VIII. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY
It is well known that the Nazi conspirators rearmed Germany on a vast scale. The purpose of that rearmament is revealed in the secret records of the plans and deliberations of the inner councils of the Nazis. These records show that the reorganization of the German government, the financial wizardry of Hjalmar Schacht, and the total mobilization of the German economy largely under Hjalmar Schacht, Hermann Goering, and Walter Funk, were directed at a single goal: aggressive war.
I. ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR
The significance of the economic measures adopted and applied by the conspirators can be properly appraised only if they are placed in the larger social and political context of Nazi Germany. These economic measures were adopted while the conspirators were directing their vast propaganda apparatus to the glorification of war. They were adopted while the conspirators were perverting physical training into training for war. They were adopted while these conspirators were threatening to use force and were planning to use force to achieve their material and political objects. In short, these measures constitute in the field of economics and government administration the same preparation for aggressive war which dominated every aspect of the Nazi state.
In 1939 and 1940, after the Nazi aggression upon Poland, Holland, Belgium, and France, it became clear to the world that the Nazi conspirators had created probably the greatest instrument of aggression in history. That machine was built up almost in its entirety in a period of less than one decade. In May of 1939 Major General George Thomas, former Chief of the Military-Economic Staff in the Reich War Ministry, reported that the German Army had grown from seven Infantry divisions in 1933 to thirty-nine Infantry divisions, among them four fully motorized and three mountain divisions; eighteen Corps Headquarters; five Panzer divisions; twenty-two machine gun battalions. Moreover, General Thomas stated that the German Navy had greatly expanded by the launching, among other vessels, of two battleships of thirty-five thousand tons, four heavy cruisers of ten thousand tons, and other warships; further, that the Luftwaffe had grown to a point where it had a strength of two hundred sixty thousand men, twenty-one squadrons, consisting of two hundred forty echelons, and thirty-three Anti-Aircraft Batteries. (EC-28) General Thomas further reported, in a lecture delivered on 24 May 1939 in the Nazi Foreign Office, that out of the few factories permitted by the Versailles Treaty there had arisen * * *
“The mightiest armament industry now existing in the world. It has attained the performances which in part equal the German wartime performances and in part even surpasses them. Germany’s crude steel production is today the largest in the world after the Americans. The aluminum production exceeds that of America and of the other countries of the world very considerably. The output of our rifle, machine gun, and artillery factories is at present larger than that of any other state.” (EC-28)
These results—about which General Thomas spoke in his book entitled Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armaments Economy—were achieved only by making preparation for war the dominating objective of German economy. As General Thomas stated on page 479 of his book:
“History will know only a few examples of cases where a country has directed, even in peace time, all its economic forces deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war, as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two World Wars.” (2353-PS)
The task of mobilizing the German economy for aggressive war began promptly after the Nazi conspirators’ seizure of power. It was entrusted principally to Schacht, Goering, and Funk.
Schacht was appointed President of the Reichsbank in March 1933, and Minister of Economics in August 1934. The world did not know, however, that the responsibility for the execution of this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year Plan under Goering (EC-408). Nor did the world know that Schacht was designated Plenipotentiary for the War Economy on 21 May 1935, with complete control over the German civilian economy for war production in the Reich Defense Council, established by a top secret Hitler decree.
A letter dated 24 June 1935, at Berlin, and signed by von Blomberg, reads in part:
“* * * The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy. * * *
“* * * I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more * * *.” (2261-PS)
Through Schacht’s financial genius monetary measures were devised to restore German industry to full production; and through the control of imports and exports, which he devised under his new plan of 1934, German production was channeled in accordance with the requirements of the German war machine.
In 1936, with an eye to the experience in the First World War, the Nazi conspirators embarked on an ambitious plan to make Germany completely self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as rubber, gasoline, and steel, in a period of four years, so that Germany would be fully prepared for aggressive war. The responsibility for the execution of this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year Plan under Goering. A “memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of the War Economy,” dated 30 December 1936, and marked “Secret Command Matter”, sets out that the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need further definition. The third paragraph refers specifically to Minister-President, Generaloberst Goering as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, by authority of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor granted 18 October 1936. The existence of this program involved the reorganization and control of the whole German economy for war. (EC-408)
The military objectives of the German economy were clearly stated by General Thomas in a lecture on 28 February 1939, delivered at the Staff Instructor’s course. He stated:
“The National Socialist State, soon after taking over the power, has reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed it towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by the Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, commerce and professions became those powerful instruments the Fuehrer needs for his extensive plans, and we can say today that Hitler’s mobile politics, as well as the powerful efforts of the Army and economy, would not have been possible without the necessary reorganization by the National Socialist Government. We can now say that the economic organization as a whole corresponds with the needs, although slight adjustments will have to be made yet. Those reorganizations made a new system of economics possible which was necessary in view of our internal and foreign political situation as well as our financial problems. The directed economy, as we have it today, concerning agriculture, commerce and industry, is not only the expression of the present State principles, but at the same time also the economy of the country’s defense.” (EC-27)
This program was not undertaken in a vacuum; it was deliberately designed and executed to provide the necessary instrument of the Nazi conspirators’ plans for aggressive war. In September 1934 Schacht admitted to the American Ambassador in Berlin that the Hitler Party was absolutely committed to war, and that the people too were ready and willing. (EC-461) At the same time Schacht promulgated his new plan for the control of imports and exports in the interest of rearmament. A year later he was appointed Plenipotentiary for War Economy by top secret decree. (2261-PS)
On 4 September 1936 Goering announced, at a Cabinet meeting attended by von Blomberg, Schacht, and others, that Hitler had issued instructions to the Reich War Minister on the basis that “the show-down with Russia is inevitable,” and added that “all measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” (EC-416)
In the same month the office of the Four Year Plan was created with the mission of making Germany self-sufficient for war in four years. Goering regarded it as his task, within four years, to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war. (EC-408)
2. COLLABORATION OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS IN REARMAMENT
Although the Nazi government officials provided the leadership in preparing Germany for war, they received also the enthusiastic and invaluable cooperation of the German industrialists.
On the invitation of Goering, approximately 25 of the leading industrialists of Germany, together with Schacht, attended a meeting in Berlin on 20 February 1933. This was shortly before the German election of 5 March 1933. At this meeting Hitler announced the conspirators’ aim to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of the Wehrmacht. Among those present at that meeting were Gustav Krupp, head of the munitions firm, Alfried Krupp, A.G.; four leading officials of the I. G. Farben Works, one of the world’s largest chemical concerns; Albert Vogler, head of United Steel Works of Germany; and other leading industrialists. This meeting is described in the following affidavit of George von Schnitzler:
“I, George von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farben, make the following deposition under oath:
“At the end of February 1933, four members of the Vorstand of I. G. Farben, including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, and myself were asked by the office of the President of the Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house, the purpose of which was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues of mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation reached me during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went to the meeting which was attended by about 20 persons, who I believe were mostly leading industrialists from the Ruhr.
“Among those present I remember:
“Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the Reichsbank again and not yet Minister of Economics.
“Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 presided over the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, which later on was changed into the semi-official organization ‘Reichsgruppe Industrie.’
“Dr. Albert Vogler, the leading man of the _Vereinigte Stahlwerke_.
“Von Lowenfeld from an industrial work in Essen.
