Chapter IV
[Sidenote: 1813. September.]
Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double misunderstanding did not however last long, and each army resumed its former position.
The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington a new port and point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a depôt, and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations; the armistice in Germany was at an end, Austria had joined the allies, and it seemed therefore certain that he would immediately invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. Meanwhile the partizans of the Bourbons were secretly endeavouring to form a conspiracy in the south, and the duke of Berri desired to join the British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were already armed and organized at the head of which he would place himself. In fine all was exultation and extravagance. But lord Wellington, well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises, while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing, “that if he had done all that was expected he should have been before that period in the moon.”
With respect to the duke of Berri’s views, it was for the sovereigns he said to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form part of their policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or any other political points was declared. It was for their interest to get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without pledging themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might indeed decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partizans in rebellion, and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon’s power rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption ever established in any country, externally upon his military force which was supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions; once confined to the limits of France he would be unable to bear the double expense of his government and army, the reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the Bourbons would thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must declare they would dethrone Napoleon before the duke of Berri should be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up its mind upon the question.
This reasoning put an end to the project, because neither the English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns were ready to adopt a decisive open line of policy. The ministers exulting at the progress of aristocratic domination, had no thought save that of wasting England’s substance by extravagant subsidies and supplies, taken without gratitude by the continental powers who held themselves no-ways bound thereby to uphold the common cause, which each secretly designed to make available for peculiar interests. Moreover they all still trembled before the conqueror and none would pledge themselves to a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved with a firm composure, the result of profound and well-understood calculations; yet his mind, naturally so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at this time by personal hatred of Napoleon.
Where is the proof, or even probability, of that great man’s system of government being internally dependent upon “the most extensive corruption ever established in any country”?
The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England, and Napoleon rejected public loans which are the very life-blood of state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the public substance in idleness merely because he was of a privileged class; the state servants were largely paid but they were made to labour effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness simplicity and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to corruption. Napoleon’s power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as a sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love which they bore towards him, and still bear for his memory because he cherished the principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant activity in the public service, his freedom from all private vices, and because his public works, wondrous for their number their utility and grandeur, never stood still; under him the poor man never wanted work. To France he gave noble institutions, a comparatively just code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the Romans. His Cadastre, more extensive and perfect than the Doomsday Book, that monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror, was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities public or private. It was designed and most ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man’s home. The French Cadastre, although not original, would from its comprehensiveness, have been when completed the greatest boon ever conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.
To say that the emperor was supported by his soldiers, is to say that he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to push her down, the conscription, without which she could never have sustained the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed upon her by the revolution; that energetic law, which he did not establish but which he freed from abuse, and rendered great, national, and endurable by causing it to strike equally on all classes, the conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon, well they might, and to assert that their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never was hated by the people of France; he was their own creation and they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from Cannes to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men, who were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might by a single shot have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were base enough to undertake but none so hardy as to execute the crime, and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a throne from whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts and hearts of men.
Lord Wellington having shaken off the weight of the continental policy, proceeded to consider the question of invading France simply as a military operation, which might conduce to or militate against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon’s power was weakened by the war in Germany; and such was his inflexible probity of character, that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility of gaining personal reputation, diverted him from this object, all the renown of which he already enjoyed, the embarrassments mortifications and difficulties, enormous, although to the surface-seeing public there appeared none, alone remaining.
The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria’s accession to the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian were favourable circumstances; but he relied not much on the military skill of the banded sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment dissolve their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce Soult and drive the allies back upon Spain, where the French still possessed the fortresses of Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortoza, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia. Meanwhile lord William Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed a serious error in sending Del Parque’s army to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster and subsequent retreat shewed that Suchet was strong enough, if it so pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian army back even to the Xucar and recover all his strong places. In fine the affairs of Catalonia were in the same unsatisfactory state they had been in from the first. It was not even certain that a British army would remain there at all, for lord William assured of Murat’s defection was intent upon invading Italy; and the ministers seemed to have leaned towards the project, since Wellington now seriously desired to know whether the Anglo-Sicilians were to go or stay in Spain.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Dispatches, MSS.]
Lord William himself had quitted that army, making the seventh change in fifteen months; this alone was sufficient to account for its misfortunes, and the Spanish generals, who had been placed under the English commander, ridiculed the latter’s ill success and spoke vauntingly of themselves. Strenuously did lord Wellington urge the appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian troops who would devote his whole attention to his business, observing that at no period of the war would he have quitted his own army even for a few days without danger to its interests. But the English minister’s ignorance of every thing relating to war was profound, and at this time he was himself being stript of generals. Graham, Picton, Leith, lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and Skerrit, had gone or were going to England on account of ill health wounds or private business; and marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous intrigues to be noticed hereafter menaced the existence of the Portuguese army. Castaños and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency from their commands, and O’Donnel, described as an able officer but of the most impracticable temper, being denied the chief command of Elio’s, Copons’, and Del Parque’s troops, quitted the army under pretext that his old wounds had broken out; whereupon, Giron was placed at the head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia were however so important, that lord Wellington thought of going there himself; and he would have done so, if the after misfortunes of Napoleon in Germany, had not rendered it impossible for that monarch to reinforce his troops on the Spanish frontier.
These general reasons for desiring to operate on the side of Catalonia were strengthened also by the consideration, that the country, immediately beyond the Bidassoa, being sterile, the difficulty of feeding the army in winter would be increased; and the twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards in his army, would certainly plunder for subsistence and incense the people of France. Moreover Soult’s actual position was strong, his troops still numerous, and his entrenched camp furnished a secure retreat. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port were so placed that no serious invasion could be made until one or both were taken, or blockaded, which, during the tempestuous season and while the admiralty refused to furnish sufficient naval means, was scarcely possible; even to get at those fortresses would be a work of time difficult against Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well might, came to the other’s support. Towards Catalonia therefore lord Wellington desired to turn when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should be secured by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he thought it not amiss meanwhile to yield something to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public feeling by occupying a menacing position within the French territory. A simple thing this seemed but the English general made no slight concession when he thus bent his military judgment to political considerations.
The French position was the base of a triangle of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great roads leading from thence to Irun and St. Jean Pied de Port, were the sides. A rugged mass of mountains intervened between the left and centre, but nearly all the valleys and communications, coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at St. Jean Pied de Port and were embraced by an entrenched camp which Foy occupied in front of that fortress. That general could, without calling upon Paris who was at Oleron, bring fifteen thousand men including the national guards into action, and serious dispositions were necessary to dislodge him; but these could not be made secretly, and Soult calculated upon having time to aid him and deliver a general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy barred any movement along the right bank of the Nive, and he could, either by the great road leading to Bayonne or by shorter communications through Bidaray, reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and so gain Espelette behind the camps of Ainhoa. From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges at Amotz and Serres he could reach St. Jean de Luz, and it was by this route he moved to aid in the attack of San Marcial. However, the allies marching from the Alduides and the Bastan could also penetrate by St. Martin D’Arosa and the Gorospil mountain to Bidaray, that is to say, between Foy’s and D’Erlon’s positions. Yet the roads were very difficult, and as the French sent out frequent scouting detachments and the bridge of Cambo was secured by works, Foy could not be easily cut off from the rest of the army.
[Sidenote: Plans 5 and 6.]
D’Erlon’s advanced camps were near Urdax, and on the Mondarain and Choupera mountains, but his main position was a broad ridge behind Ainhoa, the right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that bridge Clauzel’s position extended along a range of strong hills, trending towards Ascain and Serres, and as the Nivelle swept with a curve quite round his rear his right flank rested on that river also. The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre, barring the roads leading from Vera and the Puerto de Echallar, were in advance of his left, and the greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level overtopped all the neighbouring mountains, formed, in conjunction with its dependants the Commissary and Bayonette, a mask for his right.
From the Bayonette the French position run along the summit of the Mandale or Sulcogain mountain, on a single line, but from thence to the sea the ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second commencing near St. Jean de Luz stretched from the heights of Bordegain towards Ascain, having the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in advance. Reille’s divisions guarded these lines, and the second was connected with Clauzel’s position by Villatte’s reserve which was posted at Ascain. Finally the whole system of defence was tied to that of St. Jean Pied de Port, by the double bridge-head at Cambo which secured the junction of Foy with the rest of the army.
The French worked diligently on their entrenchments, yet they were but little advanced when the castle of San Sebastian surrendered, and Wellington had even then matured a plan of attack as daring as any undertaken during the whole war. This was to seize the great Rhune mountain and its dependents, and at the same time to force the passage of the Lower Bidassoa and establish his left wing in the French territory. He would thus bring the Rhune Commissary and Bayonette mountains, forming a salient menacing point of great altitude and strength towards the French centre, within his own system, and shorten his communications by gaining the command of the road running along the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would obtain the port of Fuentarabia, which, though bad in winter, was some advantage to a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty means of land-transport had to encounter the perverse negligence and even opposition of the Spanish authorities. Moreover Passages, his nearest port, was restricted in its anchorage-ground, hard to make from the sea and dangerous when full of vessels.
[Sidenote: October.]
[Sidenote: Foy’s report to Soult, 2d October, MSS.]
He designed this operation for the middle of September, immediately after the castle of San Sebastian fell and before the French works acquired strength, but some error retarded the arrival of his pontoons, the weather became bad, and the attack, which depended as we shall find upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred until the 7th of October. Meanwhile to mislead Soult, to ascertain Foy’s true position about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to strengthen his own right, he brought part of Del Parque’s force up from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian division which had remained at the blockade after the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron at Echallar, and at the same time Mina’s troops gathered in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles. Wellington himself repaired to that quarter on the 1st of October, and in his way, passing through the Alduides, he caused general Campbell to surprize some isolated posts on the rock of Airola, a French scouting detachment was also cut off near the foundry of Baygorry, and two thousand sheep were swept from the valley.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
These affairs awaked Soult’s jealousy. He was in daily expectation of an attack without being able to ascertain on what quarter the blow would fall, and at first, deceived by false information that the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought the march of Mina’s troops and the Andalusians was intended to mask an offensive movement by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of light cavalry in the Bastan, lord Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of the post at Airola seemed to confirm this; but he knew the pontoons were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that the real object of the allies was to gain the great Rhune. On the other hand a French commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining twelve days at Lesaca, assured him, that nothing at Wellington’s head-quarters indicated a serious attack, although the officers spoke of one and there were many movements of troops; and this weighed much with the French general, because the slow march of the pontoons and the wet weather had caused a delay contradictory to the reports of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that Wellington should, against his military judgment, push his left wing into France merely to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns in Germany, and as the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations.
The true reason of the procrastination, namely the state of the tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily hidden from Soult, who finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only designed to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from interruption by menacing the French and impeding their labours, the results of which were now becoming visible. However, as all the deserters and spies came with the same story he recommended increased vigilance along the whole line. And yet so little did he anticipate the nature of his opponent’s project, that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s divisions at Ainhoa, and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended and no way suspecting that it would be against his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side of Roncesvalles and the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris and the light cavalry under Pierre Soult should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; the troops at Maya were already posted offensively, menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle, and it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and against the French right that he could act.
Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British soldiers arrived from England. Mina was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of general Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell’s Portuguese in the Alduides; and the latter marching to Maya replaced the third division, which, shifting to its left occupied the heights above Zagaramurdi, to enable the seventh division to relieve Giron’s Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar.
These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the great Rhune and its dependents, the arrangements for which shall now be described.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the Ivantelly, was to assail a lofty ridge or saddle, uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune. A battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his right flank, was to seize the rocky head of the last-named mountain, and after placing detachments there in observation of the roads leading round it from Sarre and Ascain, was to descend upon the saddle and menace the rear of the enemy’s position at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile the principal attack was to be made in two columns, but to protect the right and rear against a counter-attack from Sarre, the Spanish general was to leave one brigade in the narrow pass leading from Vera, between the Ivantelly and the Rhune to that place.
On the left of Giron the light division was to assail the Bayonette mountain and the Puerto de Vera, connecting its right with Giron’s left by skirmishers.
Longa, who had resumed his old positions above the Salinas de Lesaca, was to move in two columns across the Bidassoa. One passing by the ford of Salinas was to aid the left wing of the light division in its attack on the Bayonette; the other passing by the bridge of Vera, was to move up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette from the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect the two attacks of the light division. During these operations Longa was also to send some men over the river at Andarlasa, to seize a telegraph which the French used to communicate between the left and centre of their line.
