XIII. GERMANIZATION AND SPOLIATION
The Nazi conspirators had made plans for the Germanization and spoliation of their conquered territories. Plans to Germanize meant plans to assimilate conquered territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically into the German Reich. Germanization meant the obliteration of the former national character of the conquered territories and the extermination of all elements which could not be reconciled with the Nazi ideology. Plans for spoliation meant plans to plunder public and private property and, in general, to exploit the people and natural resources of occupied countries.
1. POLAND
Poland was, in a sense, the testing ground for the conspirators’ theories of “lebensraum.” The four western provinces of Poland were purportedly incorporated into Germany by an order of 8 October 1939. This order, which was signed by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Frick, and Hess, is set forth in 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2042. These areas of Poland are frequently referred to in correspondence between the conspirators as the “incorporated Eastern territories”. The remainder of Poland which was seized by the Nazi invaders was established as the Government-General of Poland by an order of Hitler, dated 12 October 1939. By that same order, Hans Frank was named Governor-General of the newly-created Government-General, and Seyss-Inquart was named Deputy Governor-General. This order is set forth in 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2077.
The plans with respect to Poland, which will appear gradually from the individual documents hereafter discussed, followed a broad pattern, as follows:
First: The conspirators specifically planned to exploit the people and material resources of the Government-General of Poland in order to strengthen the Nazi war machine, to impoverish the Government-General, and to reduce it to a vassal state. At a later stage, plans were formulated for creating islands of German settlements in the more fertile regions of the Government-General in order to engulf the native Polish population and accelerate the process of Germanization.
Second: The incorporated area of Poland, which was deemed to be a part of the German Reich, was to be ruthlessly Germanized. To that end, the conspirators planned:
(a) To permit the retention of the productive facilities in the incorporated area, all of which were to be dedicated to the Nazi war machine.
(b) They planned to deport to the Government-General many hundreds of thousands of Jews, members of the Polish intelligentsia, and other noncompliant elements. The Jews deported to the Government-General were doomed to speedy annihilation. Moreover, since the conspirators felt that members of the Polish intelligentsia could not be Germanized and might serve as a center of resistance against their “new order”, they too were to be eliminated.
(c) They planned to deport all able-bodied Polish workers to Germany for work in the Nazi war machine. This was to serve the twofold purpose of helping to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine and preventing the propagation of a new generation of Poles.
(d) They planned to mold all persons in the incorporated area who were deemed to possess German blood, into German subjects who would religiously adhere to the principles of National Socialism. To that end, the conspirators set up an elaborate racial register. Those who resisted or refused to cooperate in this program were sent to concentration camps.
(e) They planned to bring thousands of German subjects into the incorporated area for purposes of settlement.
(f) They planned to confiscate the property—particularly the farms—of the Poles, the Jews, and all dissident elements. The confiscation of the property of Jews was part of the conspirators’ larger program of extermination of the Jews. Confiscation likewise served three additional purposes: (1) it provided land for the new German settlers and enabled the conspirators to reward their adherents; (2) dispossessed Polish property owners could be shipped to Germany for work in the production of implements of war; and (3) the separation of Polish farmers from their wives furthered the plan to prevent the growth of a new generation of Poles.
These plans are developed in the specific documents which follow.
A. The Program in the Incorporated Area.
(1) Economic Spoliation. A report of an interview with Frank on 3 October 1939, which was included in a large report prepared in the OKW by one Captain Varain at the direction of General Thomas, then Chief of the Military Economic Staff of the OKW, states:
“In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division and the liaison officer between the Armament Department Upper East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently called Governor-General) had with Minister Frank on October 3, 1939 in Posen, Frank explained the directive, and the economic and political responsibilities which had been conferred upon him by the Fuehrer and according to which he intended to administer Poland. According to these directives, Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations, etc., which are important for the German war economy, availability of all workers for work within Germany, reduction of the entire Polish economy to absolute minimum necessary for bare existence of the population, closing of all educational institutions, especially technical schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the new Polish intelligentsia. ‘Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles shall be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire’. * * *
* * * * * *
“By destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for importation of industrial products.” (EC-344-16 & 17)
The conspirators planned a difference in treatment for the incorporated area of Poland, and for the Government-General. A directive issued and signed by Goering on 19 October 1939, which was found among captured files of the OKW, stated, inter alia:
“In the meeting of October 13th, I have given detailed instructions for the economical administration of the occupied territories. I will repeat them here in short: 1. The task for the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is different depending on whether a country is involved which will be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we deal with the Government-General, which, in all probability, will not be made a part of Germany.
“In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, there must be removed from the territories of the Government-General all raw materials, scrap materials, machines etc., which are of use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and would make it more practical to exploit these enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their present location.” (EC-410)
Once the Government-General had been stripped of its industrial potential, the conspirators planned to leave the country desolate. Not even the war damage was to be repaired. This is the clear import of an order dated 20 November 1939, issued by Hess in his capacity as Deputy Fuehrer, and found in captured OKW files. Hess stated:
“I hear from Party members who came from the Government-General that various agencies, as, for instance, the Military Economic Staff, the Reich Ministry for Labor, etc., intend to reconstruct certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw. However, in accordance with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank, as approved by the Fuehrer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention of the Fuehrer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the Government-General.” (EC-411)
(2) Deportation and Resettlement. The Academy of German Law in January 1940 prepared a secret report on plans for the mass migration of Poles and Jews from incorporated areas of Poland to the Government-General, and for the forcible deportation of able-bodied Poles to Germany. (The date of the report does not appear in the English translation, but it is clearly set forth on the cover page of the original document, as January 1940.) It should be recalled that the decree of 11 July 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 605, 11 July 1934) provided that the Academy of German Law would be a public corporation of the Reich under the supervision of the Reich Ministers of Justice and the Interior, and that its task would be:
“To promote the reconstruction of German legal life, and to realize, in constant close collaboration with the competent legislative organizations, the National Socialist program in the entire sphere of the law.”
It should also be stated that Frank was the president of the Academy of German Law during the period when this secret report was made (2749-PS). The report stated:
“For the carrying out of costly and long term measures for the increase of agricultural production, the Government-General can at the most absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already over-populated. * * * By further absorption of 1.6 million resettlers, the 1925 Reich census figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached, which practically because of already existing rural over-population and lack of industry would result in a double over-population.
“This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice to transfer from the Reich:
“The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000), parts of the remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether over 1 million). * * *” (661-PS)
The report then goes on to say that the following groups of people should be deported:
“The Polish intelligentsia who have been politically active in the past, and potential political leaders; the leading economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates, industrialists and businessmen, etc.; the peasant population, so far as it has to be removed in order to carry out by strips of German settlements the encirclement of Polish territories in the East * * *.”
* * * * * *
“In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the Government-General as well as in the liberated East, one should remove cheap labor temporarily by the hundreds of thousands, employ them for a few years in the old Reich, and thereby hamper their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into the old Reich must be prevented.) * * *” (661-PS)
Finally, the report stated:
“Strictest care is to be taken that secret circulars, memoranda and official correspondence which contain instructions detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key so that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in Paris or the U.S.A.” (661-PS)
Frank made the following entry in his diary:
“The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) wishes that all Jews be evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories. Up to February approximately 1,000,000 people are to be brought in this way into the Government-General. The families of good racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory (approximately 4,000,000 people) should be transferred into the Reich and individually housed and thereby be uprooted as a people.” (2233-G-PS)
The top secret minutes of a meeting held on 12 February 1940 on “questions concerning the East,” at which Goering was chairman and Himmler and Frank were present, stated, among other things:
“By way of introduction, the General Field Marshal (Goering) explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the East. * * *”
* * * * * *
“Agriculture:
“The task consists of obtaining the greatest possible agriculture production from the new Eastern Gaus disregarding questions of ownership. * * *”
* * * * * *
“Special questions concerning the Government-General:
“The Government-General will have to receive the Jews who are ordered to emigrate from Germany, and the New Eastern Gaus.”
* * * * * *
“The following reported on the situation in the Eastern territories: * * *
“2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster: The population of the Danzig/West Prussia Gau (newly acquired territories) is 1.5 million, of whom 240,000 are Germans, 850,000 well-established Poles and 300,000 immigrant Poles, Jews and asocials (1,800 Jews). 87,000 persons have been evacuated, 40,000 of these from Gotenhafen. From there, also the numerous shirkers, who are now looked after by welfare, will have to be deported to the Government-General. Therefore, an evacuation of 20,000 further persons can be counted on for the current year. * * *” (EC-305)
Comparable reports were made by other Gauleiters at this meeting. These figures, it may be noted, were only as of February 1940.
These forcible deportations did not involve merely ordering the victims to leave their homes, and to take up new residences elsewhere. These deportations were accomplished, according to plan, in a brutal and inhuman manner. This is shown in a speech delivered by Himmler to officers of the SS on a day commemorating the presentation of the Nazi flag. The exact date of the speech does not appear in the document, but its contents plainly show that it was delivered sometime after Poland had been overrun. In this speech Himmler said:
“Very frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the deportation of this people here. These thoughts came to me today when watching the very difficult work out there performed by the Security Police, supported by your men, who help them a great deal. Exactly the same thing happened in Poland in weather 40 degrees below zero, where we had to haul away thousands, ten thousands, hundred thousands; where we had to have the toughness * * * you should hear this but also forget it again—to shoot thousands of leading Poles.” (1918-PS)
Such Poles from the incorporated area as managed to survive the journey to the Government-General could look forward at best to extreme hardship, and exposure to degradation and brutality. For the Jews who were forcibly deported to the Government-General there was no hope. Frank, by his own admissions, had dedicated himself to their complete annihilation. In his diary Frank wrote:
“We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them, and wherever it is possible.” (2233-D-PS)
(3) Forcible Return of Racial Germans to the Reich. The conspirators had planned the forcible Germanization of persons in the incorporated area who were deemed to possess German blood. Such persons were given the choice of the concentration camp, or submission to Germanization. Himmler was the chief executioner of this program. In a secret decree signed by Hitler, Goering, and Keitel, dated 7 October 1939, Himmler was entrusted with the task of executing the conspirators’ Germanization program. The decree provided, among other things:
“The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) has the obligation in accordance with my directives:
“1. To bring back for final return into the Reich all German nationals, and racial Germans in the foreign countries.
“2. To eliminate the harmful influence of such alien-parts of the population, which represent a danger to the Reich, and the German folk community.
“3. The forming of new German settlements by re-settling, and in particular by settling of the returning German citizens and racial Germans from abroad.
“The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary general and administrative measures for the execution of this obligation.” (686-PS)
Himmler’s conception of his tasks under this decree were plainly stated in the foreword which he wrote for the “Deutsche Arbeit” issue of June/July 1942. He wrote:
“It is not our task to Germanize the East in the old sense, that is, to teach the people there the German language and German law, but to see to it that only people of purely German, Germanic blood live in the East.” (2915-PS)
The 1940 Edition of “Der Menscheneinsatz,” a confidential publication issued by Himmler’s Office for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, contained the following statements:
“The removal of foreign races from the incorporated Eastern Territories is one of the most essential goals to be accomplished in the German East. This is the chief national political task, which has to be executed in the incorporated Eastern Territories by the Reichsfuehrer SS, Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of the national character of the German people.”
* * * * * *
“* * * there are the following two primary reasons, which make the regaining of lost German blood an urgent necessity.
“1. Prevention of a further increase of the Polish intelligentsia, through families of German descent even if they are Polonized.
“2. Increase of the population by racial elements desirable for the German nation, and the acquisition of ethno-biologically unobjectionable forces for the German reconstruction of agriculture and industry.” (2916-PS)
Further light upon the goals which the conspirators had set for their Germanization program in conquered Eastern areas, is contained in a speech delivered by Himmler on 14 October 1943. This speech was published by the National Socialist Leadership staff of the OKW. The following are excerpts from this speech:
“I consider that in dealing with members of a foreign country, especially some Slav nationality, we must not start from German points of view, and we must not endow these people with decent German thoughts, and logical conclusions of which they are not capable, but we must take them as they really are * * *.”
“Obviously in such a mixture of peoples, there will always be some racially good types. Therefore, I think that it is our duty to take their children with us, to remove them from their environment, if necessary by robbing, or stealing them. Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves and give it a place in our people, or * * * we destroy that blood.”
* * * * * *
“For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East, the creation of the Germanic Reich in this way or that * * * the fetching home of 30 million human beings of our blood, so that still during our lifetime we shall be a people of 120 million Germanic souls. That means that we shall be the sole decisive power in Europe. That means that we shall then be able to tackle the peace, during which we shall be willing for the first twenty years to rebuild and spread out our villages and towns, and that we shall push the borders of our German race 500 kilometers further out to the East.” (L-70)
(4) The Racial Register. In furtherance of these plans, the conspirators established a Racial Register in the incorporated area of Poland. The Racial Register was, in effect, an elaborate classification of persons deemed to be of German blood, and contained provisions setting forth some of the rights, privileges, and duties of the persons in each classification. Persons were classified into four groups:
(1) Germans who had actively promoted the Nazi cause.
(2) Germans who had been more or less passive in the Nazi struggle, but had retained their German nationality.
(3) Persons of German extraction who, although previously connected with the Polish nation, were willing to submit to Germanization.
(4) Persons of German descent, who had been “politically absorbed by the Polish nation”, and who would be resistant to Germanization.
The Racial Register was inaugurated under a decree of 12 September 1940, issued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood. The following are pertinent extracts:
“The list of ‘ethnic Germans’ will be divided into four parts (limited to interoffice use).
“1. Ethnic Germans who fought actively in the ethnic struggle. Besides the membership of a German organization, every other activity in favor of the German against a foreign nationality will be considered an active manifestation.
“2. Ethnic Germans, who did not actively intervene in favor of the German nationality, but who preserved their traceable German nationality.
“3. Persons of German descent, who became connected with the Polish nation in the course of the years, but have on account of their attitude, the prerequisites to become full-fledged members of the German national community. To this group belong also persons of non-German descent who live in a people’s mixed marriage with an ethnic German in which the influence of the German spouse has prevailed. Persons of Masurian, Slonzak, or upper Silesian descent who are to be recognized as ethnic Germans, usually belong to this group 3.
“4. Persons of German descent, politically absorbed by the Polish nation (renegades).
“Persons not included on the list of ethnic Germans are Poles, or foreign nationals. Their treatment is regulated by BII.
“Members of groups 1 and 2 are ethnic Germans who will be used for the reconstruction in the East. The differentiation between the groups 1 and 2 is important for the National Socialist Party; primarily only members of group 1 should be accepted in the Party according to the instructions of the deputy of the Fuehrer.
“Members of groups 3 and 4 have to be educated as full Germans, that is, have to be re-Germanized in the course of time through an intensive educational training in old Germany.
“The establishment of members of group 4 has to be based on the doctrine, that German blood must not be utilized in the interest of a foreign nation. Against those who refuse re-Germanization, Security Police measures are to be taken.” (2916-PS)
The basic idea of creating a racial register for persons of German extraction was later incorporated into a decree of 3 March 1941, signed by Himmler, Frick, and Hess. This decree is set forth in the 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt Part 1, page 118.
The entire apparatus of the SS was thrown behind the vigorous execution of these decrees. Proof of this fact is contained in the following extracts from directives issued by Himmler as the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood:
“I. Where Racial Germans have not applied for entry in the ‘German Ethnical List,’ you will instruct the subordinate agencies to turn over their names to the State Police (Superior) Office. Subsequently, you will report to me (Himmler).
“II. The Local State Police (Superior) Office, will charge the persons whose names are turned over to them to prove within eight days that they have applied for entry in the ‘German Ethnical List.’
“If such proof is not submitted, the person in question is to be taken into protective custody for transfer into a concentration camp.” (R-112)
The measures taken against persons in the fourth category, “Polonized Germans,” were particularly harsh. These persons were resistant to Germanization, and ruthless measures calculated to break their resistance were prescribed. Where the individual’s past history indicated that he could not be effectively Germanized, he was thrown into a concentration camp. In the words of Himmler’s decree of 16 February 1942:
“II. The Re-Germanization of the Polonized Germans presupposes their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List are to be dealt with in the following manner:
“A. They are to be re-settled in Old Reich territory.
“1. The Superior SS and Police Leaders are charged with evacuating and resettling them according to instructions which will follow later.
“2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State Police (Superior) Office. The latter will arrange for their transfer into a concentration camp.