“Dr. Stein, head of the Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria, a mine which belongs to the I. G. Dr. Stein was an active member of the Deutsche Volkspartei.
“I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host.
“While I had expected the appearance of Goering, Hitler entered the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat at the top of the table. In a long speech, he talked mainly about the danger of communism over which he pretended that he just had won a decisive victory.
“He then talked about the Bundnis—alliance—into which his party and the Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei had entered. This latter party, in the meantime, had been reorganized by Herr von Papen. At the end he came to the point which seemed to me the purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance that the two aforementioned parties should gain the majority in the coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen thanked Hitler for his speech. After Hitler had left the room, Dr. Schacht proposed to the meeting the raising of an election fund of, as far as I remember, RM 3,000,000. The fund should be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according to their relative strength at the time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the Deutsche Volkspartei should be included * * *.” (EC-439)
In a speech delivered to the industrialists in Berlin on 20 February 1933, Hitler stated:
“Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound idea of authority and personality. * * * I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them in Nationalism, in the value of strength and power of individual personality. * * * If one rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced by something better. * * * We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be introduced more or less with an iron fist just as once upon a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes.
* * * * * *
“With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way.”
“* * * We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other side completely. While still gaining power, one should not start the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no further possible development, shall one strike. * * *
“* * * Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election does not bring about a decision. * * *
“The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be decided at Geneva but in Germany, when we have gained internal strength through internal peace.” (D-203)
In reply to these statements Goering, who was present at that same meeting, declared:
“That the sacrifice asked for surely would be much easier for industry to bear if it realized that the election of March 5th will surely be the last one for the next ten years, probably even for the next hundred years.” (D-203)
In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933, found in the personal files of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Krupp briefly described this same meeting, and recalled that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of the 25 industrialists present. (D-204)
In April 1933, after Hitler had entrenched himself in power, Gustav Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, which was the largest association of German industrialists, submitted to Hitler the plan of that association for the reorganization of German industry. In connection therewith Krupp undertook to bring the association into line with the aims of the conspirators, and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of their policies. In a letter of transmittal (D-157), Krupp stated that the plan of reorganization which he submitted on behalf of the association of industrialists, was characterized by the desire to coordinate economic measures and political necessity, adopting the Fuehrer conception of the new German state. In the plan of reorganization itself, Krupp stated:
“The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long time. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German Industry, I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich Government.” (D-157)
The ideas of Krupp were subsequently adopted.
Under the decree introducing the leadership principle into industry, each group of industry was required to have a leader who was to serve without compensation. The leaders were to be appointed and could be removed at the discretion of the Minister of Economics. The charter of each group was to be created by the leader, who was obligated to lead his group in accordance with the principles of the National Socialist State (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part I, 1194, Sec. 11, 12, 16). The introduction of the leadership principle into the organizations of business centralized authority and guaranteed the efficient execution of orders, which the government issued to business, in the effort to promote a war economy.
The overwhelming support given by the German industrialists to the Nazi war program is described in a speech prepared by Gustav Krupp in January 1944, for delivery at the University of Berlin:
“War material is life-saving for one’s own people, and whoever works and performs in those spheres can be proud of it. Here, enterprise as a whole, finds its highest justification of existence. This justification, I may inject this here, crystallized especially during the time of interregnum between 1919 and 1933, when Germany was lying down disarmed. * * *
* * * * * *
“It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German armed forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or experience.
* * * * * *
“Only through the secret activity of German enterprise, together with the experience gained meanwhile through production of peacetime goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall into step with the new tasks arrived at, restoring Germany’s military power. Only through all that could the entirely new and various problems, brought up by the Fuehrer’s Four-Year Plan for German enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to supply the new raw materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order to make German economy independent and strong—in short, to make it war-worthy.
* * * * * *
“I think I may state here that the German enterprises followed the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great intentions of the Fuehrer their own by fair competition and conscious gratitude, and became his faithful followers. How else could the tasks between 1933 and 1939, and especially those after 1939, have been overcome?” (D-317)
3. THE USE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES TO FACILITATE REARMAMENT
It must be emphasized that the secret rearmament program was launched immediately upon the seizure of power by the Nazi conspirators. On 4 April 1933 the Reich Cabinet passed a resolution establishing a Reich Defense Council. The function of this council was secretly to mobilize for war. At the second meeting of the working committee of the Councillors for Reich Defense, the predecessor of the Reich Defense Council, which was held on 22 May 1933, the chairman was Keitel. Keitel stated that the Reich Defense Council would immediately undertake to prepare for war emergency. He stressed the urgency of the task of organizing a war economy, and announced that the council stood ready to brush aside all obstacles. Fully aware of the fact that their action was in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Keitel emphasized the extreme importance of absolute secrecy:
“No document ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into the hands of the enemies’ intelligence service. Orally transmitted, matters are not provable; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” (EC-177)
The singleness of purpose with which the Nazi conspirators geared the German economy to the forging of a war machine is further shown by the secret minutes of the second meeting of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council, held on 7 February 1934. At this meeting at which Capt. Schmundt, Col. Guerian, Maj. Gen. von Reichenau, Maj. Warlimont, and Jodl—then a Lt. Col.—were present, Lieutenant-General Beck pointed out that:
“The actual state of preparation is the purpose of this session.” (EC-404)
Detailed measures of financing a future war were discussed and it was pointed out that the financial aspects of the war economy would be regulated by the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, which was headed by Schacht. (EC-404)
Under his secret appointment as Plenipotentiary-General of the War Economy, Schacht had the express function of placing all economic forces of the nation in the services of the Nazi war machine. The secret defense law of 21 May 1935 in effect gave Schacht charge of the entire war economy. In case of war he was to be virtual economic dictator of Germany. His task was to place all economic forces into service for the conduct of war and to secure economically the life of the German people. The Ministers of Economics, Food, Agriculture, Labor, and Forestry, as well as all Reich agencies directly under the Fuehrer, were subordinated to him. He was to be responsible for the financing as well as for the conduct of the war; and he was further authorized to issue ordinances within his sphere of responsibility, even if these deviated from existing laws. (2261-PS)
The rearmament of Germany proceeded at a rapid pace. By summer of 1935 the Nazi conspirators were emboldened to make plans for the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and at the tenth meeting of the working committee of the council the question of measures to be taken in connection with the proposed reoccupation of the Rhineland was discussed.
At that meeting, on 26 June 1935, it was said that the Rhineland required special treatment because of the assurances given by Hitler to the French that no military action was being undertaken in the demilitarized zone. Among the matters requiring special treatment was the preparation of economic mobilization, a task specifically entrusted to Schacht as secret Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. In this connection it was stated:
“* * * Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only these preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of such preparations, or the intention of them must be kept in strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich.” (EC-405)
Preparations of various types were thereupon discussed.
The rapid success of German rearmament is attributable to the work of Schacht. In the fall of 1934, the Nazi conspirators announced the “New Plan”, which aimed at the control of imports and exports in order to obtain the raw materials needed for armaments and the foreign currency required to sustain the armament program. The “New Plan” was the creation of Schacht. Under the plan, Schacht controlled imports by extending the system of supervisory boards for import control, which was previously limited to the main groups of raw materials, to all goods imported into Germany. The requirement of licenses for imports enabled the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports to those commodities which served their war aims.