Behind the light division general Cole was to take post with the fourth division on Santa Barbara, pushing forward detachments to secure the commanding points gained by the fighting troops in front. The sixth division was meanwhile to make a demonstration on the right by Urdax and Zagaramurdi, against D’Erlon’s advanced posts. Thus without weakening his line between Roncesvalles and Echallar lord Wellington put nearly twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune mountain and its dependents, and he had still twenty-four thousand disposable to force the passage of the Lower Bidassoa.
It has been already shewn that between Andarlasa and Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The French trusting to this difficulty of approach, and to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had collected their troops principally, where the Bildox or green mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords. Against these points Wellington directed general Freyre’s Spaniards, who were to descend from San Marcial, cross the upper fords of Biriatu, assail the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the left of that part of the enemy’s line which being prolonged from Biriatu crossed the royal road and passed behind the town of Andaya.
Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the mountain of Louis XIV., the ridge called the Caffé Republicain, and the town of Andaya. Behind these the Calvaire d’Urogne, the Croix des Bouquets, and the camp of the Sans Culottes, served as rallying posts.
For the assault on these positions Wellington designed to employ the first and fifth divisions and the unattached brigades of Wilson and lord Aylmer, in all about fifteen thousand men. By the help of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered three fords, practicable at low water, between the bridge of Behobia and the sea, and his intent was to pass his column at the old fords above, and at the new fords below the bridge, and this though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile broad. The left bank of the river also was completely exposed to observation from the enemy’s hills, which though low in comparison of the mountains above the bridge, were nevertheless strong ridges of defence; but relying on his previous measures to deceive the enemy the English general disdained these dangers, and his anticipations were not belied by the result.
The unlikelihood that a commander, having a better line of operations, would pass such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth, deceived the French general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were negligent. Of Reille’s two divisions La Martiniere’s, now commanded by general Boyer, was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of the seventh was dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte’s reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand men composing Maucune’s division were indeed on the first line but unexpectant of an attack, and though the works on the Mandale were finished and those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea they were scarcely commenced.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
Passage of the Bidassoa. The night set in heavily. A sullen thunder-storm gathering about the craggy summit of the Pena de Haya came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over the Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions. During this turmoil Wellington whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained their respective stations along the banks of the river. Freyre’s Spaniards one brigade of the guards and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu fords to that near the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced behind the detached ridge which the French had first seized in the attack of the 31st. The second brigade of guards and the Germans of the first division were concealed near Irun, close to a ford below the bridge of Behobia called the great Jonco. The British brigades of the fifth division covered themselves behind a large river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese and lord Aylmer’s brigade were posted in the ditch of Fuenterabia.
As all the tents were left standing in the camps of the allies, the enemy could perceive no change on the morning of the 7th, but at seven o’clock, the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade emerging from their concealment took the sands in two columns, that on the left pointing against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on the right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was fired, but when they had passed the fords of the low-water channel a rocket was sent up from the steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the guns and howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco ford, and the passage above the bridge also commenced. From the crest of San Marcial seven columns could be seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles, those above the bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, those below it appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missing the Jonco ford got into deep water but quickly recovered the true line, and the French, completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth division to gain the right bank and form their lines before a hostile musket flashed.
The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth division, advancing beyond Urdax and Zagaramurdi, made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the Portuguese brigade under colonel Douglas, were however pushed too far and repulsed with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and the French marshal instantly detecting the true nature of this attack hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before he arrived.
When the British artillery first opened, Maucune’s troops had assembled at their different posts of defence, and the French guns, established principally near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the Caffé Republicain, commenced firing. The alarm spread, and Boyer’s marched from the second line behind Urogne to support Maucune without waiting for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came into action, Sprye’s Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the allies, menaced the camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore one of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. But Andaya, guarded only by a piquet, was abandoned, and Reille thinking the camp of the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men reached it, sent a battalion there from the centre, thus weakening his force at the chief point of attack; for the British brigades of the fifth division, were now advancing left in front from Andaya, and bearing under a sharp fire of artillery and musquetry towards the Croix des Bouquets.
By this time the columns of the first division had passed the river, one above the bridge, preceded by Wilson’s Portuguese, one below, preceded by Colin Halkett’s German light troops, who aided by the fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the enemy’s advanced posts, won the Caffé Republicain, the mountain of Louis XIV. and drove the French from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets: this was the key of the position, and towards it guns and troops were now hastening from every side. The Germans who had lost many men in the previous attacks were here brought to a check, for the heights were very strong, and Boyer’s leading battalions were now close at hand; but at this critical moment colonel Cameron arrived with the ninth regiment of the fifth division, and passing through the German skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit of the first height. The French infantry instantly opened their ranks to let their guns retire, and then retreated themselves at full speed to a second ridge, somewhat lower but where they could only be approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column and bore against this new position, which curving inwards enabled the French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; nor did his violent course seem to dismay them until he was within ten yards, when appalled by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they gave way, and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the royal road. The British regiment however lost many men and officers, and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops, coming from different points and rallying on Boyer’s battalions, were gathered on the ridges to the French left of the road.
The entrenched camp above Biriatu and the Bildox, had been meanwhile defended with success in front, but Freyre turned them with his right wing, which being opposed only by a single battalion soon won the Mandale mountain, and the French fell back from that quarter to the Calvaire d’Urogne and Jollimont. Reille thus beaten at the Croix des Bouquets, and his flanks turned, the left by the Spaniards on the Mandale, the right by the allies along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder along the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne. He passed through the village of Urogne and the British skirmishers at first entered it in pursuit, but they were beaten out again by the second brigade of Boyer’s division, for Soult now arrived with part of Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence and activity restored order and revived the courage of the troops at the moment when the retreat was degenerating into a flight.
Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about four hundred men, the allies did not lose more than six hundred of which half were Spaniards, so slight and easy had the skill of the general rendered this stupendous operation. But if the French commander penetrating Wellington’s design, and avoiding the surprize, had opposed all his troops, amounting with what Villatte could spare to sixteen thousand, instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the passage could scarcely have been forced; and a check would have been tantamount to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would have come with a swallowing flood upon the rear.
Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful were the French on the side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and constant.
At day-break Giron had descended from the Ivantelly rocks and general Alten from Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined by half of Longa’s force.
One brigade, consisting of the forty-third the seventeenth Portuguese regiment of the line and the first and third battalions of riflemen, drew up in column on an open space to the right of Vera. The other brigade under colonel Colborne, consisting of the fifty-second two battalions of Caçadores and a battalion of British riflemen, was disposed on the left of Vera. Half of Longa’s division was between these brigades, the other half after crossing the ford of Salinas drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains, and general Cole displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa Barbara presented a formidable reserve.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions in front of the allies. His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope descended to a small plain about two parts down the mountain. From this platform three distinct tongues shot into the valley below, each was defended by an advanced post, and the platform itself secured by a star redoubt, behind which, about half-way up the single slope, there was a second retrenchment with abbatis. Another large redoubt and an unfinished breast-work on the superior crest completed the system of defence for the Bayonette.
The Commissari, which is a continuation of the Bayonette towards the great Rhune, was covered by a profound gulf thickly wooded and defended with skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of the same nature the main road, leading from Vera over the Puerto, pierced the centre of the French position. Rugged and ascending with short abrupt turns this road was blocked at every uncovered point with abbatis and small retrenchments; each obstacle was commanded, at half musquet shot, by small detachments placed on all the projecting parts overlooking the ascent, and a regiment, entrenched above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonette and Commissari with those on the saddle-ridge, against which Giron’s attack was directed.
But between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was an isolated ridge called by the soldiers the Boar’s back, the summit of which, about half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf to cover the Puerto and saddle ridges, although of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, reached the allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying force of a musquet-ball. It was essential to take the Boar’s back before the general attack commenced, and five companies of British riflemen, supported by the seventeenth Portuguese regiment, were ordered to assail it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s Spaniards preceded by a detached company of the forty-third attacked it on the other.
[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.]
At four o’clock in the morning Clauzel had received intelligence that the Bayonette was to be assaulted that day or the next, and at seven o’clock he heard from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron’s camps were abandoned although the tents of the seventh division were still standing; at the same time the sound of musquetry was heard on the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then came Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops. To this last quarter Clauzel hurried. The Spaniards had already driven Conroux’s outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the great Rhune. He immediately ordered four regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy the summit the front and the flanks of that mountain, and he formed a reserve of two other regiments behind. With these troops he designed to secure the mountain and support Taupin, but ere they could reach their destination that general’s fate was decided.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
Second Combat of Vera.—Soon after seven o’clock a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were followed by the Spanish musquetry on the right, and the next moment the “Boars back” was simultaneously assailed at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of the way up and there rested, but soon resuming their movement with a scornful gallantry they swept the French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show that they were masters of the ridge. This was the signal for the general attack. The seventeenth Portuguese followed the victorious sharp-shooters, the forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers and by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged pass, Longa’s troops entered the gloomy wood of the ravine on the left, and beyond them Colborne’s brigade moving by narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed the Bayonette, the fifty-second took the middle tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen the two outermost and all bore with a concentric movement against the star redoubt on the platform above. Longa’s second brigade should have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement, but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve.
Soon the open slopes of the mountains were covered with men and with fire, a heavy confused sound of mingled shouts and musquetry filled the deep hollows between, and the white smoke came curling up above the dark forest trees which covered their gloomy recesses. The French compared with their assailants seemed few and scattered on the mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade soon forced its way without a check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, his skirmishers spreading wider and breaking into small detachments of support as the depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted into the higher ridges. When about half-way up an open platform gave a clear view over the Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa’s right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring and overmatched, but beyond, on the broad open space in front of the star fort, the Caçadores and riflemen of Colborne’s brigade, were seen coming out, in small bodies, from a forest which covered the three tongues of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, their pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt in a mass as if resolved to storm it. The fifty-second were not then in sight, and the French thinking from the dark clothing that all were Portuguese rushed in close order out of the entrenchment; they were numerous and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is overmatched by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries the French followed, but just then the fifty-second appeared, partly in line partly in column, on the platform, and raising their shout rushed forward. The red uniform and full career of this regiment startled the hitherto adventurous French, they stopped short, wavered, and then turning fled to their entrenchment; the fifty-second following hard entered the works with them, the riflemen and Caçadores who had meanwhile rallied passed it on both flanks, and for a few moments every thing was hidden by a dense volume of smoke. Soon however the British shout pealed again and the whole mass emerged on the other side, the French, now the fewer, flying the others pursuing, until the second entrenchment, half-way up the parent slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand.
The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s brigade now echoed along the mountain side, and with renewed vigour the men continued to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne after having carried the second entrenchment above the star fort, was brought to a check by the works on the very crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only plied his troops with musquetry at a great advantage, but rolled huge stones down the steep.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
These works were extensive well lined with men and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right, but the defenders soon faltered, for their left flank was turned by Kempt and the effects of lord Wellington’s skilful combinations were now felt in another quarter. Freyre’s Spaniards after carrying the Mandale mountain, between Biriatu and the Bayonette, had pushed to a road leading from the latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this was the line of retreat from the crest of the Bayonette for Taupin’s right wing; but Freyre’s Spaniards got there first, and if Longa’s brigade instead of slowly following Colborne had spread out widely on the left, a military line would have been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still Taupin’s right was cut off on that side, and he was forced to file it under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where he was joined by his centre. He effected this but lost his mountain battery and three hundred men. These last, apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the Bayonette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind and intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which they thinking themselves entirely cut off obeyed. Meanwhile the French skirmishers in the deep ravine, between the two lines of attack, being feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated too slowly and getting amongst some rocks from whence there was no escape surrendered to Kempt’s brigade.
The right and centre of Taupin’s division being now completely beaten fled down the side of the mountain towards Olette, they were pursued by a part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte’s reserve, which was in order of battle on a ridge extending across the gorge of Olette between Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette and Commissari, with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won after five hours’ incessant fighting and toiling up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune.
Giron after driving Conroux’s advanced post from the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre had, following his orders, pushed a battalion from that side towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack which Conroux might make. And when his left wing was rendered free to move by the capture of the “Boar’s back” he fought his way up abreast with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to his own right of the Puerto. There however he was arrested by a strong line of abbattis from behind which two French regiments poured a heavy fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice and they kept their ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There happened to be present an officer of the forty-third regiment named Havelock, who being attached to general Alten’s staff was sent to ascertain Giron’s progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abbattis and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for “El chico bianco” “the fair boy” so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French, and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera.
