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XXVI. PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION

These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both 1

Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece ib.

Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment 4

All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name Eros is confined to one special case of this large variety 5

Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus 6

Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all 7

Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades 8

Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon 9

Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it 9

Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge 10

Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros 11

Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety ib.

Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas 12

Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties of man--Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable--Reminiscence 13

Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas 14

Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory 15

Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter 17

Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion ib.

Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion 18

Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere ib.

Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths 19

Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every sort of trial 20

Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process 21

Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and complement of the other 22

Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon ib.

Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion 24

Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic 25

Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise 26

Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill 27

Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? 28

Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth ib.

Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define 29

Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates ib.

View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic--The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless 30

What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art 31

Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case 32

The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour 33

Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows ib.

Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary 34

The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer 37

Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher 38

Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue ib.

Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic ib.

His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed 39

The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn ib.

The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to truth 40

He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case 41

Plato's Idéal of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the public ib.

The other part of the Platonic Idéal is grand but unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified modes of discourse 42

Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man 44

The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners 45

Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule 46

Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out 47

Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle 47

No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus 48

Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant 49

Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know--or as an elegant pastime 50

Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised 51

No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy ib.

Plato's idéal philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here 52

Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus 53

Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind--Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions 54

XXVII. PARMENIDES

Character of dialogues immediately preceding--much transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides 56

Sokrates is the juvenile defendant--Parmenides the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant ib.

Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides 57

Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him 58

Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them 60

Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas 60

What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No ib.

Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher 61

Remarks upon this--Contrast between emotional and scientific classification ib.

Objections of Parmenides--How can objects participate in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof 62

Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented by a higher Idea--and so on ad infinitum 63

Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? Impossible 64

The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them by being likened to them. Impossible 65

If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas ib.

Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess 66

Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us ib.

Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion 67

Dilemma put by Parmenides--Acuteness of his objections 68

The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues ib.

Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês 69

Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his own 70

Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search ib.

The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural 71

Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas ib.

Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura 72

Answer of Sokrates--That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped 73

Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day--Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it 76

Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded 78

Continuation of the Dialogue--Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise 79

What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each ib.

Impossible to do this before a numerous audience--Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen--After much solicitation he agrees 80

Parmenides elects his own theory of the Unum, as the topic for exhibition--Aristoteles becomes respondent ib.

Exhibition of Parmenides--Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from Unum Est--next from Unum non Est 81

The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation ib.

Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally 82

No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising 85

This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared 87

The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or [Greek: a)pori/ai] 88

Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant 89

The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies 91

These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers ib.

In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result 93

Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c. 94

In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings 95

First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. Reductio ad Absurdum, of the assumption--Unum non Multa 96

Second Demonstration 97

It ends in demonstrating Both, of that which the first Demonstration had demonstrated Neither 98

Startling paradox--Open offence against logical canon--No logical canon had then been laid down 99

Demonstration third--Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II. 100

Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous--Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of time ib.

Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both 101

The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory--The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour 102

Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII. 103

Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides 104

Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered--Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning--The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words 105

Demonstrations VIII. and IX.--Analysis of Demonstration VIII. 106

Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian 107

Demonstration IX. Neither following Both ib.

Concluding words of the Parmenides--Declaration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different propositions 108

Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not ib.

XXVIII. THEÆTETUS

Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 110

Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates 111

Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental obstetric--He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds 112

Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge 113

Answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the Homo Mensura laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except Parmenides ib.

Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition 114

The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive--the interpretation of Plato himself 115

Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--Homo Mensura 116

Perpetual implication of Subject with Object--Relate and Correlate 118

Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient capacities ib.

Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world 121

The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense 122

Object always relative to Subject--Either without the other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes 126

Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean 126

Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him ib.

Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a comparing subject 127

Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to another object, besides the one directly described ib.

Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras 128

Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens 129

Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered 130

Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object 131

Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality--Subjective and Objective 133

Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure 135

In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required 136

Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind 137

All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language 139

Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection 141

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself--The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind 142

Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent from it 143

Plato's argument that the wise man alone is a measure--Reply to it ib.

Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future 145

The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible ib.

Plato's argument is untenable--That if the Protagorean formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled--The reverse is true--Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind 146

Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes infallible authority--sets aside dialectic 148

Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the measure for all. Counter proposition to the formula ib.

Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state explicitly the counter-proposition 150

Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions 150

Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth 152

Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Percipients 153

Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense--weighing, measuring, &c. 154

Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference 155

Argument--That sensible Perception does not include memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory 157

Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time ib.

Sokrates maintains that we do not see with our eyes, but that the mind sees through the eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ 159

Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself--It perceives Existence, Difference, &c. 160

Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add computations of the mind respecting them 161

Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of modern philosophers 162

Different views given by Plato in other dialogues 163

Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition 164

Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible 168

Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition consists in right or true opinion ib.

Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities? ib.

Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions 169

Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know 170

He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about ib.

Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus--That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this 171

He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge 172

New answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation 173

Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained ib.

Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also 174

Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings will the definition of Cognition hold ib.

Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion 175

Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by Sokrates--Value of the result, although purely negative 176

Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal ib.

Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds, value of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own suggestions 177

Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors 178

The Philosopher is master of his own debates 179

Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search ib.

Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue 180

Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life 182

Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion 183

XXIX. SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS

Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues 185

Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus 187

Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to that purpose 188

Method of logical Definition and Division ib.

Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division 189

Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed 190

Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art 191

The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision 192

Also, by a third 193

The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art 194

In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification 195

The purifier--a species under the genus discriminator--separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge 197

Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier ib.

The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing--who palms off falsehood for truth 198

Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? 199

He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions ib.

The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens 200

The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens ib.

Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens 201

Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them 201

Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof 202

1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia ib.

Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference--But Justice is not a body 203

At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality 204

Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses ib.

Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable 205

Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a tertium quid--distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both? 206

Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens ib.

Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other ib.

No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis 207

Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible ib.

Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables ib.

Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens 208

He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different ib.

Form of Diversum pervades all the others 209

Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens 210

By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens ib.

The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is 211

The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject 212

Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment 213

Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb--it must be proposition of Something. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject ib.

Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens 214

It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it ib.

Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others 215

Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself--the Sophist 215

Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist 216

These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself ib.

The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person 217

The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense 218

Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c. 219

Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible 220

Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical 221

Misconception of the function of the copula in predication ib.

No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle 222

Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c. 223

Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes ib.

Plato's argument against the Materialists 224

Reply open to the Materialists ib.

Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him 225

Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity 226

Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both ib.

The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative 227

Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus ib.

The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable 228

Plato's reasoning against the Materialists ib.

Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of Conception besides 229

Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato ib.

Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the Idealists 231

Plato's views about Non-Ens examined ib.

His review of the select Five Forms 233

Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens ib.

Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable 235

Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the predicate ib.

Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to it 236

Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction 239

Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How do we know that one is true, the other false? ib.

Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense 240

Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day 241

Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues 242

The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c. 246

The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian 247

Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false 249

Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there are false propositions ib.

What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion 251

Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded 252

Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês 253

Recommendation of logical bipartition 254

Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus ib.

Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense 255

Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus 256

Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus 257

Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês 258

Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato 259

XXX. POLITIKUS

The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês 260

Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard ib.

Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is--To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable 261

Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is 262

Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c. ib.

Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing 263

King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the people--not so any longer 264

Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also 266

Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded--Scientific or Unscientific 267

Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government 268

Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it 269

Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best ib.

Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a government 270

The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries 271

What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them 272

If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy 272

Remarks--Sokratic Ideal--Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person 273

Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action ib.

The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras 274

Points of the Protagorean theory--rests upon common sentiment 275

Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras 276

The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished ib.

Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs 277

Theory of the Politikus--distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst 278

Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference 279

Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration--in the latter to the formation and modification of names 281

Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and Charmidês 282

Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search--To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions 284

XXXI. KRATYLUS

Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus--Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others 285

Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes--all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws--speaking and naming among the rest 286

The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher 287

Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another 289

Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable--essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum ib.

Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly 290

Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns--the Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura 291

Objection by Sokrates--That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance 292

Objection unfounded--What the Protagorean theory really affirms--Belief always relative to the believer's mind ib.

Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras 293

Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates--does not sustain his inference against Protagoras 294

Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections 295

Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men--Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages 295

Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind 297

Facts of sense--some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity 298

Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions 299

These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists 302

Dissent from this theory--No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies 304

Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature 306

Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as admissible** guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means 308

Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato 310

Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled 312

Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each 313

Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance ib.

Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory 314

But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent--the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge 315

Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard to follow 315

Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis 316

Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original thesis without any qualification ib.

Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it 317

There are names better and worse--more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way 318

All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it 319

It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names 320

Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars ib.

Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names 321

Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists ib.

Theory laid down by Sokrates à priori, in the first part--Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with facts 322

Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue--he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine 324

Ideal of the best system of naming--the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them 325

Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction--contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth 327

Politikus compared with Kratylus 328

Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness of all reality 329

Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions 331

Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject 332

No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues--each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument ib.

XXXII. PHILEBUS

Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus 334

Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure 335

Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence ib.

Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires ib.

Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise 336

Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice 337

First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence--He declines to accept it 338

Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--No ib.

It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure 339

Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity--how it is distributed among species and individuals ib.

Active disputes upon this question at the time 340

Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many ib.

Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions 341

Illustration from Speech and Music 342

Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing 343

It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification 344

At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process ib.

Classification--unconscious and conscious 345

Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas ib.

Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency 346

Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth 347

In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents ib.

Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated 348

Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system--Pleasure from the restoration of it ib.

Pleasure presupposes Pain 349

Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain ib.

A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best ib.

Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein 350

Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so 351

Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him ib.

Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question 352

No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures ib.

Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure 353

Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain 354

Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly ib.

Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are connected with distempered body and mind 355

The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health 356

Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge ib.

Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion 357

Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good ib.

Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good 358

Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation ib.

Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan 359

Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity 360

Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth ib.

Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained 361

Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed? ib.

We must include all Cognitions--not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both 362

But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures ib.

What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure 363

Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures 364

Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy 365

Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine ib.

Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics 366

Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing 367

Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification 368

Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet feebly applied--in this dialogue 369

What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison 370

Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently ib.

Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests 371

Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The alternative which he tenders has no fair application 372

Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared--Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End 373

The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency 374

Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis 375

Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and avoidance of pain 377

The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They included both in their acknowledged End ib.

Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view 378

Different points of view worked out by Plato in different dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus--True and False Pleasures 379

Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and Rhetoric 380

Peculiarity of the Philêbus--Plato applies the same principle of classification--true and false--to Cognitions and Pleasures 382

Distinction of true and false--not applicable to pleasures ib.

Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute--Pleasures which he admits to be true--and why 385

Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon his own admission, against his opponents--the Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures altogether 387

Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters 389

Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the Philêbus 391

Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and applied in the Protagoras ib.

How explained in Philêbus--no statement to what items it is applied 393

Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it to Cognitions 394

Valuable principles of this classification--difference with other dialogues 395

Close of the Philêbus--Graduated elements of Good 397

Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally 398

XXXIII. MENEXENUS

Persons and situation of the dialogue 401

Funeral harangue at Athens--Choice of a public orator--Sokrates declares the task of the public orator to be easy--Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue 401

Sokrates professes to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia, and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreats him to do so 402

Harangue recited by Sokrates 403

Compliments of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished, both to the harangue itself and to Aspasia ib.

