Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16) (part 7 of 8)

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16) (part 7 of 8)

Under the former system, there were six judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, who held two sessions of the Supreme Court in each year, at the seat of Government. Those judges also held in each State a circuit court, two terms in each year, in which the judge of the district was associated with the circuit judge. The organization of the district courts having jurisdiction, principally, of matters affecting the revenue and admiralty causes, not being connected with the present question, need not be examined. From the errors of this system resulted, first, a delay of justice. The judges bound to hold courts in succession at remote parts of the continent, were continually travelling; from the variety of accidents to which travellers are subjected in this country, from the condition of roads and overflowing of rivers, it frequently happened that the judges failed in their attempts to get to the courts, or arrived so late that little business was done. Suitors, jurors, and witnesses, were subjected to the trouble and expense of attending courts without the accomplishment of their business; hence resulted a delay of justice. In the State to which I belong, during the few years existence of the former system, this was the case frequently.

Another great evil resulting from that system was, its tendency to lessen the character and respectability of the Federal bench. Those best acquainted with the profession of the law will most readily admit, that even a life of patient study is unequal to the complete attainment of principles and rules; and that much labor and industry are necessary to preserve that which is gained. Consequently, that extent of legal knowledge, correctness of judgment, and respectability of character, which should designate the persons qualified for this important trust were seldom to be found, but in men far advanced in years. Men possessing these qualifications, not inured to labor, are seldom equal to the fatigue of their duty; or, if at the time of appointment, fast approaching to the infirmities of age, were not to be expected to relinquish the enjoyments of private life for an office, which, however honorable, subjected them to the fatigue of a day laborer. The office, with its incumbrances, was, as it were, offered to the lowest bidder. And men best qualified to honor the bench, were driven from it. True it is, men have been found eminently uniting virtue and talents, who have accepted the office under all its distressing circumstances, but we owe this rather to their patriotism than to the advantages of the situation. Let it also be remembered that, in some instances, gentlemen who would have adorned the seat of justice of any country, were compelled to relinquish their seats; and in others, refused to accept the appointment.

Another error of that system was, that the judges of the Supreme Court, the court in the last resort, before whom the errors of the inferior circuit courts were to be corrected, were the same men who presided in those circuit courts. With great deference for the opinions of gentlemen who prefer that system, I pronounce my opinion, that its errors were radical; that those who justly estimated the importance to our interest and national character, of a speedy and correct administration of justice, ought to have desired a change. The present system has happily obviated these errors. The States are divided into six circuits; in each State is appointed one judge, called a circuit judge; the judges of the States, composing one circuit, ride together into the States of their circuit, and together hold the court. The much smaller distance which those judges have to travel than the circuit judges, under the former system, secure their due attendance; a portion of their time is left them to study and reflection, and the same persons presiding at successive terms, a uniformity of decision is preserved. The six former judges hold the Supreme Court, with original constitutional jurisdiction in matters of the utmost national importance, and appellate jurisdiction, in certain cases, where the sum in dispute is two thousand dollars; they are also the court in which the errors of the circuit court are examined and corrected.

It is objected against the act proposed to be repealed, that a dangerous patronage is created by it for the President. I shall pass over what I consider an inconsistency in this objection coming from gentlemen who profess that implicit confidence is due to the man chosen by the people, who, in his appointments, speaks not less the voice of the people than the voice of God, and examine the weight of the objection. If this apprehended patronage means the power of appointing the Judiciary, that power is given by the constitution, and is the same, whether the power of the Judiciary be vested in six or in sixteen judges. If it fear an undue control over the people in favor of the Executive, through the Judiciary, make the judges as independent as we contend they are and ought to be, and they are placed beyond the necessity of descending to the practice of improper means to preserve Executive favor.

We have been told, sir, that it is necessary the judges should ride into the States to gain a knowledge of the laws by which, in many cases, they are to decide. Until this occasion I have never heard that the laws of a country could only be acquired in the atmosphere of that country where they are in force. Nine-tenths of the decisions in our State courts and Federal courts turn on questions of common law; yet, has it ever been suggested that an American judge was incompetent to decide on common law questions, because he had not studied in England? No, sir, the knowledge in both cases may be acquired in the closet. To these observations permit me to add, that the remonstrances from the bar of Philadelphia, composed of gentlemen no less celebrated for the respectability of their private than of their professional character, who, on this occasion, so interesting to the welfare of their country, have sacrificed their political prejudices, strongly expressing their decided preference of the present system to the former, is, to my mind, conclusive, that it ought to be preferred. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is inexpedient to pass the present repealing bill; and so long as my opinion is supported by the respectable authority I have just alluded to, and opposed only by the objections which I have noticed, I shall feel satisfied that opinion is correct.

In approaching the second question which I proposed to examine--the constitutionality of the measure--whether I reflect on the magnitude of the question on the one hand, or my inability on the other, I am, indeed, humbled before the undertaking.

Without examining whether Government, according to the modern opinion, should be founded on the reason and sense of justice of man, it is certain our Government is calculated to guard against his weakness and his wickedness. Our Government has been particularly cautious on this subject; it has left nothing to the hazard of reason or sense of justice; it has carefully delegated powers to three distinct departments, and separated these departments by boundaries plainly marked and formed, each so as not to control, at least to check, the other. The Legislative powers, though vested in men chosen frequently and by the people themselves in one branch, and by the immediate agents of the people in the other, are nevertheless the object of suspicion and caution. Their powers, far from resting on their discretion or sense of expediency, are expressly and cautiously limited. The Executive conditional veto forms one check on the Legislature; the Judiciary, I shall contend, are a check on both. Here, permit me to say, that from the spirit and the words of our constitution, I infer that the Judiciary are a co-ordinate department with the Executive and Legislative. The framers of our constitution, satisfied that the powers of well-organized Governments ought to be divided into three branches--Legislative, Executive, and Judicial--have nowhere expressly declared there shall be such departments, but, after premising the objects of the Government, proceed to ordain how the Legislature shall be composed; and article two, section two, declares, "The power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America; he shall hold his office during the term of four years," and prescribes the mode of election. Article three, section one, also declares, "The Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and the judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold, &c., during good behavior. By comparing these sections of the constitution, it appears the Judiciary and the Executive are expressly created by the constitution, and nothing is left to the discretion of Congress, as to the existence of these departments; they are created by the same words; and if the Legislature claim a right to put down the Judiciary at pleasure, before the happening of that event till which the constitution secures their offices--their misbehavior--they may as well assume the right to remove the President before the happening of that event till which his office is secured, to wit, the expiration of four years. I shall attempt to establish as a first principle, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature, and thence to show first, that, by the spirit of our constitution, the Judiciary ought to be independent, beyond the control or influence of either of the other departments of power; and secondly, that, by the words of the constitution, they are so secured.

First, then, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature. In the constitution, we find certain powers delegated to Congress; we also find they are prohibited from exercising certain powers; among which are, they shall pass no ex post facto law, no bill of attainder, no law respecting religion, &c. Should, unhappily, a Legislature be found who, from weakness or wickedness, or the union of both, should transgress the bounds prescribed, what is the security of the citizen? After all the experience derived from the example of other Governments, after all the deliberation and wisdom of our sages who framed the constitution, are we left, in this important instance, as under the despotism of a monarch, to seek redress through the throes and convulsions of a revolution? No, sir. The Judiciary are our security. The Legislature may enact penalties, and denounce punishments against those who do not yield obedience to their unconstitutional acts; their penalties cannot be exacted, nor punishments inflicted, without the judgment of a court. The judges are to expound the law, and that fundamental, paramount law, the constitution. To this purpose they are sworn to support the constitution. While the Judiciary firmly, independently, and uprightly, discharge their duty and declare the act of the Legislature contrary to the constitution, to be void, the Legislature are checked, and the citizen shielded from oppression and persecution. But, ask gentlemen, whence do the courts derive this power, and the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. THOMPSON) says, we are contending for this common law doctrine, that the courts are a check on the Legislature. If I misunderstood the gentleman, I trust he will correct me. Sir, that gentleman, I am willing to presume, knows, what I assure him no gentleman with whom on this occasion I act, is ignorant of, that this is not a common law doctrine; that in England their courts have no check on the Legislature--their Parliament are emphatically styled omnipotent, and if they violate the few natural rights that remain to the citizens, they have no remedy but in a resort to revolutionary principles; it was the want of this check to the oppressions of their rulers, which has produced civil wars, and driven one monarch from his kingdom, and sent another to the scaffold. This power exists in no other Government, because under no other Government does there exist a Legislature with limited powers; under our Government it is the very essence, the constitution of a court, the oath enjoined on them to support the constitution. The exercise and the admission of this right are not new in America; instances must be in the recollection of every gentleman. I will cite a few most prominent: The honorable member (Mr. THOMPSON) has been pleased to call the attention of the committee to the examples drawn from his State; I beg leave to profit from the same source. In 1787, the Legislature of that State passed an act making new arrangements in the jurisdiction of the courts. The judges, among whom was that venerable gentleman mentioned by the member from that State, whose merits and worth command the sincere homage of my respects, protested against this act, and refused to carry it into effect; the Legislature acquiesced, and the law was repealed.

Upon the imposition of the carriage tax by Congress, a citizen of Virginia refused to pay the tax, on the ground that it was unconstitutionally laid. He was sued for the penalty in the circuit court of that State, from whence, by writ of error, the suit came before the Supreme Court; in this case the defendant relied solely on the unconstitutionality of the act of Congress, and on this ground was defended by the attorney general of the State of Virginia, and the attorney general of the State of Pennsylvania. At this time, then, it appears that these learned gentlemen, the judges, and the citizens, thought the court competent to relieve in case the law was judged to be unconstitutional. In 1792, Congress passed an act imposing certain duties respecting invalid pensioners, upon the judges of the circuit court. The judges, at the first court after this act, protested against it; their protests were transmitted to the President of the United States--that President, who had presided in the General Convention which framed the constitution, and, therefore, as likely to understand the powers of Congress on the Judiciary as any other man, so far sanctioned their opinions as to transmit them to the next Congress, where the act was reconsidered and repealed. I beg leave, also, to allude to the authority before mentioned by my friend from Pennsylvania, (Mr. HEMPHILL,) which I should think of some weight here. It is the opinion of a gentleman, venerable for his age, respectable for legal knowledge, and distinguished for what, in the fashionable language of the day, are termed republican principles. I mean the Executive of Pennsylvania; that gentleman, in assigning to the Legislature of his State his reasons for not approving an act they had laid before him, after expressing his doubts of the constitutionality of the act, declares, "he cannot, from a confidence in the legal knowledge, integrity, and fortitude of his former brethren in the Supreme Court, risk his character in a judicial decision on this question, when he does not see any advantage to be derived to his country from a possibility of success." If any words can make more plain the opinion here conveyed, it is that he considers the judges have the power and will exercise it, to declare the act unconstitutional.

To my mind, these considerations are satisfactory, that, from the very constitution of our courts, from the practice and admission of our State courts and State Legislatures, and Federal courts, and Federal Legislature, that the judges of the United States, sitting in court, have the power, and by oath are bound to pronounce, that, an act contrary to the constitution, is void. From the establishment of this proposition, that the judges are the expounders of the constitution, and the laws made under it, and that they are thereby a check on the Legislature, I shall infer that, by the spirit of our constitution, they ought to be independent of the other branches of Government, but particularly so of the Legislature. The concentrating the branches of power either Executive and Legislative, or Legislative and Judiciary, in the same hands, is the very essence of tyranny; in proportion as we advance towards the union of those powers, in the same proportion do we recede from liberty. Are these departments separate, unconnected--if the Legislature by any means procure their will either directly or indirectly, to be substituted for or to overrule judicial judgment? Whether the Legislature expound and adjudge their acts themselves, or submit them to the exposition and judgment of a judiciary subservient to them, is essentially the same. If the Legislature exercise the power of removal from office by the direct means of a vote of removal, or by the indirect means, the legislative legerdemain of a repealing act, is precisely the same thing, the judges are no longer independent, but dependent on the Legislature for their offices, and subject to their control; a consequence entirely repugnant to the spirit of our constitution. I shall attempt to show, that by the words of our constitution, the judges are placed beyond Legislative control. Article three, section one: "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Until the contemplation of the present measure, I incline to believe, it never entered the mind of any man acquainted with this clause of the constitution, that judges should be removed otherwise than by impeachment for misdemeanor. The advocates for this Legislative power contend that the tenure of "good behavior" in this article of the constitution is intended to restrict Executive and not Legislative power. It does not appear probable that an express restriction should be introduced against a power which is nowhere expressly granted; for gentlemen know that the Executive power of removal from office is a power admitted from construction, and not founded on any thing drawn from the constitution. I say this rather, because, by the constitution, the aid of the Senate is necessary to appoint, and a fortiori should be necessary to remove. It is important to ascertain what was the intention of the framers of the constitution in introducing the words "good behavior." The most correct source in our power from which this aid may be derived, is the writings and opinions at that day of those who aided in the great work. Among those publications which were written for the purpose of explaining and recommending this constitution, the most celebrated are those pieces over the signature of "Publius," written by the pens of gentlemen of leading influence in the Convention, and whose talents and patriotism are still honored by the nation. In that part of this work which treats of the tenure of the office of judge during "good behavior," I find this strong expression:

"The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of Government. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince. In a republic, it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body."

This, sir, to my mind, is conclusive, that the convention intended this tenure as a restriction no less on Legislative than on Executive power, and that, in this sense of the phrase, the people of America received this part of the constitution. In ascertaining the import of the words "during good behavior," it is certainly important to inquire the end to which they have been used in other similar cases. My colleague (Mr. HENDERSON) has, with much abler talents, shown that, in most of the State constitutions, which existed before our Federal constitution, these words are used to fix the tenure of offices where the Executive have neither express nor constructive power of removal; consequently, they are in those constitutions restrictive of the Legislative power. If, then, the framers of our constitution borrowed this tenure from these State constitutions, it is fair and reasonable to conclude they used them in the sense in which they were previously received. But, says my colleague on the other side of the House, (Mr. ROBERT WILLIAMS,) the judges in England hold their offices by the tenure of "good behavior," and yet are removable on an address from both Houses of Parliament, and he infers that the terms may have been taken from England. To this I will first observe, that no fair argument can be drawn from the existence of this Legislative power there, for the exercise here. The mode of appointment there may render such control over the Executive necessary, which, from the provisions of our constitution, are not wanted here. In England, the King has the sole power of appointment--the people have no previous check. In this country, the Executive appointment is checked by the requisite sanction of the Senate. But is this Legislative power in Great Britain usurped by construction? No, if the gentleman will read again the statute of 13 William III., he will find that this power of removal is expressly granted by the Crown to Parliament. If, then, one convention had this statute before them, in adopting that part which relates to the tenure of office, and omitting that part which gives the power of removal, it is not to be presumed they intended so important a power should depend on construction. The same gentleman (Mr. ROBERT WILLIAMS) also contended that it could not be presumed the convention intended to restrict the power of the Representatives of the people, the friends of the people. What will the gentleman say of the correctness of his opinion, when I remind him that our powers are all expressly restricted; that the same article which fixes the tenure of "good behavior," expressly and undoubtedly guards against the power of the Representatives of the people, the friends of the people, by securing the salaries of the judges undiminished during their continuance in office.

Mr. GILES said that he felt some degree of apprehension, that, in the course he deemed it necessary to take in the discussion of this question, some observations might fall from him which might not be in strict harmony with the feelings of some gentlemen of the committee. He should regret, however, if a compliance with a sense of duty should produce that effect. He said, therefore, that he wished to apprise gentlemen that he intended to direct his observations as much as possible to the effects and tendencies of measures; and that when he was constrained to speak of the views of gentlemen, it would be with respect to what he conceived to be their opinions in relation to the general interests, and not to private gratifications. He said it was natural that men should differ in the choice of means to produce a given end, and more natural that they should differ in the choice of political means than any other; because the subject presented more complicated and variable objects, out of which to make a choice. Accordingly, a great portion of the human mind has been at all times directed towards monarchy, as the best form of government to enforce obedience and ensure the general happiness; whereas another portion of the human mind has given a preference to the republican form, as best calculated to produce the same end; and there is no reason for applying improper motives to individuals who should give a preference to either of the principles, provided in doing so they follow the honest dictates of their own judgments. It must be obvious to the most common observer, that, from the commencement of the Government of the United States, and perhaps before it, a difference of opinion existed among the citizens, having more or less reference to these two extreme fundamental points, and that it manifested itself in the modification or administration of the Government as soon as it was put in operation. On one side, it was contended, that in the organization of the constitution a due apportionment of authority had not been made among the several departments; that the Legislature was too powerful for the Executive Department; and to create and preserve a proper equipoise, it was necessary to infuse into the Executive Department, by legislation, all artificial powers compatible with the constitution, upon which the most diffusive construction was given; or, in other words, to place in Executive hands all the patronage it was possible to create, for the purpose of protecting the President against the full force of his constitutional responsibility to the people. On the other side, it was contended, that the doctrine of patronage was repugnant to the opinions and feelings of the people; that it was unnecessary, expensive, and oppressive, and that the highest energy the Government could possess, would flow from the confidence of the mass of the people, founded upon their own sense of their common interests. Hence, what is called party in the United States, grew up from a division of opinion respecting these two great characteristic principles. Patronage, or the creation of partial interest for the protection and support of Government, on the one side: on the other side, to effect the same end, a fair responsibility of all representatives to the people; an adherence to the general interests, and a reliance on the confidence of the people at large, resulting from a sense of their common interests. A variety of circumstances existed in the United States at the commencement of the Government, and a great number of favorable incidents continued afterwards to arise, which gave the patronage system the preponderancy, during the first three Presidential terms of election; notwithstanding it was evident, that the system was adopted and pursued in direct hostility to the feelings and opinions of a great portion of the American people. The Government was ushered into operation under a vast excitement of federal fervor, flowing from its recent triumph on the question of adopting the constitution. At that time a considerable debt was afloat in the United States, which had grown out of the Revolutionary war. This debt was of two kinds: the debt proper of the United States, or engagements made by the United States in their federal capacity; the other, the State debts or engagements entered into by the respective States for the support of the common cause.

The favorers of the patronage system readily availed themselves of these materials for erecting a moneyed interest; gave to it a stability, or qualified perpetuity, and calculated upon its certain support in all their measures of irresponsibility.

This was done not only by funding the debt proper of the United States, but by assuming the payment of the State debts, and funding them also; and it is believed, extending the assumption beyond the actual engagements of the States. Hence the Federal axiom, that a public debt is a public blessing. Shortly after this event, an Indian war sprang up--he would not say by what means--in consequence of which an army was added to the list of patronage. The Algerines commenced a predatory war upon the commerce of the United States, and thence a navy formed a new item of patronage. Taxes became necessary to meet the expenses of this system, and an arrangement of internal taxes, an excise, &c., still swelled the list of patronage. But the circumstance which most favored this system was, the breaking out of a tremendous and unprecedented war in those countries of Europe with which the United States had the most intimate relations. The feelings and sympathies of the people of the United States were so strongly attracted by the tremendous scenes existing there, that they considered their own internal concerns in a secondary point of view. After a variable conduct had been pursued by the United States in relation to these events, the depredations committed upon commerce, and the excitements produced thereby, enabled the Administration to indulge themselves in a more decisive course, and they at once pushed forward the people to the X, Y, Z, of their political alphabet, before they had well learned and understood the A, B, C, of the principles of the Administration.

Armies and navies were raised, and a variety of other schemes of expense were adopted, which placed the Administration in the embarrassing predicament, either to violate their faith with their public creditors, or to resort to new taxes. The latter alternative was preferred, accompanied with other strong coercive measures to enforce obedience. A land tax was laid for two millions of dollars. This measure awakened the people to a sense of their situation; and shook to the foundation all those federal ramparts which had been planned with so much ingenuity, and erected around the Executive with so much expense and labor. Another circumstance peculiarly favorable to the advocates of Executive patronage was, that during the two first Presidential terms, the Chief Executive Magistrate possessed a greater degree of popularity and the confidence of the people than ever was, or perhaps will ever be again attached to the person occupying that dignified station. The general disquietude which manifested itself in consequence of these enterprising measures, in the year 1800, induced the Federal party to apprehend that they had pushed their principles too far, and they began to entertain doubts of the result of the Presidential election, which was approaching. In this state of things, it was natural for them to look out for some department of the Government in which they could intrench themselves in the event of an unsuccessful issue in the election, and continue to support those favorite principles of irresponsibility which they could never consent to abandon.

The Judiciary Department, of course, presented itself as best fitted for their object, not only because it was already filled with men who had manifested the most indecorous zeal in favor of their principles, but because they held their offices by indefinite tenures, and of course were further removed from any responsibility to the people, than either of the other departments. Accordingly, on the 11th of March, 1800, a bill for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States, was presented to the House of Representatives. This bill appears to have had for its objects, first, the gradual demolition of the State courts, by increasing the number and extending the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Second, to afford additional protection to the principles of the then existing Administration by creating a new corps of judges of concurring political opinions. This bill, however, was not passed into a law during that session of Congress, perhaps from an apprehension that it would tend to increase the disquietudes which other measures had before excited, and therefore operate unfavorably to the approaching Presidential election. At the next session, after the result of the late election was ascertained, the bill, after having undergone some considerable alterations, was passed into the law now under discussion. This law, it is now said, is inviolable and irrepealable. It is said, the independence of the judge will be thereby immolated. Yes, sir, this law is now considered as the sanctuary of the principles of the last Administration, and the tenures of the judges as the horns of inviolability within that sanctuary. He said, we are now called upon to rally round the constitution as the ark of our political safety. Gentlemen, discarding all generalizing expressions, and the spirit of the instrument, tie down all construction to the strict letter of the constitution. He said, it gave him great pleasure to meet gentlemen on this ground, and the more so, because he had long been in the habit of hearing very different language from the same gentlemen. He had long been in the habit of hearing the same gentlemen speak of the expressions of "the common defence and the general welfare," as the only valuable part of the constitution; that they were sufficient to obliterate all specifications and limitations of power. That the constitution was a mere nose of wax, yielding to every impression it received. That every "opening wedge" which was driven into it, was highly beneficial in severing asunder the limitations and restrictions of power. That the republicanism it secured, meant any thing or nothing. It gave him, therefore, great pleasure at this time to obey the injunctions of gentlemen in rallying round the constitution as the ark of our political safety, and of interpreting it in by the plain and obvious meaning and letter of the specified powers. But, he said, as if it was always the unfortunate destiny of these gentlemen to be upon extremes, they have now got round to the opposite extreme point of the political compass, and even beyond it. For, he said, they not only tie down all construction to the letter of the instrument, but they tell us that they see, and call upon us also to see written therein, in large capital characters, "the independence of judges;" which, to the extent they carry the meaning of the term, is neither to be found in the letter or spirit of that instrument, or in any other political establishment, he believed, under the sun. Mr. G. said he rejoiced that this subject was now to be discussed; he thought the crisis peculiarly auspicious for the discussion. He said the European world, with which the United States have the most relations, is now tranquillized. The tremendous scenes of blood and revolution which had agitated that portion of the globe, had at length subsided into profound peace; and had left mankind in silent amazement, to retrospect the wonderful events which were passed; and he hoped, with calm deliberation, to improve the lessons they had furnished for the benefit of mankind in time to come. The interests and sympathies, which the people of the United States felt in these events, no longer turn their attention from their internal concerns; arguments of the highest consideration for the safety of the constitution and the liberty of the citizens, no longer receive the short reply, French partisans! Jacobins! Disorganizers! And although the gentleman from North Carolina sees, or thinks he sees, the destructive spirit mount in the whirlwind and direct the storm, let him be consoled by the information, "that all these, our actors, are mere spirits, and are dissolved into thin air." Yes, sir, these magical delusions are now vanished, and have left the American people and their Congress, in their real persons, and original American characters, engaged in the transaction of American concerns.

He said he would now proceed to examine whether the repeal of the Judiciary law of the last session of Congress would in any respect violate that salutary and practicable independence of the judges which was secured to them by the constitution. He said the terms independence of Judges or of the Judiciary Department was not to be found in the constitution. It was therefore a mere inference from some of the specified powers. And he believed, in the meaning of gentlemen, and to the extent they carry it, that the term is not to be found either in the spirit, general character, or phraseology, of any article or section of the constitution. He meant to give the constitution the most candid interpretation in his power, according to the plain and obvious import of the English language. He should discard, in his interpretation, the terms "common defence and general welfare," which had been resorted to by some gentlemen. He considered these words as containing no grant of power whatever but merely the expression of the ends or objects to be effected by the grants of specified powers. He therefore protested against drawing any aid whatever from them in his construction of the instrument. He said he had read through the whole constitution, to enable him to form his opinion upon this question, for fear there might be in some hidden corner of it some provision which might demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the present bill; and if so, (although he should lament such a provision,) he would instantly give up the bill. But his researches had terminated in a different result. He said he found, from the general character of the constitution, that the general will was its basis, the general good its object, and the fundamental principle for effecting this object was the responsibility of all public agents, either mediately or immediately to the people. He said the context of the constitution would demonstrate the two first points, which he begged to read:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

Here we find the constitution founded upon the will of the people, and the object declared to be the good of the people. Through the whole body of the constitution may be discerned the responsibility of all public agents, either mediately or immediately, to the people. This responsibility results, first, from the division of authority into different departments; secondly, from a specification and limitation of the authorities of all and each of the departments; thirdly, from periodical appointments of the public agents. The first clause declares there shall be a Congress, to whom the business of legislation is confided. This Congress is to consist of a House of Representatives, to be chosen by the people immediately, and responsible to them at the end of every two years; and a Senate, to be chosen by the Legislatures of the different States, who are chosen by the people--one-third of the Senators to be chosen every two years, and responsible at the end of every six years. The Executive power is vested in a President, who is chosen by electors, who are chosen for the express purpose by the people, and responsible at the end of every four years. The President may be considered as immediately responsible to the people, although chosen through the medium of electors; because it is found, in practice, that the electors are constrained to avow the vote they intend to give before they are chosen, and the people have generally made their elections with a view to that object.

Thus, then, are formed two departments, their powers specified and defined, the times for extending their powers fixed, and indeed a complete organization for the execution of their respective powers, without the intervention of any law for that purpose. A third department, to wit, the Judiciary Department, is still wanting. Is that formed by the constitution? How is that to be formed? It is not formed by the constitution. It is only declared that there shall be such a department; and it is directed to be formed by the other two departments, who owe a responsibility to the people. Here there arises an important difference of opinion between the different sides of this House. It is contended on one side that the Judiciary Department is formed by the constitution itself. It is contended on the other side, that the constitution does no more than to declare that there shall be a Judiciary Department, and directs that it shall be formed by the other two departments, under certain modifications. Article third, section first, the constitution has these words: "The Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." Here, then, the power to ordain and establish inferior courts is given to Congress in the most unqualified terms, and also to ordain and establish "one Supreme Court." The only limitation upon the power of Congress in this clause, consists in the number of supreme courts to be established; the limitation is to the number of one, although that is an affirmative and not a negative expression. The number of judges, the assignation of duties, the fixing compensations, the fixing the times when, and places where, the courts shall exercise their functions, &c., are left to the entire discretion of Congress. The spirit, as well as the words of the constitution, are completely satisfied, provided one Supreme Court be established. Hence, when all these essential points in the organization and formation of courts are intrusted to the unlimited discretion of Congress, it cannot be said that the courts are formed by the constitution. For further restraints, therefore, upon the discretion of Congress, the remaining part of the same section must be consulted. Here he begged leave to remark, that he had often felt a veneration for the wisdom of the sages who formed this constitution; considering the difficulties they had to encounter, resulting from the various local prejudices and local interests of the different parts of the United States, and the vast variety of opinions which the subject presented, it was almost wonderful to conceive how they should have hit upon a system so admirably calculated to protect and to promote the general interests, when administered according to its original meaning and intention. He could not go so far as to say it was perfect. He admitted, like other human productions, it was stamped with the common fallibility of man. That he wished, however, to see no radical changes in its principles. He wished to hand it down to posterity with those amendments only which experience should suggest, and which would grow out of the continually varying state of the nation. He said it was not only remarkable for the wisdom of its arrangements, but the correct and technical mode of expression. The part of the section now to be examined, was an example of the justice of both these remarks. The words are, "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

The first part of the sentence respects the relationship between the Executive and the Judiciary Departments. It respects judges or officers of the courts who are appointed by the President. The last part of the sentence respects the relationship between the Legislative and Judiciary Departments. It respects the creation of offices, the fixing the compensation of the officers or judges, and their continuance in office. These are the peculiar attributes of the Legislative Department. Accordingly, the most correct and technical words are used in relation to both these objects. The term "hold their offices during good behavior," relates merely to the Executive Department. The term "hold," is the common technical word used to convey the idea of tenure. Tenure requires two parties. The one granting, the other holding or receiving the grant. Let the inquiry be made, of whom do the judges hold? The constitution furnishes the answer, of the President. One of the most obvious rules in the construction of instruments of writing is, that the whole of it must be taken together, and not one particular part by itself. The following words will be found in the second section of the second article of the constitution: "And he (to wit, the President) shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." In the third section of the same article, are these words: "And shall (to wit, the President) commission all the officers of the United States." These three sentences contain the relationship between the Executive and Judiciary Departments, so far as respects the objects of the present discussion.

To ascertain the real meaning and import of these sentences, they should be read in connection with each other, excluding therefrom all intermediate words not immediately bearing on the subject. In that case the constitution would read thus: "He (to wit, the President) shall nominate and appoint the Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior." It may now be asked, if this case of the judges of the supreme and inferior courts be not an obvious exception out of the general Presidential discretion of appointing and commissioning all officers of the United States during pleasure? After the Government has been in operation above twelve years, and the principle of commissioning all Executive officers during pleasure, has been practised upon during the whole of the period by the Executive, as well as the Legislative Department, the propriety of that practice is for the first time now become questionable. It is said that the right to commission during pleasure, is by implication. It is readily admitted that there are no express words in the constitution to that effect; but the inference from the words which are there, is almost as strong as the words themselves, if they had been inserted. The President is authorized, without limitation, to "commission all the officers of the United States." The question arises, by what tenure? The reply is, according to his pleasure or discretion. It was not difficult to foresee, that if the President was fully empowered to commission as he pleased, he would please to commission during his pleasure. The Legislature has no more control over an officer who holds an Executive commission during the pleasure of the President, than over a Judicial officer holding his office during good behavior. The remedy given by the constitution being the same in both cases, to wit, impeachment. Nor is there any reason why the office of the one should be less subject to the discretion of the Legislature, than the office of the other; and it seems to be universally agreed, that although the Legislature cannot deprive an Executive officer of his office in any other way than by impeachment, during the continuance of such office, yet the office itself is always subject to be abolished. The same reasoning will hold with equal force respecting a judge and a Judicial office. The reason why the Executive is proscribed from the removal of a judge, is to secure to the judge a complete independence of the President, who is not responsible for the discharge of Judicial duties; but the removal is perfectly correct in the case of an Executive officer, because the President is highly responsible for the due discharge of Executive duties. The Legislature is not responsible for either, and of course stands in the same constitutional relation to both. This appears obvious from furnishing to the Legislature the same means of removing both, as will appear by the fourth section of the second article, in the following words: "The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office by impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." He now begged to call the attention of the committee particularly to the last clause of the sentence, which ascertains the constitutional connection between the Legislative and Judicial Departments, so far as respects the limitation of the Legislative, in the exercise of the power committed to it, for the organization of the Judicial Department. He should place particular emphasis on these words of the constitution in the exposition he proposed to make. The words are: "And shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." The first part of this section having given to Congress the power of creating courts, ascertaining the number of judges, &c., these last words may be considered as containing explanations and limitations of the general power of Congress, as was the foregoing part of this sentence a limitation of the general Executive power. And accordingly the most correct terms are used for limiting Legislative discretion, and explaining its objects; according to the words of this sentence, the judge is to receive a compensation for his services. To whom are these services to be rendered? To the people, for the benefit of the people. Who is to judge of the necessity or utility of these services? The constitution has ordained, that Congress, or, in other words, the Representatives of the people, shall be the tribunal. Suppose there should be no services required, none for the judge to perform, and that Congress should so think and determine: is the judge entitled to compensation? He is not. The condition of service for the benefit of the people, is the express consideration upon which the compensation accrues. No service is rendered, the competent tribunal says, there is none required, of course no compensation accrues. The judge is entitled to receive none. On this point, an obvious and most important difference of opinion exists between the two sides of the committee. On one side it is contended, that the office is the vested property of the judge, conferred on him by his appointment, and that his good behavior is the consideration of his compensation; so long, therefore, as his good behavior exists, so long his office must continue in consequence of his good behavior, and that his compensation is his property in virtue of his office, and therefore cannot be taken away by any authority whatever, although there may be no service for him to perform. On the other side, it is contended that the good behavior is not the consideration upon which the compensation accrues, but services rendered for the public good; and that if the office is to be considered as a property, it is a property held in trust for the benefit of the people, and must therefore be held subject to that condition, of which Congress is the constitutional judge. Mr. G. said, considering the boundary line between these conflicting opinions to be the boundary line between the offices held for public utility, and offices held for personal favor, he could not bestow too much attention upon this part of the discussion; for if the construction gentlemen contend for should prevail, in vain have the framers of the constitution, with so much jealous circumspection, erected so many ramparts against the introduction of some of these offices in the Government of the United States. A sinecure office is an office held without the condition of service; often for past services already compensated; often for present favor, without the condition of any service. For the purpose of excluding from the Federal Government all sinecure offices, the sages who formed the constitution have through every part of it connected services and compensation, and they ought never to be separated in construction. The sixth section of the first article is in these words: "The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law," &c., and so far has this principle of the rendition of service been carried, that the service of the Senate and Representatives is to be rendered every day, and unless they do daily render service, they are not entitled to their day's compensation. In the first section of the second article of the constitution, are these words: "The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation," &c. In the forty-first section of the act under which the judges claim their compensation, are these words: "That each of the circuit judges of the United States, to be appointed by virtue of this act, shall be allowed as a compensation for his services," &c. These expressions all demonstrate the importance of coupling the service and compensation of office. But the jealous caution of the framers of the constitution did not stop at choosing the best affirmative expression for excluding this doctrine of sinecure offices, they also applied negative restraints.

In the ninth section of the first article of the constitution, are these words, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." In the same section, "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." If then services rendered for the public benefit be the essential consideration, upon which the compensation does accrue to the judges; if the Congress be the proper tribunal for pronouncing upon the necessity or utility of such service, and if they decide that no such service is necessary or useful; the judge sustains no injury in not receiving the compensation, because he does not comply with the condition on his part; nor does he sustain a hardship thereby, because it must be presumed that he understood the second conditions attached to his office at the time of his acceptance. It has been admitted by all gentlemen, that Congress is the constitutional tribunal for deciding respecting the services to be performed. They admit that Congress may modify the courts, diminish or add to their duties, alter the terms of their sessions, or make any other arrangements respecting them which do not go to take away or diminish their compensations. It is to be observed that there is not one of these powers specified in the constitution; they are therefore necessary inferences from the paramount power "to ordain and establish," and the power of repeal, or to take away all the services to be performed, is as necessary an inference as either of the others, and has uniformly resulted from every other specified power in the constitution. From this part of the sentence, therefore, it is deducible, that the only restraint upon the general power given to Congress in the first part of the section to ordain and establish courts, is, that the compensations of the judges should not be lessened during their continuance in office; not during their good behavior. And in this part of the sentence the correct phraseology of the constitution is worthy of observation. In speaking of the Executive attribute, to wit, the appointing and commissioning officers, the term good behavior is used. In speaking of the Legislative attribute, to wit, the creation of the offices and fixing compensations, the term during their continuance in office is used. The reason for this variation of expression is obvious. It was known that the office might be discontinued, and the judge continue to behave well; the limitation was therefore applied to the office, and not the good behavior, because if the office should be discontinued, which is clearly implied in this expression, it was not the intention of the constitution that the compensation should be received, no service in that event being to be rendered. From this interpretation of the constitution, all of the departments are preserved in the due exercise of their respective functions for the general good, without any of the mischievous and absurd consequences resulting from the opposite construction. It is admitted that the first part of this section expressly vests Congress with the general power to ordain and establish courts; and, if there had been no other restriction, the consequent power to unordain, or abolish. The restriction relied upon is not a restriction in express words: there are no words in the constitution prohibiting Congress from repealing a law for organizing courts; the restraint contended for, therefore, is by implication, and that implication, to say the least, not expressly connected with any Legislative attribute. Is it right, is it a correct interpretation, that when a power is given in express words for the most important purposes, that it should be restrained or prohibited by implication? Can so much inattention and folly be attributed to the framers of the constitution, as would result from the supposition that if it was their intention that a law growing out of one of the specified powers, in contradistinction to all others, should be irrepealable when once passed, that so extraordinary a principle would be left to mere implication? Such a supposition would be the highest injustice to the superior intelligence and patriotism of those gentlemen, manifested in every other part of the instrument. No, sir, they would have made notes of admiration: they would have used every mark, adopted every caution, to have arrested and fixed the attention of the Legislature to so extraordinary a principle.

They would have said, Legislators! Be circumspect! Be cautious! Be calm! Be deliberate! Be wise! Be wise not only for the present, but be wise for posterity! You are now about to tread upon holy ground. The law you are now about to pass, is irrepealable! Irrevokable! We are so enamored with the salutary and practical independence of the English Judiciary system, that in infusing its principle into our constitution, we have stamped it with the proverbial folly of the Medes and Persians! If this principle had been introduced into the constitution in express words, it would have formed an unfortunate contrast to all other parts of the instrument; yet gentlemen make no difficulty in introducing that principle by construction, which would have appeared so stupid and absurd if written in express words in the body of the instrument. But there is no such language in the constitution. Let us see what is the language of that instrument, "The Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Here, then, instead of cautioning the Legislature that a law for the organization of courts, when passed, can never be repealed, it contains an invitation to a revision from time to time. It contains an intimation, that the subject is new and difficult, and an injunction to ordain and establish your courts from time to time, according to the results, which an experience of the system alone could suggest. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HEMPHILL) observed that the character of irrepealability was not exclusively attached to this law, and attempted to furnish instances of other laws of the same character. He instanced a law for the admission of a new State into the Union.

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. DAVIS) had given a proper reply to that remark; the strongest instance the gentleman gave, was of a law executed. After the new State is remitted into the Union, in virtue of a law for that purpose, the object of the law is answered. The State admitted has no stipulated duties to perform on its part, no services to render; in the case before the committee the law is in a state of execution, and the judges have services to render on their part which the competent tribunals may determine to be neither useful nor necessary. A law for the appropriation of money to a given object, may be adduced is an instance; the money is applied; its object is answered; the law may be said to be irrepealable, or, in other words, the repeal would produce no effect. That is not the case of the law in question. Mr. G. said he had no doubt but that the framers of the constitution had particular reference to the British act of Parliament of William III. for the establishment of the independence of the judges in that country, in framing the section for the establishment of the Judicial Department in the United States; and it is not a little remarkable, that whilst gentlemen in one breath speak of the independence of the English judges, as the boast and glory of that nation, in the next breath they tell us that by the repeal of the present act, the independence of the judges here would be immolated. Let this subject be examined. In the third chapter of the first book of Blackstone's Commentaries, the independence of the English Judiciary is fully explained. He begged to read the exposition of that commentator on that subject.

"And, in order to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges of the superior courts, it is enacted by the statute, 13 W. III. c. 2, that their commissions shall be made (not, as formerly, durante bene placito, but) quam diu bene se gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the address of both Houses of Parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that law in the statute of Geo. III. c. 23, enacted at the earnest recommendation of the King himself, from the Throne, the judges are continued in their offices during their good behavior, notwithstanding any demise of the Crown, (which was formerly held immediately to vacate their seats,) and their full salaries are absolutely secured to them during the continuance of their commissions. His Majesty having been pleased to declare, that "he looked upon the independence and uprightness of the judges, as essential to the impartial administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of his subjects; and as the most conducive to the honor of the Crown.""

Now, sir, under the doctrine contended for by the repeal of this law, let us see whether the judges of the United States are not more independent than the judges of England. In the first place, Congress have the power of originating, abolishing, modifying, &c., the courts here. The Parliament in England have the same power there. Congress cannot remove a judicial officer from his office so long as the office itself is deemed useful, except by impeachment, two-thirds of the Senate being necessary to a conviction. In England, judges can be removed from their offices, although the offices may be deemed useful, by an address of the majority of the two Houses of Parliament. Here then is one essential advantage in favor of the independence of the judges of the United States. Congress cannot diminish the compensation of the judges here during their continuance in office. In England, the Parliament may diminish the compensation of the judges, at their discretion, during their continuance in office. Here, then, is another obvious advantage in favor of the independence of the judges of the United States; whence is it, then, that we hear of the independence of the English judiciary, as being the boast and glory of that country, and with justice, too, and at the same time hear the cry of the immolation of the independence of the judges of the United States, when, under the interpretation of the constitution by the favorers of the repeal, the judges here are more independent than the English judges? It can have no other object than to excite a popular clamor, which, if excited at all, can have only a momentary effect, and will be dissipated as soon as the subject shall be thoroughly examined and understood. But it appeared to him, that if gentlemen really do value the independence of the judges, they have taken an unfortunate ground in the interpretation of the constitution. Under their construction, the judges may be placed not only in a dependent, but a ludicrous point of view.

Gentlemen admit that Congress may constitutionally increase or diminish the duties of judges; give or take away jurisdiction; fix the times of holding courts, &c., saving therefrom the salaries of the judges. Under this admission, Congress may postpone the sessions of the courts for eight or ten years, and establish others, to whom they could transfer all the powers of the existing courts. In this case, the judges would be held up to the people as pensioners, receiving their money and rendering no service in return; or Congress might convert them into mere courts of piepoudre, assigning them the most paltry duties to perform, and keep them continually in session, in inconvenient places; whilst new courts could be erected to perform all the essential business of the nation. This would be taking down the high pretensions assigned to the judges by the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. HENDERSON,) of being formed into a permanent corps for the purpose of protecting the people against their worst enemies, themselves; and degrading them into pitiful courts of piepoudre, rendering little service and receiving large compensations. And this would be the case, if party purposes were the object, and not the general good. According to his construction, these absurd results could not take place, unless by a virtual breach of the constitution. Because, he contended, that service and compensation were correlative terms; and that there ought always to be a due apportionment of service to compensation. This he considered as the plain and sound interpretation of the constitution, and the moment it is departed from, infinite absurdities ensue. He intended to have taken another view of this subject, as it respects the relative influence of the law of the last session, and the proposed repeal upon this question; but the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BACON) has put this subject in so much stronger point of view than he could do, that he would refer to his remarks thereupon, observing only that he had no doubt but that the law of last session, now proposed to be repealed, was, in every respect, as much opposed to the doctrine of gentlemen, as the contemplated repeal could be. The sections of the law particularly alluded to, are the twenty-fourth, in these words, "and be it further enacted, that the district courts of the United States, in and for the districts of Tennessee and Kentucky, shall be and are hereby abolished," and the twenty-seventh, in these words, "and be it further enacted, that the circuit courts of the United States, heretofore established, shall cease and be abolished."

Mr. G. concluded by observing that, upon the whole view of the subject, feeling the firmest conviction that there is no constitutional impediment in the way of repealing the act in question, upon the most fair and candid interpretation of the constitution:--believing that principles advanced in opposition, go directly to the destruction of the fundamental principle of the constitution, the responsibility of all public agents to the people--that they go to the establishment of a permanent corporation of individuals invested with ultimate censorial and controlling power over all the departments of the Government, over legislation, execution, and decision, and irresponsible to the people; believing that these principles are in direct hostility to the great principle of Representative Government; believing that the courts formerly established, were fully competent to the business they had to perform, and that the present courts are useless, unnecessary, and expensive; believing that the Supreme Court has heretofore discharged all the duties assigned to it in less than one month in the year, and that its duties could be performed in half that time; considering the compensations of the judges to be among the highest given to any of the highest officers of the United States for the services of the whole year; considering the compensations of all the judges greatly exceeding the services assigned them, as well as considering all the circumstances attending the substitution of the new system for the old one, by increasing the number of judges, and compensations, and lessening their duties by the distribution of the business into a great number of hands, &c., while acting under these impressions, he should vote against the motion now made for striking out the first section of the repealing bill.

FRIDAY, February 19.

Judiciary System.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States, and for other purposes."

Mr. BAYARD.--Mr. Chairman, I must be allowed to express my surprise at the course pursued by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. GILES,) in the remarks which he has made on the subject before us. I had expected that he would have adopted a different line of conduct. I had expected it as well from that sentiment of magnanimity which ought to have been inspired by a sense of the high ground he holds on the floor of this House, as from the professions of a desire to conciliate, which he has so repeatedly made during the session. We have been invited to bury the hatchet, and brighten the chain of peace. We were disposed to meet on middle ground. We had assurances from the gentleman that he would abstain from reflections on the past, and his only wish was that we might unite in future in promoting the welfare of our common country. We confided in the gentleman's sincerity, and cherished the hope that, if the divisions of party were not banished from the House, its spirit would be less intemperate. Such were our impressions, when the mask was suddenly thrown aside, and we saw the torch of discord lighted and blazing before our eyes. Every effort has been made to revive the animosities of the House, and inflame the passions of the nation. I am at no loss to perceive why this course has been pursued. The gentleman has been unwilling to rely upon the strength of his subject, and has therefore determined to make the measure a party question. He has probably secured success, but would it not have been more honorable and more commendable to have left the decision of a great constitutional question to the understanding, and not to the prejudices of the House? It was my ardent wish to discuss the subject with calmness and deliberation, and I did intend to avoid every topic which could awaken the sensibility of party. This was my temper and design when I took my seat yesterday. It is a course at present we are no longer at liberty to pursue. The gentleman has wandered far, very far, from the points of the debate, and has extended his animadversions to all the prominent measures of the former administrations. In following him through his preliminary observations, I necessarily lose sight of the bill upon your table.

The gentleman commenced his strictures with the philosophic observation, that it was the fate of mankind to hold different opinions as to the form of government which was preferable. That some were attached to the monarchal, while others thought the republican more eligible. This, as an abstract remark, is certainly true, and could have furnished no ground of offence, if it had not evidently appeared that an allusion was designed to be made to the parties in this country. Does the gentleman suppose that we have a less lively recollection than himself of the oath which we have taken to support the constitution; that we are less sensible of the spirit of our Government, or less devoted to the wishes of our constituents? Whatever impression it might be the intention of the gentleman to make, he does not believe that there exists in this country an anti-republican party. He will not venture to assert such an opinion on the floor of this House. That there may be a few individuals having a preference for monarchy is not improbable; but will the gentleman from Virginia, or any other gentleman, affirm, in his place, that there is a party in the country who wish to establish a monarchy? Insinuations of this sort belong not to the Legislature of the Union. Their place is an election ground or an alehouse. Within these walls they are lost; abroad, they have an effect, and I fear are still capable of abusing the popular credulity.

We were next told of the parties which have existed, divided by the opposite views of promoting the Executive power and guarding the rights of the people. The gentleman did not tell us in plain language, but he wished it to be understood, that he and his friends were the guardians of the people's rights, and that we were the advocates of Executive power.

I know that this is the distinction of party which some gentlemen have been anxious to establish; but this is not the ground on which we divide. I am satisfied with the constitutional powers of the Executive, and never wished nor attempted to increase them; and I do not believe that gentlemen on the other side of the House ever had a serious apprehension of danger from an increase of Executive authority. No, sir, our views as to the powers which do and ought to belong to the General and State Governments, are the true sources of our divisions. I co-operate with the party to which I am attached, because I believe their true object and end, is an honest and efficient support of the General Government, in the exercise of the legitimate powers of the constitution.

I pray to God I may be mistaken in the opinion I entertain as to the designs of gentlemen to whom I am opposed. Those designs I believe hostile to the powers of this Government. State pride extinguishes a national sentiment. Whatever is taken from this Government is given to the States.

The ruins of this Government aggrandize the States. There are States which are too proud to be controlled; whose sense of greatness and resource renders them indifferent to our protection, and induces a belief, that if no General Government existed, their influence would be more extensive, and their importance more conspicuous. There are gentlemen who make no secret of an extreme point of depression, to which the Government is to be sunk. To that point we are rapidly progressing. But I would beg gentlemen to remember, that human affairs are not to be arrested in their course, at artificial points. The impulse now given may be accelerated by causes at present out of view. And when those who now design well, wish to stop, they may find their powers unable to resist the torrent. It is not true that we ever wished to give a dangerous strength to Executive power. While the Government was in our hands, it was our duty to maintain its constitutional balance, by preserving the energies of each branch. There never was an attempt to vary the relation of its powers. The struggle was to maintain the constitutional powers of the Executive. The wild principles of French liberty were scattered through the country. We had our Jacobins and disorganizers. They saw no difference between a King and a President, and as the people of France had put down their King, they thought the people of America ought to put down their President. They who considered the constitution as securing all the principles of rational and practical liberty, who were unwilling to embark upon the tempestuous sea of revolution, in pursuit of visionary schemes, were denounced as monarchists. A line was drawn between the Government and the people, and the friends of the Government were marked as the enemies of the people. I hope, however, that the Government and the people are now the same; and I pray to God that what has been frequently remarked may not in this case be discovered to be true, that they who have the name of people the most often in their mouths, have their true interests the most seldom at their hearts.

The honorable gentleman from Virginia wandered to the very confines of the Federal Administration, in search of materials the most inflammable and most capable of kindling the passions of his party.

He represents the Government as seizing the first moment which presented itself to create a dependent moneyed interest, ever devoted to its views. What are we to understand by this remark of the gentleman? Does he mean to say that Congress did wrong in funding the public debt? Does he mean to say that the price of our liberty and independence ought not to have been paid? Is he bold enough to denounce this measure as one of the Federal victims marked for destruction? Is it the design to tell us that its day has not yet come, but is approaching; and that the funding system is to add to the pile of Federal ruins? Do I hear the gentleman say we will reduce the army to a shadow; we will give the navy to the worms; the mint, which presented the people with the emblems of their liberty, and of their sovereignty, we will abolish; the revenue shall depend upon the winds and waves; the judges shall be made our creatures, and the great work shall be crowned and consecrated by relieving the country from an odious and oppressive public debt? These steps, I presume, are to be taken in progression. The gentleman will pause at each, and feel the public pulse. As the fever increases he will proceed, and the moment of delirium will be seized to finish the great work of destruction.

