oporto, was the subject of a subsequent communication ; and I cannot admit, that what I was wholly unacquainted with in the morning, and knew but imperfectly at noon, could have been well known in the Army before night; for it was in the night of the 24th, not on the 26th, as is erroneously stated in the Nar rative, that Lieutenant-Colonel Murray arrived with Sir Charles Cotton's decision, upon the subject of the Armistice.

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. XII The question whether Sir Arthur Wellesley did, or did not, approve the Armistice at the time it was concluded, was, I should have hoped, set at rest by his letter, to Lord Castlereagh, of the 6th of October, 1808, of which the following is an extract : the letter itself has long been before the public, in the Appendix to the Pro ceedings of the Inquiry (No. 152), and is not a bad supplement to the extract from the Report of the Board already given, as shewing the fruits, as the latter does the immediate consequences, of the measures adopted by His Majes ty's Ministers, in the outset of the Peninsular War. Extract. — "At thesame time, adverting to the " situation which I held in Portugal, previously " to His Excellency's arrival, I think it but just " to inform your Lordship, that I concurred with " the Commander of the Forces in thinking it " expedient, on the 22d of August, that the " French army, in Portugal, should be allowed " to evacuate that kingdom with their arms and " baggage, and that every facility for this pur " pose should be afforded to them. I deemed " this to be expedient in the relative state of the

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. XIII " two armies on the evening of the 22d, con " sidering that the French army had resumed a " formidable Position between us and Lisbon ; " that they had the means of retiring from that " Position to others in front of that city ; and, " finally, of crossing the Tagus into Alemtejo, " with a view to the occupation, in strength, " of the Forts of Elvas, La Lippe, and, even " tually, Almeida. As Lieutenant-General Sir " John Moore's corps had been diverted from " the occupation of the position at Santarem, " which had been proposed for them, there were " no means to prevent, and no increase of num " bers could have prevented, the French army " from effecting these objects." I give this long extract the rather, as Lord Londonderry has thought it right (" before dis " missing the subject of Cintra altogether") to give the extract of a letter, from a correspondent of his own, upon the same subject; it would appear, from the narrative, that the extract refers to what the noble author would call the Conven tion of Cintra; but that this is not the case, is evident from the first sentence : " The tumult " of our joy, on Wellesley 's glorious conduct " and success, has been cruelly disturbed by

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. XIV " the communication of a supposed Conventions obviously alluding to a copy of the armistice communicated, by the Portuguese Minister, to Mr. Secretary Canning, the day after the news of the victory of Vimiera was received, and pub lished ; of which document Ministers affected to disbelieve the authenticity. Moreover, this correspondent's seven objections to the treaty, principally relate to the suppo.sed recognition of 4>4- Bonaparte as Emperor of the French, and the acknowledgement of the neutrality of the Tagus to the Russian Fleet ; matters which are not so much as alluded to in the definitive Convention, as a reference to that instrument will prove. With reference to a discussion which arose between Don Josef Galluzzo (Captain-General of Estremadura) and myself, it is observed, by Lord Londonderry, that " I consented that Colonel " Graham should repair to Elvas, with %\\ pow " ers to conciliate the Spanish General; the " Colonel was moreover furnished with ten thou " sand dollars, as a means of enforcing his argu " ments, should they be violently opposed." The noble author was misinformed in this matter; to Lord Lyndock I appeal, that no such dollars were either furnished or bestowed ; and I dis-

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XV claim the feelings with which I am said to have been actuated on this occasion, and the absurd declaration I am represented to have made, — namely, " that, if my wish were not promptly " attended to, I should withhold all succours " from the Spaniards, and cease all correspon " dence with them." Don Josef Galluzzo was, like some other great men, a dupe to the Bishop and Junta of Oporto, and took the field accordingly, for the express purpose of obstructing the execution of the Convention ; but Galluzzo was not more opposed to my measures than to those of the Spanish authorities at Madrid ; and I can scarcely be supposed so entirely devoid of con sistency, as to speak or think of abandoning the cause of the Spanish Nation, to which I had from the first been so zealously devoted, because one of their own officers was regardless of his duty to this Country.