Supposed period--shortly after the peace of Antalkidas ib.

Custom of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such harangues existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or logographers--Established type of the harangue 404

Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type--Topics on which he insists 405

Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives 407

Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards 407

Probable motives of Plato in composing it, shortly after he established himself at Athens as a teacher--His competition with Lysias--Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician ib.

Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in the Gorgias--Necessity for an orator to conform to established sentiments 409

Colloquial portion of the Menexenus is probably intended as ridicule and sneer at Rhetoric--The harangue itself is serious, and intended as an evidence of Plato's ability 410

Anachronism of the Menexenus--Plato careless on this point 411

XXXIV. KLEITOPHON

Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon 413

Conversation of Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to observations of an unfavourable character recently made by Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain ib.

Explanation given. Kleitophon expresses gratitude and admiration for the benefit which he has derived from long companionship with Sokrates 414

The observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and analogies commonly used by Sokrates ib.

But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants information how he is to act 415

Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both to the companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself 416

Replies made by the friends of Sokrates unsatisfactory ib.

None of them could explain what the special work of justice or virtue was 417

Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates knows, but will not tell 417

Kleitophon is on the point of leaving Sokrates and going to Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly 418

Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias, the other fragment 419

Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory of Plato 420

It could not have been published until after Plato's death ib.

Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology 421

The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and Xenophontic dialogues 422

Forcible, yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil 423

The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato 424

The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the existing first book was substituted ib.

XXVI. PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION

[Side-note: These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both.]

I put together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to, another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.

[Side-note: Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece.]

The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense, and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different sex--it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic point of view,[1] upon which Plato builds, the attachment of man to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic, social, sentiment; yet as belonging to a common-place rather than to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving: that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her husband:[2] that her sphere of duty and exertion was confined to the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those too of the best families and education, were seen habitually uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public festival-matches; engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form, in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful emotional sympathy, blended with aesthetic sentiment, which in the more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language affords--and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically denounce and forbid.[3] In their view, it was an idealising passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palæstra.[4]

[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen and anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle composed [Greek: The/seis E)rôtikai\] or [Greek: E)rôtika/s], Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.

Compare the dialogue called [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], among the works of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers, especially Protogenes, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction of Eros--[Greek: a)lêthinou= de\ E)/rôtos ou)d' o(tiou=n tê=| gunaikôni/tidi me/testin], &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)

In the Treatise De Educatione Puerorum (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction proper to be imposed on youth: he is much impressed with the authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Kebês, [Greek: kai\ to\n pa/nta cho/ron e)kei/nôn tô=n a)ndrô=n, oi( tou\s a)/r)r(enas e)doki/masan e)/rôtas], &c. See the anecdote about Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon, in Xenophon, Anabasis, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable passage about Zeno the Stoic, Diog. Laert. vii. 13. Respecting the general subject of [Greek: paiderasti/a] in Greece, there is a valuable Excursus in Bekker's Charikles, vol. i. pp. 347-377, Excurs. ii. I agree generally with his belief about the practice in Greece, see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 33, 70. Bekker quotes abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the Xenophontic Symposion, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the other--[Greek: E)kei/nois me\n ga\r tau=ta no/mima, ê(mi=n de\ e)ponei/dista.] We must interpret passages of the classical authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.

If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neæra (which is full of information about Athenian manners), we find the speaker Apollodôrus distributing the relations of men with women in the following manner (p. 1386)--[Greek: to\ ga\r sunoikei=n tou=t' e)sti/n, o(\s a)\n paidopoiê=tai kai\ ei)sa/gê| ei)/s te tou\s dêmo/tas kai\ tou\s phra/toras tou\s ui(ei=s, kai\ ta\s thugate/ras e)kdidô=| ô(s au)tou= ou)/sas toi=s a)ndra/si. Ta\s me\n ga\r e(tai/ras, ê(donê=s e(/neka e)/chomen--ta\s de\ pallaka/s, tê=s kath' ê(me/ran therapei/as tou= sô/matos--ta\s de\ gunai=kas, tou= paidopoiei=sthai gnêsi/ôs, kai\ tô=n e(/ndon phu/laka pi/stên e)/chein.]

To the same purpose, the speaker in Lysias ([Greek: U(pe\r tou= E)ratosthe/nous pho/nou]--sect. 7), describing his wife, says--[Greek: e)n me\n ou)=n tô=| prô/tô| chro/nô| pasô=n ê)=n belti/stê; kai\ ga\r oi)kono/mos deinê\ kai\ pheidôlo\s a)gathê\ kai\ a)kribô=s pa/nta dioikou=sa.]

Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the Platonic vein of sentiment and ideality: neither of them led to any grand results either in war--or political ambition--or philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other of which the Grecian ideality travelled. We know from the Republic that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who, in his Oeconomicus, enlarges much (in the discourse of Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to prudential results and good management of the household; while he illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the story of Pantheia and Abradates (Cyropædia).]

[Footnote 2: See the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii. 5.]

[Footnote 3: The beginning of the Platonic Charmidês illustrates what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and Lysis, pp. 205-206.

Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus (companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).

If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenæus remarks farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses (23-5) on the [Greek: e)rôtikê\] of Sokrates, makes the same remark as Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposion; he farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they assailed him upon so many other points), but had incurred great censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he replies--[Greek: tou\s nuni\ katêgo/rous] (23, 6-7). The comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very curious.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the [Greek: e)gkô/mia] on Eros in the Symposion, as "unworthy of serious handling or of Sokrates". (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)

But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is Herakleitus--author of the Allegoriæ Homericæ. Herakleitus repels, as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of Homer--which he admits to be full of immorality if literally understood--had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the character of his own writings--[Greek: e)r)r(i/phthô de\ kai\ Pla/tôn o( ko/lax, O(mê/rou sukopha/ntês--Tou\s de\ Pla/tônos dialo/gous, a)/nô kai\ ka/tô paidikoi\ kathubri/zousin e)/rôtes, ou)damou= de ou)chi tê=s a)r)r(e/nos e)pithumi/as mesto/s e)stin o( a)nê/r] (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden, 1851).]

[Footnote 4: Plato, Sympos. 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by Thucydides, vi. 54-57. These two citizens were gratefully recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.]

[Side-note: Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment.]

Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory--this passion presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the work of philosophy--an impulse at first impetuous and undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty (this is[5] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant representative of itself among concrete objects--the Ideas of Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the only way of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character, of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would presently be farther enlarged. The like sentiment would be inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which pervades and gives common character to all these particulars--Beauty in the abstract--or the Self-Beautiful--the Idea or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of "the great ocean of the beautiful," was the most glorious privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and happiness.[6]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Sympos. pp. 210-211.

Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias Major, p. 757. "Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, pulchrum hoc Plato vocat: formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia, ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.

"Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum ordine infinité decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis discursibus ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam."]

[Side-note: All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name Eros is confined to one special case of this large variety.]

Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or aspires to happiness: this is the fundamental or primordial law of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness:[7] accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of them--and nothing else.[8] But different men have different ways of pursuing this same object. One man aspires to good or happiness by way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by gymnastics--or music--or philosophy. Still no one of these is said to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is reserved exclusively for one special variety of it--the impulse towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality by generating a new individual to replace himself.[9] In fact even mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together, either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going--so likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions, cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.[10] As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual generation of new individuals.

[Footnote 7: Plato, Sympos. pp. 204-205. [Greek: Phe/re, o( e)rô=n tô=n a)gathô=n, ti/ e)ra=|? Gene/sthai, ê)=n d' e)gô/, au)tô=|. Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/nô| ô(=| a)\n ge/nêtai ta)gatha/? Tou=t' eu)porô/teron, ê)=n d' e)gô/, e)/chô a)pokri/nasthai, o(/ti eu)dai/môn e)/stai. Ktê/sei ga/r, e)/phê, a)gathô=n, oi( eu)dai/mones eu)dai/mones; Kai\ ou)ke/ti prosdei= e)re/sthai, i(/na ti/ de\ bou/letai eu)dai/môn ei)=nai o( boulo/menos, a)lla\ te/los dokei= e)/chein ê( a)po/krisis. . . . Tau/tên dê\ tê\n bou/lêsin kai\ to\n e)/rôta tou=ton, po/tera koino\n ei)=nai pa/ntôn a)nthrô/pôn, kai\ pa/ntas ta)gatha\ bou/lesthai au)toi=s ei)=nai a)ei/, ê)\ pô=s le/geis? Ou(/tôs, ê)=n d' e)gô/, koino\n ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. [Greek: ô(s ou)de/n ge a)/llo e)sti\n ou)= e)rô=sin a)/nthrôpoi ê)\ tou= a)gathou=.]]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Sympos. p. 207 C.]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]

[Side-note: Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus.]

The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body. Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty--or rather, of procreation in the beautiful--whereby satisfaction is obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.[11] With some, this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards women, and inducing them to immortalise themselves by begetting children: with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind, and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products. In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and youthful beauty: but when, along with this beauty of person, there is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous, intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is overwhelming; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring intelligences--poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like Lykurgus and Solon--the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings respecting virtue and goodness--new excellences of disposition--and new force of intellectual combination, in both the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each is respectively conscious in himself.[12]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. [Greek: o(/then dê\ tô=| kuou=nti/ te kai\ ê)/dê spargô=nti pollê\ ê( pto/êsis ge/gone peri\ to\ kalo\n dia\ to\ mega/lês ô)di=nos a)polu/ein to\n e)/chonta. E)sti\ ga\r ou) tou= kalou= o( e)/rôs, a)lla\--tê=s gennê/seôs kai\ tou= to/kou e)n tô=| kalô=|.]]

[Footnote 12: Plato, Sympos. p. 209.]

[Side-note: Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in genere. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.]

Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to the contemplation of beauty in genere, not merely in bodies and minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the highest pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent: but which, when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he will have no eyes for the individual manifestations of it in gold, fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.[13] Herein we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to youth.[14]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, p. 211.]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, p. 211 B. [Greek: o(/tan dê/ tis a)po\ tô=nde dia\ to\ o)rthô=s paiderastei=n e)paniô\n e)kei=no to\ kalo\n a)/rchêtai kathora=|n, schedo\n a)/n ti a(/ptoito tou= te/lous], &c.]

[Side-note: Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades.]

It is thus that Plato, in the Symposion, presents Love, or erotic impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some individual person--but gradually becoming both more intense and more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty. The main purpose of the Symposion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros or Love--which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named Diotima[15]--with different views assigned to other speakers. Each of the guests at the Banquet--Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates--engages to deliver a panegyric on Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates towards Alkibiades himself--his inflexible self-command under the extreme of trial and temptation--the unbounded ascendancy which he had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates--are emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.

[Footnote 15: Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s Dioti/mas, ê( tau=ta/ te sophê\ ê)=n kai\ a)/lla polla/, kai\ A)thênai/ois pote\ thusame/nois pro\ tou= loimou= de/ka e)/tê a)nabolê\n e)poi/êse tê=s no/sou, ê)\ dê\ kai\ e)me\ ta\ e)rôtika\ e)di/daxen.]