The assumption of the State debts has been made an article of distinct crimination. It has been ascribed to the worst motives--to a design of increasing a dependent moneyed interest. Is it not well known that those debts were part of the price of our Revolution? That they rose in the exigency of our affairs, from the efforts of the particular States, at times when the Federal arm could not be extended to their relief? Each State was entitled to the protection of the Union, the defence was a common burden, and every State had a right to expect that the expenses attending its individual exertions in the general cause, would be reimbursed from the public purse. I shall be permitted further to add, that the United States, having absorbed the sources of State revenue, except direct taxation, which was required for the support of the State governments, the assumption of these debts was necessary to save some of the States from bankruptcy.

The internal taxes are made one of the crimes of the Federal Administration. They were imposed, says the gentleman, to create a host of dependents on Executive favor. This supposes the past administrations to have been not only very wicked, but very weak. They laid taxes in order to strengthen their influence. Who is so ignorant as not to know, that the imposition of a tax would create a hundred enemies for one friend? The name of excise was odious; the details of collection were unavoidably expensive, and it was to operate upon a part of the community least disposed to support public burdens, and most ready to complain of their weight. A little experience will give the gentleman a new idea of the patronage of this Government. He will find it not that dangerous weapon in the hands of the administration which he has heretofore supposed it; he will probably discover that the poison is accompanied by its antidote, and that an appointment of the Government, while it gives to the administration one lazy friend, will raise up against it ten active enemies. No! The motive ascribed for the imposition of the internal taxes is as unfounded as it is uncharitable. The Federal Administration, in creating burdens to support the credit of the nation, and to supply the means of its protection, knew that they risked the favor of those upon whom their power depended. They were willing to be the victims when the public good required.

The duties on imports and tonnage furnished a precarious revenue--a revenue at all times exposed to deficiency, from causes beyond our reach. The internal taxes offered a fund less liable to be impaired by accident--a fund which did not rob the mouth of labor, but was derived from the gratification of luxury. These taxes are an equitable distribution of the public burdens. Through this medium the Western country is enabled to contribute something to the expenses of a Government which has expended and daily expends such large sums for its defence. When these taxes were laid they were indispensable. With the aid of them it has been difficult to prevent an increase of the public debt. And notwithstanding the fairy prospects which now dazzle our eyes, I undertake to say, if you abolish them this session, you will be obliged to restore them or supply their place by a direct tax before the end of two years. Will the gentleman say, that the direct tax was laid in order to enlarge the bounds of patronage? Will he deny that this was a measure to which we had been urged for years by our adversaries, because they foresaw in it the ruin of Federal power? My word for it, no administration will ever be strengthened by a patronage united with taxes which the people are sensible of paying.

We were next told, that to get an army an Indian war was necessary. The remark was extremely bald, as the honorable gentleman did not allege a single reason for the position. He did not undertake to state that it was a wanton war, or provoked by the Government. He did not even venture to deny, that it was a war of defence, and entered into in order to protect our brethren on the frontiers from the bloody scalping-knife and murderous tomahawk of the savage. What ought the government to have done? Ought they to have estimated the value of the blood which probably would be shed, and the amount of the devastation likely to be committed before they determined on resistance? They raised an army, and after great expense and various fortune, they have secured the peace and safety of the frontiers. But why was the army mentioned on this occasion, unless to fore-warn us of the fate which awaits them, and to tell us that their days are numbered? I cannot suppose that the gentleman mentioned this little army, distributed on a line of three thousand miles, for the purpose of giving alarm to three hundred thousand free and brave yeomanry, ever ready to defend the liberties of the country.

The honorable gentleman proceeded to inform the committee, that the Government, availing itself of the depredations of the Algerines, created a navy. Did the gentleman mean to insinuate, that this war was invited by the United States? Has he any documents or proof to render the suspicion colorable? No, sir, he has none. He well knows that the Algerine aggressions were extremely embarrassing to the Government. When they commenced, we had no marine force to oppose to them. We had no harbors or places of shelter in the Mediterranean. A war with these pirates could be attended with neither honor nor profit. It might cost a great deal of blood, and in the end it might be feared that a contest so far from home, subject to numberless hazards and difficulties, could not be maintained. What would gentlemen have had the Government to do? I know there are those who are ready to answer: abandon the Mediterranean trade. But would this have done? The corsairs threatened to pass the Straits, and were expected in the Atlantic. Nay, sir, it was thought that our very coasts would not have been secure.

Will gentlemen go further, and say that the United States ought to relinquish their commerce. It has been said that we ought to be cultivators of the earth, and make the nations of Europe our carriers. This is not an occasion to examine the solidity of this opinion; but I will only ask, admitting the administration were disposed to turn the pursuits of the people of this country from the ocean to the land, whether there is a power in the Government, or whether there would be if we were as strong as the Government of Turkey, or even of France, to accomplish the object? With a sea-coast of seventeen hundred miles, with innumerable harbors and inlets, with a people enterprising beyond example, is it possible to say, you will have no ships or sailors, nor merchants? The people of this country will never consent to give up their navigation, and every administration will find themselves constrained to provide means to protect their commerce.

In respect to the Algerines, the late administration were singularly unfortunate. They were obliged to fight or pay them. The true policy was to hold a purse in one hand and a sword in the other. This was the policy of the Government. Every commercial nation in Europe was tributary to those petty barbarians. It was not esteemed disgraceful. It was an affair of calculation, and the administration made the best bargain in their power. They have heretofore been scandalized for paying tribute to a pirate, and now they are criminated for preparing a few frigates to protect our citizens from slavery and chains! Sir, I believe on this and many other occasions, if the finger of Heaven had pointed out a course, and the Government had pursued it, yet that they would not have escaped the censure and reproaches of their enemies.

We were told that the disturbances in Europe were made a pretext for augmenting the army and navy. I will not, Mr. Chairman, at present go into a detailed view of the events which compelled the Government to put on the armor of defence, and to resist by force the French aggressions. All the world know the efforts which were made to accomplish an amicable adjustment of differences with that power. It is enough to state, that ambassadors of peace were twice repelled from the shores of France with ignominy and contempt. It is enough to say, that it was not till after we had drunk the cup of humiliation to the dregs, that the national spirit was roused to a manly resolution, to depend only on their God and their own courage for protection. What, sir, did it grieve the gentleman that we did not crouch under the rod of the Mighty Nation, and, like the petty powers of Europe, tamely surrender our independence? Would he have had the people of the United States relinquish without a struggle those liberties which had cost so much blood and treasure? We had not, sir, recourse to arms, till the mouths of our rivers were choked with French corsairs; till our shores, and every harbor, were insulted and violated; till half our commercial capital had been seized, and no safety existed for the remainder but the protection of force. At this moment a noble enthusiasm electrized the country; the national pulse beat high, and we were prepared to submit to every sacrifice, determined only that our independence should be the last. At that time an American was a proud name in Europe; but I fear, much I fear, that in the course we are now likely to pursue, the time will soon arrive when our citizens abroad will be ashamed to acknowledge their country.

The measures of 1798 grew out of the public feelings; they were loudly demanded by the public voice. It was the people who drove the Government to arms, and not (as the gentleman expressed it) the Government which pushed the people to the X, Y, Z of the political designs before they understood the A, B, C of their political principles.

But what, sir, did the gentleman mean by his X, Y, Z? I must look for something very significant--something more than a quaintness of expression, or a play upon words--in what falls from a gentleman of his learning and ability. Did he mean that the dispatches which contained those letters were impostures, designed to deceive and mislead the people of America--intended to rouse a false spirit not justified by events? Though the gentleman had no respect for some of the characters of that embassy; though he felt no respect for the Chief Justice, or the gentleman appointed from South Carolina--two characters as pure, as honorable, as exalted, as any the country can boast of--yet I should have expected that he would have felt some tenderness for Mr. Gerry, in whom his party had since given proofs of undiminished confidence. Does the gentleman believe that Mr. Gerry would have joined in the deception, and assisted in fabricating a tale which was to blind his countrymen, and to enable the Government to destroy their liberties? Sir, I will not avail myself of the equivocations or confessions of Talleyrand himself; I say these gentlemen will not dare publicly to deny what is attested by the hand and seal of Mr. Gerry.

The truth of these despatches admitted, what was your Government to do? Give us, say the Directory, 1,200,000 livres for our own purse, and purchase $15,000,000 of Dutch debt, (which was worth nothing,) and we will receive your Ministers, and negotiate for peace.

It was only left to the Government to choose between an unconditional surrender of the honor and independence of the country, or a manly resistance. Can you blame, sir, the Administration for a line of conduct which has reflected on the nation so much honor, and to which, under God, it owes its present prosperity?

These are the events of the General Government which the gentleman has reviewed in succession, and endeavored to render odious or suspicious. For all this I could have forgiven him, but there is one thing for which I will not, I cannot forgive him--I mean this attempt to disturb the ashes of the dead; to disturb the ashes of the great and good WASHINGTON! Sir, I might degrade by attempting to eulogize this illustrious character. The work is infinitely beyond my powers. I will only say, that as long as exalted talents and virtues confer honor among men, the name of WASHINGTON will be held in veneration.

After, Mr. Chairman, the honorable member had exhausted one quiver of arrows against the late Executive, he opened another, equally poisoned, against the Judiciary. He has told us, sir, that when the power of the Government was rapidly passing from Federal hands--after we had heard the thundering voice of the people which dismissed us from their service--we erected a Judiciary, which we expected would afford us the shelter of an inviolable sanctuary. The gentleman is deceived. We knew better, sir, the characters who were to succeed us, and we knew that nothing was sacred in the eyes of infidels. No, sir, I never had a thought that any thing belonging to the Federal Government was holy in the eyes of those gentlemen. I could never, therefore, imagine that a sanctuary could be built up which would not be violated. I believe these gentlemen regard public opinion, because their power depends upon it; but I believe they respect no existing establishment of the Government; and if public opinion could be brought to support them, I have no doubt they would annihilate the whole. I shall at present only say further, on this head, that we thought the reorganization of the Judicial system a useful measure, and we consider it as a duty to employ the remnant of our power to the best advantage of our country.

The honorable gentleman expressed his joy that the constitution had at last become sacred in our eyes: that we formerly held that it meant every thing or nothing. I believe, sir, that the constitution formerly appeared different in our eyes from what it appears in the eyes of the dominant party. We formerly saw in it the principles of a fair and goodly creation. We looked upon it as a source of peace, of safety, of honor, and of prosperity to the country. But now the view is changed; it is the instrument of wild and dark destruction; it is a weapon which is to prostrate every establishment to which the nation owes the unexampled blessings which it enjoys.

The present state of the country is an unanswerable commentary upon our construction of the constitution. It is true that we made it mean much; and hope, sir, we shall not be taught by the present Administration that it can mean even worse than nothing.

The gentleman has not confined his animadversions to the individual establishment, but has gone so far as to make the judges the subject of personal invective. They have been charged with having transgressed the bounds of Judicial duty, and become the apostles of a political sect. We have heard of their travelling about the country for little other purpose than to preach the Federal doctrines to the people.

Sir, I think a judge should never be a partisan. No man would be more ready to condemn a judge who carried his political prejudices or antipathies on the bench. But I have still to learn that such a charge can be sustained against the judges of the United States.

The constitution is the supreme law of the land, and they have taken pains, in their charges to grand juries, to unfold and explain its principles. Upon similar occasions they have enumerated the laws which compose our criminal code, and when some of those laws have been denounced by the enemies of the Administration as unconstitutional, the judges may have felt themselves called upon to express their judgments upon that point, and the reasons of their opinions.

So far, but no farther, I believe, the judges have gone. In going thus far, they have done nothing more than faithfully discharge their duty.

But if, sir, they have offended against the constitution or laws of the country, why are they not impeached? The gentleman now holds the sword of justice. The judges are not a privileged order; they have no shelter but their innocence. But, in any view, are the sins of the former judges to be fastened upon the new Judicial system? Would you annihilate a system because some men under part of it had acted wrong? The constitution has pointed out a mode of punishing and removing the men, and does not leave this miserable pretext for the wanton exercise of powers which is now contemplated.

The honorable member has thought himself justified in making a charge of a serious and frightful nature against the judges. They have been represented going about searching out victims of the Sedition law. But no fact has been stated; no proof has been adduced, and the gentleman must excuse me for refusing my belief to the charge, till it is sustained by stronger and better ground than assertion.

If, however, Mr. Chairman, the eyes of the gentlemen are delighted with victims, if objects of misery are grateful to his feelings, let me turn his view from the walks of the judges to the track of the present Executive. It is in this path we see the real victims of stern, uncharitable, unrelenting power. It is here, sir, we see the soldier who fought the battles of the Revolution, who spilt his blood and wasted his strength to establish the independence of his country, deprived of the reward of his services, and left to pine in penury and wretchedness. It is along this path that you may see helpless children crying for bread, and gray hairs sinking in sorrow to the grave! It is here that no innocence, no merit, no truth, no services, can save the unhappy sectary who does not believe in the creed of those in power. I have been forced upon this subject, and before I leave it, allow me to remark, that without inquiring into the right of the President to make vacancies in office during the recess of the Senate, but admitting the power to exist, yet that it never was given by the constitution to enable the Chief Magistrate to punish the insults, to revenge the wrongs, or to indulge the antipathies of the man. If the discretion exists, I have no hesitation in saying that it is abused when exercised from any other motives than the public good. And when I see the will of a President precipitating from office men of probity, knowledge, and talents, against whom the community has no complaint, I consider it as a wanton and dangerous abuse of power. And when I see men who have been the victims of this abuse of power, I view them as the proper objects of national sympathy and commiseration.

Among the causes of impeachment against the judges, is their attempt to force the sovereignties of the States to bow before them. We have heard them called an ambitious body politic; and the fact I allude to has been considered as full proof of the inordinate ambition of the body.

Allow me to say, sir, the gentleman knows too much not to know that the judges are not a body politic. He supposed, perhaps, there was an odium attached to the appellation, which it might serve his purposes to connect with the judges. But, sir, how do you derive any evidence of the ambition of the judges from their decision that the States under our Federal compact were compellable to do justice? Can it be shown, or even said, that the judgment of the court was a false construction of the constitution? The policy of later times on this point has altered the constitution, and, in my opinion, has obliterated its fairest features. I am taught by my principles that no power ought to be superior to justice. It is not that I wish to see the States humbled in dust and ashes; it is not that I wish to see the pride of any man flattered by their degradation; but it is that I wish to see the great and the small, the sovereign and the subject, bow at the altar of justice, and submit to those obligations from which the Deity himself is not exempt. What was the effect of this provision in the constitution? It prevented the States being the judges in their own cause, and deprived them of the power of denying justice. Is there a principle of ethics more clear than that a man ought not to be a judge in his own cause, and is not the principle equally strong when applied not to one man but to a collective body? It was the happiness of our situation which enabled us to force the greatest State to submit to the yoke of justice, and it would have been the glory of the country in the remotest times, if the principle in the constitution had been maintained. What had the States to dread? Could they fear injustice when opposed to a feeble individual? Has a great man reason to fear from a poor one? And could a potent State be alarmed by the unfounded claim of a single person? For my part I have always thought that an independent tribunal ought to be provided to judge on the claims against this Government. The power ought not to be in our own hands. We are not impartial, and are therefore liable, without our knowledge, to do wrong. I never could see why the whole community should not be bound by as strong an obligation to do justice to an individual, as one man is bound to do it to another.

In England the subject has a better chance for justice against the Sovereign than in this country a citizen has against a State. The Crown is never its own arbiter, and they who sit in judgment have no interest in the event of their decision.

The judges, sir, have been criminated for their conduct in relation to the Sedition act, and have been charged with searching for victims who were sacrificed under it. The charge is easily made, but has the gentleman the means of supporting it? It was the evident design of the gentleman to attach the odium of the Sedition law to the Judiciary; on this score the Judges are surely innocent. They did not pass the act; the Legislature made the law, and they were obliged by their oaths to execute it. The judges decided the law to be constitutional, and I am not now going to agitate the question. I did hope, when the law passed, that its effect would be useful. It did not touch the freedom of speech, and was designed only to restrain the enormous abuses of the press. It went no farther than to punish malicious falsehoods, published with the wicked intention of destroying the Government. No innocent man ever did or could have suffered under the law. No punishment could be inflicted till a jury was satisfied that a publication was false, and that the party charged, knowing it to be false, had published it with an evil design.

The misconduct of the judges, however, on this subject, has been considered by the gentleman the more aggravated, by an attempt to extend the principles of the Sedition act, by an adoption of those of the common law. Connected with this subject, such an attempt was never made by the judges. They have held, generally, that the Constitution of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law. Of the soundness of that opinion, I never had a doubt. I should scarcely go too far, were I to say, that, stripped of the common law, there would be neither constitution nor Government. The constitution is unintelligible without reference to the common law. And were we to go into our courts of justice with the mere statutes of the United States, not a step could be taken, not even a contempt could be punished. Those statutes prescribe no forms of pleadings; they contain no principles of evidence; they furnish no rule of property. If the common law does not exist in most cases, there is no law but the will of the judge.

I have never contended that the whole of the common law attached to the constitution, but only such parts as were consonant to the nature and spirit of our Government. We have nothing to do with the law of the Ecclesiastical Establishment, nor with any principle of monarchical tendency. What belongs to us, and what is unsuitable, is a question for the sound discretion of the judges. The principle is analogous to one which is found in the writings of all jurists and commentators. When a colony is planted, it is established subject to such parts of the law of the mother country as are applicable to its situation. When our forefathers colonized the wilderness of America, they brought with them the common law of England. They claimed it as their birthright, and they left it as the most valuable inheritance to their children. Let me say, that this same common law, now so much despised and vilified, is the cradle of the rights and liberties which we now enjoy. It is to the common law we owe our distinction from the colonists of France, of Portugal, and of Spain. How long is it since we have discovered the malignant qualities which are now ascribed to this law? Is there a State in the Union which has not adopted it, and in which it is not in force? Why is it refused to the Federal Constitution? Upon the same principle that every power is denied which tends to invigorate the Government. Without this law the constitution becomes, what perhaps many gentlemen wish to see it, a dead letter.

For ten years it has been the doctrine of our courts, that the common law was in force, and yet can gentlemen say, that there has been a victim who has suffered under it? Many have experienced its protection, none can complain of its oppression.

In order to demonstrate the aspiring ambition of this body politic, the Judiciary, the honorable gentleman stated with much emphasis and feeling that the judges had been hardy enough to send their mandate into the Executive cabinet. Was the gentleman, sir, acquainted with the fact when he made this statement? It differs essentially from what I know I have heard upon the subject. I shall be allowed to state the fact.

Several commissions had been made out by the late Administration for justices of the peace of this Territory. The commissions were complete; they were signed and sealed, and left with the clerks of the office of State to be handed to the persons appointed. The new Administration found them on the Clerk's table, and thought proper to withhold them. These officers are not dependent on the will of the President. The persons named in the commissions considered that their appointments were complete, and that the detention of their commissions was a wrong, and not justified by the legitimate authority of the Executive. They applied to the Supreme Court for a rule upon the Secretary of State, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding him to deliver up the commissions. Let me ask, sir, what could the judges do? The rule to show cause was a matter of course upon a new point, at least doubtful. To have denied it, would have been to shut the doors of justice against the parties. It concludes nothing, neither the jurisdiction nor the regularity of the act. The judges did their duty; they gave an honorable proof of their independence. They listened to the complaint of an individual against your President, and have shown themselves disposed to grant redress against the greatest man in the Government. If a wrong has been committed, and the constitution authorizes their interference, will gentlemen say that the Secretary of State, or even the President, is not subject to law? And if they violate the law, where can we apply for redress but to our courts of justice? But, sir, it is not true that the judges issued their mandate to the Executive; they have only called upon the Secretary of State to show them that what he has done is right. It is but an incipient proceeding which decides nothing.

To show the inexpediency of the present bill, I shall endeavor to prove the expediency of the judicial law of the last session. In doing this it will be necessary to take a view of the leading features of the pre-existing system, to inquire into its defects, and to examine how far the evils complained of were remedied by the provisions of the late act. It is not my intention to enter into the details of the former system; it can be necessary only to state so much as will distinctly show its defects.

There existed, sir, a Supreme Court, having original cognizance in a few cases, but principally a court of appellate jurisdiction. This was the great national court of dernier resort. Before this tribunal, questions of unlimited magnitude and consequence, both of a civil and political nature, received their final decision; and I may be allowed to call it the national crucible of justice, in which the judgments of inferior courts were to be reduced to their elements and cleansed from every impurity. There was a Circuit Court, composed in each district of a judge of the Supreme Court and the district judge. This was the chief court of business both of a civil and criminal nature.

In each district a court was established for affairs of revenue, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present argument to give a more extensive outline of the former plan of our Judiciary. We discover that the judges of the Supreme Court, in consequence of their composing a part of the circuit courts, were obliged to travel from one extremity to the other of this extensive country. In order to be in the court-house two months in the year they were forced to be upon the road six. The Supreme Court being the court of last resort, having final jurisdiction over questions of incalculable importance, ought certainly to be filled with men not only of probity, but of great talents, learning, patience, and experience. The union of these qualities is rarely, very rarely found in men who have not passed the meridian of life. My Lord Coke tells us no man is fit to be a judge until he has numbered the lucubrations of twenty years. Men of studious habits are seldom men of strong bodies. In the course of things it could not be expected that men fit to be judges of your Supreme Courts would be men capable of traversing the mountains and wildernesses of this extensive country? It was an essential and great defect in this court, that it required in men the combination of qualities, which it is a phenomenon to find united. It required that they should possess the learning and experience of years and the strength and activity of youth. I may say further, Mr. Chairman, that this court, from its constitution, tended to deterioration and not to improvement. Your judges, instead of being in their closets and increasing by reflection and study their stock of wisdom and knowledge, had not even the means of repairing the ordinary waste of time. Instead of becoming more learned and more capable, they would gradually lose the fruits of their former industry. Let me ask if this was not a vicious construction of a court of the highest authority and greatest importance in the nation? In a court from which no one had an appeal and to whom it belonged to establish the leading principles of national jurisprudence?

In the constitution of this court, as a court of last resort, there was another essential defect. The appeals to this court are from the circuit courts. The circuit court consists of the district judge and a judge of the Supreme Court. In cases where the district judge is interested, where he has been counsel, and where he has decided in the court below, the judge of the Supreme Court alone composes the circuit court. What, then, is substantially the nature of this appellate jurisdiction? In truth and practice, the appeal is from a member of a court to the body of the same court. The circuit courts are but emanations of the Supreme Court. Cast your eyes upon the Supreme Court; you see it disappear, and its members afterwards arising in the shape of circuit judges. Behold the circuit judges; they vanish, and immediately you perceive the form of the Supreme Court appearing. There is, sir, a magic in this arrangement which is not friendly to justice. When the Supreme Court assembles, appeals come from the various circuits of the United States. There are appeals from the decisions of each judge. The judgments of each member pass in succession under the revision of the whole body. Will not a judge, while he is examining the sentence of a brother to-day, remember that that brother will sit in judgment upon his proceedings to-morrow? Are the members of a court thus constituted, free from all motive, exempt from all bias, which could even remotely influence opinion on the point of strict right? and yet let me ask emphatically, whether this court, being the court of final resort, should not be so constituted that the world should believe and every suitor be satisfied, that in weighing the justice of a cause, nothing entered the scales but its true merits?

Your Supreme Court, sir, I have never considered as any thing more than the judges of assize sitting in bank. It is a system with which perhaps I should find no fault, if the judges sitting in bank did not exercise a final jurisdiction. Political institutions should be so calculated as not to depend upon the virtues, but to guard against the vices and weaknesses of men. It is possible that a judge of the Supreme Court would not be influenced by the esprit du corps, that he would neither be gratified by the affirmance, nor mortified by the reversal of his opinions; but this, sir, is estimating the strength and purity of human nature upon a possible, but not on its ordinary scale.

I believe, said Mr. B., that in practice the formation of the Supreme Court frustrated, in a great degree, the design of its institution. I believe that many suitors were discouraged from seeking a revision of the opinions of the circuit court, by a deep impression of the difficulties to be surmounted in obtaining the reversal of the judgment of a court from the brethren of the judge who pronounced the judgment. The benefit of a court of appeals, well constituted, is not confined to the mere act of reviewing the sentence of an inferior court; but is more extensively useful by the general operation of the knowledge of its existence upon inferior courts. The power of uncontrollable decision is of the most delicate and dangerous nature. When exercised in the courts, it is more formidable than by any other branch of our government. It is the Judiciary only which can reach the person, the property, or life of an individual. The exercise of their power is scattered over separate cases, and creates no common cause. The great safety under this power arises from the right of appeal. A sense of this right combines the reputation of the judge with the justice of the cause. In my opinion, it is a strong proof of the wisdom of a judicial system when few causes are carried into the court of the last resort. I would say, if it were not paradoxical, that the very existence of a court of appeals ought to destroy the occasion for it. The conscience of the judge, sir, will no doubt be a great check upon him in the unbounded field of discretion created by the uncertainty of law; but I should, in general cases, more rely upon the effect produced by his knowledge, that an inadvertent or designed abuse of power was liable to be corrected by a superior tribunal. A court of appellate jurisdiction, organized upon sound principles, should exist, though few causes arose for their decision; for it is surely better to have a court and no causes, than to have causes and no court. I now proceed, sir, to consider the defects which are plainly discernible, or which have been discovered by practice in the constitution of the circuit courts. These courts, from information which I have received, I apprehend were originally constructed upon a fallacious principle. I have heard it stated that the design of placing the judges of the Supreme Court in the circuit courts, was to establish uniform rules of decision throughout the United States. It was supposed that the presiding judges of the circuit courts, proceeding from the same body, would tend to identify the principles and rules of decision in the several districts. In practice, a contrary effect has been discovered to be produced by the peculiar organization of these courts. In practice we have found not only a want of uniformity of rule between the different districts, but no uniformity of rule in the same district. No doubt there was a uniformity in the decisions of the same judge; but as the same judge seldom sat twice successively in the same district, and sometimes not till after an interval of two or three years, his opinions were forgotten or reversed before he returned. The judges were not educated in the same school. The practice of the courts, the forms of proceeding, as well as the rules of property, are extremely various in the different quarters of the United States. The lawyers of the Eastern, the Middle, and Southern States, are scarcely professors of the same science. These courts were in a state of perpetual fluctuation. The successive terms gave you courts in the same district, as different from each other as those of Connecticut and Virginia. No system of practice could grow up, no certainty of rule could be established. The seeds sown in one term scarcely vegetated before they were trodden under foot. The condition of a suitor was terrible; the ground was always trembling under his feet. The opinion of a former judge was no precedent to his successor. Each considered himself bound to follow the light of his own understanding. To exemplify these remarks, I will take the liberty of stating a case which came under my own observation. An application before one judge was made to quash an attachment in favor of a subsequent execution creditor; the application was resisted upon two grounds, and the learned judge, to whom the application was first made, expressing his opinion in support of both grounds, dismissed the motion. At the succeeding court, a different judge presided, and the application was renewed and answered upon the same grounds. The second learned judge was of opinion, that one point has no validity, but he considered the other sustainable, and was about also to dismiss the motion, but upon being pressed, at last consented to grant a rule to show cause. At the third term, a third learned judge was on the bench, and though the case was urged upon its former principles, he was of opinion, that both answers to the application were clearly insufficient, and accordingly quashed the attachment. When the opinions of his predecessors were cited, he replied, that every man was to be saved by his own faith.

Upon the opinion of one judge, a suitor would set out in a long course of proceedings, and after losing much time and wasting much money, he would be met by another judge, who would tell him he had mistaken his road, that he must return to the place from which he started, and pursue a different track. Thus it happened as to the chancery process to compel the appearance of a defendant. Some of the judges considered themselves bound by the rules in the English books, while others conceived that a power belonged to the court, upon the service of a subpoena, to make a short rule for the defendant to appear and answer, or that the bill should be taken pro confesso. A case of this kind occurred where much embarrassment was experienced. In the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, a bill in chancery was filed against a person, who then happened to be in that district, but whose place of residence was in the North-western Territory. The subpoena was served, but there was no answer nor appearance. The court to which the writ was returned, without difficulty, upon an application, granted a rule for the party to appear and answer at the expiration of a limited time, or that the bill be taken pro confesso. A personal service of this rule being necessary, the complainant was obliged to hire a messenger to travel more than a thousand miles to serve a copy of the rule. At the ensuing court, affidavit was made of the service, and a motion to make the rule absolute. The scene immediately changed, a new judge presided, and it was no longer the same court.

The authority was called for to grant such a rule. Was it warranted by any act of Congress, or by the practice of the State? It was answered there is no act of Congress--the State has no court of chancery. But this proceeding was instituted, and has been brought to its present stage at considerable expense, under the direction of this court. The judge knew of no power the court had to direct the proceeding, and he did not consider that the complainant could have a decree upon this bill without going through the long train of process found in the books of chancery practice. The complainant took this course, and at a future time was told by another judge, that he was incurring an unnecessary loss of time and money, and that a common rule would answer his purpose. I ask you, Mr. Chairman, if any system could be devised more likely to produce vexation and delay? Surely, sir, the law is uncertain enough in itself, and its paths sufficiently intricate and tedious, not to require that your suitors should be burdened with additional embarrassments by the organization of your courts.

The circuit is the principal court of civil and criminal business; the defects of this court were, therefore, most generally and sensibly felt. The high characters of the judges at first brought suitors into the courts; but the business was gradually declining, though causes belonging to the jurisdiction of the courts were multiplying, the continual oscillation of the court baffled all conjecture as to the correct course of the proceeding or the event of a cause. The law ceased to be a science. To advise your client it was less important to be skilled in the books than to be acquainted with the character of the judge who was to preside. When the term approached, the inquiry was, what judge are we to have? What is his character as a lawyer? Is he acquainted with chancery law? Is he a strict common lawyer, or a special pleader?

When the character of the judge was ascertained, gentlemen would then consider the nature of their causes, determine whether it was more advisable to use means to postpone or to bring them to a hearing.

The talents of the judges rather increased the evil, than afforded a corrective for the vicious constitution of these courts. They had not drawn their knowledge from the same sources. Their systems were different, and hence the character of the court more essentially changed at each successive term. These difficulties and embarrassments banished suitors from the court, and without more than a common motive, recourse was seldom had to the Federal tribunals.

I have ever considered it, also, as a defect in this court, that it was composed of judges of the highest and lowest grades. This, sir, was an unnatural association; the members of the court stood on ground too unequal to allow the firm assertion of his opinion to the district judge. Instead of being elevated, he felt himself degraded by a seat upon the bench of this court. In the district court he was every thing, in the circuit court he was nothing. Sometimes he was obliged to leave his seat, while his associate reviewed the judgment which he had given in the court below. In all cases he was sensible that the sentences in the court in which he was, were subject to the revision and control of a superior jurisdiction where he had no influence, but the authority of which was shared by the judge with whom he was acting. No doubt in some instances the district judge was an efficient member of this court, but this never arose from the nature of the system, but from the personal character of the man. I have yet, Mr. Chairman, another fault to find with the ancient establishment of the circuit courts. They consisted only of two judges, and sometimes of one. The number was too small, considering the extent and importance of the jurisdiction of the court. Will you remember, sir, that they held the power of life and death, without appeal? That their judgments were final over sums of two thousand dollars, and their original jurisdiction restrained by no limits of value, and that this was the court to which appeals were carried from the district court.

I have often heard, sir, that in a multitude of counsel there was wisdom, and if the converse of the maxim be equally true, this court must have been very deficient. When we saw a single judge reversing the judgment of the district court, the objection was most striking, but the court never had the weight which it ought to have possessed, and would have enjoyed had it been composed of more members. But two judges belonged to the court, and inconvenience was sometimes felt from a division of their opinions. And this inconvenience was but poorly obviated by the provision of the law that in such cases the cause should be continued to the succeeding term, and receive its decision from the opinion of the judge who should then preside.

I do not pretend, Mr. Chairman, to have enumerated all the defects which belonged to the former judicial system. But I trust those which I have pointed out, in the minds of candid men, will justify the attempt of the Legislature to revise that system, and to make a fairer experiment of that part of the plan of our constitution which regards the Judicial power. The defects, sir, to which I have alluded, had been a long time felt and often spoken of. Remedies had frequently been proposed. I have known the subject brought forward in Congress or agitated in private, ever since I have had the honor of a seat upon this floor. I believe, sir, a great and just deference for the author of the ancient scheme prevented any innovation upon its material principles; there was no gentleman who felt the deference more than myself, nor should I have ever hazarded a change upon speculative opinion. But practice had discovered defects which might well escape the most discerning mind in planning the theory. The original system could not be more than experiment; it was built upon no experience. It was the first application of principles to a new state of things. The first judicial law displays great ability, and it is no disparagement of the author to say its plan is not perfect.

I know, sir, that some have said, and perhaps not a few have believed, that the new system was introduced not so much with a view to its improvement of the old, as to the places which it provided for the friends of the Administration. This is a calumny so notoriously false, and so humble, as not to require nor to deserve an answer upon this floor. It cannot be supposed that the paltry object of providing for sixteen unknown men could have ever offered an inducement to a great party basely to violate their duty, meanly to sacrifice their character, and foolishly to forego all future hopes.

I now come, Mr. Chairman, to examine the changes which were made by the late law. This subject has not been correctly understood. It has every where been erroneously represented. I have heard much said about the additional courts created by the act of last session. I perceive them spoken of in the President's Message. In the face of this high authority, I undertake to state, that no additional court was established by that law. Under the former system there was one Supreme Court, and there is but one now. There were seventeen district courts, and there are no more now. There was a circuit court held in each district, and such is the case at present. Some of the district judges are directed to hold their courts at new places, but there is still in each district but one district court. What, sir, has been done? The unnatural alliance between the Supreme and district courts has been severed, but the jurisdiction of both these courts remains untouched. The power or authority of neither of them has been augmented or diminished. The jurisdiction of the circuit court has been extended to the cognizance of debts of four hundred dollars, and this is the only material change in the power of that court. The chief operation of the late law is a new organization of the circuit courts. To avoid the evils of the former plan, it became necessary to create a new corps of judges. It was considered that the Supreme Court ought to be stationary, and to have no connection with the judges over whose sentences they had an appellate jurisdiction.

To have formed a circuit court out of the district judges, would have allowed no court of appeal from the district court, except the Supreme Court, which would have been attended with great inconvenience. But this scheme was opposed by a still greater difficulty. In many districts the duties of the judge require a daily attention. In all of them business of great importance may on unexpected occurrences require his presence.

This plan was thought of; it was well examined and finally rejected, in consequence of strong objections to which it was liable. Nothing therefore remained but to compose the circuit court of judges distinct from those of the other courts. Admitting the propriety of excluding from this court the judges of the Supreme and district courts, I think the late Congress cannot be accused of any wanton expense, nor even of a neglect of economy in the new establishment. This extensive country has been divided into six circuits, and three judges appointed for each circuit. Most of the judges have twice a year to attend a court in three States, and there is not one of them who has not to travel further, and who in time will not have more labor to perform than any judge of the State courts. When we call to mind that the jurisdiction of this court reaches the life of the citizen, and that in civil cases its judgments are final to a large amount, certainly it will not be said that it ought to have been composed of less than three judges. One was surely not enough, and if it had been doubtful whether two were not sufficient, the inconvenience which would have frequently arisen from an equal division of opinion, justifies the provision which secures a determination in all cases.

It was, additionally, very material to place on the bench of this court a judge from each State, as the court was in general bound to conform to the law and the practice of the several States.

I trust, sir, the committee are satisfied that the number of judges which compose the circuit court is not too great, and that the Legislature would have been extremely culpable to have committed the high powers of this court to fewer hands. Let me now ask, if the compensation allowed to these judges is extravagant? It is little more than half the allowance made to the judges of the Supreme Court. It is but a small proportion of the ordinary practice of those gentlemen of the bar, who are fit, and to whom we ought to look to fill the places. You have given a salary of two thousand dollars. The puisne judges of Pennsylvania, I believe, have more. When you deduct the expenses of the office, you will leave but a moderate compensation for service, but a scanty provision for a family. When, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen coolly consider the amendments of the late law, I flatter myself their candor will at least admit that the present modification was fairly designed to meet and remedy the evils of the old system.

The Supreme Court has been rendered stationary. Men of age, of learning, and of experience, are now capable of holding a seat on the bench; they have time to mature their opinions in causes on which they are called to decide, and they have leisure to devote to their books, and to augment their store of knowledge. It was our hope, by the present establishment of the court, to render it the future pride, and honor, and safety of the nation. It is this tribunal which must stamp abroad the judicial character of our country. It is here that ambassadors and foreign agents resort for justice; and it belongs to this high court to decide finally, not only on controversies of unlimited value between individuals, and on the more important collision of State pretensions, but also upon the validity of the laws of the States, and of this Government. Will it be contended that such great trusts ought to be reposed in feeble or incapable hands? It has been asserted that this court will not have business to employ it. The assertion is supported neither by what is past, nor by what is likely to happen. During the present session of Congress, at their last term, the court was fully employed for two weeks in the daily hearing of causes. But its business must increase. There is no longer that restraint upon appeals from the circuit court, which was imposed by the authority of the judge of the court to which the appeal was to be carried; no longer will the apprehension of a secret unavoidable bias in favor of the decision of a member of their own body, shake the confidence of a suitor, in resorting to this court, who thinks that justice has not been done to him in the court below. The progressive increase of the wealth and population of the country, will unavoidably swell the business of the court. But there is a more certain and unfailing source of employment, which will arise in the appeals from the courts of the National Territory. From the courts of original cognizance in this Territory, it affords the only appellate jurisdiction. If gentlemen will look to the state of property of a vast amount in this city, they must be satisfied that the Supreme Court will have enough to do for the money which is paid them.

Mr. RANDOLPH said that he did not rise for the purpose of assuming the gauntlet which had been so proudly thrown by the Goliath of the adverse party; not but that he believed even his feeble powers, armed with the simple weapon of truth, a sling and a stone, capable of prostrating on the floor that gigantic boaster, armed cap-à-pie as he was; but that he was impelled by the desire to rescue from misrepresentation the arguments of his colleague, (Mr. GILES,) who was now absent during indisposition. That absence, said Mr. R., is a subject of peculiar regret to me, not only because I could have wished his vindication to have devolved on abler hands, but because he had to-day lost the triumph which, yesterday, he could not have failed to enjoy; that of seeing his opponent reduced to the wretched expedient of perverting and mutilating his arguments through inability to meet and answer them. Mr. R. said, that this was the strongest proof which could be given of inadequacy to refute any position. He, therefore, left to the gentleman the victory which he had obtained over his own arguments; but, while he felt no disposition to disturb him in this enjoyment, he hoped he should be permitted to correct some of the misstatements which had been made of his colleague's observations.

In the view which he had taken of the conduct of our predecessors, in the chain of whose measures the law now proposed to be repealed formed an important link, the funding of the debt of the United States, and the assumption of those of the individual States, were comprehended. An attempt is made to construe this disapprobation into a design of violating the public faith. Mr. R. denied that one syllable had fallen from his colleague, indicative of a right, or disposition on his part, to withhold the payment of any public engagements. Against these destructive measures his colleague had raised his voice; against the fatal and absurd maxim, that a public debt was a public blessing, he had indeed protested; but not a word escaped his lips, because no such sentiment lurked in his heart, which could be construed into a declaration that the present Legislature possessed the same power over the engagements of former Legislatures which they possessed over ordinary laws; that of modifying or abrogating them with the same freedom which had been exercised in their establishment. Since the gentleman had betrayed such peculiar sensibility on the subject of the debt, Mr. R. relied on his support, when a measure should be brought forward for its final and rapid extinguishment, not by a sponge, but by a fair reimbursement of one hundred cents for every dollar due.

On other topics, the Algerine depredations, Indian war, &c., it might as easily be shown that the representation had been equally unfair. He should not dwell upon them, because they were less calculated to make the unfavorable impression on the public mind, which had been attempted on the subject of the debt. He would dismiss them with a single remark: the uses to which these incidents were applied, and not the events themselves, formed the subject of his colleague's animadversions.

But to the long catalogue of unpopular acts which have deprived their authors of the public confidence, the gentleman tells us, he and his friends were "goaded" by the clamor of their opponents. He solemnly assures us, that in the adoption of those measures they clearly foresaw the downfall of their power; but impressed with a conviction that they were essential to the public good, and disdaining all considerations of a personal nature, they nobly sacrificed their political existence on the altar of the general welfare; and we are called upon now to revere in them the self-immolated victims at the shrine of patriotism. These are, indeed, lofty pretensions; and although I shall not peremptorily deny, in this age of infidelity, I may be permitted to doubt them; for I call upon this committee to decide whether, in this day's discussion, the gentleman has evinced that purity of heart, or that elevation of sentiment, which could justify me in clothing him with the attributes of Curtius or of the Decii?

I wish especially to know, whether the common law of libels which attaches to this constitution, be the doctrine laid down by Lord Mansfield, or that which has immortalized Mr. Fox? And whether the jurisdiction thus usurped over the press, in defiance of an express amendatory clause, which must be construed to annul every previous provision, if any such there be, which comes within its purview, be an example adduced to illustrate the position, which I certainly shall never contest, that "what the constitution does not permit to be done by direct means, cannot, constitutionally, be indirectly effected?" But to reconcile us to this usurpation, we are informed, that the principles of the common law are favorable only to liberty; that they neither have been, nor can be enlisted in the cause of persecution. If I did not misunderstand the gentleman, he said that no prosecution had occurred under that law. He has therefore never heard of the case of Luther Baldwin. I speak of the New Jersey case; nor that of Williams. Other instances, I learn from high authority, have taken place in Vermont.

Mr. R. said he was unhackneyed in the ways of majorities; his experience had been very limited; but was he to conclude, from these observations, that it was the common law, the uniform usage heretofore of this Government, for this House to be the mere instrument for effecting the Executive will, a Chamber for enregistering Presidential edicts? It is said, that the document on this subject was one which the Executive had no right to lay before the House. When did the right of the President to recommend modifications of the Judiciary system cease? Such recommendations had heretofore formed a prominent feature in two successive Executive communications made at the commencement of two successive sessions of Congress. Did the right of the Executive to recommend, and of Congress to act, cease at the precise period when the faultless model of the last session was perfected? Mr. R. said, that the gentleman from Delaware had taken such a range, and thrown out such a vast deal of matter, that, in attempting to reply to some of his observations, he was necessarily led into many desultory remarks. The present system, it seems, was necessary, from the inevitable corporeal infirmity of the judges: the unavoidable effect of the tedious probation indispensable to that venerable station.

Let us compare the former practice with the present theory. The judge of one of the two districts into which Virginia had been divided, was contemporary with him at school. He is certainly neither an infirm nor hoary sage. His associate from Maryland had been an active and gallant partisan at the siege of Pensacola, during our Revolutionary war: not contending, however, under those banners where you would have expected to find a man who occupies so dignified a station under the Government of the United States; but fighting the battles of his King. Bravely, yet, alas! unsuccessfully contending against the spirit of insubordination and jacobinism which threatens to sweep from the earth every thing valuable to man, against which the gentleman from Delaware is also eager to enter the lists. The selections which have been made from either House of Congress seem to have had as little reference to age and experience, which are said to be indispensable to the Judicial character. Upon a subject connected with those appointments, we have been told that the Executive had a right to presume a vacancy in all cases where a judge of an inferior tribunal had been appointed to a seat on the bench of a superior court; and that the new office vests, not at the time when the judge is notified of his promotion, nor at the date of his acceptance, but from the date of his commission. Mr. R. said, that he certainly did not mean to contend with the gentleman from Delaware on points of law, yet he would put a question to that gentleman. It will readily be conceded, that the vacating of the former office is the condition of the acceptance of the latter. Suppose a judge, after the date of his new commission, but prior to his notification or acceptance thereof, perform a Judicial act, was that act, therefore, invalid? Could his successor, on the receipt of his commission, exercise the functions of judge, prior to the resignation of the former incumbent? Could any office be at the same time in the possession of two persons? Did not this doctrine imply a right on part of the Government to anticipate the resignation of any judge, to compel his assent to an act vacating his office? The new commission, under these circumstances, either did or did not give a claim to its possessor on the office. If it did not, the Executive had a right to withhold it. If it did, a judge may be expelled from office, without his consent, and provided, at any time afterwards he shall acquiesce, the expulsion is legal. Besides, by what authority does a member of this House hold his seat under an election previous to his appointment of district judge of North Carolina? For this office a commission was issued, as I am credibly informed. But, sir, we shall be told, that the manner in which this affair was transacted ought not to affect our decision. It is with me an irrefragable proof of the inexpediency of the law, and of course conclusive evidence of the expediency of its repeal.

But the constitution is said to forbid it. And here permit me to express my satisfaction, that gentlemen have agreed to construe the constitution by the rules of common sense. This mode is better adapted to the capacity of unprofessional men, and will preclude the gentleman from arrogating to himself, and half a dozen other characters in this committee, the sole right of expounding that instrument, as he had done in the case of the law which is proposed to be repealed. Indeed, as one of those who would be unwilling to devolve upon that gentleman the high priesthood of the constitution, and patiently submit to technical expositions which I might not even comprehend, I am peculiarly pleased that we are invited to exercise our understandings in the construction of this instrument. A precedent, said to be quite analogous, has been adduced--the decision of the judges of Virginia, on a similar question. A pamphlet, entitled "A Friend to the Constitution," has been quoted. Public opinion informs me that this is the production of the pen of a gentleman who holds a pre-eminent station on the Federal bench. Am I so to consider it? If this be understood, it is entitled to high respect; the facts, at least, must be unquestionable.

The courts of Virginia consisted of one general court of common law; a court of chancery, composed of three judges; and a court of admiralty. The judges of all those courts held their office during good behavior; and did, by law, constitute a court of appeals. The general court becoming manifestly incompetent to the extensive duties assigned to it, a system of circuit courts was adopted in 1787, and the judges of the court of appeals were appointed to ride the circuits. This law the judges pronounced unconstitutional, and agreed, unanimously, to remonstrate against it. After lamenting the necessity of deciding between the constitution and the law, and that, in a case personally interesting to themselves, they say, "on this view of the subject, the following alternatives presented themselves; either to decide the question, or resign their offices. The latter would have been their choice, if they could have considered those questions as affecting their individual interests only." Yes, sir, and such was the character of those men, that none doubted the sincerity of this declaration. They then go on to declare, that the Legislature have no right even to increase their duties, by a modification of the courts; a privilege for which no one here has contended. In respect, much more, it is believed, to the characters of those venerable men, than to this opinion, the Legislature did not enforce the new regulations. The law was new-modelled, a separate court of appeals established, the judges of which were to be elected by joint ballot, in conformity with the constitution. New members were added to the general court, and it was declared to be their duty to ride the circuits. The judges of chancery, of the general court, and court of admiralty, who had not been elected, in pursuance of the constitution, judges of appeals, but on whom that duty was imposed by law, were relieved from the further discharge of it. In this arrangement several of the judges were understood to have been consulted; and on the ballot the six senior judges were elected, five into the court of appeals, and the sixth in the court of chancery. Nevertheless, against this law the judges also protested, as an invasion of the Judiciary establishment, denying the right of the Legislature to deprive them of office in any other mode than is pointed out in the constitution, (impeachment;) but to make way for the present salutary system, they do, in their mere free will, resign their appointments as judges of the court of appeals, and as they do not hold any separate commission for that office, which might be returned, they do order the same to be recorded.

Now, sir, I shall not contend, as I certainly might, and with great reason, that the practice of Virginia must be considered as settling the constitutional doctrine of the State, the opinions of individuals, however enlightened and respectable, notwithstanding; under which practice two chancellors have been removed from their office of judges in chancery, as well as of appeals, and the judges of the general court and court of admiralty also divested of their seats on the bench of the court of appeals, although a court of appeals was supposed necessary, and was retained in the new system; nor shall I insist on the disparity between the stability of the Judicial branch of Government in the eye of the Constitution of Virginia, and that of the United States, respectively, as surely I might. For the constitution of Virginia has a retrospect to pre-existing Judicial establishments, which experience had tested, which were allowed to be beneficial, and which it is contended were sanctioned by it. That of the United States, formed when the Confederacy had no such establishments, is to be created, from time to time: in other words, to be modified, as experience shall point out their defects--this power being devolved on a body constituted by express unalterable provisions. No, sir, I shall not dilate upon these forcible topics; I will concede, for argument sake, that the doctrine contended for by the judges of Virginia, was the true constitutional doctrine, and will apply it to the bill on your table, having first applied it to the act on which it is intended to operate. Previous to the existence of that act, the duty of judge of the circuit court was performed by the judges of the Supreme Court, who constituted a court of appeals, and by the judges of the respective districts. These were judges of the circuit court to every intent and purpose, as completely as the judges of Virginia were judges of appeals. By the operation of the law of the last session, they have been divested of this office, and other persons have been appointed to it. Much stress is laid, much ingenuity exercised to make metaphysical distinctions between the court and the office. I will grant all that gentlemen contend for, that there is a wide distinction. Does it affect the case? Does it alter the fact? The late circuit courts were not only abolished--the persons holding the office of judge of those courts no longer hold it; they have neither been impeached, nor have they resigned. They have not even accepted any new appointment inconsistent with it, and by which it became vacant. The function of judge of the circuit court does or does not constitute an office. If it does, then the judges of the supreme and district courts have been deprived of their offices, (the discharge of whose duties, be it remembered, constitutes no small part of the consideration for which they receive their salaries.) If it does not, then the circuit judges are not now about to be deprived of their offices. On the passage of the law of last session, did we hear any protest against its unconstitutionality from the Supreme or district courts? Of any resignations of the office of judge of the circuit court, in order "that a salutary system might take effect?" And yet, sir, is not that office as distinct from that of Supreme or district judge, as the office of judge of appeals in Virginia is from that of judge of the general court, chancery, or admiralty? Are not the jurisdictions of those courts separate and distinct? Both never having original jurisdiction of the same subjects; and an appeal lying from the inferior to the superior tribunal, as in Virginia, although the officers of those tribunals may be the same individuals? What, then, is the difference between taking the office of appellate jurisdiction from the judge who possessed original jurisdiction, or taking the office of original jurisdiction from the appellate judge? How is the independence of the judge more affected by the one act than by the other?

