An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth ... The third edition

Front matter

AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND IMMUTABILITY OF TRUTH, IN opposition to SOPHISTRY AND SCEPTICISM. Bv JAMES BEATTIE, LL. D. PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC IN THE MAR1SCHAL COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN. Ndnqnam aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dicit. Juvenal. THE SEVENTH EDITION, CORRECTED; TO WHICH IS NOW PREFIXED, A SKETCH OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE WORK. LONDON: PRINTED FOE J. MAWMAN, 22, POULTRY. 1807. (J. G. Barnard, Printer, Snow-Hill.) CONTENTS. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability op Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Pag. Preface to this Edition. Introduction, --.-__ 1

Part I

Of the Standard of Truth, -' - - 21 Chap. I. Of the Perception of Truth in general, 22 Chap. II. All Reasoning terminates in first Principles. All Evidence ultimately intuitive. Common Sense the Standard of Truth to Man, --------40 Sect. 1. Of Mathematical Reasoning, 42 Sect. 2. Of the Evidence of External Sense, 48 Sect. 3. Of the Evidence of Internal Sense, or Consciousness, - . - - -55 Sect. 4. Of' the Evidence of Memory, 74 Sect. 5. Of Reasoning from the Effect to the Cause, 83 Sect. 6. Of Probable or Experimental Reasoning, 101 Sect. 7. Of Analogical Reuso?iing, - - - 107 Sect. 8. Of Faith in Testimony, - - - - 110 Sect. 9. Conclusion of this Chapter. Further Proof. General Remarks on Scepticism, - - 1 1 8 a 2 Sect. CONTENTS. IV Pag.

Part II

Illustrations of the preceding Doctrine, with Inferences, ----- 132 Chap. I. Confirmation of this Doctrine, from the Practice, Sect. 1. Of Mathematicians, - - - - 135 Sect. 2. Of Natural Philosophers, - - - 145 Sect. 3. The Subject continued. Intuitive Truths distinguishable into Classes, - 177 Chap. II. This Doctrine rejected by Sceptical Philosophers, - 189 Sect. 1. General Observations. Rise and Progress of modern Scepticism. Of Des Cartes and Malebranche. Locke and Berkeley. • General View of Mr. Hume's Theory of the Understanding, - - - 190 Sect. 2. Of the Non-existence of Matter, - - 229 Sect. 3. Of Liberty and Necessity, - 259 Chap. III. Recapitulation and Inference, - 325

Part III

Objections Answered, , 331 Chap. I. The Principles of this Essay consistent with the Interests of Science, and the Rights of Mankind. Imperfection of the School-logic, - - , _ 33<j Chap. II. The Subject continued. Estimate of Metaphysic, - 359 Chap. III. Consequences of Metaphysical Scepticism, - - 409 Postscript, - ----- SKETCH OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE ESSAY ON TRUTH. A here are few subjects of more importance, or which tend to gratify a more useful curiosity, than a history of the studies of eminent literary characters. We seldom, indeed, peruse a book without desiring to know some thing of its author; and the stamp of popularity is, per haps, never affixed to any work without exciting a wish to know by what hints it was originally suggested, by what studies it was perfected, and from what motives, primary or ultimate, it was given to the world in the form in which we find it.

The Essay on Truth enjoyed so much celebrity on its first appearance, and still continues to add so much weight to the name of Dr. Beattie, that on gratifying the public demand for a new edition, it seems requisite to give some account of its origin and progress; which we are now enabled to accomplish from the copious stores of information. contained in Sir William Forbes's Life of the Author, lately published. What concerns the work before us, we have therefore thrown into narrative, and trust that it will be considered as no unimportant distinction to the present edition. a 3 As ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS VI As early as the year 1766, Dr. Bealtie's thoughts ap pear to have been directed to the subject of this volume. He then belonged to a society, to which the public is indebted for Dr. Gregory's " Comparative View," and Dr. Reid's " Enquiry into Human Nature, on the Prin ciples of Common Sense."