Had the Marquess of Lon donderry k'nown me better, he would not have believed so improbable a tale. I shall abstain from farther remarks upon de tached passages of the Marquess of London derry's Narrative ; if that had never been pub lished, the following statement of all myjpro ceedings, as connected with the insurrections in

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Spain and the Peninsular war, would have con tinued to be, — that for which it was originally intended, — a family record. I deem it now ex pedient to place it in the hands of such persons as may take an interest in me and my conduct, in order to supply the omissions and correct the mistakes in those parts of the Marquess of Lon donderry's Narrative, which treat of the transactions in which I bore a part. To posterity and those who are capable of judging, Colonel Napier's History leaves me nothing to wish for or explain. GIBRALTAR, BEFORE AND AFTER THE JUNTAS WERE ESTABLISHED. GIBRALTAR. AFFAIRS OF SPAIN BEFORE THE JUNTAS WERE ESTABLISHED. In June, 1806, I received orders to proceed to Gibraltar, to take the command of that fortress, in the absence of the Lieutenant-Governor, (Ge neral Fox,) who was about to be employed on another service.

Upon my arrival in the garrison, on the 2d of November, I found that the intercourse with Spain was considerable ; and, having fully ascertained that no possible danger could accrue to the place from its continuance, (as the garrison was sufficiently numerous, the troops in a high state of health and discipline, and the duty done with scrupulous exactness,) I cultivated the friendly disposition which seemed to prevail, and soon had direct and confidential communication with General Castanos, (who commanded the Spanish troops in that part of Andalusia,) upon the occurrences to which this intercourse occasionally gave rise. b2 1806. 1807 That this state of things was well known to the Spanish Government could not be doubted ; it was productive of mutual convenience, and, to the garrison, it produced an ample supply of many useful articles of provision, and, at the same time, afforded to the British merchants the means of carrying on their commercial specula tions vvith facility and advantage.

Towards the end of the year 1807, columns of French troops began to enter Spain, for the avowed purpose of taking possession of Portugal, which materially changed the face of affairs ; and, on the 7th day of October, it was officially notified to me, by the Brigadier-General com manding in the Spanish lines, " That Lieutenant - " General Don F. Xavier de Castanos had " received the orders of Government, to stop all " manner of communication with Gibraltar;" and, from this date, the fortress was held in as rigorous a state of blockade as the enemy had the power to enforce. Soon after this, I received advices from several quarters, confirmed, and more fully detailed, in an official despatch from Lord Strangford, the British Minister at Lisbon, that it was certainly a part of Bonaparte's plan of operations to possess himself of Gibraltar ; and, it must be confessed, that the mode of attack, he was said to have in contemplation, displayed much local knowledge O 1S07 AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. and great information of those circumstances which were most likely to contribute to the success of his design.

Although the danger was comparatively distant, no time was lost in making the necessary preparations to meet it when it should arrive. On the 24th of October, Captain Rosenhagen, of the Volage frigate, brought me despatches from England. He was proceeding, without delay, for Sicily, with orders to Sir John Moore, which he was anxious to deliver before the embarkation of a body of troops with which Sir John had been previously ordered to leave that island. These orders, however, did not arrive in Sicily till after Sir John Moore's corps had embarked and sailed. On the 1st of December, {hose troops from Sicily arrived in the bay. On the 4th, Sir John Moore sailed for the Tagus, in the Chiffonne frigate, for the purpose of commuuicating with Sir Sydney Smith, whom he expected to find cruizing off that river.

On the 10th, he return ed, bringing to us the first intelligence of the de parture of the royal family of Portugal for the Brazils; and, on the 15th, Sir John Moore, with the troops under his command, sailed for England. About the time that Sir John Moore arrived in England, an expedition sailed from thence under the command of Major-General Spencer, des tined for a particular service, and which was to rendezvous at Gibraltar. Those ships encounter ed a violent gale of wind, by which they were dispersed. The General, with the convoy, and the greater part of the transports were driven back to England ; the remainder of the fleet, with detachments of various regiments on board, arrived in Gibraltar-bay on the 23d January, 1808. Whilst those ships lay in the bay, exposed to heavy gales of wind which at that time prevailed, we had intelligence from a ship, detained by the Hydra frigate, that a French squadron had escaped from Rochfort, and had, in the night, passed Gibraltar into the Mediterranean ; and, on the 10th of February, Sir Richard Strachan, with seven sail of the line and one frigate, (having communicated with the garrison and ascertained the course the enemy had steer ed,) passed through the Straits in pursuit.