To prove the unconstitutionality of this bill, then, by a recurrence to the doctrine of the judiciary of Virginia, is to prove the unconstitutionality of the law of which it will effect the repeal. And no argument has been, or, in my poor opinion, can be, adduced, to prove the unconstitutionality of the one, which will not equally apply to the other. No, sir, gentlemen are precluded by their own act from assuming the ground of the judges of Virginia; they are obliged to concede that we have the power, because they have already exercised it, of modifying the courts, and here they concede the question. They tell you that this, however, must, to be constitutional, be a "bona fide" modification. It becomes them to prove, then, that this is a mala fide modification.

Gentlemen have not, they cannot meet the distinction between removing the judges from office for the purpose of putting in another person, and abolishing an office because it is useless or oppressive. Suppose the collectors of your taxes held their offices by the tenure of good behavior, would the abolition of your taxes have been an infraction of that tenure? Or would you be bound to retain them, lest it should infringe a private right? If the repeal of the taxes would be an infringement of that tenure, and therefore unconstitutional, could you ring all the changes upon the several duties on stamps, carriages, stills, &c., and, because you had retained the man and any one of these offices without diminishing his emoluments, abolish the others? Would not this be to impair the tenure of the office which was abolished, or to which another officer might have been appointed by a new regulation? Have not the judges, in the same manner, been deprived of one of their offices? And is not the tenure as completely impaired thereby, as if the other had been taken away also? Although it will be granted that the tenant is not so much affected, since, with one office, he has the salary formerly attached to both.

I agree that the constitution is a limited grant of power, and that none of its general phrases are to be construed into an extension of that grant. I am free to declare, that if the intent of this bill is to get rid of the judges, it is a perversion of your power to a base purpose; it is an unconstitutional act. If, on the contrary, it aims not at the displacing of one set of men, from whom you differ in political opinion, with a view to introduce others, but at the general good by abolishing useless offices, it is a constitutional act. The quo animo determines the nature of this act, as it determines the innocence or guilt of other acts. But we are told that this is to declare the Judiciary, which the constitution has attempted to fortify against the other branches of Government, dependent on the will of the Legislature, whose discretion alone is to limit their encroachments. Whilst I contend that the Legislature possess this discretion, I am sensible of the delicacy with which it is to be used. It is like the power of impeachment, or of declaring war, to be exercised under high responsibility. But the power is denied since its exercise will enable flagitious men to overturn the Judiciary, in order to put their creatures into office, and to wreak their vengeance on those who have become obnoxious by their merit. Yet the gentleman expressly says, that arguments drawn from a supposition of extreme political depravity, prove nothing; that every Government pre-supposes a certain degree of honesty in its rulers, and that to argue from extreme cases is totally inadmissible. Yet the whole of this argument is founded on the supposition of a total want of principle in the Legislature and Executive. In other words, arguments drawn from the hypothesis are irresistible when urged in favor of that gentleman's opinion; when they militate against him, they are totally inapplicable. It is said that the bill on your table cannot constitutionally be passed, because unprincipled men will pervert the power to the basest of purposes; that, hereafter, we may expect a revolution on the bench of justice, on every change of party, and the politics of the litigants, not the merits of the case, are to govern its decisions. The Judiciary is declared to be the guardian of the constitution against infraction, and the protection of the citizen, as well against Legislative as Executive oppression. Hence the necessity of an equal independence of both. For it is declared to be an absurdity, that we should possess the power of controlling a department of Government which has the right of checking us; since thereby that check may be either impaired or annihilated. This is a new doctrine of check and balance, according to which the constitution has unwisely given to an infant Legislature the power of impeaching their guardians, the judges. Apply this theory to the reciprocal control of the two branches of the Legislature over each other and the Executive, and of the Executive over them. But, sir, this law cannot be passed, because the character of the bench is to be given to it by the Legislature, to the entire prostration of its independence and impartiality. It will be conceded, that measures, such as have been portrayed, will never be taken, unless the sentiment of the ruling party is ready to support them. Although gentlemen contend, that the office of judge cannot be abolished, they are not hardy enough to deny that it may be created. Where then, sir, is the check, supposing such a state of things as the gentleman has imagined, (and which he has also declared cannot be conceived,) which shall prevent unprincipled men from effecting the same object by increasing the number of judges, so as to overrule, by their creatures, the decisions of the courts? Would not public opinion be as ready to sanction the one as the other of these detestable acts? Would not the same evil which has excited such apprehension in the minds of gentlemen, be thus effected by means even more injurious than those which they have specified? Without any breach of the constitution an unprincipled faction may effect the end which is so much apprehended from the measure now contemplated to be adopted. I might add, that, when the public sentiment becomes thus corrupt, the ties of any constitution will be found too feeble to control the vengeful ambition of a triumphant faction. The rejection of this bill does not secure the point which has furnished matter for so much declamation. Its friends are represented as grasping at power not devolved upon them by the constitution, which hereafter is to be made the instrument of destroying every judicial office, for the purpose of reviving them and filling the places with their partisans.

I have long been in the habit of attending to the arguments of the gentleman from Delaware, and I have generally found, in their converse, a ready touchstone, the test of which they are rarely calculated to withstand. If you are precluded from passing this law, lest depraved men make it a precedent to destroy the independence of your Judiciary, do you not concede that a desperate faction, finding themselves about to be dismissed from the confidence of their country, may pervert the power of erecting courts, to provide to an extent for their adherents and themselves? and that however flagrant that abuse of power, it is remediless, and must be submitted to? Will not the history of all Governments warrant the assertion, that the creation of new and unnecessary offices, as a provision for political partisans, is an evil more to be dreaded than the abolition of useless ones? Is not an abuse of power more to be dreaded from those who have lost the public confidence than from those whose interest it will be to cultivate and retain it? And does not the doctrine of our opponents prove that, at every change of administration, the number of your judges are probably to be doubled? Does it not involve the absurdity that, in spite of all constitutional prohibitions, Congress may exercise the power of creating an indefinite number of placemen, who are to be maintained through life at the expense of the community? But, when these cases are cited, you are gravely told that they suppose a degree of political depravity which puts an end to all argument. Here, sir, permit me to state an important difference of opinion between the two sides of this House. We are accused of an ambitious usurpation of power; of a design to destroy a great department of Government, because it thwarts our views, and of a lawless thirst of self-aggrandizement which no consideration can restrain. Let us not be amused by words. Let us attend to facts. They will show who are contending for unlimited, and who for limited power. The opponents of this bill contend that they did possess the power of creating offices to an indefinite amount; which, when created, were beyond the control of the succeeding Legislature. They, of course, contend for the existence of such a power in the present Legislature, for whose exercise there is no security but their self-respect. In other words, that if the present majority should incur the suspicion of the people, they may, as soon as there is any indication of their having forfeited the public confidence, on the signal of their dismissal from their present station, make ample and irrepealable provision for themselves and their adherents, by the creation of an adequate number of judicial offices. Now, sir, this is a power which we reject, though it is insisted that we possess it. We deny that such an authority does exist in us. We assert that we are not clothed with the tremendous power of erecting, in defiance of the whole spirit and express letter of the constitution, a vast judicial aristocracy over the heads of our fellow-citizens, on whose labor it is to prey. Who, then, are, in reality, the advocates of a limited authority, and who are the champions of a dangerous and uncontrollable power? In my estimation, the wisest prayer that ever was composed is that which deprecates the being led into temptation. I have no wish to be exposed myself, nor to see my friends exposed, to the dangerous allurements which the adverse doctrine holds out. Do gentlemen themselves think that the persons, whom I see around me, ought to be trusted with such powers? Figure to yourselves a set of men, whose incapacity or want of principle has brought on them the odium of their country, receiving, in the month of December, the solemn warning, that on the 4th of March following, they are to be dismissed from the helm of Government; establish the doctrine now contended for, and what may we not expect? Yes, sir, the doctrine advanced by our opponents is that of usurpation and ambition. It denies the existence of one power by establishing another infinitely more dangerous; and this you are told is to protect, through the organ of an independent judiciary, the vanquished party from the persecution of their antagonists, although it has been shown that, by increasing the number of judges, any tone whatever may be given to the bench.

The theory for which gentlemen contend seems to me far-fetched and overstrained. A mighty enginery is set in motion, which to all good purposes is ineffectual, although formidable in the perpetration of mischief. If, however, the people should be of a different opinion, I trust that at the next election they will apply the constitutional corrective. That is the true check; every other check is at variance with the principle, that a free people are capable of self-government.

But, sir, if you pass the law, the judges are to put their veto upon it by declaring it unconstitutional. Here is a new power, of a dangerous and uncontrollable nature, contended for. The decision of a constitutional question must rest somewhere. Shall it be confided to men immediately responsible to the people, or to those who are irresponsible? for the responsibility by impeachment is little less than a name. From whom is a corrupt decision most to be feared? To me it appears that the power which has the right of passing, without appeal, on the validity of your laws, is your sovereign. But an extreme case is put; a bill of attainder is passed; are the judges to support the constitution or the law? Shall they obey God or Mammon? Yet you cannot argue from such cases. But, sir, are we not as deeply interested in the true exposition of the constitution, as the judges can be? With all the deference to their talents, is not Congress as capable of forming a correct opinion as they are? Are not its members acting under a responsibility to public opinion, which can and will check their aberrations from duty? Let a case, not an imaginary one, be stated: Congress violates the constitution by fettering the press; the judicial corrective is applied to; far from protecting the liberty of the citizen, or the letter of the constitution, you find them outdoing the Legislature in zeal; pressing the common law of England to their service where the sedition law did not apply. Suppose your reliance had been altogether on this broken staff, and not on the elective principle? Your press might have been enchained till doomsday, your citizens incarcerated for life, and where is your remedy? But if the construction of the constitution is left with us, there are no longer limits to our power, and this would be true if an appeal did not lie through the elections, from us to the nation, to whom alone, and not a few privileged individuals, it belongs to decide, in the last resort, on the constitution. Gentlemen tell us that our doctrine will carry the people to the gallows if they suffer themselves to be misled into the belief that the judges are not the expositors of the constitution. Their practice has carried the people to infamous punishment, to fine and imprisonment; and had they affixed the penalty of death to their unconstitutional laws, judges would not have been wanting to conduct them to the gibbet.

Mr. MACON.--As no other member at present seems disposed to take the floor, I will ask the attention of the committee for a few minutes. I have attended with the greatest patience and diligence, to the arguments of gentlemen who oppose the bill as unconstitutional; and had they produced a single doubt in my mind on the point of constitutionality, I should most certainly have voted with them against the bill on your table; but I can with truth say, I have not heard any argument which has in the least changed my first conviction, that we have a constitutional right to pass it.

I should not, I believe, have spoken on this question, had not my colleagues, who differ with me in opinion, thought proper to bring into view a vote of the Legislature of the State, instructing her Senators and recommending it to the Representatives to use their best endeavors to obtain a repeal of the last Judiciary act. On this resolution of the State Legislature, they made some extraordinary remarks, which I mean to notice; but first permit me to inform the committee, that it has been the constant practice of the Legislature of that State, from the commencement of the General Government to the present day, to instruct her Senators, and to recommend to her Representatives, to pursue such measures on all the great national questions that have occurred, as the Legislature judged the interest of the State required, and this proceeding has never been considered improper. I shall endeavor to answer the gentlemen in the order they spoke, beginning with my colleague (Mr. HENDERSON,) who was first on the floor. If I understand him rightly, (and if I do not he will correct me, because it is not my desire to misstate a single word,) he said that the Legislature of the State might have adopted the resolutions in consequence of the Message of the President; but, upon examination of the dates, this will be found to be impossible. The message could not have reached the Legislature before the question on the resolutions was taken and decided; and on no important question was that body ever more unanimous; and though my colleague has said the question was there viewed but on one side, and decided in a manner ex parte, yet I will be bold to say, if there were any members in that Legislature who thought on this subject as he does, he enjoyed the same right there that my colleague does here, to deliver his sentiments.

Knowing as I do the great talents and integrity of my colleague, and I believe no one on this floor knows them better, I was surprised when he charged others with being under the influence of passion, when his conduct must convince them that he was guided by the very passion which he attributed to others. He quoted the Constitution of North Carolina, let us examine it, and see whether his argument can be aided by the practice under that instrument. The thirteenth article is in the following words: that "the General Assembly shall, by joint ballot of both Houses, appoint judges of the supreme court of law and of equity, judges of admiralty, and attorney general, who shall be commissioned by the Governor, and hold their offices during good behavior." On this clause he noted the independence of the State Judiciary; and they are independent so long as the law creating their office is in force, and no longer; and it is worthy of notice, that in this section, no mention is made of salary, and yet the judges have been considered as independent as the Judges of the United States. Soon after the adoption of the constitution, the Legislature of the States established courts in conformity thereto; first county courts, and then superior, and afterwards, by a Legislative act, without electing a single new judge, gave the superior courts the additional jurisdiction of a court of equity, and never a solitary complaint, that this law was unconstitutional; and it must be acknowledged, that if you can make a court of law also a court of equity, by a Legislative act, you can by the same power take it away; and what becomes, in this case, of the commission which is to be held during good behavior? It is, according to my construction, to last no longer than the law which created the office remains in force, and this is long enough to make the judges independent. As to the salary of the Judges of North Carolina, the twenty-first section of the constitution says, "they shall have adequate salaries during their continuance in office," and yet with this clear right in the Legislature, to lessen as well as to add to their salaries, the judges, it is agreed, are independent. My colleague well knows, that many attempts have been made to deprive the superior courts of exercising any jurisdiction in cases of equity; and he also knows, that attempts have been made to establish a court of appeals, which should revise the decisions of the superior courts now in being; and by the constitution of the State, any supreme court may, on presentment of a grand jury, try the governor for maladministration, &c., and I believe the present courts are authorized to do this. I have not at this place been able to see the act which gives this authority; but no doubt is entertained of the fact.

It is clear, then, that in North Carolina, all parties have thought, that "during good behavior," only meant so long as the office existed; because, by establishing a court of appeals, the judges now in being would not be supreme judges, and in all these various attempts, no one ever charged either of them to be unconstitutional. On examination of the Constitution of North Carolina, it will be found that it makes provision for the appointment of other officers by the Legislature, but says nothing about adequate compensation, except in the section last read, and if you take the office away, what is an adequate compensation for doing nothing? Another proof might be drawn from the Constitution of North Carolina, in favor of the opinion I hold, which is taken from the twenty-ninth section, that "no Judge of a Supreme Court shall have a seat in the General Assembly," and my colleague knows, that the present judges could not hold a seat there, because they are supreme judges. And he also knows, that no one ever doubted the constitutional right of the Legislature to establish the courts before mentioned; and it seems to me this, on his construction, would be a violation of the constitution, because, having once made a Supreme Court, it must always remain so, to secure, what he calls, the independence of the judges.

Sir, I was astonished when my colleague said, that the judges should hold their offices, whether useful or not, and that their independence was necessary, as he emphatically said, to protect the people against their worst enemies, themselves; their usefulness is the only true test of their necessity, and if there is no use for them, they ought not to be continued. I will here ask my colleague whether, since the year 1783, he has heard of any disorder in the State we represent, or whether any act has been done there which can warrant or justify such an opinion, that "it is necessary to have judges to protect the people from their worst enemies, themselves." I had thought we, the people, formed this Government, and might be trusted with it. My colleague never could have uttered this sentence, had he not been governed by that passion which he supposes governs others. It is true that we are not a rich and wealthy State, but it is equally true, that there is no State in the Union more attached to order and law; and my colleague himself would not say that it was necessary to have judges for this purpose in the country we represent; the people there behave decently without having Federal judges, or standing armies, to protect them against themselves. Is it not strange, that the people should have sense enough to pay their taxes without being driven to it by superior force, and not have sense enough to take care of themselves without this new Judiciary? They certainly contrived to do this before the act establishing this Judiciary passed.

Another expression of his equally astonished me; he said, that on the 7th day of December, a spirit which had spread discord and destruction in other countries, made its entry into this House. What! are we to be told, because at the last election the people thought proper to change some of their representatives, and to put out some of those who had heretofore been in power, and to put others in power of different opinions, that a destroying spirit entered into all the public functionaries? For what, sir, are elections held, if it be not that the people should change their representatives when they do not like them? And are we to be told from the house-tops, that the only use of elections is to promote, not public good, but public mischief? We are also told, that this constitution was to be destroyed by the all-devouring energies of its enemies. Who are its enemies? We are not, nor do I think there are any in this House; but there are parties as well in this House as out of doors, and no man wishes more sincerely than I do, that they were amalgamated, that we might get rid of all party gall, and free ourselves from improper reflections hereafter. But by what energy is the constitution to be destroyed? The only energy heretofore used, and which made the change so much complained of, was the energy of election. Sir, I scarcely know what to say when I hear such uncommon sentiments uttered from a head so correct and a heart so pure; it is the effect of a passion of which he is unconscious. Again he says, if you repeal this law, the rich will oppress the poor. Nothing but too much law can any where put it in the power of the rich to oppress the poor. Suppose you had no law at all, could the rich oppress the poor? Could they get six, eight or ten per cent. for money from the poor without law? If you destroy all law and government, can the few oppress the many, or will the many oppress the few? But the passing the bill will neither put it in the power of the rich to oppress the poor, nor the poor to oppress the rich. There will then be law enough in the country to prevent the one from oppressing the other. But while the elective principle remains free, no great danger of lasting oppression can be really apprehended; as long as this continues, the people will know who to trust.

We have heard much about the judges, and the necessity of their independence. I will state one fact, to show that they have power as well as independence. Soon after the establishment of the Federal Courts, they issued a writ--not being a professional man I shall not undertake to give its name--to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, directing a case then depending in the State court to be brought into the Federal Court. The State Judges refused to obey the summons, and laid the whole proceedings before the Legislature, who approved their conduct, and, as well as I remember, unanimously; and this in that day was not called disorganizing.

As so much has been said about the resolutions of North Carolina, I will repeat again, that it is no uncommon thing for the Legislature to express their opinion on great national subjects, and will ask my colleagues whether they ever heard any complaint of the resolutions about the Western land? And whether none of them in the Legislature never voted for the resolutions about the western land, nor about post-offices and post-roads? The Legislature surely had as much right to give an opinion as the Chamber of Commerce of New York; but, put it upon what footing you please, it is entitled to respect, as the uninfluenced opinion of so many respectable individuals; and the Legislature never intended nor wished that the recommendation to the representatives should be binding on them at all events; and if I believed the bill to be unconstitutional, I should not vote for it, but as I do not, I hope the gentleman will pardon me for pursuing my own sentiments, and voting for it. I hope no man will ascribe to me a disposition to produce anarchy in my native country. Although poor myself, I feel as strong a desire as any one on this floor for the preservation of good order and good government.

It has been asked, by the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. BAYARD,) will the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) say, the assuming the State debts was improper? I have no hesitation to say that it was done at an improper time; and, in showing that it was, I hope I shall be pardoned for travelling over topics that really have nothing to do with the merits of the present question. That act is now done, and, by what I say, it is not to be understood that I wish Congress should put their hands upon it. It will be noticed that Congress are authorized to establish post-offices and post-roads for the general and equal dissemination of information throughout the United States; and is it not known that no act was passed on that subject before the assumption of the State debts, and that there was only one post-road which run near the sea-coast? Of course, the people in the interior country had no communication with those in the Government, nor had they any knowledge of what was doing. But the rich speculator, who was on the spot, by going into the country where the people were ignorant of what had been done, purchased up their certificates--the only reward they had received for their toil and wounds--at about one-tenth of their value. And it is possible that many of these purchases may have been made with public money. And it is clear to me, that if a proper number of post-roads had been established, before the act was passed for assuming the State debts, the war-worn soldier would not have lost half as much as he did by the speculation on his certificates.

The gentleman from Delaware says we drove them to the direct tax. This is the first time I ever heard of a minority driving a majority. Is such a thing possible? Did we drive them to the measures that made such immense expenditures of the public money necessary? No, sir, we opposed those measures as useless; and the true ground of the direct tax is this: the public money was expended; public credit was stretched, until, to preserve it, it became necessary to provide for paying, and the means adopted were the direct tax.

The same gentleman tells us there is nothing sacred in the eyes of infidels. We know our opponents. The allusion here is too plain not to be understood; and evidently is, that those who differ with him in opinion are infidels. This is a strong expression; it would have seemed that his love of Americans ought to have prevented the use of it. I shall make no answer to it, except to remind him that in a book, the truth of which he will not deny, he will find these words, "Judge not, lest ye be judged." He also said that gentlemen might look to the Executive for victims, and not to the judges. Notwithstanding this remark, and without condemning or approving the appointments made by the late President, I hope I may be permitted to express my own ideas, without being considered as under the influence of the present President. Prior to the fourth of last March, all, or nearly all, the offices in the gift of the Executive, were in the hands of men of one political opinion. On that day, the people changed the President, because they did not like measures that had been pursued. But, to those who have attended to the debates in this House, it must appear strange, indeed, to hear gentlemen complain of the President having in office those who agree with him in opinion, when we were formerly told that the President would do wrong if he appointed to office those who differed from him in political opinion; and whenever he had done it, he had had cause to repent of it. Was that opinion then correct, and now false, in the estimation of gentlemen? For my part, I did not think the opinion correct when I first heard it, nor have I since been convinced of its propriety. Indeed, before I can think so, I must have a worse opinion of human nature than I now have, and think of men as they pretend to think of us, which God forbid! But, taking things as they are, what course, on this point, is most fair and tolerant? The community, as well as this House, is divided into two parties. It seems to me, that all the most tolerant could wish, would be an equal division of the offices between the parties, and thus you might fix a reciprocal check on each other. But I ask gentlemen to be candid, and tell me whether they are at this time equally divided? Sir, they know that there are many more persons who now fill offices who agree with them in opinion than agree with us. As to myself, I care not who fill offices, provided they act honestly and faithfully in them. I can with truth say, so little party attachment have I on this head, that I never solicited to have any man discharged from office. Knowing that a large majority of those now in office agree with those gentlemen in political opinion, I am at a loss for the cause of all this clamor. They have no doubt some reason for it, which has not been declared. The fact is, they have a majority of the offices, and a majority of the people are with us. I am contented it should be so.

The gentleman has dwelt much on a subject which, from my habits of life, I am not enabled fully to notice; I must decide for myself, and, judging with the small share of information I possess, I cannot agree with him. I do not pretend to understand the subject as well as he does, but certainly he was not so perspicuous as it might have been expected. I mean, sir, his opinion on the common law. He told us that the judges only adopted such parts of the common law of England as suited the people, and that he apprehended no danger from this. Sir, I do apprehend danger from this, because I cannot find any authority given them in the constitution to do it, and I suppose it is not an inherent right. Without pretending to know the extent of this common law, it has always appeared to me to be extremely dangerous to the rights of the people, for any person not elected by them, to undertake to exercise the power of legislating for them, and this adopting the common law is only another name for legislation. He has also told us, that the States had adopted it. If the States adopted it, it became a law of the State, and not of the United States; but the adoption of it by the individual States, could not give the judges a right to adopt it for the United States. The judges have no powers but what are given by the constitution or by statute, and this power cannot be found in either. He even told us, that the constitution was a dead letter without it. I do not believe this was the opinion of the convention that formed it, and by an examination of the debates of the State conventions that ratified it, it will not be found to be their opinion; nor is it, I believe, the opinion of all the Judges of the Supreme Court, that the constitution would be a dead letter without the common law of England. I have understood, that one of them has given it as his opinion, that the common law was not in force in the United States. The gentleman told us, that the Sedition law was constitutional, and that the judges had so determined. This we have often been told before; but, in my opinion, the contrary is the fact. I firmly believe there is no authority given in the constitution to pass that law, and although the judges agree with him in opinion, I believe the people agree with me. He, like my colleague, did not pretend to say that the judges under the old system had too much business, but too much riding. The whole burden of the song seems to be riding and salary, salary and riding; you may destroy the office, but the officer must have his salary, and this I suppose without riding. The old system was, in my opinion, equal to every object of justice contemplated by its establishment.

The gentleman has ascribed to us the wish to have the courts viciously formed. Is it possible, that he can have so degrading an idea of the American people, as to suppose they would send men here to legislate on their dearest interests, so base and corrupt, as to wish their courts so formed, that vice and not virtue should prevail in them? I am happy to say that gentleman is the only one who has uttered a sentiment so abhorrent to human nature. He also said, if you permit the State courts to execute your laws, you would have no constitution in ten years. I have not heard any one express a desire that you should have no courts, or that the State courts should execute all your laws; but I do not believe, that if the State courts were to execute your laws, that they would destroy the constitution which they are sworn to support. He has told us that we paid millions for an army which might be useless, and refused thousands to a Judiciary which was useful. As to the army, those who agree with me in sentiment, are as clear of it as it is possible for men to be of any political sin whatever; we always considered them useless, except in a small degree, and voted against them.

But, says he, this is the President's measure; he may prevent it. This is indeed a bold assertion. Are a majority of this House so degraded, so mean, so destitute of honor or morality, as to act at the nod of a President? What the majority may hereafter do, I cannot tell; but I can say, as yet they have done nothing which even the eye of criticism can find fault with. But are we to infer from these charges, that it has heretofore been the practice for the President to give the tone to the majority of the House, and to wield them about as he pleased? I had, before, a better opinion of our adversaries. I had thought, and still think, that no man can wield a majority of this House; that the House is, and has been, too independent for this; to think otherwise, would be degrading to my country. Sir, I do not believe the gentleman from Delaware himself, with all his talents, can wield those with whom he generally votes, at his will and pleasure.

Much has been said about the manner in which the late law was passed, and the purpose for which it was done. I hope I shall be pardoned for saying nothing on this subject; enough, if not too much has already been said on it; nor can I conceive that it has any thing to do with the question.

The true question is, were there courts enough under the old system, to do the business of the nation? In my opinion there were. We had no complaints that suits multiplied, or that business was generally delayed; and when gentlemen talk about Federal courts to do the business of the people, they seem to forget that there are State courts, and that the State courts have done, and will continue to do almost the whole business of the people in every part of the Union; that but very few suits can be brought into the Federal courts, compared with those that may be brought into the State courts. They will be convinced that under the old system, we had federal judges and courts enough; besides, sir, I believe each State knows best what courts they need, and if they have not enough, they have the power and can easily make more. I am sure the old system answered every purpose for the State I live in as well as the new.

He also told us, that we attempt to do indirectly what we cannot do directly. I do not know of any such attempt. The bill is certainly a direct attempt to repeal the act of the last session; but I have seen things done indirectly which I believe could not have been done directly; such was the army of volunteers; it surely was an indirect attempt to officer and get possession of the militia. The same gentleman challenges us to say there are any in the United States who prefer monarchy. In answer to this, I say, there were such during the American revolutionary war, and I have not heard that they had changed their opinion; but as he has told us there were jacobins in the country, it is not unfair to suppose there are monarchists; they being the two extremes. We are also charged with a design to destroy the whole Judiciary. If there is such a design, this is the first time I ever heard it; no attempt of the kind is yet made. But what is the fact? We only propose to repeal the act of the last session, and restore the Judiciary exactly to what it was for twelve years, and this is called destroying the Judiciary.

To complete the scene, we were told of the sword, of civil discord, and of the sword of brother drawn against brother. Why such declamation? Why do we hear of such things on this floor? It is for them to tell who use the expressions; to me they are too horrid to think of. Do gentlemen appeal to our fears, rather than to our understanding? Are we never to be clear of these alarms? They have often been tried without producing any effect. Every instrument of death is dragged into this question; sword, bayonet, hatchet, and tomahawk; and then we are told that the passing this bill may be attended with fatal consequences to the women and children. Can it be possible, sir, that the gentleman was really serious when he talked about an injury to women and children? He also told us, if you pass the bill and it should produce a civil war, not only himself but many enlightened citizens would support the judges. And have we already come to this, that enlightened citizens have determined on their side in case of a civil war, and that it is talked of in this assembly with deliberation and coolness? We certainly were not sent here to talk on such topics, but to take care of the affairs of the nation, and prevent such evils. In fact, it is our duty to take care of the nation, and not destroy it. Compare this with the conduct of the former minority. I challenge them to show any thing like it in all their proceedings. Whenever we supposed the constitution violated, did we talk of civil war? No, sir; we depended on elections as the main corner-stone of our safety; and supposed, whatever injury the State machine might receive from a violation of the constitution, that at the next election the people would elect those that would repair the injury, and set it right again; and this, in my opinion, ought to be the doctrine of us all; and when we differ about constitutional points, and the question shall be decided against us, we ought to consider it a temporary evil, remembering that the people possess the means of rectifying any error that may be committed by us.

Is the idea of a separation of these States so light and trifling an affair, as to be uttered with calmness in this deliberate assembly? At the very idea I shudder, and it seems to me that every man ought to look on such a scene with horror, and shrink from it with dismay. Yet some gentlemen appear to be prepared for such an event, and have determined on their sides in case it should happen. For my part, sir, I deplore such an event too much to make up my mind on it until it shall really happen, and then it must be done with great hesitation indeed. To my imagination, the idea of disunion conveys the most painful sensations; how much more painful then would be the reality! Who shall fix the boundaries of these new empires, when the fatal separation shall take place? Is it to be done with those cruel engines of death that we have heard, of, the sword, the bayonet, and the more savage instruments of tomahawk and hatchet? And is the arm of the brother to plunge them into the breast of brother, and citizen to be put in battle array against citizen, to make this separation which would ruin the whole country? And why is all this to be done? Because we cannot all think alike on political topics. As well might it be said, because we cannot all agree in the tenets embraced by each particular sect of our holy religion, because one is a Calvinist and another a Lutheran, that each should be employed in plunging the dagger into the heart of the other. But suppose, sir, you agree to divide these States, where is the boundary to be? Is it to be a river, or a line of marked trees? Be it which it may, both sides must be fortified, to keep the one from intruding on the other; both the new governments will have regular soldiers to guard their fortified places, and the people on both sides must be oppressed with taxes to support these fortifications and soldiers. What would become, in such a state of things, of the national debt, and all the banks in the United States? If we do wrong by adopting measures which the public good does not require, the injury cannot be very lasting; because at the next election the people will let us stay at home, and send others who will manage their common concerns more to their satisfaction. And if we feel power and forget right, it is proper that they should withdraw their confidence from us; but let us have no civil war; instead of the arguments of bayonets, &c., let us rely on such as are drawn from truth and reason.

Another topic has been introduced, which I very much regret; it is the naming of persons who have received appointments from the late or the present President. I hope I shall be pardoned for not following this example. And one gentleman is named as having been an important member during the election of President by the late House of Representatives. It ought to be remembered there were others as important as the gentleman named. In talking about the late or the present President, it ought not to be forgotten that they both signed the Declaration of Independence, that they have both been Ministers in Europe, and both Presidents of the United States. Although they may differ in political opinion, as many of us do, is that any reason we should attempt to destroy their reputation? Is American character worth nothing, that we should thus, in my judgment, improperly, attempt to destroy it on this floor? The people of this country will remember that British gold could not corrupt nor British power dismay these men. I have differed in opinion with the former President, but no man ever heard me say, that he was either corrupt or dishonest; and sooner than attempt to destroy the fame of those worthies, to whose talents and exertions we owe our independence, I would cease to be an American; nor will I undertake to say that all who differ from me in opinion are disorganizers and jacobins.

THURSDAY, February 25.

Judiciary System.

The House then went into a committee on the bill, sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the courts of the United States, and for other purposes."

Mr. RUTLEDGE.--I beg leave, Mr. Chairman, to proffer my thanks to the committee for the indulgence with which they favored me yesterday, and at the same time to acknowledge the respect excited by the politeness of the honorable gentleman from Maryland, who moved for its rising. In the course of the observations I yesterday offered, I endeavored to show that it was the intention of the Convention to make our judges independent of both Executive and Legislative power; that this was the acknowledged understanding of all the political writers of that time; the belief of the State Conventions, and of the first Congress, when they organized our Judicial system. If I have been successful in my attempt to establish this position, and if (what I suppose cannot be denied) it be true in jurisprudence, that whenever power is given specially to any branch of Government, and the tenure by which it is to be exercised be specially defined, that no other, by virtue of general powers, can rightfully intrude into the trust; then I presume it must follow of consequence, that the present intermeddling of Congress with the Judicial Department is a downright usurpation, and that its effect will be the concentration of all power in one body, which is the true definition of despotism. As, sir, every thing depends upon the fair construction which this article in the constitution respecting the Judiciary is susceptible of, I must again read it. [Here Mr. R. read several clauses of the constitution.] Some of the clauses we see are directory and others prohibitory. Now, sir, I beg to be informed of what avail are your prohibitory clauses, if there be no power to check Congress and the President from doing what the constitution has prohibited them from doing? Those prohibitory regulations were designed for the safety of the State Governments, and the liberties of the people. But establish what is this day the ministerial doctrine, and your prohibitory clauses are no longer barriers against the ambition or the will of the National Government; it becomes supreme and is without control. In looking over those prohibitory clauses, as the Representative of South Carolina, my eye turns with no inconsiderable degree of jealousy and anxiety to the ninth section of the first article, which declares--[Here Mr. R. read the article respecting migration before the year 1808.]

I know this clause was meant to refer to the importation of Africans only, but there are gentlemen who insist that it has a general reference, and was designed to prohibit our inhibiting migration as well from Europe as any where else. It is in the recollection of many gentlemen who now hear me, that, in discussing the alien bill, this clause in the constitution was shown to us, and we were told it was a bar to the measure. And an honorable gentleman from Georgia, then a member of this House, and now a senator of the United States, (and who had been a member of the Convention,) told us very gravely he never considered this prohibition as relating to the importation of slaves. I call upon gentlemen from the Southern States to look well to this business. If they persevere in frittering away the honest meaning of the constitution by their forced implications, this clause is not worth a rush--is a mere dead letter; and yet, without having it in the constitution, I know the members from South Carolina would never have signed this instrument, nor would the convention of that State have adopted it. My friend from Delaware, standing on this vantage ground, says to our opponents, Here I throw the gauntlet, and demand of you how you will extricate yourselves from the dilemma in which you will be placed, should Congress pass any such acts as are prohibited by the constitution? The judges are sworn to obey the constitution, which limits the powers of Congress, and says they shall not pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, they shall not tax articles exported from any State, and has other prohibitory regulations. Well, sir, suppose Congress should pass an ex post facto law, or legislate upon any other subject which is prohibited to them, where are the people of this country to seek redress? Who are to decide between the constitution and the acts of Congress? Who are to pronounce on the laws? Who will declare whether they be unconstitutional? Gentlemen have not answered this pertinent inquiry. Sir, they cannot answer it satisfactorily to the people of this country. It is a source of much gratification to me to know that my sentiments on this subject, as they relate to the constitutionality of it, are in unison with the wisest and best men in my native State. The Judicial system had proved so inconvenient there, as to render a new organization of it necessary some years past. There were gentlemen in the Legislature as anxious to send from the bench some of the judges as gentlemen here are to dismiss our federal judges. Personal animosities existed there as well as here, though not to so great an extent; but it was the opinion of a large majority of the South Carolina Legislature, that as the constitution declares, "the judges shall hold their offices during good behavior," the office could not be taken from them, the measure was abandoned, and the wise and cautious course pursued, which we wish gentlemen here to follow: the system was not abolished, but modified and extended; the judges had new duties assigned to them, and their number was increased, but no judge was deprived of his office. In South Carolina they have a court of chancery, consisting of three chancellors, and the law establishing it requires the presence of two judges to hold a court. During a recess of the Legislature, one of the chancellors resigned and another died. The functions of the court of consequence became suspended. All the business pending in it was put to sleep. The public prints were immediately filled with projects for destroying the court, which had been denounced as unnecessary. As the citizens of the western part of the State had not participated much in the benefits derived from the court of chancery, many of the most influential of them deemed it of little utility. The opposition assumed so formidable an aspect as to determine the Governor (who exercises the power of appointing judges during the recess of the Legislature) not to make any appointment, believing the court would be abolished. When the Legislature met, an effort was made to abolish the court, but a large majority giving to the constitution the honest meaning of its framers, considered the judges as having a life estate in their offices, provided they behaved well; and the vacancies on the chancery bench were immediately supplied.

That the national Judiciary Establishment is comparatively more costly than are the State Judiciaries, is far from being the case, I believe. It may be so in Virginia, where they have one chancellor, with little salary and much business, but it is not so in other States. In South Carolina, we have six judges at common law, at six hundred pounds sterling a year each; three chancellors at five hundred pounds each; which, together with the salaries and fees of office of the attorney general, master in chancery, solicitors, clerks, and sheriffs, amount to six thousand two hundred pounds sterling. And yet, sir, justice, I believe, is nowhere cheaper than in South Carolina. By the judicious structure of her judiciary system, the streams of justice are diffused over the whole State, and every man is completely protected in his life, liberty, property, and reputation. The courts are almost constantly in session. The judges are gentlemen of high talents, integrity, and strict impartiality; and every one who goes into the court of that State, not only obtains ample justice, but obtains it promptly; this, sir, is what I call cheap justice. The gentleman from Virginia has seen fit to notice the law which laid a direct tax, and said it was imposed when we knew the Administration of this Government was soon to pass from those then in power, and was resorted to as a means of extending Executive patronage, and to make provision for the friends of an expiring Administration. Can the honorable gentleman be serious in all this? Does he remember when we passed this law? It was in 1798, when I will be bold to say, the Administration enjoyed the highest degree of popular favor. In no popular Government, perhaps, was an Administration more popular than was the former Administration, at the time this tax was laid. Sir, this law had no connection with personal or party considerations. Like all the measures of the past Administration, it was designed to promote the public good. Had we, like our opponents, consulted the caprices and prejudices, and not the real interests of our constituents; had we been merely attentive to popular favor, we should not have passed this law. At the crisis it was passed, the public good demanded it, and we were regardless of every other consideration. A nation that had lighted up the flame of war in every corner of Europe, that was prostrating the liberties of every free people, and subverting the Government of every country, saw fit to menace us; told us for the preservation of our peace and independence we must pay tribute. This degrading measure was scornfully rejected by our Administration; they said, if we must fall, we will fall after a struggle; and our citizens prepared themselves for war with alacrity, and regarded every sacrifice as inconsiderable, compared with the great sacrifice of our independence. With this prospect of immediate war, we should have acted not only unwisely but treacherously, had we trusted for public income to the revenue derived from trade. Had our trade been destroyed, there would have been a complete destitution of revenue, and to place the means of national defence as far beyond the reach of contingency as possible we imposed the direct tax. We knew this law would prove arms and ammunition to those who were inventing all the falsehood credulity could swallow, and who were busily employed in misrepresenting and calumniating the conduct of the Government. We did suppose they might make this law their artillery to batter down the Administration; but we were not deterred from our honest purposes by this expectation; a change of men, when compared with a change of government, weighed with our minds as dust does in the balance; our measures did not aim at popularity, and we were just to our country, regardless of party consequences. At this early period, says the gentleman, it was to have been calculated what would be the result of the Presidential election. Sir, those must have been gifted with second sight, they must have been prophets indeed, who could have then foretold how the election would issue; the result was as doubtful as any event could be, till within a few days of the election. It is recollected that every thing depended upon the South Carolina vote; all the gentlemen in nomination went there with an equal number of votes; the anxiety displayed at the time by the gentlemen here from Virginia, proved they then deemed it doubtful how the election would terminate. Indeed, sir, nothing could have been more doubtful, and I believe it is fully known to the ministerial side of this House, that it depended upon one of the gentlemen nominated, who had not the Carolina votes, to have obtained them, and produced to the election a different result; but his correct mind was obnoxious to any intrigue; it would not descend to any compromise, and this honorable man knew that no station could be honorable to him unless honorably obtained. In the very wide range which the gentleman from Virginia has permitted himself to take, he has been pleased to notice the conduct of the late Congress when they were occupied in the election of the President of the United States, and he has said we were then "pushing forward to immolate the constitution of our country." What does all this mean, sir? What, sir! because we, of the two gentlemen who had from the electors an equal number of votes, did not prefer him who was from Virginia, are we to be charged with an immolation of our constitution? Sir, the gentleman from Virginia was not a member of the last Congress, and lest he should not know the history of the transaction to which he alludes, I will give it.

The Electors chosen in the different States gave the same number of votes for Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr; there being a tie, it devolved, by the direction of the constitution, upon the House of Representatives to make an election. We sincerely believed that Mr. Burr was the best and the most fit man to be President, and we accordingly voted for him; we continued to vote for him six and thirty times; we were anxious to have him elected, and we deprecated the election of the other candidate; but when we found gentlemen were determined not to have the candidate from New York, and said they would have him from Virginia President, or they would have no President, we, who venerated our constitution too sacredly to do any thing which should hazard the loss of it, yielded. We believed Mr. Jefferson radically and on principle hostile to the National constitution; we believed some of the most important features in it obnoxious to him; we believed him desirous of destroying the independence of our Judiciary; we believed him opposed to the Senate as now organized, and we believed him destitute of that degree of energy necessary to maintain the general liberty of the people of the United States. With these impressions deep upon our minds, we should have been traitors to our country had we voted for the gentleman from Virginia, as long as there was any prospect left to us of elevating the gentleman from New York; but when we found the object of our preference was so obnoxious to gentlemen on the other side, that they would hazard the having of no President rather than have him, we ceased our opposition.[67] And this is what the honorable member from Virginia has been pleased to call "pushing forward to immolate the constitution."

I regret, Mr. Chairman, being compelled to mention names and say any thing of a personal nature, but I am obliged to do it in pursuing the gentleman from Virginia, who in his extraordinary course has not only mentioned the names of gentlemen, but ascribed unworthy motives for their conduct. He has said Mr. Read and Mr. Green voted for the law under which they got appointments. Although I have abundant proof that neither of these gentlemen solicited their offices, that they were given spontaneously, and without being expected, yet I will merely answer this observation by mentioning what is very generally known to all gentlemen who have been of late in the councils of the nation; it is, that it was the invariable practice of the former Executive to appoint gentlemen to office without previously advising with them. It is well known that under the law gentlemen are now endeavoring to repeal, Mr. Jay was appointed Chief Justice, and about the same time several gentlemen in this House were appointed to some of the most honorable stations under our Government; the Executive's intention, it is well known, had not been previously notified to them; it is well known they all declined accepting the places proffered to them. Permit me, sir, to give a brief history of the case of Mr. Green, on which the gentleman from Virginia has dwelt so much.

The district judge in Rhode Island was appointed circuit judge, and Mr. Green was appointed district judge. On the fourth day of March, Mr. Green took his seat in the Senate; the friends of the Administration objected to his keeping it; they said he was a judge, as appeared by the journals of the Senate; they here made a complete recognition of his appointment as judge, and he vacated his seat. After getting home he received his commission, in which the blanks had been filled up with the words circuit judge, instead of district judge. Mr. Green enclosed his commission to the Executive, in a letter most profoundly respectful, and requested the errors of the clerk in the Department of State might be corrected, and his commission made to conform to the appointment, as recorded on the Senatorial journal. To this letter, which was in highly respectful terms, the President would not deign to have any answer given; he pocketed Mr. Green's commission, and placed another gentleman in his office. This is a history of the appointment of Mr. Green, and the manner in which the President "corrected the procedure."

Sir, the Judiciary is, in the fabric of the constitution, not a Corinthian pillar, not any ornament added by Congress. It is, sir, the grand Doric column; one of three foundation pillars, formed not by Congress, but by the people themselves; it binds together the abutment, is laid as the foundation of the late fabric of our Government, and if you demolish it, the grand arch itself will totter and the whole be endangered. We are asked by the gentleman from Virginia if the people want judges to protect them? Yes, sir, in popular governments constitutional checks are necessary for their preservation; the people want to be protected against themselves; no man is so absurd as to suppose the people collectedly will consent to the prostration of their liberties; but if they be not shielded by some constitutional checks they will suffer them to be destroyed; to be destroyed by demagogues, who filch the confidence of the people by pretending to be their friends; demagogues who, at the time they are soothing and cajoling the people, with bland and captivating speeches, are forging chains for them; demagogues who carry daggers in their hearts, and seductive smiles in their hypocritical faces; who are dooming the people to despotism, when they profess to be exclusively the friends of the people. Against such designs and artifices were our constitutional checks made to preserve the people of this country. Will gentlemen look back to the histories of other countries, and then tell us the people here have nothing to apprehend from themselves? Who, sir, proved fatal to the liberties of Rome? The courtier of the people; one who professed to be "the man of the people," who had willed his fortune to the people, and had exposed his will to the public eye; a man who, when a Crown was proffered to him, shrunk from the offer, and affectedly said, it did not come from the people. It was Julius Cæsar who prostrated the liberties of Rome; and yet Cæsar professed to be the friend of Rome, to be in fact the people. Who was it, that, in England, destroyed the Representative Government, and concentrated all its powers in his own hands? One who styled himself the man of the people; who was plain, nay studiously negligent in his dress; disdaining to call himself Mister, it was plain unassuming Oliver; Oliver Cromwell, the friend of the people, the protector of the Commonwealth. The gentleman from Virginia says he would rather live under a despot than a Government where the judges are as independent as we would wish them to be. Had I his propensities, I, like him, would fold my arms and look with indifference at this attack upon the constitution. It has been my fortune, Mr. Chairman, to have visited countries governed by despots. Warned by the suffering of the people I have seen there, I am zealous to avoid any thing which may establish a despotism here. It is because I am a republican in principle and by birth, and because I love a republican form of Government and none other, that I wish to keep our constitution unchanged. Independent judges, at the same time that they are useful to the people, are harmless to them. The judges cannot impose taxes; they cannot raise armies; they cannot equip fleets; they cannot enter into foreign alliances: these are powers which are exercised without control by despots; and as the gentleman from Virginia does not hold despots in abhorrence, he and I can never agree in our opinions on Government.

Whether another honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) has derived all the service from his sling and his stone he had expected, or whether he feels acquitted of his promise, and now thinks himself capable of prostrating the Goliath of this House, armed cap-à-pie with the constitution of his country, I cannot conjecture. Whether he has discovered the skill and the prowess of David, or whether he is likened to him only by the weapons he wars with, it is for the committee to judge; for myself I must say, that his high promises had excited expectations which in me have not been realized, and when the gentleman sat down I was sorry to find my objections to the bill on your table undiminished. I say sorry, for I can lay my hand upon my heart, and in the fulness of sincerity declare, there is nothing I desire more anxiously than to be convinced by gentlemen that this measure is not unconstitutional.

The gentleman has asked whether, if we had created an army of judges, and given them monstrous high salaries, it would not be right to repeal the law; that if the power exists to repeal any law which might have passed on this subject, it might not now be used? and has been pleased to say, we would have created more judges and given them higher salaries, if we had not wanted nerves; and tells my honorable and learned friend from Delaware that we were restrained by the same feebleness of nerve which induced us at the Presidential election to put blank votes into the ballot box. Sir, my friend from Delaware does want that sort of nerve that some gentlemen now discover. Although he is as brave as he is wise, yet in living without fear he will live without reproach, and never make himself liable to the charge of prostrating the constitution of his country; for such a work it is true he has no nerve. The observations of one honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) being now reiterated by another respecting the course of conduct we pursued at the Presidential election, shows that time has not abated the resentment of Virginia which we excited by our not voting for the Virginia candidate. Permit me here to declare, sir, that in reviewing all my public conduct, I can discover no one act of which I am more satisfied than my having put a blank vote into the ballot-box. Much has been said on this subject. My friend from Delaware and myself have been denounced by the jacobins of the country; at their civic feasts, and in their drunken frolics, we have been noticed. European renegadoes, who have left their ears on the whipping posts of their respective countries, or who have come to this country to save their ears, have endeavored to hang out terrors to us in the public prints; nay, sir, circular letters have been diffused through the country, charging us with the intention of preventing at one time the election of a President, and at another with the design of defeating the vote of the Electors and making a President by law. This was all a calumny, and as it relates to the South Carolina delegation, I declare they had no intention of defeating the public will; they never heard of any project for making a President by law; they had but one object in view which they pursued steadily as long as there was any prospect of attaining it. The gentleman from Virginia and the gentleman from New York had an equal number of votes; we preferred the latter; we voted for him more than thirty times, but when we found our opponents would not unite with us, and seemed obstinately determined to hazard the loss of the constitution rather than join us, we ceased to vote; we told them we cannot vote with you, but by ceasing to vote, by using blank votes, we will give effect to your votes; we will not choose, but we will suffer you to choose. Surely, Mr. Chairman, there was nothing in all this which had any aspect towards defeating the public will. Why I did not prefer the gentleman who ultimately was preferred, has already been mentioned. This is a subject on which I did not expect to be called upon to explain; but the gentlemen from Virginia have called, and it was necessary to answer. Permit me to state, also, that besides the objections common to my friend from Delaware and myself, there was a strong one which I felt with peculiar force. It resulted from a firm belief that the gentleman in question held opinions respecting a certain description of property in my State, which, should they obtain generally, would endanger it, and indeed lessen the value of every other.[68] Following the example set by his colleague, the gentleman from Virginia has bestowed much censure on the past Administration, and made it a serious charge against them, having appointed under this law a gentleman of Maryland, who he says was not with us formerly, but unfurled his standard in the service of his King, and fought against his countrymen, whom he then deemed rebels. I did not expect, Mr. Chairman, to hear this observation from one of the friends of the Executive. Since the fourth of March last, I thought philosophy had thrown her mantle over all that had passed; that sins were to be forgotten and forgiven, and to prove the sincerity of this forgiving spirit, sinners were to be distinguished by Executive favors. One would have thought so in reviewing Executive conduct; where persons had been imprisoned and fined under our laws, they we know were released; where fines had actually been paid, the officers of Government had been ordered to return them, and not only tories had been appointed to office, but old tories, rank old tories, who had been banished. The present collector of Philadelphia, for the internal revenue, has been appointed since the fourth of March last, and although he never, like the gentleman alluded to, shivered lances in the service of his King, yet he was actively employed in the more safe service of giving information to the British Generals, and marching before Sir William Howe, decorated with laurels, conducted him into the metropolis of his native State. Sir, there are many instances of this kind. Have gentlemen forgotten the young Englishman who was so busily employed here last winter during the Presidential election, that in seeing him one would really have supposed him not only a member of this House, but, like him of Tennessee, holding an entire vote at his command? This youngster was sent out here by some merchants in England to collect debts due to them in this country, and his father, whose tory principles carried him from America early in the Revolution, is now subsisting on a royal pension; and this young man has been appointed our Consul at London, and the former consul, a native and stanch American, whose conduct had been approved by merchants generally, has been turned out to create a vacancy. The gentleman from Virginia has repeated the observation of his colleague, that the people are capable of taking care of their own rights, and do not want a corps of judges to protect them. Human nature is the same every where, and man is precisely the same sort of being in the New World that he is in the Old. The citizens of other Republics were as wise and valiant and far more powerful than we are. The gentleman from Virginia knows full well, that wherever the Roman standard was unfurled, its motto, "Senatus Populusque Romani," proclaimed to a conquered world that they were governed by the Senate and the people of Rome. But now, sir, the Roman lazzaroni, who crouching at the gates of his Prince's palaces, begs the offals of his kitchen, would never know that his ancestors had been free, nor that the people had counted for any thing in Rome, or that Rome ever had her Senate; did he not read it on the broken friezes and broken columns of the ruined temples, whose fragments now lie scattered over the Roman forum!