The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune, so that Clauzel had now eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the crest including the highest rock called the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one hand, and towards Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower and parallel crest behind called the small Rhune. In this situation they were attacked at four o’clock by Giron’s right wing. The Spaniards first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time to turn it by their right. In both objects they were defeated with loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French rolled down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. This day’s fighting cost Taupin’s division two generals and four hundred men killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which about five hundred were Spaniards, and the success was not complete, for while the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune the allies’ new position was insecure.
[Sidenote: Plan 6.]
The front and the right flank of that great mountain were impregnable, but lord Wellington observing that the left flank, descending towards Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards on that side on the 8th, designing a combined attack against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. At three o’clock in the afternoon the rocks which studded the lower parts of the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, and at the same time detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks covering the advanced French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians soon won the rocks and an entrenched height that commanded the camp, for Clauzel, too easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz in rear of his left, thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned not only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre still holding with their right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon made apparent. Wellington immediately established a strong body of the Spanish troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and the two French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and the fort of San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, and without orders abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage and retired in the night to the smaller Rhune. The next morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but they were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them.
The whole loss on the three days of fighting was about fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies, one half being Spaniards, but many of the wounded were not brought in until the third day after the actions, and several perished miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes. Some men were also lost from want of discipline; having descended into the French villages they got drunk and were taken the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who plundered in defiance of lord Wellington’s proclamation; for he thought it necessary to arrest and send to England several officers, and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he had five times as many men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding was prevented. It is remarkable that the French troops on the same day acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner, but Soult also checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during the action.
With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhoa, the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and surely the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands, and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised, and while they marched with this confident valour, it was observed that the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps with far less fierceness than, when, striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a general’s not a soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin’s and Maucune’s divisions were each less than five thousand strong, and they were separately assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen thousand men, and at neither point were Reille and Clauzel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence with the Minister of War, MSS.]
Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance; yet they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th and again on the night of the 6th. The passage of the river he said had commenced at seven o’clock, long after daylight, the allies’ masses were then clearly to be seen forming on the banks, and there was full time for Boyer’s division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. The battle was fought in disorder with less than five thousand men, instead of with ten thousand in good order, and supported by a part of Villatte’s reserve. To this negligence the generals added also discouragement. They had so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward before the marshal’s arrival from Espelette, they would have entered St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position and forced the French army back upon the Nive and the Adour.
This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a stroke did not belong to lord Wellington’s system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the position he had already gained, and he was averse to the experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an undecided aspect.
Chapter V
[Sidenote: 1813. October.]
[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]
Soult was apprehensive for some days that lord Wellington would push his offensive operations further, but when he knew by Foy’s reports, and by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right, that there was no design of attacking his left, he resumed his labours to advance the works covering St. Jean de Luz. He also kept a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness to concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clauzel to recover the fort of San Barbe. This work was constructed on a comparatively low ridge barring issue from the gorge leading out of the vale of Vera to Sarre, and it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish picquet of forty men. Some battalions were also encamped in a small wood close behind; but many officers and men slept in the fort, and on the night of the 12th, about eleven o’clock, three battalions of Conroux’s division reached the platform on which the fort stood without being perceived. The work was then escaladed, the troops behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards ashamed of the surprize made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight, they were repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions, but Clauzel brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments and the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded and San Barbe, too near the enemy’s position to be safely held, was resigned with a loss of two hundred men by the French and five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated action a French sloop freighted with stores for Santona attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and cut off from the open sea, her crew after exchanging a few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire and escaped in their boats to the Adour.
Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was organized in three grand divisions. The right having Mina’s and Morillo’s battalions attached to it was commanded by sir Rowland Hill, and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The centre occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune, and Bayonette mountains, was given to marshal Beresford. The left extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea was under sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña after sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular war, but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope with a patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie the friend and comrade of Moore offered to serve as second in command, and lord Wellington joyfully accepted him, observing that he was the “ablest officer in the army.”
The positions of the right and centre were offensive and menacing, but the left was still on the defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable at high water below the bridge, was close behind. However the ridges were strong, a powerful artillery was established on the right bank, field-works were constructed, and although the fords below Behobia furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water, those above were always available, and a pontoon bridge laid down for the passage of the guns during the action was a sure resource. The front was along the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes, and there was a reserve in an entrenched camp above Andaya. The right of the line rested on the Mandale, and from that mountain and the Bayonette the allies could descend upon the flank of an attacking army.
[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sect. 2.]
Soult had however no intention of renewing the offensive. He had now lost many thousand men in battle, and the old soldiers remaining did not exceed seventy-nine thousand present under arms including officers and artillery-men. Of this number the garrisons absorbed about thirteen thousand, leaving sixty-six thousand in the field, whereas the allies, counting Mina’s and Del Parque’s troops, now at Tudela, Pampeluna, and the Val de Irati, exceeded one hundred thousand, seventy-three thousand, including officers, sergeants, and artillery-men, being British and Portuguese. And this was below the calculation of the French general, for deceived by the exaggerated reports which the Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought Del Parque had brought up twenty thousand men and that there were one hundred and forty thousand combatants in his front. But it was not so, and as conscripts of a good description were now joining the French army rapidly, and the national guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the number of soldiers rather than of men, that the English general had the advantage.
In this state of affairs Soult’s policy was to maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in the rear organized, and the conscripts disciplined and hardened to war. The loss of the Lower Bidassoa was in a political view mischievous to him, it had an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement to the secret partizans of the Bourbons; but in a military view it was a relief. The great development of the mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult; while holding them he had continual fear that his line would be pierced and his army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. His position was now more concentrated.
[Sidenote: Plan 6.]
The right, under Reille, formed two lines. One across the royal road on the fortified heights of Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; the other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena, covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the gorges of Olhette and Jollimont.
The centre under Clauzel was posted on the ridges between Ascain and Amotz holding the smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was retained by Soult in the camp of Serres on the right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain. To replace it one of D’Erlon’s divisions crossed to the left of the Nivelle and reinforced Clauzel’s left flank above Sarre.
Villatte’s reserve was about St. Jean de Luz but having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres.
D’Erlon’s remaining divisions continued in their old position, the right connected with Clauzel’s line by the bridge of Amotz; the left, holding the Choupera and Mondarin mountains, bordered on the Nive.
Behind Clauzel and D’Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of entrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank of the Nivelle to San Pé, thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive, and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He had also called general Paris up from Oleron to the defence of the latter fortress and its entrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the Nive to Bidarray half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. There watching the issues from the Val de Baygorry he was ready to occupy the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or, moving by Cambo, to reinforce the great position on the left of that river according to circumstances.
To complete these immense entrenchments, which between the Nive and the sea were double and on an opening of sixteen miles, the whole army laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the country whether of materials or working men were called out by requisition. Nevertheless this defensive warfare was justly regarded by the duke of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of affairs. Offensive operations were most consonant to the character of the French soldiers, and to the exigencies of the time. Recent experience had shown the impregnable nature of the allies’ positions against a front attack, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre of operations. But when he looked at the strength of the armies appropriated by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought France would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had just proved his power at Ordal against lord William Bentinck, and that nobleman’s successor, with inferior rank and power, with an army unpaid and feeding on salt meat from the ships, with jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the Spanish generals, none of whom were willing to act cordially with him upon a fixed and well-considered plan, was in no condition to menace the French seriously. And that he was permitted at this important crisis to paralyze from fifty to sixty thousand excellent French troops possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most singular errors of the war.
[Sidenote: Appendix 8, sect. 2.]
Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line, disposed along the whole frontier to guard the passes of the Pyrenees against sudden marauding excursions, the French armies counted at this time about one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventeen thousand horses. Of these one hundred and thirty-eight thousand were present under arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march to join them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon Navarre and Guipuscoa, and they could unite behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort in safety. Lord Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and all the Spaniards in arms on the eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands, and to unite his forces at any point required great dispositions to avoid an attack during a flank march. Suchet had above thirty thousand disposable men, he could increase them to forty thousand by relinquishing some unimportant posts, his means in artillery were immense, and distributed in all his strong places, so that he could furnish himself from almost any point. It is no exaggeration therefore to say that two hundred pieces of artillery and ninety thousand old soldiers might have united at this period upon the flank of lord Wellington, still leaving thirty thousand conscripts and the national guards of the frontier, supported by the fortresses and entrenched camps of Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, the castles of Navarens and Jaca on one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses in Catalonia on the other, to cover France from invasion.
To make this great power bear in a right direction was the duke of Dalmatia’s object, and his plans were large, and worthy of his reputation. Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects, and that marshal’s resistance would appear to have sprung from personal dislike contracted during Soult’s sojourn near Valencia in 1812. It has been already shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon and confined himself to Catalonia after quitting Valencia. He did not indeed then know that Soult had assumed the command of the army of Spain and was preparing for his great effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he was aware that Clauzel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and he was too good a general not to know that operating on the allies’ flank was the best mode of palliating the defeat of Vittoria. He might have saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza; the guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery equipment were deposited there, and from thence, by Jaca, he could have opened a sure and short communication with Soult, obtained information of that general’s projects, and saved Pampeluna.
It may be asked why the duke of Dalmatia did not endeavour to communicate with Suchet. The reason was simple. The former quitted Dresden suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on the 20th his troops were in full march towards St. Jean Pied de Port, and it was during this very rapid journey that the other marshal abandoned Valencia. Soult therefore knew neither Suchet’s plans nor the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his actual position, and there was no time to wait for accurate information. However between the 6th and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately after his own retreat from Sauroren, he earnestly prayed that the army of Aragon should march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington’s forces facilitate the efforts of the army of Spain to relieve San Sebastian. In this communication he stated, that his recent operations had caused troops actually in march under general Hill towards Catalonia to be recalled. This was an error. His emissaries were deceived by the movements, and counter-movements in pursuit of Clauzel immediately after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington’s plans as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia, but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham, and the Conde de La Bispal were all mentioned, in this correspondence between Soult and Suchet, as being actually in Catalonia, or on the march, the three first having been really sounded as to taking the command in that quarter, and the last having demanded it himself.
Suchet treated Soult’s proposal as chimerical. His movable troops he said did not exceed eleven thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen, unless he could fly into France by Venasque where he had a garrison. An extraordinary view of affairs which he supported by statements still more extraordinary!
“General Hill had joined lord William Bentinck with twenty-four thousand men.” “La Bispal had arrived with fifteen thousand.” “There were more than two hundred thousand men on the Ebro.” “The Spanish insurrection was general and strongly organized.” “He had recovered the garrison of Taragona and destroyed the works, and he must revictual Barcelona and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona and remain on the defensive”!
[Sidenote: Appendix 8, Sect. 2.]
This letter was written on the 23d of August, when lord William Bentinck had just retreated from the Gaya into the mountains above Hospitalet. The imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command, exceeded sixty-five thousand men, fifty-six thousand being present under arms. Thirty thousand were united in the field when he received Soult’s letter. There was nothing to prevent him marching upon Tortoza, except lord William Bentinck’s army which had just acknowledged by a retreat its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to prevent him marching to Lerida. The count of Bispal had thrown up his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the Echallar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at Roncesvalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington’s army. Elio and Roche were near Valencia in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian troops only fourteen thousand strong including Whittingham’s division, were on the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could remain; Del Parque’s troops and Sarzfield’s division had gone over the Ebro, and Copons’ Catalans had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera. In fine not two hundred thousand but less than thirty-five thousand men, half-organized ill-fed and scattered from Vich to Vinaros were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians could not abandon the coast, Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del Parque’s troops soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use lord Wellington’s phrase there was nothing to prevent Suchet “tumbling lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar.” The true nature of the great insurrection which the French general pretended to dread shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of.
Suchet’s errors respecting the allies were easily detected by Soult, those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of resource he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812 after the battle of Salamanca, namely, to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession if the French armies remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive operations successful was a general concentration of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree, issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction with the depôts of the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men. Ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation about Gerona. The armies of Aragon and Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some posts produce twenty thousand infantry in the field. The imperial muster-rolls prove that they could have produced forty thousand, but Soult misled by Suchet’s erroneous statements assumed only twenty thousand, and he calculated that he could himself bring thirty-five or forty thousand good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to be directed on that place, and thus seventy or seventy-five thousand infantry all the cavalry of both armies and one hundred guns, would be suddenly assembled, to thread the narrow pass of Jaca and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom they could attack the allied troops in Navarre if the latter were dispersed, and if they were united retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile the fifteen thousand unappropriated conscripts might reinforce the twenty or twenty-five thousand old soldiers left to cover Bayonne.