Instead of [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s], which was the old reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write [Greek: gunaiko\s Mantinikê=s], also 211 D. I cannot but think that [Greek: mantikê=s] is right. There is no pertinence or fit meaning in [Greek: Mantinikê=s], whereas the word [Greek: mantikê=s] is in full keeping with what is said about the special religious privileges and revelations of Diotima--that she procured for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had obtained from the [Greek: Moi=rai] a postponement of the ruin of the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from them no more (Herodot. i. 91).]

[Side-note: Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.]

Both Phædrus[16] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent, sensual--and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity--Eros Pandêmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[17] or Coelestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon--the first is medical, physiological, cosmical[18]--the second is comic and imaginative, even to exuberance--the third is poetical or dithyrambic: immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess Diotima.

[Footnote 16: Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii. 694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus, is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced phrases ([Greek: i)so/kôla, a)nti/theta]), which Aristophanes parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the Thesmophoriazusæ, Athenæus, v. 187 C.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181.]

[Footnote 18: Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a cosmical, all-pervading, procreative impulse, compare Euripides, Frag. Incert. 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (Griech. Trag. p. 737) to the lost drama--the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.]

[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it.]

Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as interpreting agents of communication between the two.[19] Eros is the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Porus).[20] He represents the state of aspiration and striving, with ability and energy, after goodness and beauty, but never actually possessing them: a middle condition, preferable to that of the person who neither knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession. Eros is always Love of something--in relation to something yet unattained, but desired: Eros is to be distinguished carefully from the object desired.[21] He is the parallel of the philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant, because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom, but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance towards a goal never attained.[22]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203.]

[Footnote 20: What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphroditê (Phædrus, pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Symposion, pp. 199-200. [Greek: O( E)/rôs e)/rôs e)sti\n ou)deno\s ê(\ tino/s? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n e)/stin. . . . Po/teron o( E)/rôs e)kei/nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rôs, e)pithumei= au)tou= ê)\ ou)/? Pa/nu ge. . . . A)na/gkê to\ e)pithumou=n e)pithumei=n ou)= e)ndee/s e)stin, ê)\ mê\ e)pithumei=n, e)a\n mê\ e)ndee\s ê)=|.]]

[Footnote 22: Plato, Sympos. p. 204 A. [Greek: Ti/nes ou)=n oi( philosophou=ntes, ei) mê/te oi( sophoi\ mê/te oi( a)mathei=s? . . . Oi( metaxu\ tou/tôn a)mphote/rôn, ô(=n au)= kai\ o( E)/rôs. E)sti\ ga\r dê\ tô=n kalli/stôn ê( sophi/a, E)/rôs d' e)sti\n e)/rôs peri\ to\ kalo/n; ô(/ste a)nagkai=on E)/rôta philo/sophon ei)=nai, philo/sophon de\ o)/nta metaxu\ ei)=nai sophou= kai\ a)mathou=s.]]

[Side-note: Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge.]

It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought out, materially different from that of the preceding speakers--Love, as a state of conscious want, and of aspiration or endeavour to satisfy that want, by striving after good or happiness--Philosophy as the like intermediate state, in regard to wisdom. And Plato follows out this coalescence of love and philosophy in the manner which has been briefly sketched above: a vehement impulse towards mental communion with some favoured youth, in the view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both persons concerned: the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is absolute--independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable elements--moreover the object of the one and supreme science.[23]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Symposion, pp. 210-211.]

[Side-note: Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros.]

I will now compare the Symposion with the Phædrus. In the first half of the Phædrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with philosophy and dialectic--but they are presented in a different manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two competing discourses (one cited from Lysias,[24] the other pronounced by Sokrates himself as competitor with Lysias in eloquence) supposed to be addressed to a youth, and intended to convince him that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend are more worthy of being listened to than the exaggerated promises and protestations of an impassioned lover, from whom he will receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend, unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of permanent esteem and gratitude.[25] By a sudden revulsion of feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or palinode upon that God.[26]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 seq.]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Phædrus, p. 237 seq.]

[Footnote 26: Eros, in the Phædrus, is pronounced to be a God, son of Aphroditê (p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a Dæmon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on Aphroditê, according to Diotima and Sokrates (p. 203).]

[Side-note: Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety.]

Eros (he says) is, mad, irrational, superseding reason and prudence in the individual mind.[27] This is true: yet still Eros exercises a beneficent and improving influence. Not all madness is bad. Some varieties of it are bad, but others are good. Some arise from human malady, others from the inspirations of the Gods: both of them supersede human reason and the orthodoxy of established custom[28]--but the former substitute what is worse, the latter what is better. The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration. And it is so imparted in four different phases and by four different Gods: Apollo infuses the prophetic madness--Dionysus, the ritual or religious--The Muses, the poetical--and Eros, the erotic.[29] This last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by mankind generally.[30] The inspired and exalted lover deserves every preference over the unimpassioned friend.

[Footnote 27: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. [Greek: to\ a)/phron tê=s dianoi/as e(/n ti koinê=| ei)=dos. . . . to\ tê=s paranoi/as ô(s e(\n e)n ê(mi=n pephuko\s ei)=dos.] Compare p. 236 A.]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: Mani/as de/ ge ei)/dê du/o; tê\n me/n, u(po\ nosêma/tôn a)nthrôpi/nôn, tê\n de/, u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn gignome/nên.] Compare 249 D.]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Phædrus, p. 244 A. [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r ê)=n a(plou=n to\ mani/an kako\n ei)=nai, kalô=s a)\n e)le/geto; nu=n de\ ta\ me/gista tô=n a)gathô=n ê(mi=n gi/gnetai dia\ mani/as, thei/a| me/ntoi do/sei didome/nês.]

Compare Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 B. [Greek: mêde/ tis ê(ma=s lo/gos thorubei/tô deditto/menos ô(s pro\ tou= kekinême/nou to\n sô/phrona dei= proairei=sthai phi/lon.]

P. 256 E; [Greek: ê( de\ a)po\ tou= mê\ e)rô=ntos oi)keio/tês, sôphrosu/nê| thnêtê=| kekrame/nê, thnêta/ te kai\ pheidôla\ oi)konomou=sa, a)neleutheri/an u(po\ plê/thous e)panoume/nên ô(s a)retê\n tê=| phi/lê|** psuchê=| e)ntekou=sa], &c.]

[Side-note: Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas.]

Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul. All soul or mind is essentially self-moving, and the cause of motion to other things. It is therefore immortal, without beginning or end: the universal or cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods and men.[31] Each soul may be compared to a chariot with a winged pair of horses. In the divine soul, both the horses are excellent, with perfect wings: in the human soul, one only of them is good, the other is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.[32] The Gods, by means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of the celestial firmament--to place themselves upon the outer circumference or back of the heaven--and thus to be carried round along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth. In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute--Justice, Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defective wings, try to accompany the Gods; some attaching themselves to one God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the horses: some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and incomplete.

[Footnote 31: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De Platonis Phædro, pp. 49-50 (Göttingen, 1848).

Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a [Greek: muthiko/s tis u(/mnos] (Phædr. p. 265 D).]

[Footnote 32: The reader will recollect Homer, Iliad, xvi. 152, where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasus is harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and Balius.]

[Side-note: Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties of man--Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable--Reminiscence.]

Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some inferior animal. It is essential that some glimpse of truth should have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition of man:[33] for the mind of man must possess within itself the capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.[34] This is brought about by the process of reminiscence; whereby it recalls those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal existence in companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus reviving these general Conceptions--the visions of a prior state of existence--belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other animals: but in most men the visions have been transient, and the power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be able to recall them with facility and success, during the subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests. Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind, whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.

[Footnote 33: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249-250. [Greek: pa=sa me\n a)nthrô/pou psuchê\ phu/sei tethe/atai ta\ o)/nta--ê)\ ou)k a)\n ê)=lthen ei)s to/de** to\ zô=on; a)namimnê/skesthai d' e)k tô=nde e)kei=na ou) r(a/|dion a(pa/sê|], &c.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 B. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê(/ ge mê/ pote i)dou=sa tê\n a)lê/theian ei)s to/de ê(/xei to\ schê=ma. Dei= ga\r a)/nthrôpon xunie/nai kat' ei)=dos lego/menon, e)k pollô=n i)o\n ai)sthê/seôn ei)s e(\n logismô=| xunairou/menon. Tou=to de/ e)stin a)na/mnêsis e)kei/nôn, a(/ pot' ei)=den ê(mô=n ê( psuchê\ sumporeuthei=sa theô=| kai\ u(peridou=sa a(\ nu=n ei)=nai/ phamen, kai\ a)naku/psasa ei)s to\ o)\n o)/ntôs.]]

[Side-note: Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.]

It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in distinguished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is first kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is only the embodiment of beauty, acting as it does powerfully upon the most intellectual of our senses, which has sufficient force to kindle up the first act or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ultimately to the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The embodiments of justice, wisdom, temperance, &c., in particular men, do not strike forcibly on the senses, nor approximate sufficiently to the original Idea, to effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unprepared mind. It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty. The shock thus received first develops the reminiscent faculty in minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and absorbing character; which may indeed take a sensual turn, by the misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case nothing but corruption and mischief--but which may also take a virtuous, sentimental, imaginative turn, and becomes in that case the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the generation of wisdom and virtue; as well as in the complete cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain such perfection, is given to few; but a greater or less approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine madness or erotic inspiration.[35]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 B. [Greek: ou(= mei=zon a)gatho\n ou)/te sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê ou)/te thei/a mani/a dunatê\ pori/sai a)nthrô/pô|.]--245 B: [Greek: e)p' eu)tuchi/a tê=| megi/stê| para\ theô=n ê( toiau/tê mani/a di/dotai.]

The long and highly poetical mythe, of which I have given some of the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 (pp. 244-257) of the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and requires the reader to keep before him the palæstræ of Athens, as described in the Lysis, Erastæ, and Charmidês of Plato--visited both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 29).]

Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phædrus, in its first half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the source and mainspring of exalted virtue--as the only avenue to philosophy--as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed. In the Phædrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety: that the temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line, some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than sobriety: that the philosophical oestrus, and the reminiscence of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and real Entia), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as sobriety: and is generated only by special inoculation from Eros or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phædrus, we still remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two individuals--an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active intelligence and exalted modes of conduct: in the Symposion, such intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with procreative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and comprehensive: dropping all restriction to any single individual, and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty in its largest sense.

[Side-note: Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory.]

The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated by Sokrates as a revelation made to him by the prophetess Diotima. It was much taken to heart by the Neo-Platonists.[36] It is a striking manifestation of the Platonic characteristics: transition from amorous impulse to religious and philosophical mysticism--implication of poetical fancy with the conception of the philosophising process--surrender of the mind to metaphor and analogy, which is real up to a certain point, but is forcibly stretched and exaggerated to serve the theorising purpose of the moment. Now we may observe, that the worship of youthful masculine beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serving as a provocative to instructive dialogue--together with a decided attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and depreciate the sensual--both these are common to Plato with Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty Absolute--[Greek: to\ Kalo\n--to\ au)to\-kalo\n]--the "full sea of the beautiful". Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates) could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably have failed and dropped him: as we read in the Phædrus respecting the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the Gods. Plato alone is the true Dædalus equal to this flight, borne up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar[37]--according to the comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.

[Footnote 36: Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23.

