The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864 ... With maps

Chapter I Page

Introductory 1 Results of the Atlanta Campaign — Hood's Movement on Sherman's Communications — Jefferson Davis's Relations to it — Beauregard's — Hood's March across Alabama — Delay at Tuscumbia — Sherman's Decision to March to the Sea — Thomas left iu Tennessee — Schofield joins him — Strength of contending F'orces — Problem of Concentration — Schofield at l'ulaski — Mood's Advance — Schofield's Retreat to Franklin— Offer of Battle — Coufederate Disaster — Tactical Problems — Comparisons — Erroneous Accounts — Official Records of the AVar — Schofield as Commander.

Chapter II

From Columbia to Franklin 21 The Line of Duck River — Thomas urgent that Hood should be held back — Positions of the Armies — Hood begins the Flank Movement — Telegraphic Correspondence — How not to do it — Division of Confederate Forces — Schofield's Cavalry lose Communication with him — Combat at Spring Hill — Midnight March to F^ranklin.

Chapter III

Taking Position at Franklin 37 Arrival at Franklin — No Bridge or Pontoons — Hood to be held back — Schofield's Oral Directions — His Correspondence with Thomas — Delay in Arrival of Reinforcements at Nashville — Can you hold Hood back three Days 1 — Orders to continue Retreat — The Position at Franklin — The Carter House — The Town and the River — The Field in Front — The Defensive Line — Repairing Bridges — Twenty-third Corps Positions — Reilly's Division — Ruger's Division — The Works on Carter Hill — Retrenchment across Turnpike — Kimball's Division. Contents VI

Chapter IV Page

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division 64 Guarding the Trains — Collecting the Stragglers — Halt on Winstead Hill — Conditional Orders— Skirmishing with Forrest — Hood's Infantry press close — Will he turn the Position or attack? — AVagner withdraws Lane's Brigade to Privet Knob — Conrad's farther in Rear — Opdycke's within our Works — AVagner's Message to Stanley — His Colloquy with Opdycke — His Orders to Lane and Conrad to Fight — The Sergeants to fix Bayonets — Ruger's Preparations — Confederates forming for the Attack.

Chapter V

The Confederate Array 83 Hood at Spring Hill — Discovers Schofield's Escape — Cavalry in Pursuit — Infantry hastening after — He decides to Assault — His Cavalry Positions — The Infantry — Deployment and Formation — Stewart's Corps on Hood's Right — Cheatham's in Centre and Left — Part of Lee's in Reserve — Artillery in Intervals — Chalmers's Cavalry on extreme Left — Hood's Headquarters.

Chapter VI

The Assault on Wagner's Outpost 91 View from the Knoll on our Left — Skirmishing in Front — The Outpost trying to intrench — Confederate Advance — Colonel Capers's Description — Artillery opens on both Sides — Surgeon Hill's View from Fort Granger — Orders sent along our Line — To Opdycke in Reserve — Retreat of the Outpost — My Ride to the Centre — Momentary Break there — Reilly's Rally — Opdycke's Rush forward — Strickland's Rally — Meeting Stanley — The Din of Battle — Stanley wounded.

Chapter VII

The First Fight at the Centre 102 Hood's Advance retarded by the Outpost — His Right Wing farthest forward — My Staff at the Carter House — Wagner also there — Contents VII Messages from the Outpost — AVagner's Replies — Marshall's Guns come in — Disorganized Retreat of the Outpost — AVagner's Efforts to rally — Swept along to the Town — Cannou in the Enemy's Hands — But soon retaken — Fight over the Batteries — Reilly's Second Line charges — Fight at the Cotton-Gin — Destruction of Confederates — Heroism of their Officers — lieilly's Report — Opdycke's F'ormation for the Charge — Position of his Regiments — Of Strickland's — F'ocus of the Fight — Two Lines on Carter Hill — Turn of the Tide.

Chapter VIII Page

The Fight of Our Left Wing 121 Advance of Stewart's Corps — The narrowing Field — Thorny Hedges — Changes in the Array — AA'althall's Report — Loring's Division strikes Stiles — Fighting in the Railway Cut — Batteries at Close Rauge — Loring Repulsed — The Attack on Casement — General Adams's Death — Our Line successfully held.

Chapter IX

The Fight of Our Right Wing 130 Cheatham's Corps — Convergent Attack of Cleburne and Brown — Line of Lane's Retreat — Moore's Brigade Front unmasked — Our Artillery Cross-fire — Advance of Bate's Division — Battery at the Bostick' Place — Close Quarters at Moore's Centre — Help from Kimball - Chalmers's Cavalry attack Kimball — Infantry attack his Left — Cavalry his Centre and Right — Confederates Repulsed.