An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon would, Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, Fraga, and Monzon, the two last being now menaced by the bands, and it was probable that Tortoza and even Saguntum would be relieved. The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca, yet he was resolved to try, even though he should convey them upon trucks to be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious inconvenience from the union of the troops in France since Suchet had already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute the entrenched line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from thence it could take a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at Cambo and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursouia with St. Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear for this secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon. That which he most dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca.
This proposition written the 2d of September, immediately after the battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th and was peremptorily rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia discouragement, he said, would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately invaded by lord William Bentinck at the head of fifty thousand men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable and the power of man could not open it for carriages under a year’s labour. His wish was to act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely necessary, he offered a counter-project; that is, he would first make the English in his front re-embark at Taragona, or he would drive them over the Ebro and then march with one hundred guns and thirty thousand men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza. Soult’s army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect this he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris’s division and the artillery-men and draft horses of Soult’s army sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then touching upon the difficulties of the road from Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far less dangerous than Soult’s, yet he enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed. In fine, he continued, “The French armies are entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain, to act between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of Spain sixty thousand strong and that of Aragon thirty thousand strong operate on the flanks. Thus the reputation of the English army, too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated.”
This illiberal remark combined with the defects of his project, proves that the duke of Albufera was far below the duke of Dalmatia’s standard both in magnanimity and in capacity. The one giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other, with an unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers.
Soult’s letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan he should have driven lord William Bentinck over the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his former letters he had estimated the enemies in his front at two hundred thousand fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable force was only eleven thousand, giving that as a reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections and estimates, he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as madness when suggested by the duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of his arguments relative to the general discouragement, the desertion of his soldiers, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he adopted Soult’s plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen on the supposition that he was retreating from weakness, a notion which would have effectually covered the real design until the great movement in advance should change the public opinion. Soult’s plan was surer better imagined and grander than his; it was less dangerous in the event of failure and more conformable to military principles. Suchet’s project involved double lines of operation without any sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just co-operation; his point of junction was within the enemy’s power, and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery. There was no solidity in this design; a failure would have left no resource. But in Soult’s project the armies were to be united at a point beyond the enemy’s reach, and to operate afterwards in mass with all arms complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet indeed averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet Soult’s counter-opinion claims more respect. Clauzel and Paris who had lately passed with troops through that defile were in his camp, he had besides made very exact inquiries of the country people, had caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty to be not insurmountable.
Neither the inconsistency, nor the exaggerations of Suchet’s statements, escaped Soult’s observation, but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted operations in the mountains he frankly accepted the other’s modification, and adopted every stipulation, save that of sending the artillery-men and horses of his army to Catalonia which he considered dangerous. Moreover he doubted not to pass his own guns by Jaca. The preparations for this great movement were therefore immediately commenced, and Suchet on his part seemed equally earnest although he complained of increasing difficulties, pretended that Longa’s and Morillo’s divisions had arrived in Catalonia, that general Graham was also in march with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss of Fraga from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison. This post commanded indeed a bridge over the Cinca a river lying in his way and dangerous from its sudden and great floods but he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.
During this correspondence between the French marshals, Napoleon remained silent, yet at a later period he expressed his discontent at Suchet’s inactivity, and indirectly approved of Soult’s plans by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza which Suchet however did not execute. It would appear that the emperor having given all the reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to act as they judged fitting for his service, would not, at a distance and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution essential to success was not to be expected if either marshal acted under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet’s modification and it would have been unwise to substitute a new plan which would have probably displeased both commanders. Meanwhile Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet’s project was annulled by the approach of winter and by the further operations of the allies.
If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro or fight a great battle with an army much less strongly constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory would have profited him little, because his enemy strong in cavalry could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he received a check he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre, and Valencia. It is not probable however that such a great operation could have been conducted without being discovered in time by Wellington. It has been already indicated in this History, that besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence employed by all generals, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph’s courtiers, and even amongst French officers of rank; and it has been shown that Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him on the 31st of August when the combinations were only two days old. It is true that the retreat of Suchet from Catalonia and his junction with Soult in France at the moment when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to the belief that it was a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless the secret must have been known to more than one person about each marshal, and the English general certainly had agents who were little suspected. Soult would however still have had the power of returning to his old positions, and, with his numbers increased by Suchet’s troops, could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles. It might be that his secret design was thus to involve that marshal in his operations, and being disappointed he was not very eager to adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the approach of the bad season, and the menacing position of Wellington, rendered each day less promising. His own project was hardy, and dangerous for the allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington’s profound acquaintance with his art. For he had entered France only in compliance with the wishes of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for Suchet, averring that the true military line of operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now however actually established in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn for the allies, he resolved to continue the operations on his actual front awaiting only the
FALL OF PAMPELUNA.
[Sidenote: September.]
This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian yet very honourable to the firmness of the governor general Cassan.
The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold table-land on which a number of valleys opened, and where the great roads, coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, Estella, Vittoria, and Irurzun, were concentrated. The northern and eastern fronts of the fortress were covered by the Arga, and the defences there consisted of simple walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river, but the other fronts were regularly fortified with ditches, covered way, and half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks were constructed on the south front, but the citadel which stood on the south west was a regular pentagon, with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system of mines.
Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the action, the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army increased the garrison to something more than three thousand five hundred men of all arms, who were immediately invested by the allies. Many of the inhabitants went off during the short interval between the king’s arrival and departure, and general Cassan, finding his troops too few for action and yet too many for the food, abandoned the two outworks on the south, demolished everything which could interfere with his defence outside, and commenced such works as he deemed necessary to improve it inside. Moreover foreseeing that the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns to succour the garrison, he prepared a field-train of forty pieces to meet the occasion.
[Sidenote: July.]
It has been already shown that Wellington, although at first inclined to besiege Pampeluna, finally established a blockade and ordered works of contravallation to be constructed. Cassan’s chief object was then to obtain provisions, and on the 28th and 30th of June he sustained actions outside the place to cover his foragers. On the 1st of July he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders’ works were completed. Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the French always seeking to gather the grain, and vegetables which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls, and the allies endeavouring to set fire to the standing corn within range of the guns of the fortress.
On the 14th of July, O’Donnel’s Andalusians were permanently established as the blockading force, and the next day the garrison made a successful forage on the south side of the town. This operation was repeated towards the east beyond the Arga on the 19th, when a sharp engagement of cavalry took place, during which the remainder of the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.
The 26th the sound of Soult’s artillery reached the place, and Cassan, judging rightly that the marshal was in march to succour Pampeluna, made a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he was driven back, but the next morning he came out again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back with the third and fourth divisions. Then O’Donnel, as I have before related, evacuated some of the entrenchments, destroyed a great deal of ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for the timely arrival of Carlos D’España’s division, and the stand made by Picton at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.
Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, the smoke rose over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage of the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction by Berioplano along the road of Irurzun. The garrison thought deliverance sure, and having reaped a good harvest withdrew into the place. The bivouac fires of the French army cheered them during the night, and the next morning a fresh sally being made with the greatest confidence, a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of men. Several deserters from the foreign regiments in the English service also came over with intelligence exaggerated and coloured after the manner of such men, and the French re-entered the place elated with hope; but in the evening the sound of the conflict ceased and the silence of the next day shewed that the battle was not to the advantage of Soult. However the governor losing no time made another sally and again obtained provisions from the south side.
The 30th the battle recommenced but the retreating fire of the French told how the conflict was decided and the spirit of the soldiers fell. Nevertheless their indefatigable officers led another sally on the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks.
[Sidenote: September.]
On the 31st Carlos D’España’s troops and two thousand of O’Donnel’s Andalusians, in all about seven thousand men, resumed the blockade, and maintained it until the middle of September, when the Prince of Anglona’s division of Del Parque’s army, relieved the Andalusians who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies’ works of contravallation were now augmented, and when Paris retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina’s troops occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguessa to Pampeluna and made entrenchments to bar the escape of the garrison that way.
In October Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each, with some rice, and he turned more families out of the town, but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen and forced to re-enter.
On the 9th of September baron Maucune, who had conducted most of the sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses on the east side of the place; he was immediately assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba. Carlos D’España then advanced to their aid in person with a greater body and the French were driven in with the loss of eighty men, yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, Carlos D’España himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn which was their principal object.
[Sidenote: October.]
The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals; seeking also for roots beyond the walls many in their hunger poisoned themselves with hemlock, and a number of others unable to bear their misery deserted. In this state Cassan made a general sally on the 10th of October, to ascertain the strength of the lines around him, with a view to breaking through, but after some fighting, his troops were driven in with the loss of seventy men and all hope of escape vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in which he increased the mines under the citadel induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and to bring up his cavalry into the vicinity of Pampeluna.
The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand men were sick, eight hundred had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, and the governor moved by the great misery, offered on the 26th to surrender if he was allowed to retire into France with his troops and six pieces of cannon. This being refused he proposed to yield on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which being also denied, he broke off the negociation, giving out that he would blow up the works of the fortress and break through the blockade. To deter him a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and lord Wellington being informed of his design denounced it as contrary to the laws of war, and directed Carlos D’España to put him, all his officers and non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the soldiers to death when the place should be taken if any damage were done to the works.
Cassan’s object being merely to obtain better terms this order remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna and break through the blockading force, as Brennier did at Almeida, would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one for the French army if Soult’s plan of changing the theatre of war by descending into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature. On the other hand if the governor, having no chance whatever of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great fortress belonging to the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors might have justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But lord Wellington’s letter to D’España involved another question, namely the putting of prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured, and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter of which they dared not judge. This would have been quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations, and the threat must undoubtedly be considered only as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to avoid the odium of refusing quarter.
A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than four months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. This compliment was honourable to both sides, but there was another article, enforced by D’España without being accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to assign any motive but the vindictive ferocity of the Spanish character. No person of either sex was permitted to follow the French troops, and women’s affections were thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword.
There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of Spain except Santona, and as the blockade of that place had been exceedingly tedious, lord Wellington, whose sea communications were interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British corps under lord Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which being on the opposite point of the harbour to Santona commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances however prevented this body from proceeding to its destination and Santona remained in the enemy’s possession. With this exception the contest in the northern parts of Spain was terminated and the south of France was now to be invaded; but it is fitting first to show with what great political labour Wellington brought the war to this state, what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a faithless alliance, and what vile governments his dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.
Chapter VI
[Sidenote: 1813.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Political state of Portugal. In this country the national jealousy which had been compressed by the force of invasion expanded again with violence as danger receded, and the influence of England sunk precisely in the measure that her army assured the safety of Portugal. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always opposed in the council to the British policy, became elate; and those members of the government who had hitherto cherished the British ascendancy because it sustained them against the Brazilian court intrigues, now sought popularity by taking an opposite direction. Each person of the regency had his own line of opposition marked out. Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial operations; the Principal Souza wrangled more fiercely and insolently at the council-board; the Patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious to command the national troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters. The return of the prince-regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of paying the subsidy, the means of military transport, the convention with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that country, the recruiting, the organization, the command of the national army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions for factious proceedings, which were conducted with the ignoble subtlety that invariably characterizes the politics of the Peninsula. Moreover the expenditure of the British army had been immense, the trade and commerce dependent upon it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous. Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes carelessly or partially enforced were vexatious to the people without being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued from duties upon British trade, and the sudden cessation of markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled all classes, and the whole nation was ready to shake off the burthen of gratitude.
In this state of feeling emissaries were employed to promulgate in various directions tales, some true some false, of the disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of communication, adding that they were the result of secret orders from Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! At the same time discourses and writings against the British influence abounded in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose statements overflowing of falsehood could be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted that England intending to retain her power in Portugal opposed the return of the prince-regent; that the war itself being removed to the frontier of France was become wholly a Spanish cause; that it was not for Portugal to levy troops, and exhaust her resources to help a nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to resist.
Mr. Stuart’s diplomatic intercourse with the government always difficult was now a continual remonstrance and dispute; his complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal violence against the persons and property of British subjects was pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months because he had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English factory were invaded, and the Oporto company which had been established as its rival in violation of treaty was openly cherished. Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed every body, and the prince-regent promising either to reform or totally abolish it ordered a preparatory investigation, but to use the words of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted on the occasion no less unfairly by their sovereign than unjustly by their ally.
Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain taxes, and from billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted, and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount. The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property, imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army. Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy the amount of the property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The regency then commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of commerce, and the prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty generally were arranged. Funchal who disliked to quit London took care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in other negociations then depending.