“3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be given by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for transfer into a concentration camp. The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political record, and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her name, too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police (Superior) Office with a view to imprisoning her in a concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be separated from their parents and to be dealt with according to III, paragraph 2 of this decree. Persons are to be considered as having a particularly bad political record who have offended the German nation to a very great degree (e.g., who participated in persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, etc.).” (R-112)
(5) Nazi Colonization. Coincident with the program of Germanizing persons of German extraction in the incorporated areas, the conspirators, as previously indicated, undertook to settle large numbers of Germans of proven Nazi convictions in that area. This aspect of their program is clearly shown by an article by SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police, Wilhelm Koppe, who was one of Himmler’s trusted agents. The following is an excerpt from this article:
“The victory of the German weapons in the East must therefore be followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish race, if the regained Eastern sphere—according to the Fuehrer’s will—henceforth shall for all time remain an essential constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore of decisive importance to penetrate the regained German region with German farmers, laborers, civil servants, merchants, and artisans so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of German people can be formed as a protective wall against foreign infiltration, and possibly as a starting point for the racial penetration of the territories further East.” (2915-PS)
B. The Program in the Government-General
(1) Germanization. In the Government-General there were relatively few persons, at the outset, who qualified as Germans by the conspirators’ standards. Hence, little would be served by the introduction of a Racial Register, categorizing persons of German extraction on the model of the one instituted in the incorporated area; and it is not known that any such Racial Register was prescribed in the Government-General. Rather, the plan seems to have been (a) to make the Government-General a colony of Germany, which was an objective announced by Frank (EC-344-16 & 17), and (b) to create so-called “German island settlements” in the productive farming areas. These island settlements were to be created by an influx of German persons who faithfully adhered to the principles of National Socialism.
In this connection, secret notes bearing the date line, “Department of the Interior, Krakow, 30th March, 1942,” reveal some of Himmler’s ideas on the “planned Germanization” of the Government-General. The following extracts are pertinent:
“The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) developed further trains of ideas to the effect that in the first five-year plan for re-settlement after the war the new German Eastern territories should first be filled; afterwards it is intended to provide at this time the Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German upper-class at least. Into the Government-General perhaps further German Island Settlements should be newly transplanted from European nations. An exact decision in this respect, however, has not been issued. In any case, it is wished that at first a heavy colonization along the San and the Brig be achieved so that the parts of Poland are encircled with alien populations. Hitherto, it has been always proved that this kind of encirclement leads most quickly to the desired nationalization.” (910-PS)
An entry in Frank’s Diary (1941, volume II, page 317) bears on the same point:
“Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers, this territory has become German, and the time will come when the valley of the Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as German as the Valley of the Rhine.” (2233-H-PS)
(2) Confiscation of Property. The conspirators had made plans to confiscate the property of Poles, Jews, and dissident elements. These plans were designed to accomplish a number of objectives. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, they were part of the conspirators’ over-all program of extermination. Confiscation was also a means of providing property for German settlers and of rewarding those who had rendered faithful service to the Nazi State. This phase of their program likewise made dispossessed Polish farmers available for slave labor in Germany, and operated to further the conspirators’ objective of preventing the growth of another generation of Poles.
Proof of these matters appears in a number of reports by Kusche, who appears to have been one of Himmler’s chief deputies in Poland. In one of these reports Kusche pointed out that it was possible, without difficulty, to confiscate small farms and that
“The former owners of Polish farms together with their families will be transferred to the old Reich by the employment agencies for employment as farm workers.” (1352-PS)
In another secret report by Kusche dated 22 May 1940, and entitled “Details of the Confiscation in the Bielitz Country”, the following appears:
“Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being built at Auschwitz spoke at Staff Leader Muller’s and requested support for the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agricultural enterprises within a certain area around the concentration camp, since not only the fields but also the farm houses of these border directly on the concentration camp. A local inspection held on the 21st of this month revealed the following: there is no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises bordering on the concentration camp must be confiscated at once. Further than this, the camp commandant requests that further plots of farmland be placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the prisoners busy. This too can be done without further delay since enough land can be made available for the purpose. The owners of the plots are all Poles.”
* * * * * *
“I had the following discussion with the head of the labor office in Bielitz:
“The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the old Reich. The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated enterprises, together with their entire families, to the Reich is possible without any further consideration. It is only necessary for the labor office to receive the lists of the persons in time, in order to enable it to take the necessary steps (collection of transportation, distribution over the various regions in need of such labor)”.
* * * * * *
“The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of the concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for the execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to take the Poles from Alzen to Auschwitz, they should be transferred to the empty castle at Zator. The liberated Polish property is to be given to the needy racial German farmers for their use.” (1352-PS)
On 17 September 1940, Goering issued a decree which was designed to regularize the program of confiscation (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940, Part I, page 1270). Under Section 2 of this decree, sequestration of movable and immovable property, stores, and other intangible property interests of Jews and “persons who have fled or are not merely temporarily absent” was made mandatory. In addition, sequestration was authorized under Section 2, sub-section 2, if the property were required “for the public welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the strengthening of Germanism.” By section 9 of the decree, confiscation of sequestrated property was authorized “if the public welfare, particularly the defense of the Reich, or the strengthening of Germanism, so requires.” However, Section 1, sub-section 2, provided that property of German nationals was not subject to sequestration and confiscation; and section 13 provided that sequestration would be suspended if the owner of the property asserted that he was a German. The decree, on its face, clearly indicates a purpose to strip Poles, Jews, and dissident elements of their property. It was, moreover, avowedly designed to promote Germanism.
Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the decree required that a determination be made in each case involving the property of a Pole that the property was required “for the public welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the strengthening of Germanism.” The answer supplied by the conspirators was firm and clear: In any case in which the property of a Pole was involved, the “strengthening of Germanism” required its seizure. On 15 April 1941, on paper bearing the letterhead of the Reich Leader SS, Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, instructions were given “for internal use on the application of the law concerning property of the Poles of 17 September 1940.” The following is an excerpt:
“The conditions permitting seizure according to section II, sub-section 2, are always present if the property belongs to a Pole. For the Polish real estate will be needed without exception for the consolidation of the German nationhood.” (R-92)
In the Government-General, Frank promulgated a decree on 24 January 1940, authorizing sequestration “in connection with the performance of tasks serving the public interest”, and liquidation of “anti-social or financially unremunerative concerns.” The decree is embodied in the Verordnungsblatt of the Government-General, No. 6, 27 January 1940, page 23. The undefined criteria in this decree clearly empowered Nazi officials in the Government-General to engage in wholesale seizure of property.
The magnitude of the conspirators’ confiscation program in Poland was staggering. The Nazis’ own statistics show that as of 31 May 1943, a total of 693,252 estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been seized, and 9,508 estates, comprising 270,446 hectares had been confiscated by the Estate Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Poznan, Zichenau, and Silesia (R-92). This, it will be noted, represented the seizures and confiscations which were effected by only four offices. Figures are not available at this time for other offices maintained by the conspirators for these purposes.
2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to Germanize Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each characterized by severity, were discussed, and finally the Fuehrer decided on plan (c), which involved the assimilation of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan envisaged a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the Fuehrer was unquestioned.
These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15 October 1940, written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears that only four copies were made. The original document bears the handwritten letters “K” and “J” on the first page on the left side, and the handwriting is unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states:
“On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General K. H. Frank spoke about the following: [SS Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary of State under Von Neurath, who at the date of this report was the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia].
“Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.
“After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this way, three ways of solution were indicated:
“a. German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
“b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely, the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore, the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable period of time.
“c. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint. This will take place, among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten-German border district), in other words, by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.
“The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.
“Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
“The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
“After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (c) (Assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protector for years to come.
“From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces. This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled: “The Czech Problem.” (Attached as annex.)
“The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.”
“(Signed) FRIDERICI Infantry Lt. General.” (862-PS)
Solution (a), as outlined in the foregoing report, would have called for German infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the Czechs from that area to Bohemia. Moravia lies between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus, solution (a) would have involved the erection of a German state between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented effective inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of people and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have been frustrated. Solution (a) was rejected because the surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia,” would have remained to plague the conspirators.
Solution (b), which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs, was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic but rather because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.
Solution (c) was regarded as the most desirable, and was adopted. This solution first provided for the assimilation of about one-half of the Czechs. This meant two things: (a) enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially qualified, and (b) deportation to slave labor in Germany for others. “Increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory”, as stated in the report, meant, in reality, slave labor in Germany.
Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and deportation “by all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population, particularly intellectuals and those who did not meet Nazi racial standards. Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well know, had a conspicuous record of resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be exterminated. That section of the report which stated, “elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated,” meant that intellectuals and other dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or immediately exterminated.
In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a practical application of the conspirators’ philosophy as expressed in Himmler’s speech referred to above:
“Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves * * * or we destroy this blood.” (L-70)
3. THE U. S. S. R.
(The Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union has assumed the task of introducing detailed evidence showing the results of the execution of this program. The American prosecution confined itself to showing the plan.)
The evidence, individual items of which will be discussed hereafter, shows the following:
A. The conspirators planned to remove to Germany all foodstuffs and raw materials from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union, over and above the needs of the Nazi invading forces and the absolute minimum necessary to supply the bare needs of the people in these particular regions who produced the materials which were to be removed to Germany. This region had previously supplied the northern area of the Soviet Union, which the conspirators called the “Forest Zone”. The latter zone embraced some of the leading industrial areas of the Soviet Union, including Moscow and Leningrad.
B. They deliberately and systematically planned to starve millions of Russians. Starvation was to be accomplished by the following means:
(1) As indicated under A above, products from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union which ordinarily were sent to the industrial regions of the north were to be forcibly diverted to Germany. Moreover, all livestock in the industrial regions was to be seized for use by the Wehrmacht and the German civilian population. The necessary consequence was that the population of the northern regions would be reduced to starvation.
(2) They established the following order of priority in which food produced by the Russians would be allocated:
First, the combat troops.
Second, the remainder of troops in enemy territory.
Third, troops stationed in Germany.
Fourth, the German civilian population, and
Lastly, the population of the occupied countries.
Thus, even Russians in the food-surplus area of the Ukraine, who were not essential to the production of products for the German war machine, were systematically to be starved.
C. They planned the permanent destruction of all industry in the northern area of the Soviet Union in order that the remnants of the Russian population would be completely dependent upon Germany for consumer goods.
D. They planned to incorporate a part of Galicia and all of the Baltic countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku, into German colonies.
By a directive issued by Goering’s office for “The Operation of the Economy in the newly-occupied Eastern Territories,” there was established the Economic Executive Staff, East, which was directly responsible to Goering, under which was created the Economic Staff, East. The Economic Staff, East, in turn was subdivided into four groups: the Chief of the Economic Staff, Group LA, Group W, and Group M. The functions of Group LA were stated to be as follows:
“Group LA. (Functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the Army, in cooperation with the Army groups concerned.)” (EC-472)
A report was made on 23 May 1941 (which was before the invasion of the Soviet Union) on the subject, “Economic Policy Directives for Economic Organization, East, Agricultural Group.” (EC-126). It was prepared by the Economic Staff, East, Group LA, the Agricultural Group, which (as shown by EC-472) was an important part of the organization which Goering had established to formulate plans for the economic administration of Russia. The report begins by a recitation of figures pertaining to the production of agricultural products in the Soviet Union. It states that the grain surplus of Russia is determined by the level of domestic consumption and that this fact affords the basis upon which the planners must predicate their actions and economic policy. The report continues:
“The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district (that is in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the north. Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must, in any case, place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.”
* * * * * *
“This (the cessation of supplies) means:
“1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned. It may be assumed that these regions today absorb an annual five to ten million tons from the food production zone.
“2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted, although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton, manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be supplied with food in any case, for special political and economic reasons.
“3. No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or the other industrial region or industrial enterprise must be permitted.
“4. Industry can only be preserved so far as it is located in the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned oil field regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food surpluses required by Germany.
“The following consequences result from this situation, which has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the small Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic provinces, of White Russia, to the prejudice of the Great Russians).
“I. For the forest belt:
“a. Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area) will become ‘naturalized,’ similar to the events during the World War and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., namely: agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere ‘home production.’ The result will be that the planting of products destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp, will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.) Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to the collapse of the dairy production and pig producing in that territory.
“b. Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the productive power of these territories, except for supplying the troops stationed there. The population, as in the old days, will utilize arable land for growing its own food. It is useless to expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many years can these extensive regions be intensified to an extent that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem.
“c. In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial advantages by quick, nonrecurrent seizure, that is, it will be vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seeds.
“It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the livestock which has no fodder base of its own, that is, it will be necessary to seize livestock holdings immediately, and to make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date, they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use, without Germany getting anything out of it.”
* * * * * *
“It has been demanded by the Fuehrer that the reduction in the meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian livestock holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable transport situation in relation to Germany.”
* * * * * *
“In future, southern Russia must turn its face toward Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, or Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must, therefore, be abolished.
“It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany’s staying power in the war, and would undermine Germany’s and Europe’s power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood.”
* * * * * *
“I. Supplies for the Army
“Germany’s food situation in the third year of war demands it imperatively that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning, must not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This minimum aim, the provisioning of the Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception be provisioned from the Eastern space.”
* * * * * *
“Thus it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away from the existing situation and introducing Russian food resources into the European framework. This will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well as a large part of the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas.
“It is impossible to state an alternative in sufficiently hard and severe terms.”
* * * * * *
“Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The task is twofold:
“1. We must use the eastern spaces for overcoming the food shortages during and after the war. This means that we must not be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East. Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe’s agriculture.”
* * * * * *
“2. For the future new order, the food-producing areas in the East must be turned into a permanent and substantial complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified cultivation and resulting higher yields.
“The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic consumption, which will require discrimination between the consuming and producing zones.” (EC-126)
It is submitted that this document discloses, on its face, a studied plan to murder millions of people through starvation. It reveals a program of premeditated murder on a scale so vast as to stagger human imagination. This plan was the logical culmination of general objectives clearly announced by Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf. (See Section 6 of Chapter IX.)
A top secret memorandum, dated 16 July, 1941, of a conference at the Fuehrer’s headquarters concerning the war in the East, seems to have been prepared by Bormann, because his initials appear at the top of page one (L-221). The text of the memorandum indicates that the conference was attended by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann. This memorandum throws light upon the conspirators’ plans to Germanize conquered areas of the Soviet Union. It also discloses the fraudulent character of the Nazi propaganda program; and shows how the conspirators sought to deceive the entire world; how they pretended to pursue one course of action when their aims and purposes were to follow precisely the opposite course. The following portions are particularly relevant.
“Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we render our task more difficult by making superfluous declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.
“What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in the same way.
“Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to recognize that it initiates final settlement. This need not prevent our taking all necessary measures—shooting, de-settling, etc.—and we shall take them.
“But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly that we shall never leave those countries.
“Our conduct therefore ought to be:
“1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but to prepare for it only in secret. * * *”
“2. To emphasize that we are liberators.
“In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans only. In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.
“Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider, and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people. We have to plan our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.
“On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able—
“first, to dominate it;
“second, to administer it, and;
“third, to exploit it.
“The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.
“Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every successor of the Fuehrer should know: security for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area against all possible danger. Our iron principle is and has to remain: We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms.”
* * * * * *
“The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have to be incorporated into Germany.
“At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland, (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.
“Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living there.
“Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.”
“The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony, too, will have to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession (military colony).”
“The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.
“The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.” (L-221)
Thus, the program, as outlined by the conspirators at this meeting of 16 July, 1941, called for the unlawful incorporation of a part of Galicia and all the Baltic countries into Germany; and for the unlawful conversion of the Crimea and areas north of it, the Volga territory and the district around Baku, into German colonies.
This point is reinforced by a directive entitled, “Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia,” which states:
“The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and White Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to strive to achieve the form of a German protectorate, and then transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by Germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea, under the guardianship of Greater Germany.” (1029-PS)
Even in the food-surplus areas of the occupied regions of the Ukraine, the conspirators planned to allocate food on a basis which left virtually nothing for those persons who were not engaged in the compulsory production of commodities for the German war machine. This was in violation of the explicit provision in Article 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, that requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. This program was disclosed in a top secret memorandum, dated 18 September, 1941, concerning a meeting of German military officials presided over by Goering (EC-3). The memorandum was signed by General Nagl, liaison officer between Goering’s Four Year Plan Office and the OKW. The memorandum states:
“At this conference which was concerned with the better exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food economy, the Reich Marshal (Goering) called attention to the following:”
* * * * * *
“It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is needed.
“First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the German nonmilitary population follows and only then comes the population of the occupied territories.” (EC-3)
Another memorandum, dated 25 November 1941, relating to the general principles of economic policy in the newly-occupied eastern territories, as prescribed in a conference held in Berlin on 8 November 1941, also bears out this point. This memorandum was also written by General Nagl. It is on the stationery of the Supreme Headquarters Armament Procurement Office. The following portions are pertinent:
“I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures in the newly-occupied Eastern territories.
“II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of view of colonial administration and by colonial methods.
“Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the Eastland which are to be Germanized by order of the Fuehrer, but even they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.
“III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the production of food and raw materials.
“The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap production based on the maintenance of the low living standard of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible, this measure is intended to create a source of income for the Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades, with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.” (EC-3)
On 17 July, 1941, Hitler and Keitel issued a decree appointing Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This was the day following the meeting at the Fuehrer’s headquarters, which is reported in the document previously quoted from (L-221). This decree states, inter alia:
“The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern territories where these territories are not included in the administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the Government-General, is subject to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
* * * * * *
“I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. He will hold office in Berlin.” (1997-PS)
Rosenberg’s views well fitted him for his task as one of the chief executioners of the conspirators’ plans in the Soviet Union. His views were plainly expressed in a speech delivered on 20 June 1941:
“The job of feeding the German people, stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings.” (1058-PS)
These views were implemented in the directives issued by Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Among his directives were these:
“The principal task of the civilian administration in the occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the Reich. This basic principle is to be given precedence in all measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they remain parts of the Greater German living space and are always to be governed according to this guiding principle.
