Chapter V
[Sidenote: 1814. March.]
The two armies being now once more in presence of each other and with an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which the generals founded their respective combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. Here he could most easily feed his troops, assemble arm and discipline the conscripts, controul and urge the civil authorities, and counteract the machinations of the discontented. Posted at Toulouse he was master of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could take a new position behind the Tarn and prolong the contest by defending successively that river and the Lot, retreating if necessary upon Decaen’s army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank, being well assured that lord Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.
His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected from the depôts and other parts of the interior at Montauban, under the command of general Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the command of a number of great roads leading to the interior of France, consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain himself as long as possible in Toulouse was however a great political object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet and with Decaen; and while he held it, both the latter general and the partizans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the same, either by marching with his whole force or sending a detachment through the Arriege department to the Upper Garonne, where general Lafitte having seven or eight hundred men, national guards and other troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult now strongly urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated the proposition, as he had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt.
Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.
The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers: these defences Soult had improved and he added a line of exterior entrenchments.
[Sidenote: Plan 10.]
Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to admit sixteen and twenty-four pound guns.
The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the most part within point-blank shot of the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.
The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, built on both sides of this canal, furnished outworks on the west, for they were entrenched and connected with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, also entrenched and flanking the approaches to the canal both above and below these suburbs.
Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the Mont Rave, run nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through which the Ers river flowed.
The south side of the town opened on a plain, but the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of heights called the Pech David commenced, trending up the Garonne in a direction nearly parallel to that river.
Such being the French general’s position, he calculated, that as lord Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross that river also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march higher up. Then he must come down by the right of the Arriege, an operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had rendered impracticable for guns. If the allies passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he could from the Pech David, and its continuation, overlook their movements, and that he should be in position to fall upon the head of their column while in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in this he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban.
For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result and he did not fear it, but a passage below the city was a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French then lost the battle they could only retreat by Carcassonne to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon, where having their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France they could not exist. Hence feeling certain the attack would finally be on that side, Soult lined the left bank of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up general Despeaux’s troops from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne: for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his communication with Montauban.
On the other hand lord Wellington whether from error from necessity or for the reasons I have before touched upon, having suffered the French army to gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes, had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops should join him from the Bastan, without giving Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing fearful and weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the offensive and could not resume the defensive with safety, the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers his business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible, and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.
[Sidenote: Manuscript notes by the duke of Wellington.]
[Sidenote: French Official Correspondence, MSS.]
It has been already shown that in a strategic view this passage should have been made below that town, but seeing that the south side of the city was the most open to attack, the English general resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With this object, at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades marched up from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, the remainder of that general’s troops being to pass at midnight. But when the river was measured the width was found too great for the pontoons and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed some considerable advantage would probably have been gained, since it does not appear that Soult knew of the attempt until two days later, and then only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.
[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.]
Wellington thus baffled tried another scheme, he drove the enemy from the Touch river on the 28th, and collected the infantry of his left and centre about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry. In the course of the operation a single squadron of the eighteenth hussars, under major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came upon a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British, for the enemy thinking that a strong support must be at hand discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.
[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]
During these movements Hill’s troops were withdrawn to St. Roques, but in the night of the 30th a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, that general passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo’s Spaniards, Gardiner’s and Maxwell’s artillery, and Fane’s cavalry, in all thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, fifteen miles up the Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south while lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have been made privily in the night, but the bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five o’clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse the strength of the column, and to ascertain that the great body of the army still remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a partial attack, the matter appeared a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept his infantry in hand, and sent only his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriege to observe the march of the allies; but he directed general Lafitte, who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army. He was however somewhat disquieted, because the baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts, was reported to be a second column, increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand men.
[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]
While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still collected there, wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, he put four divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the head of the allies if they should attempt the passage before Hill came down, resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont-Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was however soon relieved from anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the passage of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry towards Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery were quite unable to move in the deep country there, and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel, recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons left only a flying bridge with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank. His retreat was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.
[Sidenote: April.]
The French general was now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, yet he changed his design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river and the Tarn rather than lose his communications with Montauban. Having completed his works of defence for the city and the suburbs, and fortified all the bridges over the canal, he concluded not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances, and therefore set his whole army and all the working population to entrench the Mont Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let it come on which side it would. Meanwhile the Garonne continued so full and rapid that lord Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3d; then the waters falling, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, where the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third fourth and sixth divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed, and the cavalry being pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and the pontoons were taken up.
This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed, and as Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, had taken the outposts in front of St. Cyprien he imagined Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his cavalry he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse, his resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing on the 7th that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.
On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies’ bridge was again laid down, Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and lord Wellington taking the command in person advanced to the heights of Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended towards that of Croix d’Orade. The latter was defended by Vial’s dragoons, and after some skirmishing the eighteenth was suddenly menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. The two parties stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge at the same moment, but the English horses were so quick the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and the mass breaking away to the rear went off in disorder, leaving many killed and wounded and above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the victors. They were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, but beyond it they rallied on the rest of their brigade and advanced again, the hussars then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry whose fire stopped the French cavalry. The communication between the allied columns was thus secured.
The credit of this brilliant action was given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch, incorrectly, for that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived and conducted entirely by major Hughes of the eighteenth.
Lord Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison, carefully examined the French general’s position and resolved to attack on the 9th. Meanwhile to shorten his communications with general Hill he directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at Seilh. The light division were to cross at the latter place at daybreak, but the bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and the English general extremely incensed at the failure was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.
Soult’s combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, had brought the allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, and well fortified; where one-third of their force was separated by a great river from the rest, where they could derive no advantage from their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery notwithstanding their previous superiority in that arm.
His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east. His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards while maintaining tranquillity aided to transport the artillery and ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of Toulouse, the former could only communicate with the main body under Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles.
The English general was advancing from the north, but his intent was still to assail the city on the south side, where it was weakest in defence. With this design he had caused the country on the left of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view of making, under cover of that river, a flank march round the eastern front and thus gaining the open ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by force, because all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix d’Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the whole of the pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack from the northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part within musquet-shot. Here then, as at St. Cyprien, it was a fortress and not a position which was opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.
This range of heights, naturally strong and rugged, and covered by the Ers river, which as we have seen was not to be forded, presented two distinct platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere on which the extreme right of the French was posted. Between them, where the ground dipped a little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne.
The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a species of horn-work, consisting of several open retrenchments and small works, supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abbatis was also formed there by felling the trees on the Alby road. Continuing this line to the right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform.
On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. Sypiere, the other without a name nearer to the road of Caraman.
[Sidenote: Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.]
The whole range of heights occupied was about two miles long, and an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire, advance through ground, naturally steep and marshy, and now rendered almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the assault of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants should even force between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of Cambon and Saccarin. If these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town, would still have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d’Orade which had been seized so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington was therefore reduced to make a flank march under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then to carry the latter with a view of crossing the canal above the suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing his army on the south side of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of success.
[Sidenote: Plan 10.]
To impose this march upon him all Soult’s dispositions had been directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix d’Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending half his cavalry over to dispute the passage of the numerous streams in the deep country on the right bank. His army was now disposed in the following order. General Reille defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. Daricau’s division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge with his right. Harispe’s division was established in the works on the Mont-Rave. His right at St. Sypiere looked towards the bridge of Bordes, his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby towards the bridge of Croix d’Orade. On this side a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was occupied by St. Pol’s brigade, drawn from Villatte’s division. The two remaining divisions of infantry were formed in columns at certain points behind the Mont Rave, and Travot’s reserve continued to man the walls of Toulouse behind the canal. This line of battle presented an angle towards the Croix d’Orade, each side about two miles in length and the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.
Wellington having well observed the ground on the 8th and 9th, made the following disposition of attack for the 10th. General Hill was to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw the enemy’s attention according to the progress of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards, being already on the left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of Toulouse. The two first supported by Bock’s German cavalry were to make demonstrations against the line of canal defended by Daricau. That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the convent of the Minimes, while Alten maintained the communication between him and Freyre who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford’s column of march. This last composed of the fourth and sixth division with three batteries was, after passing the bridge of Croix d’Orade, to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground between the French heights and the Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons following close were to connect that general’s left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile lord Edward Somerset’s hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while Vivian’s cavalry moved up the right of that river, each destined to observe Berton’s cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from the right bank to the left, and destroying the bridge fall upon the head of Beresford’s troops while in march.
BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.
[Sidenote: Memoir by general Berton, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.]
The 10th of April at two o’clock in the morning the light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o’clock the whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced posts behind the works at the bridge over the canal. Freyre’s columns, marching along the Alby road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns until they had passed a small stream by the help of some temporary bridges, when the French general following his instructions retired to the horn-work on the Calvinet platform. The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns under major Arentschild opened a heavy cannonade against Calvinet. Meanwhile Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy ground between the Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and difficult country under the fire of the enemy. Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian’s cavalry, now under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton’s horsemen back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes which the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last moment. However the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded, and defended by a detachment of cavalry sent there by Berton who remained himself in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.
While these operations were in progress, general Freyre who had asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience assailed the horn-work on that platform about eleven o’clock and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, nine thousand strong, moved in two lines and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French musquetry and great guns thinned the ranks at every step, yet closing upon their centre they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were exposed to increasing in violence until their right wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep in parts, and covering this part of the French entrenchments; but the left wing and the second line run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulph below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.
The Spanish generals rallying the troops who had fled, led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road of Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby’s cavalry, and the reserve artillery which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the victorious French who immediately retired to their entrenchments on Calvinet: but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded and their defeat was not the only misfortune.
General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known were especially given, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the enemy fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four hundred men and officers: amongst the latter colonel Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and general Brisbane who commanded the brigade was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position, the allies had suffered enormously, and beyond the Garonne, although general Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter being much more contracted and very strongly fortified could not be stormed. The musquetry battle therefore subsided for a time, but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the allies’ side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvinet platform: injudiciously it has been said because the ammunition thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might have been gained.
[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.]
It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford, and yet from Picton’s error lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin’s whole division, and then one of Maransin’s brigades from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musquetry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented so much at every step from the difficulty of the way that frequent halts were necessary to close up the ranks.
The flat miry ground between the river and the heights became narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton’s cavalry was ahead, an impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank! Fortune came to their aid. Soult always eyeing their march, had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin’s division to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade of D’Armagnac’s division disposed the whole about the redoubts. From thence after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a regiment of Vial’s cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton’s horsemen assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was not half of the force which the French general might have employed. Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse, and that general instead of attacking at once took ground to his right, waiting until Beresford having completed his flank march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights.
Taupin’s infantry, unskilfully arranged for action it is said, at last poured down the hill, but some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance, unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; then the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire, and Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s brigade and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack, Lambert’s brigade I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French turning fled back to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen trotting down the Lavaur road now charged on the right flank, but the second and third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed them, and on the other flank general Cole had been so sudden in his advance up the heights, that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his left, general Cole meeting with less resistance had still more rapidly gained the height at that side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and the French with the utmost disorder sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon.
Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing his success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of Vial’s cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to the works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers and rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being stayed a part of Travot’s reserve immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized, but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, had decided the first great crisis of the fight.
Lambert’s brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the platform on the line of the Lavaur road, menacing the flank of the French on the Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade and Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy. And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy’s guns played incessantly.
The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The French thrown entirely on the defensive occupied three sides of a square. Their right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere while the redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French left thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards, and the whole position was very strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side with the angles all defended by formidable works. The canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and entrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured the power of retreat.