As it appeared to me, from a variety of circumstances, that Sicily would be exposed to con siderable danger, should that island be the des tination of the enemy's squadron, particularly now, when so large a body of troops as that under the command of Sir John Moore had been withdrawn from its garrison, I took it upon my self to send the detachments of General Spen- 1808. cer's corps, then in the bay, under the command of Colonel Walker of the 50th regiment, to re inforce the British troops in Sicily. The transports sailed, on the 11th February, under con voy of the Phœbe frigate. On the 10th of March, General Spencer, with the remainder of his corps, arrived at Gibraltar, and when the original object of his expedition was relinquished, (for reasons wholly unconnect ed with the temporary diminution of his force by the absence of the detachments sent to Sicily,) the transports were secured in the Mole, and the troops placed in such accommodations as could be provided for them, until His Majesty's pleasure, as to their future destination, should be made known.

This additional force at Gibraltar soon became peculiarly seasonable; for, although General Spencer's corps formed no part of the regular garrison, and was, in fact, a separate command, its presence gave weight to my sub sequent communications with the Spanish authorities, and General Spencer himself expressed the greatest readiness to act under my authority, for the public service, whenever occasion should require it. When the French troops first entered Spain and marched through Irun, on their route to Por tugal, the strength of each column and a description of the troops composing it, regularly aps 1808 AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. peared in the Madrid Gazette ; but, early in March of this year, it was ascertained that large columns had passed the frontier by other routes, and for other purposes : the French had taken possession of Pamplona and Barcelona by force or fraud; and at the moment when the insurrections at Madrid, and at the royal residence of Aranjuez had terminated in the abdication of Charles IV. ; the imprisonment of the favourite Godoy ; and the elevation of Ferdinand VII. to the throne of his father ; Murat was advancing upon Madrid (under pretext of proceeding on his route to Cadiz) at the head of the divisions of Moncey and Dupont.

I never failed to communicate to His Majesty's government the earliest and best intelligence I could obtain of the transactions in Spain at this interesting period ; but, on the 8th of April, the arrival of a confidential agent from General Cas tanos, to inform me of the actual state of things, with an accurate detail of the late events ; and to commence that confidential communication which henceforwards subsisted between us, gave, to my subsequent reports to government, a new and more interesting character. By this Spaniard I was informed of all the circumstances which preceded and accompanied the revolution which had placed Ferdinand VII. on the throne ; and, from his account, it appeared that the turn affairs had taken was not anticipated by Bonaparte ; and that, when Murat arrived at Madrid, he found a state of things for which he was wholly unprepared ; and a go vernment in full activity, which he had no authority, and probably no will, to acknowledge.

This gentleman further stated, " That all the " political talents in Spain, long sanctioned by " public opinion, now surrounded the throne of " the new sovereign; that the nation itself had " caught the impulse, and was preparing, in the " most energetic manner, to support its monarch ; " that Catalonia, Arragon, and Valencia, had al " ready offered to raise and maintain an army " of 150,000 men ; and that it was not doubted " that the example would be universally fol " lowed : in short, he believed (or affected to " believe) that should the perfidy of the French, " already suspected, be proved, by subsequent " acts of the generals or troops, the latter " would, notwithstanding their discipline and " numbers, be overwhelmed by the energy of " an enraged and formidable population, thus " roused into action by wrongs and insults."

That those opinions, so truly Spanish, were those of the multitude, and perhaps of the in dividual who now uttered them, I thought most probable ; neither did I doubt that the population of Spain was actuated by the feelings described : 1808, but it was from the sequel of the discourse of this accredited agent, that I drew more reasonable conclusions as to the objects of his mission; for he was authorized to inform me that, had matters taken an unfavourable turn, and the Prince of the Austurias been constrained to fly, he was to have taken refuge at Alge-riras, and from thence to have passed over to Gibraltar, preferring that port of embarkation to any other, from the confidence he was inclined to repose in the generosity of the English, added to the per sonal consideration which was known to subsist between General Castanos and the officers commanding that fortress.

In consequence of this communication, of which I had an opportunity that very day of sending the details to His Majesty's government, I concluded my letter to Lord Castlereagh in the following terms : "I must now observe to your " lordship, that, though the sanguine hopes, at " present entertained from the firm, (or rather as " they themselves describe it,) from the fero " cious character of the Spanish nation, when " roused into action by wrongs or insult, pre " vents any immediate contemplation of reverse " or disaster, I think I can perceive that, in such " an extremity, this would be the point to which " the new King of Spain would direct his retreat. In affording an asylum to an illustrious " fugitive from French oppression, I feel con " fident I should be fulfilling the wish of the " King; but, beyond this point, I should pro " ceed with diffidence and caution, if not first " honoured with His Majesty's commands."

From the circumstances thus described, I felt the fullest confidence that no time would be lost by His Majesty's ministers in furnishing me with at least provisional instructions ; but, though this important despatch of the 8th of April was received by Lord Castlereagh in the course of that month, his lordship's answer to it was not dated until the 25th of May ; and, in the margin of this answer, was acknowledged ten despatches from me, on the affairs of Spain, from the 24th of March up to the 8th of May, inclusive.* Whatever measures General Castanos and the friends of the Spanish monarchy might have had in contemplation at this crisis, to assert the independence of their country, were frustrated by the unexpected and most unfortunate journey of Ferdinand VII. to Bayonne, of which, I am quite sure, those faithful Spaniards had no previous intimation.

The first accounts General Castanos received from one of the ministers, * A letter to Colonel Gordon, conveyed by the same vessel that took my letter of the 8th of April, was answered the j27th of that month. 1808, who accompanied the King to Bayonne, appeared to him to be, in a certain degree, favourable. They announced that, upon the 20th of April, an interview had taken place in a country house upon the frontiers, between Bonaparte and Fer dinand, in which it had been agreed upon — that Ferdinand should be acknowledged King of Spain and the Indies, and that he should have the administration of Portugal until a general peace ; but that Spain should accede to the con federation of the Rhine, furnishing a contingent of 50,000 men, and should give the French a free port in South America. It is difficult to imagine what motive could have induced any individual about the person, and in the confidence, of the King of Spain to concur in the propagation of these falsehoods : it is, however, certain that, under such authority, the treaty I have mentioned was received at Algebras.

Those delusions were not, however, of long continuance ; the bloody transactions at Madrid, of the 2d of May; and, finally, the deposition of Ferdinand VII. and the other atro cious measures which attended that proceeding, roused into action that determined resistance to Bonaparte's power, which ultimately contributed so materially to its annihilation. After the important communication from Ge neral Castanos, which I have mentioned, our intercourse was carried on through the medium of a native merchant of Gibraltar, named Viali* This person was intimately acquainted with Ge neral Castanos, and much in his confidence, and was employed by him to introduce the accredited agent already alluded to. The communications from Algebras to this gentleman were frequently by letter, under feigned names and figurative ex pressions ; but on more important occasions, by meetings, in the Spanish lines, between Mr. Viali and the Secretary of General Castanos, or some other confidential person employed by that general.

My general instructions to Viali were, in the first place, upon every proper occasion, strongly to dwell upon the (indeed, self-evident) proposition, that, under the present circumstances, which were not, and could not have been, fore seen by His Majesty's government, I had no au thority to treat, and could therefore stipulate little or nothing, except with reference to the pleasure of the King, my master, consequently that any agree- * Mr. Viali acquitted himself of the service for which he had been selected by General Castanos with zeal and fidelity ; but when the Juntas were established, and my intercourse with the Spanish authorities was direct and official, I had no further communication with Mr. Viali on political subjects ; indeed he never was further in my confidence than was necessary for the communication with General Castafios. ment I might enter into (beyond what it was in my power immediately to fulfil) must be of such a nature as, in my judgement, to merit His Ma jesty's approbation.

When the events at Bayonne were known, I desired Viali to urge, that this last stride on the part of France towards universal monarchy, rendered it peculiarly necessary for England to obtain military means and commercial advantages, to enable her to sustain the contest in which she was engaged, for the common cause of all independent nations. That it was not easy, nor, perhaps, immediately necessary, to suggest particular arrangements, as those must depend on circumstances as they arose. Loose suggestions might, however, be thrown out of those measures, which might possibly soon be advisable, as being likely to have a material influence on the future conduct of the war. Of those measures, the first and the most important was, by some con joint operation, to get possession of the French fleet in Cadiz.