At one of the meetings of this society, an accidental question furnished Dr. Beattie with a hint, which he made the subject of an elaborate discourse. He had long been wishing for an opportunity of publishing something relating to the business of his own profession (moral philosophy), and he conceived he had now found that opportunity. In the discourse which he drew up, his doctrine was this: that as we know nothing of the eternal relation of things, that to us is and must be truth, which we feel that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood, which we feel that we must disbelieve. He shews that all genuine reasoning ultimately terminates in certain principles, which it is impossible to disbelieve, and as impossible to prove ; that therefore the ultimate standard of truth to us is com mon sense, or that instinctive conviction into which all true reasoning resolves itself: that,, therefore, what con tradicts common sense is in itself absurd, however subtle the arguments which support it: for such is the ambiguity and insufficiency of language, that it is easy to ar gue on either side of any question with acuteness suffi cient to confound one who is not expert in the art of reasoning Dr. Beattie's principles are here not essentially dif ferent from Dr. Reid's, but they seem to offer a more compendious method of destroying scepticism.

His far ther intentian was to shew that all sceptical reasoning is marked with certain characters which distinguish it from true investigation, and he hoped to be able to discover a method OF THE ESSAY ON TRUTH. VII method of detecting sophistry, even when one is not able to give a logical confutation of its arguments. It was part of his plan, likewise, to enquire into the nature of that modification of intellect which qualifies a man for being a sceptic ; and, he adds, " I think I am able to prove that it is not genius, but the want of it." Such was the original outline of this Essay communicated by our author to Sir William Forbes in the year above-mentioned. The approbation of that excellent friend is implied in the following remarks which Dr. Beattie sent to him, and which give an intimation of our author's motives in writing, and afterwards publishing the Essay.

" Your neglect of the modern philosophical sceptics, who have too much engaged the attention of these times, does equal honour lo your understanding and to your heart. To suppose that every thing may be made matter of dispute, is an exceeding false principle, subversive of all true science, and prejudicial to the happiness of mankind. To confute without convincing is a common case, and indeed a very easy matter: in all conviction (at least in all moral and religious conviction) the heart is engaged as well as the understanding : and the understanding may be satisfied, or at least confounded, with a doctrine from which the heart recoils with the strongest aversion. This is not the language of a logician ; but this, I hope, is the language of an honest man, who considers all science as frivolous, which does not make men wiser and better ; and to puzzle with words, without producing conviction (which is all that our metaphysical sceptics have been able to do), can never promote either the wisdom or the virtue of mankind.

It is strange that men should so often forget, that f happiness is our being's end and aim.' Happiness is desirable for its own sake : truth is desirable only «s a mean of producing happiness: for who would not a 4 prefer ■v'iii ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS prefer an agreeable delusion to a melancholy truth ? What, then, is the use of the philosophy which aims lo inculcate truth at the expence of happiness, by intro ducing doubt and disbelief in the place of confidence and hope ? Surely the promoters of all such philosophy are either the enemies of mankind, or the dupes of their own most egregious folly. I mean not to make any con cessions in favour of metaphysical truth: genuine truth and genuine happiness were never inconsistent; but me taphysical truth (such as we find in our sceptical systems) is not genuine, for it is perpetually changing ; and no wonder, since it depends not on the common sense of mankind (which is always the same), but varies according as the talents and inclinations of different aulhors are different.

The doctrines of metaphysical scepti cism are either true or false : if false, we have little to do with them ; if true, they prove the fallacy of the hu man faculties, and therefore prove too much; for it follows as an undeniable consequence, that all human doctrines whatsoever (themselves not excepted) are fal lacious, and consequently pernicious, insignificant, and Vain." Such was the zeal for genuine truth, in opposition to sophistry, which appears to have animated our author, while he was revolving the subject of the Essay in his mind, and extending its plan. About March 1767 he finished it, all but a proper title. He called it " An Essay on Reason and Common Sense," but afterwards altered that. In the mean time, he submitted the ma nuscript to hi* learned friends, who expressed their wishes to see it in print.