In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, the whole of Villatte’s division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of D’Armagnac’s, and with the exception of the regiment driven from the St. Sypiere redoubt the whole of Harispe’s division. On the allies’ side therefore defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far paralyzed, the Spaniards rallying slowly were not to be depended upon for another attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light division, which lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert’s brigade and the fourth division were necessarily employed to keep in check the French troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot’s reserve, the half of D’Armagnac’s division and all of Taupin’s, together with the regiment belonging to Harispe which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypiere, was commanded by general Clauzel, who disposed the greater part in advance of the entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.
Such was the state of affairs about half-past two o’clock, when Beresford renewed the action with Pack’s Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the sixth division under colonel Douglas. These troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, had been hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works, but now scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musquetry carried all the French breast-works, and the Colombette, and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising action when the loose disorderly nature of the attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground is considered; but the French although they yielded at first to the thronging rush of the British troops soon rallied and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the forty-second, and drove the rest out. The British troops were however supported by the seventy-first and ninety-first, and the whole clinging to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then rode up from the low ground and attempted a charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow road, of which there were many, and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued fiercely, the French from their numbers had certainly the advantage, but they never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents down from the brow of the hill. At last when the whole of the sixth division had rallied and again assailed them, flank and front, when their generals Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded and the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth, the battle turned, and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back partly by their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of Matabiau.
It was now about four o’clock. The Spaniards during this contest had once more partially attacked, but they were again put to flight, and the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled, and Beresford halted to reform his order of battle and receive his artillery: it came to him indeed about this time, yet with great difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However Soult seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther resistance useless and relinquished the northern end of the Calvinet platform also. About five o’clock he withdrew his whole army behind the canal, still however holding the advanced works of Sacarin and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established the Spaniards in the abandoned works and so became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent. Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men killed or wounded and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost four generals and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France and a provisional government was constituted at Paris.
During the night the French general, defeated but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended in the action, re-organized and augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a retreat he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the result of the contest and proposed a combined plan of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army, we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding on by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and make a diversion in our favour.”
On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the English general was not. The French position, within musquet-shot of the walls of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, with the view of throwing the army as originally designed on to the south side of the town. But this was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the parc on the other side of the Garonne. Hence to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain the state of general Hill’s position, and to give that general farther instructions, lord Wellington repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.
Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace Soult’s retreat by the road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same day general Hill’s troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men, and cut off a like number of gensd’armes on the side of Revel.
Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had retired with the French army. The British general, true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk, but in the afternoon two officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon they had been detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the empress Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence. Nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission reached Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor: then sending all his incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnaudary and awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, acknowledged the authority of the provincial government and readily concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil war and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on the point of engaging when the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France: and with this honourable distinction that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.
A convention which included Suchet’s army was immediately agreed upon, but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours of his own motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted the intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British army.
SALLY FROM BAYONNE.
During the progress of the main army in the interior sir John Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne, with all the zeal the intelligence and unremitting vigilance and activity which the difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly and without any official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison without lord Wellington’s authority. These rumours were however made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular communications which might be intended to deceive the governor naturally paid little attention.
[Sidenote: Beamish’s History of the German Legion.]
The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, but from thence to the extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber’s German brigade was encamped as a support to the left, the remainder of the first division was encamped in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, about one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming over to general Hay who commanded the outposts that night, gave an exact account of the projected sally. The general not able to speak French sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately interpreting the man’s story to general Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, took no additional precautions, and it is probable that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but for the activity of general Hinuber. However at three o’clock the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets, and with loud shouts breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne with exception of a fortified house which was defended by captain Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. Masters of every other part and overthrowing all who stood before them they drove the picquets and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed general Hay, took colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of general Bradford’s Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and church.
The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the centre, neither the piquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the assault and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the enclosures and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes friends encountered sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel vaguely guided by the flashes of the musquetry sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion by sir John Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine depôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.
Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the time, but it afterwards appeared, that having brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led close behind the line of picquets; the French had however lined both banks, and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck him in the arm, while his horse, a large one as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them, captain Herries, and Mr. Moore a nephew of sir John Moore, seeing his helpless state turned back and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus engaged they were both struck down with dangerous wounds, the French carried them all off, and sir John Hope was again severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.
The day was now beginning to break and the allies were enabled to act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly disposed, by general Howard who had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French drove them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men. But on the British side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. Of these more than two hundred were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged that captain Forster’s firm defence of the fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with which general Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a very terrible disaster.
A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult became known and hostilities ceased.
All the French troops in the south were now reorganized in one body under the command of Suchet, but they were so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy for a sum of money to quiet them.
The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The Spanish army to Spain, the generals being it is said inclined at first to declare for the Cortez against the king, but they were diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of lord Wellington.
The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.
Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran’s services.
VI. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
[Sidenote: 1814.]
Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of Napoleon’s abdication. This charge circulated originally by the Bourbon party is utterly unfounded. The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence by retarding his counter-operations while the works for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, nay impossible, must it not have appeared, that the emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Mont-Mirail and Champaubert were known before the close investment of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege.
As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult.
[Sidenote: Memoirs of captain Kincaid.]
The acute remark of an English military writer, that if the duke of Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable: but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the 7th that the provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could not have reached Toulouse under three days even by the most direct way, which was through Montauban. Now the allies were in possession of that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French army was actually invested. The intelligence from Paris must therefore have reached the allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was lord Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge would therefore bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny success. He also was the person of all others called upon, by honour, gratitude, justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his inhuman adversary.
Did he ever by word or deed countenance the calumny?
Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English reform bill, repeated the accusation in the house of lords and reviled the minister for being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime. Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know of the emperor’s abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable distinction of sporting with men’s lives by wholesale attaches to no general on the records of history save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe. And though marshal Soult had known of the emperor’s abdication he could not for that have been justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince, who fought at St. Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because “he would not deny himself a safe lesson in his trade.”
The French marshal was at the head of a brave army and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other intriguers, forming a provisional government, self-instituted and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult. He had even the right of denying the emperor’s legal power to abdicate. He had the right, if he thought himself strong enough, to declare, that he would not suffer the throne to become the plaything of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine it was a question of patriotism and of calculation, a national question which the general of an army had a right to decide for himself, having reference always to the real will and desire of the people at large.
It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, even after the battle and when he had seen colonel St. Simon.
[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]
Writing to Talleyrand on the 22d, he says, “The circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The 7th the provisional government informed me of the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and 7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th the duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice, that having left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately forward to me another. The 9th the prince Berthier vice-constable and major-general, wrote to me from Fontainbleau, transmitting the copy of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with the allied powers; he demanded at the same time a state of the force and condition of my army; but neither the prince nor the duke of Feltre mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a proclamation of the empress, dated the 3rd, which forbade us to recognize any thing coming from Paris.
“The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army under the orders of lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the French army the weakest by half showed all its worth, cost the allies from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington might perhaps have dispensed with it.
“The 12th I received through the English the first hint of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice, it was refused, I renewed the demand it was again refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse, and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being then in presence of each other. The 19th I ratified this convention and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I manifested my sentiments in order that my will and that of the army should be free. That neither France nor posterity should have power to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To follow only the will of the nation was a homage I owed to my country.”
The reader will observe in the above letter certain assertions, relative to the numbers of the contending armies and the loss of the allies, which are at variance with the statements in this History; and this loose but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration by some French writers, who strangely enough claim a victory for the French army although the French general himself made no such claim at the time, and so far as appears has not done so since.
Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences. By this test we shall know who won the battle of Toulouse.
Now all persons, French and English, who have treated the subject, including the generals on both sides, are agreed, that Soult fortified Toulouse the canal and the Mont Rave as positions of battle; that he was attacked, that Taupin’s division was beaten, that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts and entrenchments fell into the allies’ power. Finally that the French army abandoned Toulouse, leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred men, several guns and a quantity of stores at the discretion of their adversaries: and this without any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any remarkable event affecting the operations happening elsewhere.
[Sidenote: Soult to Suchet, 29th March.]
[Sidenote: Soult to Suchet, 7th April.]
Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment of it forced or voluntary? Let the French general speak! “I have entrenched the suburb of St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The enemy will not I think attack me there unless he desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne two leagues above the city, but he will probably try to pass it below, in which case I will attack him whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban where I have made a bridge-head.”—“I think the enemy will not move on your side unless I move that way first, and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can.”—“If I could remain a month on the Garonne I should be able to put six or eight thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarass me, and who want arms which I expect with great impatience from Perpignan.”—“I am resolved to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever may be the superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a position, which, supported by the town and the canal, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible of defence.”—“I have received the unhappy news of the enemy’s entrance into Paris. This misfortune strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen. The preservation of the place which contains establishments of all kinds is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily I am forced to quit it, my movements will naturally bring me nearer to you. In that case you cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because the enemy will inevitably follow me.”—“The enemy appears astonished at the determination I have taken to defend Toulouse, four days ago he passed the Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the bad weather is the cause.”
[Sidenote: Soult’s Orders.]
[Sidenote: Choumara.]
From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved if possible not to fall back upon Suchet, and was determined even to fight for the preservation of his communications with Montauban; yet he finally resigned this important object for the more important one of defending Toulouse. And so intent upon its preservation was he, that having on the 25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery not of immediate utility, to be sent away, he on the 2d of April forbade further progress in that work and even had those things already removed brought back. Moreover he very clearly marks that to abandon the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the signs and consequences of defeat.
These points being fixed, we find him on the evening of the 10th writing to the same general thus.
“The battle which I announced to you took place to-day, the enemy has been horribly maltreated, but he succeeded in establishing himself upon a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse. The general of division Taupin has been killed, general Harispe has lost his foot by a cannon-ball, and three generals of brigade are wounded. I am prepared to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but I do not believe I can stay in Toulouse, it might even happen that I shall be forced to open a passage to get out.”
On the 11th of April he writes again:
“As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my way at Baziege where the enemy is directing a column to cut my communications. To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my passing.”
To the minister of war he also writes on the 10th.
“To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks me I will defend myself. I have great need to replenish my means before I put the army in march, yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be forced to abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I shall direct my movements so as to rally upon the troops of the duke of Albufera.”
Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits that all the events previously indicated by him as the consequences of defeat were fulfilled to the letter. That is to say, the loss of the position of battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and the march to join Suchet. On the other hand lord Wellington clearly obtained all that he sought. He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it; he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave and he did win them; he desired to enter Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror at the head of his troops.
Amongst the French writers who without denying these facts lay claim to a victory Choumara is most deserving of notice. This gentleman, known as an able engineer, with a praise-worthy desire to render justice to the great capacity of marshal Soult, shews very clearly that his genius would have shone in this campaign with far greater lustre if marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported him in a cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara heated by his subject completes the picture by a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal himself appears not to recognize. The work is a very valuable historical document with respect to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains grave errors as to facts, and the inferences are untenable though the premises were admitted.
The substance of Mr. Choumara’s argument is, that the position of Toulouse was of the nature of a fortress. That the canal was the real position of battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of which weighed little in the balance, because the French army was victorious at Calvinet against the Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes against the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against Picton, at St. Cyprien against General Hill. Finally that the French general certainly won the victory because he offered battle the next day and did not retreat from Toulouse until the following night.
Now admitting that all these facts were established, the fortress was still taken.