Plato's way of combining, in these two dialogues--so as to pass by an easy thread of association from one to the other--subjects which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand même nous serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantôt célèbre l'absorption de l'âme dans l'essence de Dieu, tantôt chante le vin et l'amour, sans grossièreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de symbolisme--et qui généralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manières de sentir, qui nous paraissent si différentes, sans s'apercevoir lui-même qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses poésies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui aurait fait mêler une certaine dose de piété mystique, à ses vers plus légers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait étranger à la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de l'énigme dans l'état général des esprits et de la culture de son temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous réprésenter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse à cette époque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerçait depuis des siècles sur toutes les classes cultivées de la nation."--Mohl (Rapport Annuel à la Société Asiatique, 1861, p. 89.)]

[Footnote 37: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth., p. 972, Reiske.]

Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Phædrus and Phædon.

[Side-note: Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter.]

First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,--are brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old acquaintance. But in the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons from smaller groups of particulars to larger; until at length one and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions, correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of in-dwelling conceptions.

[Side-note: Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion.]

Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be immortal, à parte post as well as à parte ante. But in the Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[38] The soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation--by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings--by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others.

[Footnote 38: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]

[Side-note: Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion.]

Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas--a world or aggregate of such Entia Rationis[39]--among which Beauty is one, but only one. It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the Symposion, the Form of Beauty ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) is presented singly and exclusively--as if the communion with this one Form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.

[Footnote 39: Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recognises Forms of [Greek: a)/dikon, kako/n, ai)schro/n], as well as Forms of [Greek: di/kaion, a)gatho/n, kalo/n], &c.]

[Side-note: Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere.]

Fourthly, The Phædrus and Symposion have, both of them in common, the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory, stimulus to philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth is considered necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which would otherwise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phædon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme for generating and developing the philosophic capacity: but Eros plays no part in it. In the Theætêtus, the young man so named is announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened, and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross-examination. Yet instead of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically signified.

I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the Phædrus along with it--to illustrate the varying points of view which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the numerous Platonic dialogues.

[Side-note: Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths.]

In the strange scene with which the Symposion is wound up, the main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. The spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, after having been depicted in general terms by Diotima, are specially exemplified in the personal history of Sokrates, as recounted and appreciated by Alkibiades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks in unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are as yet sober: he enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard, and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler; which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and executes, without being the least affected by it. Alkibiades instead of following the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros, undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in colloquy with them--yet as never losing his own self-command, even while acquiring a magical ascendency over these companions.[40] The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, resembling that of a Satyr, though concealing the image of a God within--the eccentric pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness, homely illustrations with impressive principles--has exercised an influence at once fascinating, subjugating, humiliating. The impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from others. He has become enthusiastically devoted to Sokrates, whom he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation, by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers, and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek language--if we look at them in conjunction with the real character of Alkibiades as an historical person.[41] Sokrates is found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to understand that the like offers had been made to Sokrates by many other handsome youths also--especially by Charmides and Euthydemus--all of them being treated with the same quiet and repellent indifference.[42] Sokrates had kept on the vantage-ground as regards all:--and was regarded by all with the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.

[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the historical Alkibiades and his characte, Thucyd. vi. 15; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud Athenæum, xii. 534.

The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who recounted how Phrynê and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7: and the saying of Lais, [Greek: ô(s ou)k a)p' a)ndro/s, a)ll' a)p' a)ndri/antos, a)nastai/ê.] Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the description given by Alkibiades--as the maximum of testimony to the "invicta continentia" of Sokrates--with the testimony to the surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan [Greek: dêmoge/rontes] and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156). One of the speakers in Athenæus censures severely this portion of the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence of Plotinus; who was much displeased, and directed Porphyry to compose a reply.]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Symp. p. 222 B.

In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11)--a conversation between the despot Hieron and the poet Simonides--the poet, exhorting Hieron to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit, expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one manifestation will be (he says) as follows:--[Greek: ô(/ste ou) mo/non philoi=o a)/n, a)lla\ kai\ e)rô=|o, u(p' a)nthrô/pôn; kai\ tou\s kalou\s ou) peira=|n, a)lla\ peirô/menon u(p' au)tô=n a)ne/chesthai a)/n se de/oi], &c.

These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in the Platonic Symposion.

Herakleides of Pontus, Dikæarchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus, all composed treatises [Greek: Peri\ E)rôtos], especially [Greek: peri\ paidikô=n e)rô/tôn] (Athenæ. xiii. 602-603).]

[Side-note: Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every sort of trial.]

Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of Sokrates: in endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue--in contempt of the dangers of war, in bravery on the day of battle--even in the power of bearing more wine than any one else, without being intoxicated, whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus described as under the full control of Reason and Eros Philosophus--his special gift and privilege was that of conversation--not less eccentric in manner, than potent, soul-subduing,[43] and provocative in its effects.

[Footnote 43: Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222.

Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by Sokrates, at the siege of Potidæa as well as at the battle of Delium.

About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates upon his companions, compare Sympos. p. 173 C-D.

In the Xenophontic Apology (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade of Athens after the battle of Ægospotami, while others were bewailing the famine and other miseries.]

[Side-note: Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process.]

After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers, continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While Phædrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively fall asleep, and at day-break, he finds himself the only person sober,[44] except Aristodemus (the narrator of the whole scene), who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished activity--bathes--and then visits the gymnasium at the Lykeion; where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.[45]

[Footnote 44: In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as [Greek: dunatô/tatos pi/nein], above all the rest: no one can be compared with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De Legibus, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato discusses the subject of strong potations ([Greek: me/thê]) at great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He considers it of great advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues) in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency. Plato insists upon the [Greek: chrei/a tê=s me/thês], as a genuine test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too (iii. p. 413 E), the [Greek: phu/lakes] are required to be tested, in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation, as well as pain and danger.

Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find one [Greek: Peri\ Me/thês] (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his father--That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments, without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.]

[Footnote 45: Plato, Sympos. p. 223.]

[Side-note: Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and complement of the other.]

The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phædon; though the conjecture of Schleiermacher[46]--that the two together are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the trilogy promised in the Sophistês--is ingenious rather than convincing. The Phædon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation with his friends, immediately before his death; the Symposion presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness: in both situations, we find the same attributes manifested--perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every variety of disturbing agency--whether tempting or terrible--absorbing interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two elements, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue: the last of the two superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or madness.[47]

[Footnote 46: Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.]

[Footnote 47: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 C-E. [Greek: sôphrosu/nê thnêtê/--e)rôtikê\ mani/a: sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê--thei/a mani/a.] Compare p. 244 B.]

[Side-note: Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon.]

The Symposion of Plato affords also an interesting subject of comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, as to points of agreement as well as of difference.[48] Xenophon states in the beginning that he intends to describe what passed in a scene where he himself was present; because he is of opinion that the proceedings of excellent men, in hours of amusement, are not less worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet, destined to celebrate the success of a young man in a competitive struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius--Agathon has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily force and skill--Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Symposion of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic dialogues of Plato--that is, by approaching much nearer to common life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough to take place, with the usual accompaniments--a professional jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by music, dancing, throwing up balls and catching them again, jumping into and out of a circle of swords. All this would have occurred at an ordinary banquet: here, it is accompanied and followed by remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are understood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on his own corpulence.[49] Most part of the scene is broad farce, in the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.[50] The number and variety of the persons present is considerable, greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays.[51] Kallias, Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus, Kritobulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the burlesque farther than any of them; pretending to be equal in personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes, however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar function: but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to appease him. In general, each guest is made to take pride in something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him; and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody. Antisthenes, for example, boasts of his wealth. The Syracusan ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the company:[52] while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.

[Footnote 48: Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenæus (xi. 504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and Xenophon; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently proved.

Athenæus had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved) as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674); and we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the speaker in Athenæus, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and smartness--finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was almost entirety upon love and joviality. In the Symposion of Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics; the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory ([Greek: prophê/tas a)to/môn], v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. [Greek: E)pi/kouros de\ sumpo/sion philoso/phôn mo/non pepoi/êtai]), and even upon bodily ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them "flatterers praising each other"; while he terms the Platonic guests "sneerers insulting each other" ([Greek: muktêristô=n a)llê/lous tôthazo/ntôn], 182 A), though this is much more true about the Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic. He remarks farther that the Symposion of Epikurus included no libation or offering to the Gods (179 D).

It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now lost) of a philosopher like Epikurus, whom many historians of philosophy represent as thinking about nothing but convivial and sexual pleasure.]

[Footnote 49: Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1; ii. 18-19. [Greek: proga/stôr], &c.]

[Footnote 50: The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad temper of Xanthippê, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements of the [Greek: o)rchêstri\s] by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also iii. 11.]

[Footnote 51: Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.]

[Footnote 52: Xen. Symp. vi. [Greek: Au)tê\ me\n ê( paroini/a ou(/tô katesbe/sthê], vii. 1-5.

Epiktêtus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates--his patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).]

[Side-note: Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion.]

Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an alternate mixture of banter and seriousness,[53] yet the only long serious argument or lecture delivered is by Sokrates; in which he pronounces a professed panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the former--selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.[54]

[Footnote 53: Xen. Symp. iv. 28. [Greek: a)nami\x e)skôpsa/n te kai\ e)spou/dasan], viii. 41.]

[Footnote 54: Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to advert to the fact of his being elate with wine--[Greek: o(/ te ga\r oi)=nos sunepai/rei, kai\ o( a)ei\ su/noikos e)moi\ e)/rôs kentri/zei ei)s to\n a)nti/palon e)/rôta au)tou= par)r(êsia/zesthai.]

The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and those of the Lacedæmonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep. Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and Xenophon is here curious; we see how much more copious and inventive is the reasoning of Plato.]

The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of Dionysus and Ariadnê as lovers represented (at the instance of Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, to be present at the exercise of Autolykus.[55]

[Footnote 55: Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the Xenophontic Symposion is, to a great degree, in harmony with modern sentiment, though what is there expressed would probably be left to be understood. The Platonic Symposion departs altogether from that sentiment.]

[Side-note: Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic.]

We see thus that the Platonic Symposion is much more ideal, and departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet (musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima--we shall appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and common-place practical sense of Xenophon.[56] All the Platonic speakers are accomplished persons--a man of letters, a physician, two successful poets, a prophetess: the Xenophontic personages, except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity. The Platonic Symposion, after presenting Eros in five different points of view, gives pre-eminence and emphasis to a sixth, in which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the Xenophontic Symposion dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention of philosophy. The Platonic Symposion exalts Sokrates, as the representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation which places him above human fears and weaknesses[57]--coupled however with that eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a philosopher as out of his mind: the Xenophontic Symposion presents him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance, yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one else to the general hilarity.

[Footnote 56: The difference between the two coincides very much with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phædrus--[Greek: thei/a mani/a] as contrasted with [Greek: sôphrosu/nê thnêtê\] (p. 256 E). Compare Athenæus, v. 187 B.]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 D. [Greek: nouthetei=tai me\n u(po\ tô=n pollô=n ô(s parakinô=n, e)nthousia/zôn de\ le/lêthe tou\s pollou\s. . . . ai)ti/an e)/chei ô(s manikô=s diakei/menos.]]

Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between the same subject as handled by these two eminent contemporaries, both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates: and each handling it in his own manner.[58]

[Footnote 58: Which of these two Symposia was the latest in date of composition we cannot determine with certainty: though it seems certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation of the earliest.