Subsequently, in February 1935, the Devisen Law was passed (Reichsgesetzblatt 1935, I, 105). Under it, all transactions involving foreign exchange were subject to the approval of Devisenstellen (Foreign Exchange Control Offices). By thus controlling the disposition of foreign exchange, the conspirators were able to manipulate foreign trade so as to serve their ends.
Every aspect of the German economy was geared to war under the guidance of the Nazi conspirators, particularly Schacht. In a study of the economic mobilization for war as of 30 September 1934, it was stated that steps had already been taken to build up stock piles, to construct new facilities for the production of scarce goods, to redeploy industry to secure areas, and to control fiscal and trade policies. The task of stock piling, it was announced, had been hampered by the requirement of secrecy and camouflage. Reserves of automobile fuels and stocks of coal were accumulated, and the production of synthetic oil was accelerated. Civilian supply was purposely organized so that most plants would be working for the German Armed Forces. Studies were made of the possibility of barter trade with supposedly neutral countries in case of war. (EC-128)
Financing of the armament program presented a difficult problem for the conspirators. In 1934 and 1935, the German economy could by no possibility have raised funds for the Nazis’ extensive rearmament program through taxes and public loans. From the outset, the armament program involved “the engagement of the last reserves.” Moreover, apart from the problem of raising the huge sums required to sustain this program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, in the early stages, to conceal the extent of their armament activities.
After considering various techniques of financing the armament program, Schacht proposed the use of “mefo” bills. One of the primary advantages of this method was the fact that through its use figures indicating the extent of rearmament, which would have become public through the use of other methods, could be kept secret. “Mefo” bills were used exclusively for armament financing. Transactions in “mefo” bills worked as follows: “Mefo” bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a limited liability company. The spelling of the word “mefo” is taken from the name of this company, Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft, m.b.h. (MEFO). This company had a nominal capital of one million Reichsmarks and was merely a dummy organization. The bills were received by all German banks for possible rediscounting with the Reichsbank. The bills were guaranteed by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the fact that they appeared neither in the published statements of the Reichsbank nor in the budget figures.
The “mefo” bill system continued to be used until 1 April 1938. Up to that date 12 billion Reichsmarks of “mefo” bills for the financing of rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed necessary to conceal the vast progress of German rearmament, “mefo” financing was discontinued at that time. (EC-436)
Further sources of funds upon which Schacht drew to finance the secret armament program were the funds of political opponents of the Nazi regime, and Marks of foreigners on deposit in the Reichsbank. As Schacht boasted in a memorandum to Hitler dated 3 May 1935:
“Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents.” (1168-PS)
The outstanding “mefo” bills represented at all times a threat to the stability of the currency because they could be tendered to the Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation would automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present threat of inflation. Schacht nevertheless continued on his course, because he stood with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he fully recognized the basic idea of National Socialism, and because he felt that at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, could be considered irrelevant.
High-ranking military officers paid tribute to Schacht’s contrivances on behalf of the Nazi war machine. An article written for the “Military Weekly Gazette” in January 1937 stated:
“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. The defense force owes it to Schacht’s skill and great ability that, in defiance of all currency difficulties it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.”
After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators redoubled their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The Four Year Plan was proclaimed by Hitler in his address at the Nurnberg Party Convention on 9 September 1936. It was given a statutory foundation by the decree concerning the execution of the Four Year Plan dated 18 October 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1936, I, 887). By this decree Goering was put in charge of the plan. He was authorized to enact any legal and administrative measures deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment of his task, and to issue orders and instructions to all government agencies, including the highest Reich authorities. The purpose of the plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete self-sufficiency in essential raw materials, notably motor fuel, rubber, textile fiber, and non-ferrous metals, and to intensify preparations for war. The development of synthetic products was greatly accelerated despite their high costs.
Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and espionage activities abroad. Thus, in a speech on 1 November 1937 before the Wehrmachtakademie, General Thomas stated:
“If you consider that one will need during the war considerable means in order to organize the necessary propaganda, in order to pay for the espionage service, and for similar purposes, then one should be clear that our internal Mark would be of no use therefore, and that Foreign Exchange will be needed.” (EC-14)
This need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by virtue of the espionage and propaganda services rendered free of charge to the Nazi state by leading German industrial concerns. A memorandum dated at Essen on 12 October 1935, which was found in the files of the Krupp company, contains the subheading: “Concerns:—distribution official propaganda literature abroad with help of our foreign connections.” It goes on to say that on the morning of 11 October the district representative of the Ribbentrop Private Foreign Office, Dienststelle Ribbentrop, made an appointment by telephone with Mr. Lachman to arrive at an appointed time. The memorandum continues:
“In answer to my question, with whom I was dealing and which official bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s Private Foreign Office, but that a Mr. Landrat Bollman was such and that he himself had come at Mr. Bollman’s order.” (D-206)
After discussing the confusion in the field of foreign propaganda, the memorandum states that Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office is creating a private organization for foreign propaganda, and that for this purpose the support of the Krupp firm and especially an index of addresses are needed. This request received the following response:
“I informed Mr. Lachman that our firm has put itself years ago at the disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda, and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the utmost.” (D-206)
These activities are demonstrated by another document found in the files of the Krupp company. A memorandum prefaced by Herr Sonnenberg, on 14 October 1937, reports a meeting at Essen on 12 October 1937. The government’s request for assistance in foreign intelligence activities met this response:
“On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined Services Ministry (R.K.M.) as required.” (D-167)
Meanwhile the conspirators’ program of self-sufficiency was proceeding with great speed. The production of steel, for example, as shown in official German publication, rose as follows:
Tons 1933 74,000 1934 105,000 1935 145,000 1936 186,000 1937 217,000 1938 477,000
The production of gasoline increased at an even greater tempo: from 387,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938 (Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich, 1939-1942).
The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament program with a sense of urgency betraying their awareness of the imminence of war. At a meeting on 4 September 1936 Goering pointed out that “all measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the state of imminent danger of war.” He pointed out that:
“* * * if war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the present moment. They are therefore to be taken.” (EC-416)
The extreme urgency was manifested by Goering’s remark that
“* * * existent reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Fuehrer has been reached; in case of war they are not a reliable backing in any case.” (EC-416)
Schacht was advised by a top secret letter dated 31 August 1936 that Hitler ordered all formations of the air force to be ready by 1 April 1937. (1301-PS)
After their successes in Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for the war of aggression which they planned to launch. In a conference on 14 October 1938, shortly before the Nazis made their first demands on Poland, Goering stated:
“* * * Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks like, and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the way which he will overcome with the utmost energy and ruthlessness.” (1301-PS)
The supply of foreign currency had sunken because of preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Replenishment was considered necessary. At the same conference, on 14 October 1938, Goering declared:
“These gains made through the export are to be used for an increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by export activities.” (1301-PS)
Goering had received the order from the Fuehrer to increase armaments to an abnormal extent, the air force having first priority, and interpreted it as follows:
“Within the shortest time, the air force should be increased five fold; also the navy should create war weapons more rapidly, and the army should produce large amounts of war weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery and heavy tanks. Along with this a larger production of armaments must go, especially fuel, rubber, powders and explosives must be moved to the foreground. This should be coupled with an accelerated expansion of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads.” (1301-PS)
In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued between Goering and Schacht, as a result of which Schacht resigned his position as head of the Ministry of Economics and Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in November 1937. He was removed from the presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. Regardless of the details of this controversy, Schacht’s departure in no way implied any disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis. Schacht took particular pride in his vast attainments in the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi war machine. In a letter to General Thomas Schacht wrote:
“I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have always considered a rearmament of the German people as condition sine qua non of the establishment of a new German nation.” (EC-257)
In a letter written to General Von Blomberg, on 8 July 1937, Schacht wrote:
“The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would in that event never take place entirely independent from the rest of the war mechanism but would be aimed at accomplishment of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to the Defense Act.” (EC-252)
In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated with representatives of the three branches of the armed forces in “war games in war economy” at Godesberg. A report of these exercises, entitled “War economy tasks in Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between the 25th of May and the 2nd of June,” records the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht:
“Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble personally to participate in our final discussion today despite all your other activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy tasks shown at all times and your presence is renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.”