“The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in the interests of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any measures are permitted which the German administration deems necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive task.” (EC-347)
Implicit in Rosenberg’s statement that the Hague Regulations are not applicable to the Soviet Union is the recognition by him that the conspirators’ action in the Soviet Union flagrantly violated the Hague Regulations and applicable principles of International Law.
A top secret memorandum, dated 5 October 1942, written by Braeutigam, who was a high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, made the following statements:
“In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation.
* * * * * *
“With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan: ‘Liberation from Bolshevism’ was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern peoples according to her own methods.” (294-PS)
Certain German industrialists and financiers aided and abetted Himmler in his relentless program of Germanization, exploitation, oppression, and destruction. A letter from the banker, Baron Kurt von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 27 August 1943, stated:
“My very honorable Reichsfuehrer:
“With great joy I learn of your appointment as Reichsminister of the Interior and take the liberty to extend my heartiest congratulations to you on assuming your new post.
“A strong hand is now very necessary in the operation of this Department and it is universally welcomed but especially by your friends that it was you who were chosen for this by the Fuehrer. Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power at all times to assist you in every possible way.
“I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your circle of friends has again placed at your disposal this year a sum slightly in excess of RM 1 million for ‘special purposes.’ An exact list showing the name of the contributors will be sent to you shortly.
“Again all my very best wishes—as well as those of my family—I remain yours, in old loyalty and esteem.
“Heil Hitler! Yours truly.” (EC-454)
A later letter from von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 21 September 1943, enclosed the list of contributors. The letter stated:
“Dear Reichsleader:
“I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of this month with which you made me very happy. At the same time, I am enclosing a list with the total amount of funds made available to you by your circle of friends and totalling RM 1,000,000. We are very glad indeed to render some assistance to you in your special tasks and to be able to provide some small relief for you in your still further extended sphere of duties.
“Wishing you, dear Reichsleader, the best of luck, I remain in old loyalty and esteem.
“Heil Hitler! Yours very truly.” (EC-453)
The Himmler “circle of friends,” it may be noted, was a relatively small, select group. It did not include all, or even a majority of the industrialists and financiers in Germany. These contributions were not like the “Hitler Spende” or the Winter Relief contributions which were exacted from all industrialists by the Nazi state. These were contributions by a small group of very influential industrialists and financiers who, for selfish reasons, were anxious to “do everything in our power at all times to assist you “(Himmler)” in every possible way.” By a rather strange coincidence, firms like I. G. Farben, the Flick Combine, and the Herman Goering Werke, which are on the list of contributors to Himmler, were among the chief beneficiaries of the conspirators’ program of plunder of public and private property in the occupied countries. (EC-453)
4. THE WESTERN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES
(This section is based on a brief originally prepared for submission by the United States Prosecution in support of the allegation, in Count One of the Indictment, of a plan or conspiracy to commit war crimes. The evidence relating to the plan or conspiracy, however, proved to be inseparable from that on the execution thereof, a subject assigned to the French Prosecution. The materials contained herein were accordingly made available to the French for such use as they might deem appropriate in connection with the proof of their case.)
A. _The Nazi Conspirators Obtained Enormous Quantities of Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment From the Occupied Western Countries._
(1) The Nazis planned in advance of the invasion to secure from the conquered territories the strategic materials which Germany lacked and without which Germany could not prevail in a war of long duration. In this war, as in the last, German resources were sufficient only for a conflict of short duration. As early as the winter of 1939-40, following the swift and crushing defeat of Poland, Germany suffered from a critical shortage of essential raw materials (EC-615). The Nazi leaders were thus faced with the question whether to conserve their supplies for a long war or to commit their limited reserves in the hope of obtaining an early decision. Hitler decided on the latter course. As Goering told General Thomas:
“The Fuehrer is firmly convinced that he will succeed in reaching a decision * * * in the year 1940 by a big attack in the West. He reckons that Belgium, Holland, and Northern France will get into our possession and * * * had figured out that the industrial areas of Douai and Lens and those of Luxembourg, Longwy, and Briey could, from the point of view of raw material, replace the supplies from Sweden. Therefore, the Fuehrer had decided now to make use of our reserve of raw materials without regard to future times. * * *” (EC-606)
Careful plans were made in advance of the invasion in 1940 to secure for Germany the raw material resources of the to-be-occupied countries. A manual of directives and decrees issued by the Quartermaster, OKH, for the economic administration of the military government set forth an exhaustive list of important raw materials to be seized wherever found (EC-155). Directives were issued to the so-called economic squads (Wirtschafts Truppe) attached to the tactical units on the procedures to be followed in locating, seizing, and preparing such materials for shipment to Germany (EC-618). Also included in the manual mentioned were drafts of decrees to be promulgated by the German occupation authorities, for the establishment in the occupied countries of Goods Offices, modeled after the German rationing boards, to control production and distribution in the occupied countries in the German interest. (EC-155)
(2) The occupied Western countries were ruthlessly exploited according to plan. The occupied areas were systematically stripped of their economic resources to feed the German war machine. The extent of German exploitation is partially indicated by the staggering totals of the occupation levies and the “credit” balances of the local central banks under clearing arrangements imposed by the Nazis, the principal sources of the funds with which Germany financed the spoliation of Western Europe. (For a brief explanation of the clearing system, see infra under D, 2.)
The total occupation charges exacted from France alone were 31,600,000,000 RM from 25 June, 1940, to 5 September, 1944 (3615-PS). They averaged more than 7,000,000,000 RM annually, a sum more than four times the German annual payments under the Dawes and Young Plans. This sum is in addition to a “credit” of the Bank of France under the Franco-German clearing, which, as of September, 1943, amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM (3615-PS). For the period May 1942-43, the tribute exacted from Belgium (mainly from occupation charges and clearing credits) amounted to more than two-thirds of the Belgium national income (ECR-149). These figures, large as they are, take no account of the substantial quantities of materials seized and removed to the Reich without compensation (see infra under B, (1)) nor do they reflect the windfall to the Reich resulting from the substantial over-valuation of the Reichsmark, particularly in the case of France and Belgium. (EC-86)
A few illustrative examples of specific items, taken from the report of the German Military Commander for France of 10 September, 1942 (EC-267), will serve to show even more concretely than monetary figures, the extent to which materials and equipment were taken from the occupied countries for the benefit of the Reich. Since the Armistice, according to this report, the French contributed to the Germans 73 percent of the normal annual French consumption of iron, amounting to nearly 5 million tons. From the Armistice to July, 1942, 225,000 tons of copper and 5,700 tons of nickel were delivered by France to Germany, amounting to 80 percent and 86 percent of French supplies respectively; also 55 percent of the French aluminum and 80 percent of the magnesium production. For her own needs France retained only 30 percent of the normal production of the wool industry, 16 percent of the cotton production, and 13 percent of the linen production. The total French production of locomotives and the major part of the machine tool industry were put at the disposal of the Germans. (EC-267)
B. The Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment Delivered to Germany were Obtained by Compelling the Nationals of the Conquered Countries to Produce and Distribute in Accordance with German War Requirements, by Seizure and Requisition, and by Purchases Financed with Funds Exacted from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals.
(1) Much of the material and equipment removed to Germany was obtained by seizure, requisition, and confiscation of private property. During the first phase of the occupation, the Nazis systematically removed to the Reich almost all available supplies to satisfy the immediate German requirements. This phase, according to the German Military Commander’s description of the practice in France, was one of “stripping” occupied areas of “foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery”, leaving only enough to secure the “bare subsistence” of the population (EC-614). In the words of the report of the Wi-Rue Staff in France:
“In this period the legal concepts of the Hague Regulations regarding Land Warfare are not yet strictly observed. The main purpose is to get out of France through seizure Beschlagnahme or purchase at infinitesimal prices the materials of use for the German armament.” (EC-422)
By order of the German High Command, booty was defined to include not merely public property but “beyond the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare,” also “privately owned finished and semi-finished products if they were manufactured in fulfillment of an order of the French armed forces” (EC-422). At the same time, payments made by the French armed forces on account of war material orders were likewise treated as war booty. Even goods in transit were arbitrarily placed in this category (EC-422). Machinery and equipment affixed to the realty were seized and shipped to Germany in wilful disregard of the limitations of the Hague Regulations authorizing seizure only of chattels. (EC-84)
The “stripping phase” of Nazi spoliation was relatively short-lived. Decision was soon reached to utilize at least part of the industrial capacity of the occupied areas to relieve the burden on the armament plants in Germany (EC-620). Throughout the period of occupation, however, the Nazis continued the seizure and requisition of machinery and certain raw materials in short supply in the Reich. From December, 1942, to the end of the occupation, for example, 242 German demands for Belgian machinery were met, of which 110 were fulfilled by requisitions (ECH-10). In 79 instances the requisitioned equipment was shipped to Germany. (ECH-10)
Support for such requisitions was found in an order of the Military Commander of Belgium of 6 August 1942. This order was explained as embodying the “modern” German view that, as “total war is no longer limited in space but has become a struggle of peoples and nations against each other,” requisitions under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations should no longer be limited to the “needs of the occupying forces” but may also be used in the “general interest of the German war effort”; and that requisitioned articles may be used not only in the territory in which they were obtained but also “in other territories in the sphere of the occupying power.” (ECH-10)
In April 1941, Goering ordered the removal of church bells in France “which represent the most important and last reserve of copper and tin,” stressing that “no church bells would be removed in Germany before all bells had been removed in France” (EC-323). In 1943, after the removal of church bells from the other occupied countries and even from the Reich, Hitler ordered their removal from Belgium (ECH-11). The Belgians protested, invoking the Hague Regulations, and refused an offer to buy; thereupon the Germans requisitioned the bells against receipt. (ECH-11)
By circular letter, dated 23 June 1943, Speer ordered that scientific instruments and apparatus be taken out of the laboratories and research institutes in the occupied Western countries, directing that applications for instruments be made through channels and that the requisitions be made by the Military Government. (ECH-14)
In many cases, representatives of German scientific institutions sought to acquire scientific instruments in order to modernize their own installations, appearing in Army uniforms to give the impression that the requisition was a military measure (ECH-15). The Military Government of Belgium decided that Articles 52 and 56 of the Hague Regulations were inapplicable because the Allies had destroyed a number of German scientific installations in the Reich through bombing, which therefore had to be replaced from the occupied territories, and that “in a total war, no consideration could be given to the cited articles of the Hague Regulations”. (ECH-16)
As part of the design to supply the armament industry in Germany with material from the occupied Western territories, a program for the removal of copper and lead from transmission installations of power distribution plants in the occupied Western countries was instituted by a decree of Speer dated 31 May, 1943 (EC-101). The plan contemplated from the outset that the transmission of facilities would not be restored (as required by the second paragraph of Article 53 of the Hague Regulations) but that an equivalent amount of metal would be returned after the war. (EC-101)
(2) The Nazis purchased war materials and consumer goods in the regular and black markets for shipment to the Reich, all with funds exacted from the occupied countries. Following the initial “stripping” phase of the occupation, the Nazis promptly instituted an extensive “buying-out” program (061-PS) with the object of procuring not merely materials required for the German war effort, but to obtain also consumer goods, including luxury items, for the civilian population of Germany (EC-485).
No limitations, legal or moral, were observed in the execution of this program. Supplies which could not be obtained through normal channels were purchased on the black market. The disastrous effects of competition among various German agents led the central occupational authorities in Belgium, France, and Holland to take over black market operation directly (1765-PS). On 13 June 1942, by order of Goering, Col. Veltjens was appointed to direct black market purchases in all occupied territories and a new agency, the so-called UEWA, was placed at his disposal. (ECH-7)
The actual purchases were made by several corporations, including Pimetex, an agency of the Speer Ministry of Armament and Munitions. The goods were distributed through Roges according to directives of the Central Planning Board (Speer, Koerner, Milch) and in appropriate cases by the German Ministry of Economics and the Reichsstellen (ECH-7). Black market operations were finally abolished by order of Goering dated 2 April, 1943, confirmed in Belgium by circular of the Military Commander of 19 June, 1943. (ECH-9)
Certain of the purchases made through the black market while under the direction of Col. Veltjens are of special interest:
Christmas Drive. On 22 September 1942, Goering ordered a special drive in the Western occupied countries to purchase presents for the civil population in Germany for the coming Christmas. The Roges Company effected the distribution of the articles in Germany.
Special Drive WABO. This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O. Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and Pimetex did the buying.
Special Drive LOWA (Degenkolb locomotive program). The purchase were made by Pimetex. (ECH-7)
As of 15 January 1943, black market purchases totaled approximately 1,100,000,000 RM, including:
RM 929,100,000 in France.
RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, and
RM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (1765-PS)
Payment in France was made out of occupation funds, in Belgium out of such funds and through the clearing, and in Holland through “normal bank transactions” (1765-PS; ECR-132). As appears very clearly from the report of Col. Veltjens of 15 January, 1943, substantially all the goods so purchased were shipped to the Reich. (1765-PS)
(3) The Nazi conspirators compelled the nationals of the occupied countries to produce and distribute materials and equipment in accordance with the German general war requirements. The “stripping” and “buying-out” phases of the Nazi spoliation were both gradually superseded by a regulated program for the utilization of the industrial plant of the occupied areas and the transfer of orders (subcontracting) to local concerns. The Nazi conspirators established comprehensive rationing controls under which essential raw materials were made available only to those who produced in the German interest; those reluctant to produce on German order were placed under compulsory administration. “This,” Keitel noted in commenting on the controls established in France, “is * * * booty of the victor”. (EC-613)
Belgium
The means employed in Belgium were typical. Production quotas for coal, iron and steel, textiles and leather, and other products were fixed by the Ministry of Economics and its Reichsstellen, in some cases after consultation with the Reich Minister (Funk). (ECH-2)
Comprehensive production controls were established in Belgium to assure the fulfillment of these quotas. Pursuant to plans developed in advance of the invasion (EC-155), a decree was issued by the Military Commander on 27 May, 1940, creating so-called “Goods Offices,” endowed with authority to issue general and special orders to Belgian firms requiring production of designated products, and the sale thereof to designated buyers, and with the further power to prohibit production or sale without license (3604-PS). By decree of the Military Commander of 29 April, 1941, the appointment of a commissar to direct operations of private plants was authorized. (3610-PS)
The German Goods Offices (ECH-3) were transferred to similar units established by Belgian decree of 3 September, 1940. (Whether this decree was issued on German order or suggestion does not appear.) The Germans supervised the Belgian Goods Offices and adopted as German orders both the Belgian decree establishing the Offices and the orders issued thereunder, and prescribed punishment by fine and imprisonment for violations. (3609-PS)
For the first two years of the occupation, German control was exercised mainly through prohibitions and restrictions, that is, by a priority system (ECH-4), although even then important sectors of the Belgian economy, notably textiles and leather products, were controlled by “positive” orders directing the amount in kind to be produced and the persons to whom distribution must be made (ECH-4; ECH-2). During this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods Offices through “command channels,” that is, through the Belgian Minister of Economics. (ECH-3)
On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated articles (3612-PS), a signal for the introduction of “positive” controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics, German representatives selected from the Reichsstellen were attached directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (ECH-3). At the end of 1943, the office of the “Ruestungsobmann” of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and War Production began issuing “positive orders” for production to individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices, pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production (Speer). (ECH-3)
Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for the closing down of factories at his discretion (3616-PS). In the iron and metal industry alone at least 400 plants “not important for the war effort” had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (EC-335). By the end of the occupation, 1360 put of a total of 2164 plants in the textile industry had been closed down. (ECH-19)
France and Holland
Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland. German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same time as in Belgium (3604-PS). These were subsequently abolished in November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the “suggestion” of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers (EC-613; EC-616). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the local German Armament Inspectorate (EC-471; EC-472-A), who, it is believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the outbreak of war.
C. The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French Participations in European Industries by Means of Governmental Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals.
The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest extent possible, and embarked on a program to that end even during the progress of the war.
(1) The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during the war. On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks “in order, especially in the case of holding companies, to win influence * * * over the controlled companies” (EC-41). The memorandum recommended the taking possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because of the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibiting confiscation of private property, it was deemed more advisable to influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than through plain force. (EC-41)
At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on the subject of “Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern European countries,” it was decided that regulations should be issued immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these countries, and that registration should be required of owners and trustees. (1445-PS)
In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the Germans’ economic policy was the “increase of German influence with foreign enterprises,” that it was “necessary already now that any opportunity is used to make it possible for the German economy to start the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the economy of the occupied countries,” and directed that the transfer of capital from Germany to the occupied countries be facilitated to make possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied countries. (EC-137)
At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the subject of “Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in southeastern Europe,” Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics commented that “private economical penetration of the Southeast area by German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and French interests in that territory” (EC-43). The group present, including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank, agreed that “attempts should be made immediately to acquire shares” and that “in doing so the tendency should be preserved to present a bill for the shares at the peace conference.” It was further agreed that “it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares into private hands” but that “in order to make the right selection it appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage” in which “first of all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)” undertake handing them over to private industry. (EC-43)
(2) The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and under clearing agreements with the occupied countries.
Belgium
Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41 states:
“According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here:
“1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises which offer the basis for collaboration between the two economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium, particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are located in the Balkans and in which a general German interest exists.