When the battle of Vittoria became known, the regency proposed to entreat the return of the prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their expectations, approved of the proposal they deferred the execution. The British cabinet which had long neglected Wellington’s suggestions on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and Funchal who had been at first averse now urged it warmly, fearing that if the prince remained he could no longer defer going to the Brazils. However few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal family, and when the thing was proposed to the regent he discovered no inclination for the voyage.
But the most important subject of discord was the army. The absence of the sovereign and the intrigues which ruled the court of Rio Janeiro had virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed for mischief. The whole course of this history has shewn that all Wellington’s energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England’s power and riches, were scarcely sufficient to meet the evils flowing from this foul source. Even while the French armies were menacing the capital the regency was split into factions, the financial resources were neglected or wasted, the public servants were insolent incapable and corrupt, the poorer people oppressed, and the military force for want of sustenance was at the end of 1812 on the point of dissolving together. The strenuous interference of the English general and envoy, seconded by the extraordinary exertions of the British officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of 1813 the spirit of the troops was surpassing. Even the militia-men, who had been deprived of their colours and drafted into the line to punish their bad conduct at Guarda under general Trant in 1812, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]
But this state of affairs acting upon the naturally sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and marshal Beresford complained that full justice had not been done to their merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament and in the despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as wormwood.
Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the subsistence of the army altogether; and at the same time so many obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that the depôts, which ought to have furnished twelve thousand men to replace the losses sustained in the campaign, only contained four thousand, who were also without the means of taking the field. This matter became so serious that Beresford quitting the army in October came to Lisbon, to propose a new regulation which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the nobles the clergy and the English merchants for their servants and followers. On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent at the political position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said, generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by British officers, and having no distinct recognized existence their services were unnoticed and the glory of the country suffered. The world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war. It was known indeed that there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was known that there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national army nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers, and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British parliament. He proposed therefore to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct army acting under lord Wellington.
It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British divisions were fed by the British commissariat the cost being deducted from the subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that they could feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money, but Beresford referred him to his scanty means of transport, so scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded. Foiled on this point Forjas proposed gradually to withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate them with the unattached brigades of native troops and so form an auxiliary corps; but the same objection of transport still applied and this matter dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army, but the islands, which ought to have given three hundred men yearly, were exempt from their controul, and the governors supported by the prince-regent refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions, and even granted asylums to all those who wished to avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also the persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington had released those at Lisbon.
Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion was seized by Forjas to renew his complaints and his proposition for a separate army which he designed to command himself. General Sylveira’s claim to that honour was however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction he belonged, and the only matter in which all agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Lord Wellington became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing could be more different from a debate within the house than the representation of it in the newspapers. The latter seldom stated an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their observations branched out so far from the text, that they appeared absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood high and was rising daily. “Mr. Forjas is,” said lord Wellington, “the ablest man of business I have met with in the Peninsula, it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to alter a successful military system. I understand something of the organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that separated from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in a good state although their government were to incur ten times the expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting state for the field they can gain no honour, they must suffer dishonour! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes of disagreement with the Portuguese I will quit the Peninsula for ever”!
This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied officially.
“The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations since the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid peace, she did not expect increase of territory, nor any advantage save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which, unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with Spain. The English prince-regent his ministers and his generals, had rendered full justice to her military services in the official reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe. Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by Marshal Beresford, Marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits, and with as much form and solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards the Spanish army. The more so that the Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese officers. Nevertheless such grave objections being advanced they were willing, he said, to drop the matter altogether.”
The discontent however remained, for the argument had weight, and if any native officers’ reputation had been sufficient to make the proceeding plausible, the British officers would have been driven from the Portuguese service, the armies separated, and both ruined. As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to succeed; from fear not from reason. The persons who pretended to the command were Forjas and Sylveira; but the English officers who were as yet well-liked by the troops, would not have served under the former, and Wellington objected strongly to the latter, having by experience discovered that he was an incapable officer seeking a base and pernicious popularity by encouraging the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked in favour of the troops. But the most effectual check to the project of the regency was the significant intimation of Mr. Stuart, that England, being bound by no conditions in the payment of the subsidy, had a right if it was not applied in the manner most agreeable to her, to withdraw it altogether.
To have this subsidy in specie and to supply their own troops continued to be the cry of the regency, until their inability to effect the latter became at last so apparent that they gave the matter up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man ever to have supposed, that the badly organized administration of Portugal, was capable of supporting an efficient army in the field five hundred miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the British influence if possible without losing the subsidy. For the honour of the army or the welfare of the soldiers neither the regency nor the prince himself had any care. While the former were thus disputing for the command, they suffered their subordinates to ruin an establishment at Ruña, the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the prince while he lavished honours upon the dependents and creatures of his court at Rio Janeiro, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the list, amongst the menial servants of the palace who were decorated with the same ribands! Honour, justice, humanity, were alike despised by the ruling men and lord Wellington thus expressed his strong disgust.
“The British army which I have the honour to command has met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services, every thing that could be done has been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal”!
Such were the relations of the Portuguese government with England, and with Spain they were not more friendly. Seven envoys from that country had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years. The Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic opinions which had obtained ground in Spain, and the leading party in the Cortez were intent to spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula. The only bond of sympathy between the two governments was hatred of the English who had saved both. On all other points they differed. The exiled bishop of Orense, from his asylum on the frontier of Portugal, excited the Gallicians against the Cortez so vigorously, that his expulsion from Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern frontier, was specially demanded by the Spanish minister; but though a long and angry discussion followed the bishop was only civilly requested by the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter then demanded that he should be delivered up as a delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a decree of the Cortez which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen and denaturalized him. However he was removed twenty leagues from the frontier, nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free from ecclesiastic troubles. The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines which were offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was confined but soon released and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him, which only increased his followers and extended the influence of his doctrines.
Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of 1813, and as lord Wellington thought with no good intent, to reside at Fregenal. The Portuguese regency, fearing that he would rally round him other discontented persons, set agents to watch his proceedings, and under pretence of putting down robbers who abounded on that frontier, established a line of cavalry and called out the militia, thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to kindle a war between the two countries.
Political state of Spain. Lord Wellington’s victories had put an end to the intercourse between Joseph and the Spaniards who desired to make terms with the French; but those people not losing hope, formed a strong anti-English party and watched to profit by the disputes between the two great factions at Cadiz, which had now become most rancorous and dangerous to the common cause. The serviles extremely bigoted both in religion and politics had the whole body of the clergy on their side. They were the most numerous in the Cortez and their views were generally in accord with the feelings of the people beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines were comprised in two sentences—An absolute king, An intolerant church. The liberals supported and instigated by all ardent innovators, by the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partizans beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the revolutionary writings of the French philosophers were hastening onwards to a democracy, without regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without practical ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a fourth faction in the Cortez, formed by the American deputies, who were secretly labouring for the independence of the colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, as it suited their purposes, and thus often produced anomalous results, because they were numerous enough to turn the scale in favour of the side which they espoused. Jealousy of England was however common to all, and “Inglesismo” was used as a term of contempt. Posterity will scarcely believe, that when lord Wellington was commencing the campaign of 1813 the Cortez was with difficulty, and by threats rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress. Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself where they held their sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, had been retaken for them by British valour; English money had restored their broken walls and replenished their exhausted magazines; English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their ramparts; but the men from whose veins that blood had flowed, were to be denied entrance at gates which they could not approach, without treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the insult.
The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, who had in Gallicia openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition and excited the people to resistance, was an object of prominent interest with an active section of the liberals called the Jacobins. And this section generally ruled the Cortez, because the Americanos leaned strongly towards their doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English, or French party, was to produce dissensions which could be best effected by supporting the most violent public men. A fierce and obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to submit for the time, but not until the dispute became so serious that lord Wellington when in the Pyrenees expected a civil war on his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would take part with the French. This notion which gives his measure for the patriotism of both parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had somewhat warped his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he imagined, the clergy of Gallicia, meeting with no solid support, submitted to the Cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to Portugal.
Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring of the English tories’ policy. Napoleon was warred against, not as they pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because he was the powerful and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges. The happiness and independence of the Peninsula were words without meaning in their state-papers and speeches, and their anger and mortification were extreme when they found success against the emperor had fostered that democracy it was their object to destroy. They were indeed only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity of their general, from interfering with the internal government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture wherein the Spaniards would have had all appearance of justice, must have ensued. This folly was however stifled by Wellington, who desired to wait until the blow could be given with some effect, and he was quite willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the Cortez, and that of the executive government which acted under its controul, was so injurious to Spain and to his military operations, and so unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortez and perfectly acquainted with the subject.
[Sidenote: Original Letter, MSS.]
Speaking of the “Afrancesados” or French party, more numerous than was supposed and active to increase their numbers, he says, “The thing which they most enforced and which made most progress was the diminution of the English influence.” Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the Spanish constitution having brought the king’s authority under that of the Cortez was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers of England, were resolved that the Spanish constitution should not stand. To the Americans they observed that lord Wellington opposed them, because he did not help them and permitted expeditions to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they did not join their forces with Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots of all parties they said, that every concession to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers turn the army against the country and thus render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations were effectual because they flattered the national pride, as proving that the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves without the aid of foreigners. Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those victories came and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but many of their arguments were too well founded to be stifled with their party.
The change of government which had place in the beginning of the year, gave hope that the democratic violence of the Cortez would decline under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had married without the consent of the king, was from age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new regency became therefore more the slaves of the Cortez than their predecessors, and the Cadiz editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in falsehood and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled European brotherhood, being the champions of the Jacobins directed the populace of that city as they pleased. And always the serviles yielded under the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the commencement of the contest that murder was patriotism, and now their spirit sunk and quailed, because at every step to use the terribly significant expression of Wellington, “The ghost of Solano was staring them in the face.”
The principal points of the Jacobins’ policy in support of their crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation from the Deity, were, 1º. The abolition of the Inquisition, the arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, and the consequent warfare with the clergy. 2º. The putting aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. 3º. The appointment of captain-generals and other officers to suit their factious purposes. 4º. The obtaining of money for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of the armies. 5º. The control of the elections for a new Cortez so as to procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or to prevent its assembling at the legal period in October.
The matter of the bishops as we have seen nearly involved them in a national war with Portugal, and a civil war with Gallicia. The affair of the princess was less serious, but she had never ceased intriguing, and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British ministers and general while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather favoured by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the spread of democracy. Lord Wellington however still held aloof, observing that if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a slave to the Cortez than her predecessors, and England would have the discredit of giving power to the “worst woman in existence.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2.]
To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz populace was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party, and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the general Cortez in September, had apparently given the executive government some freedom of action, and seemed to furnish a favourable opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal. The regency, dreading the epidemic, suddenly resolved to proceed to Madrid, telling sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. They had secretly formed this resolution at night and proposed to commence the journey next day, but a disturbance arose in the city and the alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary Cortez; the ministers were immediately called before it and bending in fear before their masters, declared with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting the Cortez. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently to shield the regents, recommended that they should remove to Port St. Mary.
This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortez should be installed, and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of the first deputation, that the speech of Arguelles on presenting it was hissed from the galleries, although he was the most popular and eloquent member of the Cortez. The more moderate liberals thus discovered that they were equally with the serviles the slaves of the newspaper writers. Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom, though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington when he declared, that wherever the Cortez and government should fix themselves the press would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or Madrid, would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2.]
The composition of the new Cortez was naturally an object of hope and fear to all factions, and the result being uncertain, the existing assembly took such measures to prolong its own power that it was expected two Cortez would be established, the one at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However the new body after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November, and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For the general belief being, that no person could take the sickness twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from former visitations, the merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring that there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving the port, and endeavoured by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortez in the city.
An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced, form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution, and it is only the effect upon the military operations which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated evil, but it must be observed that this did not necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases alike, the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious politicians.
It has been shewn in a former volume, that one Spanish regency contracted an engagement with lord Wellington on the faith of which he took the command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously adhered to by him, but systematically violated by the new regency and minister of war, almost as soon as it was concluded. His recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, captain-general of Gallicia, Estremadura, and Castile, was disgracefully removed from his government under pretence of calling him to assist in the council of state. His nephew general Giron was at the same time deprived of his command over the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños had been largely commended for their conduct by lord Wellington. General Frere, appointed captain-general of Castile and Estremadura, succeeded Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Gallicia, chosen, it was believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom. Nor was the sagacity of that faction at fault, for Castaños would, according to lord Wellington, have turned his arms against the Cortez if an opportunity had offered. He and others were now menaced with death, and the Cortez contemplated an attack upon the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the grandees. All except the last very fitting to do if the times and circumstances had been favourable for a peaceful arrangement; but most insane when the nation generally was averse, and there was an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn. The clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were dissatisfied, and menacing in their communications with the superior civil authorities, the soldiers were starving and the people tired of their miseries only desired to get rid of the invaders, and to avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery was totally without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand if the French could have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain itself; and the following passages, from Wellington’s letters to the ministers, prove, that even he contemplated a forcible change in the government and constitution.