TUESDAY, March 2.

Mr. DANA.--After this vindication of meritorious men who have been removed from office, I will now attend more particularly to some observations of the gentleman from Virginia. He has spoken of the judicial act of the 13th of February, 1801, as if the passage of it had been attended with improper circumstances, and thence has attempted to deduce the inference that it ought to be repealed. He read part of the journal of the last session, and charged certain members of the House with having been engaged in opposing the public will at the time when the act was approved. The journal shows, that on the 13th of February, eighteen hundred and one, the representatives, voting by States, proceeded to the twenty-ninth ballot for President, and the result was the same as had taken place before; the votes of eight States given for Thomas Jefferson; the votes of six States for Aaron Burr; and the votes of two States divided. Much has been said on this topic, which has at length been brought forward as a public charge by the gentleman from Virginia. It is now time that it should be examined.

According to the principles of our Government, the public will, when explicitly ascertained by an authentic act, is the law of the land, and must be obeyed. Of this there can be no doubt; it is beyond all question. But this public will is not merely the will of part of the community, a section of the people; it is the will of the great body of American citizens. The highest and most solemn expression of the public will in this country is the Constitution of the United States. This was agreed to by the General Convention; was transmitted to the Legislatures of the several States by the unanimous resolution of Congress under the Confederation; was recommended by all those Legislatures, when they passed laws for submitting it to conventions for their ratification, and was finally ratified by the conventions of all the States in the Union. It was thus established by the general consent. In this we should acknowledge the high authority of the public will.

There is, however, a misfortune which attends the argumentation of some gentlemen. They substitute a part for the whole; and would confound the will of a certain portion of the people, however vaguely expressed, with the will of the whole public body as explicitly manifested by an authentic act.

What manifestation was there of the public will relative to the late election of a President of the United States? The only authentic evidence of the public will on this subject proved, that Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, and Aaron Burr, of New York, were equally the objects of approbation. The majority of the electors had given them an equal number of votes. What then was the difference of right between them? Was it, that one of the candidates was a Virginian? Was it that the members of Congress were assembled on the banks of the Potomac, with Virginia in view on the other side? Must it be acknowledged as the prerogative of that State to impose a Chief Magistrate on the Union? Or was there a difference of right, because Virginia, with its extent and population, could make more clamor than any other State? The noise of so great a State may sometimes seem loud enough for the voice of the people of the United States. And are they, therefore, in this House to be confounded with each other? If so, the observations about the public will, of which we have lately heard so much from a certain quarter, must be understood to mean the will of Virginia; and we may thus judge of the argumentation when gentlemen from that State are speaking of the respect due to the public will.

Two persons were presented, in constitutional form, to the House of Representatives, as being equally candidates for the office of President: one from Virginia and the other from New York. When they were so presented, the choice between the two candidates was devolved on the Representatives, by the Constitution of the United States. After maturely considering the question, it was for them, as ultimate electors, to vote as they judged to be most for the public welfare. They voted by States, as required by the constitution. And are gentlemen to be here accused for exercising the constitutional right of election according to the conviction of their own judgments? When called upon, under the constitution, to elect one of the two candidates, were they not bound, by the nature of their duty, to give their votes according as the one or the other was by them judged to be more or less preferable? Upon what principle can gentlemen be accused of hostility to the interest of the people, because they did not think proper to elect the candidate from Virginia? Are our affairs already reduced to such a situation that it is to be charged as a public offence, if any member of this House has failed to vote for a Virginian to be the President of the United States?

It was the constitutional right of members of this House, in deciding between the two candidates, to give their ballots for the one whom they believed to be superior in practical capacity for administering the Government--one whom they believed to be not hostile to the commercial interests of the country, and not disposed to subject the Union to the domination of a particular State, whatever might be its lordly pretensions in consequence of extent of territory or antiquity of dominion.

As the gentleman from Virginia has thought proper to speak of events which took place about the time of passing the act in question, allow me, sir, to mention one circumstance, of which he has said nothing. The act, as finally enrolled, was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives after the balloting for a President had commenced; and the Clerk carried it to the other House for the signature of their President. The candidate from Virginia was then in the chair of the Senate. The Clerk of this House, on first presenting himself, as was customary, at the door of the Senate Chamber, was not admitted. The situation came to the knowledge of a Senator, and was communicated to the Senate. After the sense of that body was found to be for his admission, the door was opened, and the Clerk was admitted to deliver his message, and present the enrolled bill for signature. It was then signed by the President of the Senate.

What should be thought of this, as taken in connection with the fate of the act and pendency of the Presidential election? Was it a circumstance which must ever be remembered with mortification, and which therefore will never be forgiven?

To give a further color to the suggestion that the passage of the act was attended with improper circumstances, the attempt has been made to impress an idea that it was adopted without mature deliberation, and hurried through its different stages in a reprehensible manner. If we are not willing to be misled by pretext, let us examine what was the fact.

A recurrence to the journals of the House will prove that the subject of the Judicial Establishment was recommended by the President of the United States to the attention of Congress at two successive sessions. In his communication at the opening of the first session of the sixth Congress, he recommended the subject in the following terms:

"To give due effect to the civil administration of Government, and to ensure a just execution of the laws, a revision and amendment of the Judiciary system is indispensably necessary. In this extensive country it cannot but happen that numerous questions respecting the interpretation of the laws and the rights and duties of officers and citizens must arise. On the one hand, the laws should be executed; on the other, individuals should be guarded from oppression. Neither of these objects is sufficiently assured under the present organization of the Judicial Department. I therefore earnestly recommend the subject to your serious consideration."

In the House of Representatives, this part of the President's Speech was referred to a select committee. They reported a bill which contained a variety of provisions for amending the system. The bill was referred to a Committee of the Whole, in which it was discussed several days, and was afterwards recommitted to the same gentlemen who had reported it. As it was printed for the use of the members, and the subject was extensively interesting to the community, it was judged proper to defer a final decision until another session, and in the mean time gentlemen might have an opportunity to acquire information that would assist them to form a more satisfactory judgment.

At the second session of the sixth Congress, the subject was again recommended by the President. These are his words:

"It is, in every point of view, of such primary importance to carry the laws into prompt and faithful execution, and to render that part of the administration of justice which the constitution and laws devolve on the Federal courts, as convenient to the people as may consist with their present circumstances, that I cannot omit once more to recommend to your serious consideration the Judiciary system of the United States. No subject is more interesting than this to the public happiness; and to none can those improvements which may have been suggested by experience be more beneficially applied."

On this recommendation a select committee was appointed. That committee reported a bill to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States. The bill underwent a long discussion and a variety of amendments. It was finally passed in the House of Representatives by a majority of 51 to 43; and in the Senate by a majority of 16 to 11. After knowing these facts, will gentlemen have the hardihood to call this a hasty measure?

Compare the whole proceedings with what took place respecting a former act. Gentlemen have spoken of the general power of Congress to repeal acts passed by their predecessors. Are they prepared to repeal the act to which I now refer? It is the act relative to the temporary and permanent seat of Government, passed in July, 1790. That act was carried in the Senate by a majority of 14 to 12. In the House of Representatives, a Committee of the Whole agreed to it as it came from the Senate. Twelve different amendments were proposed in the House; the yeas and nays were taken on each of them, and every amendment was rejected--all in one day. A motion was then made for the third reading of the bill on the Monday following; the motion was negatived. It was moved that the third reading should be on the next day; this was negatived. The yeas and nays were taken twelve times during the sitting. A motion was made to adjourn; this was negatived. The general rule of the House being against reading a bill twice on the same day without special order, a motion for then reading the bill the third time was made on the part of its advocates, and carried. On taking the yeas and nays, for the thirteenth time in one day, the bill passed by a majority of 32 to 29. Mark the smallness of the majority in both Houses; the utter rejection of every amendment in the House of Representatives; the hurried manner in which it was forced on to the final question. Recollect other considerations relative to the passage of that act, and then judge whether it was not attended with circumstances signally improper. If matters of this kind constitute a sufficient cause for gentlemen to repeal any act passed by their predecessors, why should we remain here in pursuance of this act? Will any gentleman say it is for our personal convenience that the seat of Government is now at this place? Is it at present for the public convenience? Is it less expensive for individuals, or for the public, than it would be in some of your commercial cities? Have you here the opportunities for valuable information which might be had elsewhere? What, then, should detain us, if it be not a regard to stability and consistency in public proceedings, combined with a regard to the expectations of respectable persons seriously interested in the question? But if you may repeal the act organizing the Judicial system, what principle is there that ought to confine the Government to the place in which we are now assembled? Repeal this act, as is proposed by the bill on your table, and you shake the principle of public stability and consistency. Repeal this act, and there can be no principle of constitutional obligation, none of political honor, or legal right, to detain you here.

WEDNESDAY, March 3.

Mr. LOWNDES moved that the further consideration of the bill be postponed until the first Monday in December next; on which a debate of considerable length ensued; when, the question being taken thereupon, it passed in the negative--yeas 32, nays 59.

And, after debate thereon, the main question was taken that the said bill do pass, and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 59, nays 32, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Theodorus Bailey, Phanuel Bishop, Richard Brent, Robert Brown, William Butler, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Condit, Richard Cutts, Thomas T. Davis, John Dawson, William Dickson, Lucas Elmendorph, Ebenezer Elmer, John Fowler, William B. Giles, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Joseph Heister, William Helms, Wm. Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, George Jackson, Charles Johnson, William Jones, Michael Leib, John Milledge, Samuel L. Mitchill, Thomas Moore, James Mott, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, John Randolph, jun., John Smilie, John Smith, (of New York,) John Smith, (of Virginia,) Josiah Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jun., John Stewart, John Taliaferro, jun., David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, John P. Van Ness, Joseph B. Varnum, Isaac Van Horne, and Henry Woods.

NAYS.--Thomas Boude, John Campbell, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dennis, William Eustis, Abiel Foster, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, Seth Hastings, Joseph Hemphill, Archibald Henderson, William H. Hill, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Lewis R. Morris, Joseph Pierce, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, John Rutledge, John Stanley, Benjamin Tallmadge, Samuel Tenney, Thomas Tillinghast, George B. Upham, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, Benjamin Walker, Lemuel Williams, and Henry Woods.

FRIDAY, March 5.

State Balances.

Mr. THOMAS, from the committee appointed to inquire into the expediency of extinguishing the claims of the United States, for certain balances, which, by the Commissioners appointed to settle the accounts between the United States and the individual States, were reported to be due from several of the States to the United States, made a report, as follows:

That the following balances were, by the said Commissioners, reported to be due from the States hereinafter mentioned, to wit: From the State of New York, two millions seventy-four thousand eight hundred and forty-six dollars; from the State of Pennsylvania, seventy-six thousand seven hundred and nine dollars; from the State of Delaware, six hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and twenty-eight dollars; from the State of Maryland, one hundred and fifty-one thousand six hundred and forty dollars; from the State of Virginia, one hundred thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine dollars; and from the State of North Carolina, five hundred and one thousand and eighty-two dollars.

That, as none of these States has evinced a disposition to pay any part of those balances, except the State of New York, which has been credited on the books of the Treasury for two hundred and twenty-two thousand eight hundred and ten dollars and six cents, for money expended in erecting fortifications, pursuant to an act of Congress, passed the 5th of February, 1799; but as it would be unequal to ask a further payment from that State exclusively, and as it does not appear that any measure of coercion can ever be resorted to, a further continuance of the demands against those States, the justice and equity of which they do not admit, will, in the opinion of the committee, answer no useful purpose; but, on the contrary, is calculated to occasion perpetual irritation and disquiet, as well to the creditor as to the debtor States.

The committee are, therefore, of opinion, that it is expedient to extinguish the claims of the United States for those balances, and for that purpose report a bill, which is herewith submitted.

The report was laid on the table. The bill was twice read, and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Wednesday next.

WEDNESDAY, March 10.

An engrossed bill for revising and amending the acts concerning Naturalization was read the third time, and on the question that the same do pass, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 59, nays 27, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Theodorus Bailey, James A. Bayard, Phanuel Bishop, Thomas Boude, Robert Brown, William Butler, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Condit, Thomas T. Davis, John Dawson, John Dennis, William Dickson, Lucas Elmendorph, Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, John Fowler, Wm. B. Giles, Andrew Gregg, William Barry Grove, Joseph Heister, William Helms, Joseph Hemphill, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, George Jackson, William Jones, Michael Leib, John Milledge, Samuel L. Mitchill, Thomas Moore, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, John Smilie, Israel Smith, John Smith, (of New York,) John Smith, (of Virginia,) Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jr., John Stewart, David Thomas, Thomas Tillinghast, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, John P. Van Ness, Joseph B. Varnum, Isaac Van Horne, Robert Williams, and Henry Woods.

NAYS.--John Campbell, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Abiel Foster, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, Archibald Henderson, William H. Hill, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Ebenezer Mattoon, Lewis R. Morris, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, John Rutledge, John C. Smith, Josiah Smith, John Stanley, Benjamin Tallmadge, Samuel Tenney, George B. Upham, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, Benjamin Walker, and Lemuel Williams.

THURSDAY, March 11.

Wyoming Controversy.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the committee to whom was referred the petition of sundry inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania, settled on the lands claimed under grants from the State of Connecticut, antecedent to the trial before the court of commissioners between the State of Pennsylvania and Connecticut.

The report of the committee embraces an historical view of the Wyoming controversy, recites the act of Pennsylvania, for preventing intrusions upon land in Northampton, Northumberland, and Luzerne Counties. The report then proceeds to state:

"The petitioners complain of these acts as unconstitutional, and pray that provisions may be made by law for transferring the proceedings under these laws from the State Courts of Pennsylvania to the Courts of the United States; and that further provision may be made by law, that in the trial of any prosecution in virtue of the said acts the defendant may have a venire facias to summon juries from some State, other than Pennsylvania. Your committee conceive that the right of jurisdiction was finally settled by the decree of Trenton, of the 30th December, 1783, and that by the decision of the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania in April, 1795, the whole question of the right of soil was fully taken up and decided by the court, in a case the most favorable for the defendant; which decision not having been revised and reversed, should also be considered as final and conclusive.

"Your committee therefore, upon the whole circumstances of the case, are of opinion, that the measures contemplated by the petitioners would tend very much to increase the embarrassments already experienced by the State of Pennsylvania, in extending and enforcing its lawful jurisdiction over the lands in question, and that it would be highly inexpedient on the part of the United States to interfere with the regulations of the States in that respect, or to countenance, by any means whatever, any circumstances of insubordination to the State authority.

"Your committee are therefore of opinion that the prayer of the petitioners ought not to be granted."

After a debate, the committee rose and reported their agreement to the report.

A motion was made and lost to recommit the report to a select committee.

It was then moved to postpone the further consideration of the report till the last day of November next. Not carried.

The question was then taken on concurring with the Committee of the Whole in their report, by yeas and nays, and agreed to--yeas 60, nays 17.

And so the petition was rejected.

FRIDAY, March 12.

The House being informed that NARSWORTHY HUNTER, the Delegate from the Mississippi Territory, in this House, died last evening:

On motion, it was

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to take order for superintending the funeral of NARSWORTHY HUNTER, late a Delegate from the Mississippi Territory; and that this House will attend the same.

Resolved, That the members testify their respect for the memory of the said NARSWORTHY HUNTER, by wearing a crape on the left arm, for one month.

Resolved, That the SPEAKER of this House address a letter to the Governor of the Mississippi Territory, to inform him of the death of NARSWORTHY HUNTER, the Delegate from the said Territory in this House, in order that measures may be taken to supply the vacancy occasioned thereby.

Ordered, That Mr. LEIB, Mr. DAVIS, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. RUTLEDGE, and Mr. LEWIS R. MORRIS, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the first resolution.

State Balances.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to extinguish the claims of the United States for balances reported against certain States by Commissioners appointed to settle the accounts between the United States and the individual States.

Mr. THOMAS.--Mr. Chairman, I rise, with a great deal of diffidence, to deliver my sentiments on this floor, as I have not been accustomed to public speaking; however, a sense of my duty as a Representative of the United States, as well as the immediate Representative from the State of New York, impels me, on this occasion, to ask the indulgence of the Committee while I make a few remarks on the subject of the bill now under consideration.

Sir, a number of the debtor States, and particularly the one which I have the honor to represent, have always believed that they were prodigiously injured in the settlement that was made; they have always believed that there was something radically wrong, grossly unequal, in the accounts exhibited by the individual States, and allowed by the Board of Commissioners; in this belief, they have frequently called for information on the subject, for a re-examination of that settlement, and have as often been denied it.

Much might be said to prove that the very economical system adopted and adhered to by the State of New York in limiting the prices of produce, and in liquidating the accounts of her citizens for supplies furnished during the Revolutionary war, operated particularly prejudicial to that State in the settlement. I shall, however, waive any remarks on this for the present, and confine myself principally to the rule which was adopted for apportioning the expenses of the war among the several States. Sir, the committee will recollect that by an act of Congress passed in the year 1789, the enumeration of inhabitants made in the year 1791 was adopted as the rule for apportioning this debt among the thirteen States.

I shall in the first place examine the original contract entered into by these States, and under which these expenses were incurred, and then endeavor to show the effect which, adopting an enumeration made seven or eight years after the close of the war, had upon the several States different from what the same rule would have produced had the apportionment been made according to the numbers in each State at that period, say 1784.

In the year 1778, the people of these States entered into a confederation for various purposes, one of which was, to prosecute the war against Great Britain. In the eighth article of this compact it was expressly agreed that--

"All charges of the war, and all other expenses that should be incurred for the common defence, and general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, should be defrayed out of a common treasury, which should be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all lands within each State granted to or surveyed for any person as such lands and the building and improvements thereon should be estimated, according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, should from time to time direct and appoint."

This, Mr. Chairman, was the agreement under which this debt was incurred; and here allow me to ask the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BACON) whether he was correct when he told us the other day that this settlement had been made agreeably to the articles of Confederation; and, further, whether, agreeably to that compact, the State which he represents would have been allowed for her losses in the Penobscot expedition, which has enabled her to become a creditor State of upwards of one million two hundred thousand dollars, and more than one-third of the whole amount of the balances. Sir, had the original agreement under which these expenses were incurred been adhered to in the settlement, no one ought now to complain; but, in order to comply with it, the expenses of the war ought to have been apportioned among the several States according to the value of the lands and buildings at the time these expenses were incurred, and I do contend that the period immediately after the termination of the war was the only proper one for carrying into effect this stipulation. I am persuaded that no gentleman on this floor will deny that the existing circumstances of the several States at that period were the most proper to determine the just proportion which each State ought to pay of these expenses, by whatever rule might be adopted. Admitting, then, that Congress had the power, and it was judged expedient to deviate from the original contract, and adopt as the rule of apportionment the enumeration of inhabitants as a more practicable one, ought it not to have had reference to the numbers in each State at the close of the war? Most unquestionably, Mr. Chairman, no gentleman will deny this, and that the year 1784 was the proper time. It may, however, be said that no enumeration was made till the year 1791, seven years afterwards. I grant it. But will this alter the justness of my position? Not at all. It must be obvious in the mind of every gentleman who has reflected on the subject, that the relative numbers in each State had changed materially between the year 1784, when this settlement ought to have been made, and the year 1791, when it was made. In order to establish this fact, I have adopted this method; I have admitted what I believe every gentleman who hears me will, without hesitation: that there has been no material variation in the increase of population in the several States since the year 1784; that the increase was nearly, if not correctly, in the same ratio between the years 1784 and 1791, with the increase between the years 1791 and 1801; that is, that the relative increase of population in the several States was nearly, if not correctly, in the same proportion for the seven years previous to the year 1791 that it was for the ten years subsequent to that period.

This I have established as my data, by which I have ascertained the numbers in each State in the year 1784, and having apportioned the whole debt among the several States, according to the enumeration, I find the following to be the result:

That the State of Massachusetts, instead of being a creditor of $1,248,801, she would have been a creditor for only $863,267; that the State of Connecticut, instead of being a creditor State of $619,121, she would have been a debtor State for $235,419; that the State of Rhode Island, instead of being a creditor State for $299,611, she would have been a debtor State for $13,212; that the State of New Jersey, instead of being a creditor for $49,030, she would have been a debtor State for $300,201; that the State of New York, instead of being a debtor State for $2,074,846, she would have been a creditor State for $965,921, &c.

This, Mr. Chairman, would have been the situation of these States had the apportionment been made according to the numbers in each State in the year 1784. As for the accuracy of this statement I think I can with safety pledge myself; it is, however, open for any gentleman who will give himself the trouble to examine it for himself. The principles on which it has been made cannot be disputed, as it respects the State of New York; if any thing, it does not make enough in her favor, for it is evident that the emigration into that State from the neighboring States was greater for the first seven years after the close of the war than it has been for any subsequent seven years.

Will, then, Mr. Chairman, any gentleman hesitate a moment to pronounce the rule of apportionment which was adopted unjust, unequal, and erroneous? Will any gentleman say, sir, that the rule of apportionment was a just one, or as just as the nature of the case would admit of, which brought the State of New York in debt upwards of two millions--two-thirds of the whole amount of the balances--when, on the principles of righteousness, on the principles of legal contract, or any other principles, but an unauthorized act of Congress, that State would have been a creditor State for nearly a million?

Mr. Chairman, I admit, as the settlement has been made, and the creditor States have received their balances, that it would be improper now to take up this subject de novo, and endeavor to compel those States to refund what they have received more than they were entitled to; this is not expected--it is not asked; all that is asked of you is, that you render such justice to those injured States as the present situation of this transaction will admit of; this is all that is contemplated in the bill now before us.

Sir, as to the present situation of the State of New York with respect to this subject, she has not acknowledged the justice of this claim, as was stated by some gentlemen when this question was under consideration the other day; she has uniformly denied it. It is true she did comply with the act of Congress passed in February, 1799, and has expended and been credited on the books of your Treasury for $223,810 under that act; she did this, not from a conviction of the justice of the claim, but from motives which have always actuated her conduct, as well during the Revolutionary war as since, to do every thing in her power for the general welfare of the nation, whenever its exigencies required it, and also from an expectation that the other States called debtor States would do the same, and thereby get rid of an evil which she considers as having a tendency to alienate the good will and cordial affection so necessary to be cherished between these States--a cause, sir, which has and will, while it is suffered to exist, occasion perpetual irritation and disquiet, as well to the creditor as to the debtor States, and which may at some future period produce consequences more fatal.

I say, sir, these were her motives in agreeing to that measure; and did she not evince a magnanimous spirit by doing it? a willingness to suffer an additional injury herself, rather than not remove a cause which might put in jeopardy the peace and harmony of these United States? But, Mr. Chairman, as it can answer no useful purpose to have the remainder of the money expended in the manner directed by the act--and this I am warranted in stating to the committee, not only as my own opinion, but as the opinion of the gentleman who was employed under Government as an agent or commissioner to superintend the expenditure already made--as no other State has evinced a disposition to extinguish these balances by paying any part of them, or by complying with any of the terms heretofore offered by Congress; and as it must be admitted on all hands that Congress have no power to effect it by eviction, I ask gentlemen if it would be just or reasonable that the State of New York, who has been injured more in the settlement than any other State in the Union; who has already paid upwards of $220,000 towards these balances, and who is the only State that has, or in all probability ever will, pay a cent towards them--I say, I ask gentlemen of the committee whether it would be just that that State should now be driven to one of two alternatives; either to draw near a million of dollars from her citizens and expend it where it will answer no useful purpose to the State nor to the nation, or to withhold any further appropriations, and thereby incur the imputation of having violated her faith? I call upon gentlemen seriously to consider whether it would not be prodigiously unjust to hold that State in this predicament; whether it would not be adding injury to injustice to do it?

Mr. Chairman, I do flatter myself that the representatives of this nation, convened here to legislate on fair and equitable principles, will not suffer a new wound to be inflicted on that State, but that they will unite with one accord in passing the bill now before us, and thereby not only heal the one already made on that, as well as several of her sister States, but remove a rock which may endanger our Federal ship.

The bill was supported by Messrs. RANDOLPH, VAN RENSSELAER, HILL, VAN NESS, GREGG, BAYARD, SMILIE, MACON, S. SMITH, CLAIBORNE, and HOLLAND--and opposed by Messrs. ELMER, BACON, EUSTIS, HASTINGS, and BUTLER.

The question was then taken on the committee rising, and reporting the bill without amendment, and carried--yeas 47, nays 33.

A motion was then made that the bill be engrossed for a third reading on Tuesday, and carried--yeas 47, nays 35.

A motion was then made by Mr. LEIB to recommit the report of the select committee on which the above bill was founded, in order to correct an erroneous statement in relation to Pennsylvania.

MONDAY, March 15.

French Spoliations.

Mr. GRISWOLD said, that he hoped the resolution which he had laid on the table for indemnifying for French spoliations would be first taken up. It was important, before a decision was made on the repeal of the internal taxes, that the extent of indemnities made by Government should be known. He therefore moved a postponement of the bill on internal taxes till to-morrow, that, in the mean time, his motion might be acted upon. He concluded by desiring the yeas and nays.

The motion of Mr. GRISWOLD is as follows:

"Resolved, That it is proper to make provision by law towards indemnifying the merchants of the United States for losses sustained by them from French spoliations, the claims for which losses have been renounced by the final ratification of the Convention with France, as published by proclamation of the President of the United States."

Mr. LOWNDES observed, that it was nearly two months since the committee was raised, to whom had been committed the petitions of merchants praying indemnities; notwithstanding this length of time, the committee had not yet met. He hoped this resolution would induce the committee to meet.

Mr. S. SMITH said, that he had presented the first petition on the subject of French spoliations, and that it had been immediately referred to a select committee, who, though they had made progress in the business committed to them, had not considered it fair to decide until all the petitions expected on the subject had been received. One indeed had been presented only this morning. Mr. S. asked if this mode was not perfectly just and fair? For himself, on this subject, he was precluded from voting, as he was deeply interested in the decision of the House. He mentioned this circumstance that the reason might be understood why particular gentlemen from different parts of the Union did not vote on this question in its several stages.

Mr. LOWNDES said he did not consider the right of deciding the principle delegated to the select committee. That must be decided in the House. It was the duty of the committee barely to make arrangements to protect the House from imposition on the score of facts. If it shall be determined by the Government, that it is improper to make compensation--though he thought such a decision scarcely possible--the select committee may be discharged. If, on the other hand, it is thought proper to compensate, the committee may go into the investigation of details.

Mr. MITCHILL felt it an obligation, that the case of those whom he had the honor to represent, and that of the other merchants in the United States, should be taken up and receive from this House the most deliberate and serious consideration. He had before submitted to the House his ideas on the proper course to be pursued, which it was not necessary for him to repeat. He would, however, observe, that the resolution now made was so broad as entirely to defeat its object. The first reference of this business was to a select committee instructed to examine all the papers and documents in relation to it, with an instruction to report their opinion to the House; on receiving which the House might be able to come to a decision. On the other hand, the present proposition goes to commit the House on the whole extent of the subject without any examination whatever.

Mr. M. said, he would suggest a few reasons, which satisfied his mind that a decision should not be too rapidly pressed. The vessels taken by the French admitted of various classifications. One class consisted of those that were captured before the dissolution of our treaty with France; another class, of those which were captured after that event; another class, of those that were captured by picaroons without commissions; and another class, where captures were made on account of contraband goods. All these classes involved distinct considerations; and when the subject was presented to the House in a form so complicated, was it proper precipitately to decide a principle that might bind the Government to make indemnity for all cases whatever?

Mr. M. said he had no doubt but that such property of the citizens of the United States as came fairly under the character of spoliated property, would be considered as a fit subject of indemnity. He was one of those who thought that in such cases payment ought to be made. He considered the merchants as a very important class of citizens, and that their interests ought to be protected. This he thought the more necessary from the consideration of the bill on the table, which, when passed, will render the Government very dependent on mercantile credit.

Mr. M. was of opinion that the best way of accomplishing the object of the merchants was not to precipitate the subject. On the other hand, he was of opinion that the best chance of success would arise from an examination of the various classes of spoliations, from separating them from each other, thereby enabling the House to act understandingly upon them. The resolution of the gentleman from Connecticut was so vague as not to be susceptible of any distinct meaning. He hoped, therefore, the subject would be suffered to undergo a full and deliberate investigation in the select committee, which he, as a member of that committee, assured the House was progressing as fast as a sense of justice and a regard to our merchants require.

Mr. DANA.--The object of the present motion is to take up the resolution of my colleague, and to take order upon it--not to decide definitely upon it. This being the true question, I hope the gentleman from New York will not think it improper in me to say that many of his remarks do not apply to it. As the question is not whether we shall immediately decide the point, but only place it in a train for decision, it must be discussed either in a Committee of the Whole, or in a select committee; and we ask the House now to decide which, that it may be progressing towards a final decision.

The resolution states a general principle. If it is the fixed determination of the majority, without an inquiry, not to grant any relief whatever, there is an end of the business. But if you agree to grant any relief, the resolution ought to be adopted. The principle is then established of indemnifying; after which you may discriminate.

The principle on which the resolution is founded is not that Government has declined to insist upon the claims of its citizens against the French; but that it has undertaken to abandon their claims, so that no citizen can now come forward with his claim either against the French Government or any citizen of France. For this is the construction of the treaty as finally ratified by the Government. It is a complete surrender and renunciation of all demands. Among the first claims of our citizens are some of private right, which were it not for the treaty, could be recovered in the courts of France, but which the treaty bars. This constitutes a class of claims which the Government cannot refuse to indemnify. There are other descriptions of claims which might require discrimination; in some of which the degree of compensation should be varied, and others in which there should be no compensation whatever. I think, therefore, it is proper for the Government to say the business shall be attended to; at some future time an inquiry may be made into the nature of the various claims. This is all we ask.

Mr. GRISWOLD said that the gentleman from New York had misapprehended the order of proceeding in that House. He supposes the present resolution so vaguely worded as to be improper to be passed. But, if taken up, that very gentleman may offer any amendment he pleases. I do, however, apprehend that it is so worded as to bring the subject fairly before the House. It is worded even with caution. Its sole object is to bring the principle of indemnity before the House, unfettered, that its decision might not be embarrassed by any details; supposing there would be an indisposition in the House to pledge the nation to an unlimited extent, the words used are, "towards indemnifying." Gentlemen, therefore, who are disposed to do any thing, can feel no objection to a resolution so qualified. Other parts of the resolution are worded with equal caution, so as to extend only to cases where losses are renounced by treaty. Are gentlemen unwilling to indemnify for such losses?

This is a principle proper for decision in Committee of the Whole. Why take it to a select committee? It involves no details; it requires the elucidation of no facts. We know the losses of our merchants, and we know the treaty has renounced them. The House is, therefore, prepared to say whether it will or will not indemnify. When the principle is decided, it may be sent to a select committee to settle the details. I hope that it will be taken up, and an early day fixed for consideration.

The gentleman says the committee are progressing. It may be so. Though I observe the gentleman from South Carolina says the committee has not yet met. How progressing? Without meeting? I do not understand this new mode, though I will not say that it is not a very correct mode. The gentleman further says the committee have not progressed because they wished to have first all the petitions before them; but the principle to be settled is as much involved in one petition as in all.

Mr. GREGG said he should not have risen but for the remarks of the gentleman from South Carolina, and after him those of the gentleman from Connecticut, who had stated that the committee had not met. Being a member of the committee he would inform those gentlemen that the committee had met; that they had perused a number of the papers, and had determined that it was improper to proceed until they had received documents that would show the extent of the claims.

As the business now stands, we find it referred to a select committee, instructed to examine the papers, and report their opinion thereupon. This report will form the grounds of decision for the House. Now the gentleman would wrest the business from the committee, and urge the House into a decision without any of the necessary information. The attempt was unprecedented. Mr. G. said he never knew a similar instance where the select committee had not been previously discharged.

Mr. LOWNDES rose to explain. He said that when he informed the House that the committee had never been called together, he had been induced to say so, from never having been himself notified, though a member of the committee.

Mr. BAYARD thought the motion ought to prevail for the reason assigned by the honorable gentleman from Connecticut. He has properly remarked that we are not now called on to decide the abstract question, but only to say what course of proceeding shall be pursued. The point ought now to be decided whether the business shall be sent to a select committee, or to a Committee of the Whole. The gentleman from Pennsylvania says it is altogether unprecedented to take a subject out of the hands of a select committee. But this will not be the effect of the resolution; which will only facilitate the business before the committee, and shed additional light on the path they ought to pursue. We do not wish to interfere with the operations of the committee, but to decide a question that will greatly facilitate their proceedings, and which question ought to be settled in a Committee of the Whole. It is peculiarly and strikingly proper to postpone the question of repealing the internal taxes until a decision shall have been made on these claims. Not that we are anxious to decide upon them immediately, but because we are solicitous not to prejudge all claims to indemnity by repealing the very taxes on which the indemnity must depend. Do gentlemen mean to decide at once thus precipitately against all indemnity whatever? If they are not in favor of so deciding, surely they will not be for immediately deciding on the internal taxes.

Let the gentleman from New York classify the claims as he pleases, can he tell the extent of the demands? May they not amount to five million or ten million of dollars? And if to either sum, can we with propriety dispense with the internal taxes? It appears from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury that the whole of the revenue for the year 1803 and 1804 will be wanted. If, then, these claims shall be allowed, and shall produce an increase of the public debt, the fund derived from the internal revenue will be required.

It is cruel to decide at once against the claims of our merchants. If it is predetermined not to give them relief, at least allow them the consolation of a hearing. Whoever votes for now taking up the question of the repeal of the internal taxes, votes, not only against indemnifying, but also against hearing the merchants; because he votes away all means of indemnification. It is hard, peculiarly hard, that at the moment when you are about to throw the whole burdens of the Government upon the merchants, you should deny them a hearing, an impartial hearing, of their claims. Suppose there should be a combination of these men, seeing the Government act towards them with such flagrant injustice, to refuse all importations. I ask, if you do not, by such treatment, put the Government entirely into their hands?

If gentlemen will agree to postpone the question of internal taxes, we will agree to postpone this question, if they are not prepared to decide upon it. The subject of the internal taxes is the least pressing of all the subjects before the House. The bill, indeed, ought not to pass until we know the appropriations that are necessary to be made for the present year. Have gentlemen shown, can they show, that with propriety these taxes can be dispensed with from any retrenchments that can be made in our expenditures? I do not know any official document on this point, except that of the Secretary of War, who, in his very correct report, says there will be a saving in his department of a little more or less than $500,000; which report I confess I do not understand. The Committee of Ways and Means say there will be a retrenchment in the War Department of a sum not exceeding $400,000; which mode of expression I do not precisely comprehend. Surely we ought to know with precision the sums that will be required for the objects of the Government before we abandon our resources.

Mr. EUSTIS thought the object of indemnity to our merchants very important both in its nature and its consequences. And, first, as to its amount, it was known to be great. The consequence of these applications will be a hearing, and procedure thereon. And the amount of the claims, as well as the nature of them, ought to have great influence on the deliberations of the House. And yet we talk of deciding the abstract question, when the very facts on which we are to decide are not before us. For it will be perceived by the public prints that the claims of the merchants of the State of Massachusetts are not yet brought forward. The necessary evidence is not before the House. I appeal to the gentlemen to know how we are to act, understandingly, if the subject be taken up now. What is the abstract question? Will gentlemen say they will pay all demands before they know any thing of their nature or amount?

The claims of our merchants are very serious, and merit great consideration. But the revenue, which gentlemen are so anxious to retain, to them will be but as the light dust in the balance. I presume that the losses of the merchants of Massachusetts alone are not less than five to ten millions of dollars. But to act understandingly upon them we must have evidence as well of their amount as their nature, both of which we at present want.

Mr. RUTLEDGE.--I am sorry the resolution of my honorable friend from Connecticut is not acceptable to the gentleman from New York. It is not the least indelicate to that committee. On the contrary, were I a member of that committee, I should feel infinitely gratified by it. I would ask solicitously, whether it were possible that Congress would agree to this principle before the details were gone into. We are now for giving that information to the committee.

The honorable gentleman says this resolution conveys no light. But I will say, that, if adopted, it will confer not only light, but comfort to our merchants. It will foster their hopes, and animate them to meet the difficulties under which they are staggering.

The gentleman from Massachusetts says there is no evidence of fact. What fact? Surely he will not say there is no evidence of the French having condemned our vessels, and of their having committed vast spoliation. If this were so, how happens it that an American embassy had demanded compensation; and that, on the ulterior negotiations of the Government, the Government had said we will abandon it, that we may release ourselves from guaranteeing to France her colonial possessions. Had this not been so, France might have called upon us to guarantee her West India possessions, and to supply her with men and money. From this situation we have been kept by those negotiations which terminated in an abandonment of the just Claims of your merchants on the French Government or her citizens. And this constitutes your good bargains.

If these are facts, we possess sufficient evidence not only to justify, but to compel our paying the merchants, if under the influence of common honesty. The amount is perfectly immaterial. Whatever it is we must pay it. It is true that of the millions claimed, Government may not in law or equity be compelled to pay more than a small part. But if you establish the principle that there shall be an indemnity made, you enable your committee to devise the mode of collecting evidences of and settling the validity of the claims.

But the gentleman from Massachusetts says these taxes, right or wrong, must be repealed. For, he says, the public expectation has already decided the question; and that, indeed, the public officers could not now collect them. But I hope, for the honor of the Government, and of the American people, this opinion is not correct.

Mr. MITCHILL begged to be indulged in making a few observations on what had fallen from the gentleman from South Carolina. I do not know that these observations will satisfy his mind, but they will at least serve to justify my own character as a Representative of a portion of the Union respectable for its mercantile opulence. I believe the subject of indemnities, in the contemplation of gentlemen, has swelled much beyond its real magnitude. I believe that a large portion of losses were so covered by insurance that Government will not be obliged to pay for them. I feel as sincerely for the merchants as any gentleman; yet I do not wish to swell the subject to an improper magnitude. Suppose, as the gentlemen wish, we say we will indemnify, does that pay the claims?

Besides, it is not so evident, as some gentlemen assert, that our merchants have been deprived of valuable rights by the mode in which the French Convention has been ratified. Let gentlemen recollect the mass of depredations committed by Great Britain, and the engagements, under treaty, of the British Government to make reparation for them. Yet, notwithstanding this engagement, reparation has been to this day evaded, under the pretext that the claims under one article depend on the construction given to a preceding article. Now, suppose in the French Treaty there were the same provisions as in the British Treaty, would this have produced payment? No. The operations under the treaty might have gone on as long as under the British Treaty, with the like effect, and without any substantial provision being made. I state these circumstances barely to show that the renunciation in the French Treaty is not so grievous as some gentlemen imagine.

It is manifest that an inattention to similar claims has been considered as less a departure from right among nations than among individuals. And, judging of the future by the past, my opinion is that a retention of the article stricken out of the French Convention, would not have benefited the claims of our merchants, or afforded them any adequate eventual compensation. In France, as on the other side of the Channel, there would have been claim raised against claim, pretext against pretext, and the boards for adjusting the several claims might have been, in this case, as in the other, dissolved.

It is said by the gentleman from Delaware, that it is the object of gentlemen on his side of the House to prevent a repeal of the internal taxes. Though I admire the gentleman's candor, I believe it is needful to repeal these laws. I believe, too, the people wish them repealed. But I further believe, that if future events shall show the necessity of restoring these taxes, the good sense of the people will restore them; and if the indemnities agreed to be made shall require them, I believe they will be restored. The work of examining these claims will be the work of years. What is the consequence? Will the present repeal of the internal taxes interfere with the doing substantial justice to our merchants? Suppose these taxes are removed, are not the products of the country increasing? and are not our resources increasing with our population? The truth is, whenever your Treasury wants a fresh supply of resources, the people will submit to what their Representatives desire. Are we to legislate for succeeding ages? No. We are to suffer our successors to act for themselves; and I have no doubt either of their ability or their inclination to do justice.

Mr. DANA.--If I understood the honorable member from New York, he admitted the propriety of making some indemnity; and if so, I could not understand why he dwelt so elaborately upon the minutiæ of detail, to show why we ought not to indemnify. Nor can I yet understand him, unless his object be to let the subject sleep, and to say that the longer it is delayed, the less chance of reparation.

The gentleman says, property insured cannot be recovered. But is that gentleman, coming as he does from the first commercial city in the Union, yet to learn that, in the case of loss, the insurer stands precisely in the place of the insured? Is he so ignorant of this fact as not to know that the underwriter, in such circumstances, becomes entitled to the same indemnity with him who is underwritten?

With regard to the analogy attempted between the British Treaty and the French Convention, it is totally incorrect. For, in the British Treaty, we had insisted upon the claims of our merchants to reparation by Britain, or her subjects; whereas, in the French Convention, we had renounced all claim. Nor were the remarks of the honorable member more fortunate respecting the operations under the British Treaty; for he must know that our merchants have, in many cases, received compensation under it.

One concession has been made which I did not expect would be avowed so early, either by the gentleman from Massachusetts or the gentleman from New York; a confession that is founded on the principle that the House, before examining the important details which ought to regulate their decision, are so placed by the head of the Executive ministry, that certain taxes, recommended to be abrogated, must be repealed. You must repeal them. The public clamor is excited, and you must obey it. I did not suppose it would so soon have been avowed that we are under the absolute rule of Executive influence, and that, to obey it, we are compelled to perjure our understandings.

Mr. BAYARD.--The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts has thanked me for the candor of my avowal that I am opposed to the repeal of these taxes. But I do not wish to be thanked for more than I really said. It is true, that I do not think this the proper time to repeal all of those taxes, because I do not know that Government may not want them.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has broached a new species of ethics. He says, if the amount of claims shall be small, we may pay, but if large we cannot. But I will tell that gentleman I have never acknowledged such a principle of morality. I believe if the merchants have a just demand for one dollar, we must pay it; and if they have a just demand for one hundred millions, we must pay that too. Nor can I too forcibly express my astonishment at an opposite principle avowed by this House.

The gentleman says you want evidence, and therefore ought not to act. But can you examine each distinct case? If the subject goes to a select committee, and they shall be allowed years to decide, still they will have to establish some principle; for instance, that a certain description of vessels was captured unjustly by the French; that the injured merchants had a moral claim on the French Government for reparation; that the United States had bartered away their rights, and that Government, in consequence, is bound to indemnify. If the House decide that the Government is bound to relieve in one case, are they not bound to afford relief in all similar cases? Will you not, then, be obliged to make a general provision that all claims, so circumstanced, shall be allowed? Here is a great mass of claims; some made now, and some not likely to be made for years. What more, then, can you do, than decide the principle which shall be applied to them?

My opinion as to indemnity is, that whoever had a valid claim against the French Government, which the United States extinguished, has a demand against the United States, which she must satisfy. Put the case to its consequence: Will gentlemen tell me whether, according to any principle of morality, where you have taken from your citizens all chance of recovery, you are not bound to indemnify for that of which you have deprived them? Where the French Government was not bound to pay before the convention, you are not now bound to pay. So, in the case of war, you are not bound. But where the claim on the French Government was perfect, and you destroyed that claim, your obligation to pay cannot be evaded. I wish to know if the establishment of this principle requires facts?

With respect to the circumstances of particular cases, this House cannot act. On those numerous grades of credibility that will be attached to the various claims that shall be made, you cannot decide. To effect this you must establish some competent tribunal. You can establish the principle; but the details could not be settled by Congress, even if their attention were exclusively directed to that subject, in three years. Having decided the principle, it will be proper to leave the application of it to your courts of law.

Mr. BACON hoped that a great deal of time would not be spent in exploring the secret motives of individual members. He supposed they should all stand or fall on their own consciences. He hoped, therefore, they should have the question.

Mr. S. SMITH.--I am against the proposition of the gentleman from Connecticut, because to act now upon it will be in direct opposition to the uniform order of the House. If our attention is thus to be withdrawn from every important object before us, I do not know how we are possibly to progress with the public business. I know of no case, where a particular subject has been referred to a select committee, and it has afterward been taken up in the House, while it remained with the committee. I should have understood the motion, if it had been to discharge the select committee, and to refer the subject to a Committee of the Whole.

As gentlemen, however, have taken so wide a range in the field of debate, I hope their course will produce a saving of time, and that we shall not have their speeches over again on repealing the internal taxes.

It is not my purpose, at this time, to enter into a discussion of the claims of our merchants, because I think this is not the proper occasion. But I will tell gentlemen, that if they were disposed to destroy those claims, they could not have pursued a plan more effectually calculated to do it. Had such been my intention, I would have offered a resolution so broad and vague as to alarm the whole community as to the amount of indemnity. I would have endeavored to throw the censure attached to their losses on the present Administration. I would have opposed their claims to the wish of the nation to repeal the internal taxes. All these steps I would have taken to frustrate any indemnity; and they are just the steps taken by gentlemen who profess so strong a regard for the merchants. Let me tell those gentlemen until they shall pursue a far different plan, we must doubt whether they are in earnest to pay the merchants for their losses.

If the public business is to be thus perpetually procrastinated, I hope the gentlemen with whom I act will be firm enough, after rejecting this motion, to pursue the other business even to a late hour.

The yeas and nays were then taken on Mr. GRISWOLD'S motion, to postpone taking up the bill on internal taxes till to-morrow, in order to take up his resolution on French spoliations; and decided in the negative--yeas 33, nays 54.

TUESDAY, March 16.

State Balances.

The bill for extinguishing State balances was read a third time, when Mr. DAVIS moved its postponement to the first Monday in November.

This motion was supported by Messrs. DAVIS, BACON, ELMER, and GODDARD, who declared themselves adverse to the passage of the bill; and opposed by Messrs. BAYARD, T. MORRIS, RANDOLPH, and NICHOLAS, who declared themselves in favor of the bill.

Mr. GRISWOLD delivered his sentiments against the postponement, declaring, however, his determination to vote against the passage of the bill.

The question of postponement was taken by yeas and nays, and carried--yeas 48, nays 42.

WEDNESDAY, March 24.

A new member, to wit, WALTER BOWIE, from the State of Maryland, returned to serve in this House as a member for the said State, in the room of Richard Sprigg, who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

MONDAY, March 29.

An engrossed bill, making a partial appropriation for the support of Government, during the year 1802, was read the third time and passed.

Previous to its passage, conversation took place respecting an alleged looseness of appropriation. This objection was made by Mr. GRISWOLD, and supported by Mr. DANA, who were of opinion that the sum in the bill should be more specifically appropriated.

The objection was repelled by Messrs. MILLEDGE, GILES, ELMENDORPH, RANDOLPH, and ALSTON, who contended that the objection did not apply, and that no inconvenience could arise from a partial appropriation made in the bill and contemplated for a definitive object.

A motion made to recommit the bill was lost; when the bill passed--yeas 45.

TUESDAY, March 30.

Funeral Expenses of Members.

On a motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution:

Resolved, That, in case of the death of a member of the House of Representatives at the seat of Government, while Congress is in session, the expenses accruing, in conformity to an order of the House, made to testify their respect for the deceased member, shall be paid out of the contingent funds of the House, and not out of his wages for travelling home, as is now allowed by law:

Ordered, That the said motion be referred to Mr. DAVIS, Mr. LEWIS R. MORRIS, and Mr. NICHOLSON, to consider and report thereon to the House.

WEDNESDAY, March 31.

Funeral Expenses of Members.

Mr. DAVIS, from the committee to whom was yesterday referred a motion respecting "members of this House dying at the seat of Government during a session, of Congress," made a report thereon; which was read and considered: Whereupon,

Resolved, That the expenses accruing by order of the House, in attending the funeral of NARSWORTHY HUNTER, a member from the Mississippi Territory, be paid out of the contingent funds of the House.

Resolved, That the legal representatives of a member of this House, who shall die at the seat of Government during the session, shall be entitled to receive the same allowance for his itinerant expenses, as the member would have been entitled to, had he returned to his place of abode.

Ohio State Government.

The House went again into Committee of the Whole on the report of a select committee respecting the admission of the North-western Territory as a State into the Union.

The second resolution being under consideration,

Mr. FEARING referred to the provisions of the ordinance empowering Congress to divide the Territory, from which he inferred that Congress had not the right to divide the Territory so as to form one part of it into a State, while the remaining section was not made a State, without the consent of the Territory; he conceived that Congress must, in such event, form this section also into a State. He, therefore, was of opinion that Congress must consult the people of the Territory before they shall divide the Territory.

As to the expediency of the resolution, he thought it very expedient to make the division therein marked out. The effect of it would be that the whole of Lake Erie would be thrown out of the State to be formed, and the inconvenience to the section of the Territory not incorporated in the new State would be very great, if it should be attached to the Indiana Territory, from its great distance, which he understood was contemplated.

Mr. GILES said that the committee who reported these resolutions, so far from entertaining a disposition to change the ordinance, had strictly observed the conditions therein prescribed. [Mr. G. here quoted the ordinance.] It appeared therefrom that Congress was under an obligation, after laying off one State, to form the remainder into a State. But when? Hereafter, whenever they shall think it expedient to do so.

Mr. BAYARD agreed that there was no obligation imposed upon Congress to decide definitively the boundary of a State. If the ultimate right of Congress, after the formation of a new State, to alter the boundary be doubted, they have a right to remove all doubts by so declaring at this time. It is certain that at present great inconvenience would arise from drawing the boundary as fixed in the resolution.