They were of opinion that h* bad set the sceptics in a new point of view, by treatino them without any kind of reserve or deference : and that il might be of use to those who may be in danger from their OF THE ESSAY ON TRUTH. their doctrines, to consider them in the same light. The author, however, was far from being convinced that it would be proper to publish such a treatise: as the principles were unfashionable, and there was a keenness of expression in some passages which could please only those who are thoroughly convinced of the truth and im portance of religion. If it be asked, why then was it written ? he affords a satisfactory answer : " I do not re pent my having written it: it has rivetted my conviction of the insignificance of metaphysics and scepticism ; and I hope it will be of some use to the young people under my care, for whose principles (at least as far as they de pend upon me) I hold myself accountable to my own conscience and the public."

In the following year, I768, we find him developing his plan and his motives with somewhat more decision, in a letter to his chief correspondent, Sir William Forbes. " I have, for a time, laid aside my favourite studies, that I might have leisure to prosecute a philosophical enquiry, less amusing indeed than poetry and criticism, but not less important. The extraordinary success of the sceptical philosophy has long filled me with regret. I wish I could undeceive mankind in regard to this matter: perhaps this wish is vain; but it can do no harm to make the trial.' The point I am now labouring to prove, is the universality and immutability of moral sentiment, a point which has been brought into dispute both by the friends and by the enemies of virtue. In an age less li centious in its principles, it would not, perhaps, be ne cessary to insist much on this point.

At present it is very necessary. Philosophers have ascribed all religion to human policy. Nobody knows how soon they may ascribe all morality to the same origin ; and then the foundatioqs of human society, as well as of human happiness, ON THE OltTGIN AND PROGRESS X piness, will be effectually undermined. To accomplish this end, Hobbes, Hume, Mandeville, and even Locke, have laboured ; and I am sorry to say, from my knowledge of mankind, that their labour has not been altogether in vain. Not that the works of these philosophers are generally read, or even understood by the few who read them. It is not the mode, now-a-days, for a man to think for himself; but they greedily adopt the conclusions, without any concern about the arguments or principles whence they proceed : and they justify their own Credulity by general declamations upon the transcendent merit of their favourite authors, and the universal deference that is paid to their genius and learning.

If I can prove those authors guilty of gross misrepresentations of matters of fact, unacquainted with the human heart, ignorant even of their own principles, and dupes of verbal ambiguities, and the votaries of frivolous, though dan gerous philosophy, I shall do some little service to the cause of truth : and all this I will undertake to prove in many instances of high importance." In the beginning of the year 1769, his Essay was not yet so complete as he could wish. On a second tran scription of it, he purposed to enlarge some parts and shorten others; to increase the examples from history, and the authorities from ancient authors, to correct the language throughout, and to divide the whole into chapters and sections. In a letter to Dr. Blacklock, he ex plains his motives, and what led him originally into these enquiries, which terminated in this work.

From this, after what we have already given, it seems necessary to extract the following passage only : — <' One gentleman a friend of your's (Hume), I shall have occasion to treat with much freedom. I have heard of his virtues. I know he has many virtues : God forbid I should ever seek OF THE ESSAY ON TRUTH. XI seek to lessen them, or wish them to be found insincere; I hope they are sincere, and that they will increase in number and merit every day. To his virtues I shall do justice; but I must also do justice to his faults, at least to those faults which are public, and which, for the sake of truth and of mankind, ought not to be concealed or disguised." He still, however, appears to hesitate as to publishing, and at this time had fixed on no other title than " An Essay on the Immutability of Moral Senti ment."