“If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them.”—“It is quite impossible such a system can last. What I regret is that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am much mistaken if O’Donnel and even Castaños, and probably others are not equally ready. If the king should return he also will overturn the whole fabric if he has any spirit.”—“I wish you would let me know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy the government would approve of my doing it.” And in another letter he seriously treated the question of withdrawing from the contest altogether. “The government were the best judges,” he said, “of whether they could or ought to withdraw,” but he did not believe that Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with England, if the republican system was not put down. Meanwhile he recommended to the English government and to his brother, to take no part either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance the democratical principles and measures of the Cortez, and if their opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new regency, to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged all power with the Cortez, and to give instead, some authority to the executive government whether in the hands of king or regent. To fill the latter office one of royal blood uniting the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity should he thought be selected, but if capacity was wanting in the royal race then to choose the Spaniard who was most deserving in the public estimation! Thus necessity teaches privilege to bend before merit.
[Sidenote: Letter to the Spanish minister of war, 30th Aug. 1813.]
The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period about one hundred and sixty thousand men. Of this number not more than fifty thousand were available for operations in the field, and those only because they were paid clothed and armed by England, and kept together by the ability and vigour of the English general. He had proposed when at Cadiz an arrangement for the civil and political government of the provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the armies, but his plan was rejected and his repeated representations of the misery the army and the people endured under the system of the Spanish government were unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the support of each army, yet, with a jealous fear of military domination, the government refused the captain-generals of those districts the necessary powers to draw forth the resources of the country, powers which lord Wellington recommended that they should have, and wanting which the whole system was sure to become a nullity. Each branch of administration was thus conducted by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each too restricted in authority, generally at variance with one another, and all of them neglectful of their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was thus described by the English general as early as August.
“More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of money spent by the contending armies are circulating every where, and yet your armies however weak in numbers are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese armies under my command have been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned to inform your excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies in order to enable them to remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding this assistance I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts, obliged to plunder the nut and apple-trees for subsistence, and to know that the Spanish troops, employed in the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system then is insufficient to procure supplies for the army and at the same time I assure your excellency that it is the most oppressive and injurious to the country that could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary for its defence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant, and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary for its defence.”
These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants, and to their overwhelming numbers, that certain sign of an unprosperous state; to the disgraceful negligence and disregard of public duties, and to there being no power in the country for enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue cost in several branches seventy and eighty per cent. Meanwhile no Spanish officers capable of commanding a large body of troops or keeping it in an efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, no system of military administration had been formed, and no shame for these deficiencies, no exertions to amend were visible.
From this picture two conclusions are to be drawn, 1º. that the provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having been for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was represented. 2º. That Spain, being now towards the end as helpless as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite unequal to her own deliverance either by arms or policy; that it was English valour English steel, directed by the genius of an English general, which rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented by his own or the peninsular governments or by the perversity of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, that now, at the end of six years’ war, lord Wellington declared thirty thousand of their troops could not be trusted to act separately; they were only useful when mixed in the line with larger numbers of other nations. And yet all men in authority to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous as arrogant and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be rendered callous to public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless of the consequences of their actions and never suffered prudential considerations or national honour to check the execution of any project. The generals from repeated failures had become insensible to misfortunes, and without any remarkable display of personal daring, were always ready to deliver battle on slight occasions, as if that were a common matter instead of being the great event of war.
The government agents were corrupt, and the government itself was as it had ever been tyrannical faithless mean and equivocating to the lowest degree. In 1812 a Spaniard of known and active patriotism thus commenced an elaborate plan of defence for the provinces. “Catalonia abhors France as her oppressor but she abhors still more the despotism which has been carried on in all the branches of her administration since the beginning of the war.” In fine there was no healthy action in any part of the body politic, every thing was rotten except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at Cadiz Spanish writers compared the state to a vessel in a hurricane without captain, pilot, compass, chart sails or rudder, and advised the crew to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they only blasphemed.
When Wellington, indignant at the systematic breach of his engagement, remonstrated, he was answered that the actual regency did not hold itself bound by the contracts of the former government. Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for they had themselves also accepted the contract, nor of honest policy, nor the usages of civilized states with respect to national faith, had any influence on their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge, he was yet conscious how essential it was he should retain his command. And seeing all Spanish generals more or less engaged in political intrigues, none capable of co-operating with him, and that no Spanish army could possibly subsist as a military body under the neglect and bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious also that public opinion in Spain would, better than the menaces of the English government, enable him to obtain a counterpoise to the democratic party, he tendered indeed his resignation if the government engagement was not fulfilled, but earnestly endeavoured by a due mixture of mildness argument and reproof to reduce the ruling authorities to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told them, limits to his forbearance to his submission under injury, and he had been already most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish government.
From the world these quarrels were covered by an appearance of the utmost respect and honour. He was made a grandee of the first class, and the estate of Soto de Roma in Grenada, of which the much-maligned and miserable Prince of Peace had been despoiled, was settled upon him. He accepted the gift, but, as he had before done with his Portuguese and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to the public treasury during the war. The regents however, under the pressure of the Jacobins, and apparently bearing some personal enmity, although one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring him the command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him from it; and the excesses committed at San Sebastian served their factious writers as a topic for exciting the people not only to demand his resignation, but to commence a warfare of assassination against the British soldiers. Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness, they pretended amongst other absurdities that the nobility had offered, if he would change his religion, to make him king of Spain. This tale was eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and three Spanish grandees thought it necessary to declare that they were not among the nobles who made the proposition. His resignation was accepted in the latter end of September, and he held the command only until the assembling of the new Cortez, but the attempt to render him odious failed even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal ascendancy which all great minds so surely attain over the masses in troubled times. Both the people and the soldiers respected him more than they did their own government, and the Spanish officers had generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes before he was appointed generalissimo, as they did to his orders when holding that high office. It was this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little were the English ministers capable of appreciating its importance, that after the battle of Vittoria they entertained the design of removing him from Spain to take part in the German operations. His answer was short and modest, but full of wisdom.
“Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can both here and in Germany, but nobody would enjoy the same advantages here, and I should be no better than another in Germany.”
The egregious folly which dictated this proposition was thus checked, and in December the new Cortez decided that he should retain the command of the armies and the regency be bound to fulfil its predecessor’s engagements. Nevertheless so deeply had he been offended by the libels relative to San Sebastian that a private letter to his brother terminated thus:—“It will rest with the king’s government to determine what they will do upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, but if I was to decide I would not keep the army in Spain for one hour.” And to many other persons at different times he expressed his fears and conviction that the cause was lost and that he should fail at last. It was under these, and other enormous difficulties he carried on his military operations. It was with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than the foe in his front that he invaded the south of France; and that is the answer to those French writers who have described him as being at the head of more than two hundred thousand well-furnished soldiers, supported by a well-organized insurrection of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in his movements, and luxuriously rioting in all the resources of the Peninsula and of England.
I. WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE
[Sidenote: 1813. November.]
While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to complete his works of defence, especially the entrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of the Lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties were not less than lord Wellington’s, all his efforts to draw forth the resources of France were met with apathy, or secret hostility, and there was no money in the military chest to answer the common daily expenses. A junta of the leading merchants in Bayonne voluntarily provided for the most pressing necessities of the troops, but their means were limited and Soult vainly urged the merchants of Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the patriotic example. It required therefore all his firmness of character to support the crisis; and if the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept the coasting vessels between Bordeaux and Bayonne, the French army must have retired beyond the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of the field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so far to the rear for forage, that they could not be counted a part of the fighting troops; and the infantry, in addition to their immense labours, were forced to carry their own provisions from the navigable points of the rivers to the top of the mountains.
Soult was strongly affected. “Tell the emperor,” he wrote to the minister of war, “tell him when you make your next report that on the very soil of France, this is the situation of the army destined to defend the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also that the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I meet with shall not make me fail in my duty.”
The French troops suffered much, but the privations of the allies were perhaps greater, for being on higher mountains, more extended, more dependent upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to their distance from the coast. A much shorter line had been indeed gained for the supply of the centre, and a bridge was laid down at Andarlassa which gave access to the roots of the Bayonette mountain, yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and so scantily, that lord Wellington in amends reduced the usual stoppage of pay, and invoked the army by its military honour to sustain with firmness the unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. The murmurs, loud in the camps before, were hushed instantly, although the soldiers knew that some commissaries leaguing with the speculators upon the coast, secretly loaded the provision mules with condiments and other luxuries, to sell on the mountains at enormous profit. The desertion was however great, more than twelve hundred men went over to the enemy in less than four months; and they were all Germans, Englishmen or Spaniards, for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours invariably went back to their own country.
This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, the extreme distress of the Spaniards and the certainty that they would plunder in France and so raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy state of the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered lord Wellington very averse to further offensive operations while Napoleon so tenaciously maintained his positions on the Elbe against the allied sovereigns. It was impossible to make a formidable and sustained invasion of France with the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither money nor means of transport to feed the Spaniards, even if policy warranted such a measure. The nature of the country also forbad a decisive victory, and hence an advance was attended with the risk of returning to Spain again during the winter, when a retreat would be dangerous and dishonouring. But on the 20th of October a letter from the governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, observing that the compliment of ceremony at the beginning was also in numerals, ingeniously followed the cue and made out the whole. It announced that the place could not hold out more than a week, and as intelligence of Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became known at the same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield once more to the wishes of the allied sovereigns and the English ministers, who were earnest that he should invade France.
His intent was to attack Soult’s entrenched camp on the 29th, thinking Pampeluna would fall before that period. In this he was mistaken; and bad weather stopped his movements, for in the passes above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in snow. The preparations however continued and strict precautions were taken to baffle the enemy’s emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly informed by the deserters of the original design and the cause of the delay; and he likewise obtained from a serjeant-major of artillery who losing his road was taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders indicating an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, between D’Erlon’s right and Clauzel’s left. Some French peasants also who had been allowed to pass the allied outposts declared they had been closely questioned about that bridge and the roads leading to it. The defences there were therefore augmented with new redoubts and abbatis, and Soult having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided for its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor for Clauzel’s position, covered as the latter was by the smaller Rhune, turned his attention towards Foy’s corps.
That general had been posted at Bidarray, half way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to watch certain roads, which leading to the Nive from Val Baigorry by St. Martin d’Arosa, and from the Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave Soult anxiety for his left; but now expecting the principal attack at the bridge of Amotz, and not by these roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at first supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time designed, he resolved to use Foy’s division offensively. In this view on the 3d of November he instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be only slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he could possibly spare from its defence to Bidarray, and when the allies assailed D’Erlon, he was to seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their right as they descended from the Puerto de Maya. If on the other hand he was himself assailed by those lines, he was to call in all his detached troops from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the bridge of Bidarray, make the best defence possible behind that river, and open a communication with Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of cavalry were at St. Palais and Orthes.
On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult to pass, proposed to seize the Col de Yspegui from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and so descend into the Bastan. Soult however preferred Bidarray as a safer point and more united with the main body of the army; but he gave Foy a discretionary power to march along the left of the Nive upon Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to reinforce D’Erlon’s left rather than to attack the enemy.
Having thus arranged his regular defence, the French general directed the prefect of the Lower Pyrenees to post the organized national guards at the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de Port, but to keep the mass of the people quiet until the allies penetrating into the country should at once provoke and offer facilities for an irregular warfare.
On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San Martin d’Arosa and Gorospil roads, he brought up his brother’s cavalry from St. Palais to the heights above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected storm burst.
Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th of November, lord Wellington had moved sir Rowland Hill’s troops from the Roncesvalles to the Bastan with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on the position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. The other corps had also received their orders, and the battle was to commence on the 8th, but general Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist on the mountains he must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a scheme to obtain provisions from the English magazines, and it was successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour with a formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain, contented Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses of the Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed when the chief of the staff declared that the flour would only suffice for two days, although there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for every fighting man and yet her troops were starving!