* * * * * *
“I want to point out, however, that all matters and all information received has to be kept in strictest secrecy * * *.” (EC-174)
The annexation of Austria was apparently a goal which Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former Austrian National Bank he declared:
“* * * Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the bearer of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the German name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such a mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich and based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which, regardless of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the soul of Europe.”
* * * * * *
“We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain degree justified, but that the methods of effecting this union was terrible. This method which certainly did not suit one or the other power was nothing but the consequence of countless perfidies and brutal acts and violence which foreign countries have practiced against us * * *.”
* * * * * *
“* * * I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense and there I would not like to depart from this consideration. I know that there are even in this country a few people—I believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with the events of the last few days, but nobody, I believe, doubts the goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it, and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and within the German community, but not to disturb us from without.” (EC-297-A)
A memorandum of 7 January 1939, written by Schacht and other directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urged a balancing of the budget in view of the threatening danger of inflation. The memorandum continued:
“* * * From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the Reichsbank] therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing, and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible.” (EC-369)
The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer possible. That was merely a judgment on the situation and not a moral stand, for there was no opposition to Hitler’s policy of aggression. Doubts were merely entertained as to whether that policy could be financed. Hitler’s letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht’s departure from the Reichsbank paid high tribute to Schacht’s great efforts in furthering the program of the Nazi conspirators. The armed forces by now had enabled Hitler to take Austria and the Sudetenland. Hitler, in his letter to Schacht declared:
“Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of national rearmament.” (EC-397)
Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was retained as a minister without portfolio and special confidential adviser to Hitler. Funk stepped into Schacht’s position as president of the Reichsbank (Voelkisher Beobachter of 21 January 1939). Funk was uninhibited by fears of inflation, and like Goering, under whom he had served in the Four Year Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to attack Poland. In a letter written on 25 August 1939, only a few days before the attack on Poland, Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank was prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency and credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic tasks which lay ahead. (699-PS)
It seems clear that the Nazi conspirators directed the whole of the German economy toward preparation for aggressive war. To paraphrase the words of Goering, the conspirators gave the German people “guns instead of butter.” They also gave history its most striking example of a nation gearing itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war. Their economic preparations, formulated and applied with the energy of Goering, the financial wizardry of Schacht, and the willing complicity of Funk, among others, were the indispensable prerequisites for their subsequent campaign of aggression.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (E). │ I │ 21 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *699-PS │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August │ │ │1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│ │ │49) │ III │ 509 │ │ │ *1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3│ │ │May 1935, concerning the financing of │ │ │the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827 │ │ │ *1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament │ │ │including minutes of conference with │ │ │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │ │ │1938, concerning acceleration of │ │ │rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868 │ │ │ *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │ │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │ │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │ │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │ │May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │ │the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 │ │ │ *2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │ │Facts for History of German War and │ │ │Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071 │ │ │ *3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │ │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │ │(USA 782) │ VI │ 718 │ │ │ *3901-PS │Letter written November 1932 by Schacht,│ │ │Krupp and others to the Reich President.│ │ │(USA 851) │ VI │ 796 │ │ │ *D-157 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April │ │ │1933, with enclosure. (USA 765) │ VI │ 1063 │ │ │ *D-167 │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn │ │ │concerning exchange of intelligence │ │ │involving Krupp works. (USA 766) │ VI │ 1069 │ │ │ *D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of │ │ │industry before the election of March │ │ │1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080 │ │ │ *D-204 │Statement of Krupp concerning political │ │ │organization of state and economy, 22 │ │ │February 1933 (USA 768) │ VI │ 1085 │ │ │ *D-206 │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on │ │ │distribution of propaganda abroad │ │ │through foreign connections of Krupp │ │ │firm. (USA 769) │ VI │ 1085 │ │ │ *D-317 │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the │ │ │Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944. │ │ │(USA 770) │ VII │ 21 │ │ │ *EC-14 │Speech before the Wehrmacht War College,│ │ │1 November 1937, by Major-General │ │ │Thomas. (USA 758) │ VII │ 246 │ │ │ *EC-27 │Address of Major-General Thomas before │ │ │the Staff Instructors’ Course, on 28 │ │ │February 1939 in Saarow-Pieskow. (USA │ │ │759) │ VII │ 250 │ │ │ *EC-28 │Lecture of Major-General Thomas │ │ │delivered, 24 May 1939, at the Foreign │ │ │Office. (USA 760) │ VII │ 250 │ │ │ *EC-128 │Report on state of preparations for │ │ │war-economic mobilization as of 30 │ │ │September 1934. (USA 623) │ VII │ 306 │ │ │ *EC-174 │Summary “war economy” trip to Godesberg │ │ │undertaken by General Staff between 25 │ │ │May and 2 June 1937. (USA 761) │ VII │ 326 │ │ │ *EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │ │Committee of the Reich Defense held on │ │ │26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328 │ │ │ *EC-252 │Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 July │ │ │1937. (USA 762) │ VII │ 346 │ │ │ *EC-257 │Personal letter from Schacht to Thomas, │ │ │29 December 1937. (USA 763) │ VII │ 347 │ │ │ *EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │ │Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │ │price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380 │ │ │ *EC-293 │Letter from Schacht to Reich and │ │ │Prussian Economics Minister, 24 December│ │ │1935, concerning army demands for raw │ │ │material. (USA 834) │ VII │ 391 │ │ │ *EC-297-A │Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank │ │ │President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938. │ │ │(USA 632) │ VII │ 394 │ │ │ *EC-369 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │ │Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631) │ VII │ 426 │ │ │ *EC-383 │Letter 16 January 1937 with │ │ │enclosure—article about Schacht │ │ │appearing in the Military weekly │ │ │Gazette. (USA 640) │ VII │ 436 │ │ │ *EC-397 │Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 │ │ │January 1939. (USA 650) │ VII │ 438 │ │ │ *EC-404 │Minutes of conference of Sixth Session │ │ │of Working Committee of Reichs Defense │ │ │Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934.│ │ │(USA 764) │ VII │ 443 │ │ │ *EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │ │Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 │ │ │June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450 │ │ │ *EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │ │Plan and preparation of the war economy,│ │ │30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465 │ │ │ *EC-416 │Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September │ │ │1936. (USA 635) │ VII │ 471 │ │ │ *EC-436 │Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 4 1945. │ │ │(USA 620) │ VII │ 494 │ │ │ *EC-439 │Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November │ │ │1945. (USA 618) │ VII │ 501 │ │ │ *EC-461 │Extracts from Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, │ │ │1933-38. (USA 58) │ VII │ 515 │ │ │ Affidavit J │Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January │ │ │1946. │ VIII │ 653 │ │ │ Chart No. 9 │The Organization of German Business. │ VIII │ 778
IX. LAUNCHING OF WARS OF AGGRESSION
I. THE PLOTTING OF AGGRESSIVE WAR
The aggressive war phase of the case against the Nazi conspirators is, in the view of the American prosecution, the heart of the case. Everything else in this case, however dramatic, however sordid, however shocking and revolting to the common instinct of civilized peoples, is incidental or subordinate to, the fact of aggressive war.