Chapter X

The Situation at Sunset 141 Determined Fighting at the Centre - Examination of Strickland s Line-Knemv holding outside of his Works -The Second Line — Relative Position of Opdycke and Strickland — Orders to the latter _ Visit to Ruger — AVagner reorganizing — Visit to extreme Left _ Reinforcements for the Centre. Contents

Chapter XI Page

From the Confederate Standpoint 148 Multiplication of Lines of Attack — How caused — Walthall's Description of the Assault — In the Abattis — Repulsed iu Confusion — The Ditch at the Cotton-gin — Brown's Attack on Right Centre — Bate overlaps him — Johnson's Attack after Dark — Hood's Description ■ — S. D. Lee's — Colonel Capers's — Capture of Gordon — His Account of the Charge — Cleburne falls.

Chapter XII

The Battle after Dark 160 In the Locust Grove — The Two Lines — The 1 12th Illinois — Reilly's Detachment — Sweeping the Ditches — Captain Cunningham's Story — The Sergeant Major's — General Strahl's Death— Hood's Reserves — Rallying on them — Later Alarms — Orders to AVood's Division — Preparations for AVithdrawal.

Chapter XIII

Wilson's Cavalry Engagement 172 Morning Positions — Covering both Flanks of the Army — Forrest's Advance — The Fords of the Harpeth — Confederates cross at Hughes's Ford — Wilson attacks — Sharp Combat — Enemy retreat across the River— Covering the March to Nashville.

Chapter XIV

Our Withdrawal -.gr, The Medical Department - Field Hospitals - Ambulance Train - Sick and Wounded sent to Nashville — Work of Surgical Corps during the Battle - Artillery gradually withdrawn - Arrangement of Skirmish Lines - Movement of the Infantry - Orders as to Kimball s and AVagner's March — Misunderstanding — March of Ru^er Opdycke and Reilly - A burning Building -The Field in Fr°ont — The March to Nashville. Contents IX

Chapter XV Page

Franklin after the Battle 194 Hood's Midnight Order — Condition of his Army — Discussion of Probabilities — Confederates move by the Flank — Experiences of the Carter Family — Colonel Carter's" Story — Defeusive Armor — Refuge in the Cellar — The terrible Night — Captain Carter's Fate — Private Gist's Adventures — General Cooper's Retreat.

Chapter XVI

Results and Lessons 207 Sources of Statistical Knowledge — Hood's F'orces before the Battle Schofield's — Numbers actually eugaged — Hood's Casualties — Loss of Officers — Schofield's Losses — Analysis of them — The Problem of Attack aud Defence — Fire Discipline.

Chapter XVII

Discussion of Wagner's Conduct 220 Natural Rise of Controversies — Corps F"eeliug — Good Comradeship — AVagner's Personal Situation — Disposition to befriend him — Criticisms by his Subordinates — Efforts to allay the Irritation — Correspondence — Preliminary Reports — Conrad's Report — Wagner retired from the Division — Leaves the Army.

Chapter XVIII

Double Breastworks on Carter Hili 233 The Two Lines at our Right Centre — Conflicting Memory of Eyewitnesses — Confederate Testimony — Solution of the Matter — Bullet Marks on Brick Smoke-house — Summary of the Evidence.

Chapter XIX

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades .... 243 Value of Detailed Reports — Landmarks — Lines of Retreat from the Outpost — Crowding toward the Centre — Significant Omissions — Lists of Missing — What they Teach — Reports Compared — Incidents relating to Captured Flags — Statements of various Officers — ■ Conclusions from the Facts. Contents X

Chapter XX Page

An Unexpected Controversy 258 Colonel Stone's Paper iu Century War Book — General Stanley's Criticism — A Violent Attack — Earlier Correspondence — Nine Points — Two Corrections — Basis of a Historical Narrative.

Chapter XXI

Controverted Points 266 Work assigned the Twenty-third Corps — Detachment of Fourth Corps Batteries — Orders to Ruger and Kimball — Detachments often Necessary — Articles of War and Regulations — Questions of Commaud — Stanley on North Side of River — His Ride to the front — Soon Wounded — He Retires — Statements of Officers — At the Field Hospital — At Schofield's Headquarters — Summary — Official Reports — Analysis of Stanley's — Contemporaneous Records — Conclusion. APPENDICES A. General Schofield's Report 305 B. General Cox's Report 311 C. General Wood's Report 323 D. General Stanley's Report 327 E. Colonel Dow's Statement 332 F. Colonel Cox's Statements 336 INDEX BOOKS OF FREQUENT REFERENCE Their Full Titles Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I. Referred to by the initials O. R., with the numbers of the original volumes in parts.