“2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.” (ECR-24)
In his report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium stated:
“A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany. Among the important business deals of this kind which have been concluded should be mentioned the taking over by the Kreditanstalt, Wien (Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential interest in the Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein (General Yugoslav Bank Association) from the Societé Generale (capital approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the Deutsche Bank of the overwhelming majority [translator’s note: of shares] of the Banca Commerciala Romana from the Societé Generale (capital approximately 2 million RM). The Deutsche Bank also succeeded in acquiring shares of the Kreditanstalt, Wien, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from the Societé Generale and from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between the Deutsche Bank and the Societé Generale on the transfer of approximately 25% of the capital of the Banque Generale du Luxembourg are about to be concluded. Through this deal the Deutsche Bank together with the other German groups obtains the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately 70% of the shares). The Deutsche Bank gets the right to acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being, remained with the Societé Generale.” (EC-34)
While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance that the owners would not be compelled to sell (ECH-22), in at least one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order (EC-335). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of Trustees East of shares of the Belgian “Trust Metallurgique” in electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had “to be done, at the request of the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a financial basis could not be obtained.” (EC-335)
The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20 March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which “is explained by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital participations in Balkan enterprises” (ECR-14). Increasing transfers resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the Commissar’s issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment (ECR-24). As a sequel, “capital” payments were separated from those for “goods and services” and financed by a separate “capital” clearing agreement covering purchases of securities and other “capital” transactions (ECR-24). The Belgian clearing “credit” under the capital clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs (ECR-173). As shown below, (see infra, D, 2) the Belgian credit under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army.
France and Holland
The limited evidence, in the presently available German documents indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (See infra, D, 5.) In France, participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through the clearing. (1991-PS)
D. The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the Needs of the Occupation Armies.
Except for the early period of the occupation, during which Reichskreditkassen certificates were issued to finance the needs of the occupation troops (Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied Europe, p. 329), the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency through the levy of excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing arrangements under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange.
(1) The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the conquered countries.
Belgium
The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both “internal occupation costs” and “external occupation costs” (ECR-32). The former was defined as “those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance the needs of the German military formations located in the country” (ECR-32). The term “external occupation costs” was used interchangeably with the title “antibolshevistic contribution” (EC-401). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges was made “to the limit of capacity”. (ECR-59)
Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of regular practice “not for occupation cost purposes” (ECR-166; ECR-155-A; ECR-35), including:
(a) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (ECR-89; ECR-104).
(b) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a “not inconsiderable part” of which did “not have the least thing to do with occupation costs” (ECR-39; ECR-142).
(c) “Political purposes (that is, SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth)” (ECR-106).
(d) Purchases in the “black market” (ECR-106), many of them destined for export. (See supra, B, (2).)
(e) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in Belgium for military operations against England (ECH-5); the Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and those for military operations (ECH-5).
Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium
“were not only sufficient to cover the needs of the Wehrmacht * * * but also made it possible * * * to fund a cash reserve which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs”. (ECH-5)
France
The occupation cost accounts of the Reichskreditkasse in Paris disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation cost accounts, were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made on behalf of various Reichs ministeries and agencies, and for specified purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for the Wehrmacht (3615-PS). The funds in Account A were used for obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows:
_June 1940 to end 1943_ A I. Reich Minister for Economic Affairs (primarily for the buying agency, “Roges,” also for the purchase of securities and devisen) RM 1,518,000,000 A II. Foreign Office (for propaganda purposes in France) 27,000,000 A III. Payment of support to dependents of laborers recruited in France for work in Germany 1,500,000 A IV. Reich Minister for Transportation (purchase of securities) 2,500,000 A V. Paris Agency of the Reichstierstelle (Reich Agency for Animals)—imports of meat and meat products 19,000,000 A VI. Exchange by the Bank of France of RM notes for persons evacuated from Alsace-Lorraine 900,000 A VII. Financing purchases of raw sugar in North France by sugar refinery in South Germany 1,285,000 A VIII. Compensation for war damage to Reichsdeutsche and Volkdeutsche in France 8,500,000 A IX. Sale of French francs to the Reich (Commodity imports into Alsace-Lorraine) 66,000,000 A X. Reich Minister of Education (Purchases for libraries in the Reich of books destroyed in air raids) 1,000,000 (3615-PS)
The available records do not disclose the full extent to which the Wehrmacht used the funds at its disposal in Account B for nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of the OKW to the Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve for Account B, states:
“In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears from the following compilation:
Million RM. a. For procurement of goods exported from France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. RM 900 b. To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for purchases on black market 700 c. For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s Panzer army in Africa) 40 d. Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria) 4 e. Allotments in favor of families of French workersw orking in Germany 1.5 f. Special commissioner Rumania 1.3 g. Costs of building completions for directors of French powder factories 0.2 ——— 1,647
Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation.” (1741-PS)
Holland
Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month (ECR-174; EC-86). (100 RM = 75 gulden, approximately (EC-468)).
Expenditures were divided between “occupation” purposes and “nonoccupation” purposes, according to whether “the products purchased or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands remain in the Netherlands (occupation cost) or leave the Netherlands (nonoccupation cost)” (ECR-174). During the 20-month period from March 1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden, 433,800,000 gulden were expended for “nonoccupation” purposes (ECR-175-193). A large part of the “pure” occupation expenditure, moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts. (ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191)
In theory, only the “occupation” costs were supposed to be charged to the Netherlands (ECR-174); until April 1941, the “nonoccupation” expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands (ECR-175). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums “returned,” however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports (ECR-175-193), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April 1941, when reimbursements ceased. (ECR-176)
During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional levy from the Netherlands under the heading of “external occupation costs,” amounting to 500,000,000 RM (ECR-194). Of this sum, 100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at the Verrechnungskasse to the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (ECR-194)
In April 1942, “at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart,” the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per month, retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in gold (ECR-195). By 31 March 1944, this “contribution” amounted to 2,150,000,000 RM. (EC-86)
It is immaterial whether this “contribution” was made at the direction of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the “voluntary” act of the then President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the occupant. (See infra, Conclusion.) The spirit in which he discharged his duties is sympathetically described by the German Commissar at the Netherlands Bank as follows:
“The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost Van Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership, penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude in itself gives him the correct position on financial and monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the greater German economic space. Furthermore, it makes easier cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas has also entrusted Mr. Rost Van Tonningen with the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance (Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums). Mr. Rost Van Tonningen took over this office at the end of the month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to unified points of view.” (ECR-196)
(2) The Nazi conspirators financed exports from the occupied countries to Germany by means of forced loans under the guise of clearing agreements.
Belgium
The principle of the clearing system is as follows:
The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country. The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus if trade between two countries is unequal the clearing agency of one acquires a claim against the agency of the other which, however, is satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an offsetting claim.
In the order establishing the German-Belgium clearing, the Belgium clearing agency was the National Bank of Belgium (3608-PS). The administration of the clearing was shortly thereafter transferred to Emission Bank, an organization originally incorporated by Belgian interests pursuant to order of the Military Commander of 27 June 1940 (ECR-24). The change was one in name only, however, since at this time the management of the two banks was substantially identical and the Emission Bank obtained its currency by loan from the National Bank. The Emission Bank was, by its charter terms, subject to orders of the Commissar at the National Bank; the Commissar obtained the same powers over the National Bank by German order of 16 December 1940. (ECR-24)
The Belgian total “credit” under the clearing, as of 31 July 1944, amounted to 60,837,000,000 bfrs = 4,867,000,000 RM, of which 54,993,000,000 bfrs = 4,399,000,000 RM arose from the Belgian-German clearing for goods and services. (ECR-173)
The continued increase in the Belgian “credit” was due mainly to “the increasing Belgian export to Germany for which there are only small imports from Germany on the other side of the account.” (ECR-149)
The entire Belgian credit under the clearing constitutes a forced loan, largely for nonoccupation purposes:
(a) The Belgian-German clearing was established by circular of the Reichs Minister of Economics, 4 July 1940 (ECH-6), which was published to the Belgians by proclamation of the Military Commander of 10 July 1940 (EC-604; 3608-PS).
(b) “Since it was to be foreseen that as the result of the increased deliveries from Belgium to the Reich, which were not matched by opposite accounts, particularly in the early period, the clearing status would develop to the favor of the Emission Bank” (ECR-24), an agreement was signed by the Emission Bank and the German Reichsbank on 16/17 August 1940 under which each undertook to pay out clearing transfers immediately (ECR-24; ECH-5).
(c) This agreement did not prescribe what must be financed through the clearing; it merely provided for immediate payment of claim arising thereunder without waiting until the account should be balanced by equalizing of imports and exports. As the Military Commander stated, the German-Belgian clearing was “not regulated by an agreement, but has been regulated unilaterally by my proclamation of 10 July 1940” (EC-604). The Military Commander made clear the absolute power asserted by the German authorities over the Belgian Note Banks (as the Germans described the Emission and National Banks). He stated:
“* * * The claim made to the Commissar that the Emission Bank is entitled to ask in every case for detailed explanation of compensation payments coming from Germany is incorrect. The clearing activities between Germany and Belgium are not regulated by an agreement but have been regulated unilaterally by my proclamation on July 10, 1940 and are not subject to any Belgian control. Inter-alia the transfer of all payments which have been specially authorized by the Reich Ministry of Economy has been expressly permitted * * *.” (EC-604)
(d) The Commissar freely invoked his directive power over the Note Banks.
1. When, in April 1941, the clearing balance of the Emission Bank exceeded 1,500,000 bfrs the Emission Bank refused to pay out several large sums arising by virtue of German-Belgian “capital” transactions. Thereupon, the Commissar issued an order directing the bank to make the payment. (ECR-24)
2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon issued an order directing the bank to do so. (ECR-172)
3. In October 1942, the Emission Bank refused to pay out certain amounts expended for purchases on the Belgian black market. The military administrator, however, “held down the increasing resistance of the Note Banks which culminated at the end of October of this year in a public threat of resignation by the Governor of the National Bank, by the heaviest pressure, and forced the Note Banks, while emphasizing his willingness to negotiate on certain Belgian proposals, again to take up the global clearing transfers for German procurement agencies which were cut off for a period” (ECR-132). The nature of this pressure is explicitly shown in the following communication from the Commissar to the President of the Emission Bank dated 29 October 1942:
“The Military Commander has ordered me to inform you of the following:
“The requested extension of time for the resumption of business relations with the Armed Forces Clearing Institute (Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse) and for the payment of the arrears of RM 60 million have been denied. An official will determine tomorrow at 10 a. m. whether payment has been made.
“Severest measures against you and all responsible parties must be expected in case of failure to pay.
“If acts of sabotage occur on the equipment and the values of the National Bank or the Emission Bank, you and the gentlemen designated on the enclosed list will be held responsible personally and your property will be seized. Your liability is a joint one.” (EC-605)
France
The “credit” balance of the Bank of France under the Franco-German clearing established on 14 November 1940 amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM as of September 1943 (3615-PS). The clearing arrangement was designed, of course, principally for the financing of exports, that is, for purposes not related to the needs of the occupation army. (EC-619)
Coercion in the establishment of the Franco-German clearing is readily demonstrable. Extreme pressure was brought to bear, particularly in regard to the rate of exchange established in the agreement, by threatening to cut off communications between “occupied” and “nonoccupied” zones in France (3602-PS; 3603-PS), a step which would have destroyed the last vestige of economic order in France. The harsh terms of the agreement, which required the Bank of France to make immediate payment for exports to Germany regardless of the balance of trade, fixed the rate of exchange at 20 francs to the mark (as compared to 10 to 1 before the war), and gave Germany a unilateral option to cancel at any time, forcibly suggest that the agreement would not voluntarily have been accepted. (EC-619)
Holland
The clearing system between Holland and Germany was of short duration, being cancelled effective 1 April 1941, when free transfer of Reichsmarks to Holland was introduced. (See infra, D, (5).) It is therefore not deemed of sufficient importance to warrant discussion at this point.
(3) The Nazi conspirators unlawfully took over the gold reserve of the National Bank of Belgium and the Netherlands Bank in the interest of the German general war effort.
Belgium
The gold of the National Bank, deposited with the Bank of France and transferred to Dakar, was brought to Berlin pursuant to German-French “agreement” in the amount of 545,700,000 RM (ECR-149), and there deposited with the Reichsbank in Berlin (ECR-24). Because of the “high demands on gold and foreign exchange” which led to a “considerable straining of the reserves” (EC-401), the “Reich Government felt itself required to lay claim to the gold of the National Bank for the Reich” (ECR-149). A decision to proceed by requisitioning under paragraph 52 of the Hague Regulations (EC-401) was not executed, apparently because of fears on the part of the Reichsbank that title thus acquired would not be recognized (ECR-115). On order of Goering (ECH-5, part 9, Annex XIII), the gold was then “requisitioned on 19 September 1942 by the Oberpraesident of the Province of Mark Brandenburg for the Deputy of the Four-Year Plan, on the basis of the Reich Contribution Law (Reichsleistungsgesetz) of 1.IX.1939 (Sec. 15, paragraph 1, No. 5, and Sec. 2a)” (ECR-149).
Holland
As shown above, part of the Dutch “voluntary” contribution to the “war against Bolshevism” was paid in gold. The gold was, in fact, taken from the Netherlands Bank. (EC-401)
(4) The Nazi conspirators unlawfully compelled the nationals of the occupied countries to surrender and offer for sale all precious metals and foreign exchange to the local central banks, which delivered them to the German Reichsbank.
Belgium
By German decree of 17 June 1940 and administrative orders issued pursuant thereto the Belgians were required to surrender gold and foreign exchange notes to the Emission Bank, which in turn, delivered the loot to the Reichsbank (ECR-24).
By May 1943, the Reichsbank had acquired in this fashion gold and foreign exchange of the value of 23,400,000 RM. (ECR-149)
Holland
Gold and foreign exchange delivered by the Netherlands Bank to the Reichsbank “on the basis of the direction of the Reichsmarshal” (Goering) amounted to 74,000,000 RM through November 1940. (EC-465)
France
It is believed that the same practice was followed in France, but evidence as to details has not been found in the German documents presently available.
(5) The Nazi conspirators used German Reichsmarks as currency in the Netherlands, for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupational troops, which currency they caused to be freely exchanged for gulden by the Netherlands Bank. The Nazi conspirators, animated in part by the view that the Netherlands were “akin in blood to the German nation” (3613-PS), sought to promote a “mutual interpenetration of the German and Netherlands economies” through the acquisition by Germans of Dutch participations (EC-468) and Dutch investment in German securities. (ECR-174)
To this end, restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmark and gulden across the German-Dutch border were removed. Conversations between the Reich Economics and Finance Ministers in October 1940 led to the first step in this direction, the issuance by the Economics Minister of a Circular (Runderlass)—No. 89/40—which produced substantial changes in the foreign exchange control along the German-Dutch borders (EC-468). This provided, inter-alia, that RM 1,000 or its equivalent in gulden could be taken across the German-Dutch border by travelers or in border trade without permit, and permitted Germans to transfer to Holland up to 5,000 RM per person per month for any purpose except purchase of goods without any permission (EC-468).
These relaxations were made effective in Holland by free exchange of Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank, introduced “on the initiative” of the Commissar, and by enforced acceptance of Reichsmark currency by the Dutch business population. (EC-468)
The Reichsmarks thus made available in the Netherlands were mainly used to purchase Dutch securities on the stock exchange (EC-468). Permission to make such purchases was extended to a large number of German banks by the German Ministry of Economics. The transfers were made with “reluctance” by the Dutch, in connection with which the Reich Commissar at the Netherlands Bank observed, “it may be pointed out with some justification that an out-payment of gulden made against a Reichsmark credit, which can only result through the burdening of the Netherlands State credit, represents no genuine transfer” (EC-468).
Notwithstanding the objections of the then Commissar at the Netherlands Bank (EC-468), circular 87/40 was soon followed by No. 29/41 of 31 March 1941, which abolished almost completely all restrictions on the free use of the Reichsmark in Holland (ECR-197). Circular 29/41 provided that all foreign exchange transactions between Germany and the Netherlands were freed of control, the only important exception being that German investments of more than 100,000 gulden in Holland required permission of the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands. The clearing agreement was abolished, and payments between Germany and the Netherlands were permitted by simple bank checks, drafts, or postal money orders. A simultaneous order by the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands Areas lifted all restrictions set by Netherlands foreign exchange law on such transactions (ECR-197).
After this “introduction of free payments traffic” or “removal of the foreign exchange frontiers,” payments for exports from Holland were made in Germany “through the accounts of the banks, mainly through the account of the Netherlands Bank, which takes on the exchange into gulden means of payment without further formalities.” (ECR-174)
This exchange presumably merely continued the practice introduced earlier at the “instigation” of Seyss-Inquart. At all events, the President of the Bank, Van Tonningen, was a Nazi agent, and his acts may be charged to the Nazi conspirators.