But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For first marshal Soult himself tells Suchet that the Mont Rave was his position of battle, and that the town and the canal supported it. Nothing could be more accurate than this description. For when he lost the Mont Rave, the town and the canal enabled him to rally his army and take measures for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered the canal untenable, why else was Toulouse abandoned? That the line of the canal was a more formidable one to attack in front than the Mont Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it a position; it was not necessary to attack it, except partially at Sacarin and Cambon and the bridge of the Demoiselles; those points once forced the canal would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have helped to keep the French in Toulouse as it had before helped to keep the allies out. Lord Wellington once established on the south side of the city and holding the Pech David could have removed the bridge from Seilh to Portet, above Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication with Hill; the French army must then have surrendered, or broken out, no easy matter in such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont Rave was therefore not only the position of battle, it was also the key of the position behind the canal, and Mr. de Choumara is placed in this dilemma. He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess the main position was so badly chosen that a slight reverse at an outwork was sufficient to make the French army abandon it at every other point.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
But were the French victorious at every other point? Against the Spaniards they were, and Picton also was repulsed. The order of movements for the battle proves indeed that this general’s attack was intended to be a false one; he disobeyed his orders however, and one of his brigades was repulsed; but to check one brigade with a loss of three or four hundred men, is a small matter in a battle where more than eighty thousand combatants were engaged.
[Sidenote: Official Returns.]
The light division made a demonstration against the convent of the Minimes and nothing more. Its loss on the whole day was only fifty-six men and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula but would laugh at the notion that a real attack by that matchless division could be so stopped.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien was occupied with a view to offensive movements, and to prevent the allies from establishing batteries to rake the line of the canal from that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have been the object, General Hill got possession of it, and was so far victorious. He was ordered not to assail the second line seriously and he did not, for his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and officers.
From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the French gained an advantage against Picton, and a marked success against the Spaniards; but Beresford’s attack was so decisive as to counterbalance these failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards in possession of the height they had originally contended for in vain.
Mr. Choumara attributes Beresford’s success to Taupin’s errors and to a vast superiority of numbers on the side of the allies. “Fifty-three thousand infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry, and a reserve of eighteen thousand men of all arms, opposed to twenty-five thousand French infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve of seven thousand conscripts three thousand of which were unarmed.” Such is the enormous disproportion assumed on the authority of general Vaudoncourt.
[Sidenote: Kock’s Campaign of 1814.]
Now the errors of Taupin may have been great, and his countrymen are the best judges of his demerit; but the numbers here assumed are most inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a later date than December 1813, yet an official table of the organization of Soult’s army, published by the French military historian Kock, gives thirty-six thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, twenty-eight thousand six hundred were infantry, two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and five thousand seven hundred were artillery-men, engineers, miners, sappers, gensd’armes, and military workmen. Nothing is said of the reserve division of conscripts commanded by general Travot, but general Vaudoncourt’s table of the same army on the 1st of April, adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency. The conscripts are there set down seven thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, and this cipher being added to Kock’s, gives a total of forty-three thousand nine hundred fighting men. The loss in combats and marches from the 10th of March to the 1st of April must be deducted, but on the other hand we find Soult informing the minister of war, on the 7th of March, that three thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of Orthes were still wandering behind the army: the greatest part must have joined before the battle of Toulouse. There was also the regular garrison of that city, composed of the depôts of several regiments and the urban guards, all under Travot. Thus little less than fifty thousand men were at Soult’s disposal.
Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1º. the urban guard which was only employed to maintain the police of the town, 2º. the unarmed conscripts, 3º. the military workmen not brought into action, 4º. the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate with La Fitte in the Arriege, and to reinforce general Loverdo at Montauban. There will remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all arms. And with a very powerful artillery; for we find Soult after the action, directing seven field-batteries of eight pieces each to attend the army; and the French writers mention, besides this field-train, 1º. fifteen pieces which were transferred during the battle from the exterior line of St. Cyprien to the northern and eastern fronts. 2º. Four twenty-four pounders and several sixteen-pounders mounted on the walls of the city. 3º. The armaments of the bridge-heads, the works on Calvinet and those at Saccarin and Cambon. Wherefore not less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of French artillery were engaged.
An approximation to the strength of the French army being thus made it remains to show the number of the allies, and with respect to the Anglo-Portuguese troops that can be done very exactly, not by approximative estimates but positively from the original returns.
[Sidenote: See note at the end of the Appendix.]
The morning state delivered to lord Wellington on the 10th of April bears forty-three thousand seven hundred and forty-four British and Germans, and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three Portuguese, in all sixty-four thousand five hundred and thirty-seven soldiers and officers present under arms, exclusive of artillery-men. Of this number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven hundred and eighty-eight being Portuguese.
The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina’s bands investing St. Jean Pied de Port, were 1º. Giron’s Andalusians and the third army under O’Donnel, fifteen thousand. 2º. The Gallicians under general Freyre, fourteen thousand. 3º. Three thousand Gallicians under Morillo and as many more under Longa, making with the Anglo-Portuguese a total of ninety thousand combatants with somewhat more than a hundred pieces of field-artillery.
[Sidenote: See note at the end of the Appendix.]
[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sections 6 and 7.]
Of this force, O’Donnel’s troops were in the valley of the Bastan, Longa’s on the Upper Ebro; one division of Freyre’s Gallicians was under Carlos D’España in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo’s division was blockading Navarens, the other half and the nine thousand Gallicians remaining under Freyre, were in front of Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, the first and fifth divisions, and three unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of cavalry, were with sir John Hope at Bayonne; the seventh division was at Bordeaux; the household brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march from the Ebro where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese horsemen were partly employed on the communications in the rear, partly near Agen, where sir John Campbell commanding the fourth regiment had an engagement on the 11th with the celebrated partizan Florian. The second, third, fourth, sixth, and light divisions of infantry, and Le Cor’s Portuguese, called the unattached division, were with lord Wellington, who had also Bock’s, Ponsonby’s, Fane’s, Vivian’s, and lord E. Somerset’s brigades of cavalry.
These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered under arms, in round numbers, thirty-one thousand infantry, of which four thousand three hundred were officers sergeants and drummers, leaving twenty-six thousand and six hundred bayonets. Add twelve thousand Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand five hundred infantry. The cavalry amounted to seven thousand, and there were sixty-four pieces of artillery. Hence about fifty-two thousand of all ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight thousand French with more than eighty pieces of artillery, some being of the largest calibre.
But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men with fifty-two guns can be said to have been seriously engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne under general Hill. Neither the light division nor Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, nor Bock’s Germans were really engaged. Wherefore twelve thousand six hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand five hundred of Picton’s division really fought the battle. Thus the enormous disproportion assumed by the French writers disappears entirely; for if the allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in cavalry, and horsemen were of little avail against the entrenched position and preponderating artillery of the French general.
The duke of Dalmatia’s claim to the admiration of his countrymen is well-founded and requires no vain assumption to prop it up. Vast combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can justly deny him. In this celebrated campaign of only nine months, although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places and entrenched five great camps with such works as Marius himself would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations and either attacking or defending delivered twenty-four battles and combats. Defeated in all he yet fought the last as fiercely as the first, remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing the struggle when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts. Those efforts were fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because the people of the south were apathetic and fortune was adverse; because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alexander’s Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal’s Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar’s Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon’s guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington’s British soldiers at this period. The same men who had fought at Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse. Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and fierceness a confidence which rendered them invincible. It is by this measure Soult’s firmness and the constancy of his army is to be valued, and the equality to which he reduced his great adversary at Toulouse is a proof of ability which a judicious friend would put forward rather than suppress.
Was he not a great general who being originally opposed on the Adour by nearly double his own numbers, for such was the proportion after the great detachments were withdrawn from the French army by the emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his fortresses, by his able marches and combinations, oblige his adversary to employ so many troops for blockades sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse his army was scarcely more numerous than the French? Was it nothing to have drawn Wellington from such a distance along the frontier, and force him at last, either to fight a battle under the most astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour. And this not because the English general had committed any fault, but by the force of combinations which embracing all the advantages offered by the country left him no option.
That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps the most important was that which the emperor warned him against, though too late, the leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he says because the place could not hold out fifteen days without the entrenched camp, and the latter required men; but the result proved Napoleon’s sagacity, for the allies made no attempt to try the strength of the camp, and on the 18th of March lord Wellington knew not the real force of the garrison. Up to that period sir John Hope was inclined to blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of gathering the necessary stores and ammunition on the right bank of the Adour, the siege though resolved upon was not even commenced on the 14th of April when that bloody and most lamentable sally was made. Hence the citadel could not even with a weaker garrison have been taken before the end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé’s division of six thousand good troops in the battles of Orthes and Toulouse. Had Suchet joined him, his army would have been numerous enough to bar lord Wellington’s progress altogether, especially in the latter position. Here it is impossible not to admire the sagacity of the English general, who from the first was averse to entering France and only did so for a political object, under the promise of great reinforcements and in the expectation that he should be allowed to organize a Bourbon army. What could he have done if Soult had retained the twenty thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had joined, or the people had taken arms?
How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, how confidently he trusted that his adversary would eventually pass the Garonne below and not above the city, with what foresight he constructed the bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties lord Wellington had to encounter have been already touched upon. But Mr. Choumara has assumed that the English general’s reason for relinquishing the passage of the Garonne at Portet on the night of the 27th, was not the want of pontoons but the fear of being attacked during the operation, adducing in proof Soult’s orders to assail the heads of his columns. Those orders are however dated the 31st, three days after the attempt of which Soult appears to have known nothing at the time: they were given in the supposition that lord Wellington wished to effect a second passage at that point to aid general Hill while descending the Arriege. And what reason has any man to suppose that the same general and troops who passed the Nive and defeated a like counter-attack near Bayonne, would be deterred by the fear of a battle from attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the Nive was clearly more dangerous, because the communication with the rest of the army was more difficult, Soult’s disposable force larger, his counter-movements more easily hidden until the moment of execution. At Portet the passage, designed for the night season, would have been a surprise, and the whole army, drawn close to that side could have been thrown over in three or four hours with the exception of the divisions destined to keep the French in check at St. Cyprien. Soult’s orders did not embrace such an operation. They directed Clauzel to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them while in the disorder of a later passage which was expected and watched for.
General Clauzel having four divisions in hand was no doubt a formidable enemy, and Soult’s notion of defending the river by a counter-attack was excellent in principle; but to conceive is one thing to execute is another. His orders were, as I have said, only issued on the 31st, when Hill was across both the Garonne and the Arriege. Lord Wellington’s design was then not to force a passage at Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack St. Cyprien when Hill should have descended the Arriege. Nor did Soult himself much expect Clauzel would have any opportunity to attack, for in his letter to the minister of war he said, the positions between the Arriege and the canal were all disadvantageous to the French and his intention was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached from the south; yet he still believed Hill’s movement to be only a blind and that lord Wellington would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.
[Sidenote: Notes by general Berton, MSS.]
The French general’s views and measures were profoundly reasoned but extremely simple. His first care on arriving at Toulouse was to secure the only bridge over the Garonne by completing the works of St. Cyprien, which he had begun while the army was still at Tarbes. He thus gained time, and as he felt sure that the allies could not act in the Arriege district, he next directed his attention to the bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat behind the Tarn and the power of establishing a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile contrary to his expectation lord Wellington did attempt to act on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of necessity in observation to that side, entrenched a position on the south; soon however he had proof that his first notion was well-founded, that his adversary after losing much time must at last pass below Toulouse; wherefore he proceeded with prodigious activity to fortify the Mont Rave and prepare a field of battle on the northern and eastern fronts of the city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced lord Wellington to inactivity, that Soult became confident in their strength, and being influenced also by the news from Paris, relinquished his first design of opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving the line of operations by Montauban. To hold Toulouse then became his great object, nor was he diverted from this by the accident which befel lord Wellington’s bridge at Grenade. Most writers, French and English, have blamed him for letting slip that opportunity of attacking Beresford. It is said that general Reille first informed him of the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him to attack the troops on the right bank; but Choumara has well defended him on that point; the distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the works on the Mount Rave would have stood still meanwhile, and the allies might perhaps have stormed St. Cyprien.