All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, the suppressions of human freedom employed in the seizure of power, and even the concentration camps and the crimes against humanity, the persecutions, tortures and murders committed—all these things would have had little international juridical significance except for the fact that they were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against peaceful neighboring peoples. Even the aspects of the case involving “war crimes” in the strict sense are merely the inevitable, proximate result of the wars of aggression launched and waged by these conspirators, and of the kind of warfare they waged. It was total war, the natural result of the totalitarian party-dominated state that waged it; it was atrocious war, the natural result of the doctrines, designs and purposes of the Nazi conspirators.
The substantive rule of law which is controlling on this part of the case is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which, so far as is pertinent here, reads as follows:
“Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, either as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.
“The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
“(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing * * *”
“Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”
Five important principles are contained in these portions of the Charter:
(1) The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts constituting “crimes against peace”;
(2) The term “Crimes against peace” embraces planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of illegal war;
(3) The term “Crimes against peace” also embraces participation in a common plan or conspiracy to commit illegal war;
(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances; (these two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same; it will be sufficient for the prosecution to show either that the war was aggressive irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or that the war was in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances irrespective of whether or not it was a war of aggression; but the American prosecution will undertake to establish that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by the Nazi conspirators were illegal for both reasons);
(5) Individual criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the Charter not merely by reasons of direct, immediate participation in the crime. It is sufficient to show that a defendant was a leader, an organizer, instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the formulation or in the execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace. In this connection, the Charter declares that the responsibility of conspirators extends not only to their own acts but also to all acts performed by any persons in execution of the conspiracy.
It is familiar law in the United States that if two or more persons set out to rob a bank in accordance with a criminal scheme to that end, and in the course of carrying out their scheme one of the conspirators commits the crime of murder, all the participants in the planning and execution of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether or not they had any other personal participation in the killing. This is a simple rule of law declared in the Charter. All the parties to a common plan or conspiracy are the agents of each other and each is responsible as principal for the acts of all the others as his agents.
The documentary evidence assembled on this aggressive war aspect of the case will show the following: (1) the conspiratorial nature of the planning and preparation which underlay the Nazi aggressions already known to history; (2) the deliberate premeditation which preceded those acts of aggression; (3) the evil motives which led to the attacks; (4) the individual participation of named persons in the Nazi conspiracy for aggression; (5) the deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by the Nazi aggressors as they arose for their criminal activities.
The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the initiation of the first war of aggression was very short. This critical period of illegal preparation and scheming, which ultimately set the whole world aflame, covered 6 years, from 1933 to 1939. Crowded into these 6 short years is the making of tragedy for mankind.
A full understanding of these 6 years, and the 6 years of war that followed, requires that this period be divided into phases that reflect the development and execution of the Nazi master plan. These phases may be said to be six. The first was primarily preparatory, although it did involve overt acts. That phase covers roughly the period from 1933 to 1936. In that period the Nazi conspirators, having acquired government control of Germany by the middle of 1933, turned their attention toward utilization of that control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this stage was to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. In this they succeeded.
The second phase of their aggression was shorter. As the conspiracy gained strength it gained speed. During each phase the conspirators succeeded in accomplishing more and more in less and less time until toward the end of the period, the rate of acceleration of their conspiratorial movement was enormous. The second phase of their utilization of control for foreign aggression involved the actual seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order. By March 1939 they had succeeded in this phase.
The third phase may be measured in months rather than years, from March to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful and having been consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, the conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war, if necessary. By September 1939 war was upon the world.
The fourth phase of the aggression consisted of expanding the war into a general European war of aggression. By April 1941 the war which had theretofore involved Poland, the United Kingdom, and France, had been expanded by invasions into Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and into the Balkans.
In the next phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war eastward by invasion of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The sixth phase consisted of collaboration with and instigation of their Pacific ally, Japan, and precipitated the attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor.
The essential elements of the crime of aggressive war can be made out by a mere handful of captured German documents. These documents will leave no reasonable doubt concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war or concerning the conspiratorial premeditation of that war. After the corpus of the crime has been demonstrated in this way, the documentary evidence will be discussed in subsequent sections, in a more or less chronological and detailed presentation of the relevant activities of the conspirators from 1933 to 1941.
Each of the ten documents which will be discussed in this section has been selected to establish the basic facts concerning a particular phase of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression. Each document has met three standards of selection: each is conspiratorial in nature; each is believed to have been hitherto unknown to history; and each is self-contained and tells its own story.
A. 1933 to 1936.
The period of 1933 to 1936 was characterized by an orderly, planned sequence of preparation for war. The essential objective of this period was the formulation and execution of the plan to rearm and re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the treaty of Versailles and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining powers to be used against other nations.
A secret speech of Hitler’s delivered to all supreme commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy (789-PS). The report of the speech was found in the OKW files captured at Flensberg. Hitler spoke as follows:
“November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:
“The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological [weltanschaulich] education of the German people by the Party.
“When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of setbacks which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small. Then beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.
“One year later, Austria came. This step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate, and with that basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west, or vice-versa”. (789-PS)
There are some curious antitheses of thought in that, speech, as in most of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by providence with the making of “brutal decisions.” He constantly speaks of how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German people were with him. But he does give a brief summary of this early period: the organization of the mass of the people, the extension of organization to the armed forces, and the various “brutal decisions” that were made.
A top secret letter dated 24 June 1935, from General von Blomberg to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces demonstrates the preparations for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period. Attached to that letter is a copy of a Secret Reich Defense law of 21 May 1935, and a copy of a decision of the Reichcabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Reich (2261-PS). These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. Von Blomberg’s letter reads as follows:
“In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935, and of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich’s Defense Council. The publication of the Reich’s defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
“The Fuehrer and the Reichschancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht to be ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War economy’.
“I request that the copies of the Reich’s defense law needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war.
“I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.” (2261-PS)
Underneath von Blomberg’s signature is an indorsement, “Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To Defense-Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.” (2261-PS)
Attached to this letter is the statute referred to as the Reich’s Defense Law of 21 May 1935, enacted by the Reichscabinet. The law covers in detail preparations for a state of defense, mobilization, and appointment of the Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy (Schacht) with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation of the war. Part III provides for penalties. The law is signed, “The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reichsminister of War, von Blomberg; the Reichsminister of the Interior, Frick.” At the bottom of it there is this note:
“Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935.
“The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935.
“The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler.” (2261-PS)
Thus, although the publication itself stated the law was made public, and although the law became effective immediately, publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler.