The result of this radical step was this:
“Ever since the introduction of free payments traffic the status of the Netherlands Bank is mainly influenced by the taking up of Reichsmarks. On 31 March 1941, the day before the introduction of free payments traffic, the Netherlands Bank had a total stock of about 83 million RM of Reichsmark credits, on 30 April 1941 of about 213 million RM, and on 31 May 1941 of about 366 million RM. Thus, in the two months after the removal of the foreign exchange frontier, it has taken up about 283 million RM, the gulden equivalent, at the rate of RM 132.7 equals florin 100, on the basis of the transfer agreement with the Reichsbank.” (ECR-174)
Thus the Netherlands Bank was caused to pledge its credit (in the form of Dutch currency) in exchange for a Reichsmark credit. In this manner the Nazi conspirators were enabled to exact from the bank a loan unlimited in quantity and beyond the bank’s control, by the simple expedient of writing out a check in Germany.
E. Argument and Conclusion.
The acts of the Nazi conspirators as revealed by the evidence constitute war crimes within the meaning of Article 6 (B) of the charter of the International Military Tribunal. Two general observations should be made at the outset. In the first place, the pertinent provisions of the Hague Regulations (3737-PS) are controlling. The Germans entered into an Armistice Agreement with only one of the countries under discussion (France), and the Franco-German Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940 contains nothing which purports to confer on the occupant powers broader than those which may be exercised under the Hague Regulations. Article 3 of the Armistice reserves to Germany in the occupied zone “all the rights of the occupying power.” No other provision is material here. The language of Article 3 plainly does not purport to qualify in any way the otherwise binding terms of the Hague Regulations. The German position (EC-113) that “the rights of Article 3 are more extensive than the rights of the occupation power in the Hague Regulations” and permitted Germany to base thereon “all measures which are, according to her own judgment, necessary for the continuation of the war against England,” is therefore plainly untenable.
Secondly, the collaboration of certain French, Dutch, and Belgian officials is legally immaterial and does not serve to shield the Nazi conspirators from responsibility for the acts done in the territory under German control. Belgium, Holland, and a large part of France were under German occupation throughout the period in question and, after 10 November 1942, so-called Vichy France was overrun and occupied as well. It is accepted doctrine that governmental authority is completely, albeit temporarily, vested in the occupant during the period of its control. Whether the occupant elects to employ the existing administrative machinery and personnel or substitute its own, is solely a question of political and administrative convenience; the choice is without legal significance. The civil administration of an occupied country, it may be confidently asserted, has no independent legal status whatever.
(1) The acts of the Nazi conspirators as revealed by the evidence are prohibited by the Hague Regulations.
(a) The forcible removal of machinery, foodstuffs, and raw materials. It has been shown above that the Nazis forcibly removed large quantities of machinery, foodstuffs, and raw materials to Germany, including even church bells and the strategic metals contained in the transmission systems of the occupied countries. Articles 52 and 53 of the Hague Regulations (the only pertinent provisions) provide no basis for such action.
Article 52 of the Hague Regulations declares that requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded except for “the needs of the occupation army,” a limitation deliberately substituted for the less restrictive one of “military necessity” which had previously been contained in the Brussels Declaration of 1874 (Conference Internationale de la Paix, La Haye, 1899, Part I, p. 60; Part III, pp. 45, 181). It is settled that requisitions for export to the country of the occupying power is violative of Article 52 (see Feilchenfeld, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Washington, 1942, pars. 148-149, and cases cited).
The argument, advanced by the Germans in defense of such requisitions during the first World War (see Garner, International Law and World War, Vol. II, p. 126, n.) and frequently again during the recent conflict (EC-344-7; ECH-16), that the limitations of Article 52 may be disregarded in case of military necessity, is not well founded. Article 23g, which permits the destruction of private property when “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war,” is included among the provisions relating to the rights of belligerents in the conduct of military operations, and has no relation to the powers of a belligerent in an occupied area in which conflict has ceased (see Garner, loc. cit. supra). The latter are governed, so far as material here, by Articles 42-56.
Apart from Article 23g, there is no basis whatever for the German position. The Hague Regulations are limitations on the powers which may be exercised under the plea of military necessity (II, Oppenheim, International Law, 6th Edition Revised, edited by Lauterpacht, p. 185, n.1). An exception for cases of alleged military necessity, therefore, cannot be implied. The deliberate substitution of the present terminology in lieu of the vague limitations of “military necessity” as contained in the Brussels Declaration of 1874, moreover, would seem to remove all basis for a contrary construction.
Article 53 provides no better support for the Nazis’ action. The second paragraph, relating to private property, states:
“All appliances, whether on land, on sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”
This Article, it may be conceded, authorizes not only the sequestration but the use of all matters within its reach. The term “munitions of war,” however, clearly refers only to chattels (Feilchenfeld, supra, par. 351). It does not, therefore, include machinery affixed to the realty. The German legal advisors uniformly so conceded during this war (EC-560; EC-84; EC-263; EC-344-7). The suggestion that Article 53 is subject to an implied exception in the case of military necessity (EC-344-7) is, for reasons noted above, untenable. It is equally clear that the deliberate removal of the metal content of the transmission systems in the occupied areas is without legal basis. Article 53 in terms requires restoration when peace is made and, whatever exceptions may be implied in case of munitions which are necessarily consumed by use, no basis can be found for the deliberate destruction of transmission facilities.
The question as to the class of chattels included within the deliberately general term “munitions of war” is not free from doubt. The right of seizure is based on military necessity, namely, the danger of leaving at large things which are peculiarly adapted to warlike purposes (Spaight, War Rights on Land, p. 512). It should accordingly be limited to those things which are “susceptible of direct military use” (see British Manual of Military Law, 1929, Amendment No. 12, par. 415; U. S. Army Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, 1940, par. 332). Article 53, which contains no limitation restricting seizures to the needs of the occupation army, would otherwise completely nullify the deliberate limitations on the right of requisition imposed in Article 52. In this view, raw materials and even semi-finished goods, save perhaps such goods as are normally part of military equipment, would seem outside the reach of Article 53.
(b) The control and direction of production and distribution in the German interest. The planned control and direction of the economy of the occupied countries in the interest of the German war effort constitute a violation of Article 52. This seems clearly true to the extent that production and sale for export to Germany were ordered by the Ruestungsobmann pursuant to Speer’s directive late in 1943. It would seem equally true of the earlier method of control by prohibitions and restrictions. For the net effect of the priority system was to leave no alternative to producing in the German interest save to cease operations. And even this alternative was not available, since the power to appoint a commissar in case of recalcitrant plants was expressly reserved.
Article 53, which is limited to chattels and has no relation to the demanding of personal services in any event, provides not even a remote basis for the imposition of the controls in question.
In what has been said, it is not meant to be suggested that an occupant is without power to institute a system of rationing for articles in short supply with the aim of securing an equitable distribution among the population of the occupied area. Such a measure is plainly related to the promotion of economic order and there is nothing in the Hague Regulations which restricts even requisition for the needs of the local population. The Nazi controls, however, were exercised, not in the interest of the local population, but to fulfill the general war requirements of Germany, in the Reich as well as in the occupied area.
(c) Levy of occupation charges for purposes not related to the needs of the occupation army. Article 49 of the Hague Regulations limits the levy of occupation charges to the “needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.” The only purpose for which such contributions may be levied (other than for the financing of the costs of administration, a matter not material here), is to supply the needs of the army of occupation (Conference Internationale de la Paix, La Haye, 1899, Pt. I, p. 60; Feilchenfeld, supra, par. 167; Spaight, supra, pp. 384-392). The power to levy contributions is reserved in order to permit an equitable distribution among the entire community of costs which, if supplies were requisitioned, would fall directly and solely on the owners of the requisitioned property (Spaight, supra, pp. 387-389). Accordingly, the levy of contributions to finance exports or for other purposes unrelated to the needs of the army in the territory in question would seem plainly forbidden (Feilchenfeld, supra, par. 167; Spaight, supra, pp. 384-392).
Moreover, as Article 49 refers to the occupation army only, the levy of contributions to support the troops engaged in military operations against an enemy located outside the boundaries of the occupied country or to finance other general war expenses would seem prohibited.
(d) Forced loans. Forced loans can be justified only as contributions and are therefore subject to the same limitations (Feilchenfeld, supra, par. 185). The forced loans under the Belgian-German and Franco-German clearing arrangements, were executed largely to finance exports to Germany, that is, for nonoccupation purposes.
(e) The exchange of reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank. These transactions, whether viewed as resulting in a loan or merely in an exchange, constitute a contribution of money for nonoccupation purposes. It may be assumed that they were carried out “voluntarily” while the Netherlands Bank was under the immediate direction of Rost Van Tonningen. This circumstance is immaterial, however, since Van Tonningen was a civil official appointed by Seyss-Inquart, and his authority, like that of civilian officials in occupied areas generally, was derived solely from that of the occupant.
(f) The taking over of gold of the National Bank of Belgium and the Netherlands Bank. That the gold of the National Bank of Belgium was private property is not disputed; the Nazi conspirators proceeded on this view in the original decision to requisition under Article 52 (EC-401, second enclosure). Confiscation under Article 53, first paragraph, therefore, was not open to the Nazi conspirators; so far as appears they never considered such a step.
It may be assumed for purposes of argument that gold is subject to requisition under the Hague Regulations. Requisition may be made, however, only for the needs of the occupation army. It cannot be resorted to to relieve the “considerable straining of the reserves” of Germany.
The gold reserve of the Netherlands Bank, it is believed, is private property, no less than that of the National Bank of Belgium. In this view, the taking over of the gold of the Netherlands Bank was likewise illegal. There is, of course, no basis in law for exacting a contribution for the so-called “war against Bolshevism,” to use the Nazis’ phrase. And, for the reasons indicated above, it is immaterial whether these “contributions” were “voluntarily” made by Van Tonningen.
(g) The compulsory surrender of gold and foreign exchange. The requirement of surrender of gold and foreign exchange for ultimate delivery to the Reichsbank amounts in substance to a requisition and cannot be supported because obviously done solely to maintain the reserves of foreign exchange for the total war effort, not for the needs of the occupation army alone.
(h) The acquisition of business interests. The Nazis’ acquisition of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations was unlawful. That this is so in the case of the sales ordered by the Ministry of Economics is clear (EC-43). The conclusion should be the same even when sale was not expressly ordered. These purchases were financed through the clearing system (which, as shown above, constituted a forced loan) and out of occupation cost funds. Since such expenditures bore no relation to the needs of the occupation army or, indeed, served any purpose other than to enrich the Nazi conspirators and their nominees, the Nazi program for acquisition of participations was in plain violation of Article 49 of the Hague Regulations.
(2) Such acts constitute “plunder of public or private property” within the meaning of Article 6 (B) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Save as they may be authorized by International Law (and hence “consented” to by the occupied countries), the acts complained of are of a character condemned by the criminal code of the occupied countries and, indeed, of all civilized nations. Absent such authority, the forcible permanent taking of money or other property whether from Government agencies or private persons, constitutes larceny or, as known in the international law of belligerent occupation, “pillage” (Garner, supra, pp. 472-473). The question of which court or courts may try and punish for the offense is one of jurisdiction only (see Garner, supra, pp. 475-480) and has been resolved by the Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GERMANIZATION AND SPOLIATION
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (b, │ │ │ c). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Sections III; │ │ 15, 43, │ VIII (E, J). │ I │ 51 │ │ │ 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │ │ │ Laws and Customs of War on Land, │ │ │ Annex, Articles 49, 52, 53, 55. │ VI │598, 599 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was│ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ │document number indicates that the │ │ │document was referred to during the │ │ │trial but was not formally received in │ │ │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ │parentheses following the description of│ │ │the document. The USA series number, │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *061-PS │Secret Bormann letter, 11 January 1944, │ │ │concerning large-scale organization for │ │ │withdrawal of commodities from occupied │ │ │territories for use of bombed-out │ │ │population in Germany. (USA 692) │ III │ 105 │ │ │ *294-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by │ │ │Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning │ │ │conditions in Russia. (USA 185) │ III │ 242 │ │ │ *661-PS │Secret thesis from the Academy of German│ │ │Law, January 1940, on Resettlement. (USA│ │ │300) │ III │ 472 │ │ │ *686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor to strengthen German Folkdom,│ │ │7 October 1939, signed by Hitler, │ │ │Goering, Lammers and Keitel. (USA 305) │ III │ 496 │ │ │ *862-PS │Memorandum by General Friderici, │ │ │Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht to the │ │ │Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ │initialled by Keitel, Jodl and │ │ │Warlimont, 15 October 1940, concerning │ │ │plan to Germanize Czechoslovakia. (USA │ │ │313) │ III │ 618 │ │ │ *910-PS │Notes on Himmler’s plan for │ │ │Germanization of Poland, 27 and 30 March│ │ │1942, from the Main Office, Interior │ │ │Administration, initialled “Dr. S. H.”. │ │ │(USA 310) │ III │ 639 │ │ │ 997-PS │Top secret report by Seyss-Inquart │ │ │concerning the situation in the │ │ │Netherlands—Exploitation and │ │ │Nazification in period 29 May to 19 July│ │ │1940. │ III │ 641 │ │ │ *1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│ │ │Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May │ │ │1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia │ │ │File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690 │ │ │ *1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │ │ │Rosenberg before people most intimately │ │ │concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│ │ │his “Russia File”. (USA 147) │ III │ 716 │ │ │ *1352-PS │Reports concerning the confiscation of │ │ │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and │ │ │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III │ 916 │ │ │ 1445-PS │Report on conference at Ministry of │ │ │Economics regarding use of Belgian and │ │ │Dutch capital investments in │ │ │southeastern European enterprises, 15 │ │ │June 1940. │ IV │ 20 │ │ │ *1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel │ │ │consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │ │ │148) │ IV │ 21 │ │ │ 1741-PS │Collection of documents relating to the │ │ │French Armistice. │ IV │ 228 │ │ │ 1765-PS │Report of the Commissioner for the Four │ │ │Year Plan Plenipotentiary for Special │ │ │Missions on Black Market Activities, 15 │ │ │January 1943. │ IV │ 325 │ │ │ *1918-PS │Speech by Himmler to SS officers on day │ │ │of Metz. (USA 304) │ IV │ 553 │ │ │ 1991-PS │Sixth report on activity and final │ │ │report of the German Armistice │ │ │Delegation for Economy, and of Delegate │ │ │of Reich Government for Economic and │ │ │Financial Questions with French │ │ │Government, 1 July 1943 to 17 August │ │ │1944. │ IV │ 605 │ │ │ *1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │ │concerning administration of Newly │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 319) │ IV │ 634 │ │ │ 2149-PS │Letter, 11 December 1942, to Foreign │ │ │Office, enclosing statement of German │ │ │Reichsbank concerning question of an │ │ │increase of French contributions to │ │ │Occupation expenses. │ IV │ 758 │ │ │ *2233-D-PS │Frank Diary. Regierungsitzungen. 1941. │ │ │October-December. Entry of 16 December │ │ │1941 at pp. 76-77. (USA 281) │ IV │ 891 │ │ │ *2233-G-PS │Frank Diary. 1939. 25 October to 15 │ │ │December. (USA 302) │ IV │ 903 │ │ │ *2233-H-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1941. Part II. │ │ │Entry of 19 April 1941. (USA 311) │ IV │ 904 │ │ │ *2749-PS │Title page of publication of Academy for│ │ │German Law, 7th year, 1940. (USA 301) │ V │ 390 │ │ │ *2915-PS │Extracts from German Labor, June-July │ │ │1942. (USA 306) │ V │ 580 │ │ │ *2916-PS │Commitment of Manpower │ │ │Doctrines-Orders-Directives, published │ │ │by Office of Reich Commissioner for │ │ │strengthening of National Character of │ │ │German People, December 1940. (USA 307) │ V │ 581 │ │ │ 3602-PS │Report on conversation (interview) │ │ │between Mr. Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger,│ │ │4 October. │ VI │ 314 │ │ │ 3603-PS │Report on conversation between Mr. │ │ │Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger, 10 October.│ VI │ 314 │ │ │ 3604-PS │Decree concerning rationing of │ │ │industrial goods from Official Gazette │ │ │of Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 37, Sec. 1.│ VI │ 315 │ │ │ 3605-PS │Rationing decree, 27 May 1940, from │ │ │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ │in Belgium and Northern France, 1940-41,│ │ │p. 37, Sec. 4. │ VI │ 315 │ │ │ 3606-PS │Rationing decree, 27 May 1940, from │ │ │Official Gazette of Military Commanders │ │ │in Belgium and Northern France, 1940-41,│ │ │p. 38, Sec. 10. │ VI │ 316 │ │ │ 3607-PS │Public Notice on Board of Directors of │ │ │Reichskreditkasse, from Official Gazette│ │ │of Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 65. │ VI │ 316 │ │ │ 3608-PS │Public Notice of Establishment of a │ │ │Clearing system between Belgium and │ │ │German Reich, 10 July 1940, from │ │ │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ │in Belgium and Northern France. │ VI │ 317 │ │ │ 3609-PS │Decree for execution of rationing decree│ │ │in Belgium, 5 November 1940, from │ │ │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ │in Belgium and Northern France. │ VI │ 318 │ │ │ 3610-PS │Decree regarding Plant Commissars, 29 │ │ │April 1941, from Official Gazette of │ │ │Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 599. │ VI │ 319 │ │ │ 3611-PS │Decree on economic measures against │ │ │Jews, 31 May 1941, from Official Gazette│ │ │of Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 620, Sec. │ │ │17. │ VI │ 320 │ │ │ 3612-PS │Decree regarding prohibition of │ │ │manufacturing of certain products, 6 │ │ │August 1942, from Official Gazette of │ │ │Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France, 1942, p. 986, Sec. 1. │ VI │ 321 │ │ │ 3613-PS │Proclamation to Netherlands population, │ │ │25 May 1940, from Official Gazette for │ │ │Occupied Dutch Territory, No. 1, 5 June │ │ │1940. │ VI │ 321 │ │ │ 3615-PS │Report by Ostrow on examination of │ │ │records of Reichskreditkasse, 29 │ │ │September 1945. │ VI │ 322 │ │ │ 3616-PS │Decree on prohibition to establish and │ │ │enlarge enterprises and on shutting down│ │ │enterprises, 30 March 1942, from │ │ │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ │in Belgium and Northern France, 1942, p.│ │ │865. │ VI │ 388 │ │ │ *EC-3 │Letter of Liaison Staff at Supreme │ │ │Headquarters, Armament Procurement │ │ │Office directed to General Thomas, Chief│ │ │of Wi Rue Amt, Berlin, 25 November 1941.│ │ │(USA 318) │ VII │ 242 │ │ │ EC-21 │Memorandum of Posse, 8 January 1940. │ VII │ 249 │ │ │ EC-34 │Report No. 1 on activities of Military │ │ │Administration for month of November │ │ │1940. │ VII │ 254 │ │ │ EC-41 │Notice concerning seizure of security │ │ │properties of Dutch and Belgian │ │ │holdings, 23 May 1940. │ VII │ 255 │ │ │ EC-43 │Report on conferences at Ministry of │ │ │Economics, 20 August 1940, regarding │ │ │acquisition of shares in important │ │ │foreign enterprises in Southeast Europe.│ VII │ 258 │ │ │ EC-69 │Memorandum of General Holder, 13 │ │ │December 1939, regarding treatment of │ │ │economical questions at the OKH. │ VII │ 262 │ │ │ EC-84 │Report of Lt. Colonel Helder on │ │ │reconversion of the economy, 7 December │ │ │1940. │ VII │ 263 │ │ │ EC-86 │Report on financial contributions of the│ │ │Occupied Areas. │ VII │ 264 │ │ │ EC-87 │Report on contribution of Netherlands │ │ │for German War economy. │ VII │ 278 │ │ │ EC-101 │Affidavit by Schmid-Lossberg, 21 │ │ │September 1945, concerning Holland, │ │ │Belgium and France. │ VII │ 280 │ │ │ EC-113 │Covering letter, 8 July 1940, to letter │ │ │from Supreme Command of Armed Forces, │ │ │concerning decision of Fuehrer in │ │ │Armistice questions, and memorandum of │ │ │Goering, 5 July 1940. │ VII │ 291 │ │ │ *EC-126 │Economic Policy Directive for Economic │ │ │Organization, East, Agricultural Group, │ │ │23 May 1941. (USA 316) │ VII │ 295 │ │ │ EC-137 │Memorandum of Goering, 2 August 1940, │ │ │regarding extension of German interests │ │ │in foreign enterprise, and covering │ │ │letter. │ VII │ 309 │ │ │ EC-155 │Collection of planned decrees on │ │ │economic matters, from Military │ │ │Administration-Economy, pp. 50-74. │ VII │ 312 │ │ │ EC-256 │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Goering and │ │ │Funk, 12 October 1937. │ VII │ 346 │ │ │ EC-261 │Letter from Funk to all Ministries, 14 │ │ │March 1938, regarding appointment of │ │ │Sarnow, deputy of Plenipotentiary for │ │ │War Economy. │ VII │ 371 │ │ │ EC-263 │Note on draft of decree on confiscation │ │ │of private Polish property. │ VII │ 373 │ │ │ EC-267 │Development and Position of French │ │ │Industry in area of Military Commander, │ │ │France, in 1941, from Report on Economy │ │ │by Military Commander, France. │ VII │ 376 │ │ │ *EC-305 │Minutes of meeting on 12 February 1940, │ │ │under Chairmanship of Goering concerning│ │ │labor supply in the East. (USA 303) │ VII │ 402 │ │ │ EC-323 │Telegram signed Schleier, dated Paris 26│ │ │April 1941. │ VII │ 406 │ │ │ EC-335 │Report of the Military Administration in│ │ │Belgium and Northern France, │ │ │January-March 1943. │ VII │ 407 │ │ │ EC-336 │Report of the Reich Minister for │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories, 26 │ │ │November 1942, concerning treatment of │ │ │Poles under his jurisdiction. │ VII │ 408 │ │ │ EC-344-7 │Report on Armament Economy in │ │ │Poland, 1939-1940. │ VII │ 416 │ │ │ *EC-344 16 and │Thomas report, 20 August 1940, │ │ 17 │summarizing experience with German │ │ │Armament Industry in Poland 1939-40 and │ │ │extract from report by Captain Dr. │ │ │Varain on same subject. (USA 297) │ VII │ 419 │ │ │ *EC-347 │Directives for operation of the Economy │ │ │in Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ │320) │ VII │ 421 │ │ │ EC-401 │Letter from Office Four Year Plan, 8 │ │ │July 1942, on seizure of Belgian gold. │ VII │ 439 │ │ │ *EC-410 │Appendix to Goering’s directive of 19 │ │ │October 1939 concerning the economic │ │ │administration of Occupied Territories. │ │ │(USA 298) │ VII │ 466 │ │ │ *EC-411 │Order by Hess concerning the │ │ │reconstruction of certain industrial │ │ │enterprises in Poland, 20 November 1939.│ │ │(USA 299) │ VII │ 469 │ │ │ EC-422 │Extracts from History of the War │ │ │Economy—and Armament Staff in France. │ VII │ 481 │ │ │ EC-427 │Letter from Lammers to Reichsbank │ │ │Directorate, 20 January 1939, on │ │ │appointment of Funk as President of │ │ │Reichsbank. │ VII │ 484 │ │ │ *EC-453 │Letter to Himmler, 21 September 1943, │ │ │and list of contributions by his │ │ │friends. (USA 322) │ VII │ 510 │ │ │ *EC-454 │Letter to Himmler, 27 August 1943, │ │ │regarding contributions by his friends. │ │ │(USA 321) │ VII │ 512 │ │ │ EC-465 │Letter from Commissar with the │ │ │Netherlands Bank, 9 December 1940, with │ │ │November report to Fuehrer. │ VII │ 518 │ │ │ EC-468 │Letter from Commissar at the Netherlands│ │ │Bank, 10 February 1941, with report for │ │ │January 1941 to Fuehrer. │ VII │ 524 │ │ │ EC-469 │Memorandum on meeting in Duesseldorf, 25│ │ │May 1940. │ VII │ 536 │ │ │ EC-470 │Special Events in the field of │ │ │procurement of means of production, raw │ │ │material, semi-finished products. │ VII │ 538 │ │ │ EC-471 │Armament Inspectorate Netherlands—War │ │ │Diary for time from 1 January-31 March │ │ │1943. │ VII │ 538 │ │ │ *EC-472 │Directives of Reich Marshal Goering │ │ │concerning economic organization of │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 315) │ VII │ 539 │ │ │ EC-472-A │War Diary of Armament Inspectorate from │ │ │10 April 1940-30 September 1942. │ VII │ 540 │ │ │ EC-473 │Extract from History of Armament │ │ │Inspectorate—Netherlands. │ VII │ 542 │ │ │ EC-474 │Letter, 1 June 1940, enclosing report of│ │ │Armament Inspectorate Netherlands. │ VII │ 542 │ │ │ EC-485 │Minutes on Goering Meeting, 1 October │ │ │1940, on the economic exploitation of │ │ │Occupied Territories. │ VII │ 543 │ │ │ EC-560 │Extract from War Diary of Armament │ │ │Inspectorate—Belgium 21 January 1941, │ │ │regarding right to remove machinery. │ VII │ 584 │ │ │ EC-604 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 1 May 1942.│ VII │ 584 │ │ │ EC-605 │Letter of the Commissar with the │ │ │Emission Bank in Brussels, 29 October │ │ │1942, with enclosure. │ VII │ 585 │ │ │ EC-606 │Minutes concerning conference with Field│ │ │Marshal Goering at Karinhall, 30 January│ │ │1940. │ VII │ 588 │ │ │ EC-613 │Memorandum on contributions of French │ │ │economy in favor of France performed at │ │ │instigation of Military Commander in │ │ │France. │ VII │ 602 │ │ │ EC-614 │Memorandum of the Military Commander in │ │ │France. │ VII │ 602 │ │ │ EC-615 │Notes by General Thomas on Meeting with │ │ │Colonel General Keitel, 1 December 1939.│ VII │ 603 │ │ │ EC-616 │Interference of War Economy and Armament│ │ │Staff with raw material rationing boards│ │ │from Situation Report of War Economy and│ │ │Armament Staff of France. │ VII │ 603 │ │ │ EC-617 │Extracts from Situation Report of War │ │ │Economy and Armament Staff of France. │ VII │ 604 │ │ │ EC-618 │Service instructions for Economic │ │ │Squads. │ VII │ 604 │ │ │ EC-619 │Clearing agreement of 14 November 1940, │ │ │for French-German payments. │ VII │ 608 │ │ │ EC-620 │Directive of Goering on exploitation of │ │ │the Occupied Western Territories, 26 │ │ │August 1940. │ VII │ 608 │ │ │ ECH-1 │Final report of Military Commander │ │ │Belgium, Part 10, Section I, concerning │ │ │German-Belgian trade. │ VII │ 609 │ │ │ ECH-2 │Report on Economic Planning of Military │ │ │Commander Belgium and Northern France, │ │ │13 September 1940. │ VII │ 610 │ │ │ ECH-3 │Final Report of Chief of Military │ │ │Administration in Belgium and Northern │ │ │France. │ VII │ 611 │ │ │ ECH-4 │Annual report of Military Commander of │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 15 July │ │ │1941. │ VII │ 613 │ │ │ ECH-5 │Final Report of Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 615 │ │ │ ECH-6 │Final report of Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 620 │ │ │ ECH-7 │Final Report of Supervisory Office with │ │ │Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France on legalized │ │ │exploitation of black market in Belgium │ │ │and Northern France. │ VII │ 622 │ │ │ ECH-9 │Circular of Military Commander, 19 June │ │ │1943, concerning prohibition of black │ │ │market purchase. │ VII │ 629 │ │ │ ECH-10 │Final Report of Military Commander on │ │ │machinery clearing. │ VII │ 629 │ │ │ ECH-11 │Final Report of Military Commander on │ │ │Church Bell drive in Belgium. │ VII │ 631 │ │ │ ECH-12 │Report of Activity Department for │ │ │“Protection of Art” of Military │ │ │Commander Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 632 │ │ │ ECH-14 │Letter from Speer, 23 June 1943, with │ │ │covering letter. │ VII │ 632 │ │ │ ECH-15 │Draft of letter to Falkenhausen, 22 May │ │ │1944. │ VII │ 634 │ │ │ ECH-16 │Memorandum from Military Administration │ │ │Department for Culture, 17 May 1944, │ │ │concerning requisition of scientific │ │ │instruments. │ VII │ 635 │ │ │ ECH-19 │Final Report of Military Commander │ │ │showing total picture of consolidation │ │ │of Belgian Textile Industry. │ VII │ 636 │ │ │ ECH-21 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France to General │ │ │Falkenhausen, 12 October 1940, and │ │ │annexes. │ VII │ 637 │ │ │ ECH-22 │Final Report of Military Commander, │ │ │concerning foreign exchange and gold. │ VII │ 639 │ │ │ ECH-23 │Report of Military Commander on supplies│ │ │in the German interest in Belgium and │ │ │Northern France in 1941. │ VII │ 641 │ │ │ ECH-24 │Introduction to Final Report of Military│ │ │Commander by Dr. Beyer. │ VII │ 642 │ │ │ ECR-14 │Memorandum from Commissar at the Belgian│ │ │National Bank on Clearing Transfers, 24 │ │ │March 1941. │ VII │ 642 │ │ │ ECR-24 │Annual report of the Commissar at the │ │ │National Bank of Belgium, covering │ │ │period May 1940-May 1941. │ VII │ 642 │ │ │ ECR-32 │Memorandum from Reich Marshal of the │ │ │Greater German Reich Commissioner for │ │ │the Four Year Plan, 11 June 1941, on │ │ │occupation costs in Belgium and covering│ │ │letters. │ VII │ 667 │ │ │ ECR-35 │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ │West of the Reichskreditkassen, 2 August│ │ │1941. │ VII │ 670 │ │ │ ECR-39 │Memorandum from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 2 August │ │ │1941, concerning procurement of │ │ │Occupation Costs in Belgium, and │ │ │covering letter. │ VII │ 671 │ │ │ ECR-59 │Memorandum from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 2 October │ │ │1941, on contributions from Belgium to │ │ │the limit of its capacity, and covering │ │ │letter. │ VII │ 676 │ │ │ ECR-72 │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ │West of RKK, 22 December 1941, ordering │ │ │Emission Bank to pay out clearing │ │ │transfer. │ VII │ 681 │ │ │ ECR-89 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 2 March │ │ │1942, concerning payment for German │ │ │Military Expenditures in Belgium through│ │ │clearing; and letter of transmittal. │ VII │ 682 │ │ │ ECR-104 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 24 April │ │ │1942, concerning payment of expenses of │ │ │German Armed Forces in Belgium in │ │ │clearing. │ VII │ 685 │ │ │ ECR-106 │Memorandum from Commissar at the │ │ │National Bank of Belgium, 1 May 1942, on│ │ │use of occupation funds for black market│ │ │purchases and political purposes. │ VII │ 686 │ │ │ ECR-115 │Teletype, 27 July 1942, on position of │ │ │Reichsbank regarding requisition of │ │ │Belgian gold. │ VII │ 689 │ │ │ ECR-132 │Report of the Commissar at the National │ │ │Bank of Belgium, 1 December 1942, │ │ │covering period August-October 1942. │ VII │ 690 │ │ │ ECR-142 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France, 22 February│ │ │1943, on exchange of RKK notes in │ │ │Belgium. │ VII │ 695 │ │ │ ECR-149 │Third Annual Report of the Commissar at │ │ │the National Bank of Belgium, 5 June │ │ │1943. │ VII │ 700 │ │ │ ECR-155-A │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ │West of Reichskreditkassen, 7 December │ │ │1943, on occupation costs. │ VII │ 716 │ │ │ ECR-166 │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ │West of Reichskreditkassen, 10 May 1944,│ │ │concerning cash situation of Chief │ │ │Paymaster at Military Commander in │ │ │Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 718 │ │ │ ECR-172 │Letter from Reichskommissar for Occupied│ │ │Territories of Belgium and Northern │ │ │France, 21 July 1944, concerning │ │ │equalization of monthly balance in giro │ │ │traffic of Reichskreditkassen. │ VII │ 720 │ │ │ ECR-173 │Report of Commissar at the National Bank│ │ │of Belgium, 15 August 1944, on total │ │ │occupation charges and Belgium clearing │ │ │balance. │ VII │ 721 │ │ │ ECR-174 │Report of the Commissar of the │ │ │Netherlands Bank for the month May 1941,│ │ │dated 12 June 1941. │ VII │ 726 │ │ │ ECR-175 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Brussels, 18 May │ │ │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 732 │ │ │ ECR-176 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Brussels, 27 May │ │ │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 733 │ │ │ ECR-177 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 June │ │ │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 735 │ │ │ ECR-178 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 25 July │ │ │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 735 │ │ │ ECR-179 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 August │ │ │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 735 │ │ │ ECR-180 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 │ │ │September 1941, concerning occupation │ │ │costs. │ VII │ 736 │ │ │ ECR-181 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 October│ │ │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 737 │ │ │ ECR-182 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 29 │ │ │November 1941, concerning occupation │ │ │costs. │ VII │ 737 │ │ │ ECR-183 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 6 January │ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 738 │ │ │ ECR-184 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 January│ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 739 │ │ │ ECR-185 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 27 │ │ │February 1942, concerning occupation │ │ │costs. │ VII │ 740 │ │ │ ECR-186 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 March │ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 740 │ │ │ ECR-187 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 April │ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 741 │ │ │ ECR-188 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 13 July │ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 742 │ │ │ ECR-189 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 13 August │ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 743 │ │ │ ECR-190 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 31 August │ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 743 │ │ │ ECR-191 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 │ │ │September 1942, concerning occupation │ │ │costs. │ VII │ 744 │ │ │ ECR-192 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 6 November│ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 744 │ │ │ ECR-193 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 7 December│ │ │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 745 │ │ │ ECR-194 │Letter of Commissar at the Netherlands │ │ │Bank Amsterdam, enclosing report on │ │ │contributions of Holland for Germany │ │ │during the first year of occupation, 28 │ │ │May 1941. │ VII │ 745 │ │ │ ECR-195 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ │Administration of RKK Berlin, 21 April │ │ │1942, concerning Dutch East Help. │ VII │ 747 │ │ │ ECR-196 │Report of the Commissar of the │ │ │Netherlands Bank, 9 May 1941. │ VII │ 748 │ │ │ ECR-197 │Circular of the Reichsminister of │ │ │Economics in foreign exchange matters, │ │ │31 March 1941. │ VII │ 749 │ │ │ *L-70 │Speech by Himmler at Bad Schachen, 14 │ │ │October 1943, on the Question of │ │ │Security. (USA 308) │ VII │ 818 │ │ │ *L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 July │ │ │1941, concerning treatment of Eastern │ │ │populations and territories. (USA 317) │ VII │ 1086 │ │ │ *R-92 │Instruction for internal use on │ │ │application of law concerning property │ │ │of Poles of 17 September 1940; copy of │ │ │monthly report 31 May 1942 with │ │ │statistics on farms and estates seized │ │ │and confiscated in the Incorporated │ │ │Eastern Territories; copy of letter from│ │ │SS officer to Himmler, 20 November 1940.│ │ │(USA 312) │ VIII │ 61 │ │ │ *R-112 │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner for │ │ │the Consolidation of German nationhood, │ │ │16 February 1942, 1 July 1942, 28 July │ │ │1942. (USA 309) │ VIII │ 108 │ │ │ *R-114 │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18 │ │ │August 1942, concerning directions for │ │ │treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │ │ │314) │ VIII │ 122
XIV. THE PLUNDER OF ART TREASURES
1. THE EINSATZSTAB ROSENBERG
A. Formation, Purpose, Powers.
On 29 January 1940 Hitler issued a decree in the following terms:
“The ‘Hohe Schule’ is supposed to become the center for national socialistic ideological and educational research. It will be established after the conclusion of the war. I order that the already initiated preparations be continued by Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, especially in the way of research and the setting up of the library.