At length having overcome all his scruples, and the manuscript being completed, he became desirous of selling it to a bookseller for publication, not with any view, as he had often declared, of obtaining a great price, but in order that he might avoid all risk to himself, and that the publisher might feel his own interest connected with the sale of the book, which otherwise,he feared, would never make its way into the world. He therefore com mitted the care of this business to his friends Mr. Ar buthnotand Sir William Forbes, with ample authority to dispose of the manuscript as they should judge proper. It appears by the account of his biographer, that there was much more difficulty in this affair than will readily be believed in our times, when the liberality of the book seller is so generally and justly acknowledged. — On these gentlemen's applying to the bookseller whom they thought most likely to publish it to advantage, they were mortified by his positive refusal to purchase the manuscript, although he readily offered to publish it on Dr. Beattie's account, a mode to which they knew Dr. Beattie never would agree.

In this dilemma it occurred to Sir William Forbes that his coadjutor might, without much artifice, bring the business to an easy conclusion by their own I ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS XII own interposition. They therefore resolved to become themselves the purchasers, at a sum with which they knew Dr. Beattie would be well satisSed as the price of the first edition. Sir William accordingly wrote to him what was certainly the truth, but not the whole truth, that the manuscript was sold for fifty guineas, and added, that they had stipulated with the bookseller who was to print the book, that they should be partners in the publi cation. " On such trivial causes," Sir William remarks, " dothings of considerablemomentoften depend. For had it not been for this interference, in a manner somewhat ambiguous, perhaps the Essay on Truth, on which all Dr. Beattie's future fortunes hinged, might never have seen the light.

It also," he adds, " strongly marks the slender opinion entertained by the booksellers at that period, of the value of a work which has risen into such well-merited celebrity." It does not appear, however, by Sir William's account, that more than one bookseller had been consulted. It may yet appear more surprising, that Dr. Beattie declared that '■' this price really exceeded his warmest expectations," and was much afraid that it exceeded the real commercial value of the book; a book, the publica tion of which had been advised by the most eminent literary characters of their day, and on which he had be stowed the almost unremitting labour of four years, during which he had written it three times over, and some parts of it oftener. Among the last revisers of it were his friends Dis. Campbell and Gerard, who were perfectly conversant in the subject, and predicted the success of the Essay.

All preliminaries being settled in the month of May 1770, the work appeared under the title of " An Essay on. OF THE ESSAY ON TRUTH. XIII on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism." As the manuscript had been seen by several eminent men of learning, and as it was known to be written as a direct attack on the philosophical principles of Mr. Hume, its publication had been looked for with considerable expectation. The boldness, too, of a writer so little known in the world, as Beattie was at this time (for he had only published a few juvenile poems) in attacking an author so formidable as Mr. Hume, contributed not a little to excite the public curiosity. The sale of the first edition was consequently very ra pid, and early in the year 1771 a second edition was published.

In this he made several corrections and im provements, and subjoined a postscript, the rough draught of which he submitted to some of his literary friends, and candidly, and even thankfully, adopted such altera tions as they suggested. They were of opinion that the warmth of his zeal in the cause of truth, and his desire to vindicate himself from some attacks which had been made upon him, as he conceived most unjustly, had led him to express himself, in some instances, with a degree of acri mony, which they thought had better be corrected. It is unnecessary to inform those who are acquainted with Dr. Beattie's history, that this Essay proved the foundation of his fame and fortune. In England it be came popular beyond all expectation, and perhaps be yond all precedent. In that country, too, it procured him not only the friendship of the most eminent charac ters of the day either for talents or rank, but also the special favour of his majesty, who was pleased to bestow a pension on him, and admitted him to more than one private conference.

The university of Oxford, and some foreign ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS foreign universities, at the same time honoured him with degrees; and he had the happiness to see his Essay pass through several editions, with great rapidity, and lo be translated into Dutch, French, and German. On its first appearance in London, it received the highest praises from the Monthly and Critical Reviews, the only literary journals then in existence. What is ad vanced by the former seems worthy of being transcribed in this place, as the writers of the Monthly Review, at that time, were supposed to be somewhat deficient in or thodoxy of sentiment. " Whoever," says the reviewer, " is acquainted with the genius and spirit of scepticism, and has reflected on its obvious and manifest tendency to throw darkness and perplexity into the understanding, and coldness and insensibility into the heart, to spread a gloom over the whole intellectual and moral world, to divest the mind of man of every principle, to subvert the most solid foundations of his happiness, and, in a word, to render him an useless and a wretched being, will be highly pleased with this ingenious author's well meant and laudable attempt to expose it in its genuine colours, and to vindicate the cause of truth and virtue.