There was also further attached to von Blomberg’s letter a copy of the decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Realm. This decree deals largely with organization for economic preparation for the war. This law of May 1935 was the cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators, and makes clear the relationship of Schacht to this preparation. (2261-PS)
B. Formulation and Execution of Plans to Invade Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The next phase of aggression was the formulation and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order.
One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents which have come to hand is one which has come to be known as the Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours (386-PS). In the course of that meeting Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their foreign policy, and requested, “That his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” The recorder of the minutes of this meeting, Colonel Hossbach, was the Fuehrer’s adjutant. Present at this conspiratorial meeting, among others, were Erich Raeder, Constantin von Neurath, and Hermann Wilhelm Goering. The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime (386-PS). Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force. They would provide “lebensraum” (living space) and improve Germany’s military position for further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out. These notes, which destroy any possible doubt concerning the Nazi’s premeditation of their crimes against peace, read as follows:
“Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.
“Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor;
“The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. Blomberg;
“The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Fritsch;
“The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. Raeder;
“The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Goering;
“The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr v. Neurath;
“Oberst Hossbach [the adjutant who took the minutes].
“The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s conference was of such high importance, that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his four and a half years in government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.
“The Fuehrer then stated: The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation comprises eighty-five million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which can not be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space then that is the result of historical development spread over several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in Germany itself.
“Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about one to three generations.
“Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.
“Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:
“A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total autarchy can be attained:
“1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.
“2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can not.
“3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.
“4. Edible fats—possible.
“B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite NO.
“The general increase of living standards, compared with thirty to forty years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could not be avoided.
“The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.
“Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationing is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.
“Participation in world economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18), as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.
“The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those states who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent, generations. The development of great worldwide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root [Volksstamm] has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.” (386-PS)
After this somewhat jumbled discussion of geopolitical economic theory and of the need for expansion and “Lebensraum”, Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach notes, posed a question and proceeded to answer it:
“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.
“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.
“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.
“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable.
“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.
“Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?
“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:
“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.
“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.
“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.
“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius—expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan World.
“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population to become too low.
“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:
“Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.
“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.
“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are practically concluded.
“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.
“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a ‘point of weakness in the regime.’ Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.
“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.
“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.
“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.
“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another State that it cannot ‘proceed’ against Germany.
“For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.
“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.
“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to ’45, then the behaviour of France, England, Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner.
“The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability England and perhaps also France, have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the nonparticipation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without British support, is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England’s support, it would also not be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally we should in every case, have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia, in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for five to six million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of two million from Czechoslovakia, and of one million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve Divisions, representing a new Division per one million population.
“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.
“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.
“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.
“Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil War—then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.
“The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.
“Following recent experiences in the course of events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white [Franco’s] hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions.
“As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan fighting forces.
“If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.
“The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the speed of lightning [blitzartig schnell].
“Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications—which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had, assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.
“Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France’s attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.
“In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.
“The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.
“(Signed) Hossbach”. (386-PS)
The record of what happened thereafter is well-known to history. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred in March 1938. Pressure on Czechoslovakia resulted in the Munich Pact of September 1938. That Pact was violated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by Germany on 15 March 1939.
Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia (388-PS). The file was found in a cellar of the Platterhof at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It consists of a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is “Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen”, (Basic Principles for “Case Green”), “Green” being a codeword for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Item No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April 1938. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates to “Case Green”. This meeting occurred within approximately one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the “Plan Green”, to take into account changed conditions, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. Item 2 reads:
“Berlin, 22 April 1938.
“Bases of the Dissertation on Gruen.
“Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:
“A. Political Aspect.
“1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.
“2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
“3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.)
“Military Conclusions.
“1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security measures.
“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail—which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.
“3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.
“The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)
“4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize ‘Gruen.’
“Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)
“5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from ‘Gruen’. [‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put ‘Case Rot’ into operation at any time.
“C. Propaganda.
“1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)
“2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
[Initialled by Schmundt]” (388-PS)
Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this document, under the heading “Political Aspect”, which reads as follows:
“Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an upshot of an anti-German demonstration).” (388-PS)
The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes that consideration was being given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident.
C. Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland.
The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. Here again the careful and meticulous record keeping of Hitler’s adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own handwriting which throws down the mask (L-79). The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer’s Study in the New Reich Chancellery. Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present. The subject of the meeting was, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.”
The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt’s record of the meeting of 23 May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a pretrial interrogation. The minutes read as follows:
“Top Secret
“To be transmitted by officer only
“Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39”
“Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.
“Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.
“Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).
“Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.
“The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:
“1. Analysis of the situation.
“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.
“Secrecy is the first essential for success.
“The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form below.
“Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:
“1. The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
“2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.
“In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields.
Our military situation improved enormously.
“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.
“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.
“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘Encroachments’. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.
“A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.
“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.
“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:
“The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.
“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.
“There is no other possibility for Europe.
“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember—blockade.
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.
“The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.
“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.
“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.
“It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.
“The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:
“To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. [This sentence is underscored in the original German text.]
“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.
“Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers [France and England].
“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.
“Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland—beginning with an attack on Poland—will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.
“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.
“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.
“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.
“If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.
“What will this struggle be like? [This sentence is underscored in the German original.]
“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.
“The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally to force them into cooperation.
“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.
“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.
“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.
“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.
“Question: Short or long war?
“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years’ duration.
“History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.
“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.
“England is the driving force against Germany.
“Her strength lies in the following:
“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.
“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.
“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.
“England’s weakness:
“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.
“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet’s protection.
“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result.
“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.
“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by—
“1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned.
“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.
“3. Human failings.
“4. Weather conditions.
“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.
“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.
“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.
“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.
“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.
“England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the blockade.
“Consequences:
“England will not be able to fight on the Continent:
“Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines:
“Germany will not bleed to death on land.
“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative—
“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.
“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter-measures.
“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army’s battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.
“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.
“This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.
“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling. * * *”
* * * * * *
“Purpose:
“1. Study of the entire problem.
“2. Study of the events.
“3. Study of the means needed.
“4. Study of the necessary training.
“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding.
“Working principles:
“1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of it.
“2. No one can find out more than he must know.
“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.
“On Goering’s question, the Fuehrer decided that:
“a. The armed forces determine what shall be built.
“b. In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed.
“c. The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or 1944.
[Schmundt certified this text.]” (L-79)
These minutes demonstrate that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. They demonstrate the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. They demonstrate that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive, expansion for food, and Lebensraum.
Just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland, Hitler made an address to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. [Three reports of this meeting are available: (L-3; 798-PS; and 1014-PS). The first of the three documents (L-3) was obtained through an American newspaperman, and purported to be original minutes of the Obersalzberg meeting, transmitted to the newspaperman by some other person. There was no proof of actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document (L-3) therefore, merely served as an incentive to search for something better. The result was that two other documents (798-PS) and (1014-PS) were discovered in the OKW files at Flensberg. These two documents indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, one apparently in the morning and one in the afternoon. Comparison of those two documents with the first document (L-3) led to the conclusion that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches, and therefore was not relied upon.]
On this day of 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed the supreme commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the commanding generals, (Oberbefehlshabers) as follows:
“I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss military details.
“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring. [Apparently this referred to (L-79).] But I thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable to me could not be executed, since essential points have changed.
“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a conflict in the West.