[Sidenote: Appendix, 7, No. 3.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
When this difficulty was surmounted heavy rain caused the attack to be again deferred, but on the 10th ninety thousand combatants of all arms and ranks above seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and with them went ninety-five pieces of artillery, which under the command of colonel Dickson were all with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into action. Nor in this host do I reckon four thousand five hundred cavalry, nor the Spaniards of the blockading division which remained in reserve. On the other hand the French numbers were now increased by the new levy of conscripts, but many had deserted again into the interior, and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including the garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and as Foy’s operations were extraneous to the line of defence scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery were opposed to the allies.
Lord Wellington seeing that the right of Soult’s line could not be forced without great loss, resolved to hold it in check while he turned it by forcing the centre and left, pushing down the Nivelle to San Pé. In this view the second and sixth British division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, Morillo’s Spaniards, four of Mina’s battalions, and Grant’s brigade of light cavalry, in all twenty-six thousand fighting men and officers with nine guns, were collected under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D’Erlon. The position of Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied by the remainder of Mina’s troops supported by the blockading force under Carlos D’España.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.]
The third fourth and seventh divisions, and Giron’s Andalusians, the whole under the command of marshal Beresford, were disposed about Zagaramurdi, the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts of those slopes of the greater Rhune which descended upon Sarre. On the left of this body the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, both under Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the greater Rhune which led down towards Ascain. Victor Alten’s brigade of light cavalry and three British batteries, were placed on the road to Sarre, and six mountain-guns followed Giron’s and Charles Alten’s troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting men and officers, with twenty-four guns, were concentrated in this quarter to attack Clauzel.
[Sidenote: Plan 6.]
General Freyre’s Spaniards, about nine thousand strong, with six guns, were disposed on Alten’s left, at the fort of Calvary and towards Jollimont, ready to fall upon any troops which might be detached from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain, to support Clauzel.
General Hope having the first and fifth divisions, Wilson’s, Bradford’s, and lord Aylmer’s brigades of infantry, Vandeleur’s brigade of light dragoons, and the heavy German cavalry, in all about nineteen thousand men and officers with fifty-four guns, was opposed to Soult’s right wing; and the naval squadron hovering on Hope’s left flank was to aid the land operations.
On the French side each lieutenant-general had a special position to defend. D’Erlon’s first line, its left resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarin which could not be turned, run from thence along the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the forge of Urdax to the Nivelle. This range was strongly entrenched and occupied by one of Abbé’s and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, Espelette being behind the former and Ainhoa behind the latter. The second line or main position was several miles distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was occupied by the remaining brigades of the two divisions. The left did not extend beyond the centre of the first line, but the right reaching to the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, because the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction towards the French gave greater space as their positions receded. Three great redoubts were constructed in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced close to the bridge.
On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clauzel’s position extended to Ascain, also along a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts trenches and abbatis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz swept in a curve completely round the range to Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river, having communication by the bridges of Amotz and Ascain on the right and left, and a retreat by the bridges of San Pé and Harastagui which were in rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel’s divisions reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under general Maransin were here posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the right was the smaller Rhune which was fortified and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division. A new redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.
On the right of this line beyond the bridge of Ascain, Daricau’s division belonging to Clauzel’s corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol drawn from Villatte’s reserve, were posted to hold the entrenched camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel’s position with Villatte’s, which was as I have before said on a ridge crossing the gorges of Olette and Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille, strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.
Soult’s weakest point of general defence was certainly the opening between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing as it approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the most open, the least fortified, and the Nivelle being fordable above that bridge could not hamper the allies’ movements. Wherefore a powerful force acting in this direction could pass by D’Erlon’s first line and breaking in upon the main position, between the right of that general’s second line and Clauzel’s left, turn both by the same attack.
Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General Hill, leaving Minas four battalions on the Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of Mondarin, moved in the night by the different passes of the Puerto de Maya, Morillo’s Spaniards being to menace the French on the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa and Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese were to assault the works covering the bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left bank of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus the action of twenty-six thousand men was combined against D’Erlon’s position, and on their left Beresford’s corps was assembled. The third division under general Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi, was to move against the unfinished redoubts and entrenchments covering the approaches to the bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle, thus turning D’Erlon’s right at the moment when it was attacked in front by Hill’s corps. On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending from the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of Sarre assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with the attack of the third division. On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon the redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through Sarre also to assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with the seventh division. On the left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up on the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest attack Clauzel’s main position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s corps, forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry were to be thrust, on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and D’Erlon to break their line of battle.
Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, furnishing together about eight thousand men, was likewise to attack Clauzel’s line on the left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians approached the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clauzel’s right the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be stormed. This mountain outwork was a hog’s-back ridge rising abruptly out of table-land and parallel with the greater Rhune. It was inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; but on the enemy’s left these rocks gradually decreased, descending by a long slope to the valley of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way down the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with an advanced post on some isolated crags situated in the hollow between the two Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into the plain or platform. It was however covered at that point by a marsh scarcely passable, and the attacking troops were therefore first to move up against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file to their left under fire, between the marsh and the lower crags, until they gained an accessible point from whence they could fight their way along the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back But the bristles of the latter were huge perpendicular crags connected with walls of loose stones so as to form several small forts or castles communicating with each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one above another until the culminant point was attained. The table-land beyond this ridge was extensive and terminated in a very deep ravine on every side, save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, where the enemy had drawn a traverse of loose stones, running perpendicularly from behind the hog’s-back and ending in a star fort which overhung the edge of the ravine.
This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself, were defended by Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s division, and the line of retreat was towards a low narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine linked the Rhune to Clauzel’s main position: a reserve was placed here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth French regiment posted on the slope of the mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the neck of land on the side of that village. As this neck was the only approach to the French position in that part, to storm the smaller Rhune was a necessary preliminary to the general battle, wherefore Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage, the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards Ascain. The main body of the light division, turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; and the forty-third regiment supported by the seventeenth Portuguese was to assail the hog’s-back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns were however left on the summit of the greater Rhune, with orders to assail the craggy post between the Rhunes and connect Alten’s attack with that of Giron’s Spaniards. All these troops gained their respective stations so secretly that the enemy had no suspicion of their presence, although for several hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot of the works. Towards morning indeed five or six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the sea, broke the stillness, but the French on the Rhune remained quiet, and the British troops awaited the rising of the sun when three guns fired from the Atchubia mountain were to give the signal of attack.
BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.
The day broke with great splendour, and as the first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal-guns were fired in rapid succession from its summit. The soldiers instantly leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment several columns rushing forward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their defences with much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and at the same moment two companies of the forty-third were detached to cross the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy’s fire from the lower part of the hog’s-back. The action being thus commenced the remainder of the regiment, formed partly in line partly in a column of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced against the high rocks. From these crags the French shot fast and thickly, but the quick even movement of the British line deceived their aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly though the ground was rough, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh, and were immediately joined by the two companies which had passed that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the lower works, but the men exhausted by their exertions, for they had passed over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes inactive within half pistol-shot of the first stone castle from whence came a sharp and biting musketry. When they had recovered breath they arose and with a stern shout commenced the assault.
The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, and for six weeks they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour before the veterans of the forty-third. One French grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks on his flanks. Close and confused then was the action, man met man at every turn, but with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate narrow paths sometimes climbing the loose stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way until they had carried the second castle, called by the French the place of arms, and the magpie’s nest, because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above it and on which a few marksmen were perched. From these points the defenders were driven into their last castle, which being higher and larger than the others and covered by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks, fifteen feet deep, was called the Donjon. Here they made a stand, and the assailants, having advanced so far as to look into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while, partly to gather a head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath them, who were now warmly engaged with the two battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores, and the seventeenth Portuguese. This last regiment was to have followed the forty-third but seeing how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh; and very soon the French defending the rampart, being thus pressed in front, and warned by the direction of the fire that they were turned on the ridge above, seeing also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left of the division, now emerging from the deep ravine beyond the star fort on the other flank, abandoned their works. Then the forty-third gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.
The whole mountain was now cleared of the French, for the riflemen dropping perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post of crags in the hollow between the Rhunes seized it with small loss; but they were ill-seconded by Giron’s Spaniards and were hardly handled by the thirty-fourth French regiment, which maintaining its post on the slope, covered the flight of the confused crowd which came rushing down the mountain behind them towards the neck of land leading to the main position. At that point they all rallied and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after some hesitation continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke had been looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but the officer entrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had thrown them needlessly into the fight, thus rendering it impossible to collect a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.
The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, was not very severe, but general Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded, nevertheless he did not quit the field and soon reformed his brigade on the platform he had thus so gallantly won. Meanwhile the fifty-second having turned the position by the ravine was now approaching the enemy’s line of retreat, when general Alten, following his instructions, halted the division partly in the ravine itself to the left of the neck, partly on the table-land, and during this action Longa’s Spaniards having got near Ascain were in connection with Freyre’s Gallicians. In this position with the enemy now and then cannonading Longa’s people and the troops in the ravine, Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns there had a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the movements.
The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division against the Rhune, had also put the fourth and seventh divisions in movement against the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen guns were immediately placed in battery against the former, and while they poured their stream of shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders and the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the rear of the work, whereupon the French leaped out and fled. Ross’s battery of horse artillery galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the fourth and seventh divisions carried the village of Sarre and the position beyond it and advanced to the attack of Clauzel’s main position.
It was now eight o’clock and from the smaller Rhune a splendid spectacle of war opened upon the view. On one hand the ships of war slowly sailing to and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa; Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks, and they were answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains. On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia was just lighted by the rising sun, and fifty thousand men rushing down its enormous slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France so long overlooked from the towering crags of the Pyrenees were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished soldiers in their fury, broke through the iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds.
The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, but the skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations failed. Far on the right general Hill after a long and difficult night march had got within reach of the enemy a little before seven o’clock. Opposing Morillo’s and Mina’s Spaniards to Abbé’s troops on the Mondarain and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second division against D’Armagnac’s brigade and brushed it back from the forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese being demanded by him, they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their march along the right bank towards the bridge of Amotz. Thus while Mina’s battalion and Morillo’s division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left flank in advance, approached D’Erlon’s second position, but the country being very rugged it was eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of the French redoubts. Each of these contained five hundred men, and they were placed along the summit of a high ridge which being thickly clothed with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine was very difficult to attack. However general Clinton, leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the works covering the approaches to the bridge, after which wheeling to his right he advanced against the nearest redoubt, and the garrison not daring to await the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese division passing the ravine and marching on the right of the sixth menaced the second redoubt, and the second division in like manner approached the third redoubt. D’Armagnac’s troops now set fire to their hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda behind San Pé, pursued by the sixth division. Abbé’s second brigade forming the French left was separated by a ravine from D’Armagnac’s ground, but he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette and Cambo, where his other brigade, which had meanwhile fallen back from the Mondarain before Morillo, rejoined him.
It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that rendered D’Erlon’s defence so feeble. After the fall of the St. Barbe and Grenada redoubts Conroux’s right and centre endeavoured to defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while the fourth and seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth regiment detached from the third division, attacked and carried those points, the third division being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly towards the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction with the sixth division the narrow end of the wedge into which Beresford’s and Hill’s corps were now thrown. The French were thus driven from all their new unfinished works covering the approaches to that bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spreading from Sarre to Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. That general indeed vigorously defended the old works around the bridge itself, but he soon fell mortally wounded, his troops were again broken, and the third division seized the bridge and established itself on the heights between that structure and the redoubt of Louis the XIV. which having been also lately commenced was unfinished. This happened about eleven o’clock and D’Erlon fearing to be cut off from St. Pé yielded as we have seen at once to the attack of the sixth division, and at the same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back in disorder from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and seventh divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the third. Thus the communication between Clauzel and D’Erlon was cut, the left flank of one and the right flank of the other broken, and a direct communication between Hill and Beresford secured by the same blow.
D’Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. The latter now completed by the return of Barbot’s brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis the XIV. and supported with eight field-pieces attempted to cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. The guns opened briskly but they were silenced by Ross’s battery of horse artillery, the only one which had surmounted the difficulties of the ground after passing Sarre, the infantry were then assailed, in front by the fourth and seventh divisions, in flank by the third division, the redoubt of Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison bayonetted, Conroux’s men continued to fly, Maransin’s after a stiff combat were cast headlong into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin himself was taken but escaped in the confusion. Giron’s Spaniards now came up on the left of the fourth division, somewhat late however, and after having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune.
On the French side Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts forming Clauzel’s right wing still remained to fight. The left rested on a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery but overlooked the whole position; the right was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres, and some works in the ravine itself protected the communication by the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San Pé and along which Maransin and Conroux’s beaten divisions were now flying in disorder, there was another work called the redoubt of Harastaguia, and Clauzel thinking he might still dispute the victory, if his reserve division, posted in the camp of Serres, could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French regiment from Taupin, and posted it in front of this redoubt of Harastaguia. His object was to rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops there and so form a new line, the left on the Harastaguia, the right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw six hundred of the eighty-eighth regiment. In this position having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed at the moment of conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division which was now again in full action.