The population of the Territory does not amount to that which is sufficient to give it admission into the Union. He had, however, no disposition to oppose its admission, notwithstanding this circumstance. The population in the Eastern State does not exceed forty-five thousand. We are now about to pare off five or six thousand inhabitants, which will bring it down to thirty-nine thousand. A population of forty-five thousand is quite small enough for an independent State. It is a smaller population than exists in any of the present States in the Union. From this consideration, it might have been expected that Congress would take no step whose effect would be a diminution of that population.

The division, as made in the resolution, is manifestly unjust, as far as it relates to the people north of the dividing line. By it they are about to be severed from their connection with the other portion of the Territory. Mr. B. wished to know to whom they are to be attached? If attached to the Indiana Territory, the inhabitants, to arrive at the seat of Government, will be obliged to go across the new State, a distance of two or three hundred miles. Besides, after having advanced them to the second grade of territorial government, you will consign them back again to the first, and thereby give them a system of government extremely odious, and which we ought to get rid of as soon as possible. Thus, after having held out to them the flattering prospect of being elevated to the high rank of a State, you degrade them, contrary to their expectations, to the humblest condition in the Union. Mr. B., therefore, thought it would be most just and politic to include this population of five or six thousand in the bounds of the new State, subject to the reserved right of Congress to alter the boundary hereafter.

Mr. GILES said he was not tenacious of his opinions; but it was necessary to justify the contents of the report by stating some considerations that might not be generally known to the members of the House.

Mr. G. said he supposed the section of the Territory, not embraced in the new State, would be attached to the Indiana Territory; nor would any great hardship result from this disposition; and such as did result would arise from their local situation and not from any circumstances over which the National Legislature had a controlling power. He believed that people, to reach the seat of Government, had as far to go now as they will then have. His object was to reserve in future to Congress the right of determining the boundary of the States in the Territory. If this section should once be admitted, he believed it would be very difficult, however proper, to detach it from the State to which it had become attached.

The report contemplates the forming a constitution. Should the people on the northwardly side of the line be admitted as a part of the State, they will participate in the formation of the constitution--a constitution which will not be ultimately for themselves, but after a short time exclusively for others. This participation would be unjust. The question then is, whether you will suffer those to form a constitution who are not to be permanently affected by it; and whether, if you once constitute a State, you will be able hereafter to alter its boundaries? For if this section be now admitted, gentlemen, by looking at the map, will see that the boundary now fixed cannot be permanent.

As to the remarks made by the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. G. said he was extremely glad that gentleman was for giving to the Territory the right of a State. If, however, he had attended to the report, he would have found that his calculation of numbers was incorrect. The population of five thousand had been deducted by the committee, and after that deduction forty-five thousand remained. Though the numbers in the Territory proposed to be formed into a State amounted, a year ago, to no more than forty thousand, yet it might be stated upon strong ground, that, before the new government can get into operation, there will be a sufficient population to demand admission as a matter of right. By attaching the inhabitants on the north of the line to the Indiana Territory, they will remain in the same grade of government they now are, and not be degraded, as stated by the gentleman from Delaware, to a lower state. This disposition appeared to Mr. G. the best that could be made. But if, when gentlemen came to the details of the bill, it should be thought best to introduce into the new State the population north of the line, he said he might have no objection.

Mr. FEARING stated the great inconveniences that would be felt by the inhabitants north of the line, if attached to the Indiana Territory. He considered the remarks of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. GILES,) respecting the participation of this description of citizens in forming a constitution for others, as entitled to little weight. Such a measure was by no means uncommon. It had been done in the case of Kentucky, and other States.

Mr. F. conceived that the people of the Territory had all equal rights under the ordinance; they had been virtually promised that they should not be attached to any other Western Territory, and Congress had only reserved to themselves the right of admitting them into the Union as States. More they could not do, without their consent.

Mr. BAYARD moved to strike out of the resolution the words that fix the boundary, for the purpose of introducing words that should prescribe that the new State be circumscribed by the original boundaries of the Eastern State, referring to Congress the right of making one or more States in said State at any future time.

Mr. GILES said that the State, as formed in the report, was one of the most compact and convenient in the Union. The amendment would materially change its character. Besides, it would in fact impair the right of Congress to accommodate the boundaries to future circumstances. It was well known, and sensibly felt, that there were many inconvenient boundaries to several of the States now in the Union; yet so great was the difficulty attending their alteration, that they could not be changed.

Mr. BAYARD was not so sensible of the difficulty of altering the boundaries as the gentleman from Virginia, who had stated that Congress would not have power to alter them when once fixed. This difficulty might exist as to the States now in the Union, because Congress had not the constitutional power to alter them without the consent of the adjacent States. But if this power be referred to Congress, which will be a disinterested tribunal, there will be no difficulty in varying the boundaries as circumstances shall dictate.

Mr. B. asked, if, while gentlemen are attending to the interests and wishes of one part of the people, they are disposed to disregard the interests and wishes of another part? If they were not, they ought to admit the section, proposed by the resolution to be cut off, to a participation in State rights.

Mr. BACON objected to the amendment. He said that Congress were vested by the constitution with certain powers which they cannot increase, or diminish, or delegate. By the constitution likewise, the several States are vested with certain powers which they cannot increase, diminish, or divest themselves of. By the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, "new States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union." This act proposes to make this Territory a State with State powers under the constitution. How, then, can these people, once a State, divest themselves of these powers. This is a question that does not interest simply the State proposed to be formed, but every State in the Union. All are equally interested in preserving the powers vested in them by the constitution.

Mr. BAYARD said he did not see any occasion for striking out the proviso. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BACON) goes on the principle that Congress has only a right to admit, without any reservation. Mr. B. said he had always believed the greater included the smaller. If you are vested with the greater power of admitting, you have certainly the minor powers included in the greater power. From the nature of the ordinance, it constitutes the fundamental principle on which the States are admitted--they are not admitted under the constitution. They are to be admitted exclusively under the provision of the ordinance. You may, therefore, say that you will not now exercise the whole power committed to you, but reserve the right of exercising it hereafter.

Mr. SMILIE did not consider the principle laid down by the gentleman from Delaware as constitutional. We must be governed by the constitution. If the Territory be admitted as a State into the Union, when admitted it must be bound down by the constitution, which says the boundaries of States shall not be altered but with the express permission of the State.

Mr. GILES--The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. GRISWOLD,) affects lately to have discovered a great deal of disguise in the proceedings of this House. What disguise? What were the committee to do? This country is placed in a certain peculiar situation. We have waters running to the East--then to the West; and the committee thought it was desirable to connect these by good roads. With the committee, State principles or interests had no influence--they were governed entirely by general principles and the common interest.

The gentleman has also insinuated that the Secretary of the Treasury holds lands that will be benefited by these roads. It may be so. Mr. G. had not inquired; but he supposed he did not hold all the lands. Congress may lay out these roads as they please. He could foresee how Congress would lay them out, and it is a million to one that they will not touch his lands.

The United States are about making a new contract. These propositions are made as additional securities for the national property. The Secretary of the Treasury having estimated the annual product of these lands at four hundred thousand dollars, Mr. G. said, as chairman of the committee, he had applied to him to know his opinion of the manner in which this sum could be best secured, and he gave his opinion that this provision would be most likely to effect that object. This is all the mystery and disguise attending the resolution.

Mr. SMILIE said when gentlemen charge particular States with injustice, they ought to be prepared to prove what they advance. If there had been any co-operation between the delegations of Virginia and Pennsylvania on this occasion, he had never heard of it. The fact was, that no peculiar good could result to Pennsylvania from this measure. The great object was to keep up that intercourse which will attach the people of the Territory to you. When the Territory shall become a State, she will have a right to tax your lands. This benefit, together with the salt-springs, as I understand, is proposed as a substitution far the relinquishment of those rights.

Mr. FEARING said he considered a part of the rights of the Territory given up by this resolution; and though the Territory would be highly benefited by the projected roads, and the cession of the salt-springs, yet he conceived they would be much more benefited by laying out the roads within the Territory.

Mr. GRISWOLD said he was glad the honorable gentleman from Virginia had assured the House there was no disguise in this business. If the object be to make an advantageous contract with the Territory to secure our Western lands, let us offer them five per cent. of the proceeds of those lands, to be paid into their treasury. If they shall be disposed to make roads through Pennsylvania and Virginia, he should have no objection.

He was as sensible as the gentleman from Virginia, that whatever improves a part of the Union improves the whole; though this was undoubtedly the case, he was not of opinion that a sum of money should be taken from the public treasury, and specially applied to local purposes. Under this resolution, according to the calculation of the Secretary of the Treasury, forty thousand dollars was the smallest sum that would be annually applied to the laying out of those roads. Mr. G. said he thought the sum too large to be withdrawn from the national treasury, and directed to local objects.

The allusion of the gentlemen to light-houses raised on the Connecticut shore does not apply. There was but one light-house in Connecticut, ordered to be built by this House, for which the enormous sum of twenty-five hundred dollars had been appropriated. Yet this solitary measure had been rejected by the Senate. This is the great boon given to Connecticut!

For these reasons Mr. G. hoped the article would be stricken out, and that, if it was necessary to make terms with the new State, they might receive five per cent. on the receipts of the land, to be paid into their own treasury, disposable by themselves as they saw fit.

Messrs. R. WILLIAMS, JACKSON, and HOLLAND, said a few words in favor of retaining the article; when the question was taken on striking it out, and lost--yeas 17.

Mr. FEARING, wishing that half the proceeds of the Western lands should be laid out on roads within the Territory, made a motion to that effect; lost--yeas 25.

The report of the select committee, without further amendment, was then agreed to, and a bill ordered in conformity thereto.

WEDNESDAY, April 7.

An engrossed bill for the relief of Thomas K. Jones was read the third time, and passed.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of State, accompanying his report on the memorial of Fulwar Skipwith, referred to him by order of the House on the nineteenth of January last; which were read, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole House on Friday next.

Mr. JOHN C. SMITH, from the Committee of Claims, to whom was recommitted, on the fifteenth ultimo, their report on the memorial of Paul Coulon, a French citizen, made a supplementary report thereon; which was read, and ordered to be referred to a Committee of the whole House to-day.

On motion it was Resolved, That a committee be appointed to examine and report the state of the office of the Clerk of this House.

Ordered, That Mr. CLAY, Mr. HUGER, and Mr. SOUTHARD, be appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution.

Mr. MITCHILL, from the committee to whom were referred, on the fifth instant, the amendments proposed by the Senate to the bill, entitled "An act for revising and amending the acts concerning naturalization," reported that the committee had had the said amendments under consideration, and directed him to report to the House their agreement to the same.

North-western Territory.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to enable the people of the eastern division of the Territory north-west of the river Ohio to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union, on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes.

Mr. FEARING moved to amend the bill so as to embrace the population of the eastern division as bounded by the articles of the ordinance, the effect of which motion would be to include about thirty thousand inhabitants of that division, that are excluded by the provisions of the bill, and respecting whom it is provided in the bill, that they may hereafter be added by Congress to the new State, or disposed of otherwise, as provided by the fifth article of the compact.

This motion gave rise to a debate of considerable length, in which Messrs. FEARING, BAYARD, GRISWOLD, GODDARD, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, supported; and Messrs. GILES, BACON, and R. WILLIAMS, opposed the amendment.

Those who supported the amendment contended that the exclusion of that portion of territory occupied by about three thousand inhabitants was both unconstitutional and inexpedient. On the ground of constitutionality, they contended, that under the articles of the compact, which were to be considered as the constitution of the territory, Congress had only the right of forming the eastern division into one, two, or three States; and that under this power, no right existed to form one part of the division into a State, and leave the remaining section in a Territorial condition; that the rights of the whole of the inhabitants of the eastern division were equal, and if one part was, so also must the remaining part be, admitted to the privilege of a State.

On the ground of expediency, it was contended that the situation of the excluded inhabitants would be peculiarly hard; that, if attached to the Indiana Territory, they would be placed two or three hundred miles from it; that they would be furthermore degraded from the second to the first branch of Territorial government, and that they would be deprived, by the reduction of their numbers, from the prospect of being admitted for a great number of years, to State rights.

On the contrary, the opponents of the amendment contended that the provisions of the bill were both constitutional and expedient; that under the compact the right was given to Congress of admitting the eastern division into the Union, in the form of one, two, or three States; that this right involved a discretion to admit a part of that division at one time, and the remaining part at a subsequent period; that if the whole division were once admitted into the Union, Congress would be prohibited from dividing hereafter, when it was acknowledged such division would be expedient, the said division into two or more States, without the consent of the State now formed.

That, as to considerations of expediency, the hardships likely to be felt by the excluded inhabitants were such as arose, not from the provisions of the bill, but from their local situation; and that it was not true that they would be degraded by annexation to the Indiana Territory; to a lower grade of Territorial character than they at present enjoyed--the grade being the same.

Mr. RANDOLPH supported the amendment on peculiar ground, declaring that if the amendment should not prevail, he would still vote for the admission. He declared himself in favor of the amendment, principally from a desire to avoid the introduction of too many small States into the Union.

The question was then taken on Mr. FEARING'S amendment, and lost--yeas 34, nays 38.

Mr. FEARING moved so to amend the bill as to leave to the new State the right of naming itself. Agreed to.

After some discussion of the details of the bill, the committee rose and repeated the bill, with amendments.

Ordered, That the said bill, with the amendments, do lie on the table.

THURSDAY, April 8.

Mr. JOHN TALIAFERRO, Jun., from the committee to whom was referred, on the fifth instant, the petition of sundry citizens of Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, with instruction to report thereon by bill or otherwise, presented a bill to incorporate the Directors of the Columbian Library Company; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

Mr. DENNIS, from the committee to whom was referred, on the fifth of February last, a motion, in the form of two resolutions of the House, "respecting the adjustment of the existing disputes between the Commissioners of the City of Washington, and other persons who may conceive themselves injured by the several alterations made in the plan of the said city; also, relative to a plan of the said City of Washington, conformably, as nearly as may be, to the original design thereof, with certain exceptions," made a report thereon; which was read, and ordered to be referred to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

Mr. JOHN TALIAFERRO, Jun., from the committee appointed, presented a bill to incorporate the inhabitants of the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, enclosing a statement prepared by the Register, of the application of the appropriations made by Congress for clerk-hire, in the several offices of the Treasury Department, specifying the names of the persons, and the salaries allowed to each, for the three last years, in pursuance of a resolution of this House, of the twenty-fifth ultimo; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanying two statements, marked A and B, relative to expenses incurred by the United States in the exercise of jurisdiction over the territory of Columbia, since the assumption of jurisdiction by Congress, prepared in pursuance of a resolution of this House of the first instant; which were read, and ordered to be referred to the committee appointed, on the eighth of December last, to inquire whether any, and, if any, what alterations or amendments may be necessary in the existing government and laws of the District of Columbia.

The House proceeded to consider the report of the select committee to whom were referred, on the fifth instant, the amendments of the Senate to the bill, entitled "An act for revising and amending the acts concerning naturalization," which lay on the table: Whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth agree to the said amendments, with amendments, to the section proposed to be substituted by the Senate in lieu of the first and second sections of the original bill.

Mr. NICHOLSON, from the committee appointed on the second instant, presented a bill to abolish the Board of Commissioners in the city of Washington, and to make provision for the repayment of loans made by the State of Maryland for the use of the city; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

Mr. NICHOLSON, from the committee appointed, presented a bill to provide more effectually for the due application of public money, and for the accountability of persons intrusted therewith; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the supplementary report of the Committee on Claims, of the seventh instant, to whom was recommitted, on the fifteenth ultimo, their report on the memorial of Paul Coulon, a French citizen; and after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported a resolution, which was twice read, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That there be paid to Paul Coulon, as agent for the captors of the ship Betty Cathcart and brig Aaron, prizes to the French privateer La Bellone, out of any moneys in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, the sum of six thousand two hundred and forty-one dollars and forty-four cents, being the amount retained by the Treasury Department, from the sales of the ship Betty Cathcart, and for duties on the cargo of the brig Aaron.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that the Committee on Claims do prepare and bring in the same.

North-western Territory.

The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported yesterday from the Committee of the Whole to the bill to enable the people of the Eastern division of the Territory north-west of the river Ohio to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes, which lay on the table; and the same being severally twice read, were, on the question put thereupon, agreed to by the House.

A motion was then made, further to amend the said bill, at the Clerk's table, by striking out, in the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth lines of the second section thereof, the following words: "and on the north, by an east and west line, drawn through the southerly extreme of Lake Michigan, running east, after intersecting the due north line aforesaid, from the mouth of the Great Miami, until it shall intersect Lake Erie or"--and inserting in lieu thereof, the word "to."

It passed in the negative--yeas 27, nays 44, as follows:

YEAS.--James A. Bayard, Thomas Boude, Manasseh Cutler, John Davenport, Thomas T. Davis, John Dennis, Ebenezer Elmer, Abiel Foster, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, William Helms, Joseph Hemphill, Archibald Henderson, William H. Hill, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Lewis R. Morris, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, John Cotton Smith, John Stanley, John Stratton, Samuel Tenney, Thomas Tillinghast, Lemuel Williams, and Henry Woods.

NAYS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Theodorus Bailey, Phanuel Bishop, Richard Brent, Robert Brown, William Butler, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Condit, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, Lucas Elmendorph, William Eustis, John Fowler, William B. Giles, John A. Hanna, Daniel Heister, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, George Jackson, Charles Johnson, Samuel L. Mitchill, Thomas Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jr., Joseph H. Nicholson, John Smilie, Israel Smith, John Smith, (of Virginia,) Samuel Smith, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jr., John Taliaferro, jr., Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, and Robert Williams.

Mr. JOHN C. SMITH moved further to amend the bill, by striking out the third section thereof, in the words following, to wit:

And be it further enacted, That all male citizens of the United States, who shall have arrived at full age, and resided within the said Territory at least one year previous to the day of election, and shall have paid a territorial or county tax, and all persons having, in other respects, the legal qualifications to vote for Representatives in the General Assembly of the Territory, be, and they are hereby, authorized to choose Representatives to form a Convention, who shall be apportioned amongst the several counties within the Eastern division aforesaid, in a ratio of one Representative to every ---- inhabitants of each county, according to the enumeration taken under the authority of the United States, as near as may be, that is to say: from the county of Trumbull, ---- Representatives; from the county of Jefferson, ---- Representatives, ---- of the ---- to be elected within what is now known by the county of Belmont, taken from Jefferson and Washington Counties; from the county of Washington, ---- Representatives; from the county of Ross, ---- Representatives, ---- of the ---- to be elected in what is now known by Fairfield County, taken from Ross and Washington Counties; from the county of Adams, ---- Representatives; from the county of Hamilton, ---- Representatives, ---- of the ---- to be elected in what is now known by Clermont County, taken entirely from Hamilton County: and the elections for the Representatives aforesaid, shall take place on the second Tuesday of October next, the time fixed by a law of the Territory, entitled "An act to ascertain the number of free male inhabitants of the age of twenty-one, in the Territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio, and to regulate the elections of Representatives for the same," for electing Representatives to the General Assembly, and shall be held and conducted in the same manner as is provided by the aforesaid act, except that the qualifications of electors shall be as herein specified.

The motion to strike out was supported by Messrs. JOHN C. SMITH, GODDARD, FEARING, and HENDERSON, and opposed by Messrs. GILES, MITCHILL, R. WILLIAMS, ELMER, and HOLLAND, on the ground that the right of the United States to admit necessarily involved the power of prescribing a convention.

The yeas and nays were taken, and it passed in the negative--yeas 26, nays 48, as follows:

YEAS.--Thomas Boude, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Abiel Foster, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, Joseph Hemphill, Archibald Henderson, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Thomas Morris, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, William Shepard, John Cotton Smith, John Stratton, Samuel Tenney, Thomas Tillinghast, George B. Upham, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams, and Henry Woods.

NAYS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Phanuel Bishop, Richard Brent, William Butler, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, John Condit, Thomas T. Davis, John Dawson, William Dickson, Lucas Elmendorph, Ebenezer Elmer, John Fowler, William B. Giles, Edwin Gray, John A. Hanna, Daniel Heister, William Helms, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, George Jackson, Charles Johnson, Samuel L. Mitchill, Thomas Moore, James Mott, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jr., Joseph H. Nicholson, John Smilie, Israel Smith, John Smith, (of Virginia,) Josiah Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jr., John Stewart, John Taliaferro, jr., David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, and Robert Williams.

Mr. FEARING said he was of opinion that some provision ought to be made for the inhabitants excluded from the new State, and the continuance of suits from the old to the new Government; for these purposes he moved the recommitment of the bill. Lost.

Mr. DANA proposed so to amend the fourth section, as that a majority of the whole number of delegates elected in the Convention, instead of a majority of those present, should first determine whether it be or be not expedient to form a constitution, &c.

The yeas and nays were called, and the motion carried--yeas 38, nays 33, as follows:

YEAS.--Thomas Boude, William Brent, John Condit, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas T. Davis, Lucas Elmendorph, Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, Abiel Foster, John Fowler, Calvin Goddard, Edwin Gray, Roger Griswold, John A. Hanna, Joseph Hemphill, Archibald Henderson, William Hoge, Benjamin Huger, Lewis R. Morris, Thomas Morris, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, William Shepard, John Cotton Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jr., John Stewart, John Stratton, Samuel Tenney, Thomas Tillinghast, John Trigg, George B. Upham, Peleg Wadsworth, and Lemuel Williams.

NAYS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Robert Brown, William Butler, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, William B. Giles, William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, George Jackson, Charles Johnson, Samuel L. Mitchill, Thomas Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jr., Joseph H. Nicholson, John Smilie, Israel Smith, John Smith, (of Virginia,) Samuel Smith, John Taliaferro, jr., David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, and Robert Williams.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.

FRIDAY, April 9.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed a bill, entitled "An act to amend the Judicial System of the United States;" to which they desire the concurrence of this House.

[The chief alterations made from the old system consist in the holding the Supreme Court only once a year by four justices, and the establishment of six circuits, within each district of which circuit courts are to be holden twice a year, composed of one justice of the Supreme Court and the judge of the district, in which said court is held.]

The bill was read twice, and referred to a select committee.

Ohio State Government.

An engrossed bill to enable the people of the Eastern division of the Territory north-west of the river Ohio to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes, was read the third time, and the blanks therein filled up: And, on the question that the same do pass, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 47, nays 29, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Theodorus Bailey, Phanuel Bishop, Richard Brent, Robert Brown, William Butler, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Condit, Thomas T. Davis, John Dawson, William Dickson, Lucas Elmendorph, Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, John Fowler, William B. Giles, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, George Jackson, Samuel L. Mitchill, Thomas Moore, James Mott, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jr., Joseph H. Nicholson, John Smilie, Israel Smith, John Smith, (of New York,) Josiah Smith, Samuel Smith, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jr., John Stewart, John Taliaferro, jr., David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, John P. Van Ness, Isaac Van Horne, and Robert Williams.

NAYS.--Thomas Boude, John Campbell, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dennis, Abiel Foster, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, Seth Hastings, Joseph Hemphill, Archibald Henderson, Benjamin Huger, Thomas Lowndes, Lewis R. Morris, Thomas Morris, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, William Shepard, John Cotton Smith, John Stanley, John Stratton, Samuel Tenney, Thomas Tillinghast, George B. Upham, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Lemuel Williams, and Henry Woods.

MONDAY, April 12.

An engrossed bill for the relief of Theodosius Fowler, was read the third time, and passed.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill for the relief of Paul Coulon, which was reported without amendment, and ordered to be engrossed and read the third time to-day.

Mr. S. SMITH, from the committee appointed, presented a bill for the relief of Lewis Tousard; which was read twice and committed to the Committee of the Whole for to-morrow.

Mr. CLAY, from the committee appointed on the seventh instant, to examine and report on the state of the office of the Clerk of this House, made a report: which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to provide for the establishment of certain districts, and therein to amend an act, entitled "An act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage," and for other purposes; and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported several amendments thereto; which were severally twice read, and agreed to by the House.

Ordered, That the said bill, with the amendments, be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Secretary of State, of the seventh instant, to whom was referred, on the nineteenth of January last, the memorial of Fulwar Skipwith; and after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported two resolutions thereupon; which were severally twice read and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law, for the payment of four thousand five hundred and fifty dollars, unto Fulwar Skipwith, (which sum was advanced by him to the United States,) with an interest of ---- per centum, from the first of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five.

Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law, for compensating the said Fulwar Skipwith, for his services from the first of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, to the first of May, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine, at the rate of ---- dollars, per annum.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolutions; and that Mr. DAWSON, Mr. VAN CORTLANDT, and Mr. STANTON, do prepare and bring in the same.

The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the report of the committee of the twenty-second of January, on the petition of Sarah Fletcher and Jane Ingraham, referred to them on the tenth of December last, and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported several resolutions thereupon; which were severally twice read, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That it is expedient to grant to the widows and children, as the case may be, of the officers, seamen, and marines, who were lost at sea, on board the ship Insurgent and brigantine Pickering, lately in the service of the United States, four months' pay of their respective husbands or fathers.

Resolved, That it is expedient to provide by law for the payment of five years' half pay to the widows and children, as the case may be, of such officers in the naval service of the United States as shall be slain in battle, or die, when in the actual line of their duty.

Resolved, That the widows and children of those officers who were lost at sea in the ship Insurgent and brigantine Pickering, shall be entitled to this provision.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolutions; and that Mr. EUSTIS, Mr. GODDARD, and Mr. STANTON, do prepare and bring in the same.

An engrossed bill for the relief of Paul Coulon was read the third time and passed.

Mr. S. SMITH, from the committee appointed the ninth instant, on the part of this House, jointly, with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate, "to consider and report what business is necessary to be done by Congress in their present session, and when it may be expedient to close the same," made a report thereon; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill for the relief of sick and disabled seamen.

Mr. EUSTIS moved to strike out the first section which forms the moneys devoted to the above object into a general fund, to be applied according to the discretion of the President, instead of suffering it to remain, as heretofore, applied to the particular ports, (or those in the vicinity,) from which the moneys are derived.

This motion was supported by Messrs. EUSTIS, MITCHILL, and DANA, and opposed by Messrs. S. SMITH, MILLEDGE, DAVIS, MACON, and HUGER.

The question was then taken on striking out the first section, and lost; when the committee rose, and reported the bill with amendments.

MONDAY, April 19.

Navy Pensions.

An engrossed bill for the relief of widows and orphans of certain persons who have died, or may hereafter die, in the naval service of the United States, was read the third time; and, on the question that the same do pass, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 34, nays 29.

Compensation of Collectors.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill to amend the act fixing the compensation of officers employed in the collection of duties on imposts and tonnage.

This bill allows certain compensations to collectors of ports, provided the clear annual receipt does not exceed $5,000. A motion was made to strike out $5,000, for the purpose of introducing $4,000.

It was contended that this latter sum was sufficient compensation to any collector; that it greatly exceeded most of the compensations allowed to the Federal officers; and that as money was appreciating, it became necessary to reduce the salaries of officers generally.

In reply it was observed that very few collectors would receive so large a sum as $5,000--none other than those of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and perhaps Charleston; that the responsibility attached to these officers was greater than that attached to any other, as in some instances two million of dollars passed through their hands; that the temptation to violate duty was proportionably great; and that, from these considerations, it became the Government to afford them a liberal compensation; and that the sum was considerably below that heretofore allowed.

The question was taken on striking out $5,000, and lost--yeas 26.

Mr. STANLEY moved to strike out that part of the bill which deducted from the compensations made to the collectors of Newbern and Edenton, the sum of $250, heretofore allowed beyond their fees.

For this motion he assigned several reasons: among which were the inadequacy of the compensations, viz: about $1,600 to the duties performed, which were, notwithstanding the small amount of duties, very burdensome, owing to the smallness of the cargoes imported, and theirs being greatly inferior to the compensations allowed to the collectors of Wilmington and Petersburg.

Mr. S. SMITH informed the committee that the principle on which the several compensations had been graduated was, that when the gross emoluments exceed $2,000, the salary heretofore allowed by law, in addition to the emoluments, should be withdrawn. This was the fact in relation to the ports of Newbern and Edenton; and as the duties in each of these ports did not exceed $45,000, the compensation seemed adequate; he was, however, far from being tenacious, and would have little objection to a vote of the House which should increase it. Motion lost--yeas 25.

The committee rose, and reported the bill without amendment.

Mr. SOUTHARD renewed the motion to strike out $5,000, for the purpose of inserting $4,000, (the same motion made in committee,) and assigned substantially the same reasons above stated.

Messrs. STANLEY, BACON, and SMILIE, delivered a few observations for, and Mr. HUGER against the motion, which was taken by yeas and nays, on the call of Mr. SOUTHARD, and lost--yeas 31, nays 40.

THURSDAY, April 22.

French Spoliations.

Mr. GILES, from the committee appointed on the fifth of February last, to whom were referred the memorials and petitions of sundry citizens of the United States, and resident merchants therein, praying relief in the case of depredations committed on their vessels and cargoes, while in pursuit of lawful commerce, by the cruisers of the French Republic, during the late European war, made a report thereon; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

FRIDAY, April 23.

Judiciary System.

The question was then put on the passage of the bill.

Mr. BAYARD called for the yeas and nays, which were taken, and stood--yeas 46, nays 30, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, John Archer, John Bacon, Theodorus Bailey, Phanuel Bishop, Walter Bowie, Richard Brent, Robert Brown, William Butler, Thomas Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, John Condit, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, Lucas Elmendorph, John Fowler, William B. Giles, Edwin Gray, John A. Hanna, Daniel Heister, William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, Michael Leib, John Milledge, Anthony New, Joseph H. Nicholson, John Smilie, Israel Smith, John Smith, (of New York,) John Smith, (of Virginia,) Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, jr., John Stewart, John Taliaferro, jr., Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, John P. Van Ness, Isaac Van Horne, and Robert Williams.

NAYS.--James A. Bayard, Thomas Boude, John Campbell, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas T. Davis, John Dennis, Ebenezer Elmer, Abiel Foster, Calvin Goddard, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, Archibald Henderson, Thomas Lowndes, Lewis R. Morris, Thomas Morris, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Nathan Read, John Stanley, John Stratton, Benjamin Tallmadge, Samuel Tenney, Thomas Tillinghast, George P. Upham, Peleg Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams, and Henry Woods.

TUESDAY, April 27.

Naval Sites.

UNAUTHORIZED PURCHASES.

Mr. MITCHILL, from the committee appointed on so much of the President's Message as relates to naval sites, &c., made a further report. The report concludes as follows:

"The committee find that, prior to the fourth of March, 1801, the sum of one hundred and ninety-nine thousand and thirty dollars, and ninety-two cents, has been expended in purchasing navy yards and making improvements upon them, without any law authorizing the purchase, or any appropriation of money, either for purchase or improvements."

WEDNESDAY, April 28.

Sedition Act.

PETITION OF THOMAS COOPER.

A petition of Thomas Cooper, of the county of Northumberland, in the State of Pennsylvania, was presented to the House and read, setting forth that, in the month of April, eighteen hundred, he was tried and condemned at Philadelphia, before Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, judges of the circuit court of the United States there sitting, for having written and published a libel upon the political character and conduct of John Adams, the then President of the United States; and was thereupon adjudged to pay a fine of four hundred dollars, and to suffer an imprisonment of six months; which punishment he accordingly underwent; that he apprehends the said trial, condemnation, and punishment, were unjust: first, because the law, commonly called the Sedition law, under which he was indicted, was passed in direct opposition to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the United States; and secondly, because the said judges did not only take for granted the constitutionality of the said law, but did unjustly and improperly refuse to grant him a subpoena ad testificandum, directed to the said John Adams; and therefore praying such redress as the wisdom of Congress shall deign to bestow.

Mr. GRISWOLD moved to reject the prayer of the petition.

Mr. GILES moved to postpone the consideration of the petition till the third Monday in November.

On this motion a debate ensued, in which Mr. GILES and Mr. RANDOLPH supported, and Mr. GRISWOLD and Mr. BAYARD opposed the motion.

The question on postponement was carried, by a large majority.

SATURDAY, May 1.

Disbursement of Public Moneys.

UNAUTHORIZED PURCHASE OF NAVY YARDS.

Mr. GRISWOLD.--Again, the committee say that four navy yards were purchased without authority, and the money misapplied which was paid for them. In my judgment, this is one of the most extraordinary opinions ever pronounced. The facts which gave rise to the purchase of the navy yards were as follows: In the year 1799, Congress authorized by law the building of six 74-gun ships, and one million of dollars was then appropriated for that object, and for building six sloops-of-war. The Secretary of the Treasury found that the committee ought to have understood that ships could not be built either in the air or upon the water, and as he was directed to build the ships, that he must, of course, procure land to place them upon, and that the land must be either purchased or hired. He found that there was not a navy yard within the United States calculated for building ships-of-the-line, and that the expense of preparing yards upon private property would be lost the moment the ship was launched, and of course that this would be bad economy. Experience had likewise taught him, that the better mode would be to purchase the ground, as it would then remain at the control of the Government, so long as it was wanted, and the improvements would be saved. This course was accordingly pursued, and I believe that few gentlemen, except the committee, will conclude that it was not the wisest and best. But whether it was the best course or not, it was certainly authorized by law, because it can never be seriously doubted, whether a law which directs a thing to be done, does authorize the agents to be employed to do every thing which becomes necessary for accomplishing the object. The laws which have authorized the building of ships have certainly empowered the public agents to purchase timber, copper, cordage, and every other necessary material, and yet no law for those objects has ever named any one of those articles. On the same principle, the law which directed the building of these particular ships, necessarily authorized the public agent to procure the ground to place them upon, although it was not said, whether the ships should be built upon the water or upon the land.

But there has been one omission in this part of the report, which, on every principle of fairness ought to be connected with it, and for which purpose the report ought to be recommitted: the omission of the letter of Mr. Stoddert, late Secretary of the Navy, explanatory of the purchase made by him of the navy yards, addressed to the committee, in answer to an application made by them upon this subject. This letter contains, in my opinion, a complete justification of that transaction, and was so viewed by the minority of the committee, who urged that it might, at least, be included in the report; but, to our astonishment, the minority refused this justice to the man whom their report had implicated. This opinion of the majority, in respect to the propriety of including Mr. Stoddert's letter, I must believe, will remain a solitary one, for I can scarcely imagine it possible that any other gentleman in this House would have refused, when they presented a charge against this gentleman with one hand, to offer with the other his vindication, written at their own request. If, however, the motion to recommit should prevail, I will then move an instruction to the committee, which will produce Mr. Stoddert's letter.

What renders the report of the committee still more extraordinary, both in respect to erecting the buildings, and also the purchase of navy yards, is, that another subject, resembling these in principle, was before the committee, and on which they refused to report. This was the erecting of the extensive navy stores in this place by the present Administration.

The present Secretary of the Navy was requested to inform the committee when those stores were erected, and from what fund the money had been taken. His answer satisfied the committee that the stores had been erected by the present Administration, and that the money, if I recollect correctly, had been taken from an appropriation for the 74's, navy yards, and docks. The minority of the committee believed, what I trust will be generally believed by those who examine the question, that this was (to say no more of it) at least as doubtful an expenditure as that for the purchase of navy yards, or for erecting the buildings on the Schuylkill. If an authority to build 74's, to complete navy yards and docks, gave an authority to erect stores for the accommodation of the navy, it was thought that an authority to build ships, necessarily included a power to procure the land to place them upon; and that an authority to purchase military stores and to manage the affairs of the army necessarily included a power to furnish, at the public expense, buildings to cover the stores, and for other necessary military purposes, at the discretion of the officers intrusted with those concerns. The minority of the committee, therefore, urged to include this transaction in the report, together with the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, but the request was rejected by the majority. We believed that the cases were precisely similar in principle, and that it was not conducting with impartiality to include the one without the other; and we have thought that when it was discovered that the present Administration was conducting on principles precisely similar to those of their predecessors, it would greatly tend to satisfy all parties that the conduct of the Government had been correct. I feel no hesitation in declaring that, in my judgment, the present Administration were authorized to erect the navy stores, although I believe that the power may be better questioned than it could be in the other cases. These navy stores, I presume, are useful both for receiving the necessary materials for ship building, and securing the stores of the public ships laid up in ordinary; and although not expressly authorized by the words of the law, may very well be considered as a proper appendage to a navy yard, or as buildings rendered necessary in the finishing of the 74's; and as to the extent of the buildings, I am content to leave that point to the Department to which it has been confided. The propriety, however, of including this statement in the report (I trust) will be apparent to the House, and it will not in this place be thought correct to confine our criticisms exclusively to the past Administration. I therefore urge this as a further reason for recommitting the report.

Mr. NICHOLSON had very little inclination, at this time, to enter into an explanation of this subject, which had been so misunderstood by the gentleman just up, on account of indisposition, nor was he very anxiously opposed to the recommitment, but he could perceive not a shadow of reason why the report should be recommitted.

The gentleman had grounded his motion upon the opinion, that all the necessary facts had not been stated. It was, to be sure, a very late period of the session, and the discussion would therefore consume much precious time; but notwithstanding that, if it should appear that any material facts had been suppressed, there would be good ground for recommitting the report. He should therefore think it necessary to test the grounds advanced, to prove the necessity of the recommitment.

As to the navy yards, the committee having been appointed "to report whether moneys drawn from the Treasury have been faithfully applied to the objects for which they were appropriated, and whether the same have been regularly accounted for;" and knowing that six navy yards had been purchased, very naturally inquired under what authority these purchases had been made, and how they were paid for. They referred to the law authorizing the building of six seventy-fours and six sloops-of-war. The committee submitted an inquiry to the former Secretary of the Navy, (Mr. Stoddert,) directing him to inform the committee as to the purchase. Mr. Stoddert answered that a law had passed, appropriating one million of dollars for building the seventy-fours and sloops-of-war, and that fifty thousand dollars were also appropriated for two dock-yards; and also that two hundred thousand dollars were appropriated for the purchase of timber, or land clothed therewith; and that he thought himself authorized to purchase six navy yards, wherein to build the seventy-fours. To these several laws the committee referred for the authority under which the Secretary acted, but they could find no such authority; they could find no other, than authority to purchase two dock-yards, wherein to repair the ships. Now, although not stated in the report, there is very good reason to believe that the fifty thousand dollars never was laid out upon the two dock-yards, but that this sum was cast into the surplus fund. Whether Mr. Stoddert's opinion was correct or not, that it would be more economical to build the seventy-fours in public yards, than in private yards at rent, they were not appointed to inquire; it was their business to say whether he was authorized to act so, let his private opinion be what it might. The committee were clearly of opinion, that he was not authorized to take money appropriated for one purpose and make use of it for another.

As to the reason, why the gentleman wishes the report recommitted; to wit, to insert Mr. Stoddert's answer with the report; it is true a motion for the insertion was made. But the committee thought that letter was addressed to them, and not to the House; that it was to inform their minds, so as to enable them to make the report. They paid due attention to the reasoning of the letter, but it did not convince them that Mr. S. acted authoritatively. Mr. Stoddert's reasoning upon the subject could not form a part of the report; the committee were called upon to form an opinion, and not to substitute that of any individual. They were to inquire whether moneys appropriated were used to the purposes for which they were appropriated. They thought it was not, because it was appropriated to build ships, and to purchase land with timber on it, or timber alone. The question then is, whether six navy yards are six seventy-four gun ships, and whether six sloops-of-war are lands with timber growing on it or not? If Mr. Stoddert's reasoning had been adopted by the committee, it would have become their reasoning, and except it should be theirs, it would have had no business in the report. If a disposition of vindication could have been admitted, Mr. Stoddert might have been permitted to have appeared with counsel before the committee, but facts alone were required, and facts the committee state. Ships had been built for the public before, but the idea never was entertained to build docks for them. No measure different from those taken in the building of the frigates, except by legal authority, ought to have been taken with the seventy-fours.

The case of the navy yard at this place was brought before the committee. It was the request of the minority that the case should be inquired into. The committee sent to request the Secretary of the Navy to say by what authority the storehouse had been erected here, or from what fund it was paid. The answer was, that the storehouse had been erected out of a fund granted in February, eighteen hundred and one, for completing the seventy-fours, the navy yards, and the docks. The ships had been ordered to be laid up in ordinary at this place, and the navy yard purchased. When the present Secretary of the Navy came into office, he found, that as a navy yard was to be completed here, and as sails, rigging, and other naval stores, must be kept here; and finding that one storehouse was already built, and another begun, here, it would be most prudent to complete that storehouse, as a necessary appendage to a navy yard where shipping would be sent for repairs. To this none of the gentlemen objected, but rather approved; and this is surely a purpose to which the money was appropriated. Whether the other applications are or not, is for the House to decide. The committee have stated the facts.

The gentleman says the accountant of the War Department was satisfied with the accounts of General Wilkins. I did not understand the fact so--vouchers were sent on, but they were not satisfactory.

Mr. BAYARD.--I shall beg the indulgence only of a few words, upon one or two heads, respecting which, the opinion I entertain is decidedly opposed to that expressed by a majority of the committee. I cannot well conceive of a plainer mistake, than what appears in the opinion, pronounced on the purchase of six navy yards, made by the late Secretary of the Navy. The committee, I think, ought to be allowed an opportunity of reviewing that opinion. Four of those six yards are considered as purchased without authority, and the money paid for them misapplied.

By the act of the Legislature, of February, 1799, the Secretary of the Navy was directed to cause to be built six ships, each to carry not less than seventy-four guns; and six sloops-of-war of eighteen guns. For this purpose, a million of dollars was appropriated; two hundred thousand were appropriated to the purchase of land, bearing timber suitable for the navy, and fifty thousand dollars for the making of two docks. These laws, passed on successive days, indicated the design of a permanent Navy Establishment. It was perfectly understood that the ships of the line were not directed to be built for the occasional defence of the country at that period, but were intended as the commencement of a lasting system of defence, which was expected to increase with the growth of the commerce and resources of the country. It was far from our expectation that the Navy of the United States was to be limited to six ships of the line, or to any number within the convenient means of the country, short of a force adequate to render our flag respectable and our navigation secure. It was not supposed that the seventy-fours would be launched for several years, but we had hopes when they left the stocks, a flourishing commerce would enable us to lay the keels of new ships in their places. Under this view were the two hundred thousand dollars appropriated, to the purchase of land producing timber fit for a navy. With this knowledge, so plainly derivable from the policy pursued by the Legislature, what was the Secretary of the Navy to do? It was made his duty to build six seventy-fours and six sloops-of-war. It is surely not expected that they were to be built on the water or in the air, and of consequence it will be allowed that he had authority to provide yards, for the purpose of constructing them. The public had no yards, and it was therefore necessary to obtain ground from individuals. As there were no persons disposed to make charitable grants, it remained only for the United States to purchase ground in fee simple, or for a term of years, paying a gross sum or an annual rent. The act of Congress, directing the ships to be built, appropriated not a dollar either for the renting or for the purchase of land. But a million of dollars were appropriated to the building of the ships, which was directed to be done, but which could not be done without an expenditure for land. Can there be a plainer proposition, than that an appropriation for a certain service, embraces every article without which the service cannot be performed? In the present instance, the service imposed upon the Secretary, could not be performed without obtaining navy yards at the public expense. It therefore rested in his discretion, for the faithful exercise of which he was accountable to the Government, either to purchase or rent the ground, necessary for the yards. It was his duty to conform to the views of the Legislature, and to make such an arrangement as would be most advantageous to the public. If it answered the object, and was most for the interest of the Government to rent, then surely he ought to have rented it; but if it comported more with their views, or was more to their benefit to purchase, it was then his duty to purchase.

This inquiry, however, was never made by the committee. They never asked the question whether it was cheaper to buy or to rent, and they have condemned the Secretary for buying and not renting, when he had no more authority to rent than to buy, and when by buying he has probably saved to the United States several hundred thousand dollars. The situation of this officer is peculiarly hard. Having been directed to build a number of ships for the public service, he has purchased navy yards for the purpose, and in consequence has subjected himself to the accusation of expending public money without authority. If he had rented land for the purpose, he would have been equally liable to the same reproach; and if he had neglected to do either, he would have been exposed to an impeachment. The Secretary has it fully in his power to show, that his purchases will save a large sum of money to the United States. A navy yard, for a seventy-four, cannot be prepared without great expense. Under this head, I am informed by the Secretary, that one hundred thousand dollars were expended on one frigate, the Constellation. This was occasioned in a great degree by leasing the yard. At the expiration of the lease, the public lose the benefit of all their expense in preparing and improving the ground.

In addition to the inference which the Secretary might fairly make, of an authority to purchase ground for the navy yards, if a purchase could be made on cheaper terms than a contract of lease, he had further to consider the intention, plainly manifested by the Legislature, of establishing a system which would require the use of these navy yards at a future time, beyond the duration of any common lease. Nay, he knew not what time was to be consumed in building the ships directed, and of course could not know for what term a contract could be made. At present, if the Government should be disposed to sell the ships on the stocks, they have the power to sell the navy yards, and they will have the same power when the ships are launched; and they may thus convert in effect the permanent purchase into a term for years, and restore to the Treasury the money which has been expended. But, sir, what I consider as the hardest act on the part of the majority of the committee, was their refusal to suffer the answer of the Secretary to the letter we addressed to him, explaining the grounds of his conduct, to accompany the documents annexed to the report. We have been told by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. NICHOLSON) that it was not the business of the committee to report the opinions of the Secretary, or of any other individual. If this be correct, I believe it was as little the business of the committee to report their own opinions. They should have confined themselves to the statement of facts, and upon those facts have left the House and the nation at large to form their own opinions.

If this course had been pursued, there would have been little occasion to publish the reasoning of Mr. Stoddert; but, as the opinion of the committee is merely their inference from certain premises, it was due to the public, as well as to the Secretary, that the grounds should be explained which had led him to a different conclusion from that adopted by the committee. This report seems, at present, intended only for public information; certainly I must believe to give correct information. The letter of Mr. Stoddert throws great light upon a part of it, and when our object is only to inform the people on a subject, why should we refuse any light which places it more clearly before their eyes?

MONDAY, 5 o'clock P. M., May 3.

Adjournment.

On motion, Ordered, That Mr. GRISWOLD and Mr. SAMUEL SMITH be appointed a committee, on the part of this House, jointly, with such committee as may be appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and notify him of the proposed recess of Congress.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part, jointly, with the committee appointed on the part of this House, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and notify him of the proposed recess of Congress.

Mr. GRISWOLD, from the committee appointed on the part of this House, jointly, with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and notify him of the proposed recess of Congress, reported that the committee had performed that service; and that the PRESIDENT signified to them he had no farther communication to make during the present Session.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate, to inform them that this House, having completed the business before them, are now about to adjourn until the first Monday in December next; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate, having completed the Legislative business before them, are now ready to adjourn. Whereupon,

The SPEAKER adjourned the House until the first Monday in December next.

SEVENTH CONGRESS.--SECOND SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 6, 1802.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.

MONDAY, December 6, 1802.

In pursuance of the law of last session, the second session of the seventh Congress commenced this day, at the city of Washington, and the Senate assembled, in their Chamber, at the Capitol.

PRESENT:

SIMEON OLCOTT, from New Hampshire.

URIAH TRACY, from Connecticut.

CHRISTOPHER ELLERY, from Rhode Island.

STEPHEN R. BRADLEY, from Vermont.

SAMUEL WHITE, from Delaware.

ROBERT WRIGHT, from Maryland.

ABRAHAM BALDWIN, from Georgia.

WILLIAM PLUMER, appointed a Senator by the State of New Hampshire, to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of JAMES SHEAFE, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the Senate.

The number of members assembled not being sufficient to form a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

TUESDAY, December 7.

Mr. BRECKENRIDGE, from Kentucky; Mr. FOSTER, from Rhode Island; Mr. HOWARD, from Maryland; and Mr. LOGAN, from Pennsylvania, severally attended.

There being no quorum, the Senate adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, December 8.

The number of members assembled not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

THURSDAY, December 9.

The number of members assembled not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

FRIDAY, December 10.

Mr. S. T. MASON, from Virginia, attended.

The number of members assembled not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

SATURDAY, December 11.

Mr. FRANKLIN, from North Carolina, attended.

The number of members assembled not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

MONDAY, December 13.

Mr. J. MASON, from Massachusetts; Mr. DAYTON, and Mr. OGDEN, from New Jersey; and Mr. SUMTER, from South Carolina, severally attended.

The VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate proceeded to the choice of a President, pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be 17, of which 9 make a majority.

Mr. Bradley had 7, Mr. Tracy had 7, Mr. Baldwin 1, Mr. Dayton 1, Mr. Logan 1.

There was consequently no choice. Whereupon, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President, pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be 17, of which 9 make a majority.

Mr. Bradley had 8, Mr. Tracy 7, Mr. Dayton 1, Mr. Logan 1.

There was consequently no choice. Whereupon the Senate proceeded to the election of a President pro tempore, as the Constitution provides, and the ballots being counted, the whole number was found to be 17, of which 9 make a majority.

Mr. Bradley had 8, Mr. Tracy 7, Mr. Dayton 1, Mr. Logan 1.

There was consequently no choice. Whereupon, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President, pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the ballots being counted, the whole number of votes was 14, of which 8 make a majority.

Mr. Tracy had 7, Mr. Bradley 5, Mr. Dayton 1, Mr. Logan 1.

There was consequently no choice; and the Senate adjourned.

TUESDAY, December 14.

The VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate proceeded to the choice of a President, pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be 17, of which 9 make a majority.

Mr. Bradley had 9, Mr. Tracy 7, Mr. Dayton 1.

Consequently, STEPHEN R. BRADLEY was elected President of the Senate, pro tempore.

The credentials of Mr. PLUMER, appointed a Senator by the State of New Hampshire, to supply a vacancy occasioned by the resignation of JAMES SHEAFE, Esq., were read; and the oath prescribed by law was administered to him by the President.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and that, in the absence of the VICE PRESIDENT, they have elected STEPHEN R. BRADLEY, President of the Senate, pro tempore.

A similar notice was directed to be given to the House of Representatives, and also that the Senate are ready to proceed to business.

On motion, it was agreed to proceed to the choice of a Chaplain on the part of the Senate, and the ballots having been collected and counted, the whole number was 17, of which 9 is the majority.

Doctor Gantt had 10, Mr. M'Cormick 4, Mr. Priestley 2, Mr. Balch 1.