“All sections of Party and State are requested to cooperate with him in this task.” (136-PS)
What began as a project for the establishment of a research library developed into a project for the seizure of cultural treasures. (141-PS)
On 1 March 1942 Hitler issued a decree in which he asserted that Jews, Freemasons, and affiliated opponents of National Socialism are the authors of the War against the Reich, and that a systematic spiritual battle against them is a military necessity. The decree thereupon authorized Rosenberg to search libraries, archives, lodges, and cultural establishments, to seize relevant material from these establishments as well as cultural treasures which were the property or in the possession of Jews, which were ownerless, or the origin of which could not be clearly established. The decree directed the cooperation of the Wehrmacht High Command and indicated that Rosenberg’s activities in the West were to be conducted in his capacity as Reichsleiter and in the East in his capacity as Reichsminister. (149-PS)
This decree was implemented by a letter from Dr. Lammers, Reichsminister and Chief of Chancellory, directed to the “Highest Reich Authorities and the Services directly subordinate to the Fuehrer.” The letter reiterated the terms of the Hitler decree and requested support of the Reich authorities in Rosenberg’s fulfillment of his task. (154-PS)
B. Scope of Activities.
Rosenberg’s activities in fulfillment of the above decrees were extended, in the West, to France (138-PS), Belgium (139-PS), the Netherlands (140-PS), Luxembourg (137-PS), and Norway and Denmark. (159-PS)
In the East activities were carried out throughout the Occupied Eastern Territories (153-PS), including the Baltic states and the Ukraine (151-PS), as well as in Hungary (158-PS), Greece (171-PS), and Yugoslavia. (071-PS)
The function of the Rosenberg Organization included not only the seizure of books and scientific materials specified in the original Hitler Order (171-PS), but the seizure of private art treasures (1015-B-PS), public art treasures (055-PS), and household furnishings. (L-188)
C. Cooperating Agencies.
On 5 July 1940 Keitel (Chief of the OKW) informed the Chief of the Army High Command (OKH) and the Chief of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands that the Fuehrer had ordered that Rosenberg’s suggestion be followed, to the effect that certain libraries and archives, chancelleries of high church authorities, and lodges be searched for documents valuable to Germany or indicating political maneuvers directed against Germany, and that such material be seized. The letter further stated that Hitler had ordered the support of the Gestapo and that the Chief of the Sipo (Security Police), SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, had been informed and would communicate with the competent military commanders. (137-PS)
Keitel issued a further order to the Chief of the OKH, France, on 17 September 1940, providing:
“The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the declaration of war on 1 September 1939, shall be the criterion.
“Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers completed after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid (for example, Polish and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions of the Palais Rothschild or other ownerless Jewish possessions). Reservations regarding search, seizure and transportation to Germany on the basis of the above reasons will not be recognized.
“Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his deputy Reichshauptstellenleiter Ebert has received clear instructions from the Fuehrer personally governing the right of seizure; he is entitled to transport to Germany cultural goods which appear valuable to him and to safeguard them there. The Fuehrer has reserved for himself the decision as to their use.
“It is requested that the services in question be informed correspondingly.” (138-PS)
The above order was extended to Belgium on 10 October 1940 (139-PS), and an identical order was issued by the Chief of the OKH to the Armed Forces Commander in The Netherlands on 17 September 1940. (140-PS)
Hitler’s order of 1 March 1942 stated:
“Directions for carrying out this order in cooperation with the Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (149-PS)
Dr. Lammers’ order of 5 July 1942 declared that the Chief of the OKH, in agreement with Keitel, would issue regulations governing the cooperation with the Wehrmacht and the Police Services for assistance in making seizures. (154-PS)
An official of the Rosenberg Ministry for the Occupied East declared the Wehrmacht to be one of the primary agencies engaged in removing art treasures from Russia. (1107-PS)
Cooperation of the SS and the SD was indicated by Rosenberg in a letter to Bormann on 23 April 1941:
“* * * It is understood that the confiscations are not executed by the regional authorities but that this is conducted by the Security Service as well as by the police. * * * it has been communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter, that the chief office of the Reich Security (RSHA) of the SS has claimed the following from the library of a monastery: * * *.” (071-PS)
The above letter also points out that there has been
“* * * close cooperation on the widest scale with the Security Service and the military commanders. * * *
“This affair (Operations in Salonika) has already been executed on our side with the Security Service (SD) in the most loyal fashion.” (071-PS)
The National Socialist Party financed the operations of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (090-PS; 145-PS)
In a letter to Goering, 18 June 1942, Rosenberg voiced the opinion that all art objects and other confiscated items should belong to the National Socialist Party because the Party has been bearing the brunt of the battle against the persons and forces from whom this property was taken. (1118-PS)
D. Cooperation of Hermann Goering.
On 5 November 1940, Goering issued an order specifying the distribution to be made of art objects brought to the Louvre. The order lists as second in priority of disposition, “Those art objects which serve to the completion of the Reichsmarshal’s collection” and states that the objects will “be packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of the Luftwaffe.” (141-PS)
On 1 May 1941 Goering issued an order to all Party, State, and Wehrmacht Services requesting them:
“* * * to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Staff, Reichshauptstellenleiter Party Comrade Utikal, and his deputy DRK-Feldfuehrer Party Comrade von Behr, in the discharge of their duties. The above-mentioned persons are requested to report to me on their work, particularly on any difficulties that might arise.” (1117-PS)
On 30 May 1942, Goering claimed credit for the success of the Einsatzstab:
“* * * On the other hand I also support personally the work of your Einsatzstab wherever I can do so, and a great part of the seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to assist the Einsatzstab by my organizations.” (1015-I-PS)
E. Method of Operation.
The staff of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg seized not only “abandoned” art treasures but also treasures which had been hidden, or were left in the custody of depots or warehouses, including art treasures that were already packed for shipment to America. (1015-B-PS)
Robert Scholz, Chief of the Special Staff for Pictorial Art, described the thoroughness with which the Einsatzstab conducted investigations and seizures:
“* * * These seizures were carried out on the basis of preliminary exhaustive investigations into the address lists of the French Police authorities, on the basis of Jewish handbooks, warehouse inventories and order books of French shipping firms as well as on the basis of French art and collection catalogs.
“* * * The seizure of ownerless Jewish works of art has gradually extended over the whole French territory.” (1015-B-PS)
In the East, members of Rosenberg’s staff operated directly behind the front in close cooperation with the infantry. (035-PS)
Von Behr, in a progress report dated 8 August 1944, described the method of seizing household furnishings:
“The confiscation of Jewish homes was effected in most cases in such a way that the so-called confiscation officials went from house to house when no records were available of the addresses of Jews who had departed or fled, as was the case for example, in Paris * * * They drew up inventories of these homes and subsequently sealed them . . . . . . . . .
“The goods are dispatched first, to large collecting camps from where they are turned over, sorted out and loaded for Germany.
“* * * work shops were established for cabinet-makers, watchmakers, shoemakers, electricians, radio experts, furriers, etc. All incoming goods were diligently sorted out and those not ready for use were repaired. Moreover special boxes were dispatched for the use of special trades * * *
“For the sorting out of the confiscated furniture and goods on the invisible assembly line and for the packing and loading, exclusive use was made of interned Jews. Because of its experience as to confiscation, as to working systems within the camps, and as to transportation, the Office West was able to reorganize their entire working system and thus to succeed in providing for the use in Germany of even things which appeared to be valueless such as scrap paper, rags, salvage, etc. * * *” (L-188).
F. Nature, Extent, and Value of Property Seized.
(1) Books, manuscripts, documents, and incunabula. A report on the library of the “Hohe Schule,” prepared by Dr. Wunder, lists the most significant book collections belonging to the library and confiscated by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer, as follows (171-PS):
(approx.) Alliance Israelite Universelle 40,000 Vols. Ecole Rabbinique 10,000 Vols. Federation de Societé des Juifs de France 4,000 Vols. Lipschuetz Bookstore, Paris 20,000 Vols. Rothschild Family, Paris 28,000 Vols. Rosenthaliana, Amsterdam 20,000 Vols. Sefardischen Jewish Community, Amsterdam 25,000 Vols. Occupied Eastern Territories 280,000 Vols. Jewish Community, Greece 10,000 Vols. “Special Action”, Rhineland 5,000 Vols. Other sources 100,000 Vols. ——— 552,000
An undated report on the activities of the Einsatzstab Working Group, Netherlands, lists Masonic Lodges and other organizations whose libraries and archives have been seized. The report states that 470 cases of books had already been packed and reports materials seized from 92 separate lodges of the “Droit Humain”, the “Groot Oosten”, the “IOOF” and the “Rotary Club”. An additional 776 cases containing approximately 160,000 volumes were seized from the International Institute for Social History at Amsterdam. An additional 170 cases were seized from the “Theosophischen Society” and other organizations. (176-PS)
The report further states that the value of the above works is between 30 million and 40 million Reichsmarks. Additional materials to be derived from other sources, including 100,000 volumes from the “Rosenthaliana” collection, are estimated to have a value of three times that of the above, or an additional 90 million to 120 million Reichsmarks. The estimated over-all value is thus between 120 and 160 million Reichsmarks. (176-PS)
(2) Household furnishings. The entire furniture seizure action, known as “Action M”, is summarized in a report of Von Behr, Chief of the Office West, dated 8 August 1944. The report furnishes the following statistics on results up to 1 July 1944:
Jewish homes confiscated 71,619 Loading capacity required cu. ms. 1,079,373 Railroad cars required 26,984 Foreign currency and securities confiscated RM 11,695,516 Scrap metal, scrap paper, and textiles dispatched kgms. 3,191,352 (L-188)
The report goes on to list in detail the number of boxes of miscellaneous items seized, including china (199 boxes), curtains (72 boxes), coat hangers (120 boxes), toys (99 boxes), bottles (730 boxes), etc. The report concludes with an itemized statement of the number of wagons dispatched to various cities throughout Germany, to German camps, to SS Divisions, the German State Railways, the Postal Service, and the Police. (L-188)
(3) Works of Art (East). With reference to the work of the Einsatzstab in the Eastern Territories, Robert Scholz reported as follows:
“In the course of the evacuation of the territory several hundred most valuable Russian ikons, several hundred Russian paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual articles of furniture and furniture from castles were saved in cooperation with the individual Army Groups, and brought to a shelter in the Reich.” (1015-B-PS)
In August 1943, just prior to the loss of Charcow by the Germans, 300 paintings of West European masters and Ukrainian painters, and 25 valuable Ukrainian carpets, mostly from the Charcow museum, were packed and shipped by the Einsatzstab. (707-PS)
Reporting on the withdrawal from the Ukraine, Staff Director Utikal accounted for the removal of the following materials:
From the Museum of Art at Charcow: Ukrainian paintings 96 Western European paintings 185 Wood carvings and etchings 12 Carpets and tapestries 25
From the Ukrainian museum in Kiev: Textiles of all sorts. Collection of valuable embroidery patterns. Collection of brocades. Numerous items of wood, etc. (035-PS)
In addition Utikal reported shipment of a total of 131 cases containing: 10,186 books, the catalog of the “East” library, art folios, samples of magazines, Bolshevist pictures, and Bolshevist films. Utikal also stated:
“Moreover an essential part of the prehistoric museum was transported away.” (035-PS)
Another report on the shipment of works of art from the Ukraine, 12 September 1944, indicated the value of the contents of 85 chests of art objects:
“There are a great many of the oldest ikons, works of famous masters of the German, Dutch and Italian schools of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, as well as works of the best Russian artists of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the whole, the contents include the most valuable works of the known Ukrainian art possession, which in themselves represent a value of many millions after a cursory appraisal.” (055-PS)
Attached to the above report is a detailed inventory listing hundreds of individual objects.
Additional evidence as to the extent of material seized in Kiev is found in a secret note, 17 June 1944, dealing with measures taken prior to the Russian Occupation. The note reported the taking of materials from museums, archives, institutions, etc., during the autumn of 1943 on the order of the Einsatzstab and of the Reichs-commissar. During October there were sent to the Reich 40 railway trucks, carrying mostly goods belonging to the Central Research Institute of the Ukraine. The report concluded with the statement that when the Soviets entered the town nothing of value was left. (1109-PS)
On 28 September 1941, the General Commissar for White Ruthenia reported the seizure of art treasures in the area of Minsk, destined for Konigsberg and Linz. The value of these confiscations was stated to amount to millions of marks. (1099-PS)
(4) Works of Art (West). The Robert Scholz report declared that:
“During the period from March 1941 to July 1944, the Special Staff for Pictorial Art brought into the Reich: 29 large shipments including 137 freight cars with 4,174 cases of art works.” (1015-B-PS)
The report stated that a total of 21,903 art objects of all types had been counted and inventoried, and stated:
“With this scientific inventory of a material unique in its scope and importance and of a value hitherto unknown to art research, the Special Staff for Pictorial Art has conducted a work important to the entire field of art. This inventory work will form the basis of an all-inclusive scientific catalog in which should be recorded history, scope and scientific and political significance of this historically unique art seizure.” (1015-B-PS)
The following is a summary of the inventory attached to the report:
Paintings 10,890 Plastics 583 Furniture 2,477 Textiles 583 Hand-made art objects 5,825 East Asiatic objects 1,286 Antiquities 259 ——— Total 21,903 (1015-B-PS)
The report stated that the above figures would be increased since seizures in the West were not yet completed and it had not been possible to make a scientific inventory of part of the seized objects because of the lack of experts. (1015-B-PS)
As early as 28 January 1941, Rosenberg stated, with reference to properties seized in France alone:
“* * * the value involved will come close to a billion Reichsmarks.” (090-PS)
Scholz, in his report on activities from March 1941 to July 1944, expressed the value of the seizures as follows:
“The extraordinary artistic and material value of the seized art works cannot be expressed in figures. The paintings, period furniture of the 17th and 18th Centuries, the Gobelins, the antiques and renaissance jewelry of the Rothschild’s are objects of such a unique character that their evaluation is impossible, since no comparable values have so far appeared on the art market.
“A short report, moreover, can only hint at the artistic worth of the collections. Among the seized paintings, pastels and drawings there are several hundred works of the first quality, masterpieces of European art, which could take first place in any museum. Included therein are absolutely authenticated signed works of Rembrandt Van Rijn, Rubens, Frans Hals, Vermeer van Delft, Valasquez, Murillo, Goya, Sebastiano del Piombo, Palma Vecchio, etc.
“Of first importance among the seized paintings are the works of the famous French painters of the 18th Century, with masterpieces of Boucher, Watteau, Rigaud, Largielliere, Rattler, Fragonard, Pater, Danloux and de Troy.
“This collection can compare with those of the best European museums. It includes many works of the foremost French masters, who up to now have been only inadequately represented in the best German museums. Very important also is the representation of masterpieces of the Dutch Painters of the 17th and 18th Centuries. First of all should be mentioned the works of Van Dyck, Saloman and Jacob Ruisdal, Wouvermann, Terborch, Jan Weenix, Gabriel Metsu, Adrian van Ostade, David Teniers, Pieter de Hooch, Willem van der Velde, etc.
“Of foremost importance also are the represented works of English painting of the 18th and early 19th centuries, with masterpieces of Reynolds, Romney, and Gainsborough. Cranach and Amberger, among the German masters, should be mentioned.
“The collection of French furniture of the 17th and 18th centuries is perhaps even more highly to be evaluated. This contains hundreds of the best preserved and, for the most part, signed works of the best known cabinet-makers from the period between Louis XIV to Louis XVI. Since German cabinetmakers played an important part in this golden age of French cabinetry, now recognized for the first time in the field of art, this collection is of paramount importance.