[Sidenote: Morning State of lord Wellington, 4th of April, MSS.]
Lord Wellington was however under no alarm for Beresford, or rather for himself, because each day he passed the river in a boat and remained on that side. His force was not less than twenty thousand including sergeants and officers, principally British; his position was on a gentle range the flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; he had eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was likewise flanked by thirty other pieces placed on the left of the Garonne. Nor was he without retreat. He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not have followed to any distance lest the river should subside and the rest of the army pass on his rear, unless, reverting to his original design of operating by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now matured plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore he continued to strengthen his position round that city, his combinations being all directed to force the allies to attack him between the Ers and the Mount Rave where it seemed scarcely possible to succeed.
He has been also charged with this fault, that he did not entrench the Hill of Pugade. Choumara holds that troops placed there would have been endangered without adequate advantage. This does not seem conclusive. The hill was under the shot of the main height, it might have been entrenched with works open to the rear, and St. Pol’s brigade would thus have incurred no more danger than when placed there without any entrenchments. Beresford could not have moved up the left bank of the Ers until these works were carried, and this would have cost men. It is therefore probable that want of time caused Soult to neglect this advantage. He committed a graver error during the battle by falling upon Beresford with Taupin’s division only when he could have employed D’Armagnac’s and Villatte’s likewise in that attack. He should have fallen on him also while in the deep country below, and before he had formed his lines at the foot of the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, Freyre was defeated, the light division was protecting the fugitives, and one of Maransin’s brigades withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvinet platform. Beresford’s column entangled in the marshy ground, without artillery and menaced both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted such an overwhelming mass, and lord Wellington can scarcely escape criticism for placing him in that predicament.
A commander is not indeed to refrain from high attempts because of their perilous nature, the greatest have ever been the most daring, and the English general who could not remain inactive before Toulouse was not deterred by danger or difficulty: twice he passed the broad and rapid Garonne and reckless of his enemy’s strength and skill worked his way to a crowning victory. This was hardihood, greatness. But in Beresford’s particular attack he did not overstep the rules of art, he hurtled against them, and that he was not damaged by the shock is owing to his good fortune the fierceness of his soldiers and the errors of his adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the Garonne, happy if by rapidity he could reunite in time with Hill on the left bank. Beresford’s failure would have been absolute ruin and that alone refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there no other mode of attack? That can hardly be said. Beresford passed the Lavaur road to assail the platform of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and because the platform of Calvinet on the side of the Ers river was more strongly entrenched than that of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too much to throw his column into the deep ground without guns, and quite separated from the rest of the army seeing that the cavalry intended to maintain the connection were unable to act in that miry labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were judged capable of carrying the strongest part of the Calvinet platform, Beresford’s fine Anglo-Portuguese divisions were surely equal to attacking this same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards, and an advanced guard would have sufficed to protect the left flank. The assault would then have been made with unity, by a great mass and on the most important point: for the conquest of St. Sypiere was but a step towards that of Calvinet, but the conquest of Calvinet would have rendered St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed that the Spaniards attacked too soon and their dispersion exceeded all reasonable calculation: so panic-stricken they were as to draw from lord Wellington at the time the bitter observation, that he had seen many curious spectacles but never before saw ten thousand men running a race.
Soult’s retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and regularity, was made in the night. This proves the difficulty of his situation. Nevertheless it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his adversary’s generous forbearance that he passed unmolested under the allies’ guns as an English writer has erroneously assumed. For first those guns had no ammunition, and this was one reason why lord Wellington though eager to fall upon him on the 11th could not do so. On the 12th Soult was gone, and his march covered by the great canal could scarcely have been molested, because the nearest point occupied by the allies was more than a mile and a half distant. Nor do I believe that Soult, as some other writers have imagined, ever designed to hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an avowal of military insolvency to which his proposal, that Suchet should join him at Carcassone and retake the offensive, written on the night of the 11th, is quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of French warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility of that people are ill-suited for stern Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of war before the French soldier and he will make supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded energy: the fear of death never checks him he will attempt anything. But the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance wears his fury out; it was so proved in the Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle more full and terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a French column before whose fierce and vehement assault any other troops would have given way.
Napoleon’s system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships and strong endurance under fire; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare every thing even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play: hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit, certain that they would then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier, but so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations: the Romans not excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered.
Let their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so great and important was but an episode in their military history, be considered. “In Spain large armies will starve and small armies will be beaten” was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and this was no light phrase of an indolent monarch but the profound conclusion of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon’s enormous armies were so wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six years, and without cessation, for to them winters and summers were alike. Their large armies endured incredible toils and privations but were not starved out, nor were their small armies beaten by the Spaniards. And for their daring and resource a single fact recorded by lord Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong place in Spain without any provision of bullets save those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed the siege! Before the British troops they fell, but how terrible was the struggle! how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave men they slew, what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and hers only were capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the merit of his constancy. England could not alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let this brief summary speak.
She expended more than one hundred millions sterling on her own operations, she subsidised Spain and Portugal besides, and with her supplies of clothing arms and ammunition maintained the armies of both even to the guerillas. From thirty up to seventy thousand British troops were employed by her constantly, and while her naval squadrons continually harassed the French with descents upon the coasts, her land forces fought and won nineteen pitched battles and innumerable combats; they made or sustained ten sieges, took four great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved Alicant, Carthagena, Cadiz, Lisbon; they killed wounded and took about two hundred thousand enemies, and the bones of forty thousand British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the Peninsula.
Finally, for Portugal she re-organized a native army and supplied officers who led it to victory, and to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all this and more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula from France!
The duke of Wellington’s campaigns furnish lessons for generals of all nations, but they must always be peculiarly models for British commanders in future continental wars, because he modified and reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals controlled by politicians who depending upon private intrigue prefer parliamentary to national interests. An English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk much however conscious he may be of personal resources when one disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures must therefore be subordinate to this primary consideration. Lord Wellington’s caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike into wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The French call it want of enterprize, timidity; the English have denominated it the Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight; and thus prepared he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, but always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a pains-taking man.
That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon must be admitted, and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed that he learned something of the art from that greatest of all masters; yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never even in his first campaign of Italy so harassed by the French as Wellington was by the English Spanish and Portuguese governments. Their systems of war were however alike in principle, their operations being necessarily modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications without scattering their forces, these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, enduring; in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, but always operating by the flanks in preference to the front: in these things they were alike, but in following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.
Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural want of enterprize to be discerned in the English general’s campaigns. Neither was he of the Fabian school. He recommended that commander’s system to the Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself. His military policy more resembled that of Scipio Africanus. Fabius dreading Hannibal’s veterans, red with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched skill and valour of the great Carthaginian opposed the almost inexhaustible military resources of Rome. Lord Wellington was never loath to fight when there was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack Junot who had twenty-four thousand. At Roliça he was the assailant, at Vimiera he was assailed, but he would have changed to the offensive during the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto he was again the daring and successful assailant. In the Talavera campaign he took the initiatory movements, although in the battle itself he sustained the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was entirely defensive, because the Portuguese army was young and untried, but his pursuit of Massena in 1811 was as entirely aggressive although cautiously so, as well knowing that in mountain warfare those who attack labour at a disadvantage. The operations of the following campaign, including the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera the first siege of Badajos and the combat of Guinaldo, were of a mixed character; so was the campaign of Salamanca; but the campaign of Vittoria and that in the south of France were entirely and eminently offensive.
Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian warfare. And for the Englishman’s hardiness and enterprise bear witness the passage of the Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming of Badajos, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to Vittoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes, the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is only to say that he made war; but to deny him the qualities of a great commander is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of light. How few of his combinations failed. How many battles he fought, victorious in all! Iron hardihood of body, a quick and sure vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the habit of laborious minute investigation and arrangement; all these qualities he possessed, and with them that most rare faculty of coming to prompt and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This is the certain mark of a master spirit in war, without it a commander may be distinguished, he may be a great man, but he cannot be a great captain: where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge are opposed the battle generally turns upon the decision of the moment.
At the Somosierra, Napoleon’s sudden and what to those about him appeared an insensate order, sent the Polish cavalry successfully charging up the mountain when more studied arrangements with ten times that force might have failed. At Talavera, if Joseph had not yielded to the imprudent heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would have been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun’s refusal to charge with his cavalry saved general Craufurd’s division, the loss of which would have gone far towards producing the evacuation of Portugal. At Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the first day, and thus lost the only favourable opportunity for assailing that formidable position. At Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly suspended his attack when a powerful effort would probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult’s column of attack instead of pushing forward halted to fire from the first height they had gained on Beresford’s right, which saved that general from an early and total defeat; again at a later period of that battle the unpremeditated attack of the fusileers decided the contest. At Barosa, general Graham with a wonderful promptitude snatched the victory at the very moment when a terrible defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even the astonishing fighting of the light division could have saved it if general Reynier had possessed this essential quality of a general. At El Bodon, Marmont failed to seize the most favourable opportunity which occurred during the whole war for crushing the allies. At Orthes, Soult let slip two opportunities of falling upon the allies with advantage, and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.
At Vimiera, lord Wellington was debarred by Burrard from giving a signal illustration of this intuitive generalship, but at Busaco and the heights of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. On the other hand he has furnished many examples of that successful improvisation in which Napoleon seems to have surpassed all mankind. His sudden retreat from Oropesa across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his passage of the Douro in 1809; his halt at Guinaldo in the face of Marmont’s overwhelming numbers; the battle of Salamanca; his sudden rush with the third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria; his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren; his battle of the 30th two days afterwards; his sudden passage of the Gave below Orthes. Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the proofs are complete that he possesses in an eminent degree that intuitive perception which distinguishes the greatest generals.
Fortune however always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow that in every age and every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial. Napoleon’s march upon Madrid in 1808 before he knew the exact situation of the British army is an example. By that march he lent his flank to his enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage and though the French emperor repaired the error for the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was then decided. If he had not been forced to turn against Moore, Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could not have been organized for resistance, and the jealousy of the Spaniards would never have suffered Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz: that general’s after-successes would then have been with the things that are unborn. It was not so ordained. Wellington was victorious, the great conqueror was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant nation of the world. But with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms! And it is a stirring sound! War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty and temperance, excites the brave man’s patriotism and is a chastening corrective for the rich man’s pride. It is yet no security for power. Napoleon the greatest man of whom history makes mention, Napoleon the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him, and without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean.
Appendix
No. I.
JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.
Lord William Bentinck to sir E. Pellew.
At sea, June 18th, 1813.
SIR,
Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily in the tonnage and small craft of the country.—The most important question is, whether this can be effected by the enemy.—I have no difficulty in saying on my part, that in the present disposition of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the non-existence of any national force, and the imperfect composition of the British force, if half the number intended for this expedition should land in Sicily the island would be conquered.
(Signed) W. BENTINCK.
Sir E. Pellew to lord W. Bentinck.
H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813.
MY LORD,
I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment the Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong N. W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres islands, without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that they may have from twelve to twenty-four hours’ start of me in chasing them. When blown off the coast, my look-out ships would certainly bring me such information as would enable me to follow them immediately to the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is most competent to judge whether in the interval of their arrival and my pursuit, the French admiral would be able to embark Murat’s army artillery and stores, and land them on the coast of Sicily before I came up with them.—The facility of communication by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would certainly apprize Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but for my own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before they could make good their landing.
Lord Wm. Bentinck to lord Wellington.
At sea, June 20th, 1813.