So it was Resolved, That the Rev. Dr. GANTT be the Chaplain to Congress, on the part of the Senate, during the present session.

WEDNESDAY, December 15.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

When we assemble together, fellow-citizens, to consider the state of our beloved country, our just attentions are first drawn to those pleasing circumstances which mark the goodness of that Being from whose favor they flow, and the large measure of thankfulness we owe for his bounty. Another year has come around, and finds us still blessed with peace and friendship abroad; law, order, and religion, at home; good affection and harmony with our Indian neighbors; our burdens lightened, yet our income sufficient for the public wants, and the produce of the year great beyond example. These, fellow-citizens, are the circumstances under which we meet: and we remark, with special satisfaction, those which, under the smiles of Providence, result from the skill, industry, and order of our citizens, managing their own affairs in their own way, and for their own use, unembarrassed by too much regulation, unoppressed by fiscal exactions.

On the restoration of peace in Europe, that portion of the general carrying trade which had fallen to our share during the war, was abridged by the returning competition of the belligerent powers. This was to be expected, and was just. But, in addition, we find in some parts of Europe monopolizing discriminations, which, in the form of duties, tend effectually to prohibit the carrying thither our own produce in our own vessels. From existing amities, and a spirit of justice, it is hoped that friendly discussion will produce a fair and adequate reciprocity. But should false calculations of interest defeat our hope, it rests with the Legislature to decide whether they will meet inequalities abroad with countervailing inequalities at home, or provide for the evil in any other way.

It is with satisfaction I lay before you an act of the British Parliament anticipating this subject so far as to authorize a mutual abolition of the duties and countervailing duties, permitted under the treaty of 1794. It shows, on their part, a spirit of justice and friendly accommodation, which it is our duty and our interest to cultivate with all nations. Whether this would produce a due equality in the navigation between the two countries is a subject for your consideration.

Another circumstance which claims attention, as directly affecting the very source of our navigation, is the defect or the evasion of the law providing for the return of seamen, and particularly of those belonging to vessels sold abroad. Numbers of them, discharged in foreign ports, have been thrown on the hands of our Consuls, who, to rescue them from the dangers into which their distresses might plunge them, and save them to their country, have found it necessary, in some cases, to return them at the public charge.

The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the late war, will, if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations, which will doubtless have just weight in any deliberations of the Legislature connected with that subject.

There was reason, not long since, to apprehend that the warfare in which we were engaged with Tripoli might be taken up by some other of the Barbary Powers. A reinforcement, therefore, was immediately ordered to the vessels already there. Subsequent information, however, has removed these apprehensions for the present. To secure our commerce in that sea with the smallest force competent, we have supposed it best to watch strictly the harbor of Tripoli. Still, however, the shallowness of their coast, and the want of smaller vessels on our part, has permitted some cruisers to escape unobserved; and to one of these an American vessel unfortunately fell a prey. The captain, one American seaman, and two others of color, remain prisoners with them; unless exchanged under an agreement formerly made with the Bashaw, to whom, on the faith of that, some of his captive subjects had been restored.

The convention with the State of Georgia has been ratified by their Legislature, and a repurchase from the Creeks has been consequently made of a part of the Tallassee country. In this purchase has been also comprehended a part of the lands within the fork of Oconee and Ocmulgee Rivers. The particulars of the contract will be laid before Congress so soon as they shall be in a state for communication.

In order to remove every ground of difference possible with our Indian neighbors, I have proceeded in the work of settling with them and marking the boundaries between us. That with the Choctaw nation is fixed in one part, and will be through the whole within a short time. The country to which their title had been extinguished before the Revolution is sufficient to receive a very respectable population, which Congress will probably see the expediency of encouraging so soon as the limits shall be declared. We are to view this position as an outpost of the United States, surrounded by strong neighbors, and distant from its support. And how far that monopoly which prevents population should here be guarded against, and actual habitation made a condition of the continuance of title, will be for your consideration. A prompt settlement, too, of all existing rights and claims within this Territory presents itself as a preliminary operation.

In that part of the Indiana Territory which includes Vincennes, the lines settled with the neighboring tribes fix the extinction of their title at a breadth of twenty-four leagues from east to west, and about the same length, parallel with and including the Wabash. They have also ceded a tract of four miles square, including the salt springs, near the mouth of that river.

In the department of finance it is with pleasure I inform you that the receipts of external duties for the last twelve months have exceeded those of any former year, and that the ratio of increase has been also greater than usual. This has enabled us to answer all the regular exigencies of Government, to pay from the Treasury within one year upwards of eight millions of dollars, principal and interest, of the public debt, exclusive of upwards of one million paid by the sale of bank stock, and making in the whole a reduction of nearly five millions and a half of principal, and to have now in the Treasury four millions and a half of dollars, which are in a course of application to the further discharge of debt and current demands. Experience, too, so far, authorizes us to believe, if no extraordinary event supervenes, and the expenses which will be actually incurred shall not be greater than were contemplated by Congress at their last session, that we shall not be disappointed in the expectations then formed. But, nevertheless, as the effect of peace on the amount of duties is not yet fully ascertained, it is the more necessary to practise every useful economy, and to incur no expense which may be avoided without prejudice.

No change being deemed necessary in our Military Establishment, an estimate of its expenses for the ensuing year, on its present footing, as also of the sums to be employed in fortifications, and other objects within that department, has been prepared by the Secretary of War, and will make a part of the general estimates which will be presented to you.

Considering that our regular troops are employed for local purposes, and that the militia is our general reliance for great and sudden emergencies, you will doubtless think this institution worthy of a review, and give it those improvements of which you find it susceptible.

Estimates for the Naval Department, prepared by the Secretary of the Navy, for another year, will, in like manner, be communicated with the general estimates. A small force in the Mediterranean will still be necessary to restrain the Tripoline cruisers; and the uncertain tenure of peace with some other of the Barbary Powers may eventually require that force to be augmented. The necessity of procuring some smaller vessels for that service will raise the estimate; but the difference in their maintenance will soon make it a measure of economy.

Presuming it will be deemed expedient to expend annually a convenient sum towards providing the Naval defence which our situation may require, I cannot but recommend that the first appropriations for that purpose may go to the saving what we already possess. No cares, no attentions, can preserve vessels from rapid decay, which lie in water and exposed to the sun. These decays require great and constant repairs, and will consume, if continued, a great portion of the moneys destined to Naval purposes. To avoid this waste of our resources, it is proposed to add to our navy yard here a dock, within which our present vessels may be laid up dry, and under cover from the sun. Under these circumstances, experience proves that works of wood will remain scarcely at all affected by time. The great abundance of running water which this situation possesses, at heights far above the level of the tide, if employed as is practised for lock navigation, furnishes the means for raising and laying up our vessels on a dry and sheltered bed. And should the measure be found useful here, similar depositories for laying up, as well as for building and repairing vessels, may hereafter be undertaken at other navy yards offering the same means. The plans and estimates of the work, prepared by a person of skill and experience, will be presented to you without delay; and from this it will be seen that scarcely more than has been the cost of one vessel is necessary to save the whole, and that the annual sum to be employed towards its completion may be adapted to the views of the Legislature as to Naval expenditure.

To cultivate peace, and maintain commerce and navigation in all their lawful enterprises; to foster our fisheries as nurseries of navigation and for the nurture of man, and protect the manufactures adapted to our circumstances; to preserve the faith of the nation by an exact discharge of its debts and contracts, expend the public money with the same care and economy we would practise with our own, and impose on our citizens no unnecessary burdens; to keep, in all things, within the pale of our constitutional powers, and cherish the Federal Union as the only rock of safety; these, fellow-citizens, are the landmarks by which we are to guide ourselves in all our proceedings. By continuing to make these the rule of our action, we shall endear to our countrymen the true principles of their constitution, and promote a union of sentiment and of action, equally auspicious to their happiness and safety. On my part you may count on a cordial concurrence in every measure for the public good; and on all the information I possess which may enable you to discharge to advantage the high functions with which you are invested by your country.

TH. JEFFERSON.

DECEMBER 15, 1802.

The Message and papers therein referred to were read; and

Ordered, That five hundred copies of the Message of the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, together with one hundred copies of each of the papers referred to in the Message, be printed for the use of the Senate.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House have elected the Reverend WILLIAM PARKINSON a Chaplain to Congress, on their part.

WEDNESDAY, December 22.

DWIGHT FOSTER, from the State of Massachusetts, attended.

THURSDAY, December 23.

Mr. MORRIS, from the State of New York, attended.

MONDAY, December 27.

Mr. HILLHOUSE, from the State of Connecticut, attended.

THURSDAY, December 30.

Mr. ANDERSON, and Mr. COCKE, from the State of Tennessee, severally attended.

MONDAY, January 3, 1803.

Mr. NICHOLAS, from the State of Virginia, and Mr. WELLS, from the State of Delaware, attended.

FRIDAY, January 7.

Mr. STONE, from North Carolina, attended.

The PRESIDENT communicated a letter signed T. Worthington, agent for the State of Ohio, enclosing a copy of the constitution of the said State, and requesting it might be laid before the Senate; and they were read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion made on the 5th instant for extending the laws of the United States to the State of Ohio, together with the amendment proposed thereon; which amendment was withdrawn; and it was agreed to adopt the motion, amended as follows:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what Legislative measures may be necessary for admitting the State of Ohio into the Union, or for extending to that State the laws of the United States; and

Ordered, That Messrs. BRECKENRIDGE, MORRIS, and ANDERSON, be the committee, and that the letter signed T. Worthington, agent for the State of Ohio, laid before the Senate this morning, together with a copy of the constitution of said State, be referred to the same committee, to consider and report thereon.

The bill to carry into effect the several resolutions of Congress for erecting monuments to the memories of the late Generals Wooster, Herkimer, Davidson, and Scriven, was read the third time.

On motion to postpone the further consideration of this bill until the first Monday in December next, it passed in the negative--yeas 9, nays 17, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Cocke, Ellery, Nicholas, Sumter, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Clinton, Dayton, T. Foster, D. Foster, Franklin, Hillhouse, Howard, Jackson, Logan, J. Mason, Morris, Olcott, Plumer, Stone, Tracy, Wells, and White.

On the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 18, nays 8, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Baldwin, Clinton, Dayton, T. Foster, D. Foster, Franklin, Hillhouse, Howard, Jackson, Logan, J. Mason, Morris, Olcott, Plumer, Stone, Tracy, Wells, and White.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bradley, Breckenridge, Cocke, Ellery, Nicholas, Sumter, and Wright.

So it was Resolved, That this bill pass, that it be engrossed, and that the title thereof be "An act to carry into effect the several resolutions of Congress for erecting monuments to the memories of the late Generals Wooster, Herkimer, Davidson, and Scriven."

TUESDAY, January 11.

In Executive session, the following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Gentlemen of the Senate:

The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, and perhaps of the Floridas, and the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans, are events of primary interest to the United States. On both occasions, such measures were promptly taken as were thought most likely amicably to remove the present and to prevent future causes of inquietude. The objects of these measures were to obtain the territory on the left bank of the Mississippi, and eastward of that, if practicable, on conditions to which the proper authorities of our country would agree; or, at least, to prevent any changes which might lessen the secure exercise of our rights. While my confidence in our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris is entire and undiminished, I still think that these objects might be promoted by joining with him a person sent from hence directly, carrying with him the feelings and sentiments of the nation, excited on the late occurrence, impressed by full communications of all the views we entertain on this interesting subject; and thus prepared to meet and to improve, to a useful result, the counter-propositions of the other contracting party, whatsoever form their interests may give to them, and to secure to us the ultimate accomplishment of our object.

I therefore nominate Robert R. Livingston to be Minister Plenipotentiary, and James Monroe to be Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, with full powers to both, jointly, or to either, on the death of the other, to enter into a treaty or convention with the First Consul of France, for the purpose of enlarging, and more effectually securing, our rights and interests in the river Mississippi, and in the territories eastward thereof.

But as the possession of these provinces is still in Spain, and the course of events may retard or prevent the cession to France being carried into effect, to secure our object, it will be expedient to address equal powers to the Government of Spain also, to be used only in the event of its being necessary.

I therefore nominate Charles Pinckney to be Minister Plenipotentiary, and James Monroe, of Virginia, to be Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, with full powers to both, jointly, or to either, on the death of the other, to enter into a treaty or convention with His Catholic Majesty, for the purpose of enlarging, and more effectually securing, our rights and interests in the river Mississippi, and in the territories eastward thereof.

JAN. 11, 1803.

TH. JEFFERSON.

The Messages and papers therein referred to were read, and ordered that they severally lie for consideration.

MONDAY, January 17.

Mr. BROWN, from the State of Kentucky, attended.

WEDNESDAY, January 19.

AARON BURR, Vice President of the United States, and President of the Senate, attended.

THURSDAY, January 20.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a certificate of the election of SAMUEL M'CLAY, Esq. of Northumberland county, and State of Pennsylvania, to be a Senator of the United States from the fourth day of March next, inclusive; and it was read and ordered to lie on file.

MONDAY, January 24.

The VICE PRESIDENT communicated a letter from the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the State of Delaware, enclosing the credentials of SAMUEL WHITE, Esq., elected a Senator of the United States for the term of six years, commencing on the 4th day of March next; and they were read.

Ordered, That they lie on file.

WEDNESDAY, January 26.

JAMES ROSS, from Pennsylvania, attended.

THURSDAY, January 27.

Mr. Ross presented the several representations and memorials of Richard Basset, Egbert Benson, Benjamin Bourne, William Griffith, Samuel Hitchcock, B. P. Key, C. Magill, Jeremiah Smith, G. K. Taylor, William Tilghman, and Oliver Wolcott, judges of the circuit courts under the late act, entitled "An act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States;" stating that, since the repeal of the said act, no law had been made for assigning to them the execution of any Judicial functions, nor has any provision been made for the payment of their stipulated compensations; and most respectfully requesting Congress to review the existing laws with respect to the officers in question; and the memorials were read.

Ordered, That they be referred to Messrs. MORRIS, ROSS, and DAYTON, to consider and report thereon, and that the memorials be printed for the use of the Senate. The memorial is as follows

To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled:

The undersigned most respectfully submit the following resolution and memorial.

By an act of Congress passed on the thirteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and one, entitled "An act to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States," certain judicial offices were created, and courts established, called circuit courts of the United States.

In virtue of appointments made under the Constitution of the United States, the undersigned became vested with the offices so created, and received commissions authorizing them to hold the same, with the emoluments thereunto appertaining, during their good behavior.

During the last session an act of Congress passed, by which the above-mentioned law was declared to be repealed; since which no law has been made for assigning to your memorialists the execution of any judicial functions, nor has any provision been made for the payment of their stipulated compensations.

Under these circumstances, and finding it expressly declared in the Constitution of the United States, that "The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," the undersigned, after the most deliberate consideration, are compelled to represent it as their opinion, that the rights secured to them by the constitution, as members of the Judicial Department, have been impaired.

With this sincere conviction, and influenced by a sense of public duty, they most respectfully request of Congress to review the existing laws which respect the offices in question, and to define the duties to be performed by the undersigned, by such provisions as shall be consistent with the constitution, and the convenient administration of justice.

The right of the undersigned to their compensations, they sincerely believe to be secured by the constitution, notwithstanding any modification of the Judicial Department, which, in the opinion of Congress, public convenience may recommend. This right, however, involving a personal interest, will be cheerfully submitted to Judicial examination and decision, in such manner as the wisdom and impartiality of Congress may prescribe.

That judges should not be deprived of their offices or compensations without misbehavior appears to the undersigned to be among the first and best established principles of the American constitutions; and in the various reforms they have undergone, it has been preserved and guarded with increased solicitude.

On this basis the Constitution of the United States has laid the foundation of the Judicial Department, and expressed its meaning in terms equally plain and peremptory.

This being the deliberate and solemn opinion of the undersigned, the duty of their stations requires that they should declare it to the Legislative body. They regret the necessity which compels them to make the representation, and they confide that it will be attributed to a conviction that they ought not voluntarily to surrender rights and authorities intrusted to their protection, not for their personal advantage, but for the benefit of the community.

THURSDAY, February 3.

Memorial of Judges.

Agreeably to the order of the day, the Senate took into consideration the report of the committee on the several memorials of the judges, under the late act to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States. The committee report as follows:

That the petitioners were judges of certain courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, constituted by an act of the 13th of February, 1801, and duly commissioned to hold their offices during good behavior.

That, while holding and exercising their offices, an act was passed on the 8th of March last, to repeal the said act of the 13th of February, 1801, and transfer the duties of the said judges from them to others.

That a question has arisen whether, by reason of the premises, the said petitioners be deprived of their offices.

That this question, depending on the construction of the laws and Constitution of the United States, is not properly cognizable by the Senate.

The committee, therefore, conceive it improper either to give reasons or express opinions; but they consider it as a question of high and serious import, and believe that a speedy investigation and final decision is of great moment to the commonwealth.

Wherefore, they submit the following resolution.

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause an information, in the nature of a quo warranto, to be filed by the Attorney General against Richard Basset, one of the said petitioners, for the purpose of deciding judicially on their claims.

Mr. MORRIS said, I rise, Mr. PRESIDENT, as chairman of the committee whose report you have just had the goodness to read, for the purpose of explaining their reasons. If this were a common or an ordinary occasion, if no heats had been excited, if there were no unpleasant, no tormenting recollections, a measure so plain, so easy, so simple, would require neither argument nor persuasion. It would be adopted for its own interior evidence, and from the general sense of propriety. Unhappily, sir, this is not the case. Serious differences of opinion have existed, and still exist on the subject with which it is connected. From these have arisen disputes, divisions, bickerings. There is not, I fear, in the minds of men, that calm impartiality which is needful to fair investigation. There remains much of prejudice, of irritability.

Your committee have pursued the course which appeared to be proper, not only in itself, but according to the existent circumstances. Gentlemen will easily see that they might have made an elaborate report, containing a long detail of reasons to establish a favorite conclusion; and a slight knowledge of the forms of business will show, that they might have placed that report at length on your journals. But would this have been right? Would it have tended to conciliate? Would it have been a proper return for the unanimity with which your committee was chosen? Surely it would not; and is it not the duty of every good citizen to heal, as far as possible, the wounds of society? To calm those irritations which disturb its repose? To remove all things which may alarm, torment, or exacerbate?

Mr. President, your committee have no intention, no wish to revive a discussion of points already settled. While the act of last session was in agitation, we opposed it steadily, pertinaciously. But that act has become a law, and to the authority of the law we bow submissively. While in suspense, we thought it our duty, as Senators, to oppose it. But since it has been adopted, according to the forms of the constitution, we know that as citizens we are bound to obey. With these deep impressions, then, of what is due to the supreme law of our land, I shall proceed to the report of your committee, and endeavor to explain its several parts.

Gentlemen will perceive that the question which the memorialists have submitted to our investigation is, whether the law of last session has deprived them of their office of judge. Your committee consider this question as not being cognizable by the Senate. It is not for the Senate, nor the Representatives, nor both combined, to interpret their own acts. We are a part of the Legislature. A part of the Executive power is also delegated to us. If the Judiciary be added, it will constitute a tyranny. It is, indeed, the very definition of tyranny which has been given by those best acquainted with the subject. This Senate can have no wish to arrogate power. It is too just, too wise. If a sense of propriety did not prevent, prudence alone would forbid the attempt. This body is too feeble for the exercise of so much authority. Its form, its constitution, the mode and manner of its creation and existence, the strength and structure of its members, render it incapable of sustaining a greater weight of power.

Your committee, sir, have ventured to express their belief, that the question should be speedily settled. I learned in early youth, from the volumes of professional science, that it is expedient for the Commonwealth that a speedy end should be put to litigation; and if it be important that litigation should cease between man and man, how much more important that a litigated point of public right, which interests and agitates the whole community, should be laid at rest? And if this be important in the general course of things, is it not, under present circumstances, indispensable? And how is it to be effected? By an exertion of Legislative might; by force. Remember, force will excite resistance. Such is the nature of the human heart. Free citizens revolt with disdain at the exercise of force. But judgment commands their prompt, their willing obedience. When the law is known, when it is declared by the proper tribunals, all will bow to its authority. You, then, may expect a full, and quiet, and general submission. But while it is litigated and uncertain what the law is, differences will exist, and discord will prevail.

It is under these impressions, sir, that your committee have presumed to offer the resolutions on your table; and as some of the technical terms may not be familiar to every gentleman, it may be proper to state the kind of proceeding which is recommended.

The attorney general, or, as he is denominated in French idiom, the public accuser, will institute, before the proper tribunal, an inquiry by what authority these men claim to hold and exercise the office of judge. It will then be incumbent upon them, either to disclaim the office, and then there is an end of the question; or else (claiming it) to establish their right. And to do this, they must prove two things; first, that the office exists, and secondly, that of right it belongs to them. Failing of either, their claim is gone.

Now, sir, it may be well to consider the decisions which may be made, and their probable effect. I take it for granted, that these gentlemen, who have asked a Judicial decision, will not disclaim, and that whatever judgment may be given in the first instance, the cause will be brought up to the Supreme Court. If the judgment, in the last resort, should be (as it probably would be) against the claim, all complaint will be quieted, and all opposition will cease. Some then, indeed, might triumph. For my own part, I should find in it great consolation--the consolation of knowing that, however wrong may have been my own opinions, the Supreme Legislature of my country have done right. The pride of opinion might, indeed, be wounded; but God forbid, that from motives of pride, or from any other motive, I should hear, without deep concern, that the Legislature of my country have violated that sacred charter from which they derive their authority!

But suppose an opinion different, contrarient, or the very reverse (for that also is possible.) Will the judges rudely declare that you have violated the constitution, unmindful of your duty, and regardless of your oath? No. With that decency which becomes the Judicial character; that decency which upholds national dignity and impresses obedience on the public will; that decency, the handmaid of the graces, which more adorns a magistrate than ermine, aye, than royal robes; with that decency which so peculiarly befits their state and condition, they will declare what the Legislature meant. They will never presume to believe, much less to declare, that you meant to violate the constitution. There will be no dangerous and hateful clashing of public authorities. They will never question the exercise of that high discretion with which you are invested. They will not deny your full supremacy. They will not examine into your motives, nor assign improper views. They will respect you so long as they preserve a due respect for themselves. They will declare, that in assigning duties to one officer, and taking them from another, you have to consult only your own convictions of what the interest or convenience or the people may require. They will modestly conclude, that you did not mean to abolish the offices which the constitution had forbidden you to abolish; and, therefore, finding that it was not your intention to abolish, they will declare that the offices still exist. Such, sir, would be the language of your supreme Judiciary, from the high sense they entertain of their duty. And, if it were decent to suggest in this Senate, that they were lost to a sense of duty, can it be believed, that a few feeble judges will dare oppose themselves to the power of the Legislature?

The VICE PRESIDENT rose, and said he must call the attention of the Senate to the point in discussion, which was, whether the Senate would request the President to cause a process to be instituted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the petitioners still hold the office of judge. On this question, it could not be in order to go back to a law passed at the last session, and to discuss the merits of that law.

Mr. JACKSON said, it appeared by the memorial that the petitioners considered themselves as being still judges, notwithstanding the law of last session. He thought, therefore, it could not be out of order to show that that act deprived them of their offices.

Mr. WRIGHT premised, that he would endeavor to confine his remarks to the point before the Senate. He felt no disposition to travel again over the ground which had been traversed at the last session.

The petition was addressed to both Houses, and prayed for two things; first, that Congress, in their Legislative capacity, would assign to the petitioners some Judicial duties; and secondly, that they would authorize a Judicial investigation of their claim to compensation. The committee, therefore, ought to have confined their inquiries to these points, and to have reported accordingly. Instead of that, they had reported a resolution, which, if adopted, would be neither a grant nor a denial of the prayer of the petition. In doing this, the committee had exceeded their powers, and proposed a measure which the Senate itself was not authorized to adopt.

Mr. W. took a review of the constitutional powers of the Senate, in its Legislative and Executive capacities, and inquired, Have we any constitutional authority to make such a request of the President? In what part of the constitution is such power delegated to this House? Are we to make the request as private gentlemen, or as a constitutional organ of the Government. If as private gentlemen, the act would clearly be a nullity; the President would still be at liberty to comply with the request, or not, as he might think proper. If as a constitutional organ of the Government, where is the power given to the Senate? And what would be the remedy if he should refuse to comply? The Senate is the constitutional adviser of the President in the formation of treaties, and in the appointment of officers, &c. The constitution expressly declares that the President shall exercise these powers by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Here, then, it is their right and their duty to advise him. But the constitution further says: "He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Have the Senate any authority to advise him as to the faithful execution of the laws? They can go no further than they are expressly commissioned by the constitution. The specification of particular Executive powers, by the constitution, is a denial of all others. Admissio unius est exclusio alterius; and, as the constitution has given no power to this effect, it follows that no such power can be exercised by the Senate. If the courts have power to try the validity of laws of Congress, they can exercise that power as well without the authority of this resolution as with it. If they have not the power, neither this House nor the Legislature can give it them. The duties and the powers of the Supreme Court are defined by the constitution. Should the Senate, then, adopt the resolution, the Supreme Court would have no power to act under it, unless that power is given by the constitution. Let us, then, examine the authority of this court. The constitution says: "In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." Will the gentlemen say that these judges are ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls, or that they are a state? If not, the Supreme Court can have no jurisdiction of the case, and the committee have imposed upon the Senate a resolution which they had no authority to submit. As to the law of the last session, by which these judges had been deprived of their offices, Mr. W. had no fear that the Supreme Court, or any body else would attempt to set it aside. The whole nation has approved the measure, as many of those who opposed it have fatally experienced.

The question on agreeing to the resolution was now taken, and determined in the negative--yeas 13, nays 15, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Dayton, Dwight, Foster, Hillhouse, Howard, J. Mason, Morris, Ogden, Olcott, Plumer, Ross, Tracy, Wells, and White.

NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Clinton, Cocke, Ellery, T. Foster, Jackson, Logan, Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, and Wright.

Ordered, That the memorialists have leave to withdraw their memorial.

MONDAY, February 14.

The Mississippi Question.

After the Senate had finished its deliberations upon the Legislative business before it--

Mr. Ross rose and said, that although he came from a part of the country where the late events upon the Mississippi had excited great alarm and solicitude, he had hitherto forborne the expression of his sentiments, or to bring forward any measure relative to the unjustifiable, oppressive conduct of the officers of the Spanish Government at New Orleans. He had waited thus long in the hope that some person, more likely than himself to conciliate and unite the opinions of a majority of the Senate, would have offered efficacious measures for their consideration; but, seeing the session now drawing to a close, without any such proposition, he could not reconcile a longer silence either to his own sense of propriety or to the duty he owed to his constituents. He would not consent to go home without making one effort, however feeble or unsuccessful, to avert the calamity which threatened the Western country. Present appearances, he confessed, but little justified the hope that any thing he might propose would be adopted, yet it would at least afford him some consolation, hereafter, that he had done his duty, when the storm was approaching, by warning those who had power in their hands of the means which ought to be employed to resist it.

He was fully aware that the Executive of the United States had acted; that he had sent an Envoy Extraordinary to Europe. This was the peculiar province, and perhaps the duty of the President. He would not say that it was unwise in this state of our affairs to prepare for remonstrance and negotiation, much less was he then about to propose any measure that would thwart negotiation, or embarrass the President. On the other hand, he was convinced that more than negotiation was absolutely necessary, that more power and more means ought to be given to the President, in order to render his negotiations efficacious. Could the President proceed further, even if he thought more vigorous measures proper and expedient? Was it in his power to repel and punish the indignity put upon the nation? Could he use the public force to redress our wrongs? Certainly not. This must be the act of Congress. They are now to judge of ulterior measures; they must give the power, and vote the means to vindicate, in a becoming manner, the wounded honor and the best interests of the country.

Mr. R. said, he held in his hands certain resolutions for that purpose, and, before he offered them to the Senate, he would fully explain his reasons for bringing them forward and pressing them with earnestness, as the best system the United States could now pursue.

It was certainly unnecessary to waste the time of that body in stating that we had a solemn explicit treaty with Spain; that this treaty had been wantonly and unprovokedly violated, not only in what related to the Mississippi, but by the most flagrant, destructive spoliations of our commerce, on every part of the ocean, where Spanish armed vessels met the American flag. These spoliations were of immense magnitude, and demanded the most serious notice of our Government. They had been followed by an indignity and a direct infraction of our treaty relative to the Mississippi, which bore an aspect not to be dissembled or mistaken.

To the free navigation of that river we had an undoubted right from nature, and from the position of our Western country. This right, and the right of deposit in the island of New Orleans, had been solemnly acknowledged and fixed by treaty in 1795. That treaty had been in actual operation and execution for many years; and now, without any pretence of abuse or violation on our part, the officers of the Spanish Government deny the right, refuse the place of deposit, and add the most offensive of all insults, by forbidding us from landing on any part of their territory, and shutting us out as a common nuisance.

By whom has this outrage been offered? By those who have constantly acknowledged our right, and now tell us that they are no longer owners of the country! They have given it away, and, because they have no longer a right themselves, therefore, they turn us out, who have an undoubted right! Such an insult, such unprovoked malignity of conduct, no nation but this would affect to mistake. And yet we not only hesitate as to the course which interest and honor call us to pursue, but we bear it with patience, tameness, and apparent unconcern.

Sir, said Mr. R., whom does this infraction of the treaty and the natural rights of this country most intimately affect? If the wound inflicted on national honor be not sensibly felt by the whole nation, is there not a large portion of your citizens exposed to immediate ruin by a continuance of this state of things? The calamity lights upon all those who live upon the Western waters. More than half a million of your citizens are by this cut off from a market. What would be the language, what would be the feelings of gentlemen in this House, were such an indignity offered on the Atlantic coast? What would they say if the Chesapeake, the Delaware, or the Bay of New York were shut up, and all egress prohibited by a foreign power? And yet none of these waters embrace the interests of so many as the Mississippi. The numbers and the property affected by shutting this river, are greater than any thing that could follow by the blockade of a river on the Atlantic coast. Every part of the Union was equally entitled to protection, and no good reason could be offered why one part should be less attended to than another.

Fortunately for this country, there could be no doubt in the present case; our national right had been acknowledged, and solemnly secured by treaty. The treaty had been long in a state of execution. It was violated and denied without provocation or apology. The treaty then was no security. This evident right was one, the security of which ought not to be precarious: it was indispensable that the enjoyment of it should be placed beyond all doubt. He declared it therefore to be his firm and mature opinion, that so important a right would never be secure, while the mouth of the Mississippi was exclusively in the hands of the Spaniards. Caprice and enmity occasion constant interruption. From the very position of our country, from its geographical shape, from motives of complete independence, the command of the navigation of the river ought to be in our hands.

We are now wantonly provoked to take it. Hostility in its most offensive shape has been offered by those who disclaim all right to the soil and the sovereignty of that country--a hostility fatal to the happiness of the Western world. Why not seize then what is so essential to us as a nation? Why not expel the wrongdoers?--wrongdoers by their own confession, to whom by a seizure we are doing no injury. Paper contracts, or treaties, have proved too feeble. Plant yourselves on the river, fortify the banks, invite those who have an interest at stake to defend it: do justice to yourselves when your adversaries deny it; and leave the event to Him who controls the fate of nations.

Why submit to a tardy, uncertain negotiation, as the only means of regaining what you have lost: a negotiation with those who have wronged you; with those who declare they have no right, at the moment they deprive you of yours? When in possession, you will negotiate with more advantage. You will then be in the condition to keep others out. You will be in the actual exercise of jurisdiction over all your claims; your people will have the benefits of a lawful commerce. When your determination is known, you will make an easy and an honorable accommodation with any other claimant. The present possessors have no pretence to complain, for they have no right to the country by their own confession. The Western people will discover that you are making every effort they could desire for their protection. They will ardently support you in the contest, if a contest becomes necessary. Their all will be at stake, and neither their zeal nor their courage need be doubted.

Suppose that this course be not now pursued. Let me warn gentlemen how they trifle with the feelings, the hopes, and the fears of such a body of men, who inhabit the Western waters. Let every honorable man put the question to himself; how would half a million round him be affected by such a calamity, and no prompt measures taken by the Government to redress it? These men have arms in their hands; the same arms with which they proved victorious over their savage neighbors. They have a daring spirit; they have ample means of subsistence; and they have men disposed to lead them on to revenge their wrongs. Are you certain that they will wait the end of negotiation? When they hear that nothing has been done for their immediate relief, they will probably take their resolution and act. Indeed, from all we have heard, there is great reason to believe that they will, or that they may have already taken that resolution.

They know the nature of the obstruction, they know the weakness of the country; they are sure of present success, and they have a bold river to bear them forward to the place of action. They only want a leader to conduct them, and it would be strange, if with such means and such a spirit, a leader should not soon present himself.

Suppose they do go, and do chase away the present oppressors, and that in the end they are overpowered and defeated by a stronger foe than the present feeble possessors. They will never return to you, for you cannot protect them. They will make the best compromise they can with the power commanding the mouth of the river, who, in effect, has thereby the command of their fortunes. Will such a bargain be of light or trivial moment to the Atlantic States. Buonaparte will then say to you, my French West India colonies, and those of my allies, can be supplied from my colony of Louisiana, with flour, pork, beef, lumber, and any other necessary. These articles can be carried by my own ships, navigated by my own sailors. If you, on the Atlantic coast, wish to trade with my colonies in those articles, you must pay fifteen or twenty per cent, of an impost. We want no further supplies from you, and revenue to France must be the condition of all future intercourse. What will you say to this? It will be vain to address your Western brethren, and complain your commerce is ruined, your revenue dwindles, and your condition is desperate. They will reply that you came not to their assistance in the only moment you could have saved them; that you balanced between national honor and sordid interest, and suffered them to be borne down and subdued, at a time when for a trifle you could have secured the Mississippi; that now their interest must be consulted, and it forbade any assistance to you, when following in the same train of ruin which overwhelmed them. If the evil does not immediately proceed the full length of disunion, yet the strength, the unity of exertion, the union of interest will be gone. We are no longer one people, and representatives from that part of the country in our public councils, will partake of the spirit and breathe the sentiments of a distinct nation; they will rob you of your public lands; they will not submit to taxes; they will form a girdle round the Southern States, which may be denominated a foreign yoke, and render the situation of that country very precarious as to its peace and past connections. Indeed, every aspect of such a state of things is gloomy and alarming to men who take the trouble of reflecting upon it.

Where is the nation, ancient or modern, that has borne such treatment without resentment of resistance? Where is the nation that will respect another that is passive under such humiliating degradation and disgrace? Your outlet to market closed, next they will trample you under foot upon your own territory which borders upon theirs! Yet you will not stir, you will not arm a single man; you will negotiate! Negotiation alone, under such circumstances, must be hopeless. No. Go forward, remove the aggressors, clear away the obstructions, restore your possession with your own hand, and use your sword if resistance be offered. Call upon those who are most injured, to redress themselves; you have only to give the call, you have men enough near to the scene, without sending a man from this side the mountains; force sufficient, and more than sufficient, for a prompt execution of your orders. If money be an object, one half of the money which would be consumed and lost by delay and negotiation, would put you in possession; then you may negotiate whether you shall abandon it and go out again.

I say, also, let us go and redress ourselves; you will have the whole nation with you. On no question since the Declaration of Independence, has the nation been so unanimous as upon this. We have at different times suffered great indignity and outrages from different European Powers; but none so palpable, so inexcusable, so provoking, or of such magnitude in their consequences, as this. Upon none has public opinion united so generally as this. It is true we have a lamentable division of political opinion among us, which has produced much mischief, and may produce much greater than any we have yet felt. On this question, party spirit ought to sink and disappear. My opinions are well known, and are not likely to change; but I candidly, and with all possible sincerity, declare my conviction to be clear, that there will not be a dissenting voice in the Western country if this course be taken; that so far as my own abilities go, they shall be exerted to the utmost to support it; and I know that my friends on this floor with whom I have long thought and acted, have too high a regard for the national honor, and the best interests of their country, to hesitate a moment giving the same pledge of their honest determination to support and render these measures effectual, if taken: call them ours, if you please, we take the responsibility, and leave the execution of them with you. For, as to myself or my friends, no agency is wished, except that of uniting with you in rousing the spirit, and calling out the resources of the country, to protect itself against serious aggression, and the total subjection and loss of the Western country.

Mr. R. then read his resolutions, which are as follows:

"Resolved, That the United States have an indisputable right to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and to a convenient place of deposit for their produce and merchandise in the island of New Orleans.

"That the late infraction of such their unquestionable right, is an aggression hostile to their honor and interest.

"That it does not consist with the dignity or safety of this Union to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain.

"That it materially concerns such of the American citizens as dwell on the Western waters, and is essential to the union, strength, and prosperity of these States, that they obtain complete security for the full and peaceable enjoyment of such their absolute right.

"That the President be authorized to take immediate possession of such place or places, in the said island, or the adjacent territories, as he may deem fit and convenient for the purposes aforesaid; and to adopt such other measures for obtaining that complete security as to him in his wisdom shall seem meet.

"That he be authorized to call into actual service any number of the militia of the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, or of the Mississippi Territory, which he may think proper, not exceeding fifty thousand, and to employ them, together with the military and naval forces of the Union, for effecting the objects above mentioned.

"That the sum of five millions of dollars be appropriated to the carrying into effect the foregoing resolutions, and that the whole or any part of that sum be paid or applied, on warrants drawn in pursuance of such directions as the President may, from time to time, think proper to give to the Secretary of the Treasury."[69]

MONDAY, February 21.

The VICE PRESIDENT communicated the credentials of THEODORUS BAILEY, appointed a Senator by the State of New York, to take his seat after the third day of March next; which were read, and ordered to lie on file.

TUESDAY, February 22.

Purchase of Louisiana.

In Executive session, the bill, entitled "An act making further provision for the expenses attending the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," was read the third time.

On the question, Shall this bill pass? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 14, nays 12, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Clinton, Cocke, Ellery, T. Foster, Jackson, Logan, S. T. Mason, Nicholas, Sumter, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Dayton, D. Foster, Hillhouse, Howard, J. Mason, Morris, Olcott, Plumer, Ross, Stone, Wells and White.

So it was Resolved, That this bill pass.[70]

WEDNESDAY, February 23.

Mississippi Question.

Mr. WHITE, of Delaware, rose and addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. President, on this subject, which has on a former day been discussed with so much ability, and with so much eloquence, by my friend from Pennsylvania, the honorable mover of the resolutions, I shall submit the few observations that I may make, in as concise a manner as I am capable of; for it is very far from my wish to occupy the time or attention of the Senate unnecessarily. The resolutions on your table I approve of in their full extent; I believe they express the firm and manly tone that at this moment is especially becoming the dignity of the Government to assume; I believe they mark out a system of measures, which, if promptly pursued, will be honorable to the nation, and equal to the accomplishment of the important object which gentlemen on all sides seem to have in view. These alone, with me, would be sufficient inducements to yield them my feeble support; but in addition to these, and to the thorough conviction of my own mind as to the course I ought to pursue, I have the happiness of being supported in my opinions on this subject by the unequivocal expression of the sentiment of the State to which I have the honor to belong.

It was early seen, Mr. President, and required but little penetration to discover, that adventurers emigrating beyond the mountains, and settling on the Western waters, must possess the free navigation of the Mississippi, it being their only outlet to the ocean. This important privilege it became necessary on the part of the Government of the United States to secure by treaty, and not leave to the capricious will of whatever nation who might in future hold the territory at the mouth of the river. Accordingly, in the 4th and 23d articles of our Treaty with Spain, I find on this subject the following stipulation:

"ART. 4. It is likewise agreed that the western boundary of the United States, which separates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, is in the middle of the channel or bed of the river Mississippi, from the northern boundary of the said States to the completion of the 31st degree of latitude north of the equator. And His Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the navigation of the said river, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other powers by special convention."

"ART. 22. The two high contracting parties, hoping that the good correspondence and friendship which happily reigns between them will be further increased by this treaty, and that it will contribute to augment their prosperity and opulence, will in future give to their mutual commerce all the extension and favor which the advantages of both countries may require.

"And in consequence of the stipulations contained in the 4th article, His Majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores; and His Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds, during that time, that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment."

This instrument, Mr. President, it is known, for a time, quieted the fears and jealousies of our Western brethren; they supposed it had removed for ever the possibility of any future embarrassment to their commerce on those waters. And after it had been proclaimed as the law of the land--after it had been ratified by both nations, and become obligatory upon the faith and honor of each, who could have thought otherwise? Yet, sir, it has happened otherwise. This place of deposit at New Orleans, secured to our citizens by the article last read, has been recently wrested from their hands by the authority of the Spanish Government, and no other equivalent one assigned, where, after more than two thousand miles of boat navigation, they may disembark their produce in order to be shipped for sea; and without this advantage the navigation of the river is to them but an empty name.

I have said, by the authority of the Spanish Government, it has indeed been given out to the world, for reasons that every man may conjecture, and are unnecessary to be mentioned, that this was not the act of the Government, but the rash measure of a single officer--the Intendant General of the Spanish provinces; that the Spanish Minister had issued orders for the speedy adjustment of these difficulties; had kindly offered to throw himself into the breach to prevent this Intendant General from going to extremities with the Government of the United States. Sir, gentlemen may find, when too late, that this is a mere piece of diplomatic policy, intended only to amuse them; and to say nothing of the humiliating idea of resorting to such a plaster for the wound that has been inflicted upon our national honor, if they had taken the trouble, they might have been informed that the Spanish Minister near this Government has no control at New Orleans; that the Intendant General is, like himself, an immediate officer of the Crown, and responsible only to the Crown for his conduct. If the Spanish Minister has interfered, which I am not disposed to question, to make the best of it, it could only have been by the entreaties of men in power, as a mere mediator, to beg of the Intendant General of New Orleans justice and peace on behalf of the people of the United States. Are honorable gentlemen prepared to accept peace on such terms? They might do, sir, for a tribe of starving Indians; but is this the rank that we are to hold among the nations of the world? And it seems that even these supplicating advances are likely to avail us nothing. By accounts very lately received from New Orleans, by a private letter which I have seen since these resolutions were submitted to the Senate, the Intendant General has expressed much displeasure at the interference of the Spanish Minister, stating that it was not within his duty or his province, and that he, the Intendant, acted not under Spanish but French orders.

As to the closing of the port of New Orleans against our citizens, the man who can now doubt, after viewing all the accompanying circumstances, that it was the deliberate act of the Spanish or French Government, must have locked up his mind against truth and conviction, and be determined to discredit even the evidence of his own senses. But, sir, it is not only the depriving us of our right of deposit by which we have been aggrieved, it is by a system of measures pursued antecedent and subsequent to that event, equally hostile and even more insulting. I have in my hand a paper, signed by a Spanish officer, which, with the indulgence of the Chair, I will read to the Senate:

ADVERTISEMENT.--Under date of the 16th instant, (December,) the Intendant General of these provinces tells me that the citizens of the United States of America can have no commerce with His Majesty's subjects--they only having the free navigation of the river for the exportation of the fruits and produce of their establishments to foreign countries, and the importation of what they may want from them. As such I charge you, so far as respects you, to be zealous and vigilant, with particular care, that the inhabitants neither purchase nor sell any thing to the shipping, flat-bottomed boats, barges, or any other smaller vessels that may go along the river, destined for the American possessions, or proceeding from them, that they shall be informed of it, for their due compliance of the same.

CARLOS DE GRANDPRE.

BATON ROUGE, Dec. 22, 1802.

These are the measures, Mr. President, that have been adopted; these are the orders that have been issued by the Intendant General to every district of the Spanish provinces, prohibiting the subjects of His Catholic Majesty from having any commerce, dealing, intercourse, or communion whatsoever with the citizens of the United States; excluding us from their shores for the distance of two hundred and seventy miles; treating us like a nation of pirates, or a banditti of robbers, who they feared to trust in their country. And this day, sir, if a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, engaged in a fair and legal trade, was upon the waters of the Mississippi, within the Spanish lines, and in a state of the most extreme distress, the Spaniard who should yield her aid or comfort would do it at the peril of his life.

If it should be said, sir, that this important question will not long be an affair of controversy between the United States and Spain; that Louisiana, New Orleans, and this usurped claim of the Spanish Government to the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, will soon be found in other hands; that whenever we may have to negotiate on this subject, either in the cabinet or the field, it will not be with His Catholic Majesty, but with the First Consul; not with a King, but with the King of Kings--I answer that in these insults to our national dignity, we at present know no power but Spain. Whatever agency Buonaparte may have had in this business, he has been concealed from our view. It is Spain that has violated her plighted faith; it is Spain that has trampled upon the dearest interests of the United States, and insulted our Government to our faces without the semblance of a cause, and she alone is responsible to us for these outrages. And, under such circumstances, is it becoming, politic, or honorable in us to treat her as a friend and as a neighbor; to remonstrate with her on her acts of injustice, and wait till she shall add insult to insult, and heap injury upon injury; or what is perhaps even worse, if any thing worse than national degradation can befall an independent people, till this golden opportunity shall have passed away, and the facility of redress be wrested from our hands? No, sir, we should now view her as our open enemy, as having declared war against us, and do justice to ourselves. We can never have permanent peace on our Western waters, till we possess ourselves of New Orleans, and such other positions as may be necessary to give us the complete and absolute command of the navigation of the Mississippi. We have now such an opportunity of accomplishing this important object as may not be presented again in centuries, and every justification that could be wished for availing ourselves of the opportunity. Spain has dared us to the trial, and now bids us defiance; she is yet in possession of that country: it is at this moment within your reach and within your power; it offers a sure and easy conquest; we should have to encounter there now only a weak, inactive, and unenterprising people; but how may a few months vary this scene, and darken our prospects! Though not officially informed we know that the Spanish provinces on the Mississippi have been ceded to the French, and that they will as soon as possible take possession of them. What may we then expect? When in the last extremity we shall be driven to arms in defence of our indisputable rights, where now slumbers on his post with folded arms the sluggish Spaniard, we shall be hailed by the vigilant and alert French grenadier, and in the defenceless garrison that would now surrender at our approach, we shall see unfurled the standards that have waved triumphant in Italy, surrounded by impregnable ramparts, and defended by the disciplined veterans of Egypt.

But, Mr. President, what is more than all to be dreaded, in such hands, it may be made the means of access and corruption to your national councils and a key to your Treasury. Your Western people will see in Buonaparte, at their very doors, a powerful friend or a dangerous enemy; and should he, after obtaining complete control over the navigation of the Mississippi, approach them, not in the menacing attitude of an enemy, but under the specious garb of a protector and a friend; should he, instead of embarrassing their commerce by any fiscal arrangements, invite them to the free navigation of the river, and give them privileges in trade not heretofore enjoyed; should he, instead of attempting to coerce them to his measures, contrary to their wishes, send missionaries into their country to court and intrigue with them, he may seduce their affections, and thus accomplish by address and cunning, what even his force might not be equal to. In this way, having operated upon their passions, having enlisted in his service their hopes and their fears, he may gain an undue ascendency over them. Should these things be effected, which God forbid--but Buonaparte in a few years has done much more--what, let me ask honorable gentlemen, will be the consequences? I fear even to look them in the face. The degraded countries of Europe, that have been enslaved by the divisions and distractions of their councils, produced by similar means, afford us melancholy examples. Foreign influence will gain admittance to your national councils; the First Consul, or his interests, will be represented in the Congress of the United States; this floor may become the theatre of sedition and intrigue. You will have a French faction in the Government, and that faction will increase, with the rapidly increasing population of the Western world. Whenever this period shall arrive, it will be the crisis of American glory, and must result, either in the political subjugation of the Atlantic States, or in their separation from the Western country; and I am sure there is no American who does not view as one of the greatest evils that could befall us, the dismemberment of this Union. Honorable gentlemen may wrap themselves up in their present imaginary security, and say that these things are afar off, or that they can never happen; but let me beseech of them to look well to the measures they are now pursuing, for, on the wisdom, the promptness, and energy of those measures, will depend whether they shall happen or not. And let me tell them, sir, that the want of firmness or judgment in the cabinet, will be no apology for the disgrace and ruin of the nation.

Mr. BRECKENRIDGE observed, that he did not mean to wander in the field of declamation, nor, after the example of the honorable gentleman who had preceded him, endeavor to alarm or agitate the public mind; that he should endeavor to strip the subject of all improper coloring, and examine dispassionately the propriety of the measures which the Senate were called upon to sanction. He would be very brief.

What is the true and undisguised state of facts? Early in the session, the House of Representatives were informed, by a communication from the President, of the conduct of the Intendant at New Orleans. This communication stated, that he had taken measures to attempt a restoration of the right which had been violated; and that there were reasons to believe that the conduct of the Intendant was unauthorized by the Court of Spain. Accompanying this message were official papers, in which it appeared that the Governor of New Orleans had strongly opposed the conduct of the Intendant, declared that he was acting without authority in refusing the deposit, and indicated a disposition to oppose openly the proceeding. The Spanish Minister who resides here, also interposed on the occasion, and who stands deservedly high in the confidence of his Government, was clearly of opinion, that the Intendant was acting without authority, and that redress would be given so soon as the competent authority could interpose. From this state of things, and which is the actual state at this moment, what is the course any civilized nation who respects her character or rights, would pursue? There is but one course, which is admitted by writers on the laws of nations, as the proper one; and is thus described by Vattel, in his book, sec. 336, 338:

"A sovereign ought to show, in all his quarrels, a sincere desire of rendering justice and preserving peace. He is obliged before he takes up arms, and after having taken them up also, to offer equitable conditions, and then alone his arms become just against an obstinate enemy, who refuses to listen to justice or to equity. His own advantage, and that of human society, oblige him to attempt, before he takes up arms, all the pacific methods of obtaining either the reparation of the injury, or a just satisfaction. This moderation, this circumspection, is so much the more proper, and commonly even indispensable, as the action we take for an injury does not always proceed from a design to offend us, and is sometimes a mistake rather than an act of malice: frequently it even happens, that the injury is done by inferior persons, without their sovereign having any share in it; and on these occasions, it is not natural to presume that he would refuse us a just satisfaction."

This is the course which the President has taken, and in which the House of Representatives have expressed, by their resolution, their confidence.