“Poland wants access to the sea.
“The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an unopportune moment.
“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal constitutions, my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activity.
“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
“The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can only ask benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal unity.
“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.
“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose: we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and gain only little. England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.
“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
“The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south African Union became more independent, concessions had to be made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.
“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the Mediterranean.
“Further favorable factors for us are these:
“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.
“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady weak men.
“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini’s could only change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”
* * * * * *
“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.”
* * * * * *
“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinhund will make a proposal for mediation.”
* * * * * *
“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.” (798-PS)
In his second speech on 22 August 1939 the Fuehrer had this to say:
“It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.
“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.
“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.
“Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80,000,000 people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.
“Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.
“First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly-created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of attrition.
“New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.
“Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.” (1014-PS)
D. Expansion into General War of Aggression: Scandinavia, The Low Countries, The Balkans.
The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939, and Poland having been defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. (Under the division of the case agreed by the four Chief Prosecutors, this phase of aggression was left for development to the British prosecuting staff, and is discussed in Sections 9, 10 and 11 of this Chapter, infra.)
E. Aggression Against the U. S. S. R.
The attack upon Russia was preceded with premeditation and deliberation. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation, “Case Green”, so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name, “Case Barbarossa”. A secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to “Case Barbarossa,” was captured among the OKW files at Flensberg (446-PS). This directive was issued more than six months in advance of the attack. (Other evidence shows that the planning occurred even earlier.) This order, signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl and Keitel, was issued in nine copies, of which we have the fourth. The directive reads:
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa.)
“For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.
“For the Eastern campaign the Air force will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the Eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.
“Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.
“If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.
“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.
“The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:
“I. General Purpose:
“The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.
“In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Air force will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russian from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.
“Effective intervention by the Russian Air force is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.” (446-PS)
Another secret document captured from the OKW files establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union (2718-PS). It also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941 concerning the results of a discussion on that day with the State Secretaries concerning “Case Barbarossa.” The memorandum reads in part:
“Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files Ia. Second copy to General Schubert. May 2nd, 1941. Memorandum. About the result of today’s discussion with the State Secretaries about Barbarossa.
“1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed by Russia in the third year of war.
“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things necessary for us.” (2718-PS)
F. Collaboration with Japan: Precipitation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack.
With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in particular Ribbentrop, called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear. The Nazi’s incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they preferred that the United States not be involved in the conflict, due to military considerations. However, their incitement resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would declare War on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on these assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.
These matters are disclosed in a document, captured from the files of the German Foreign Office, which consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, signed by Schmidt, regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of Ribbentrop (1881-PS). Pertinent parts of this document read as follows:
“Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. * * *
“Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America would probably side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worse situation, that is war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarine, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan. “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese these developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.
“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowance for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contribution depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldier naturally ranks high above the American.
“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.
“Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment instantly to reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.
“Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuver towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. * * *
“The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
“The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
“Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under those circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clean breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
“Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
“On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
“Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
“The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.
“Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.
“The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.
“Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
“(signed) SCHMIDT” (1881-PS)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLOTTING OF AGGRESSIVE WAR
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (F); │ │ │ V. │ I │ 22, 29 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │ │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ 442-PS │General Order No. 16 on the preparation │ │ │of a landing operation against England, │ │ │16 July 1940, initialled by Jodl and │ │ │Keitel. │ III │ 399 │ │ │ *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed │ │ │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │ │ │concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │ │ │Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │ │29) │ III │ 581 │ │ │ *1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ │22 August 1939. (USA 30) │ III │ 665 │ │ │ *1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │ │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │ │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522 │ │ │ *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │ │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │ │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │ │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │ │May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │ │the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 │ │ │ *2718-PS │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │ │ │discussion with State Secretaries about │ │ │Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) │ V │ 378 │ │ │ *D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated │ │ │edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164 │ │ │ **L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │ │Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │ │Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28) │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence) │ VII │ 752 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
2. PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION: 1933-1936
By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial proportions. At that time its plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for consolidation, within the country, of all the internal resources and potentialities.
As soon as there was sufficient progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations.
The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary if Germany were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that the Versailles Treaty came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. It was as a part of the same plan and for the same reason that Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible for the Nazis to carry out their plan on the basis of existing international obligations or on the basis of the orthodox kind of future commitments.
Every military and diplomatic operation undertaken by the Nazis was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each event was part of a long prepared plan of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the preparation of the schedule of aggressions which was subsequently carried out.
Three of the steps in preparation for aggression were first, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious in the matter of international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanctions being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong military action from France with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that no one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility for such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. These actions, however, cannot be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action. It was a violation of the Versailles Treaty, but the Nazis got away with it. Then came outright military defiance, with the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
A. Planning to Overthrow the Versailles Treaty.
The determination and the plans of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, started very early. This fact is confirmed by their own statements, their boasts of long planning and careful execution. Hitler, in his speech to all Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, stated that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles (789-PS). And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, in which he traced the development of German strength (L-172). The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces. In his speech, entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War,” General Jodl gave a retrospective summary of the war for the benefit of the Reich and Gau leaders. He stated:
“Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.
“I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate, that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call it—a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by the force of arms but by the will of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.
“The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean, and in that of Russia—these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture; I shall divide it into three parts:
“I. A review of the most important development up to the present.
“II. Consideration of the present situation.
“III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in victory.
“In view of my position as military advisor to the Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.
“I. Review
“1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen] in nurturing fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two forces.
“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty [Wehrhoheit—conscription, occupation of the Rhineland] and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.
“3. The Austrian ‘Anschlluss’ in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers.
“Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.
“This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contra-distinction to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the East.
“4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.
“This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland—in itself unavoidable—was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent—after all, not inconsiderable in himself—collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany.” (L-172)
In this speech General Jodl identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. His own words show that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, his speech identifies the military with the political, it also shows the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.
In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the six-year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. The minutes of conference of the Fuehrer kept by Schmundt, his adjutant, contain the following passage:
“In the period 1933-1939 progress was made in all fields. Our military system improved enormously.”
* * * * * *
“The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.” (L-79)
B. Economic and Financial Preparations for Aggressive War.
One of the most significant preparations for aggressive war is found in the Secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 (2261-PS). The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be made public instanter, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. General Thomas, who was in charge of War Armament Economy and for some time a high-ranking member of the German High Command, refers, to this law as the cornerstone of war preparations. He points out that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program for preparations. These statements are made at page 25 of General Thomas’ work, “A History of the German War and Armament Economy, 1923-1944.” (2353-PS)
This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1939, at which time it was replaced by another secret defense law (2194-PS) revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of “mobilization,” which was clearly an euphemism for war.
The covering letter, under which this second Reich Defense Law, was sent to the Ministry for Economy and Labor for Saxony in Dresden, on 6 December 1939, was classified Top Secret and read as follows:
“Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief Counsellor Hirches, or representative in the office of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, received Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274.
“Inclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL 10.2212/38, top secret, and of 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, top secret. For your information and observance, by order, signed Kretzchmar. 3 inclosures completed to Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider 3 inclosures. Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September, 1939, and returned to construction Counsellor Kretzchmar.” (2194-PS)
Thus the second secret Reich Defense Law was transmitted under top secret cover.