MY LORD,
By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to lord Castlereagh, your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a negociation with us, the object of which is friendship with us and hostility to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations with Murat’s agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte had ordered Murat to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for the invasion of Sicily in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose the copy of a letter I have in consequence addressed to Sir E. Pellew, together with his answer, upon the practicability of the Toulon fleet sailing without the knowledge of the blockading fleet. Your lordship will have received my letter of the 21st of May enclosing a copy of my dispatch to Lord Bathurst, relative to the discontent of the Neapolitan troops in Sicily and the consequent state of weakness if not of danger resulting from it to that island. I stated also that this circumstance had induced me to detain in Sicily the two battalions which had been withdrawn from Spain.
Lord Wellington to lord William Bentinck.
Huarte, July 1st, 1813.
MY LORD,
In answer to your lordship’s despatch, I have to observe, that I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger whatever.
No. II.
Letter from general Nugent to lord William Bentinck.
Vienna, January 24th, 1812.
MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,
I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those then destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances caused the delay of the present which otherwise you would have had much sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted to inform you of the answer which would be given by this house to the speculations that I was commissioned by the prince-regent to propose relative to the arch-duke. There was no decisive answer given, and the only manner of forming an opinion upon that subject was by observing and getting information of their true intentions. I am now firmly convinced that these are such as we could wish, and that it is only fear of being committed that prevents them to speak in a more positive manner. Their whole conduct proves this, more particularly in La Tour’s affair which has produced no change whatsoever nor led to any discovery of views or connexions. There is even now less difficulty than ever for officers going to the Mediterranean. They get passports from government here without its inquiring or seeming to know the real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to which this conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is not even requisite and I am convinced that when the thing is once done they will gladly agree. This is likewise King’s and Hardenberg’s and Johnson’s opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire me to express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things here makes the forwarding of the measures you may think expedient in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.
They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government in England, and by the accounts we have the latter is much pleased with the conduct of this country, particularly relative to the affairs of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But whatever the consequence may be and whatever this country may do for the present, I am convinced that your measures will ultimately contribute much to the result. I am happy to perceive by the last information from England that every thing seems to have been settled there by you. The recruiting business of major Burke is going on rapidly. As it was not begun at the time of my departure I can only attribute it to your presence. The letters contain likewise that government is come to the most favorable resolutions relative to the arch-duke, and I hope the formation of the troops will soon be effectuated. The dispositions of the Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good as can be, but all depends upon establishing a basis and without that all partial exertions would be useless or destructive. At the same time that some regiments would be formed, I think it would be very expedient, to form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat regiment, particularly as in the present state of things it will be much easier even than the other. The men could be easily recruited in Bosnia, and sent from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. The bearer will give you every information upon the subject, and at all events, I should propose to you to send him immediately back to Durazzo, and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary orders and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he is. He knows the languages, the country, and the character of the people, and understands every thing that relates to commercial affairs. As to the place of formation, I think I already proposed Cephalonia to you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would give too much jealousy in the beginning in those parts, until our capital increases so as to undertake an important enterprise, at all events it is important to form a noyau of the three nations; it is then that we may hope to be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and Croatia after a short time. Major and other officers will shortly proceed to the Mediterranean. They will be directed to Messina where I request you will send orders for them. It would be very useful and saving to provide means for transporting them to that place from Durazzo, and if possible to establish a more frequent and regular intercourse between you and the latter. Johnson who soon sets off from here will in the meantime establish a communication across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in those parts will be productive of many good effects. You will find that he is an able active and zealous man and will certainly be very useful in forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy of your full confidence, should you adopt the proposition relative to the recruiting it would be necessary to put at his disposal the requisite funds.
You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you whether cloth &c. can be had at a cheaper rate from this country or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to have clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. Many important reasons have prevented me hitherto from proceeding to the Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I hope however not to be detained much longer and soon to have removed every obstacle. I think to set off from here in the beginning of March, and request you will be so kind as to provide with the return of the bearer to Durazzo the means of my passage from thence, where I shall come with a feigned name. I hope he will be back there by the time of my arrival. I shall endeavour to hasten my journey as I have important information in every respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative to the north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an alteration necessary in regard to Frozzi’s journey. Part of your object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy &c. As to the other and principal part relative to connections in the army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the government in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to have a person of sufficient consequence and ability to execute your instructions, and he will go to Milan &c. as soon as it can be done with safety. His permanent residence in that country seems to be necessary, that he may be able to accomplish fully the object, and as the sum you have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for a considerable time, you can determine whether he is to remain there permanently or not. Frozzi will bring you an exact account of what has been arranged relative to this business, and will himself be a very proper person for communications between you and Italy or this country. He will for that purpose go back to Italy, the obstacle that opposed it hitherto being now no more. I cannot but repeat the importance of giving all possible extent to the arch-duke’s establishment, and particularly the raising of as much troops as possible, for all will depend upon having the means of landing. We are then sure of augmenting very speedily, and finding the greatest assistance. The place for beginning cannot be determined on exactly, but there is much to be expected in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined by the inhabitants and troops. The lower part would be best adapted in case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers particularly acquainted with the country and provide every other assistance such as plans &c. and I think it would be expedient to prevent for the present any enterprize in that country that would alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has arrived from Paris.
The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to be ready for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France to the north and every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte told to Swartzenburg that he would begin in April and all circumstances seem to agree with this. On the other side Russia is very slow in making peace with Turkey. He entirely neglects Prussia, and for this reason it is to be feared that the latter will place his capital with Buonaparte notwithstanding that this cabinet is endeavouring to prevent it. I should be then very much afraid for the conduct of this house well inclined as the emperor is. Proposals were made by France but no resolution has been taken until it is known how things turn out. The worst is that Romanzow is still in credit with Alexander, which prevents all confidence in other houses and makes Russia adopt half measures. This sketch of the situation will give you some idea of the wavering and uncertain state people are in. There is no calculation to be made as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised at any thing they may do. On the other side our speculations are not built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation if the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal object of mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures for the case that it comes here to the very worst. The most important thing is the augmenting in every possible manner the force at your disposition. The accounts we have to-day of your return and the powers I hope you have give me the best hopes of your overcoming every difficulty. I must yet observe that as Johnson’s proceedings are entirely subordinate to, and make a part of your plans and operations in general, and that he cannot of course depend upon King, you will be so good as to give him decisive instructions to that purpose, and assign him the means and powers for acting in consequence. I shall combine with him in my passage through Bosnia every thing in the hopes that you will approve of this.
Letter from Mr. King to lord William Bentinck.
Vienna, January 24th, 1812.
MY LORD,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards the latter end of October by captain Frizzi whom I should immediately have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for the purpose of carrying your lordship’s instructions into effect, had it not appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my arrival here had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship’s intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to transmit for your lordship’s perusal the reports (marked A) of three messengers whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the public mind, particularly in the ci-devant Venetian territories and adjacent districts. These reports confirm in a very satisfactory manner the assurances, which I have received through various other channels, that the inhabitants of those countries are ready and determined to avail themselves of the first opportunity to shake off a yoke which is become insupportable. I have also the honour to transmit to your lordship the copy of a letter from count Montgelas, the minister of foreign affairs in Bavaria, to the commissary-general at Nimpten, from which it appears that the Bavarian government is not altogether ignorant of the intentions of the Swiss and Tyroleze, but I am happy to have it in my power to inform your lordship that the persons who seem to have excited the suspicions of the Bavarian government do not enjoy the confidence of our friends in Switzerland, and have not been made acquainted with their intentions; it is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we should act with the greatest possible caution in the employment of emissaries, lest the French and Bavarian governments should take the alarm and adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least occasion a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously consulted with general N. to whom captain Frizzi was particularly addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion) I think it eligible to send this officer back to Sicily and I trust that in so doing I shall meet with your lordship’s approbation. I beg leave to observe that the only service captain Frizzi could render in Italy at the present moment would be to ascertain the number and distribution of the French forces in this country, but as these undergo continual changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch a confidential agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence from Italy, at a period when the northern war and consequent occupation of the French troops will enable your lordship to derive advantage from such intelligence.
The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between France and Russia in the month of April at which period the preparations of the French government will be completed, and there is little reason to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of the interval, either to annihilate the army of the duchy of Warsaw or to advance to the assistance of the king of Prussia, who will in all probability ally himself with France notwithstanding his former declarations to the contrary. The latest intelligence from Berlin states that count St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum of his government, which demands an unconditional surrender of all the Prussian fortresses, and insists on the military force and resources of Prussia being placed at the disposal of French generals. It is positively asserted that the king is inclined to submit to these humiliating proposals, but nothing has been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to inform your lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is highly discouraging; the injudicial financial measures which count Wallis has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for government to place the army on a respectable footing, and have considerably increased the discontent of the people, who however still retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The government is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the approaching crisis if possible.
In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention of establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers &c. &c. and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the state of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late repeated assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants of those parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under the dominion of the French, and of their willingness to make every effort to shake off the yoke, and being aware how important it is at the present moment not to neglect an object of this nature I have desired Mr. Johnson to proceed thither in order to form connections in Albania, Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every possible manner of the spirit of discontent which has so decidedly manifested itself. Mr. Johnson who has been employed on the continent for some years past as an agent of government, and who has given proofs of his zeal and abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or according to circumstances to some other town in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic and will there reside as agent of the British government. He will communicate his arrival to your lordship with as little delay as possible.
By the following piece of information which I have derived from an authentic source your lordship will perceive that the French and Swedish governments are far from being on friendly terms. An alliance has been proposed by the former to the latter and instantaneously rejected. The terms of the alliance were as follows, viz. 1st, a body of 30,000 Swedes to be placed at the disposal of France. 2nd, 3000 seamen to be furnished to the French marine, and 3rd, a regiment of Swedes to be raised for the service of France as was the case before the French revolution. I transmit this letter to your lordship by captain Steinberg and ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served creditably in the Austrian army. The former has connections and local knowledge in his native country which may become particularly useful. I fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers to Sicily as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely useful in the formation of new corps.
No. III.
Extracts from the correspondence of sir Henry Wellesley, sir Charles Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan.
Mr. Vaughan to sir Charles Stuart.
Cadiz, August 3d, 1813.
“The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, and the government are feeding them with proclamations to intendants. Since I have known Spain I have never known the seat of government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent beyond measure.”
Ditto to Ditto.
Chichana, Nov. 2d, 1813.
“Never was any thing so disgraceful in the annals of the world as the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion of the sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have the sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed the epidemic of the fever the interested merchants would not allow it to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue clear bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of the mortality and did all they could to intimidate the government and Cortez into remaining amongst them.”
Sir Henry Wellesley to lord Wellington.
Sept. 13th, 1813.
“A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent deputation[13] having been appointed the Cortez closed their session on the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the prevalence of the yellow fever which had excited alarm. On the 16th in the evening, I received an official note from the ministers of state apprizing me of the intention of the government to proceed to Madrid on the following day, but without assigning any reason for so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the regency, thinking this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together, the cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to leave Cadiz; and Ciscar particularly dwelt upon the necessity of removing, saying he had seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthagena. They then told me that there was disturbance in the town, in consequence of which they determined on summoning the extraordinary Cortez. I went from the regency to the Cortez. A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz until the Cortez had been consulted, although I had in my pocket the official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been told by Ciscar that the extraordinary Cortez was assembled for no other reason than because there were disturbances in the town.”
Ditto to Ditto.
Cadiz, Dec. 10th, 1813.
“The party for placing the princess at the head of the Spanish regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid, unless a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to all such projects.”
Mr. Stuart to lord Wellington.
June 11th, 1813.
“The repugnance of the Admiralty to adopt the measures suggested by your lordship at the commencement of the American war for the protection of the coast, has been followed by events which have fully justified your opinion. Fifteen merchantmen have been taken off Oporto in a fortnight and a valuable Portuguese homeward-bound merchant ship was captured three days ago close to the bar of Lisbon.”
No. IV.