What are the reasons urged by the gentlemen to induce a different proceeding, an immediate appeal to arms? You prostrate, say the gentlemen, your national honor by negotiating, where there is a direct violation of a treaty! How happens it that our national honor has, at this particular crisis, become so delicate, and that the feelings of certain gentlemen are now so alive to it? Has it been the practice of this Government heretofore to break lances on the spot with any nation who injured or insulted her? Or has not the invariable course been to seek reparation in the first place by negotiation? I ask for an example to the contrary; even under the Administration of WASHINGTON, so much eulogized by the gentleman last up. Were not the Detroit, and several other forts within our territory, held ten or a dozen years by Great Britain, in direct violation of a treaty? Were not wanton spoliations committed on your commerce by Great Britain, by France, and by Spain, to the amount of very many millions; and all adjusted through the medium of negotiations? Were not your merchants plundered, and your citizens doomed to slavery by Algiers, and still those in power, even WASHINGTON himself, submitted to negotiation, to ransom, and to tribute? Why then do gentlemen, who on those occasions approved of these measures, now despair of negotiation? America has been uniformly successful, at least in settling her differences by treaty.

But the gentleman is afraid that if we do not immediately seize the country, we shall lose the golden opportunity of doing it. Would your national honor be free from imputation by a conduct of such inconsistency and duplicity? A minister is sent to the offending nation with an olive-branch, for the purpose of an amicable discussion and settlement of differences, and before he has scarcely turned his back, we invade the territories of that nation with an army of fifty thousand men! Would such conduct comport with the genius and principles of our Republic, whose true interest is peace, and who has hitherto professed to cultivate it with all nations? Would not such a procedure subject us to the just censure of the world, and to the strongest jealousy of those who have possessions near to us? Would such a procedure meet the approbation of even our own citizens, whose lives and fortunes would be risked in the conflict? And would it not be policy inexcusably rash, to plunge this country into war, to effect that which the President not only thinks can be effected, but is now actually in a train of negotiation? If, on the other hand, negotiation should fail, how different will be the ground on which we stand! We stand acquitted by the world, and what is of more consequence, by our own citizens, and our own consciences. But one sentiment will then animate and pervade the whole, and from thenceforth we will take counsel only from our courage.

But to induce us to depart from this proper, this safe, and honorable course of proceeding, which is pursuing by the President, the gentleman from Pennsylvania first, and the gentleman from Delaware again told you, that by such pacific measures you will irritate the Western people against you; that they will not be restrained by you, but will either invade the country themselves, or withdraw from the Union and unite with those who will give them what they want. Sir, said Mr. B., I did not expect to hear such language held on this floor. Sir, the gentleman from Pennsylvania best knows the temper and views of the Western people he represents, but if he meant to extend the imputation to the State I have the honor to represent, I utterly disclaim it. The citizens of Kentucky value too highly their rights and character to endanger the one or dishonor the other. They deal not, sir, in insurrections. They hold in too sacred regard their federal compact to sport with it. They were among the first to oppose violations of it, and will, I trust, be the last to attempt its dissolution. The time indeed was, when not only irritation but disgust prevailed in that country; when, instead of sending fifty thousand men to seize on Orleans, an attempt was meditated, and a solemn vote taken in Congress to barter away this right for twenty-five years. The time indeed was, when great dissatisfaction prevailed in that country, as to the measures of the General Government; but it never furnished there, whatever it might have done elsewhere, even the germs for treasons or insurrections. The people I have the honor to represent are not accustomed to procure redress in this way. Instead of trampling on the constitution of their country, they rally round it as the rock of their safety. But, unhappily, these times have passed away. Distrust and dissatisfaction have given place to confidence in, and attachment to those in whom the concerns of the nation are confided. I ask no reliance on my opinion for this fact, but appeal to the memorial of the Legislature of Kentucky to the present Congress, for the truth of this assertion. In this disposition of mind, therefore, and from the sound sense and correct views and discernment of their true interest, which the people of Kentucky possess, I have no hesitation in pledging myself, that no such precipitate and unwarranted measures will be taken by them, as predicted by the gentlemen in the opposition.

But he begged leave to ask gentlemen who hold such language, would the Western people, admitting they were to withdraw from the Union, be able to accomplish the object? Could they alone go to war with France and Spain? Could they hold Orleans, were they to take possession of it, without the aid of the United States? Admitting they could hold it, what security would they have for their commerce? A single ship of the line would be able completely to blockade that port. See, also, the Havana, one of the safest and strongest of the Spanish ports, and so situated as to possess every advantage in annoying our commerce. Are the gentlemen, therefore, really serious when they endeavor to persuade us that the Western people are in such a state of fury and mad impatience that they will not wait even a few months to see the fate of a negotiation, and, if unsuccessful, receive the aid of the whole nation, but that they will madly run to the attack without a ship, without a single cannon, without magazines, without money or preparation of any kind; and, what is worse, without union among themselves; and what is still worse, in face of the laws and constitution of their country? It is impossible. Such a desperate project could not come to a successful issue; for should they even obtain the right by their own exertions alone, they could not expect long to enjoy it in peace, without descending from that exalted, that enviable rank of one of the independent States of United America, to the degraded, dependent condition of a colonial department of a foreign nation.

Although he thought it incumbent on us, for the reasons he had stated, to try the effect of negotiation, yet, should that fail, he thought it incumbent on us also to be prepared for another resort. He considered this right, and upon a different footing from what we ever enjoyed it, so all-important, so indispensable to the very existence of the Western States, that it was a waste of words and time to attempt to portray the evils which a privation of it would produce; and he rejoiced to find that gentlemen with whom he had not been in the habit of voting on most political subjects so perfectly accord with him, that our precarious tenure of it must be changed. He hoped they were sincere in their declarations. If they were, the only difference between us now is, what are the proper means to obtain this great end? The course pursued by the President was, in his opinion, the only true and dignified course. It is that, and that only, which will certainly attain the object; and is the only one which will tend to unite cordially all parts of the Union. But we ought to be prepared, in case of a failure, instantly to redress ourselves. This, instead of having an evil, would, in his opinion, have a good effect on the negotiation. It would show, that although we are willing amicably to adjust our differences, yet that we are not only resolved on, but prepared for that resort which cannot fail to restore our violated rights. With that view, he would offer the following resolutions, as substitutes for those proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

He moved that the whole of the resolutions be struck out, excepting the word "Resolved," and the following be substituted in their place--after the word "Resolved:"

"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he shall judge it expedient, to require of the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, eighty thousand effective militia, officers included.

Resolved, "That the President may, if he judges it expedient, authorize the Executives of the several States, to accept, as part of the detachment aforesaid, any corps of volunteers; who shall continue in service for such time, not exceeding ---- months, and perform such services as shall be prescribed by law.

Resolved, "That ---- dollars be appropriated for paying and subsisting such part of the troops aforesaid, whose actual service may be wanted, and for defraying such other expenses as, during the recess of Congress, the President may deem necessary for the security of the territory of the United States.

Resolved, "That ---- dollars be appropriated for erecting at such place or places on the Western waters, as the President may judge most proper, one or more arsenals."

Mr. CLINTON.--The importance of a free navigation of the Mississippi has been duly appreciated by the Government, and a constant eye has been kept upon it in our negotiations with foreign powers. An attempt was, indeed, made under the Old Confederation to barter it away for twenty-five years, which, however, was effectually controlled by the good sense and patriotism of the Government. By the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783, by the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with her in 1794, and by the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation with Spain, in 1795, the right of a free navigation of the Mississippi is recognized, and declared to exist from its source to the ocean, in the citizens of the United States. By the 22d article of the Treaty with Spain, it is declared that, "in consequence of the stipulations contained in the 4th article, his Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores. And his Majesty promises either to continue this permission if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain; or, if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them, on another part of the lands of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." The 22d article, granting the right of deposit, is, therefore, founded upon the 4th article recognizing the right of free navigation, and is intended to give full and complete efficacy to it. By a proclamation of the Intendant of the Province of Louisiana, dated the 16th of October last, the right of deposit is prohibited. The reason assigned for this daring interdiction is, that the three years for which it was granted having expired, it cannot be continued without an express order from the King of Spain; and at the same time no equivalent establishment is assigned, according to the stipulations of the Treaty.

There can be no doubt but that the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans, and the assignment of another place equally convenient, ought to have been contemporaneous and concurrent; that the conduct of the Intendant is an atrocious infraction of the treaty, and that it aims a deadly blow at the prosperity of the Western States; but it is extremely questionable whether it was authorized by the Government of Spain or not. On this subject I am free to declare that I entertain great doubts, which can only be cleared up by the course of events, or perhaps it will be enveloped in darkness. On the one hand, the terms of the proclamation, indicating a misunderstanding of the treaty, the remonstrances of the Governor of the Province, whose authority does not extend to commercial and fiscal affairs, over which the Intendant has an exclusive control, and the prompt and decided assurances of the Spanish Minister near the United States, would induce a belief that the act of the Intendant was unauthorized. On the other hand, it cannot readily be believed that this officer would assume such an immense responsibility, and encounter an event so big with important consequences, not only to his country but to himself, without knowing explicitly the intentions of his Government. Such, then, is the true state of the Spanish aggression: an important right had been secured to our citizens by the solemnity of a treaty. This right had been withdrawn by an officer of the Spanish Government, and whether this aggression was directed by it or not, is not as yet known. Other aggressions have, indeed, been stated by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. ROSS,) in order to darken the picture, and with the manifest design of exasperating our feelings, inflaming our passions, and prompting an immediate appeal to the sword.

As to the nature, character, and tendency of the remedy proposed, there can be but one opinion. It proposes to enter the country of a foreign nation with a hostile force, and to seize a part of its territory. It is not preceded by a formal declaration, and cannot, therefore, come under the denomination of a solemn war, but it partakes of the character of a war not solemn. It answers to the definition of war, by Burlamaqui, "a nation taking up arms with a view to decide a quarrel;" to that given by Vattel, who represents it to be "that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force." A state of general hostilities would as necessarily follow as an effect would follow a cause; no nation would submit to the irruption of a hostile army without repelling it by force; the proud Castilian, as described by the gentleman from Delaware, would revolt at the insult; the door of negotiation would be effectually closed, and as the appeal would be to arms in the first instance, so the controversy must be finally decided by the preponderance of force. It would, therefore, not only have impressed me with a more favorable opinion of the honorable mover's candor, but also of his decision and energy as a statesman, if he had spoken out boldly, and declared his real object. War is unquestionably his design--his wish. Why, then, mask his proposition? Why combine it with considerations connected with negotiation? Why not furnish the American people at once with the real and the whole project of himself and his friends? If it is bottomed on patriotism and dictated by wisdom, it need not shrink from the touch of investigation--it will receive their approving voice, and be supported by all their force. The resolution is then to be considered as a war resolution; in no other light can it be viewed; in no other light ought it to be viewed; and in no other light will it be viewed by the intelligence of the country. In this point of view, I will proceed, said Mr. C., to consider its justice and policy; its conformity with the laws and usage of nations, and the substantial interests of this country.

I shall not attempt to occupy your attention by threadbare declamation upon the evils of war, by painting the calamities it inflicts upon the happiness of individuals, and the prosperity of nations. This terrible scourge of mankind, worse than the famine or pestilence, ought not to be resorted to until every reasonable expedient has been adopted to avert it. When aggressions have been committed by the sovereign or representatives of a nation, negotiation ought in all cases to be first tried, unless the rights of self-defence demand a contrary course. This is the practice of nations, and is enjoined by the unerring monitor which the God of Nature has planted in every human bosom. What right have the rulers of nations to unsheath the sword of destruction, and to let loose the demon of desolation upon mankind, whenever caprice or pride, ambition or avarice, shall prescribe? And are there no fixed laws founded in the nature of things which ordain bounds to the fell spirit of revenge, the mad fury of domination, and the insatiable thirst of cupidity? Mankind have not only in their individual character, but in their collective capacity as nations, recognized and avowed in their opinions and actions, a system of laws calculated to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And it may be safely asserted, that it is a fundamental article of this code, that a nation ought not to go to war, until it is evident that the injury committed is highly detrimental, and that it emanated from the will of the nation charged with the aggression, either by an express authorization in the first instance, or by a recognition of it when called upon for redress, and a refusal in both cases to give it. A demand of satisfaction ought to precede an appeal to arms, even when the injury is manifestly the act of the Sovereign; and when it is the act of a private individual, it is not imputable to his nation, until his Government is called upon to explain and redress, and refuses; because the evils of war are too heavy and serious to be incurred, without the most urgent necessity; because remonstrance and negotiation have often recalled an offending nation to a sense of justice, and a performance of right; because nations, like individuals, have their paroxysms of passion, and when reflection and reason resume their dominion, will extend that redress to the olive-branch, which their pride will not permit them to grant to the sword; because a nation is a moral person, and, as such, is not chargeable with an offence committed by others, or where its will has not been consulted, the unauthorized conduct of individuals being never considered a just ground of hostility, until their sovereign refuses that reparation for which his right of controlling their actions, and of punishing their misconduct, necessarily renders him responsible. These opinions are sanctioned by the most approved elementary writers on the laws of nations.

If I were called upon to prescribe a course of policy most important for this country to pursue, it would be to avoid European connections and wars. The time must arrive when we will have to contend with some of the great powers of Europe, but let that period be put off as long as possible. It is our interest and our duty to cultivate peace, with sincerity and good faith. As a young nation, pursuing industry in every channel, and adventuring commerce in every sea, it is highly important that we should not only have a pacific character, but that we should really deserve it. If we manifest an unwarrantable ambition, and a rage for conquest, we unite all the great powers of Europe against us. The security of all the European possessions in our vicinity will eternally depend, not upon their strength, but upon our moderation and justice. Look at the Canadas--at the Spanish territories to the South--at the British, Spanish, French, Danish, and Dutch West India islands--at the vast countries to the West, as far as where the Pacific rolls its waves; consider well the eventful consequences that would result if we were possessed by a spirit of conquest; consider well the impression which a manifestation of that spirit will make upon those who would be affected by it. If we are to rush at once into the territory of a neighboring nation, with fire and sword, for the misconduct of a subordinate officer, will not our national character be greatly injured? Will we not be classed with the robbers and destroyers of mankind? Will not the nations of Europe perceive in this conduct the germ of a lofty spirit and an enterprising ambition which will level them to the earth, when age has matured our strength and expanded our powers of annoyance, unless they combine to cripple us in our infancy? May not the consequences be, that we must look out for a naval force to protect our commerce; that a close alliance will result; that we will be thrown at once into the ocean of European politics, where every wave that rolls, and every wind that blows, will agitate our bark? Is this a desirable state of things? Will the people of this country be seduced into it by all the colorings of rhetoric, and all the arts of sophistry--by vehement appeals to their pride, and artful addresses to their cupidity? No, sir. Three-fourths of the American people (I assert it boldly, and without fear of contradiction) are opposed to this measure. And would you take up arms with a millstone hanging around your neck? How would you bear up, not only against the force of the enemy, but against the irresistible current of public opinion? The thing, sir, is impossible; the measure is worse than madness; it is wicked beyond the powers of description.

It is in vain for the mover to oppose these weighty considerations by menacing us with an insurrection in the Western States, that may eventuate in their seizure of New Orleans without the authority of Government; their throwing themselves into the arms of a foreign power; or in a dissolution of the Union. Such threats are doubly improper--improper as they respect the persons to whom they are addressed, because we are not to be deterred from the performance of our duty by menaces of any kind, from whatever quarter they may proceed; and it is no less improper to represent our Western brethren as a lawless, unprincipled banditti, who would at once release themselves from the wholesome restraints of law and order; forego the sweets of liberty, and either renounce the blessings of self-government, or, like Goths and Vandals, pour down with the irresistible force of a torrent upon the countries below, and carry havoc and desolation in their train. A separation by a mountain, and a different outlet into the Atlantic, cannot create any natural collision between the Atlantic and Western States; on the contrary, they are bound together by a community of interests, and a similarity of language and manners--by the ties of consanguinity and friendship, and a sameness of principles. There is no reflecting and well-principled man in this country who can view the severance of the States without horror, and who does not consider it as a Pandora's box, which will overwhelm us with every calamity; and it has struck me with not a little astonishment that, on the agitation of almost every great political question, we should be menaced with this evil. Last session, when a bill repealing a Judiciary act was under consideration, we were told that the Eastern States would withdraw themselves from the Union, if it should obtain; and we are now informed that, if we do not accede to the proposition before us, the Western States will hoist the standard of revolt and dismember the empire. Sir, these threats are calculated to produce the evils they predict, and they may possibly approximate the spirit they pretend to warn us against. They are at all times unnecessary, at all times improper, at all times mischievous, and ought never to be mentioned within these walls.

Mr. J. JACKSON, of Georgia.--Coming from a State, at the extreme of the Union in the South, and excepting the States immediately interested in the navigation of the Mississippi, the most concerned, on the present occasion, of any in the Union, he hoped it would not be deemed improper in him to offer his sentiments on the resolution before the Senate; for, sir, no event can affect the settlers on the Mississippi, no change of masters can take place there, without the shock being felt on the frontiers of Georgia. The nation which holds New Orleans must eventually possess the Floridas, and Georgia cannot remain an indifferent spectator; in case of war, the blow struck on that river will be vibrated on the Saint Mary's, and the attack on the one will be seconded by an attack on the other.

The gentlemen from Kentucky and Tennessee have not those fears expressed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania; they have declared their citizens satisfied with negotiation in the first place, and the conduct pursued by the Executive. He could say the same, as respects the citizens of the State he represents, and begged leave to read a letter on the subject, from a respectable gentleman of Georgia, applauding the appointment of Mr. Monroe. [He here read a letter expressing the approbation generally expressed at the nomination.]

That there has been an indignity offered to the United States by the Spanish Government of New Orleans, he should not deny; so far, he joined the gentlemen on the other side, as not only to declare that sense of it, but to assert that the withdrawing the right of deposit, given under the fourth article of our treaty with Spain, concluded at San Lorenzo el Real, prior to the pointing out another place for that purpose, is such a violation of our right, and such an insult to the dignity of the nation, as ought not to be put up with in silence. We ought, we are bound to demand a restoration of that right, and to secure it to our Western citizens, let the risk be what it may, if it even extends to life and fortune. He cordially agreed with the gentleman who had preceded him, (Mr. MASON,) that it is a momentous subject; but could not consent to go at once to war, without trying, in the first place, every peaceable mode to obtain redress.

The first part of the resolution declares, that the United States have an indisputable right to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and to a convenient place of deposit for their produce and merchandise, in the island of New Orleans. Now, sir, the former part of this resolution is not affected by any proceedings of the Spanish Government. You are as perfectly in possession of the right as you ever were; your vessels are at this moment freely navigating that river; you have not heard of a single interruption; you have not learnt that the Spaniards, so far from interrupting that navigation, have ever doubted your right. Why then, sir, resolve on the assertion of rights which are not questioned, but of which you are completely in possession! He could compare it to no other case than that of a man in private life, in peaceable possession of his house, resolving on and publishing his own right to it, and thereby rousing the suspicions of his neighbors to doubt the title to it. Passing over the latter division of the first resolution, and which he acknowledged to be the fact, let us consider the second proposition, "That the late infraction of such their unquestionable right, is an aggression hostile to their honor and interest." Sir, after a declaration of this kind, can you retract? You cannot; it is in fact a declaration of war itself. Many of the courts of Europe would consider it so, and have engaged in war for less cause of offence than this resolution contains. You pronounce at once, without knowing whether the proceedings at New Orleans were sanctioned by the Court of Spain, that that nation is in a state of hostility against your honor and interest, which declaration, coupled with the following resolution, "That it does not consist with the dignity or safety of this Union to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain," is a direct insult to that nation. But if war is not to be found in those resolutions, is it not in the fifth resolution, "That the President be authorized to take immediate possession of such place or places in the said island, or the adjacent territories, as he may deem fit or convenient." Is this not war? If it be not, he knew not what war was! And now let us inquire, if we should be justified in adopting those measures, on the grounds of public or private justice, or the laws of nations.

Sir, the going to war has always been considered, even among barbarous nations, a most serious thing; and it has not been undertaken without the most serious deliberation. It was a practice among the Romans, prior to undertaking a war, to consult the faciales on the justice of it; and, after it had been declared just, to refer it to the Senate, to judge of the policy of it; and unless the justice and the policy were both accorded in, the war was not undertaken. If this was the case then among barbarous nations, shall we, who call ourselves a civilized nation, not well weigh the justice and the policy of going to war, before we undertake it?

As to national honor and dignity, he believed we have all a proper sense of it, and he would be one of the last on this floor to put up with insult and indignity from any nation; but, as much as we had heard of it, he did not think we ought, without negotiation, to resent every injury by war. In many cases, national honor is only a convertible term for national interest; and he begged leave to relate an anecdote of a celebrated soldier on this head. After the failure of the attempted storm of Savannah, in the year 1779, Count D'Estaing, who was wounded in the attack, and lay in that situation about five miles from Savannah, was visited by Governor Rutledge and other gentlemen of South Carolina and Georgia. The Governor having perceived some movements in camp indicative of a retrogade motion, told the Count that his own honor and the honor of France were concerned in his remaining and taking the city. The Count very mildly replied, "Gentlemen, if my honor is to be lost by not taking the city, it is lost already; but I deem my honor to consist in the honor of my country, and that honor is my country's interest!" The time of operation in the West Indies was arrived, and the Count re-embarked his troops.

Now, sir, is it not our duty to consult our country's interest, before we take this rash step, which we cannot recall? Peace is the interest of all republics, and war their destruction; it loads and fetters them with debt, and entangles not only the present race, but posterity. Peace, sir, has been the ruling policy of the United States throughout all her career. If we show the citizens that we are not willing to go to war, and load them with taxes, they will all be with us, when a necessity for war arrives. What, sir, was the policy of America, from the commencement of the Revolution? At that day, did we hastily go to war? No; we tried every peaceable means to avoid it, and those means induced a unanimity in the people.

At the commencement many States were exceedingly divided, in some a majority were against us; yet, seeing the moderation and justice of our measures, and the rashness and tyranny of the British cabinet, they came over to our side, and became the most zealous among us. At the present moment, sir, the people are averse to war, they are satisfied with the steps of the Executive, they wish negotiation. If you adopt these resolutions, they will be still divided; if you negotiate, and fail in that negotiation--if you cannot obtain a redress of the injury which they feel as well as you, they will go all lengths with you, and be prepared for any event; you will have this advantage, you will be unanimous, and America united is a match for the world. In such a case, sir, every man will be anxious to march, he would go himself if called on, and whether the sluggish Spaniard or the French grenadier commands New Orleans, it must fall; they will not be able to resist the brave and numerous hosts of our Western brethren, who are so much interested in the injury complained of. He was himself of opinion that New Orleans must belong to the United States; it must come to us in the course of human events, although not at the present day; for he did not wish to use force to obtain it, if we could get a redress of injury; yet it will naturally fall into our hands by gradual but inevitable causes, as sure and certain as manufactures arise from increased population and the plentiful products of agriculture and commerce. But let it be noticed, that if New Orleans by a refusal of justice falls into our hands by force, the Floridas, as sure as fate, fall with it. Good faith forbids encroachment on a pacific ally; but if hostility shows itself against us, interest demands it; Georgia in such case could not do without it. God and nature have destined New Orleans and the Floridas to belong to this great and rising empire. As natural bounds to the South, are the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mississippi, and the world at some future day cannot hold them from us.

THURSDAY, February 24.

Mississippi Question.

Agreeably to the order of the day, the Senate resumed the consideration of the resolutions respecting the indisputable right of the United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi, together with the proposed amendments thereto.

Mr. WELLS, of Delaware, said,--Gentlemen have persuaded themselves that the conduct of the Intendant is not authorized by the Spanish or French Government; but what reason have they assigned us in support of this opinion? They tell us of the friendly assurances received from the Minister of His Catholic Majesty resident near our Government; and they place considerable stress upon the circumstance of the Governor of New Orleans disapproving of what the Intendant has done. I will not stop to speak of the imprudence of reposing themselves upon the assurances of a Minister, perhaps expressly instructed to mislead them. But why have they trusted to the imaginary collision of sentiment between the Governor and Intendant of New Orleans? Do not gentlemen know that our Government is in possession of testimony, demonstrating beyond all kind of doubt, that this is not the fact? Have they not seen the letter of the Governor of New Orleans to the Governor of the Mississippi Territory? In this letter I learn that the Governor comes out and acknowledges his co-operation with the Intendant, justifies the breach of the treaty, and declares that these instruments cease their binding force the moment it suits the interest of either party to break through them. Alas! the history of the world furnishes us too many evidences of this melancholy truth. But this is the first time that any nation has had the hardihood to avow it. No, sir, even Carthage herself, who became proverbial for her disregard of treaties, never attained to a point so profligate. If I am incorrect in my statement, honorable gentlemen, who have easier access to the sources of official information than is permitted to us, will set me right. Why has this document been so sedulously kept from the public eye? Why it should be even now so carefully locked up, is a mystery not for me to unravel.

I see no other course for us to pursue than that pointed out by the resolutions. Our interests, our honor, and our safety, require it to be adopted. I am aware that the alarm of war will be rung through the country. I know full well the pains that will be taken to impress an opinion upon our fellow-citizens that we are the friends of war. This we cannot help: the danger with which our country is threatened, will not permit us to shrink from the discharge of our duty, let the consequences to ourselves be what they may. Let me ask you with my honorable friend from New Jersey, (Mr. DAYTON,) what stronger evidence can we give you of the sincerity of our intentions than the resolutions themselves? So far from cramping, or diminishing the power of gentlemen opposed to us, in a crisis like the present, we only offer to strengthen their own hands. Had the advice of an honorable gentleman near me (Mr. MORRIS) been listened to, when you were disbanding your army, this crisis would not have happened. Had you then posted at the Natchez, as he recommended, a thousand soldiers, the navigation of the Mississippi would not now have been interrupted. He foretold you what would happen, and his prediction has been literally fulfilled.

There is but one fault I find with these resolutions, which is, they do not go far enough. If I could obtain a second, I would move an amendment explicitly authorizing the taking possession of both the Floridas as well as the island of New Orleans. In one respect I entirely accord with the honorable gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. JACKSON,) and I admire the manly and decisive tone in which he has spoken upon this subject. We both agree that the Floridas must be attached to the United States; but we differ in point of time. The violent aggression committed upon our rights, and the extent of the danger with which we are threatened, in my humble opinion, would amply justify our taking possession of them immediately. Look at the relative situation of Georgia, the Mississippi Territory, and the Floridas, and it will require very little of the spirit of prophecy to foretell that we shall, ere long, be compelled to possess ourselves of them in our own defence.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.--Mr. President, my object is peace. I could assign many reasons to show that this declaration is sincere. But can it be necessary to give this Senate any other assurance than my word? Notwithstanding the acerbity of temper which results from party strife, gentlemen will believe me on my word. I will not pretend, like my honorable colleague, (Mr. CLINTON,) to describe to you the waste, the ravages, and the horrors of war. I have not the same harmonious periods, nor the same musical tones; neither shall I boast of Christian charity, nor attempt to display that ingenuous glow of benevolence so decorous to the cheek of youth, which gave a vivid tint to every sentence he uttered; and was, if possible, as impressive even as his eloquence. But, though we possess not the same pomp of words, our hearts are not insensible to the woes of humanity. We can feel for the misery of plundered towns, the conflagration of defenceless villages, and the devastation of cultured fields. Turning from these features of general distress, we can enter the abodes of private affliction, and behold the widow weeping, as she traces, in the pledges of connubial affection, the resemblance of him whom she has lost for ever. We see the aged matron bending over the ashes of her son. He was her darling; for he was generous and brave, and therefore his spirit led him to the field in defence of his country. We can observe another oppressed with unutterable anguish: condemned to conceal her affection; forced to hide that passion which is at once the torment and delight of life; she learns that those eyes which beamed with sentiment, are closed in death; and his lip, the ruby harbinger of joy, lies pale and cold, the miserable appendage of a mangled corpse. Hard, hard indeed, must be that heart which can be insensible to scenes like these, and bold the man who dare present to the Almighty Father a conscience crimsoned with the blood of his children.

Yes, sir, we wish for peace; but how is that blessing to be preserved? I shall here repeat a sentiment I have often had occasion to express. In my opinion, there is nothing worth fighting for, but national honor; for in the national honor is involved the national independence. I know that a State may find itself in such unpropitious circumstances, that prudence may force a wise government to conceal the sense of indignity. But the insult should be engraven on tablets of brass, with a pencil of steel. And when that time and chance, which happen to all, shall bring forward the favorable moment, then let the avenging arm strike him. It is by avowing and maintaining this stern principle of honor, that peace can be preserved. But let it not be supposed that any thing I say has the slightest allusion to the injuries sustained from France, while suffering in the pangs of her Revolution. As soon should I upbraid a sick man for what he might have done in the paroxysms of disease. Nor is this a new sentiment; it was felt and avowed at the time when these wrongs were heaped on us, and I appeal for the proof to the files of your Secretary of State. The destinies of France were then in the hands of monsters. By the decree of Heaven she was broken on the wheel, in the face of the world, to warn mankind of her folly and madness. But these scenes have passed away. On the throne of the Bourbons is now seated the first of the Gallic Cæsars. At the head of that gallant nation is the great--the greatest--man of the present age. It becomes us well to consider his situation. The things he has achieved, compel him to the achievement of things more great. In his vast career, we must soon become objects to command attention. We too, in our turn, must contend or submit. By submission we may indeed have peace, alike precarious and ignominious. But is this the peace which we ought to seek? Will this satisfy the just expectation of our country? No. Let us have peace permanent, secure, and, if I may use the term, independent. Peace which depends, not on the pity of others, but on our own force. Let us have the only peace worth having, a peace consistent with honor.

Before I consider the existing state of things, let me notice what gentlemen have said in relation to it. The honorable member from Kentucky has told us, that indeed there is a right arrested, but whether by authority or not is equivocal. He says the representative of Spain verily believes it to be an unauthorized act. My honorable colleague informs us there has been a clashing between the Governor and Intendant. He says we are told by the Spanish Minister it was unauthorized. Notwithstanding these assurances, however, my honorable colleague has, it seems, some doubts; but nevertheless he presumes innocence, for my colleague is charitable. The honorable member from Maryland goes further. He tells us the Minister of Spain says, the Intendant had no such authority, and the Minister of France, too, says there is no such authority. Sir, I have all possible respect for those gentlemen, and every proper confidence in what they may think proper to communicate. I believe the Spanish Minister has the best imaginable disposition to preserve peace; being indeed the express purpose for which he was sent among us. I believe it to be an object near to his heart, and which has a strong hold upon his affections. I respect the warmth and benevolence of his feelings, but he must pardon me that I am deficient in courtly compliment; I am a republican, and cannot commit the interests of my country to the goodness of his heart.

What is the state of things? There has been a cession of the island of New Orleans and of Louisiana to France. Whether the Floridas have also been ceded is not yet certain. It has been said, as from authority, and I think it probable. Now, sir, let us note the time and the manner of this cession. It was at or immediately after the treaty of Lunéville, at the first moment when France could take up a distant object of attention. But had Spain a right to make this cession without our consent? Gentlemen have taken it for granted that she had. But I deny the position. No nation has a right to give to another a dangerous neighbor without her consent. This is not like the case of private citizens, for there, when a man is injured, he can resort to the tribunals for redress; and yet, even there, to dispose of property to one who is a bad neighbor is always considered as an act of unkindness. But as between nations, who can redress themselves only by war, such transfer is in itself an aggression. He who renders me insecure; he who hazards my peace, and exposes me to imminent danger, commits an act of hostility against me, and gives me the rights consequent on that act. Suppose Great Britain should give to Algiers one of the Bahamas, and contribute thereby to establish a nest of pirates near your coasts, would you not consider it as an aggression? Suppose, during the late war, you had conveyed to France a tract of land along Hudson's River, and the northern route by the Lakes into Canada, would not Britain have considered and treated it as an act of direct hostility? It is among the first limitations to the exercise of the rights of property, that we must so use our own as not to injure another; and it is under the immediate sense of this restriction that nations are bound to act toward each other.

But it is not this transfer alone. There are circumstances both in the time and in the manner of it which deserve attention. A gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WRIGHT) has told you, that all treaties ought to be published and proclaimed for the information of other nations. I ask, was this a public treaty? No. Was official notice of it given to the Government of this country? Was it announced to the President of the United States, in the usual forms of civility between nations who duly respect each other? It was not. Let gentlemen contradict me if they can. They will say perhaps that it was the omission only of a vain and idle ceremony. Ignorance may indeed pretend that such communication is an empty compliment, which, established without use, may be omitted without offence. But this is not so. If these be ceremonies, they are not vain, but of serious import, and are founded on strong reason. He who means me well acts without disguise. Had this transaction been intended fairly, it would have been told frankly. But it was secret because it was hostile. The First Consul, in the moment of terminating his differences with you, sought the means of future influence and control. He found and secured a pivot for that immense lever, by which, with potent arm, he means to subvert your civil and political institutions. Thus, the beginning was made in deep hostility. Conceived in such principles, it presaged no good. Its bodings were evil, and evil have been its fruits. We heard of it during the last session of Congress, but to this hour we have not heard of any formal and regular communication from those by whom it was made. Has the King of Spain, has the First Consul of France, no means of making such communication to the President of the United States? Yes, sir, we have a Minister in Spain; we have a Minister in France. Nothing was easier, and yet nothing has been done. Our First Magistrate has been treated with contempt; and through him our country has been insulted.

With that meek and peaceful spirit now so strongly recommended, we submitted to this insult, and what followed? That which might have been expected; a violation of our treaty. An open and direct violation by a public officer of the Spanish Government. This is not the case cited from one of the books. It is not a wrong done by a private citizen, which might, for that reason, be of doubtful nature. No; it is by a public officer,--that officer, in whose particular department it was to cause the faithful observance of the treaty which he has violated. We are told indeed that there was a clashing of opinion between the Governor and the Intendant. But what have we to do with their domestic broils? The injury is done, we feel it. Let the fault be whose it may, the suffering is ours. But, say gentlemen, the Spanish Minister has interfered to correct this irregular procedure. Sir, if the Intendant was amenable to the Minister, why did he not inform him of the step he was about to take, that the President of the United States might seasonably have been apprised of his intention, and given the proper notice to our fellow-citizens? Why has he first learnt this offensive act from those who suffer by it? Why is he thus held up to contempt and derision? If the Intendant is to be controlled by the Minister, would he have taken a step so important without his advice? Common sense will say no. But, the bitter cup of humiliation was not yet full. Smarting under the lash of the Intendant, the Minister soothes you with assurances, and sends advice-boats to announce your forbearance. But while they are on their way, new injury and new insult are added. The Intendant, as if determined to try the extent of your meekness, forbids to your citizens all communication with those who inhabit the shores of the Mississippi. Though they should be starving, the Spaniard is made criminal who should give them food. Fortunately, the waters of the river are potable, or else we should be precluded from the common benefits of nature, the common bounty of heaven. What then, I ask, is the amount of this savage conduct? Sir, it is war. Open and direct war. And yet gentlemen recommend peace, and forbid us to take up the gauntlet of defiance. Will gentlemen sit here and shut their eyes to the state and condition of their country? I shall not reply to what has been said respecting depredations on commerce, but confine myself to objects of which there can be no shadow of doubt. Here is a vast country given away, and not without danger to us. Has a nation a right to put these States in a dangerous situation? No, sir. And yet it has been done, not only without our consent previous to the grant, but without observing the common forms of civility after it was made. Is that wonderful man who presides over the destinies of France, ignorant or unmindful of these forms? See what was done the other day. He directed his Minister to communicate to the Elector of Bavaria, his intended movements in Switzerland, and their object. He knew the Elector had a right to expect that information, although the greater part of Swabia lies between his dominions and Switzerland. And this right is founded on the broad principles already mentioned.

Having thus considered the effect of this cession upon the United States, in a general point of view, let us now examine it more particularly, as it regards the greater divisions of our country, the Western, the Southern, the Middle, and the Eastern States. I fear, sir, I shall detain you longer than I intended, certainly longer than the light of day will last, notwithstanding my effort to comprise what I have to say in the smallest compass. As to the Western States, the effects will be remote and immediate. Those more remote may be examined under the twofold aspect of peace and war. In peace they will suffer the diminution of price for their produce. The advantage of supplying the French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies, may at first sight lead to a different opinion; but when the port of New Orleans is shut to all but French ships, there will no longer be that competition which now exists, and which always results in the highest price that commodities can bear. The French merchants have neither the large capital, nor have they the steady temper and persevering industry which foster commerce. Their invariable object in trade, is to acquire sudden wealth by large profit; and if that cannot be done, they abandon the pursuit for some new project. Certain of the market, and certain of the increasing supply, they will prescribe the price, both to those who cultivate, and to those who consume. Such will be the effect in peace.

In a war with Great Britain, the attention of her fleets to cut off supplies from her enemies, must necessarily affect the price of produce in a still greater degree; and in a war with France it will bear no price at all, until New Orleans shall be wrested from their grasp. Add to this the danger and the devastation from the troops of that country, aided by innumerable hosts of savages from the Western wilds. Such being the evident effects to be produced in times not far remote, the present evil follows from the anticipation of them. The price of land must be reduced, from the certainty that its produce will become less valuable. The flood of emigration to those fertile regions must cease to flow. The debts incurred in the hope of advantageous sales, must remain unpaid. The distress of the debtor must then recoil on his creditor, and, from the common relations of society, become general.

What will be the effect on the Southern States? Georgia, Carolina, and the Mississippi Territory are exposed to invasion from the Floridas and New Orleans. There are circumstances in that portion of America which render the invasion easy, and the defence difficult. Pensacola, though the climate be warm, is among the healthiest spots on earth. Not only a large garrison, but an army may remain there without hazard. At Pensacola and St. Augustine, forces may be assembled to operate in that season of the year, when the morasses which separate them from our southern frontier no longer breathe pestilence. By what are those armies to be opposed? Will you call the militia from the North to assist their Southern brethren? They are too remote. Will you secure their seasonable aid, bring them early to the fields they are ordered to defend? They must perish. The climate, more fatal than the sword, will destroy them before they see their foe. The country adjoining to our Southern frontier is now in possession of the most numerous tribes of savages we are acquainted with. The access to it from New Orleans and the Floridas is easy and immediate. The toys and gewgaws manufactured in France, will be scattered in abundance, to win their affections, and seduce them from their present connection. The talents of the French to gain the good will of the savages is well known, and the disposition of those uncultured men for war, is equally notorious. Here then is a powerful instrument of destruction, which may be used against you with ruinous effect. Besides, what is the population of the Southern States? Do you not tremble when you look at it? Have we not within these few days passed a law to prevent the importation of certain dangerous characters? What will hinder them from arriving in the Floridas, and what can guard the approach from thence to our Southern frontier? These pernicious emissaries may stimulate with a prospect of freedom the miserable men who now toil without hope. They may excite them to imitate a fatal example, and to act over those scenes which fill our minds with horror. When the train shall be laid; when the conspiracy shall be ripe; when the armies of France shall reach your frontier, the firing of the first musket will be a signal for general carnage and conflagration. If you will not see your danger now, the time must soon arrive when you shall feel it. The Southern States being exposed to such imminent danger, their Representatives may be made to know, that a vote given in Congress shall realize the worst apprehensions. You will then feel their danger even on this floor.

Let us now consider the consequence of the cession we complain of, to other nations, and this we may do generally, and then more especially as to those who have a direct and immediate interest in the transaction. In a general view, the first prominent feature is the colossal power of France. Dangerous to Europe and to the world, what will be the effect of a great increase of that power? Look at Europe! One half of it is blotted from the list of empire. Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Britain, are the only powers remaining, except Sweden and Denmark, and they are paralyzed. Where is Italy, Switzerland, Flanders, and all Germany west of the Rhine? Gone; swallowed up in the empire of the Gauls. Holland, Spain, Portugal, reduced to a state of submission and dependence. What is the situation of the powers that remain? Austria is cut off from Italy, the great object of her ambition for more than three centuries; long the rival of France, long balancing with the Bourbons the fate of Europe, she must now submit, and tacitly acknowledge to the world the superiority of her foe, and her own humiliation. Prussia, under the auspices of the Great Frederick, was at the head of a Germanic league to balance the imperial power. Though united with Austria for a moment in the hollow league of the coalition, she has, like Austria, been actuated by a blind jealousy, and favoring the operations of France for the ruin of her rival, expected to share largely in the general spoil. In this fond hope she is disappointed; she now sees the power of France at her door. There is not a fortress from the Rhine to the Baltic, except Magdeburgh, which the First Consul may leave on his left. The fertile plains near Leipsic contain the magazines for his armies when he shall think proper to march to Berlin. Westphalia and Lower Saxony are open on the side of Flanders and Holland. The Maine presents him a military road to the borders of Bohemia. By the Necker he approaches Ulm, and establishes himself on the Danube.[71] These rivers enable him to take the vast resources of his wide domain to the point where he may wish to employ them. Menacing at pleasure his neighbors, he is himself secured by a line of fortresses along his whole frontier. Switzerland, which was the only feeble point of his defence, and which separated his Gallic and Italian dominions, has lately been subjected. The voice you now hear, warned the Swiss of their fate more than eight years ago. The idea seemed then extravagant; but realized, it appears but as a necessary incident. Russia is deprived of her influence in Germany, and thereby of a principal instrument by which her policy might operate on the great powers of the South. The Germanic body is indeed in the hand of the First Consul. Three new Electors along the Rhine are under the mouths of his cannon. They dare not speak. Speak! None dare speak. They dare not think any thing inconsistent with his wishes. Even at their courtly feasts they sit like Damocles, destruction suspended over their heads by a single hair. Would you know the sentiment of England? Look at the debates. In the two Houses of Parliament they speak their fears. Such being the general sentiment of Europe, can it be supposed that they will view without anxiety a new extension of that power and dominion, the object of their hatred and apprehension?

Will it be said that there is a security to the freedom of mankind from the moderation with which this enormous power is to be exercised? Vain delusion! This power is not the result of accident. At the moment when France dethroned her sovereign, it was easy to foresee that a contest must ensue in which her existence would be staked against the empire of the world. If not conquered by surrounding princes, (and the hope of such conquest, unless by the aid of her own citizens, was idle,) her numerous armies acquiring discipline must eventually conquer. She had the advantages of situation, and those which result from union, opposed to councils uncertain and selfish. It was easy also to foresee that, in the same progress of events, some fortunate soldier would seat himself on the vacant throne; for the idea of a French Republic was always a ridiculous chimera. Buonaparte has placed himself at the head of that nation by deeds which cast a lustre on his name. In his splendid career he must proceed. When he ceases to act he will cease to reign. Whenever in any plan he fails, that moment he falls. He is condemned to magnificence. To him are forbidden the harmonies and the charities of social life. He commands a noble and gallant nation, passionately fond of glory. That nation stimulates him to glorious enterprise, and, because they are generous and brave, they ensure his success. Thus the same principle presents at once the object and the means. Impelled by imperious circumstances, he rules in Europe, and he will rule here also, unless by vigorous exertion you set a bound to his power.

I have trespassed on your patience more than I wished, although, from the lateness of the hour, much has been omitted of what I ought to have said. I have endeavored to show that, under the existing circumstances, we are now actually at war, and have no choice but manly resistance or vile submission. That the possession of this country by France is dangerous to other nations, but fatal to us. That it forms a natural and necessary part of our empire; that, to use the strong language of the gentleman near me, it is joined to us by the hand of the Almighty, and that we have no hope of obtaining it by treaty. If, indeed, there be any such hope, it must be by adopting the resolutions offered by my honorable friend. Sir, I wish for peace--I wish the negotiation may succeed, and therefore I strongly urge you to adopt those resolutions. But though you should adopt them, they alone will not ensure success. I have no hesitation in saying that you ought to have taken possession of New Orleans and the Floridas the instant your treaty was violated. You ought to do it now. Your rights are invaded--confidence in negotiation is vain; there is therefore no alternative but force. You are exposed to imminent present danger. You have the prospect of great future advantage. You are justified by the clearest principles of right. You are urged by the strongest motives of policy. You are commanded by every sentiment of national dignity. Look at the conduct of America in her infant years, when there was no actual invasion of right, but only a claim to invade. She resisted the claim; she spurned the insult. Did we then hesitate? Did we then wait for foreign alliance? No; animated with the spirit, warmed with the soul of freedom, we threw our oaths of allegiance in the face of our sovereign, and committed our fortunes and our fate to the God of battles. We then were subjects. We had not then attained to the dignity of an independent Republic. We then had no rank among the nations of the earth. But we had the spirit which deserved that elevated station. And now that we have gained it, shall we fall from our honor?

Sir, I repeat to you that I wish for peace--real, lasting, honorable peace. To obtain and secure this blessing, let us by a bold and decisive conduct convince the Powers of Europe that we are determined to defend our rights; that we will not submit to insult; that we will not bear degradation. This is the conduct which becomes a generous people. This conduct will command the respect of the world. Nay, sir, it may rouse all Europe to a proper sense of their situation. They see that the balance of power on which their liberties depend, is, if not destroyed, in extreme danger. They know that the dominion of France has been extended by the sword over millions who groan in the servitude of their new masters. These unwilling subjects are ripe for revolt. The empire of the Gauls is not like that of Rome, secured by political institutions. It may yet be broken. But whatever may be the conduct of others, let us act as becomes ourselves. I cannot believe with my honorable colleague, that three-fourths of America are opposed to vigorous measures. I cannot believe that they will meanly refuse to pay the sums needful to vindicate their honor and support their independence. Sir, this is a libel on the people of America. They will disdain submission to the proudest sovereign on earth. They have not lost the spirit of seventy-six. But, sir, if they are so base as to barter their rights for gold, if they are so vile that they will not defend their honor, they are unworthy of the rank they enjoy, and it is no matter how soon they are parcelled out among better masters.

FRIDAY, February 25.

Mississippi Question.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolutions respecting the indisputable right of the United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi, together with the proposed amendment thereto.

Mr. ANDERSON (of Tennessee) said he rose with much diffidence, after the very able discussion which the subject had already undergone; after so many men distinguished among the first in our country had treated it with so much ability, he could not expect to furnish many new facts or observations on the subject. But coming from that part of the country which is particularly interested in the discussion, he felt himself particularly bound to offer a few remarks, which some erroneous statements that had fallen in debate, from the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. WHITE,) particularly called for. He would, while he was up, endeavor to add a few observations on the resolutions.

The first of the resolutions appeared to him to be introduced merely with a view to involve the members who were opposed to hostile measures in a dilemma. It was the assertion of a truth which no one would deny, but it was connected with other resolutions or assertions, which must from propriety bring the whole under a negative vote. Taking the naked proposition that we have a right to the place of deposit, we all agree; that it has been suspended, we are equally agreed; but there we stop; by prefacing their resolutions with these truths, they expect either to induce us to vote for other things repugnant to our judgment, or afford room for the imputation of wrong motives and clamor abroad. But we are not to be led astray in this way, nor are the people of this country to be so deceived. On the first organization of the Government, the most earnest attention was directed to that river; and it is now as much an object of the care of Government as at any period since we have been an independent people. Gentlemen have not, therefore, represented the matter with that candor which the seriousness of the subject demanded. The navigation of the Mississippi has not been infringed on the present occasion, though the arguments of all, and the assertions of some, went to the extreme on that point. The river, he repeated, was and continues to be open, and he could not discover the utility of our declaring our right to the free navigation when we are in full unmolested possession of the right. He could indeed discover something beside utility; he could see a design nowise founded. The gentlemen expected with them the votes of the Western members; they expected to play upon our passions, and to place us between the danger of unpopularity and the sense of personal feeling, in a case of a critical nature. But gentlemen would find themselves mistaken to the utmost; though he felt himself, in common with other Western members, responsible to his constituents, yet he would on all occasions where the sense of right impressed itself strongly on him, risk popularity to do right. On this occasion he saw no danger of his popularity, because, although he was aware that the people whom he represented were dissatisfied, they respected their Government and themselves too much to countenance any means that were not honorable and just, to obtain the deposit right.

The resolutions called upon us to declare the deprivation of the right of deposit to be hostile to our honor and interests. On this there were a variety of opinions; and it appears to be agreed (for it was not contradicted by any) that the act of an individual unauthorized cannot be either a cause of war, or the act of the government of which he is an officer. No gentleman has positively declared the act to be authorized by Spain. We have the best evidence that the case will admit of, that it has not been authorized. As the act of an individual, therefore, it cannot affect the honor of this country. That her interests are affected is agreed on all hands; but then the due course of proceeding has been adopted, and redress is to be expected. If it should be denied us, we have our remedy, and it is then that it will become a point of honor. But now, as had been well said by his friend from Georgia, (Mr. JACKSON,) if we were to rashly declare the act of the individual contrary to our national honor, we could not retrograde; and if Spain should not do us justice, he trusted that we should then take our strong ground, and not give way a step. This would be the effect. Gentlemen do not know the American character--they underrate it: there is not that levity in it which gentlemen suppose, capable of being lightly led astray. The character of America is fixed, and when real necessity calls for their exertions, the people will require no artificial excitement.

From time to time, he had heard in that House and in other places, the most wanton and cruel aspersions cast upon the people of the Western country. He knew not how gentlemen could reconcile their pretensions of regard for the Western people with the odious imputations which were constantly cast upon their attachment. The whole of the opposition appeared to concur in their illiberality towards the Western people, at the very moment they were professing so much zeal for their good. The late President of the United States had in the most unwarrantable manner told him, that the Western people were ready to hold out their hands to the first foreigner that should offer them an alliance; the same sentiment is echoed here, only in different terms. But such vile imputations attach not to the Western people, but to those who employed them. The Western people are Americans, who wasted the spring-tide and summer of their days in the cause of their country; men who, having spent their patrimony in establishing their country's independence, travelled to the wilderness, to seek a homestead for themselves and children. Was it honorable, was it consistent with those labored efforts for their good, which we are told actuate gentlemen, to calumniate them in so unworthy a fashion? Gentlemen appear by their gestures to deny that they have been guilty of this calumny. But my charge against them is not of that evasive or double character which they deal in; the words they have used I have taken down--they are; "The French would draw the Western people into an alliance," "The Western people would be influenced by the insidious emissaries of France," "Corruption would find its way among them, and be transferred even to that floor." Is this not calumny of the darkest hue? Is this the way in which six hundred thousand men are to be stigmatized? Men, a greater proportion of whom are soldiers who fought for the independence of America, than ever was to be found in the whole State (Delaware) to which the gentleman belongs.