The general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions was carried out in four ways: (1) secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; (4) the building of an air force.
The facts of rearmament and of secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity lies in the fact that it was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno Pact, and to make ready for aggressive wars which were to follow.
Those activities by their nature and extent, could only have been for aggressive purposes. The highest importance which the German government attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised methods of financing utilized both before and after the announcement of conscription, and the rebuilding of the army, on 16 March 1935.
The point is illustrated by an unsigned memorandum by Schacht dated 3 May 1935, entitled, “The Financing of the Armament program, “Finanzierung der Ruestung.” (1168-PS) It is not signed by Schacht, but in an interrogation on 16 October 1945, he identified it as being his memorandum. The memorandum reads as follows:
“Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler [identified by Schacht as Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, page 40] May 3, 1935.
“Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935, the difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.
“Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree, as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged completely till March 16, 1935, and even since this date the camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final point of financing. In the porte-feuille of the Reichsbank are segregated notes for this purpose, that is, armament, of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which the armament notes amount to Reichsmarks 2,374 millions, that is, of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners in blank notes of armament. Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of armament, which originated out of [Reichsanleihe], the federal loans, placed with savings banks. In the regular budget, the following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933-34, Reichsmarks 750 millions; for the budget period 1934-35, Reichsmarks 1,100 millions; and for the budget period 1935-36, Reichsmarks 2,500 millions.
“The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the budget 1935-36 to 5 to 6 millions Reichsmarks. This total deficit is already financed at the present time by short term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market for the armament. The Minister of Finance [Reichsfinanzminister], correctly points out at the defense of the budget: As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the impending great task of military policy. For all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that is, by saving.
“How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following, that a large amount of task has been started by the state and party and which is now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes.
“The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A whole number of ministries and various branches of the party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the Minister of Finance and therefore also not subject to the control of the cabinet. Just as in the sphere of politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within the states, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of state and party, working side by side and against each other, has a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on this territory concentration and unified control is not introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament financing is endangered.
“We have the following tasks:
“(1) A deputy is entrusted with finding all sources and revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the federal government, to the state and party and in profits of public and party enterprises.
“(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to examine how these amounts were used and which of these amounts can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose.
“(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and party organizations, to which extent this property can be used for the purpose of armament financing.
“(4) The federal Ministry of Finance is to be entrusted to examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or increasing of existing taxes.
“The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under existing political conditions was a necessity and the political success proved the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under any circumstances. For this purpose all absolutely non-essential expenditures for other purposes must not take place and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether the problem of financing, as outlined in this program, succeeds, remains to be seen, but without such concentration, it will fail with absolute certainty.” (1168-PS)
C. Renunciation of Armament Provisions of Versailles Treaty.
21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. It was on that date that the Nazis passed the secret Reich Defense Law (2261-PS). The secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage. Since their program called for still further expansion, they unilaterally renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935. Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on that day (2288-PS) was published in “Voelkischer Beobachter” under the heading “The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.” Hitler declared:
“1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 May.
“The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by Treaty.
“2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, which are nothing but a discrimination against the German nation for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner contrary to the spirit of the agreement.” (2288-PS)
In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. They included not only the training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other military organizations, such as the Police Force, which could be and were absorbed by the Army. The extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of ninety billion Reichsmarks during the period 1933 to 1939, in the building up of the armed forces.
In a speech by Adolf Hitler delivered on 1 September, 1939, (2322-PS), which was published in the “Voelkischer Beobachter” under the heading “The Fuehrer announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich”, the following passage occurred:
“For more than six years now, I have been engaged in building up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than ninety billion Reichsmarks were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken.” (2322-PS)
The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a report to Hess, in 1932, concerning the secret training of flying personnel, as well as the early plans to build a military air force (1143-PS). This report was sent in a letter from Schickedantz to Rosenberg, for delivery to Hess. Apparently Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery to Hess. The letter points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization. The letter dated 20 October 1932, reads:
“Dear Alfred [Rosenberg]: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential man (Vertrauensmann) which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our tall friend.” [Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this “tall friend” as being Von Albensleben.] “I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. Mit bestem Gruss, Yours Amo.” (1143-PS)
Enclosed in the report is:
“Air Force Organization”
“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide for the case of the armament of the air force.
“Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Col. Von Willberg, at present commander of Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going on leave of absence.
“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air lines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.
“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm [steel helmet] which is being turned over to Col. Hanel, retired.
“All existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10:20:20. Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” (1143-PS)
D. Secret Rearmament
The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German navy in this rearmament program which was secret at first. When it was deemed safe to say so, the Navy openly acknowledged that it had always been its objective to break the Versailles Treaty.
In 1937 the Navy High Command (OKM) published a secret book entitled, “The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935”, written by Sea Captain Schussler (C-156). The preface refers to the fight of the navy against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament; and camouflaged rearmament from 1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935. (C-156)
This book points out the significant effect of seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy, which was only hampered insofar as concealment of rearmament had to considered in compliance with the Versailles Treaty (C-156). With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935—the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland—the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.
This book of the German navy bears the symbol of the Nazi Party, the Swastika, in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed “secret”, underscored (C-156). Raeder has identified this book in an interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. The following are pertinent extracts from the book:
“The object and aim of this memorandum under the heading ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich navy after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so create by work of soldiers and technicians the primary condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace treaty; thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their position unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained task. This compilation makes it clearer, however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual power, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this peace treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will, [signed] The Compiler”. (C-156)
The summary of the contents indicated in the chapter titles is significant:
“I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the Ruhr, 1923).
“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons. * * *
“3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland.
“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann case in 1927).
“1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy.
“2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the people.
“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.
“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.
“5. Building up of the air force.
“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (Die Mine).
“7. Economic rearmament.
“8. Miscellaneous measures.
“a. The Aerogeodetic, and;
“b. Secret evidence.
“III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the seizure of power, 1933.
“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).” (C-156)
The following is a passage from Chapter IV:
“The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.
“While the second chamber, Reichsrat, approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a one-sided attitude toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took over the management of the rearmament program upon this foundation.
“Development of the Armed Forces.”
“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the armed forces, received far-reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of the accounting office of the German Reich.
“Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy”
“The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.
“Declaration of Military Freedom”
“When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.” (C-156)
An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows:
“Q. I have here a document, C-156, which is a photostatic copy of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work?
“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.
“Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy?
“A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these officers to put all these things together.
“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?
“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he told us here in the foreword.
“Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the official naval files, and based his work on the items contained therein?
“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files, which were necessary.
“Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?
“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.
“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?
“A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.
“Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles?
“A. No.
“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty?
“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They didn’t belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an Industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built much later when we began to act with the English government about the Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but tried to have advantages.
“Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although actually avoiding it?
“A. That was their endeavor”.
Raeder had his explanations:
“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?
“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state, and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea, because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive aims.
“Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say?
“A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, Groner and Noske.
“Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the First World War?
“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things.”
The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy (C-17). Although a copy of the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s special military historian. The table of contents however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read:
“Part A (1919—The year of Transition.)
“Chapter VII.
First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects.
“Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934;
“Noskos’ proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin;
“Formation of the “Naval Arsenal Kiel”.
“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.
“1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts.”
* * * * * *
“2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemunde;
“Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable guns and mortars there.
“3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.
“Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order)