“The collection of Gobelins and Persian tapestries contains numerous world-famous objects. The collection of handicraft works and the Rothschild collection of renaissance jewelry is valuable beyond comparison.” (1015-B-PS)
The report refers to 25 portfolios of pictures of the most valuable works of the art collections seized in the West, which portfolios were presented to the Fuehrer. Ten additional portfolios are stated to be attached to the report and additional portfolios are said to be in preparation. Thirty-nine leatherbound volumes prepared by the Einsatzstab contain photographs of paintings, textiles, furniture, candelabra, and numerous other objects of art and illustrate the magnitude and value of the collection made by Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
2. THE GENERAL-GOUVERNEMENT
A. Confiscatory Laws and Decrees
In October 1939 Goering issued a verbal order to Dr. Muehlmann asking him to undertake the immediate securing of all Polish art treasures. (1709-PS)
On 15 November 1939, Hans Frank, Governor-General for the Occupied Polish Territories, issued a decree providing in part:
“Article 1. 1. All movable and stationary property of the Former Polish State * * * will be sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables.” (1773-PS).
On 16 December 1939, Frank issued a decree providing in part:
“Article 1. All art objects in public possession in the General Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public tasks of common interest insofar as it has not already been seized under the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State in the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, p. 37).
“Article 2. With the exception of art collections and art objects which were the property of the former Polish State, art objects will be considered as owned by the public:
“1. Private art collections which have been taken under protection by the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures.
“2. All ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those objects required for the daily performance of liturgic actions.
“Article 3. 1. In order to determine whether art objects are public property in the sense of this regulation, every private and ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with exact data on the kind, nature and number of pieces.
“2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in possession of or else is entitled to dispose of such objects of art since 15 March 1939, is obliged to register the same.” (1773-PS)
In order to implement the above decree, the following registration decree was issued in the name of the Governor-General by Dr. Muehlmann, Special Deputy for the Securing of Art Treasures:
“Article 2. 1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and historical value which originate from the time before 1850, have to be registered.
“2. The registration includes the following:
“a. Paintings.
“b. Sculpture.
“c. Products of handicraft (for instance antique furniture, chinaware, glass, golden and silver objects, Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, lacework, paramente, etc.).
“d. Drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc.
“e. Rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs, book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc.
“f. Weapons, armors, etc.
“g. Coins, medals, seals, etc.
“3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed information has to be given if possible, on the master, the time of production, the contents of the representation, measurements and material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.).” (1773-PS)
The seizures authorized by the above decrees ripened into confiscation and assumption of ownership by the General Gouvernement, with the issuance of the following decree by Frank on 24 September 1940:
“Article 1. The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, section 1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 37) will be transferred to the ownership of the General Gouvernement.” (1773-PS)
Heinrich Himmler, as Reichscommissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism, issued an “urgent decree” to the regional officers of the Secret Police in the Annexed Eastern Territories and the Commanders of Security Service in Krakau (Charkow), Radom, Warsaw, and Lublin. The decree, 1 December 1939, was circulated on 16 December 1939, the same date as the promulgation of the decree of Dr. Muehlmann, above referred to (1773-PS). The Himmler decree contained administrative directions for execution of the Art Seizure program. (R-143)
B. Purpose of Art Seizures.
The purpose of the Seizure Program is indicated in the aforementioned Himmler decree:
“I
“1. To strengthen Germanism in the defense of the Reich all articles mentioned in Section II of this decree are hereby confiscated. This applies to all articles located in the territories annexed by the Fuehrer’s and Reich Chancellor’s decree of 12/10/39, and the General Government for the Occupied Polish Territories. They are confiscated for the benefit of the German Reich and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism.”
* * * * * *
IV
“All confiscations made before this decree by authorities of the Reich Fuehrer SS and the Chief of German Police and the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism are hereby confirmed. They are to be regarded as made for the benefit of the German Reich and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism.” (R-143)
The methodical nature of the Art Seizure Program, and the existence of a general policy of confiscation of art treasures, is indicated in section V of Himmler’s decree:
“In due course the usual questionnaires for cataloguing confiscated articles are to be sent to the Chief Custodian East.” (R-143)
The intention to enrich Germany by the seizures rather than merely to protect the seized objects is indicated in a report by Dr. Hans Posse, Director of the Dresden State Picture Gallery:
“I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of great Art works, of paintings and sculptures, with the exception of the Veit-Stoss Altar and the plates of Hans Von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow . . . . . . and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw. * * *” (1600-PS)
The avowed purpose of the art treasure seizures was the promulgation of German Culture throughout the Occupied East:
“* * * the result is put down in the catalogue together with reproductions, and this is a definite proof of the penetration of the East by the German Cultural urge.” (1233-PS)
C. Nature, Extent, and Value of Property Seized.
Virtually the entire art possession of Poland, private as well as public, was seized by the General Gouvernement (1233-PS). In a catalogue of the more important works of art seized by the General Gouvernement, paragraph 1 of the Foreword contains the following admission:
“On the basis of the decree of the General Governor for the Occupied Polish Territories of December 16, 1939, the Special Delegate for the Safeguarding of Treasures of Art and Culture was able in the course of six months to secure almost the entire art treasure of the country, with one single exception: the Flemish Gobelin series from the castle in Cracow. According to the latest information, these are kept in France, so that it will be possible to secure them eventually.” (1233-PS)
The nature and extent of materials seized by the General Gouvernement is indicated in Document 1709-PS. The document inventories the objects seized, and divides them into two classifications: those of primary importance (“Reich-important”), and those of secondary importance. Articles of primary importance, totaling 521 separate objects, are also set forth in a descriptive catalogue. (1233-PS)
The articles catalogued include paintings by German, Italian, Dutch, French, and Spanish masters, rare illustrated books, Indian and Persian miniatures, woodcuts, the famous Veit-Stoss hand-carved altar, handicraft articles of gold and silver, antique furniture, articles of crystal, glass and porcelain, tapestries, antique weapons, rare coins, and medals. The objects were seized from both public and private sources, including the National Museum in Cracow and the National Museum in Warsaw, the cathedrals of Warsaw and Lublin, a number of churches and monasteries, the Chateau of the Kings in Warsaw, university and other libraries, and a large number of private collections of the Polish nobility. (1709-PS)
Items placed in the second category are of the same nature as those placed in category I. Approximately 500 separate items are catalogued, many of the items including a large number of separate objects treated under a single catalogue heading. (1709-PS)
The value of the objects seized from 22 collections is stated to be 9,437,000 Zloty. The materials referred to are only a portion of those selected as being of secondary importance. No valuation is given as to the balance of the items of secondary importance or as to the 521 objects selected as being of primary importance. (1709-PS)
D. Evidence That Seizures Were Not Merely for Protective Purposes.
In Dr. Posse’s report (1600-PS), a number of items are referred to which may be found in the catalogue of art objects “made secure” (1233-PS):
“I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of great Art works, of paintings and sculptures, with the exception of the Veit-Stoss altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raphael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from the collection Czartoryski, and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw, * * * works of a rather high value of whose existence we in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish stock of ‘objects d’art’, such as handicraft in gold and silver, of German origin to a large part, particularly from the Church of Maria and the Cathedral of Wawel, tapestries, arms, porcelains, furniture, bronzes, coins, valuable parchment scrips, books, etc. * * *”
* * * * * *
“As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum at Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski collection, namely the Raphael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged parts of it (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors, glass-chandeliers, porcelains, etc.) be used for the interior decoration of the Pavillion of the ‘Zivinges’ in Dresden.” (1600-PS)
The following items listed in the above report are also listed in the catalogue:
Item Catalog No. Veit-Stoss Altar 241 Hans Vol Kulmbach Works 22 Raphael 141 Leonardo 134 Rembrandt 81 Church of Maria Handicraft 262-265, 279, 280 From Jagellonic Library 166, 167, 186, 199-203, 206, 209, 212, 215-224 (See 1233-PS; 1600-PS.)
Appendix 8 of Document 1709-PS lists a large number of objects which were turned over to Architect Koettgen. The items listed include, in addition to paintings, tapestries, etc., plates, dishes, cups and saucers, vases, cream pitchers, glasses, a bread basket, a service tray, and other items of table service. These objects were turned over to the architect for the purpose of furnishing the Castle at Cracow and Schloss Kressendorf for the Governor. (1709-PS)
A number of objects were transported out of Poland and placed in Berlin in the Depot of the Special Deputy or in the safe of the Deutsche Bank (1709-PS). Items at this location are also listed in the catalog (1233-PS) as numbers 4, 17, 27, 35, 42, 45, 47, 51, 138, 141, 145, and 148.
Thirty-one sketches by Durer were taken from the collection Lubomierski in Lemberg:
“The Special Deputy has personally handed over these sketches in July 1941 to the Reichsmarshal who took them to the Fuehrer at headquarters where they remain at the present time. On express direction of the Fuehrer they will stay in his possession for the time being.” (1709-PS)
All art objects seized were screened for those which were important from the German point of view:
“The Reich-important pieces were collected in a catalogue of the so called ‘First Choice’. One copy of this catalogue has been submitted to the Fuehrer who reserved to himself the first decision as to location and use of the art objects of the ‘First Choice’”. (1709-PS)
Dr. Muehlmann, the “Special Deputy for the Safeguarding of Art Treasures” in the General Government, has confirmed that it was the policy and purpose of the art seizure program to confiscate the art treasures and to retain them for the benefit of Germany:
“I confirm, that it was the official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art treasures, which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections and the Church. I confirm, that the art treasures, mentioned, were actually confiscated, and it is clear to me, that they would not have remained in Poland in case of a German victory, but that they would have been used to complement German artistic property.” (3042-PS)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLUNDER OF ART TREASURES
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6 (b). │ I │ 5 │ │ │ │International Military Tribunal, Indictment│ │ │ Number 1, Sections III; VIII (E). │ I │15, 43 │ │ │ 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │ │ │ Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, │ │ 597, │ Articles 46, 47, 56. │ VI │ 599 │ ————— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document was │ │ │received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial.│ │ │A double asterisk (**) before a document │ │ │number indicates that the document was │ │ │referred to during the trial but was not │ │ │formally received in evidence, for the │ │ │reason given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA series│ │ │number, given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document, is the │ │ │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ │court. │ │ │ ————— │ │ *015-PS │Letter and report of Rosenberg to Hitler, │ │ │16 April 1943, concerning seizure of │ │ │ownerless Jewish art possessions. (USA 387)│ III │ 41 │ │ │ 035-PS │Report, 26 October 1943, regarding security│ │ │measures by Main Division Ukraine during │ │ │withdrawal of Armed Forces. │ III │ 75 │ │ │ 055-PS │Report, 12 September 1944, concerning works│ │ │of art shipped from the Ukraine. │ III │ 99 │ │ │ *071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April 1941,│ │ │replying to Bormann’s letter of 19 April │ │ │1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA 371) │ III │ 119 │ │ │ *090-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Schwarz, 28 │ │ │January 1941, concerning registration and │ │ │collection of art treasures. (USA 372) │ III │ 148 │ │ │ *136-PS │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29 January │ │ │1940, concerning establishment of “Hohe │ │ │Schule”. (USA 367) │ III │ 184 │ │ │ *137-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding │ │ │General of Netherlands, 5 July 1940, to │ │ │cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ │ │(USA 379) │ III │ 185 │ │ │ 138-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding │ │ │General of France, 17 September 1940, to │ │ │cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 186 │ │ │ 139-PS │Reineke order, 10 October 1940, concerning │ │ │instructions to be given to Military │ │ │Administration in Belgium to cooperate with│ │ │Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 187 │ │ │ 140-PS │Reineke order, 30 October 1940, │ │ │supplementing order of 17 September 1940 │ │ │(Document 138-PS). │ III │ 187 │ │ │ *141-PS │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, concerning │ │ │seizure of Jewish art treasures. (USA 368) │ III │ 188 │ │ │ *145-PS │Order signed by Rosenberg, 20 August 1941, │ │ │concerning safeguarding the cultural goods │ │ │in the Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ │373) │ III │ 189 │ │ │ *149-PS │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, establishing │ │ │authority of Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA │ │ │369) │ III │ 190 │ │ │ 151-PS │Rosenberg Order, 7 April 1942, concerning │ │ │safeguarding of cultural goods, research │ │ │material and Scientific Institutions in │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories. │ III │ 191 │ │ │ *153-PS │Rosenberg Order, 27 April 1942, for │ │ │formation of central unit for seizure of │ │ │art treasures in occupied Eastern │ │ │Territories. (USA 381) │ III │ 192 │ │ │ *154-PS │Letter from Lammers to high State and Party│ │ │authorities, 5 July 1942, confirming │ │ │Rosenberg’s powers. (USA 370) │ III │ 193 │ │ │ *158-PS │Message, 1 June 1944, initialled Utikal, │ │ │Chief of Einsatzstab, concerning missions │ │ │in Hungary. (USA 382) │ III │ 199 │ │ │ *159-PS │Message, 6 June 1944, initialled Utikal, │ │ │Chief of Einsatzstab, concerning missions │ │ │in Denmark and Norway. (USA 380) │ III │ 199 │ │ │ *171-PS │Undated report on “Library for Exploration │ │ │of the Jewish Question” by the Hohe Schule │ │ │District Office. (USA 383) │ III │ 200 │ │ │ *176-PS │Report on Einsatzstab Rosenberg, Working │ │ │Group Netherlands, signed Schimmer. (USA │ │ │707) │ III │ 203 │ │ │ 707-PS │Letters, June-October 1943 concerning │ │ │evacuation of the museum of Charkow. │ III │ 516 │ │ │ 1015-B-PS │Report on activities of Special Staff for │ │ │Pictorial Art, October 1940 to July 1944. │ III │ 666 │ │ │ *1015-I-PS │Letter from Goering to Rosenberg, 30 May │ │ │1942. (USA 385) │ III │ 670 │ │ │ 1015-GG-PS │Inventory of art objects—attached to a │ │ │report (Document 1015-B-PS). │ III │ 671 │ │ │ 1099-PS │Letter from Kube, General Commissar White │ │ │Ruthenia, to Rosenberg, 28 September 1941. │ III │ 781 │ │ │ 1107-PS │Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in │ │ │Rosenberg Ministry concerning the │ │ │Wehrmacht’s function in removing treasures │ │ │from the USSR. │ III │ 789 │ │ │ 1109-PS │Note signed by Dr. Ullman, 17 June 1944, │ │ │concerning Bolshevic Atrocity Propaganda. │ III │ 791 │ │ │ *1117-PS │Goering Order, 1 May 1941 concerning │ │ │establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg in │ │ │all Occupied Territories. (USA 384) │ III │ 793 │ │ │ 1118-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Goering, 18 June │ │ │1942, and related correspondence. │ III │ 793 │ │ │ *1233-PS │Printed catalog undated, concerning secured│ │ │objects of art in the Government General │ │ │(Poland). (USA 377) │ III │ 850 │ │ │ *1600-PS │Bormann correspondence, 1940-1941, │ │ │concerning confiscation of religious art │ │ │treasures. (USA 690) │ IV │ 128 │ │ │ *1709-PS │Report of Special Delegate for art │ │ │seizures, July 1943. (USA 378) │ IV │ 211 │ │ │ *1773-PS │Decree on sequestration of property of │ │ │former Polish State in the General │ │ │Government, 15 November 1939, published in │ │ │The Law of the General Government, pp. │ │ │E810, E845, E846. (USA 376) │ IV │ 346 │ │ │ *2523-PS │Account of conversation between Goering and│ │ │Bunjes. (USA 783) │ V │ 258 │ │ │ *3042-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann, 19 │ │ │November 1945. (USA 375) │ V │ 754 │ │ │ 3766-PS │Report prepared by the German Army in │ │ │France 1942 concerning removal of French │ │ │art objects through the German Embassy and │ │ │the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France. │ VI │ 646 │ │ │ 3814-PS │Correspondence between Hans Frank, Lammers │ │ │and various witnesses to the conduct of │ │ │Frank, February 1945. │ VI │ 739 │ │ │ *L-188 │Report of 8 August 1944, on confiscation up│ │ │to 31 July 1944. (USA 386) │ VII │ 1022 │ │ │ R-143 │Himmler decree, 1 December 1939, concerning│ │ │procedure for confiscation of works of art,│ │ │archives, and documents. │ VIII │ 246
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred including missing periods or commas for periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. There are differences in spellings of cities depending on whether the source is the prosecutor or part of a quoted statement. Multiple occurrences of the following spellings which differ and are found throughout this volume are as follows:
Luxemburg Luxembourg Esthonia Estonia Kiew Kiev Roumania Rumania Czecho-Slovakia Checkoslovakia
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as presented read into the record and reflects the actual translations of the various national documents presented as material for the trial(s). This volume had no German, Polish, Czech, Russian or other eastern European diacritics, only French diacritics. As a result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled without umlauts throughout.
A correction of fact has been made on page 778 regarding “. . . the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November 1940. . . .” It should be “28 October 1940”. In this ebook, “November” is marked with overstrike and “[October]” has been added.
An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as possible to the original document's presentation and layout. As a result, the reader will find that the quoted texts in the first six chapters have indented paragraphs and the remaining chapters have quotations which are not indented, just as in the original document.
[The end of Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. I), by Anonymous.]