From the allusion to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia (p. 193 A) we know that the Platonic Symposion must have been composed after 385 B.C.: there is great probability also, though not full certainty, that it was composed during the time when Mantineia was still an aggregate of separate villages and not a town--that is, between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantineia was re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposion affords no mark of date of composition: Xenophon reports it as having been himself present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an opinion supported by Pausanias [Greek: o( A)ga/thônos tou= poiêtou= e)rastê/s], who discourses in the Platonic Symposion: and several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion improbable. It would require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since the opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Phædrus. Athenæus (v. 216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but he does not mention that it is delivered by Phædrus. He remarks that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself: and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenæus wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenæus was anxious to prove anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice that of the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia mentioned in a conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.

I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion to Pausanias, Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable. I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the Præf. of Schneider to the former, pp. 140-143.]

[Side-note: Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise.]

I have already stated that the first half of the Phædrus differs materially from the second; and that its three discourses on the subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction with the Symposion. The second half of the Phædrus passes into a different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a rhetorical composition: examining the principles upon which the teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either is founded, or ought to be founded: and estimating the efficacy of written discourse generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.

[Side-note: Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill.]

I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phædrus) severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses, for fear of being called Sophists.[59] To write discourses (replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is, whether he writes them well.[60] And the same question is the only one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects--public or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak well, and how to write well--is the problem.[61] Is there any art or systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object well? Or does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor describe to others?

[Footnote 59: Plato, Phædrus, p. 257 C.]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.

The two appellations--[Greek: logogra/phos] and [Greek: sophistê/s]--are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so denominated took money for their compositions or teaching. The [Greek: logogra/phos] wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of the two terms would imply any reproach.

Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term [Greek: logogra/phos] only in this etymological, literal sense, omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker. This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus, we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all, he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of instruction.

Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in comparing the [Greek: logogra/phos] to the proposer of a law or decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset, [Greek: e)/doxe tê=| boulê=|], &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p. 258).]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pê| kalô=s e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pê| mê/, skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalô=s te kai\ mê\ gra/phein.]]

[Side-note: Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.]

First let us ask--When an orator addresses himself to a listening crowd upon the common themes--Good and Evil, Just and Unjust--is it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate himself, if he wishes to persuade.[62]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Phædrus, p. 260 A.]

[Side-note: Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth.]

He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and to his own. He ought to know the real truth--not merely what the public whom he addresses believe to be the truth--respecting just and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the subject-matter.[63] The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good, presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as being both like and unlike--both one and many--both in motion and at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed off as the other: if there be little likeness, deception will be difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[64]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 260-261.]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.]

[Side-note: Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define.]

Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two orations (the first depreciating, the second extolling, Eros) in the point of view of art; to see how far they are artistically constructed. Among the matters of discourse, there are some on which all men are agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may assume established unanimity in his audience: there are others on which great dissension and discord prevail. Among the latter (the topics of dissension), questions about just and unjust, good and evil, stand foremost:[65] it is upon these that deception is most easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accordingly, an orator should begin by understanding to which of these two categories the topic which he handles belongs: If it belongs to the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse has done: but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides, the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to do, if the discourse were put together according to rule.[66]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad. i. p. 109.]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-265.]

[Side-note: Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.]

Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the process of logical definition exemplified in the case of Eros--but also the process of logical division, in the case of Madness or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into two species--Madness, from human distemper--Madness, from divine inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.[67] Next, this last species was again divided into four branches or sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration--the prophetic, emanating from Apollo--the ritual or mystic, from Dionysus--the poetic, from the Muses--the amatory, from Eros and Aphroditê.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division, are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in words as the definition. He ought also to perform the counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to the joints) but into legitimate species;[69] each founded on some positive and assignable characteristic. "It is these divisions and combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature--I follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[70]

[Footnote 67: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn.]]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s mi/an te i)de/an sunorô=nta a)/gein ta\ pollachê= diesparme/na, i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos dê=lon poi=ê| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\ dida/skein e)the/lê|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/dê du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, ê(=| pe/phuke, kai\ mê\ e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mêde/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/pô| chrô/menon.]

Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile est."]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/tôn dê\ e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê/s, ô)= Phai=dre, tô=n diaire/seôn kai\ sunagôgô=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n te/ tin' a)/llon ê(gê/sômai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\ pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton diô/kô kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion ô(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n ei) me\n o)rthô=s ê)\ mê\ prosagoreu/ô, theo\s oi)=de; kalô= de\ ou)=n me/chri tou=de dialektikou/s.]]

This is Dialectic (replies Phædrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.

[Side-note: View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic--The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless.]

What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these professors teach? The order and distribution of a discourse: first, the exordium, then recital, proof, second proof, refutation, recapitulation at the close: advice how to introduce maxims or similes: receipts for moving the anger or compassion of the dikasts. Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce considerable effect upon popular assemblies:[71] but it is not the art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of preliminary accomplishments, necessary before a man can acquire the art: but it is not the art itself. You must know when, how far, in what cases, and towards what persons, to employ these accomplishments:[72] otherwise you have not learnt the art of rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician because you know how to bring about vomit and purging--or a musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured, seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in different doses adapted to each special matter and audience--that the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to acquire for himself.[73]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 267-268.]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Phædrus, p. 268 B. [Greek: e)re/sthai ei) prosepi/statai kai\ ou(sti/nas dei= kai\ o(po/te e(/kasta tou/tôn poiei=n, kai\ me/chri o(po/sou?]]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, p. 269.]

[Side-note: What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art.]

The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger range than these teachers imagine. It deals with mind, as the medical researches of Hippokrates deal with body--as a generic total with all its species and varieties, and as essentially relative to the totality of external circumstances. First, Hippokrates investigates how far the body is, in every particular man, simple, homogeneous, uniform: and how far it is complex, heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he examines what are its properties in relation to each particular substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its properties in relation to every substance.[74] It is in this way that Hippokrates discovers the nature or essence of the human body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.

[Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)ch ô(=de dei= dianoei=sthai peri\ o(touou=n phu/seôs? Prô=ton me\n, a(plou=n ê)\ polueide/s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulêso/metha ei)=nai au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei=n? e)/peita de/, e)a\n me\n a(plou=n ê)=|, skopei=n tê\n du/namin au)tou=, ti/na pro\s ti/ pe/phuken ei)s to\ dra=|n e)/chon ê)\ ti/na ei)s to\ pathei=n u(po\ tou=? e)a\n de\ plei/ô ei)/dê e)/chê|, tau=ta a)rithmêsa/menos, o(/per e)ph' e(no/s, tou=t' i)dei=n e)ph' e(ka/stou, tô=| ti/ poiei=n au)to\ pe/phuken ê)\ tô=| ti/ pathei=n u(po\ tou=?]]

[Side-note: Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case.]

Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in like manner. His task is to work persuasion in the minds of certain men by means of discourse. He has therefore, first, to ascertain how far all mind is one and the same, and what are the affections belonging to it universally in relation to other things: next, to distinguish the different varieties of minds, together with the properties, susceptibilities, and active aptitudes, of each: carrying the subdivision down until he comes to a variety no longer admitting division.[75] He must then proceed to distinguish the different varieties of discourse, noting the effects which each is calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different ways in which it is likely to impress different minds.[76] Such and such men are persuadable by such and such discourses--or the contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to address belong: and therefore what class of discourses will be likely to operate on them persuasively.[77] He must farther know those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit within which each can be safely employed.[78]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te pa/lin kat' ei)/dê me/chri tou= a)tmê/tou te/mnein e)pistêthê=|.]]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 A. [Greek: Prô=ton, pa/sê| a)kribei/a| gra/psei te kai\ poiê/sei psuchê\n i)dei=n, po/teron e(\n kai\ o(/moion pe/phuken ê)\ kata\ sô/matos morphê\n polueide/s; tou=to ga/r phamen phu/sin ei)=nai deiknu/nai.

Deu/teron de/ ge, o(/tô| ti/ poiei=n ê)\ pathei=n u(po\ tou= pe/phuken.

Tri/ton de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê kai\ ta\ tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn e(/kaston e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn lo/gôn di' ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\ a)peithei=.]]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D. [Greek: dei= mê\ tau=ta i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, o)xe/ôs tê=| ai)sthê/sei du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Phædrus, p. 272 A. [Greek: tau=ta de\ ê)/dê pa/nt' e)/chonti, proslabo/nti kairou\s tou= po/te lekte/on kai\ e)pischete/on, brachulogi/as te au)= kai\ e)leeinologi/as kai\ deinô/seôs, e(ka/stôn te o(/s' a)\n ei)/dê ma/thê| lo/gôn, tou/tôn tê\n eu)kairi/an te kai\ a)kairi/an diagno/nti, kalô=s te kai\ tele/ôs e)sti\n ê( te/chnê a)peirgasme/nê, pro/teron d' ou)/.]]

[Side-note: The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour.]

Nothing less than this assemblage of acquirements (says Sokrates) will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is: but there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will believe to be true--must be reminded that this belief, on the part of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real truth will be cleverest in suggesting apparent or quasi-truth adapted to their feelings. If a man is bent on becoming an artist in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out: yet undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he has acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.[79]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274.]

[Side-note: Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows.]

We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers himself--Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and satisfaction for the moment: it will remind the reader of something which he knew before, if he really did know. But in respect to any thing which he did not know before, it will neither teach nor persuade him: it may produce in him an impression or fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting--one and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply deficiencies, reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is defenceless against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory, implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the reality.[80]

[Footnote 80: Plato, Phædrus, p. 275 D-E. [Greek: tau)to\n de\ kai\ oi( lo/goi (oi( gegramme/noi); do/xais me\n a)\n ô(/s ti phronou=ntas au)tou\s le/gein e)a\n de/ ti e(/rê| tô=n legome/nôn boulo/menos mathei=n, e(/n ti sêmai/nei mo/non tau)to\n a)ei/. O(/tan de\ a(/pax graphê=|, kulindei=tai me\n pantachou= pa=s lo/gos o(moi/ôs para\ toi=s e)pai+/ousin, ô(s d' au)tô=s par' oi(=s ou)de\n prosê/kei, kai\ ou)k e)pi/statai le/gein oi(=s dei= ge kai\ mê/.]]

[Side-note: Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary.]

Any writer therefore, in prose or verse--Homer, Solon, or Lysias--who imagines that he can by a ready-made composition, however carefully turned,[81] if simply heard or read without cross-examination or oral comment, produce any serious and permanent effect in persuading or teaching, beyond a temporary gratification--falls into a disgraceful error. If he intends to accomplish any thing serious, he must be competent to originate spoken discourse more effective than the written. The written word is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word: which latter is the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the mind of the hearer.[82] The speaker must know, with discriminative comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to whom he addresses himself. He will thus be able to adapt the order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,[83] remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried under ground; but which, after such interval, springs up and ripens into complete and lasting fruit.[84] By repeated dialectic debate, he will both familiarise to his own mind and propagate in his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge; together with all the manifold reasonings bearing on the subject, and with the power also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing, but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds; prolific in its own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to all.[85]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 277-278. [Greek: ô(s oi( r(apsô|dou/menoi (lo/goi) a)/neu a)nakri/seôs kai\ didachê=s peithou=s e(/neka e)le/chthêsan], &c.]