During twelve years, eight of which one of the first men the world ever saw, or perhaps ever will see, presided over our affairs, the policy of pacific negotiation prevailed in our councils; a policy somewhat more hostile in its aspect was attempted by his successor, but still negotiation succeeded negotiation, and success attended perseverance. In the early stages of our existence, before we were yet a nation, it is indeed true that we drank of the cup of humiliation, even to the dregs; it was the natural effect of our dependent situation; of the prejudices that bound us, and from which great violence was necessary, and was employed to detach us. Such humiliation would not befit us now; no motives exist to demand or justify it: we were then a part of another nation, and connected with another Government; we began by petition in the terms of abjectness and humility, which are incidental to subjects of monarchs; which are always necessary, in order to conceal the spirit and the presumption, of which monarchs are always jealous in their subjects; but abject as we appeared, the very temper and phrase of humility deceived our oppressor into a belief that we were too lowly to entertain the manly temper of resistance against oppression. Yet our precursory and reiterated humility did not unnerve our arms nor subdue our minds, when it became necessary to fling off the trammels of oppression. The result, we now enjoy. When that very power from which we had detached ourselves, refused to carry her treaty into execution, did we then go to war? She held several of our fortresses; we were entitled by every right of nature, and the usage of nations, to seize upon them; not like the right of deposit, a privilege enjoyed on the territory of another, but fortresses held, and in military array on our own territory. Did we then make war? No, we negotiated; and when another power subsequently attacked us, we pursued the same course with the like success. The gentleman (Mr. ROSS) has told us that when President WASHINGTON came into office, he would not have negotiated for the Mississippi, had he not found the negotiation already begun. The gentleman has not told us upon what authority he states this, or how he came to possess the knowledge of a fact of which all others are ignorant; a fact, too, contradictory of his practice through life, and of the principles of that legacy which he left to his country.

Mr. S. T. MASON, said, that if he were to consult the state of his health, he should not trouble the Senate with any remarks on the resolutions before them. But he had heard in the course of debate, certain observations, such strange and paradoxical arguments; insinuations and assertions of such a nature as ought not to be passed unnoticed. Doubtful whether his strength would sustain him through the whole scope which in better health he should take, he would endeavor to limit his arguments to a few of the most prominent particulars, which excited his attention, and to the delivery of his reasons for preferring the substitute propositions of his friend from Kentucky, (Mr. BRECKENRIDGE,) to the original resolutions of the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

He had heard, in the debate, many professions of confidence in the Executive. He was very glad to hear such unusual expressions from that quarter. However, it was entitled to its due weight--what that was he would not inquire; but this he would say, that this unexpected ebullition of confidence went very much farther than he should be disposed to carry his confidence in any man or any President whatever. Gentlemen tell us that they are willing to intrust to the Executive the power of going to war, or not, at his discretion. Wonderful indeed is this sudden disposition to confidence? Why do not gentlemen give away that which they have some authority or right to bestow? Who gave them the power to vest in any other authority than in Congress the right of declaring war? The framers of this constitution had too much experience to intrust such a power to any individual; they early and wisely foresaw, that though there might be men too virtuous to abuse such a power, that it ought not to be intrusted to any; and nugatory would be the authority of the Senate, if we could assume the right of transferring our constitutional functions to any man or set of men. It was a stretch of confidence which he would not trust to any President that ever lived, or that will live. He could not as one, without treason to the constitution, consent ever to relinquish the right of declaring war to any man, or men, beside Congress.

We are told that negotiation is not the course which is proper for us to pursue. But to this he should reply, that such was the usage of all civilized nations; and, however gentlemen might attempt to whittle away the strong ground taken by his friend from New York, he had shown, in a manner not to be shaken, that negotiation before a resort to the last scourge of nations, is the course most consistent with good policy, as well as with universal practice. The gentleman from Pennsylvania had indeed told us that Great Britain had departed from that practice; unfortunately for Great Britain and the gentleman's argument, he told us, at the same time, that she had sustained a most serious injury by her injustice and precipitation. She went to war to seek retribution, and after fighting a while, she left off, and forgot to ask the retribution for which she went to war! And this is the example held up for our imitation; because Great Britain violated the law of nations, we are called upon to do so too! We are told also that Great Britain commenced war during our Revolution, against the Dutch, without any previous notification; that she did the same in the late war with France, and in both cases seized on the ships in her harbors; that is, like a professional bully, she struck first, and then told them she would fight them--and this is the gracious example held up to us.

The merits of the different propositions consisted in this, that by the amendments we propose to seek the recourse of pacific nations--to follow up our own uniform practice; we pursue, in fact, the ordinary and rational course. The first resolutions go at once to the point of war. This was openly and fairly acknowledged by the gentleman from New York (Mr. G. MORRIS.) The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. ROSS,) indeed, told us that it is not war--it was only going and taking peaceable possession of New Orleans! He did not before think the gentleman felt so little respect for the Senate, or estimated their understandings so much inferior to his own, as to call such a measure an act of peace! How did the gentleman mean to go, and how take peaceable possession? Would he march at the head of the posse comitatus? No! he would march at the head of fifty thousand militia, and he would send forth the whole naval and regular force, armed and provided with military stores. He would enter their island, set fire to their warehouses, and bombard their city, desolate their farms and plantations, and having swept all their habitations away, after wading through streams of blood, he would tell those who had escaped destruction, we do not come here to make war on you--we are a very moderate, tender-hearted kind of neighbors, and are come here barely to take peaceable possession of your territory! Why, sir, this is too naked not to be an insult to the understanding of a child!

But the gentleman from New York (Mr. MORRIS) did not trifle with the Senate in such a style; he threw off the mask at once, and in a downright manly way, fairly told us that he liked war--that it was his favorite mode of negotiating between nations; that war gave dignity to the species--that it drew forth the most noble energies of humanity! That gentleman scorned to tell us that he wished to take peaceable possession. No! He could not snivel; his vast genius spurned huckstering; his mighty soul would not bear to be locked up in a petty warehouse at New Orleans; he was for war, terrible, glorious havoc! He tells you plainly, that you are not only to recover your rights, but, you must remove your neighbors from their possessions, and repel those to whom they may transfer the soil; that Buonaparte's ambition is insatiable; that he will throw in colonies of Frenchmen, who will settle on your frontier for thousands of miles round about, (when he comes there;) and he does not forget to tell you of the imminent dangers which threaten our good old friends the English. He tells you that New Orleans is the lock and you must seize upon the key, and shut the door against this terrible Buonaparte, or he will come with his legions, and, as Gulliver served the Lilliputians, wash you off the map. Not content, in his great care for your honor and glory, as a statesman and a warrior, he turns prophet to oblige you--your safety in the present year or the next, does not satisfy him--his vast mind, untrammelled by the ordinary progressions of chronology, looks over ages to come with a faculty bordering on omniscience, and conjures us to come forward and regulate the decrees of Providence at ten thousand years distance.

We have been told that Spain had no right to cede Louisiana to France; that she had ceded to us the privilege of deposit, and had therefore no right to cede her territory without our consent! Are gentlemen disposed to wage war in support of this principle? Because she has given us a little privilege--a mere indulgence on her territory--is she thereby constrained from doing any thing for ever with her immense possessions? No doubt, if the gentleman (Mr. MORRIS) were to be the negotiator on this occasion, he would say: "You mean to cede New Orleans; no, gentlemen, I beg your pardon, you cannot cede that, for we want it ourselves; and as to the Floridas, it would be very indiscreet to cede that, as, in all human probability, we shall want that also in less than five hundred years from this day; and then, as to Louisiana, you surely could not think of that, for in something less than a thousand years, in the natural order of things, our population will progress towards that place also."

If Spain has ceded those countries to France, the cession has been made with all the encumbrances and obligations to which it is subject by previous compact with us. Whether Buonaparte will execute these obligations with good faith, he could not say; but to say that Spain has no right to cede, is a bold assertion indeed. The people of America will not go along with such doctrines, for they lead to ruin alone. We are also told, that the power of the Chief Consul is so great, that he puts up and pulls down all the nations of the Old World at discretion, and that he can do so with us. Yet we are told by the wonderful statesman, who gives us this awful information, that we must go to war with this maker and destroyer of Governments. If, after the unceasing pursuit of empire and conquest, which is thus presented to us, we take possession of his territory, from the gentleman's own declarations, what are we to expect, only that this wonderful man, who never abandons an object--who thinks his own and the nation's honor pledged to go through whatever he undertakes--will next attack us? Does the gentleman think that this terrible picture, which his warm imagination has drawn, is a conclusive argument for proceeding to that war which he recommends?

The Senate, Mr. PRESIDENT, at this moment, presents a very extraordinary aspect; and by those not acquainted with our political affairs, it would appear a political phenomenon. Here we see a number of people from the Eastern States and the seaboard, filled with the most extreme solicitude for the interest and rights of the Western and inland States; while the representatives of the Western people themselves appear to know nothing of this great danger, and to feel a full confidence in their Government. The former declaring that the Western people are all ready for revolt and open to seduction; the latter ignorant of any such disposition, and indignant at the disgrace which is thrown on their character. In their great loving-kindness for the Western people, those new friends of theirs tell them that they are a simple people, who do not know what is good for them, and that they will kindly undertake to do this for them. From the contiguous States of South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, (those States from which the gentleman from Pennsylvania, by his resolutions, proposes to draw the militia,) every member of this House is opposed to war; but from the East, (and one can scarcely refrain from laughing, to hear of the all-important representatives of the State of Delaware in particular,) such is the passion for the wonderful, or the absurd, there prevails the liveliest sensibility for the Western country!

Mr. NICHOLAS said,--When the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. ROSS) opened his war project, his resentment appeared to be confined wholly to Spain; his sole object the securing the navigation of the Mississippi, and our right to a convenient place of deposit on that river. We were told by that gentleman, that we are bound to go to war for this right, which God and nature had given the Western people. What are we to understand by this right, given by God and nature? Surely not the right of deposit, for that was given by treaty; and as to the right of navigation, that has been neither suspended nor brought into question. But we are told by the same gentleman, that the possession of New Orleans is necessary to our complete security. Leaving to the gentleman's own conscience to settle the question as to the morality of taking that place, because it would be convenient, he would inform him that the possession of it will not give us complete security. The island of Cuba, from its position, and the excellence of its harbors, commands the Gulf of Mexico as completely as New Orleans does the river Mississippi, and to give that complete security that he requires of the President, the island of Cuba must likewise be taken possession of. It has been shown that the measures proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and he would again demonstrate it, if it was necessary, are calculated to bring upon the Western country all the mischiefs that gentleman has depicted as resulting to them from a loss of the navigation of the river Mississippi. If we are driven to war to assert our rights, the Western people must make up their minds to bear that loss during the war; for without a naval superiority, which we have not and cannot obtain, or the possession of Cuba, we shall not be able to avail ourselves of the navigation to any useful purpose. Although we may take possession of the Floridas and New Orleans, it is from a conviction of its pernicious effects upon the Western country, as well as other reasons, that he was averse to appealing to arms as long as there is a prospect of attaining our object in another way.

The gentleman from New York, finding the weight of argument against him, and that a resort to arms would not be justifiable upon the ground taken by his friends, with a boldness and promptitude that characterizes veteran politicians, has not only assigned new and different causes for war, but new objects, and a new and more powerful enemy to cope with. He no doubt felt the force of the arguments that have been used to show the improbability that Spain would authorize an act that would produce a rupture with this country, at the moment that she was parting with Louisiana, and when she could not possibly derive any advantage from the wrong that she could do us by that act; and at a time when we knew from unquestionable evidence that it is the desire of Spain to cultivate a good understanding with this country. He could give no credit to the suggestion, that the First Consul had required Spain to take that step. He knew that character too well to believe that he would attempt to throw a responsibility upon others, for his measures, nor indeed could it be shown that the First Consul would be in any way benefited by it; he knows the American character too well to believe that any of the reasons that have been assigned by his friends who have preceded him in this argument, would form a justification for a declaration of war, without a previous demand for a redress of the wrongs that we have sustained. He knows that our countrymen, with a courage and perseverance that does promise success in any war, are at all times ready when it is necessary to assert their rights with arms, but that they will not be employed in wars of ambition or conquest; and above all, he sees the folly of going to war with Spain, and taking from her a country that we should be obliged in honor and justice to give up to the French, perhaps the instant after we had taken possession of it; for if France would reinstate us in the rights and privileges that we hold under our new treaty with Spain, I demand of the gentleman from New York, if he would wish this country to hold possession against France; and if he would, upon what ground he would justify it?

The cession was made to France before the injury done us by the Spanish officer; knowing this, we take the country; upon France demanding it of us, we should be bound by every principle of honor and justice to give her possession, upon her engaging to respect properly our rights. Spain having injured us surely will not justify our committing an outrage of the most injurious and insulting nature upon France. Would conduct like this comport with the gentleman's ideas of national honor, about which we have heard so much in the course of this debate? Can it be, that an act, which, if perpetrated by an individual, would be robbery, can be justifiable in a nation? And can it be justifiable in the eyes of men, who believe there is nothing so precious or important as national honor? Can the usefulness or convenience of any acquisition justify us in taking from another by force what we have no sort of right to?

There were not in America men more attached or more faithful to the Government of the United States than they were; and I will venture to predict, from my knowledge of them, that they will be the last to submit to the yoke of despotism, let it be attempted to be imposed upon them by whom it may. If there is one part of America more interested than any other in preserving the union of these States, and the present Government, it is the Western. Important as the Mississippi is to them, their free intercourse with the Atlantic States is more important--all their imports are received through that channel, and their most valuable exports are sold, and will continue to be so, in the Atlantic States. The same gentleman (Mr. MORRIS) says, we must line our frontier with custom-house officers, to prevent smuggling. If there is any force in what he says upon this subject, we ought not only to take New Orleans and the Floridas, but Louisiana, and all the British possessions on the continent. Another reason urged with great earnestness by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. MORRIS,) is, that France, without this acquisition, is too powerful for the peace and security of the rest of the world--that half the nations that lately existed are gone--that those that are left are afraid to act, and nation after nation falling at her nod--that, if France acquires the Floridas and New Orleans, it will put England and Spain completely in her power, giving to those places an importance that they do not merit; and yet that gentleman and his friends have repeatedly asserted that war would not result from our taking immediate possession of those places; indeed, they say, it is the only way to avoid war. At one moment the country is represented as so important as to make the First Consul the sovereign of the world; at the next, we are told that we may take it without any sort of risk, and without a probability that either France or Spain will go to war with us for the recovery of a country so all-important to them. In the language of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I say, this idle tale may amuse children, but will not satisfy men.

Mr. PRESIDENT, we have nothing to fear from the colony of any European nation on this continent; they ought rather to be considered as a pledge of the good conduct of the mother country towards us; for such possessions must be held only during our pleasure.

Can France, in fifty years, or in a century, establish a colony in any part of the territories now possessed by Spain, that could resist the power of the United States, even at this day, for a single campaign? What has been our progress since the year 1763, in settling our Western country? In forty years, under the most favorable circumstances that a new country could be settled, we have only a population of between five and six hundred thousand souls, and this country is settled by men who knew it perfectly--by men who either carried all their friends with them, or who knew that change of residence would not prevent their frequently seeing and hearing from their nearest relatives. Can it be expected that any country will be peopled as fast, from a nation at the distance of three thousand miles, as our Western country has been? And yet we are taught to be apprehensive of a colony to be landed to-morrow or next day from Europe. Sir, if we are wise and true to ourselves, we have nothing to fear from any nation, or combination of nations, against us. We are too far removed from the theatre of European politics, to be embroiled in them, if we act with common discretion. Friendship with us, is the interest of every commercial and manufacturing nation. Our interest is not to encourage partialities or prejudices towards any, but to treat them all with justice and liberality. He should be sorry to reproach any nation--he would rather suffer former causes of reproach to be buried in oblivion; and he was happy to perceive that prejudices which were incidental to the war that we had been forced into in defence of our liberties, with a nation from which we are principally sprung, were fast wearing off. Those prejudices had been very powerfully revived, soon after our Revolution had established our independence, by the aggressions of that nation, in various ways, more flagrant and atrocious than any thing we have to complain of at this day.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania said that this is not an apposite case; that at that time there was no blockade. It is true there was not a blockade of one of our ports, nor is there now, (the river Mississippi is open for the passage of our boats and vessels,) but we were injured, in a commercial point of view, in a more material manner than we should have been by the blockade of the Delaware or the Chesapeake; for all the countries (except Great Britain) to which it was desirable for us to trade were declared to be in a state of blockade, and all our vessels going to those countries were subject to seizure. Let gentlemen call to mind what was the conduct of our Government at that time. The House of Representatives had the subject under consideration, when the then President appointed an Envoy Extraordinary to demand satisfaction of Great Britain. What was the conduct of the members of the House of Representatives, who were acting upon the subject, before it was known to them that the Executive had taken any measures to obtain satisfaction for the injury sustained? Did they attempt to counteract the Executive? No; they suspended all Legislative discussions and Legislative measures. And even the injuries done us by the actual invasion of our territory, the erection of fortifications within our limits, the withholding the posts that belonged to us by treaty, and the robbery and abuse of our citizens on the high seas, did not provoke us to declare war, nor even to dispossess the invaders of our territory of what actually belonged to us. The Executive proposed to negotiate, and it was thought improper to obstruct it. How gentlemen who approved of the interference of the Executive upon that occasion, can justify their attempt to defeat the efforts of the present Administration to obtain redress for the injury that we now complain of, they must answer to their consciences and their country. Fortunately for the United States, not only the President, but a majority of both Houses of Congress, upon the present occasion, have put themselves in the gap between the pestilence and the people.

If the gentleman from New York had exerted his ingenuity as much to state the grounds upon which an expectation of the complete success of our Envoy might be founded, he would have been at least as usefully employed for his country as he has been in his attempt to show that it will not succeed, and he would have avoided the palpable contradictions of his own arguments that he has run into. The gentleman himself, without intending it, has assigned sufficient reasons why we might expect entire satisfaction. He has said, truly, that America, united, holds the command of the West Indies in her hands. This must be known to all the nations that have colonies there; it must likewise be known to the proprietors of Louisiana and the Floridas, that, circumstanced as we at present are, there will be perpetual sources of contention between them and us. Every thing that has happened as to the Mississippi will be reacted as to the great rivers that head in what is now the Mississippi Territory, and empty themselves into the Gulf of Mexico, after passing through West Florida. In the infancy of the colonies that may be settled in Florida or Louisiana, the mother country can count upon nothing but expense, particularly if they are to be the causes of perpetual quarrels with this country. In twenty years, the population of the United States will be nine or ten millions of people; one-third of that population will probably be on the Western waters. This will give a force in that quarter of the Union equal to that with which we contended with Great Britain; and our united force will be such that no nation at the distance of three thousand miles will be able to contend with us for any object in our neighborhood. These considerations, with a belief that, if we are treated with justice and liberality, we shall never violate the rights of other nations, or suffer ourselves to be involved in the wars that may take place among the great European nations, are arguments that cannot be withstood, if the Governments of France and Spain are in the hands of wise men; for they must see that they have nothing to hope from a contest with us, and that a union of our force with a rival nation would be productive of very serious danger and inconvenience to them.

Mr. DAYTON said, he lamented exceedingly the indisposition of the honorable member from Virginia, (Mr. NICHOLAS,) not only because it had compelled him to abridge his arguments, which always entertained, even when they failed to convince, but because to that distraction of mind which sickness often produces, could alone be ascribed the doubts expressed by that member, respecting the views of the advocates of the original resolutions. The difficulty of the opposers of the resolutions, would, he said, have been less, if the gentlemen who supported them had settled among themselves what was their object, and had ascertained with whom we were to make war. To both these points, Mr. D. said, the fullest and clearest answers had been given. Our object, says he, is to obtain a prompt redress of injuries immediately affecting our Western brethren, who look to us for decisive and effectual measures, and have told us that a delay of remedy will be ruinous to them; and our views and wishes are to take possession of the place of deposit guaranteed by treaty, whether it be in the hands of the one nation or the other, and to hold it as a security that the trade of so important a river should not be liable to similar interruptions in future. We are not, as the gentleman from Virginia would insinuate, for rushing into a war, but we are for repelling insults, and insisting upon our rights, even at the risk of one. It was easy to foresee that the opposers of the resolutions offered by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, must resort to other means than fair argument, to justify them in the course which they were about to pursue. Our most precious rights flagrantly violated, treaties perfidiously broken, the outlet or road to market of half a million of our fellow-citizens obstructed, our trade shackled, our country grossly insulted, were facts too notorious, and too outrageous to allow them the least plausible ground of reasoning. Deprived of every other means of attack, they have resorted to that of alarm. They charge us with a thirst for war, and enter into a description of its horrors, as if they supposed that it was in our power to produce, or in theirs to prevent it. That which requires the concurrence of two parties, viz: contract or negotiation, they consider most easy; and war, which may always be produced by one party only, they consider as most difficult. Nay, sir, they do what is more extraordinary and unpardonable, they shut their eyes to the fact that hostility has already been commenced against us. Attacked and insulted as we had been, do we now, asked Mr. D., call for war? Let the resolutions give the answer. They begin with a declaration of certain rights, indisputable in their nature, indispensable in their possession, to the safety, peace, and union of this country. Not a member opposed to us has controverted them, except the honorable gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. WRIGHT.) He denied the truth of all except one of them, and even of a part of that one. His honorable friends from the Western country, who are in the habit of acting with him, cannot thank him for such defence. The formerly well applied words, "Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis egent," must be applicable on this occasion, and it may be as well to leave them with each other to settle the question of their rights. But there is one article of the Maryland member's creed which ought not to escape comment, because, if adopted, it would be fatal to the Union. I understood him, said Mr. D., as stating, that inasmuch as the produce which descends the Mississippi bears a proportion of about a twentieth only to the exports of the whole Union, it was not reasonable to expect that the other portion should be endangered to protect that minor part. If maxims like this were to actuate our councils, short indeed would be the duration of our independence. Our enemies would have only to attack us by piecemeal, State by State, to make us an easy prey. The honorable member from Maryland could not hope for even that gloomy consolation which we heard of on a former melancholy occasion. He could not flatter himself that he and his State would be left to be the last victim.

But, Mr. PRESIDENT, every other gentleman appears to admit the truth of the prefatory declaration of rights; they admit, too, that if we cannot be possessed of them otherwise, we must seize on them by force; but they refuse to give the means and the power to the President, in whom they have told us, over and over again, they repose implicit confidence. Is any one of the resolutions too imperative on the President, we will agree so to alter as to make it discretionary, if desired by any gentleman on the other side; for without their leave, we cannot now amend our own resolutions.

It is my consolation, Mr. PRESIDENT, said Mr. D., and it ought to be matter of triumph to my honorable friend, the mover of these resolutions, that, whatever may be their fate, the introduction and discussion of them will have produced no little benefit. They have brought forward gentlemen to pledge themselves, in their speeches, to employ force on failure of negotiation; which, though late, is better than never. They must be allowed the merit, too, of producing the resolutions which they offer as a substitute. These milk-and-water propositions of Mr. BRECKENRIDGE will at least serve to show that something should be done, some preparations made; and therefore even to these, feeble as they are, I will agree, if more cannot be carried. But let the relative merits of the two be compared. Ours authorize to call out of those militia nearest to the scene, and most interested in the event, a number not exceeding fifty thousand, and to give them orders to act, when the occasion requires it, in conjunction with the army and navy; theirs authorize an enrolment of eighty thousand, dispersed over the whole Continent, without any authority to act with them, however pressing the danger, nor even to march them out of their own State. Ours authorize the President to take immediate possession of some convenient place of deposit, as guaranteed by treaty, in order to afford immediate vent for the Western produce, and relief to our suffering fellow-citizens, and thereby put it out of the power of a Spanish Intendant, whether acting from caprice, or orders from his Court, to obstruct so important an outlet; theirs give no such authority, but leave to the slow progress and uncertainty of negotiation that remedy, which, to delay, is almost as fatal as to refuse.

The question being at length called for, on the motion of Mr. BRECKENRIDGE, for striking out the first section of the resolutions proposed by Mr. ROSS, the yeas and nays were required, and stood, 15 to 11, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Clinton, Cocke, Ellery, T. Foster, Jackson, Logan, S. T. Mason, Nicholas, Stone, Sumter, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Dayton, Hillhouse, Howard, J. Mason, Morris, Olcott, Plumer, Ross, Tracy, Wells, and White.

On the question for striking out the remaining parts of the resolutions, the question was also taken, and carried by the same votes on each side.

The question being then called for on the adoption of the amendments proposed by Mr. BRECKENRIDGE, the yeas and nays were called for, and the votes were as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Clinton, Cocke, Dayton, Ellery, T. Foster, Hillhouse, Howard, Jackson, Logan, S. T. Mason, J. Mason, Morris, Nicholas, Olcott, Plumer, Ross, Stone, Sumter, Tracy, Wells, and Wright.

NAYS.--None.

So it was unanimously

Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he shall judge it expedient, to require of the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march, at a moment's warning, eighty thousand effective militia, officers included.

Resolved, That the President may, if he judges it expedient, authorize the Executives of the several States to accept, as part of the detachment aforesaid, any corps of volunteers who shall continue in service for such time not exceeding ---- months, and perform such services as shall be prescribed by law.

Resolved, That ---- dollars be appropriated for paying and subsisting such part of the troops aforesaid, whose actual service may be wanted, and for defraying such other expenses as during the recess of Congress the President may deem necessary for the security of the territory of the United States.

Resolved, That ---- dollars be appropriated for erecting, at such place or places on the Western waters as the President may judge most proper, one or more arsenals.

After the question was taken,

The resolutions were referred to Messrs. BRECKENRIDGE, JACKSON, and SUMTER, to bring in a bill or bills accordingly.

WEDNESDAY, March 2.

The VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President, pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be 18, of which 10 make a majority.

Mr. Bradley had 13, Mr. Morris 3, Mr. Hillhouse 1, and Mr. Logan 1.

Consequently, the Hon. STEPHEN R. BRADLEY was elected President of the Senate, pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and acquaint him that, in the absence of the Vice President, they have elected the Hon. STEPHEN R. BRADLEY President of the Senate, pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

The PRESIDENT communicated the credentials of JAMES HILLHOUSE, elected by the State of Connecticut a Senator of the United States for six years, commencing with the fourth day of March current; and they were read and ordered to lie on file.

THURSDAY, March 3.

A message was received from the House of Representatives by Mr. NICHOLSON and Mr. RANDOLPH, two of the members of said House, in the words following:

"Mr. PRESIDENT: We are commanded, in the name of the House of Representatives and of all the people of the United States, to impeach John Pickering, judge of the district court for the district of New Hampshire, of high crimes and misdemeanors, and to acquaint the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same. We are further commanded to demand that the Senate take order for the appearance of the said John Pickering, to answer to the said impeachment."

THURSDAY EVENING, 6 o'clock.

Mr. TRACY, from the committee appointed on the subject, made the following report, which was adopted, and the House of Representatives notified accordingly:

Whereas the House of Representatives have this day, by two of their members, Messrs. Nicholson and Randolph, at the bar of the Senate, impeached John Pickering, judge of the district court for the district of New Hampshire, of high crimes and misdemeanors, and have acquainted the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same: and have likewise demanded that the Senate take order for the appearance of the said John Pickering to answer to the said impeachment: Therefore,

"Resolved, That the Senate will take proper order thereon, of which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives."

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate notify the House of Representatives of this resolution.

Adjournment.

Ordered, That Messrs. WRIGHT and COCKE be a committee on the part of the Senate, with such as the House of Representatives may join, to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES and notify him that, unless he may have any further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House of Representatives concur in the resolution of the Senate for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and notify him of the proposed adjournment of the two Houses of Congress, and have appointed a committee on their part.

Mr. WRIGHT reported, from the joint committee, that they had waited on the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, and that he informed the committee that he had no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress.

On motion, the Senate adjourned to the first Monday in November next.

SEVENTH CONGRESS.--SECOND SESSION.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES

IN

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

MONDAY, December 6, 1802.

This being the day appointed by the constitution for the annual meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared and took their seats, to wit:

From New Hampshire.--Abiel Foster and Samuel Tenney.

From Massachusetts.--John Bacon, Seth Hastings, Nathan Read, Josiah Smith, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, and Lemuel Williams.

From Rhode Island.--Joseph Stanton, jr., and Thomas Tillinghast.

From Connecticut.--John Davenport, Calvin Goddard, Elias Perkins, John Cotton Smith, and Benjamin Tallmadge.

From New York.--Samuel L. Mitchill, John Smith, David Thomas, John P. Van Ness, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.

From New Jersey.--John Condit, Ebenezer Elmer, James Mott, and Henry Southard.

From Pennsylvania.--Robert Brown, Andrew Gregg, Joseph Heister, Joseph Hemphill, William Hoge, Michael Leib, John Smilie, John Stewart, Isaac Van Horn, and Henry Woods.

From Maryland.--John Dennis, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater, and Samuel Smith.

From Virginia.--Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, John Dawson, David Holmes, George Jackson, Anthony New, John Smith, and Philip R. Thompson.

From North Carolina.--Nathaniel Macon, Speaker, Richard Stanford, and John Stanley.

From Tennessee.--William Dickson.

From the North-western Territory.--Paul Fearing.

Several new members, to wit: SAMUEL HUNT, from New Hampshire, returned to serve as a member of this House, in the room of Joseph Peirce, who has resigned his seat; SAMUEL THATCHER, from Massachusetts, returned to serve as a member of this House, in the room of Silas Lee, who has resigned; and DAVID MERIWETHER, from Georgia, returned to serve as a member of this House, in the room of Benjamin Taliaferro, who has also resigned; appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

A new delegate, from the Mississippi Territory, to wit, THOMAS M. GREEN, returned to serve in this House, in the room of Narsworthy Hunter, deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

But a quorum of the whole number of qualified members not being present, the House adjourned until to-morrow morning, eleven o'clock.

TUESDAY, December 7.

Another new member, to wit, THOMAS WYNN, from North Carolina, returned to serve as a member of this House, for the said State, in the room of Charles Johnson, deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

Several other members, viz: from New Hampshire, GEORGE B. UPHAM; from Massachusetts, PHANUEL BISHOP, MANASSEH CUTLER, and WILLIAM SHEPARD; from Connecticut, SAMUEL W. DANA and ROGER GRISWOLD; from Pennsylvania, THOMAS BOUDE; from Virginia, THOMAS NEWTON, jr., and JOHN TRIGG; from North Carolina, JAMES HOLLAND; and from South Carolina, THOMAS MOORE; appeared, and took their seats in the House.

And a quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole number of qualified members, being present, the oath to support the Constitution of the United States, as prescribed by the act, entitled "An act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths," was administered by Mr. SPEAKER to the new members.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate, to inform them that a quorum of this House is assembled, and are ready to proceed to business, and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

WEDNESDAY, December 8.

Two other members, to wit: from New Jersey, WILLIAM HELMS, and from North Carolina, WILLIS ALSTON, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

THURSDAY, December 9.

Two other members, to wit: WALTER BOWIE, from Maryland, and THOMAS T. DAVIS, from Kentucky, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

FRIDAY, December 10.

Two other members, to wit: WILLIAM EUSTIS, from Massachusetts, and JOHN A. HANNA, from Pennsylvania, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

SATURDAY, December 11.

Another member, to wit, ARCHIBALD HENDERSON, from North Carolina, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

MONDAY, December 13.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, RICHARD CUTTS; from New York, THOMAS MORRIS; from Virginia, ABRAM TRIGG; and from South Carolina, THOMAS LOWNDES; appeared, and took their seats in the House.

TUESDAY, December 14.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, EBENEZER MATTOON; from New York, THEODORUS BAILEY; from Virginia, JOHN RANDOLPH, jr., and JOHN TALIAFERRO, jr.; and from South Carolina, WILLIAM BUTLER; appeared, and took their seats in the House.

WEDNESDAY, December 15.

Another member, to wit, EDWIN GRAY, from Virginia, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have agreed to the resolution of this House for the appointment of Chaplains to Congress for the present session; and have appointed the Rev. Dr. GANTT, on their part.

The House proceeded, by ballot, to the appointment of a Chaplain to Congress, on the part of this House; and, upon examining the ballots, a majority of the votes of the whole House was found in favor of the Reverend WILLIAM PARKINSON.

A Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, by Mr. LEWIS, his Secretary, as follows:

Mr. SPEAKER: I am directed by the President of the United States to hand you a communication, in writing, from the President to the two Houses of Congress.

And he delivered in the same, together with the accompanying documents. The said communication was read. [For which, see proceedings in the Senate of this date.]

Ordered, That the said communication, with the accompanying documents, be referred to the Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union.

THURSDAY, December 16.

Two other members, to wit: LUCAS ELMENDORPH, from New York, and DANIEL HEISTER, from Maryland, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

FRIDAY, December 17.

Two other members, to wit: from South Carolina, BENJAMIN HUGER, and JOHN RUTLEDGE, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Violation of the Right of Deposit at New Orleans.

Mr. RANDOLPH observed that there had been a recent occurrence, in which every member of the House was interested, though every member might not, perhaps, possess competent information respecting it. He said it would be useless in him to impress the magnitude of a subject that related to the free navigation of the Mississippi, which materially affected a district of country growing every day in wealth and importance, and which it behooved the whole United States to cherish and protect. He moved, therefore, the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before this House such papers as are in the possession of the Department of State, as relate to the violation on the part of Spain, of the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, between the United States of America and the King of Spain."

MONDAY, December 20.

Several other members, to wit: from Vermont, ISRAEL SMITH; and from Virginia, RICHARD BRENT, and MATTHEW CLAY; appeared, and took their seats in the House.

TUESDAY, December 21.

Another member, to wit, JOHN CAMPBELL, from Maryland, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, December 22.

Another member, to wit, JOHN ARCHER, from Maryland, appeared, and took his seat.

Violation of the Right of Deposit at New Orleans.

A Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, as follows:

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

I now transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the information requested in your resolutions of the seventeenth instant.

In making this communication, I deem it proper to observe, that I was led by the regard due to the rights and interests of the United States, and to the just sensibility of the portion of our fellow-citizens more immediately affected by the irregular proceeding at New Orleans, to lose not a moment in causing every step to be taken which the occasion claimed from me; being equally aware of the obligation to maintain, in all cases, the rights of the nation, and to employ, for that purpose, those just and honorable means which belong to the character of the United States.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Dec. 22, 1802.

The Message, and the papers referred to therein, were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The Mint.

Mr. RANDOLPH rose, in order to renew a motion which he had made yesterday, and on which--being called to the door when some objections were urged against it--he was surprised to find himself in a small minority. Understanding that the refusal to resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on his motion for abolishing the Mint, was the effect of a desire on the part of the House to receive the report of the Director of that institution, for the past year, he would endeavor to show that the House were already in possession of competent information, and that it could not be affected by any communication which the head of that department might make. If this were a subject novel to the House, and of an undigested nature, he should readily acknowledge his motion to have been premature; nor would it, under those circumstances, have been submitted to the House. But, on examination, it would appear that the subject had been matured during the last session; that information of the most satisfactory nature had been received from the Director; and a bill actually passed the House. That information, if it were not in the recollection of every member of the House, was accessible to all of them. It stated explicitly that the machinery would not last, without repair, longer than another year--this, he presumed, had not renewed itself; that the horses were so old that it would be necessary, at the end of the year, to replace them by others--these had not, he supposed, grown younger; that the lot was too circumscribed, and this, he imagined, had not enlarged its limits; that the expense of the institution could not, by any new arrangements, be reduced below twenty thousand dollars. The Director had not only recommended a change of the site, but of the modus operandi of the machinery of the Mint, by supplying the labor of horses by steam. Upon this information the House had acted last session. No general election having intervened, he must presume that no change of sentiment had taken place. He, therefore, thought he had a right to consider this subject as perfectly matured, and there being no other business before the House, hoped it would be taken up; although he was not surprised at the reluctance of those gentlemen who cherished the institution as one of the insignia of sovereignty, to act upon it. This aspect of the subject could not, however, be changed by any report of the detailed operations of the Mint. He, therefore, moved that the House, agreeably to the order of the day, resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on the resolution to repeal so much of the laws on the subject of the Mint as relate to the establishing of a Mint.

Mr. SOUTHARD was in favor of the postponement. There were now present a number of gentlemen not members at the period of discussion during the last session. They have no documents, and cannot be correctly informed. He saw no advantage in entering upon the discussion at this time, as new and additional information may be received from the report of the Director. It had been said there was no business before the House; but there was business; there was a bill upon their table, why not take that up and act upon it?

Mr. RANDOLPH called for the reading of a document that would throw clear and full light upon the subject; not light of that fleeting kind that may be derived from an annual report. From this document sufficient information could be had to convince any member that we might act as well now as at any other time.

[The Clerk read a report from the Director of the Mint, received during the last session, stating the real and personal property attached to the Mint; that the machinery might last for one year; that the horses may last a year; that to conduct the operations of the Mint to advantage, steam should be used instead of horses; that the lot on which the Mint is erected was too small; and that a less annual sum than seventeen or eighteen thousand dollars would not provide for the establishment.]

Mr. RANDOLPH said he would state a fact, which was, that notwithstanding all the issues from the Mint, no member sees a coin. For himself he had not seen a piece of gold coined in the Mint for two years.

Mr. LOWNDES said the remark of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) was not correct, as he had seen many pieces of American coin. But he could assign a satisfactory reason for the appearance of so little gold in ordinary circulation. It was the practice of the banks to count over once a month the specie in their vaults. This trouble was considerably lessened by depositing gold instead of silver. He had been credibly assured that there was now in the vaults of the banks of the United States gold, in eagles and half eagles, to the amount of two millions of dollars.[72]

Mr. DENNIS said that, if, on full inquiry, the establishment appeared to be a drain on the Treasury, he should be for abolishing it; but he should not, on immature information, be for abolishing an institution, coeval with the Government, and founded on good reasons. The reasons adduced by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) were insufficient. So far as related to the horses, he believed there were only four employed, and the purchase of four fresh ones would be a very unimportant consideration. Another argument was drawn from the smallness of the lot on which the Mint stands. Though it might be better conducted on a more extensive lot, yet he was not satisfied, notwithstanding present disadvantages, that it might not be profitably conducted, at least so far as regarded a copper coinage. For these reasons he thought it proper to wait a few days, in order to receive information that would enable them to understand the points on which their decision may ultimately turn.

The question was then taken on Mr. GREGG'S motion to postpone the subject till the second Monday in January, and carried--ayes 47, noes 28.

THURSDAY, December 23.

Another member, to wit, LEWIS R. MORRIS, from Vermont, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

FRIDAY, December 24.

Another member, to wit, WILLIAM H. HILL, from North Carolina, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

MONDAY, December 27.

Case of J. P. Van Ness.

Mr. DAVIS observed that he was of opinion that a member of the House retained his seat contrary to the spirit and sense of the constitution. It therefore became his duty to offer a resolution for instituting an inquiry into the subject, in doing which he disclaimed all personal view. He then made the following motion:

Resolved, That the Committee of Elections be, and they are hereby, instructed to inquire whether John P. Van Ness, one of the members of this House from the State of New York, returned by said State to serve as one of its members in the seventh Congress of the United States, has not, since his election as a member of this House, and since he occupied a seat as a member, accepted of, and exercised the office of a major of militia, under the authority of the United States, within the Territory of Columbia, and thereby forfeited his right to a seat as a member of this House.

Mr. MITCHILL considered the point as interesting in two relations; that which involved the decision of a principle, and that which went to deprive the State, (New York,) one of whose representatives he was, of a member. For these reasons he hoped the business would not be immediately pressed. He acknowledged this was not the first intimation he had received of the contemplation of such a motion; but he had entertained a hope that the gentleman with whom it originated, had, on reflection, considered it not inconsistent with his duty to abandon it.

Mr. DAVIS replied, that he felt no disposition to press a decision. He had communicated, the first day he took his seat, his ideas on the subject to certain members, the friends of the gentleman implicated by the resolution, in hopes that he would resign. He now entertained no wish to push the business. He supposed, however, that the resolution would, of course, go to the Committee of Elections. He repeated that he was governed by no personal prejudice, but entirely by a sense of duty. He concluded with saying he was in favor of the question of reference being immediately taken.

But on Mr. MITCHILL repeating his desire for some delay, Mr. DAVIS agreed to let the resolution lie till to-morrow.

TUESDAY, December 28.

Two other members, to wit: from Virginia, JOHN STRATTON; and from North Carolina, WILLIAM BARRY GROVE, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Letter of James McHenry.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter addressed to him from James McHenry, late Secretary for the War Department, containing a variety of observations on the subject-matter of a report presented to the House, on the twenty-ninth day of April last, from the committee appointed to inquire and report, whether moneys drawn from the Treasury have been faithfully applied to the objects for which they were appropriated, and whether the same have been regularly accounted for; and to report, likewise, whether any further arrangements are necessary to promote economy, enforce adherence to Legislative restrictions, and secure the accountability of persons intrusted with the public money, together with an appendix, comprising sundry explanatory statements in defence of the official conduct of the said James McHenry, whilst acting in the capacity aforesaid: the House proceeded in the reading of the said letter, and having made some progress therein,

Mr. ALSTON said that the paper which the Clerk was reading appeared to him to be a very voluminous one, and that he did not think the House were bound to listen to the reading of it. He conceived them only bound to attend to such documents as might be received from public officers, or to petitions for a redress of grievances. He did not believe the paper now before the House to be one of that description, or that the House ought to take any notice of it. If the House were bound to take notice of every letter any individual might think proper to write and address to the Speaker, very little time might be left to do any other business. He concluded by saying he thought they ought to take no more notice of it than they should of any paragraph in a newspaper which might be enclosed to the Speaker. He therefore moved that the paper should not be read.

Mr. STANLEY observed that he did not perceive the difference stated by his colleague; nor did he know how the gentleman could anticipate the contents of a communication before read. We shall be enabled to judge better of it when we hear it. By what inspiration could the gentleman form a judgment now? The communication appeared to him of the utmost importance. He hoped, therefore, it would be read.

Mr. MORRIS could not omit making a remark or two. From the communication, so far as read, it appeared that it was charged that the character of a former public officer had been aspersed. The House ought, therefore, not only to read the communication, but also to inquire into the complaint. There was not an indecent expression in it. The writer complains that his character has been attacked; he thinks unjustly attacked. It will be the height of injustice to refuse him an opportunity of being heard.

The SPEAKER said that it was a rule of the House that when the reading of a paper is called for, it shall be read, unless dispensed with by general consent.

Mr. RANDOLPH said he wished only to observe, that there was but one principle (and that had been stated by the Speaker) on which these papers ought to be read. Any member had a right to call for the reading of papers. To him, however, it appeared that there was no occasion for inspiration to perceive that the papers, so far as read, were in a high degree indecent, unworthy of any man who had held, or ought to hold, an office under Government, and derogatory from the dignity of the House. Members were cited by name; insults were offered to individual members; a committee was divided into different sects; on one class illiberal calumnies were thrown, while the other class was shielded from reflection. Was this decent or indecent? He congratulated himself that he differed as widely on this subject as he did on others from gentlemen.

Mr. MORRIS said, however widely he might differ on this as well as other subjects from the gentleman from Virginia, he believed his own ideas of what was decent or indecent as correct as those of that gentleman. The letter states that a report had been made during the last session implicating the character of the writer. It further states that certain gentlemen on the committee did not concur in the report. This the writer knew from the debates upon the report. He therefore thought it his duty, in vindicating himself, to exonerate those members from censure. Was this indecent? He conceived not.

Mr. M. said that when he had observed that there was not an indecent expression in the letter, he meant that there was no such expression applied to the House collectively. He did not mean to say there were no charges against individual members. But if there were charges against individual members, that was no reason for the House refusing to hear it. That could only be done when charges were made against the House in its collective character.

The SPEAKER read the rules of the House that applied to the case before them.

Mr. ALSTON said he only rose to notice the observation of his colleague, (Mr. STANLEY,) who supposed he saw the inside of the communication before it was presented. This he denied. He had grounded his motion exclusively on what he had heard read.

Mr. BACON was at a loss to decide on the propriety of reading or not reading these papers. He perceived that they contained not only a complaint, but a high charge against a committee of the House, stating that the major part assumed to act exclusively upon the business assigned to the whole committee, without consulting the other members. This was a high charge. Whether proper, or regularly made, he did not know. It was rather his opinion that the House ought to proceed in reading the papers, and afterwards to pass proper order on them.

The SPEAKER declared the rule for reading imperative, and Mr. ALSTON withdrew his motion; on which the Clerk proceeded in the reading, which was continued for more than an hour.

WEDNESDAY, December 29.

Case of John P. Van Ness.

Mr. DAVIS called up his resolution instructing the Committee of Elections to inquire whether Mr. VAN NESS had not forfeited his seat, by accepting the appointment of Major in the Militia of the Territory of Columbia.

Mr. VAN NESS said that, so far as the decision of the House might affect him personally, he felt little concern; but, so far as it affected him as a representative of an important State, he was not so indifferent. He had no objection whatever to the proposed inquiry being made. As it involved the decision of an important principle, it deserved great attention. He had no doubt of the inquiry being made with that candor and fairness which, in most cases, characterized the proceedings of the House. He was far from imputing any impure motives to the mover or seconder of the resolution. It would be as derogatory to him to impute, as in them to entertain, any views dishonorable or base. He had risen barely to state his wish that an inquiry might be made.

Mr. ELMENDORPH proposed a verbal amendment, which was not agreed to.

The resolution was then adopted without a division.

WEDNESDAY, January 5, 1803.

Cession of Louisiana to France.

Mr. GRISWOLD called up his resolution respecting Louisiana, laid on the table yesterday, as follows:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to direct the proper officer to lay before this House copies of such official documents as have been received by this Government, announcing the cession of Louisiana to France, together with a report explaining the stipulations, circumstances, and conditions, under which that province is to be delivered up: unless such documents and report will, in the opinion of the President, divulge to the House particular transactions not proper at this time to be communicated.

The question was put on taking it into consideration, and carried--yeas 35, nays 32.

Mr. RANDOLPH observed that the discussion on this motion might embrace points nearly connected with the subject referred to a committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and which had been discussed with closed doors. He therefore thought it would be expedient to commit this motion also to the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, to whom had been committed the Message of the President respecting New Orleans.

Mr. GRISWOLD hoped the motion would not prevail. He did not see what argument could be urged in favor of it. The resolution related to a public transaction stated on their journal. He did not think that any thing which ought to be kept secret could be involved in the discussion of it. What is its purport? It only requests the President to furnish documents respecting "the cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the late war," and which the President says "will, if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations, which will doubtless have just weight in any deliberations of the Legislature connected with this subject."

Are not, said Mr. G., these papers important to the House? Does not the President refer to them as important to enlighten us? He speaks of the cession as a fact. He took it for granted the President would not make the declaration unless he had official information of its truth. Ought not the House to be possessed of all the important information in the power of the Executive to give? It certainly ought. Every gentleman would agree that the House ought to have all the information. If the information is confidential, it will be received with closed doors. But the question, whether the House shall obtain this information is a public question; and there was not a man within those walls, or in the United States, who would not say that the Legislature ought to possess every information on a subject so deeply interesting. Why, then, refer this resolution calling for information to a committee? Why postpone it? They had but a short time to sit. More than half the session was already elapsed. Is it not time to gain information? Mr. G. said, he would venture to declare that no subject so important could be brought before the Legislature this session. Ought we not, therefore, on such a subject, to take immediate means to gain information? He hoped the House would not agree to the reference, which could have no effect but to put the resolution asleep, and deprive the Legislature of information they ought to possess.

Mr. RANDOLPH said, as he had expressed his disinclination to discuss a proposition with open doors which would trench on the decision of the House to discuss a subject to which it intimately related with closed doors, it could scarcely be expected that he should indulge the gentleman in entering into arguments calculated to carry him from his purpose. But he denied that the adoption of his motion would be a refusal to give information. He well knew that there was nothing easier than to declare the subject vastly important, and to make an eloquent harangue upon it, and to infer that those who did not immediately agree to the resolution were averse to giving information, and to going into a discussion of the merits of the main subject. It would, however, not be expected that he should enter upon these on a preliminary resolution. But he would assure the gentleman who had submitted this resolution, that, so far from indulging any disposition to be dilatory in his attention to this important subject, he came yesterday prepared to make a motion that the House should go into a Committee of the Whole on the subject, which motion he should have then made but for that offered by the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. RUTLEDGE said that, did he consider that the giving publicity to any information on this subject would in the least interfere with the constitutional functions of the President, he would be the last man to support the resolution of his friend from Connecticut. But he could not conceive that this could be its effect. What were they about to ask? They were about to ask, in respectful terms, the President for information relative to what he states as a fact; so much information as he may think it expedient to give. Surely there would be no impropriety in this. The cession of Louisiana had been stated in all the public prints of Europe and this country, and on the floor of the British Parliament. This cession had been made a year ago, and, notwithstanding the elapse of this time, we have received no official information on this subject. Is it not natural for the people to ask why Congress do not call for this information? Will they not say the President has done his duty in stating the fact? Upon this subject, so very important, are they to be kept in the dark? Mr. R. could not conceive any turn of the debate on this resolution that could produce a discussion of the merits of the Message referred to the Committee of the Whole. If the President shall say the information he gives us ought not to be made public, he would answer for himself, and he believed he could answer for his friends, that they would not seek a public discussion. And if the information is imparted without confidence, the House, if it see fit, can itself control a public discussion. Mr. R. concluded with saying that, in the present case, he was for deciding on the resolution with open doors.

Mr. S. SMITH thought this point ought in a great measure to be determined by the custom of the House in similar cases. He did not assert it as a fact, but, from recollection, he believed it was so, that when a call was made for papers in the case of the British Treaty, the question was referred to a Committee of the Whole, and there fully discussed. According to his recollection, one side of the House called for papers on the principle that, after negotiations were terminated, the House had a right to information before they made a grant of money under a treaty, but acknowledging that a call for such information might be improper during a pending negotiation. He was one of those who thought it proper, on that occasion, that the House should have the papers; but he also thought it improper, and had then so declared, to call for papers during a pending negotiation. Whether in the present instance a negotiation was pending or was not, he did not know. He was, therefore, for postponing the resolution till this was known to the House.

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