Such of our readers, too, as have been long wandering in metaphysical mazes, been fond of the refinements and subleties of modern sceptics, and, as the fruit of their cold, intricate, and often uninteresting investigations, have reaped little more than darkness and uncertainty in regard to the first principles of action and science, will receive no small comfort and satisfaction from an attentive perusal of Mr. Beattie's Essay: through the whole of which he appears not only in the character of a good citizen, earnestly de sirous of promoting the best interests of mankind, but in that OF THE ESSAY ON TRUTH. XV that of a judicious philosopher and agreeahle writer. His style is clear and easy, his manner of writing lively aud entertaining, and the many illustrations interspersed, through his Essay, are extremely pertinent and ingenious.

In a word, we cannot help considering his performance as an excellent antidote against scepticism and infidelity, and accordingly we recommend it to our readers." After many very long extracts, the same reviewer concludes ; his account in the following words : " Our author's man-. ner of treating the modern sceptics, especially Mr. Hume, gives great offence, we are told, to many readers. In what light the generality of readers consider this mat ter we know not: as for us, though we have the sincerest respect for Mr. Hume's distinguished abilities, yet we cannot think that he is treated with any greater degree of freedom or severity than he deserves ; nay, farther, we think it impossible for any writer, endowed with sensibility of heart, the love of mankind, and a regard for the interests of virtue and religion, to express himself with less warmth that Mr. Beattie has done."

In the year 1776, a new edition of the Essay was pub lished in quarto, accompanied with other essays on lite rary subjects. Of this publication, by subscription, an ample account is given in his life. It is only necessary to add, in this place, that it underwent the author's final corrections and amendments, and continued afterwards to be the standard for the octavo editions. We cannot close this article, without giving the opi nion of Professor Dugald Stewart on the Essay on Truth, as we find il in an extract from one of his letters to Sir William Forbes. " In a work professedly polemical," says this eminent philosopher, " it was impossible for the author to aim at unity or at elegance of design ; but what ON THE ORIGIN, &C. what was really practicable, he appears to me to liave executed with an uncommon degree of skill and judgment; arranging his materials in a distinct and luminous order, and leading the attention agreeably from one part of his argument to another, by those happy transitions, which form one of the chief secrets in the art of compo sition ; above all, enlivening and adorning his important subject (so unattractive in itself to the generality of readers) by a power of varied and happy illustration, pe culiarly characteristic of his own genius." Poultry, March 1807.

Preface

.

PREFACE.

. I his Edition will, it is hoped, be found less faulty than any of the former. Several inaccuracies are now removed, unnecessary words and sentences expunged, a few erroneous passages either cancelled or rectified, and some new-modelled in the style, which before seemed too harshly or too strongly expressed. In regard to the reasonings and general principles of this Essay, I have not as yet seen cause to alter my opinion; though I have carefully attended to what has been urged against them by several ingenious authors. Some objections will perhaps be found obviated by occasional remarks and amendments interspersed in this Edition. I once intended to have offered a more complete vindication, and had actually prepared materials for it: but, finding them swell to a considerable bulk, and recollecting, that disputes of this nature, when once begun, are not soon terminated, and are apt to become less useful as they grow more voluminous, I was easily prevailed with to lay aside that design, at least till Providence should be pleased to grant me better health. Even then, the prosecution of this controversy may not perhaps be thought requisite. To the b wise

PREFACE.