[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report to Soult, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Taupin’s Official Report, MSS.]
About half-past nine, general Alten, seeing the whole of the columns on his right, as far as the eye could reach, well engaged with the enemy, had crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was first passed by the fifty-second regiment with a rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and fire of musketry from the entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite mountain; a road coming from Ascain by the ravine led up the position, and as the fifty-second pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even his crowning works above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of Alten’s troops, and Taupin, though his division was weak from its losses on the 7th of October and now still further diminished by the absence of the thirty-first regiment, awaited the assault above, being supported by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at this time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, approached Ascain, and being joined by part of Freyre’s troops their skirmishers opened a distant musketry against the works covering that bridge on Taupin’s right; a panic immediately seized the French, the seventieth regiment abandoned the two redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn. Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts but this only added to the disorder, the seventieth regiment instead of facing about disbanded entirely and were not reassembled until next day. There remained only four regiments unbroken, one, the eighty-eighth, was in the signal redoubt, two under Taupin in person kept together in rear of the works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the fort of Harastaguia now the only line of retreat.
In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off the eighty-eighth regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing between that regiment and the signal redoubt. Moreover Alten previous to this had directed the forty-third, preceded by Barnard’s riflemen, to turn at the distance of musquet shot the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore Taupin instead of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell dangerously wounded. During this struggle the seventh division broke the thirty-first, the rout was complete; the French fled to the different bridges over the Nivelle and the signal redoubt was left to its fate.
This formidable work barred the way of the light division, but it was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on Colborne’s right, the fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was as we have seen turning it on the left. Colborne whose military judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the brow of the conical hill on which the work was situated, but some of Giron’s Spaniards making a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his right were beaten back, and at that moment a staff-officer without warrant, for general Alten on the spot assured the Author of this History that he sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance and his troops covered by the steepness of the hill reached the flat top which was about forty yards across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, but a wide ditch, thirty feet deep well fraised and pallisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the foremost men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment under cover of the brow to another point, and thinking to take the French unawares made another rush, yet with the same result. At three different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded and how hopeless his defence, whereupon the garrison yielded having had only one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell two hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first borne by men.
During this affair Clauzel’s divisions had crossed the Nivelle in great disorder, Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops near San Pé, the thirty-first regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh divisions, and the skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and a bridge above San Pé entered that place while the French were in the act of passing the river below. It was now past two o’clock, Conroux’s troops pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin and by D’Erlon with D’Armagnac’s division, but Clauzel rallied Maransin’s men and took post on some heights immediately above San Pé. Meanwhile Soult had hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp of Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare troops to menace the allies’ left flank by Ascain, and Wellington thereupon halted the fourth and light divisions, and Giron’s Spaniards, on the reverse slopes of Clauzel’s original position, facing the camp of Serres, waiting until the sixth division, then following D’Armagnac’s retreat on the right of the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he was assured of Clinton’s progress he crossed the Nivelle with the third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin from his new position after a hard struggle, in which general Inglis was wounded and the fifty-first and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly. This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and the troops were exhausted, especially the sixth division which had been marching or fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions were firmly established in rear of Soult’s right wing of whose operations it is now time to treat.
In front of Reille’s entrenchments were two advanced positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the centre covering Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Ciboure. The second after a short cannonade was taken by Halket’s Germans and the guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth regiment, of lord Aylmer’s brigade, drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first division, being on the right, then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering this part of the line, but they were driven back by the enemy whose musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont and the Calvaire on the right of the first division, placed eight guns in battery against the Nassau redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge occupied by Villate to cover the approaches to Ascain. The Spaniards were here opposed by their own countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded the remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards, and during the fight general Freyre’s skirmishers on the right united with Longa’s men. Thus a kind of false battle was maintained along the whole line to the sea until nightfall, with equal loss of men but great advantage to the allies, because it entirely occupied Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid Clauzel, who was thus overpowered. When that event happened and lord Wellington had passed the Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from Serres, and Villatte’s reserve occupied it, whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de Luz and destroyed all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle; when that was effected the whole retired and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on the road to Bayonne.
During the night the allies halted on the position they had gained in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood completely separated the picquets towards Ascain from the main body, and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.
On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Sir John Hope on the left, forded the river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, and marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the centre moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne. General Hill, communicating by his right with Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain, brought his left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre took possession of Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The time required to restore the bridges for the artillery at Ciboure, and the change of front on the right rendered these movements slow, and gave the duke of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but the works were only slightly advanced and Soult dreading a second battle on so wide a field drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings. The next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. During this movement a dense fog arrested the allies, but when the day cleared sir John Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe, in the centre. General Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz and he also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo, but the rain which fell heavily in the mountains on the 11th rendered the fords impassable and both points were defended successfully by Foy whose operations had been distinct from the rest.
In the night of the 9th D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had sent that general orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette, but the messenger did not arrive in time and on the morning of the 10th about eleven o’clock Foy, following Soult’s previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle was at this period receding fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men, having however taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, just in time to relieve Abbé’s division at those posts, and on the 12th defended them against general Hill. Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain position which he had been fortifying for three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men and officers including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and one general was killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one pieces of artillery were taken, the greater part having been abandoned in the redoubts of the low country to sir John Hope. The allies had two generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men and officers.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. Soult fared in this battle as most generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the assailants are the better soldiers. Cæsar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in modern times the duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that example. His works were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan, that is to say a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected by inundations. But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to complete his system, his labours were under the gaze of his enemy, his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington’s lines at Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew of them when they stopped his progress, and his army inferior in numbers had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.
It is not meant by this to decry entrenched camps within compass, and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies only to those extensive covering lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to their enemies. A general is thus precluded from shewing himself at important points and at critical periods; he is unable to encourage his troops or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions they like, menace every point and select where to break through. The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them and unable to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful, knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on the offensive; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no resource but victory look to their flanks, and are more anxious about their neighbours’ fighting than their own.
[Sidenote: Official Reports of the French generals to Soult, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report to the Minister of War, MSS.]
All these disadvantages were experienced at the battle of the Nivelle. D’Erlon attributed his defeat to the loss of the bridge of Amotz by Conroux’s division, and to this cause also Maransin traced his misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin’s door, but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed it at once to want of firmness in the troops, although he also asserted that if Daricau’s division had come to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have maintained his ground. Soult however traced Clauzel’s defeat to injudicious measures. That general he said attempted to defend the village of Sarre after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were carried, whereby Conroux’s division was overwhelmed in detail and driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel should rather have assembled his three divisions at once in the main position which was his battleground, and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, ought to have been victorious. It was scarcely credible he observed that such entrenchments as Clauzel’s and D’Erlon’s should have been carried. For his part he relied on their strength so confidently as to think the allies must sacrifice twenty-five thousand men to force them and perhaps fail then. He had been on the right when the battle began, no reports came to him, he could judge of events only by the fire, and when he reached the camp of Serres with his reserve troops and artillery Clauzel’s works were lost! His arrival had however paralyzed the march of three divisions. This was true, yet there seems some foundation for Clauzel’s complaint, namely, that he had for five hours fought on his main position, and during that time no help had come, although the camp of Serres was close at hand, the distance from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, and the attack in the low ground evidently a feint. This then was Soult’s error. He suffered sir John Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand men in the low ground, while fifteen thousand under Clauzel lost the battle on the hills.
2º. The French army was inferior in numbers and many of the works were unfinished; and yet two strong divisions, Daricau’s and Foy’s, were quite thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive movement made by the latter produced no effect whatever. Vigorous counter-attacks are no doubt essential to a good defence, and it was in allusion to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph’s position behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, “if a river were as broad and rapid as the Danube it would be nothing without secure points for passing to the offensive.” The same maxim applies to lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this principle when he proposed the descent upon Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it meanly and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the Gorospil mountain. That general’s numbers were too few, and the direction of the march false; one regiment in the field of battle at the decisive moment would have been worth three on a distant and secondary point. Foy’s retreat was inevitable if D’Erlon failed, and wanting the other’s aid he did fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might have driven Mina’s battalions over the Puerto de Maya and quite through the Bastan; he might have defeated Morillo and perhaps have taken general Hill’s baggage; yet all this would have weighed little against the allies’ success at Amotz; and the deeper he penetrated the more difficult would have been his retreat. The incursion into the Bastan by Yspegui proposed by him on the 6th, although properly rejected by Soult would probably have produced greater effects than the one executed by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th, Hill’s troops being then in march by brigades through the Alduides, might have brought some advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed the general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy rains which set in on the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack at all: Soult would thus have had time to complete his works.
3º. It has been observed that a minor cause of defeat was the drawing up of the French troops in front instead of in rear of the redoubts. This may possibly have happened in some places from error and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel’s report expressly states that Maransin was directed to form in rear of the redoubts and charge the allies when they were between the works and the abbatis. It is however needless to pry closely into these matters when the true cause lies broad on the surface. Lord Wellington directed superior numbers with superior skill. The following analysis will prove this, but it must be remembered that the conscripts are not included in the enumeration of the French force: being quite undisciplined they were kept in masses behind and never engaged.
Abbé’s division, furnishing five thousand old soldiers, was posted in two lines one behind the other, and they were both paralyzed by the position of Morillo’s division and Mina’s battalions. Foy’s division was entirely occupied by the same troops. Six thousand of Wellington’s worst soldiers therefore sufficed to employ twelve thousand of Soult’s best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile Hill fell upon the decisive point where there was only D’Armagnac’s division to oppose him, that is to say, five thousand against twenty thousand. And while the battle was secured on the right of the Nivelle by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank thrust twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand composing Conroux’s and Maransin’s divisions. Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing, the one from his left the other from his right, formed a wedge towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four thousand men composing the six divisions under those generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand composing the divisions of D’Armagnac Conroux and Maransin; and these last were also attacked in detail, because part of Conroux’s troops were defeated near Sarre, and Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division before the main position was attacked. Finally Alten with eight thousand men, having first defeated Barbot’s brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only three thousand while the rest of the French army was held in check by Freyre and Hope. Thus more than fifty thousand troops full of confidence from repeated victories were suddenly thrown upon the decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand dispirited by previous reverses to oppose them. Against such a thunderbolt there was no defence in the French works. Was it then a simple matter for Wellington so to combine his battle? The mountains on whose huge flanks he gathered his fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the horrid crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, the wild regions through which he poured the destructive fire of more than ninety guns, these and the reputation of the French commander furnish the everlasting reply.
And yet he did not compass all that he designed. The French right escaped, because when he passed the Nivelle at San Pé he had only two divisions in hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in observation of the camp at Serres, and before he could assemble enough men to descend upon the enemy in the low ground the day had closed. The great object of the battle was therefore unattained, and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of the days and the difficulty of the roads were not unexpected obstacles, whether the combinations would not have been surer if the principal attack had been directed entirely against Clauzel’s position. Carlos D’España’s force and the remainder of Mina’s battalions could have reinforced Morillo’s division with five thousand men to occupy D’Erlon’s attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for though he attributed his retreat to Clauzel’s reverse that general did not complain that D’Erlon’s retreat endangered his position. This arrangement would have enabled the rest of Hill’s troops to reinforce Beresford and have given lord Wellington three additional divisions in hand with which to cross the Nivelle before two o’clock. Soult’s right wing could not then have escaped.
4º. In the report of the battle lord Wellington from some oversight did but scant and tardy justice to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s Spaniards went off towards Ascain and scarcely fired a shot, this division furnishing only four thousand seven hundred men and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s brigade, and then beat Taupin’s division from the main position, thus driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine being less than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they defeated one-third of that general’s corps. Many brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this battle I will speak.
The first, low in rank for he was but a lieutenant, rich in honour for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only nineteen. But he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly following where he led, would like children obey his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating future greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the forty-third one of three brothers who covered with wounds have all died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of coming death so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the middle of the fight when they heard of his fate.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches.]
[Sidenote: The Eventful Life of a Sergeant.]
On the same day and at the same hour was killed colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the ninety-fourth, and it was leading that regiment he fell. In him also were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined with Herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and commanding, and his military knowledge extensive both from experience and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I will not dwell, save to remark, that he used the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse, for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was prescient of, and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved but remained watching the battle and making observations upon the changes in it until death came. It was thus at the age of thirty, that the good the brave the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by lord Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, let those who served on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.