Extract from a manuscript memoir by captain Norton, thirty-fourth regiment.
COMBAT OF MAYA.
The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the hon. col. O’Callaghan, then immediately engaged with the French and after a severe contest also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second which met the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides the remnant of the right wing retired, leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no interval; the French column advanced up to this line and then halted, the killed and wounded of the ninety-second forming a sort of rampart, the left wing then opened its fire on the column, and as I was but a little to the right of the ninety-second I could not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their comrades. The left wing after doing good service and sustaining a loss equal to the first line retired.
COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES.
EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL COLE’S AND MARSHAL SOULT’S OFFICIAL REPORTS, MSS.
General Cole to lord Wellington.
Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813.
——“The enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I therefore proceeded in that direction and found that their advance had nearly reached the road leading from Roncesvalles pass to Los Alduides, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the communications the head of major-general Ross’s brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general however, with great decision, attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the twentieth, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy and bayonetted several in the ranks. They were however forced to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley, the enemy attempted to follow them but were repulsed with loss, the remainder of the brigade having come up.”
Marshal Soult to the Minister of War.
“Linzoin, 26 Juiller, 1813.
“Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l’attaque du Lindouz par le général Reille ou le 20^{me} regiment a été presque détruit à la suite d’une charge à la bayonnette executée par un bataillon du 6^{me} leger, division Foy, soit à l’attaque d’Altobiscar par le général Clauzel.”
Extract from the correspondence of the duke of Dalmatia with the Minister of War.
Ascain, 12 Août, 1813.
“Dés a présent V. E. voit la situation de l’armée, elle connait ses forces, celles de l’ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée de ses projets, et d’avance elle peut apprécier ce qu’il est en notre pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée sans détour, et j’avoue que si l’ennemi emploie tous ses moyens, ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrons en ce moment lui opposer etant de beaucoup inferieurs, nous ne pourrons pas empêcher qu’ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est de le dire à V. E. quoique je tienne une autre language aux troupes et au pays, et que d’ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen pour remplir de mon mieux la tache qui m’est imposée.”
No. V.
EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.
Report of the movements of the army of Arragon during the first fifteen days of September, 1813.
“Le 12^{eme} toute l’armée d’Aragon se reunit a Molino del Rey; partie de celle de Catalonia et la garrison de Barcelonne se placent a droite a Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble a 8 heures du soir et se porter le droite par San Sadurni, le rest par le grande route d’Ordal sur Villa Franca, ou l’armée Anglaise etait rasemble. General Harispe rencontré a onze heures du soir un fort advant garde au Col d’Ordal dans les anciens ratranchemens. Un combat de plus vif s’engagea sous les ordres du general de l’avant garde Mesclop. Le 7^{eme} et 44^{eme} reg^{ns.} montrerent une haute valeur, ainsi qu’une partie d’116^{eme}. Les positions sont prise et reprise, et nous restent enfin, couvert des morts et de blesses Anglais. Dans la pursuite le 4^{eme} houssards se saissirent des 4 pieces de cannon Anglais, &c. avec trois ou quatre cents prisoniers, presque tous de la 27^{eme} reg^{n.} Anglais. Le droit, ayant rencontrer des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemis a combattre dans les passages, est retarde dans sa marche, et n’arriva pas avec le jour au rendezvouz entre L’Ongat et Grenada. Un battalion de 117^{eme} venant à gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet, rejoint l’armée en position, avec des prisoniers.
“Le marechal Suchet directé une movement de cavalrie et de l’artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le tems à l’infanterie d’entrer en ligne. Les Anglais etaient en battaile sur trois lignes en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencerent aussitot leur retraite en bon ordre. On les poursuiverent et on les harcelerent, la cavalrie fit plusieurs charges assez vive. Ils opposerent de la resistance, essuyerent des pertes, surtout en cavalrie, precipiterent leur marche, brulerent un pont et s’eloignerent vers Arbos et Vendrils, laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup des morts et des blesses, surtout des houssards de Brunswick. Nôtre avant garde va ce soir à Vendrils et plusieurs certaines de deserteurs sont ramassé.”
No. VI.
No. 1.—Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by lieutenant-general sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.
Present fit for Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total duty. men.
British and German cavalry 739 12 6 733 ” 757
British Portuguese and Sicilian artillery 783 8 199 362 604 990
British engineers and staff corps 78 5 36 ” ” 119
British and German infantry 7,226 830 637 ” ” 8,693
Whittingham’s infantry 4,370 503 316 ” ” 5,189
Sicilian infantry 985 121 272 ” ” 1,378 ------------------------------------------------ General Total 14,181 1,479 1,466 1,095 604 17,126 ------------------------------------------------
No. 2.—Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force, commanded by lieutenant-general sir William Clinton. Head-quarters, Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.
Present fit for Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total duty. men.
Cavalry 663 61 215 875 40 939
Artillery, engineers, and staff corps 997 67 58 507 896 1,122
Infantry 9,124 1,390 1,019 115 429 11,533 ------------------------------------------------- General Total 10,784 1,518 1,292 1,497 1,465 13,594 -------------------------------------------------
No. 3.—Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division (Whittingham’s.) Taragona, 15th of December, 1813.
Under Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total arms. men.
Infantry 4,014 400 627 110 21 5,041
No. 4.—Extract from the original state of the first army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters, Vich, 1st of August, 1813.
Under Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total arms. men.
Infantry disposable 10,219 1,535 2,207 586 ” 13,961
In Cardona 1,182 115 398 ” ” 1,695
Seo d’Urgel 984 172 144 ” ” 1,300
Artillery, &c. 877 7 59 6 ” 1,070 -------------------------------------------------- Grand total 13,262 1,829 2,808 592 ” 18,026 --------------------------------------------------
No. 5.—Extract from the original state of the second army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th September, 1833.
Present Sick. Command. Total Horses. under arms. of men. Total of all arms 26,835 3,181 7,454 37,470 4,073
Note.—This state includes Villa Campa’s, Sarzfield’s, Duran’s, the Empecinado’s, and Roche’s divisions, besides the troops immediately under Elio himself.
No. VII.
No. 1.—Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the marquis of Wellington’s command. Extracted from the original morning state for the 24th of July, 1813.
Officers, Rank Total. Sergeants, &c. and file. Men. Horses. British and German cavalry} Present under arms } 916 5,894 6,750 5,834 Ditto infantry 4,665 29,926 34,581 ” Portuguese cavalry 251 1,241 1,492 1,178 Ditto infantry 2,594 20,565 23,459 ” ------------------------------------- Grand Total, exclusive of} sick and absent on command } 8,726 57,566 66,282 7,012 (Infantry and cavalry.) -------------------------------------
The artillerymen, &c. were about 4,000.
No. 2.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 15th of October, 1813.
Officers, Rank Sergeants,&c. and file. Total. British and German cavalry and infantry 5,859 37,250 43,109 Portuguese ditto 4,253 21,274 25,527 ------------------------------- Grand Total, exclusive of sick,} absent on command. &c. &c.} 10,112 58,524 68,636 ------------------------------- The artillerymen and drivers about 4,000 ------ Total 72,636 ------
No. 3.—Anglo-Portuguese force, from the original morning state, 9th November, 1813.
Officers, Rank Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. British and German cavalry and infantry 5,356 39,687 45,043 Portuguese ditto 2,990 22,237 25,227 ------------------------------- Grand Total, exclusive of sick,} absent on command, &c. } 8,346 61,924 70,270 ------------------------------- The artillerymen, &c. &c. about 4,000 ------ Total 74,270 ------
No. 4.—Sir Rowland Hill’s force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813.
Officers, Rank Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. Second division {British 802 5,371 6,173 {Portuguese 277 2,331 2,608 Lecor’s Portuguese division 507 4,163 4,670 ------------------------------ Total under arms, exclusive} of artillerymen } 1,586 11,865 13,451 ------------------------------
No. 5.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1814.
Officers, Rank Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. Cavalry. British and German cavalry 1,093 7,315 8,408} Portuguese cavalry 280 1,210 1,490} 9,898
Infantry. British and German infantry 4,853 29,714 34,567} Portuguese infantry 2,828 18,911 21,739} 56,306 ------ General Total, present under arms 66,204 ------ Artillerymen, &c. about 4,000
No. 6.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th of April, 1814.
Officers, Rank Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. British and German cavalry 1,159 7,640 8,799} Portuguese cavalry 230 958 1,188} 9,987
British and German infantry 4,946 29,999 34,945} Portuguese infantry 2,622 16,983 19,605} 54,550 ------ General Total, present under arms 64,537 ------ The artillerymen, &c. about 4,000
No. 7.—Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.
Infantry, present Officers, Rank under arms. Sergeants, &c. and file. Total.
Second division, British 715 4,123} Grand Ditto Portuguese 235 1,867} 6,940 Total Third division, British 529 2,741 } infantry, Ditto Portuguese 226 1,183 } 4,679 officers Fourth division, British 531 3,028} and Ditto Portuguese 239 1,585} 5,383 soldiers, Sixth division, British 558 3,233 } present Ditto Portuguese 246 1,644 } 5,681 under Light division, British 378 2,469} arms. Ditto Portuguese 231 1,240} 4,318 Lecor’s Portuguese division 455 3,507 3,962 30,963 ----- ------- 4,343 26,620 ----- -------
Note.—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April, but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows.
Cavalry, present Officers, Rank under arms. Sergeants, &c. and file.
Bock’s brigade of Germans 112 694 Total Ponsonby’s brigade of British 188 1,921 cavalry, Fane’s brigade of British 240 1,506 present Vivian’s brigade of British 128 960 under Lord Edw. Somerset’s brigade 214 1,691 arms. of British ---- ----- 882 6,072 6,954 ---- -----
Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms 37,917 Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be 14,000 ------ 51,917 Artillerymen, &c. 1,500 ------ General Total 53,417 ------
Note.—My authority for the number of guns employed during this campaign are copies of the returns given to me by sir Alexander Dickson who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on the morning states, but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May, 1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and waggon-train, amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, with five thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as the average strength during the campaign, but more than half were with sir John Hope and some with lord Dalhousie. Wherefore, the number at the battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen hundred, making a total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand combatants.
No. VIII.
No. 1.—General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July 1813. The armies of the north centre and south being by an imperial decree reorganised in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain.
Present under arms. Detached. Hosp- Total. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. itals Men. Horses. Army of Spain 97,983 12,676 2,110 392 14,074 114,167 13,028 Arragon 32,362 4,919 3,621 551 3,201 39,184 5,470 Catalonia 25,910 1,869 168 ” 1,379 27,457 1,744 ------------------------------------------------------- General Total 156,255 19,464 5,899 943 18,654 180,808 20,242 -------------------------------------------------------
No. 2.—15th of September, 1813.
Total. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Horses. Army of Spain 81,351 11,159 4,004 1,438 22,488 107,843 11,272 Arragon 32,476 4,447 2,721 320 3,616 38,813 6,305 Catalonia 24,026 1,670 120 ” 2,137 26,283 2,497 ------------------------------------------------------- General Total 137,853 17,276 6,845 1,758 28,241 172,939 20,074 -------------------------------------------------------
Note.—The garrison of San Sebastian though captive is borne on this state.
This is the last general state of the French army in my possession but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls.
“Army of Spain, 16th November, 1813. —102 battalions. 74 squadrons, without garrisons. 74,152 men present under arms. 100,212 effectives. 17,206 horses.
18,230 Hospital. } 8,555 Troop horses. } 1,809 Officers’ horses. } 5,384 Horses of draft. }
“Army of Spain, 1st December. —93 battalions. 74 squadrons. 17,989 horses.”
No. 3.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, July 1813, when Soult took the command.