Battles aud Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. The Century Co. 1884-88. Referred to as Century War Book. Sketches of War History. Papers published by the Ohio Coramandery of the Loyal Legion. Referred to as Ohio L. L. Papers. History of the Army of the Cumberland. By Thomas B. Van Home, Chaplain U. S. A. 2 vols. 8vo, and Atlas. Cincinnati : Robert Clarke & Co. 1875. Referred to as Van Home's Army of the Cumberland. The Life of Major General George H. Thomas. By Thomas B. Van Horne, U. S. A. New York : Charles Seribner's Sons. 1882. Referred to as Aran Home's Life of Thomas. Narrative of Military Operations directed, during the late War between the States, by Joseph E. Johnston, General C. S. A. New York: Appleton & Co. 1874. Referred to as Johnston's Narrative. Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.

By Jefferson Davis. New York : Appleton & Co. 1881. Referred to as Davis's Rise and Fall, etc. Advance and Retreat : Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies. By J. B. Hood, Lieut. General Confederate Arm}'. New Orleans. 1880. Referred to as Hood's Advance and Retreat. Campaigns of the Civil AATar : Atlanta. By Jacob D. Cox, late Major General Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. New York: Charles Seribner's Sons. 1881. Referred to as Atlanta. Campaigns of the Civil War : The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville. By Jacob D. Cox, etc. New York : Charles Seribner's Sons. 1882. Referred to as Franklin and Nashville. Campaigns of the Civil AVar: Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States. By Frederick Phisterer, late Captain U. S. A. New York : Charles Seribner's Sons. 18S3.

Referred to as Phisterer's Statistical Record. LIST OF MAPS 1. Map of Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama. To face Chapter I. 2. Sketch Map of Carter Hill, from Survey by Colonel M. B. Carter. To face Page 43. 3. Map of the Battle-field of Franklin. By Major W. J. Twining, U. S. A., Chief Engineer Army of the Ohio. The original of this Map is in the Atlas accompanying the Official Records, Plate CXXXV., C, No. 5. To face Page 45. 4. Map of the Battle-field of Franklin. By Major W. F. Foster, Engineer of Stewart's Corps, Confederate Army. The original of this Map is in the Atlas accompanying the Official Records, Plate LXXIIL, No. 3. To face Page 83. MIDDLE TENNESSEE AND NOETHEKN ALABAMA.

Chapter I Introductory

Results of the Atlanta Campaign — Hood's Movement on Sherman's Communications — Jefferson Davis's Relations to it — Beauregard's — Hood's March across Alabama — Delay at Tuscumbia — Sherman's Decision to March to the Sea — Thomas left in Tennessee — Schofield joins him — Strength of contending Forces — Problem of Concentration — Schofield at Pulaski — Hood's Advance — Schofield's Retreat to Franklin — Offer of Battle — Confederate Disaster — Tactical Problems — Comparisons — Erroneous Accounts — Official Records of the AVar — Schofield as Commander. That the battle of Franklin Avas a hard fought and bloody combat is now generally known ; but this of itself would not warrant a monograph giving with some fulness of detail the progress and the incidents of the fight. There must be a limit to the minuteness of history even in the most important events, and in military history no less than in the narration of civil affairs.

When, however, a battle proves to be a turning point in a decisive campaign, — when it marks the " beginning of the end " in such a contest as our civil war, — when it justifies the strategy of such a leader as Sherman in his division of his forces in Georgia and making the March to the Sea, — when in addition to this the combat may be fairly said to be a crucial experiment in the problem of attack and de fence of fieldworks in an open country, — we can hardly place a limit to the desirability of detailed knowledge. Everything which helps to a complete understanding is then made welcome. Even those tilings which at first blush may seem trivial are not so if they aid us in comprehending how men live, and act, and think, and fight, and die, on such a stubbornly contested field. In all these respects the battle of Franklin was an important one; but besides these claims upon histori cal attention, it was for a long time greatly mis understood, and controversies of all sorts grew out of it and the campaign of which it was a part.