[Footnote 82: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A. [Greek: a)/llon o(rô=men lo/gon tou/tou a)delpho\n gnê/sion tô=| tro/pô| te gi/gnetai, kai\ o(/sô| a)mei/nôn kai\ dunatô/teros tou/tou phu/etai? . . . . O(/s met' e)pistê/mês gra/phetai e)n tê=| tou= mantha/nontos psuchê=|, dunato\s me\n a)mu=nai e(autô=|, e)pistê/môn de\ le/gein te kai\ siga=|n pro\s ou(\s dei=. To\n tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon le/geis zô=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon, ou(= o( gegramme/nos ei)/dôlon a)/n ti le/goito dikai/ôs], &c. 278 A.]

[Footnote 83: Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 C. [Greek: ei) me\n ei)dô\s ê(=| ta)lêthe\s e)/chei sune/thêke tau=ta (ta\ suggra/mmata) kai\ e)/chôn boêthei=n, ei)s e)/legchon i)ô\n peri\ ô(=n e)/grapse, kai\ le/gôn au)to\s dunato\s ta\ gegramme/na phau=la a)podei=xai], &c.]

[Footnote 84: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A.]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 276-277.]

This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the criticisms on Lysias in the Phædrus, is farther illustrated by the praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates occupied that which Plato in Euthydêmus calls "the border country between philosophy and politics". Many critics declare (and I think with probable reason[86]) that Isokrates is the person intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the Euthydêmus. In the Phædrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate friend of Sokrates, still young; and is pronounced already superior in every way to Lysias--likely to become superior in future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished--and destined probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.[87]

[Footnote 86: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227.]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Phædrus, p. 279 A.]

When we consider that the Phædrus was pretty sure to bring upon Plato a good deal of enmity--since it attacked, by name, both Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated--we can understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at Athens, and received a good education; but when his family became impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios: after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in composing discourses for pleaders before the dikastery[88] and for speakers in the assembly; by which practice he acquired both fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relinquished these harangues destined for real persons on real occasions, and confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of hearers) on general questions--social, political, and philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he composed the Phædrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato composed the Euthydêmus, his feeling was different.[89] In the Phædrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the Euthydêmus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred, and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most beautiful ape is ugly compared with man--the most beautiful man is an ape compared with the Gods:[90] the same intermediate position between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.

[Footnote 88: Dion. Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 576. [Greek: desma\s pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn periphe/resthai/ phêsin u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês], &c.

Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.

The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus. Isokrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune like what had happened to himself (Orat. xi. Busiris 1). Compare De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172.

The assertion made by Isokrates--that he did not compose political and judicial orations, to be spoken by individuals for real causes and public discussions--may be true comparatively, and with reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be received subject to much reserve and qualification. Even out of the twenty-one orations of Isokrates which we possess, the last five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery. They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.]

[Footnote 89: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with Ueberweg in thinking that the Euthydêmus is later than the Phædrus. Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp. 256-259-265.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.]

From the pen of Isokrates also, we find various passages apparently directed against the viri Socratici including Plato (though without his name): depreciating,[91] as idle and worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties; maintaining that the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical results: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato's life, his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them, gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school of rhetoric in opposition to him.[92] Kephisodôrus, a pupil of Isokrates, retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the Isokratean school.[93]

[Footnote 91: Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v. (Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.) sect. 285-290. [Greek: philosophi/an me\n ou)=n ou)k oi)=mai dei=n prosagoreu/ein tê\n mêde\n e)n tô=| paro/nti mê/te pro\s to\ le/gein mê/te pro\s to\ pra/ttein ô(/phelou=san--tê\n kaloume/nên u(po/ tinôn philosophi/an ou)k ei)=nai phêmi/], &c.]

[Footnote 92: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62; Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr, Aristotelia, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq.

Schroeder's Quæstiones Isocrateæ (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's work, Isokrates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But, unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I read the Oration De Permut., Or. xv. (composed by Isokrates about fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before the death of Plato, near 353 B.C.), I am impressed with the belief that many of his complaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when he talks of [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s e)rôtê/seis kai\ a)pokri/seis, ou(\s a)ntilogikou\s kalou=sin--oi( peri\ ta\s e)/ridas spouda/zontes]--those who are powerful in contentious dialectic, and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which others call [Greek: a)doleschi/a] and [Greek: mikrologi/a] (280)--those who exhorted hearers to virtue about which others knew nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he complains of the [Greek: perittolo/giai] of the ancient Sophists, Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose that he had in his mind the Timæus of Plato also, though he avoids mention of the name.]

[Footnote 93: Athenæus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.]

[Side-note: The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer.]

This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)--the man who alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good, and honourable.[94] He who merely writes, must not delude himself with the belief that upon these important topics his composition can impart any clear or lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for reality hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake be made by few or by many persons. If indeed the writer can explain to others orally the matters written--if he can answer all questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiencies, of each several reader--in that case he is something far more and better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a poet, or nomographer, or logographer.[95]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 D-E.]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 278-279.]

[Side-note: Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher.]

In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes Sokrates) something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one day to genuine philosophy.[96]

[Footnote 96: Respecting the manner in which Plato speaks of Isokrates in the Phædrus, see what I have already observed upon the Euthydêmus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue.]

I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phædrus either as positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato's life: though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly either its date or its place in the chronological series of dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.

[Side-note: Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.]

The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates (supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the rhetorical point of view,[97] and are made the handle for introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that ever emanated from Plato.

[Footnote 97: Plato, Phædrus, p. 235 A.]

[Side-note: His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed.]

The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his questions. But in the Phædrus we find Plato (under the name of Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor shall be found who knows what is really and truly just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable--distinct from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these subjects, traditional among his neighbours and fellow-citizens:[98] assuming (to express the same thing in other words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated, and removed.

[Footnote 98: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.]

[Side-note: The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.]

The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic feature.[99] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable in matters small or great.[100]

[Footnote 99: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266.]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A.

That truth upon matters small and contemptible deserves to be sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime, is a doctrine affirmed in the Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês: Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A; Politik. 266 D; Parmenid. 130 E.]

Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by way of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many topics on which men's minds are, in the common and natural course of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This is especially the case with Justice, Goodness, the Honourable, &c.[101] It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be undeceived--contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides: such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.

[Footnote 101: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 A.]

[Side-note: The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to truth.]

The Rhetor is one who does not teach (according to the logical process previously described), but persuades; guiding the mind by discourse to or from various opinions or sentiments.[102] Now if this is to be done by art and methodically--that is, upon principle or system explicable and defensible--it pre-supposes (according to Plato) a knowledge of truth, and can only be performed by the logical expositor. For when men are deceived, it is only because they mistake what is like truth for truth itself: when they are undeceived, it is because they are made to perceive that what they believe to be truth is only an apparent likeness thereof. Such resemblances are strong or faint, differing by many gradations. Now no one can detect, or bring into account, or compare, these shades of resemblance, except he who knows the truth to which they all ultimately refer. It is through the slight differences that deception is operated. To deceive a man, you must carry him gradually away from the truth by transitional stages, each resembling that which immediately precedes, though the last in the series will hardly at all resemble the first: to undeceive him (or to avoid being deceived yourself), you must conduct him back by the counter-process from error to truth, by a series of transitional resemblances tending in that direction. You cannot do this like an artist (on system and by pre-determination), unless you know what the truth is.[103] By anyone who does not know, the process will be performed without art, or at haphazard.

[Footnote 102: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A. [Greek: ê( r(êtorikê\ te/chnê psuchagôgi/a tis dia\ lo/gôn], &c.]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.]

[Side-note: He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case.]

The Rhetor--being assumed as already knowing the truth--if he wishes to make persuasion an art, must proceed in the following manner:--He must distribute the multiplicity of individual minds into distinct classes, each marked by its characteristic features of differences, emotional and intellectual. He must also distribute the manifold modes of discourse into distinct classes, each marked in like manner. Each of these modes of discourse is well adapted to persuade some classes of mind--badly adapted to persuade other classes: for such adaptation or non-adaptation there exists a rational necessity,[104] which the Rhetor must examine and ascertain, informing himself which modes of discourse are adapted to each different class of mind. Having mastered this general question, he must, whenever he is about to speak, be able to distinguish, by rapid perception,[105] to which class of minds the hearer or hearers whom he is addressing belong: and accordingly, which mode of discourse is adapted to their particular case. Moreover, he must also seize, in the case before him, the seasonable moment and the appropriate limit, for the use of each mode of discourse. Unless the Rhetor is capable of fulfilling all these exigencies, without failing in any one point, his Rhetoric is not entitled to be called an Art. He requires, in order to be an artist in persuading the mind, as great an assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the body.[106]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 270 E, 271 A-D. [Greek: Tri/ton de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê, kai\ ta\ tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn e(/kaston e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn lo/gôn di' ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\ a)peithei=.]]

[Footnote 105: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D-E. [Greek: dei= dê\ tau=ta i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, o)xe/ôs tê=| ai)sthê/sei du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n, ê)\ mêde\ ei)de/nai pô ple/on au)tô=n ô(=n to/te ê)/koue lo/gôn xunô/n.]]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 C.]

[Side-note: Plato's Idéal of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the public.]

The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and comprehensive. It is indeed an idéal, not merely unattainable by reason of its magnitude, but also including impracticable conditions. He begins by postulating a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the most important social subjects; on which his country-men hold erroneous beliefs, just as sincerely as he holds his true beliefs. But Plato has already told us, in the Gorgias, that such a person will not be listened to: that in order to address auditors with effect, the rhetor must be in genuine harmony of belief and character with them, not dissenting from them either for the better or the worse: nay, that the true philosopher (so we read in one of the most impressive portions of the Republic) not only has no chance of guiding the public mind, but incurs public obloquy, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes persecution.[107] The dissenter will never be allowed to be the guide of a body of orthodox believers; and is even likely enough, unless he be prudent, to become their victim. He may be permitted to lecture or discuss, in the gardens of the Academy, with a few chosen friends, and to write eloquent dialogues: but if he embodies his views in motions before the public assembly, he will find only strenuous opposition, or something worse. This view, which is powerfully set forth by Sokrates both in the Gorgias and Republic, is founded on a just appreciation of human societies: and it is moreover the basis of the Sokratic procedure--That the first step to be taken is to disabuse men's minds of their false persuasion of knowledge--to make them conscious of ignorance--and thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate advanced by Sokrates here in the Phædrus--of a perfectly wise man as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of Error:--that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance to truth. This is the case to a certain extent: but it is very incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.

[Footnote 107: Plato, Gorg. p. 513 B, see supra, ch. xxiv.; Republic, vi. pp. 495-496.]

[Side-note: The other part of the Platonic Idéal is grand but unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified modes of discourse.]