Right wing.—Lieutenant-general Reille. Present Effective and under arms, non-effective. Men. Horses. men. horses. Men. Total. First division, Foy, 9 battalions 5,922 189 } { 6,784 } Seventh ditto, Maucune, 7 ditto 4,186 110 } 17,235 450 { 5,676 } 21,366 Ninth ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto 7,127 151 } { 8,906 }
Centre.—Drouet, Count D’Erlon.
Second division, D’Armagnac, 8 batt. 6,961 116 } { 8,580 } Third ditto, Abbé, 9 ditto 8,030 285 } 20,957 624 { 8,723 } 23,935 Sixth ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto 5,966 223 } { 6,627 }
Left wing.—Lieut.-general Clauzel.
Fourth division, Conroux, 9 battalions 7,056 150 } { 7,477 } Fifth ditto, Vandermaesen, 7 ditto 4,181 141 } 17,218 432 { 5,201 } 20,265 Eighth ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto 5,981 141 } { 7,587 }
Reserve, General Villatte.
French 14,959 2,091 17,929 Foreign 4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given. 4 ditto Italians, general St. Pol, ditto. 4 ditto Spaniards, general Casabianca, ditto.
Cavalry, Pierre Soult. Present Effective and under arms, non-effective. Men. Horses. men. horses. Men. Total. 22 squadrons 4,723 4,416} { 5,098 } Ditto Trielhard 2,358 2,275} 7,081 6,691 { 2,523 } 7,621
Total according to the } organization, but } exclusive of the } 77,450 91,086 foreign battalions }
Men under arms. Troops not in the organization 14,938 16,946 Generals {Garrison of St. Sebastian, } 2,731 3,086 { 1st July, forming part } Rey { of this number } Cassan.—Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July 2,951 3,121 Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May 1,465 1,674 Second reserve, not in the above 5,595 6,105
Effective and non-effective. Men. Horses. Present Men. Horses. General Total 97,983 12,676. under arms. 114,167 13,028
No. 4.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.
Effective and Men. non-effective. { Foy 5,002 } present } Right wing { Maucune 4,166 } 14,875 under arms. } { Menne 5,707 } } Men. } { D’Armagnac 4,353 } } Centre. { Abbé 5,903 } 15,098 ditto } 45,752 { Maranzin 4,842 } } } { Conroux 4,736 } } Left wing. { Roguet 5,982 } 15,789 ditto } { Taupin 5,071 }
Reserve. Villatte 8,256 } The Italian brigade,} Provisional troops of the } } about 2,000 } right wing, destined } 2,168 } ordered to Milan. } 10,424 to reinforce the } garrison of Bayonne }
Total. Men. Horses. Men. Cavalry.—Pierre Soult 4,456 4,617 } Ditto Trielhard 2,368 2,583 } Gensd’armes { mounted 291 247 } 8,325 { dismounted 1,210 ” } Parc 895 885 } Engineers 504 127 } 1,399
{ Pampeluna 3,805 191 } { San Sebastian 2,366 prisoners of war. } Garr- { Santona 1,633 } isons. { Bayonne 4,631 137 } 15,164 { St. Jean Pied de Port 1,786 } { Navarens 842 } { Castle of Lourdes 107 } ------ 81,064 Deduct garrison of San Sebastian 2,366 ------ Total, present under arms 78,698 ------
No. IX.
Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the attack of the enemy’s fortified position in front of Toulouse for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United Service Journal, October 1838.
(EXTRACT.)
“St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.
“The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of that road.
“The light division will be immediately on the left of the third division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road above-mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of the Spanish troops.
“The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where the form of the ground, or other circumstances most favour the advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and of the light divisions must be kept in reserve.”
Note.—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in Appendix VII. Sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully made and faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give the Morning State of the whole army, accurately printed from the original document delivered by the adjutant-general to lord Wellington on the morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain its true numbers.
No. X.
MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the PENINSULA, under the Command of HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G. Head-Quarters, St. Jory, 10th April, 1814.
(Part 1 of 6) KEY: AA = Colonels. AB = Lieut.-Colonels. AC = Majors. AD = Captains. AE = Lieutenants. AF = Cornets or Ensigns. AG = Staff. +----------+-----------------+------------------------------------+ | Date of | | OFFICERS | |last State| DIVISIONS. +----+----+----+-----+-----+----+----+ | received.| | AA | AB | AC | AD | AE | AF | AG | +----------+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+----+----+ | | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | | 7th Apr. | Cavalry | 1 | 13 | 17 | 106 | 189 | 25 | 94 | | | | | | | | | | | | ” Do. | 1st Dn. Infantry| 3 | 16 | 6 | 64 | 53 | 56 | 48 | | 9th Do. | 2d | 2 | 2 | 10 | 45 | 123 | 29 | 41 | | | | | | | | | | | | ” Do. | 3d | 2 | 3 | 10 | 38 | 69 | 30 | 32 | | 6th Do. | 4th | .. | 3 | 9 | 42 | 86 | 27 | 30 | | | | | | | | | | | | 7th Do. | 5th | 1 | 3 | 6 | 35 | 82 | 39 | 38 | | 8th Do. | 6th | .. | 4 | 9 | 41 | 102 | 41 | 25 | | 5th Do. | 7th | 1 | 4 | 6 | 38 | 74 | 31 | 31 | | | | | | | | | | | | 9th Do. | Lt. | 2 | 2 | 4 | 24 | 68 | 13 | 19 | | 7th Do. | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. | 6 | 7 | 37 | 74 | 19 | 26 | | | | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL | | | | | | | | | | ------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | | 7th Apr. | Cavalry | 2 | 4 | 4 | 17 | 39 | 15 | 41 | | 9th Do. | 2d Dn. Infantry | .. | 2 | 2 | 16 | 16 | 28 | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | ” Do. | 3d | 2 | .. | 2 | 9 | 17 | 23 | 14 | | 6th Do. | 4th | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 24 | 51 | | 7th Do. | 5th | 1 | 2 | 3 | 13 | 12 | 22 | 49 | | 8th Do. | 6th | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 16 | 47 | | 5th Do. | 7th | 2 | 3 | 4 | 17 | 18 | 27 | 43 | | 9th Do. | Lt. | .. | 2 | 3 | 13 | 11 | 26 | 29 | | 7th Do. | Unattached Dn. | 2 | 4 | 7 | 25 | 22 | 51 | 80 | | 8th Do. | 1st Brigade | 1 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 27 | 16 | | ” Do. | 10th | .. | 4 | 4 | 18 | 14 | 23 | 38 | | | | | | | | | | | | | Total Portuguese| | | | | | | | | | Total British | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | | | | +----------+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+----+----+
(Part 2 of 6) KEY: BA = Quarter-Masters of Cavalry. BB = Present. BC = Present. BD = Absent. BE = Command. BF = Prs. of War & Missing. BG = Total. +-----------------+----+-------------------------------+ | | | SERGEANTS. | | | |-----+---------+---------------| | | | | Sick. | | | | | DIVISIONS. | | |---------| | | | | | BA | BB | BC | BD | BE | BF | BG | +-----------------+----+-----+----+----+----+----+-----+ | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | | Cavalry | 25 | 581 | 9 | 17 | 68 | 7 | 682 | | | | | | | | | | | 1st Dn. Infantry| .. | 433 | 13 | 40 | 38 | 4 | 528 | | 2d | .. | 320 | 5 | 89 | 68 | 18 | 500 | | | | | | | | | | | 3d | .. | 231 | 3 | 82 | 47 | 5 | 368 | | 4th | .. | 232 | 3 | 76 | 56 | 4 | 371 | | | | | | | | | | | 5th | .. | 245 | 28 | 63 | 30 | 10 | 376 | | 6th | .. | 236 | 4 | 59 | 41 | 1 | 341 | | 7th | .. | 187 | 5 | 62 | 42 | 16 | 312 | | | | | | | | | | | Lt. | .. | 182 | 2 | 39 | 21 | 1 | 245 | | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. | 188 | 7 | 7 | 8 | .. | 210 | | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL | | | | | | | | | ------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | | Cavalry | 4 | 64 | 2 | .. | 28 | .. | 94 | | 2d Dn. Infantry | .. | 122 | .. | 19 | 32 | .. | 173 | | | | | | | | | | | 3d | .. | 101 | 5 | 20 | 39 | .. | 165 | | 4th | .. | 103 | .. | 27 | 23 | .. | 153 | | 5th | .. | 105 | 3 | 25 | 18 | .. | 151 | | 6th | .. | 119 | 3 | 12 | 20 | .. | 154 | | 7th | .. | 110 | 4 | 12 | 23 | .. | 149 | | Lt. | .. | 101 | 3 | 6 | 27 | .. | 137 | | Unattached Dn. | .. | 197 | 7 | 47 | 26 | 1 | 278 | | 1st Brigade | .. | 137 | 1 | 10 | 20 | .. | 168 | | 10th | .. | 124 | 7 | 7 | 15 | .. | 153 | | | | | | | | | | | Total Portuguese| | | | | | | | | Total British | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | | | | +-----------------+----+-----+----+----+----+----+-----+
(Part 3 of 6) KEY: CA = Present. CB = Present. CC = Absent. CD = Command. CE = Prs. of War & Missing. CF = Total. +-----------------+-------------------------------+ | | TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS. | | |-----+---------+---------------| | | | Sick. | | | | | DIVISIONS. | |---------| | | | | | CA | CB | CC | CD | CE | CF | +-----------------+-----+----+----+----+----+-----+ | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | Cavalry | 108 | .. | 8 | 4 | 2 | 122 | | | | | | | | | | 1st Dn. Infantry| 142 | 4 | 3 | .. | 3 | 152 | | 2d | 143 | 1 | 23 | 3 | 8 | 178 | | | | | | | | | | 3d | 114 | .. | 20 | 7 | 4 | 145 | | 4th | 102 | 1 | 15 | 5 | 6 | 129 | | | | | | | | | | 5th | 99 | 10 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 130 | | 6th | 101 | 1 | 19 | 3 | .. | 124 | | 7th | 92 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 117 | | | | | | | | | | Lt. | 66 | 1 | 3 | .. | 3 | 73 | | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| 72 | 1 | 4 | .. | .. | 77 | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL | | | | | | | | ------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | Cavalry | 40 | .. | .. | 10 | .. | 50 | | 2d Dn. Infantry | 39 | .. | 1 | 4 | .. | 44 | | | | | | | | | | 3d | 58 | 2 | 5 | 6 | .. | 71 | | 4th | 36 | .. | 6 | 5 | .. | 47 | | 5th | 34 | 1 | 3 | 2 | .. | 40 | | 6th | 33 | 1 | 5 | 3 | .. | 42 | | 7th | 33 | .. | 3 | 2 | .. | 38 | | Lt. | 51 | 3 | 2 | 7 | .. | 63 | | Unattached Dn. | 67 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 85 | | 1st Brigade | 64 | .. | 2 | 2 | 4 | 72 | | 10th | 31 | .. | 3 | 5 | .. | 39 | | | | | | | | | | Total Portuguese| | | | | | | | Total British | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | | | +-----------------|-----+----+----+----+----+-----+
(Part 4 of 6) KEY: DA = Present. DB = Present. DC = Absent. DD = Command. DE = Prs. of War & Missing. DF = Total. +-----------------+--------------------------------------------+ | | RANK AND FILE | | |-------+--------------+---------------------| | | | Sick. | | | | | DIVISIONS. | |--------------| | | | | | DA | DB | DC | DD | DE | DF | +-----------------+-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | Cavalry | 7640 | 106 | 406 | 1071 | 233 | 9456 | | | | | | | | | | 1st Dn. Infantry| 5894 | 244 | 632 | 200 | 185 | 7155 | | 2d | 4123 | 112 | 2251 | 474 | 716 | 7676 | | | | | | | | | | 3d | 2741 | 75 | 1352 | 297 | 229 | 4694 | | 4th | 3028 | 44 | 1700 | 279 | 201 | 5252 | | | | | | | | | | 5th | 3277 | 363 | 1075 | 224 | 315 | 5254 | | 6th | 3233 | 54 | 1223 | 309 | 103 | 4922 | | 7th | 2738 | 114 | 1074 | 391 | 673 | 4990 | | | | | | | | | | Lt. | 2469 | 77 | 696 | 131 | 146 | 3519 | | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| 2496 | 212 | 312 | 92 | .. | 3112 | | |-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ | TOTAL | 37639 | 1401 | 10721 | 3468 | 2801 | 56030 | | ------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | Cavalry | 958 | 5 | 73 | 598 | 16 | 1650 | | 2d Dn. Infantry | 1867 | 71 | 472 | 101 | .. | 2511 | | | | | | | | | | 3d | 1183 | 105 | 598 | 383 | .. | 2269 | | 4th | 1585 | 30 | 635 | 199 | .. | 2449 | | 5th | 1161 | 13 | 550 | 176 | .. | 1900 | | 6th | 1644 | 44 | 469 | 151 | .. | 2308 | | 7th | 1736 | 48 | 228 | 211 | 48 | 2271 | | Lt. | 1240 | 54 | 237 | 394 | 11 | 1936 | | Unattached Dn. | 3507 | 215 | 835 | 219 | 76 | 4852 | | 1st Brigade | 1510 | 68 | 328 | 146 | 213 | 2265 | | 10th | 1550 | 115 | 351 | 82 | 4 | 2102 | | |-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ | Total Portuguese| 17941 | 768 | 4776 | 2660 | 368 | 26513 | | Total British | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | | | +-----------------|-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+