. XVIII wise a word is said to be enough. If the principles of this Book be good, they need no further support; if erroneous or bad, they deserve none. All I shall add at present on this head, is<, that after a long examination of these matters, it appears, not to me only, but to many other persons of far superior under standing, that my principles are founded on right reason, and on that way of thinking and judging, which has in ever-' age been most familiar to the human mind. To ad vance paradoxes, or to be an innovator in philosophy, was never my design. 1 hate paradoxes ; I am no friend to innovation. If I cannot reconcile myself to some modern theories of the understanding, it is for this reason, among others, because I look upon them as paradoxical, and inconsistent with those dictates of Rationality, which seem to me to be as old and as extensive as human nature.

It is possible I may have thrown a little light on some points relating to Moral Science; but to discover in the human mind any thing which was never discovered before, would require a degree of sagacity which I am certain I do not possess. A complete theory of evidence is not to be expected in this bock. The attentive reader will see I never intended one. That is a very copious and difficult subject; and I have not prosecuted it further than my ar gument seemed to require. It is with great pleasure I take this opportunity to declare, that

PREFACE.

. XIX that the best Theory of Evidence I have ever seen, is delivered by my excellent friend Dr. Campbell, in that most ingenious and learned performance, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. His principles and mine, though they differ somewhat in the arrangement (in which I am inclined to think that his have the advantage), will not be found to differ in any thing material. I have been blamed for borrowing some hints, without acknowledgment, from Dr. Price, Dr. Oswald, and Buffi er. I beg leave to say, that I am to this hour totally unacquainted with that work of Dr. Price which is alluded to; and that, when I published the first Edition of the Essay on Truth, I was totally unacquainted Avith the writings of Buffier and Dr. Oswald. 1 had heard indeed, that the French philosopher used the term Common Sense in a way similar to that in which I use it; but this was only hearsay; and I have since found, that though between his fundamental opinions and mine there is a striking resemblance, his application of that term is not entirely the same.

I should not have mentioned this, if I did not think, that it supplies an argument in favour of our common principles. I had finished all these papers for the press, when a friend at London sent me an Advertisement, which had just then appeared pre fixed to a new edition of Mr. Hume's Es says; and which, in justice to that author, b 2 I shall

PREFACE.

. XX I shall here insert, subjoining a few remarks injustice to myself. " Most of the principles and reasonings " contained in this volume were published " in a work in three volumes, intitled, A " Treatise of Human Nature: a work which " the author had projected before he left " college, and which he wrote and published " not long after. But not finding it suc " cessful, he was sensible of his error in go- " ing to the press too earl}', and he cast " the whole anew in the following pieces; " where some negligences in his former rea " soning, and more in the expression, are, " he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers, " who have honoured the author's philoso " phy with answers, have taken care to di " rect all their batteries against that juvenile " work, which the author never acknow " ledged; and have affected to triumph in " any advantages which, they imagined, " they had obtained over it: a practice very " contrary to all rules of candour and fair " dealing, and a strong instance of those po " lemical artifices, which a bigotted zeal " thinks itself authorised to employ.

Hence " forth the author desires, that the following " pieces may alone be regarded as contain " ing his philosophical sentiments and prin " ciples." Thus far Mr. Hume. I do not think it was with an evil purpose, that any of those who attacked this auhor's philosophy directed their batteries against

PREFACE.

. XXI against the Treatise of Human Nature. In regard to myself, the case was briefly this: Ever since 1 began to attend to matters of this kind, 1 had heard Mr. Hume's philosophy mentioned as a system very unfriendly to religion both revealed and natural, as well as to science ; and its author spoken of as a teacher of sceptical and atheistical doctrines, and withal as a most acute and ingenious writer. I had reason to believe, that his arguments, and his influence as a great literary character, had clone harm, by subverting or weakening the good principles of some, and countenancing the licentious opinions of others. Being honoured with the care of a part of the British youth, and considering it as my indispensable duty (from which I trust I shall never deviate) to guard their minds against impiety and error, I endeavoured, among other studies that belonged to my office, to form a right estimate of Mr. Hume's philosophy, so as not only to understand his peculiar tenets, but also to perceive their connection and consequences.