But the other portion of Plato's sum total of what is necessary to an Art of Rhetoric, is not open to the same objection. It involves no incompatible conditions: and we can say nothing against it, except that it requires a breadth and logical command of scientific data, far greater than there is the smallest chance of attaining. That Art is an assemblage of processes, directed to a definite end, and prescribed by rules which themselves rest upon scientific data--we find first announced in the works of Plato.[108] A vast amount of scientific research, both inductive and deductive, is here assumed as an indispensable foundation--and even as a portion--of what he calls the Art of Rhetoric: first, a science of psychology, complete both in its principles and details: next, an exhaustive catalogue and classification of the various modes of operative speech, with their respective impression upon each different class of minds. So prodigious a measure of scientific requirement has never yet been filled up: of course, therefore, no one has ever put together a body of precepts commensurate with it. Aristotle, following partially the large conceptions of his master, has given a comprehensive view of many among the theoretical postulates of Rhetoric; and has partially enumerated the varieties both of persuadable auditors, and of persuasive means available to the speaker for guiding them. Cicero, Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Quintilian, have furnished valuable contributions towards this last category of data, but not much towards the first: being all of them defective in breadth of psychological theory. Nor has Plato himself done anything to work out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it. We read it only as an impressive sketch--a grand but unattainable idéal--"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum".

[Footnote 108: I repeat the citation from the Phædrus, one of the most striking passages in Plato, p. 271 D.

[Greek: e)/peidê\ lo/gou du/namis tugcha/nei psuchagôgi/a ou)=sa, to\n me/llonta r(êtoriko\n e)/sesthai a)na/gkê ei)de/nai psuchê\ o(/sa ei)/dê e)/chei. e)/stin ou)=n to/sa kai\ to/sa, kai\ toi=a kai\ toi=a; o(/then oi( me\n toioi/de, oi( de\ toioi/de gi/gnontai. tou/tôn de\ dê\ diê|rême/nôn, lo/gôn au)= to/sa kai\ to/sa e)/stin ei)/dê, toio/nde e(/kaston. oi( me\n ou)=n toioi/de u(po\ tô=n toiô=nde logôn dia\ tê/nde tê\n aiti/an e)s ta\ toia/de eu)peithei=s, oi( de\ toioi/de dia\ ta/de duspeithei=s], &c. Comp. p. 261 A.

The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the concluding chapter of his System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xii. § 2):

"The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the Science. The Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to Art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premisses, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premiss, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premisses Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable; and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept."]

[Side-note: Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man.]

Indeed it seems that Plato himself regarded it as unattainable--and as only worth aiming at for the purpose of pleasing the Gods, not with any view to practical benefit, arising from either speech or action among mankind.[109] This is a point to be considered, when we compare his views on Rhetoric with those of Lysias and the other rhetors, whom he here judges unfavourably and even contemptuously. The work of speech and action among mankind, which Plato sets aside as unworthy of attention, was the express object of solicitude to Lysias, Isokrates, and rhetors generally: that which they practised efficaciously themselves, and which they desired to assist, cultivate, and improve in others: that which Perikles, in his funeral oration preserved by Thucydides, represents as the pride of the Athenian people collectively[110]--combination of full freedom of preliminary contentious debate, with energy in executing the resolution which might be ultimately adopted. These rhetors, by the example of their composed speeches as well as by their teaching, did much to impart to young men the power of expressing themselves with fluency and effect before auditors, either in the assembly or in the dikastery: as Sokrates here fully admits.[111] Towards this purpose it was useful to analyse the constituent parts of a discourse, and to give an appropriate name to each part. Accordingly, all the rhetorical teachers (Quintilian included) continued such analysis, though differing more or less in their way of performing it, until the extinction of Pagan civilisation. Young men were taught to learn by heart regular discourses,[112]--to compose the like for themselves--to understand the difference between such as were well or ill composed--and to acquire a command of oratorical means for moving or convincing the hearer. All this instruction had a practical value: though Plato, both here and elsewhere, treats it as worthless. A citizen who stood mute and embarrassed, unable to argue a case with some propriety before an audience, felt himself helpless and defective in one of the characteristic privileges of a Greek and a freeman: while one who could perform the process well, acquired much esteem and influence.[113] The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by saying--What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous? Such consolation failed to satisfy: as it would fail to satisfy the sick, the lame, or the blind.

[Footnote 109: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274. [Greek: ê(\n ou)ch e(/neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\s a)nthrô/pous dei= diaponei=sthai to\n sô/phrona, a)lla\ tou= theoi=s kecharisme/na me\n le/gein du/nasthai], &c. (273 E).]

[Footnote 110: Thucyd. ii. 39-40-41.]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Phædrus, p. 288 A.]

[Footnote 112: See what is said by Aristotle about [Greek: ê( Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a] in the last chapter of De Sophisticis Elenchis.]

[Footnote 113: I have illustrated this point in my History of Greece, by the example of Xenophon in his command of the Cyreian army during its retreat.

His democratical education, and his powers of public speaking, were of the greatest service not only in procuring influence to himself, but also in conducting the army through its many perils and difficulties.

See Aristot. Rhet. i. 1, 3, p. 1355, b. 1.]

[Side-note: The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners.]

The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security, dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming them for public speech and action. But it was essentially practical, or empirical: it had little system, and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon these points Plato in the Phædrus attacks them. He sets little value upon the accomplishments arming men for speech and action ([Greek: lektikou\s kai\ praktikou\s ei)=nai])--and he will not allow such teaching to be called an Art. He explains, in opposition to them, what he himself conceived the Art of Rhetoric to be, in the comprehensive way which I have above described.

But if the conception of the Art, as entertained by the Rhetors, is too narrow--that of Plato, on the other hand, is too wide.

First, it includes the whole basis of science or theory on which the Art rests: it is a Philosophy of Rhetoric, expounded by a theorist--rather than an Art of Rhetoric, taught to learners by a master. To teach the observance of certain rules or precepts is one thing: to set forth the reasons upon which those rules are founded, is another--highly important indeed, and proper to be known by the teacher; yet not necessarily communicated, or even communicable, to all learners. Quintilian, in his Institutio Rhetorica, gives both:--an ample theory, as well as an ample development of rules, of his professional teaching. But he would not have thought himself obliged to give this ample theory to all learners. With many, he would have been satisfied to make them understand the rules, and to exercise them in the ready observance thereof.

[Side-note: Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particular cases.--This can never be taught by rule.]

Secondly, Plato, in defining the Art of Rhetoric, includes not only its foundation of science (which, though intimately connected with it, ought not to be considered as a constituent part), but also the application of it to particular cases; which application lies beyond the province both of science and of art, and cannot be reduced to any rule. "The Rhetor" (says Plato) "must teach his pupils, not merely to observe the rules whereby persuasion is operated, but also to know the particular persons to whom those rules are to be applied--on what occasions--within what limits--at what peculiar moments, &c.[114] Unless the Rhetor can teach thus much, his pretended art is no art at all: all his other teaching is of no value." Now this is an amount of exigence which can never be realised. Neither art nor science can communicate that which Plato here requires. The rules of art, together with many different hypothetical applications thereof, may be learnt: when the scientific explanation of the rules is superadded, the learner will be assisted farther towards fresh applications: but after both these have been learnt, the new cases which will arise can never be specially foreseen. The proper way of applying the general precepts to each case must be suggested by conjecture adapted to the circumstances, under the corrections of past experience.[115] It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing deserves the name of art[116] except what is general--capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand--then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases; the analogy of the medical art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this point.

[Footnote 114: Plato, Phædr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.]

[Footnote 115: What Longinus says about critical skill is applicable here also--[Greek: pollê=s e)/sti pei/ras teleutai=on e)pige/nnêma.] Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316) has some good remarks about the impossibility of [Greek: e)pistê/mê] respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts [Greek: te/chnê], which he states to depend upon reason and foreknowledge, in opposition to [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] and [Greek: tribê/], which he considers as dependant on the [Greek: phu/sis stochastikê/]. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to particular cases, the [Greek: phu/sis stochastikê\] is the best that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of [Greek: te/chnê] given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we find in the Phædrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phædrus, speaks of the necessity that [Greek: phu/sis, e)pistê/mê], and [Greek: mele/tê], shall concur to make an accomplished orator. This is very true; and Lysias, Isokrates, and all the other rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his description of [Greek: te/chnê] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê], and in the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no outlying ground for [Greek: mele/tê]. Compare Xenophon, Memor. iii. 1, 11; also Isokrates contra Sophistas, a. 16; and a good passage of Dionysius Halik. De Compos. Verborum, in which that rhetor remarks that [Greek: kairo\s] or opportunity neither has been nor can be reduced to art and rule.]

[Footnote 116: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 464-465.]

[Side-note: Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out.]

While therefore Plato's view of the science or theory of Rhetoric is far more comprehensive and philosophical than any thing given by the rhetorical teachers--he has not made good his charge against them, that what they taught as an art of Rhetoric was useless and illusory. The charge can only be sustained if we grant--what appears to have been Plato's own feeling--that the social and political life of the Athenians was a dirty and corrupt business, unworthy of a virtuous man to meddle with. This is the argument of Sokrates (in the Gorgias,[117] the other great anti-rhetorical dialogue), proclaiming himself to stand alone and aloof, an isolated, free-thinking dissenter. As representing his sincere conviction, and interpreting Plato's plan of life, this argument deserves honourable recognition. But we must remember that Lysias and the rhetorical teachers repudiated such a point of view. They aimed at assisting and strengthening others to perform their parts, not in speculative debate on philosophy, but in active citizenship; and they succeeded in this object to a great degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias personally is attested not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to Phædrus,[118] but also by his great celebrity--by the frequent demand for his services as a logographer or composer of discourses for others--by the number of his discourses preserved and studied after his death. He, and a fair proportion of the other rhetors named in the Phædrus, performed well the useful work which they undertook.

[Footnote 117: Plato, Gorg. 521 D.]

[Footnote 118: Plato, Phædr. p. 228 A.]

[Side-note: Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle.]

When Plato selects, out of the very numerous discourses before him composed by Lysias, one hardly intended for any real auditors--neither deliberative, nor judicial, nor panegyrical, but an ingenious erotic paradox for a private circle of friends--this is no fair specimen of the author. Moreover Plato criticises it as if it were a philosophic exposition instead of an oratorical pleading. He complains that Lysias does not begin his discourse by defining--but neither do Demosthenes and other great orators proceed in that manner. He affirms that there is no organic structure, or necessary sequence, in the discourse, and that the sentences of it might be read in an inverted order:[119]--and this remark is to a certain extent well-founded. In respect to the skilful marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, so as to give best effect to the whole, Dionysius of Halikarnassus[120] declares Lysias to be inferior to some other orators--while ascribing to him marked oratorical superiority on various other points. Yet Plato, in specifying his objections against the erotic discourses of Lysias, does not show that it offends against the sound general principle which he himself lays down respecting the art of persuasion--That the topics insisted on by the persuader shall be adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the persuadend. Far from violating this principle, Lysias kept it in view, and employed it to the best of his power--as we may see, not merely by his remaining orations, but also by the testimonies of the critics:[121] though he did not go through the large preliminary work of scientific classification, both of different minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato considers essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the principle.

[Footnote 119: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-264.]

[Footnote 120: Dionysius (Judicium De Lysiâ, pp. 487-493) gives an elaborate criticism on the [Greek: pragmatiko\s charaktê\r] of Lysias. The special excellence of Lysias (according to this critic) lay in his judicial orations, which were highly persuasive and plausible: the manner of presenting thoughts was ingenious and adapted to the auditors: the narration of facts and details, especially, was performed with unrivalled skill. But as to the marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, Dionysius considers Lysias as inferior to some other orators--and still more inferior in respect to [Greek: deinotê\s] and to strong emotional effects.]