For thirty years the author has been frequently urged by his comrades to accept the task of writing the story of the battle, and when he had prepared a brief his tory of the campaign,1 the desire for a much fuller account of the battle itself did not appear to be satisfied. He made conditional promises that, if he should live to see the completion of the great work undertaken by the government in printing the " Offi cial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies," he would accept the duty. The last volumes of the principal series of those records are passing through the press, and the following pages are written in the effort to redeem his promise. Soon after the fall of Atlanta, Mr. Davis, the Con federate President, visited General Hood in his Georgia camp for a conference upon the further prosecution of the campaign.

Hood's energy was indomitable, and he still believed in aggressive strategy. In this he had the sympathy of Davis, who had constantly shown his dissatisfaction with Johnston's defensive policy, and who was ready to believe Hood's 1 The March to the Sea : Franklin and Nashville. Charles Serib ner's Sons, 1882. Introductory 3 over-sanguine assertions that his army had not suf fered in its morale by the bloody and unsuccessful engagements around Atlanta or by the loss of that important strategic point. Hood's proposal to turn Sherman's position by a somewhat wide detour to the west of Atlanta, and to carry the war again into Northern Georgia, or even into Tennessee, met with Mr. Davis's complete approval, and in a speech to the troops he was so far carried away by the desire to stimulate their confidence and their courage that he imprudently announced the general plan of campaign.

The speech got into the neAvspapers, and came to Sherman's ears. It need hardly be said that, with his characteristic alertness of mind and quickness of decision, he set himself the task of defeating his enemies' expectation. He would not give them the appearance even of success, and at the last moment, before breaking his communications with the North, and starting on his March to the Sea, he used Davis's defiantly proclaimed purpose to overcome the last of Grant's doubts. "The whole burden of his song,'7 he wrote to the General in Chief, " consisted in the statement that Sherman's communications must be broken, and his army destroyed. Now it is a well settled principle that, if we can prevent his succeed ing in his threat, we defeat him, and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. " l Sherman gave Hood full credit "for his skilful and rapid lodgment made on the railroad,"2 but pointed out that he had preserved his own communications by his rapid chase of the enemy, and had taken from Hood the ad van - 1 Sherman to Grant, November 6, 1864, 0.

R., xxxix. part iii. p. 659. 2 Ibid. tage of the movement, by forcing him into the long march in retreat across northern Alabama into Mississippi. "To have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle," though much might be said in favor of it, "would be," he concluded, to " play into his hands by being draAvn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance."1 So he cut the knot, and gave orders for the concentra tion of his own column at Atlanta, and for the march through Georgia. The game, at this stage, was a magnificent one. Hood's plan proved a military character and mind of no ordinary powers, and he had carried it out with a celerity and vigor that were in complete keep ing with it. The probabilities were all in favor of his success.

The odds were a hundred to one that his march to Tuscumbia, in the northwest corner of Alabama, would be met by Sherman's transfer by railroad to meet him at Columbia or Pulaski, in southern Tennessee. Grant's dispatches show that he would have continued the pursuit, and this alone is a sufficient tribute to Hood's ability.2 Sherman met him Avith a still greater audacity than his own, and with a success followed by far reaching consequences, which precipitated the fate of the Confederacy. Under pressure from influential men in the Con federate Congress, Mr. Davis had assigned General Beauregard to the command of the two departments which had been under Generals Hood and Taylor, but with limitations which implied that he should 1 Sherman to Grant, November 6, 1864, O. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 659. 2 Id., p. 576.

Introductory 5 not assume active command of either army in the field unless an exigency made it necessary. Hood was disposed to make the most of his independence, and Beauregard limited himself generally to advice and suggestions, the larger plan being supposed to have been settled between Davis and Hood at the beginning of the new campaign.1 Beauregard's relations to the active army remained merely nominal, though he gradually became more pressing in his urgency that Hood should resume vigorous offensive activity. The latter found the railways near Tus cumbia badly out of order, and thought it necessary to accumulate tAventy days' supplies before crossing the Tennessee River.2 General Wheeler, the cavalry commander, Avho had been left near Georgia, had sent him accurate information of the movements of Sherman's different corps, and of the statements of prisoners that Sherman Avas expecting to march to Savannah ; but he preferred to interpret the news in accordance with his wishes, and on the 4th of No vember reported to Richmond that Sherman seemed to be concentrating his army at Huntsville and Decatur in Alabama.3 When he finally became con vinced that Sherman in person, with a veteran army, was marching toward the Atlantic coast, he was torn by conflicting motives as to his own course, and it required the peremptory orders of Beauregard to put an end to his delay.

But it Avas now the last week in NoA-ember; nearly a month had been given Sherman and Thomas to complete the arrangements 1 See dispatches between Davis and Beauregard, 0. R., xxxix. part iii. pp. 782, 785, 870, 874, 879. 2 Hood to Taylor, Id., p. 868 ; to Seddon, Secretary of AVar, p. 870; to Railway Officials and Quartermaster, p. 871 ; to Beauregard, p. 888. 8 Wheeler to Hood, O. R., xxxix. part iii. pp. 859, 878. Hood to War Department, Id, p. 888. for a double campaign, and Sherman's start was too long a one, both in time and in distance, to give the Confederates any hope of overtaking him. To force the fighting Avith Thomas Avas the only course left, and this was Avhat Beauregard ordered. J The contrast betAveen the boldness and vigor of Hood's October campaign and his delay after reach ing Tuscumbia points to a consciousness on his part that he had been outgeneralled, though he kept up a show of satisfaction at Sherman's division of his army, folloAved by the wide separation of its parts.

He even wrote to Davis, that, should Sherman " move tAvo or three corps south from Atlanta," he thought it would be "the best thing that could happen for the general good" of the Confederacy.2 But Davis reminded him that this implied that prompt advan tage should be taken of the dispersion to beat his adA^ersary in detail.3 The troops left under General Thomas were necessarily scattered, and for Hood to give him time to concentrate was to imperil the campaign. His true policy Avas, plainly, to risk everything on the quickest and strongest advance against Thomas, living upon the country, or trusting to suc cess to give him possession of some of the national depots of supply. He was at Tuscumbia on the 30th of October, and next day reported that he was in possession of Florence (on the north bank of the Tennessee), and Avas laying a pontoon bridge.4 He did not begin his advance nortliAvard till the 21st of November.5 Knowing, as we do, the energy of his 1 Beauregard to Hood, November 17, O. R., xlv. part i. p. 1215.

Hood reported that he had only seven of the twenty days' needed sup plies on hand. Ibid. 2 O. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 891. « Id , p. 896. 4 Id., p. 870. 6 o. R., xlv. part i. p. 1236. Introductory 7 character, it is incredible that he should have waited so long unless he were hoping that something would happen to make it feasible to follow Sherman, by showing that the latter was moving upon Selma or Mobile instead of Savannah. In arranging his plans for the March to the Sea, Sherman had from the first determined to put Thomas in general command of all that was left behind, and which lay east of the Mississippi River. For himself, he did not mean to make a subordinate operation with a detachment, but to move an army which would be fit to make the campaign of the Carolinas after he should reach Savannah, and which could cope even with Lee's army if it should break away from Richmond.

Definite plans beyond Savannah were postponed till he should be successful in reaching the coast, but the contingency of a march northward was prominent in his mind from the beginning. As he must move from Atlanta without lines of supply or communication, he must strip his army of every unnecessary weight or encumbrance, and must look for no help or reinforcement on the Avay. His column must necessarily diminish by the attrition of the campaign, and would be strongest at the start. Thomas's, on the other hand, Avould be Aveakest at the start, but would be rapidly increased by new troops which were moving to the front, by return of the convalescents of the whole army, and by detachments from the departments west of the Mississippi. The principal of these last was a portion of the Sixteenth Corps, supposed to be ten thousand strong, under General A. J. Smith, who was already under orders to proceed from Missouri to Tennessee.1 1 O. R., xxxix. part iii. pp. 477, 494, 595.

Sherman had at first planned to send back the Fourth Corps, and to take the Twenty-third Corps with him, leaving General Schosield to support General Thomas Avith the troops of the Department of the Ohio which Avere in Kentucky and East Tennessee. But when Schosield returned from ab sence at the North, and rejoined the army at Gayles ville, Alabama, on October 22d, he was very unwilling to part with the corps. It was, besides, much re duced by the casualties of the year's campaigns, and greatly needed to be recruited. When, then, we got news that Hood had appeared at Decatur, and, being repulsed there, had marched to Tuscumbia, Schofield suggested that, if the corps were sent into Tennessee, it could be recruited, a division of new troops could be added to it, and he himself could take acti\re field service under Thomas.

Before that time it had seemed probable that Hood would folloAv Sherman southward with at least the greater part of his army ; but his committal to a movement in force into middle Tennessee made it apparent that Thomas might need reinforcement before troops from distant positions could come to him. Thomas was fearful that troops from Missouri could not reach him soon enough, but said that if he had Schofield he should feel perfectly safe. On the 28th of October, therefore, Sherman announced his intention of sending the Twenty-third Corps, as well as the Fourth, to General Thomas, and to take Avith him the remainder of his army, thus reduced to about fifty thousand men. It turned out that the hurry of ab sentees to rejoin their commands increased his num bers somewhat, before communications were broken.1 1 O. R., xxxix. part iii.

Sherman to Halleck, October 27, p. 461 ; Schofield to Sherman, p. 468 ; Sherman to Halleck, October 28, p. 476 ; Introductory 9 The effective force under General Thomas, in middle and southern Tennessee, was sixty-five thou sand fiA-e hundred, officers and men "present for duty equipped," Avhich was the official phrase indi cating complete readiness for active service. The aggregate present Avas some twenty thousand more.1 These figures do not include the troops in Schofield's Department of the Ohio in East Tennessee and Kentucky, nor those of the Military Division between the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers, all of which Avere subject to Thomas's orders. Hood's army in the field numbered forty-two or forty -three thousand men of all arms, and had been very closely estimated by General Sherman.2 Thomas's problem, therefore, was chiefly one of concentration in time to meet Hood's advance, and the delay of the latter, whether necessary or not, was more than could have been hoped for.

As early as October 29th, Sherman, in promising to send Schofield back, had urged Thomas to "break up all minor posts, and get about Columbia as big an army as you can, and go at him. " 3 Again, two days later, he reiterated, "You must unite all your men into one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat Hood."4 In pursuance of this policy, Thomas ordered Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps to join Stanley and the Fourth Corps at Pulaski, on the railroad between Sherman to Beckwith, p. 477 ; Thomas to Halleck, p. 582 ; Sherman to Thomas, pp 484, 497, 499, 514. i Tri-mouthly Official Return of General Thomas for November 20, 1864, which was the first after the severance from Sherman. The effectives were increased by 9,700 in the next ten days. O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 52, 53, 54.

As to Hood's forces, see chap, xxi., post. 2 Sherman to Grant, 0. R , xxxix. part iii. p. 576; to Thomas, Id., p. 599. < Id., p. 535. » Id., p. 498. Columbia and Decatur, though it was necessary to send one brigade temporarily to Johnsonville, on the Tennessee River Avest of Nashville, to meet a raid that Forrest Avas making in West Tennessee by way of diversion in favor of Hood. General Schofield reached Pulaski on November 13th,1 and assumed command of the two corps of infantry, and of the cavalry corps under General James H. Wilson, as the latter gradually assembled, aud the army in the field consisted of these organiza tions until the general concentration at Nashville on December 1st, after the battle of Franklin. Each of these corps Avas reinforced by some new troops, and some small detachments of older ones, but their general organization remained.

A question of rank between General Schosield and General Stanley Avas before the War Department, but General Thomas had not heard of its decision in favor of Schofield Avhen he assigned him to command in the field. He in formed General Halleck of what he had done, and gave his reasons for hoping that his action would be sustained, as Avas in fact done.2 Sherman advised that the two veteran corps should be filled up to twenty-five thousand each, and that Thomas should take the field in person when the enemy should ad vance. Thomas replied that such was his purpose.3 Both the corps, however, had only the force intended for one, in the period of the campaign we are now considering, and at Pulaski only one division of the Twenty-third Corps Avas present. 1 0. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 768 ; Id., xlv. part i. pp. 885, 886 2 Thomas to Halleck, O. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 666 ; to Schofield p. 691.

See also Thomas's order, Id., p. 638; Grant to Halleck Id' p. 684 ; Halleck to Sherman, Id., p. 64. ' '' B Id., p. 685. Introductory 11 Hood moved his infantry forward from his bridge at Florence on the 21st and 22d of November,1 marching upon Columbia by way of Lawrenceburg and Mount Pleasant, turning Schofield's position at Pulaski upon the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. Schofield withdrew his little army in echelon, by way of Lynnville and Hurricane, keeping just ahead of Hood in the convergent movements upon Columbia, and reaching the latter place on the 24th, barely in time to prevent Hood from anticipating him. Our army remained there till the 27th, when the enemy's operations to turn the position by the other flank (our left) forced our retirement to the north bank of Duck River. There, the more detailed account of events preceding the battle of Franklin will begin.2 At Franklin, on the 30th of November, Hood was pressing so close upon our columns that it became necessary to choose between abandoning our wagon trains and resisting him on the south side of the Harpeth River.