(Part 5 of 6) KEY: EA = Present. EB = Sick. EC = Command. ED = Total. +-----------------+-------------------------------+ | | HORSES. | | |-------+-------+-------+-------| | DIVISIONS. | | | | | | | EA | EB | EC | ED | +-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ | BRITISH. | | | | | | Cavalry | 7289 | 611 | 602 | 8502 | | | | | | | | 1st Dn. Infantry| .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 2d | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | | | | | | | 3d | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 4th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | | | | | | | 5th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 6th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 7th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | | | | | | | Lt. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | |-------+-------+-------+-------+ | TOTAL | 7289 | 611 | 602 | 8502 | | ------- | | | | | | | | | | | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | Cavalry | 855 | 114 | 404 | 1373 | | 2d Dn. Infantry | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | | | | | | | 3d | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 4th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 5th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 6th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 7th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | Lt. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | Unattached Dn. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 1st Brigade | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | 10th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | | |-------+-------+-------+-------+ | Total Portuguese| 855 | 114 | 404 | 1373 | | Total British | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | +-----------------|-------+-------+-------+-------+
(Part 6 of 6) KEY: FA = Joined. FB = Dead. FC = Discharged. FD = Deserted. FE = Transferred FF = Promoted. FG = Reduced. FH = Effective Rank and File, Portuguese included. +-----------------+-----------------------------------------+------+ | | ALTERATIONS. | | | |-----------------------------------------| | | | Men. | | | DIVISIONS. |-----------------------------------------| | | | FA | FB | FC | FD | FE | FF | FG | FH | +-----------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | | | Cavalry | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8144 | | | {b} | | | | {c} | {c} | {d} | | | 1st Dn. Infantry| 4 | 6 | .. | 4 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 5894 | | 2d | .. | 11 | .. | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 5990 | | | {a} | | | | | | {a} | | | 3d | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 3924 | | 4th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4613 | | | | | | | {a} | {e} | .. | | | 5th | .. | 2 | .. | 2 | 17 | 1 | .. | 4438 | | 6th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4877 | | 7th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4474 | | | | | | | | | {a} | | | Lt. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 3709 | | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. | 2 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 2496 | | |-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ | TOTAL | 5 | 24 | .. | 6 | 33 | 4 | 6 | .. | | ------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | | | Cavalry | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | 2d Dn. Infantry | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | | | {e} | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | 3d | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | 4th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | 5th | 69 | 3 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | | 6th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | 7th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | Lt. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | Unattached Dn. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3507 | | 1st Brigade | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1510 | | 10th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1550 | | |-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ | Total Portuguese| 70 | 5 | 1 | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | | Total British | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Grand Total | | | | | | | | | +-----------------|-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+
3 Men deserted 2d Line Bn. K.G.L. 1 Do. ” 1st Line Do. 1 Do. ” 47th Foot. 1 Do. ” 4th Do.
The Men transferred are Invalids sent home.
Note.—The figures belonging to the grand total are wanting in the original.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Transcriber Note: This table has five table-note anchors indicated | | in this etext by {a} to {e}. They were printed as one or more | | asterisks in the original book; however there is no explanation of | | their meaning. | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Since colonel and surveyor-general of South Australia.
[2] The present major-general sir George Napier.
[3] A splendid soldier.
[4] A false stopping here misled me about the bridge. I made the allies pass by ladders instead of the French.
[5] Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from excellent authority that marshal Beresford did actually in person order general sir Colin Halket to retreat from the bridge, and rebuked him for being slow to obey.
[6] I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders of movements signed, George Murray, and addressed to the generals commanding divisions. Had they been given to me according to the duke of Wellington’s desire when I first commenced my Work they would have saved me much time much expense and much labour; but I repeat that from sir George Murray and from him only I have met with hostility. He has not been able to hurt me but I take the will for the deed.
[7] Above five thousand pounds.
[8] Since this was written Mr. Leader did put the question in the house when sir George Murray’s conduct was strongly animadverted upon by lord Howick and his lordship’s observations were loudly cheered. Sir George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the public.
[9] Another has appeared since but I have not read it being informed that it was precisely like its predecessors.
[10] This work has been since discontinued by lieutenant Godwin in consequence as he told me of foul play in a high quarter where he least expected it.
[11] That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English politician, sir De Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions upon the Spanish armies to be “a most deplorable defect in a historian, and the result of violent partialities.” I dare to say the Spaniards will agree with him.
[12] This was in February.
[13] Called the Extraordinary Cortez.
* * * * *
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RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS
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A SKETCH OF THE SERVICES OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE,
FROM ITS FORMATION TO THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
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MEMOIR BY GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART.
OF HIS PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN, AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.
In one vol. post 8vo. price 9s. boards.
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SKETCHES IN SPAIN,
DURING THE YEARS 1829-30-31 AND 32;
CONTAINING NOTICES OF SOME DISTRICTS VERY LITTLE KNOWN; OF THE MANNERS OF THE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT, RECENT CHANGE, COMMERCE, NATURAL HISTORY, AND FINE ARTS;
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THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN LEGION,
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BY N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, ESQ. F.R.S LATE MAJOR UNATTACHED.
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THE TOUR OF THE FRENCH TRAVELLER, M. DE LA BOULLAYE LE GOUZ, IN IRELAND, A.D. 1644.
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LISTE DES PLANCHES QUI SERONT CONTENUES DANS LE VOLUME:
Pl. 1. Carte générale de l’Yucatan avec Walis. 2. Costume des femmes de Campêche. 3. Costume des soldats de la milice. 4. Costume des Mestices de Mérida. 5. Indien contrebandier de l’intérieur. 6. Manière de voyager dans l’Yucatan. 7. Costume de majordome des fermes. 8. Carte et plan d’une partie des ruines d’Ytzalane. 9. Plan de la pyramide de Kingsborough. 10. Elévation de la pyramide de Kingsborough. 11. Etude d’une partie de cet édifice, coupe des pierres. 12. Plan du grand carré des 4 temples. 13. Façade du temple aux deux serpents. 14.}Façade du temple aux asterismes. 15.}Façade du temple du soleil. 16. Etude d’une partie du temple du soleil. 17. Etude d’une partie du templenaux asterismes. 18. Planche de détails de l’édifice aux deux serpents. 19.{Ces trois planches sont des terres cuites trouvées dans les 20.{ ruines de l’antique ville de 21.{ Tulhà ou Ocozingo à 32 lieues des ruines de Palenqué. 22. Bas relief Astronomique des ruines de Palenqué.
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources.
Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
Some occurrences of upper-case titles (such as Lord, Sir, Colonel) have been made lower-case for consistency.
The names d’España and d’Amarante have been changed to D’España and D’Amarante, for consistency.
In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, incorrect grammar, spelling and accents have been left unchanged.
The tables in Appendix VIII No. 3 (page 708) have been restructured to fit on the page. No data has been lost.
The table at the end of the original book (page 710) was very large, about 240 characters in width. For this etext it has been split into six parts. The second column ‘DIVISIONS’ has been replicated in each part, for readability.
This table has five table-note anchors indicated in this etext by {a} to {e}. They were printed as one or more asterisks in the original book; however there is no explanation of their meaning.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
TOC: ‘hemns the allies’ replaced by ‘hems the allies’. Pg xi: ‘citadel of Ciuded’ replaced by ‘citadel of Ciudad’. Pg xxiv: ‘mistate facts for’ replaced by ‘misstate facts for’. Pg xxix: ‘twice over, tbat’ replaced by ‘twice over, that’. Pg xxxiv: ‘ever acuated me’ replaced by ‘ever actuated me’. Pg xli: ‘Medium estimate’ replaced by ‘Median estimate’. Pg lxvii: ‘the Portuguse treat’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese treat’. Pg lxxx: ‘witten expressly’ replaced by ‘written expressly’. Pg 11: ‘neigbourhood of Reus’ replaced by ‘neighbourhood of Reus’. Pg 49: ‘also run upon’ replaced by ‘also ran upon’. Pg 74: ‘his way p from’ replaced by ‘his way up from’. Pg 93: ‘all amountaineers’ replaced by ‘all mountaineers’. Pg 141: ‘some hishonour’ replaced by ‘some dishonour’. Pg 143: ‘to whse corps’ replaced by ‘to whose corps’. Pg 247: ‘frequent scouring’ replaced by ‘frequent scouting’. Pg 254: ‘between the brige’ replaced by ‘between the bridge’. Pg 279: ‘he must revitual’ replaced by ‘he must revictual’. Pg 289: ‘the two outwarks’ replaced by ‘the two outworks’. Pg 289: ‘forseeing that the’ replaced by ‘foreseeing that the’. Pg 293: ‘letter to España’ replaced by ‘letter to D’España’. Pg 294: ‘enforced by España’ replaced by ‘enforced by D’España’. Pg 319: (Sidenote) ‘minis- of war’ replaced by ‘minister of war’. Pg 351: ‘took possesion of’ replaced by ‘took possession of’. Pg 394: (Sidenote) ‘See plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 8.’. Pg 417: ‘Carlos D’Españo’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’. Pg 449: ‘the Lepsic battle’ replaced by ‘the Leipsic battle’. Pg 456: ‘of his genins’ replaced by ‘of his genius’. Pg 483: ‘way ot Madrid’ replaced by ‘way to Madrid’. Pg 531: (Sidenote) ‘See Plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 9.’. Pg 549: ‘current run so’ replaced by ‘current ran so’. Pg 584: ‘to develope his’ replaced by ‘to develop his’. Pg 588: ‘by sedidions and’ replaced by ‘by seditions and’. Pg 607: ‘Aire and Barcelone’ replaced by ‘Aire and Barcelona’. Pg 635: ‘was not be forded’ replaced by ‘was not to be forded’. Pg 669: ‘Carlos D’Espagne’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’. Pg 686: ‘surpassed a mankind’ replaced by ‘surpassed all mankind’. Pg 709: ‘dismountned’ replaced by ‘dismounted’. Catalog: ‘of Exter College’ replaced by ‘of Exeter College’.