[Footnote 121: Dionys. Hal. (Ars Rhetorica, p. 381) notices the severe exigencies which Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor, remarking that scarcely any rhetorical discourse could be produced which came up to them. The defect did not belong to Lysias alone, but to all other rhetors also--[Greek: o(po/te ga\r kai\ Lusi/an e)le/gchei, pa=san tê\n ê(mete/ran r(êtorikê\n e)/oiken e)le/gchein.] Demosthenes almost alone (in the opinion of Dionysius) contrived to avoid the fault, because he imitated Plato.]

[Side-note: No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus.]

The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to be placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias, and to aim at the same object. But in reality it aims at a different object: it gives the dissuasive arguments, but omits the persuasive--as Phædrus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be said respecting the second discourse of Sokrates: which is of a character and purpose so totally disparate, that no fair comparison can be taken between it and the ostensible competitor. The mixture of philosophy, mysticism, and dithyrambic poetry, which the second discourse of Sokrates presents, was considered by a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.[122] In the Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with Lysias, and there the competition is fairer:[123] for Plato has there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Phædrus, and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles downward. But in the Phædrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric. Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydêmus. "Philosophy and politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes, and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he pleases; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an untoward attempt to join the two together."[124]

[Footnote 122: See the Epistol. of Dion. Halikarn. to Cneius Pompey--De Platone--pp. 755-765.]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Menexen. p. 237 seq. Stallbaum, Comm. in Menexenum, pp. 10-11.]

[Footnote 124: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306 A-C.]

[Side-note: Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant.]

Another important subject is also treated in the Phædrus. Sokrates delivers views both original and characteristic, respecting the efficacy of continuous discourse--either written to be read, or spoken to be heard without cross-examination--as a means of instruction. They are re-stated--in a manner substantially the same, though with some variety and fulness of illustration--in Plato's seventh Epistle[125] to the surviving friends of Dion. I have already touched upon these views in my eighth** Chapter, on the Platonic Dialogues generally, and have pointed out how much Plato understood to be involved in what he termed knowledge. No man (in his view) could be said to know, who was not competent to sustain successfully, and to apply successfully, a Sokratic cross-examination. Now knowledge, involving such a competency, certainly cannot be communicated by any writing, or by any fixed and unchangeable array of words, whether written or spoken. You must familiarise learners with the subject on many different sides, and in relation to many different points of view, each presenting more or less chance of error or confusion. Moreover, you must apply a different treatment to each mind, and to the same mind at different stages: no two are exactly alike, and the treatment adapted for one will be unsuitable for the other. While it is impossible, for these reasons, to employ any set forms of words, it will be found that the process of reading or listening leaves the reader or listener comparatively passive: there is nothing to stir the depths of the mind, or to evolve the inherent forces and dormant capacities. Dialectic conversation is the only process which can adapt itself with infinite variety to each particular case and moment--and which stimulates fresh mental efforts ever renewed on the part of each respondent and each questioner. Knowledge--being a slow result generated by this stimulating operation, when skilfully conducted, long continued, and much diversified--is not infused into, but evolved out of, the mind. It consists in a revival of those unchangeable Ideas or Forms, with which the mind during its state of eternal pre-existence had had communion. There are only a few privileged minds, however, that have had sufficient communion therewith to render such revival possible: accordingly, none but these few can ever rise to knowledge.[126]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Epistol. vii. pp. 341-344.]

[Footnote 126: Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the Phædrus, justly characterises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism--"die ächt Sokratische erhabene Verachtung alles Schreibens and alles rednerischen Redens," p. 70.]

[Side-note: Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know--or as an elegant pastime.]

Though knowledge cannot be first communicated by written matters, yet if it has been once communicated and subsequently forgotten, it may be revived by written matters. Writing has thus a real, though secondary, usefulness, as a memorandum. And Plato doubtless accounted written dialogues the most useful of all written compositions, because they imitated portions of that long oral process whereby alone knowledge had been originally generated. His dialogues were reports of the conversations purporting to have been held by Sokrates with others.

[Side-note: Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised.]

It is an excellent feature in the didactic theories of Plato, that they distinguish so pointedly between the passive and active conditions of the intellect; and that they postulate as indispensable, an habitual and cultivated mental activity, worked up by slow, long-continued, colloquy. To read or hear, and then to commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing more. But while, on this point, Plato's didactic theories deserve admiration, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility of being realised.[127] They mark out an idéal, which no person ever attained, either then or since--like the Platonic theory of rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and perfection required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic cross-examination--is a condition which scarce any one can ever fulfil: certainly no one, except upon a small range of subjects. Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.

[Footnote 127: A remark made by Sextus Empiricus (upon another doctrine which he is discussing) may be applied to this view of Plato--[Greek: to\ de\ le/gein o(/ti tê=| diomalismô=| tô=n pra/xeôn katalamba/nomen to\n e)/chonta tê\n peri\ to\n bi/on te/chnên, u(perphtheggome/nôn e)/sti tê\n a)nthrô/pôn phu/sin, kai\ eu)chome/nôn ma=llon ê)\ a)lêthê= lego/ntôn] (Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 244).]

[Side-note: No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy.]

Such a cross-examination involved the mastery of all the openings for doubt, difficulty, deception, or refutation, bearing on the subject: openings which a man is to profit by, if assailant--to keep guarded, if defendant. Now when we survey the Greek negative philosophy, as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus Empiricus--and when we recollect that between the second and the third of these names, there appeared three other philosophers equally or more formidable in the same vein, all whose arguments have perished (Arkesilaus, Karneades, Ænesidêmus)--we shall see that no man has ever been known competent both to strike and parry with these weapons, in a manner so skilful and ready as to amount to knowledge in the Platonic sense. But in so far as such knowledge is attainable or approachable, Plato is right in saying that it cannot be attained except by long dialectic practice. Reading books, and hearing lectures, are undoubtedly valuable aids, but insufficient by themselves. Modern times recede from it even more than ancient. Regulated oral dialectic has become unknown; the logical and metaphysical difficulties--which negative philosophy required to be solved before it would allow any farther progress--are now little heeded, amidst the multiplicity of observed facts, and theories adapted to and commensurate with those facts. This change in the character of philosophy is doubtless a great improvement. It is found that by acquiescing provisionally in the axiomata media, and by applying at every step the control of verification, now rendered possible by the multitude of ascertained facts--the sciences may march safely onward: notwithstanding that the logical and metaphysical difficulties, the puzzles ([Greek: a)pori/ai]) involved in philosophia prima and its very high abstractions, are left behind unsolved and indeterminate. But though the modern course of philosophy is preferable to the ancient, it is not for that reason to be considered as satisfactory. These metaphysical difficulties are not diminished either in force or relevancy, because modern writers choose to leave them unnoticed. Plato and Aristotle were quite right in propounding them as problems, the solution of which was indispensable to the exigencies and consistent schematism of the theorising intelligence, as well as to any complete discrimination between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Such they still remain, overlooked yet not defunct.

[Side-note: Plato's idéal philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here.]

Now all these questions would be solved by the idéal philosopher whom Plato in the Phædrus conceives as possessing knowledge: a person who shall be at once a negative Sokrates in excogitating and enforcing all the difficulties--and an affirmative match for Sokrates, as respondent in solving them: a person competent to apply this process to all the indefinite variety of individual minds, under the inspirations of the moment. This is a magnificent idéal. Plato affirms truly, that those teachers who taught rhetoric and philosophy by writing, could never produce such a pupil: and that even the Sokratic dialectic training, though indispensable and far more efficacious, would fail in doing so, unless in those few cases where it was favoured by very superior capacity--understood by him as superhuman, and as a remnant from the pre-existing commerce of the soul with the world of Forms or Ideas. The foundation therefore of the whole scheme rests upon Plato's hypothesis of an antecedent life of the soul, proclaimed by Sokrates here in his second or panegyrical discourse on Eros. The rhetorical teachers, with whom he here compares himself and whom he despises as aiming at low practical ends--might at any rate reply that they avoided losing themselves in such unmeasured and unwarranted hypotheses.

[Side-note: Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus.]

One remark yet remains to be made upon the doctrine here set forth by Plato: that no teaching is possible by means of continuous discourse spoken or written--none, except through prolonged and varied oral dialectic.[128] To this doctrine Plato does not constantly conform in his practice: he departs from it on various important occasions. In the Timæus, Sokrates calls upon the philosopher so named for an exposition on the deepest and most mysterious cosmical subjects. Timæus delivers the exposition in a continuous harangue, without a word of remark or question addressed by any of the auditors: while at the beginning of the Kritias (the next succeeding dialogue) Sokrates greatly commends what Timæus had spoken. The Kritias itself too (though unfinished) is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the Timæus is more abstruse than any other Platonic writing, we cannot imagine that Plato, at the time when he composed it, thought so meanly about continuous exposition, as a vehicle of instruction, as we find him declaring in the Phædrus. I point this out, because it illustrates my opinion that the different dialogues of Plato represent very different, sometimes even opposite, points of view: and that it is a mistake to treat them as parts of one preconceived and methodical system.

[Footnote 128: The historical Sokrates would not allow his oral dialectic process to be called teaching. He expressly says "I have never been the teacher of any one" (Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 33 A, 19 E): and he disclaimed the possession of knowledge. Aristotle too considers teaching as a presentation of truths, ready made and supposed to be known, by the teacher to learners, who are bound to believe them, [Greek: dei= ga\r pisteu/ein to\n mantha/nonta]. The Platonic Sokrates, in the Phædrus and Symposion, differs from both; he recognises no teaching except the perpetual generation of new thoughts and feelings, by means of stimulating dialectic colloquy, and the revival in the mind thereby of the experience of an antecedent life, during which some communion has been enjoyed with the world of Ideas or Forms.]

[Side-note: Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind--Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions.]

Plato is usually extolled by his admirers, as the champion of the Absolute--of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective necessity cogent and binding on every one. He is praised for having refuted Protagoras; who can find no standard beyond the individual recognition and belief, of his own mind or that of some one else. There is no doubt that Plato often talks in that strain: but the method followed in his dialogues, and the general principles of method which he lays down, here as well as elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. Of this the Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of generality, it proclaims the extreme of specialty. The objection which the Sokrates of the Phædrus advances against the didactic efficacy of written discourse, is founded on the fact, that it is the same to all readers--that it takes no cognizance of the differences of individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. Sokrates claims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege, that it is constant action and re-action between two individual minds--an appeal by the inherent force and actual condition of each, to the like elements in the other--an ever shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated to the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers and at the moment. The individuality of each mind--both questioner and respondent--is here kept in view as the governing condition of the process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by the same interrogation. The questioner cannot advance a step except by the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by his own suggestions; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and inconsistency, when he feels them, and not before. Each dialogist is (to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and falsehood, according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent, whichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the individual mind, in its actual condition then and there. It is to the individual mind alone, that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras asks for.

We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme opposite tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognise them both: but they can never be reconciled: sometimes he obeys and follows the one, sometimes the other.

If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one something which he called "Absolute Truth," one and the same alike imperative upon all--he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. To modify this "Absolute," according to the varieties of the persons addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence. If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes from all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects.