Warren Commission (05 of 26): Hearings Vol. V (of 15) (part 4 of 6)

Warren Commission (05 of 26): Hearings Vol. V (of 15) (part 4 of 6)

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 918 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Have you seen that before and can you identify that?

Mr. SNYDER. I do not recall having seen this telegram before; no, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, sir; the next contact that you had with Oswald was by a letter dated November 3, 1959, which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 912, is that correct?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 912 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes--to the best of my knowledge, this was the next thing that I heard of Oswald--the next thing I heard from Oswald.

Mr. COLEMAN. How did the original of Commission Exhibit No. 912 come into your possession?

Mr. SNYDER. I believe it came through the mail.

Mr. COLEMAN. And after you received Commission Exhibit No. 912, what did you do?

Mr. SNYDER. I wrote Mr. Oswald a reply, I believe, the same day.

The CHAIRMAN. Exhibit No. 912 was a request to revoke his application to renounce citizenship, was it not?

Mr. COLEMAN. No, Mr. Chief Justice; Commission Exhibit No. 912 is a letter from Mr. Oswald complaining that the Embassy had not permitted him to renounce.

The CHAIRMAN. I misread it. Yes; that is right. Excuse me.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say you wrote Mr. Oswald a letter the same day?

We have had marked as Commission Exhibit No. 919 a letter from Richard E. Snyder, to Lee Harvey Oswald, dated November 6, 1959.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 919 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I show it to you and ask you is this a copy of the letter which you wrote to Mr. Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman----

Mr. DULLES. Could we have some indication of what that letter is, for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring back to Exhibit No. 912, where I was acting apparently under some misapprehension I read the first three lines and it said "Nov. 3, 1959. I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my present United States citizenship be revoked." Well, that is consistent with what was said.

Representative FORD. I think that is a pretty categorical statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it is.

Representative FORD. He subsequently, in Exhibit No. 912, makes a protest about the fact that he was not accorded that right previously. But I don't see how we could come to any other conclusion but the first three lines are a specific request for the right to revoke his American citizenship.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I had misread that first sentence, and I had asked if it wasn't a revocation of his original request. I was in error when I said that. You are correct, absolutely, on your interpretation of it.

Mr. COLEMAN. As a result of receiving Commission Exhibit No. 912, you wrote Mr. Oswald a letter which has been--a copy of which has been marked and identified as Commission Exhibit No. 919, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Earlier in your testimony, when asked about what a citizen has to do to renounce his citizenship, you referred to section 349(a) (6).

I would like to call your attention to the fact there is also another provision--section 349(a) (2)--which provides that an American citizen shall lose his nationality by "taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof."

Did you consider whether the Oswald letter, marked as Commission Exhibit No. 912, was such an affirmation or other formal declaration?

Mr. SNYDER. There is a considerable body of law, I believe, interpreting this provision of law as to what constitutes an affirmation or other formal declaration. I believe that I was quite aware at the time that a mere statement did not constitute a formal declaration within the meaning of the law.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did----

Mr. DULLES. May I ask one question about Exhibit No. 912?

In the second paragraph of this letter, Exhibit No. 912, Oswald says, "I appered [sic] in person at the consulate office of the United States Embassy, Moscow, on Oct. 31st, for the purpose of signing the formal papers to this effect. This legal right I was refused at that time."

Do you know how he learned about his legal rights? Did you tell him his legal rights in your conversation with him? Or where did he get the information about his legal rights, if you know about that?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Dulles, I did discuss with Oswald both the significance of his act and the legal basis of it, and so forth. And I believe that in the letter which I wrote to him----

Mr. DULLES. Which was subsequent to Exhibit No. 912, was it not, in answer to 912?

Mr. SNYDER. In answer to Exhibit No. 912--in the letter which I wrote, replying to this, I purposely used the word, I think, "again", or words to that effect, and I put that word in there at the time, indicating that he had been told this before, and that I was repeating it to him.

Mr. COLEMAN. You are talking about Commission Exhibit No. 919, the third paragraph, is that correct, where you use the word "again"?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; that is correct.

In other words, at the time Oswald was there, the reason which I gave him for not taking his renunciation at the time was not that he was not legally entitled to have it, but that the office was closed at the time. In matter of fact, I don't think I had a secretary there to type out the form and so forth. But this is really quite beside the point.

But the reason which I gave him was not that I had any legal right to refuse him--that is, it wasn't based on a provision of law, as it was based on simply the fact that the Embassy was closed at the time.

Mr. COLEMAN. You will recall in Commission Exhibit No. 913, which was the first letter that Oswald gave you, that the last paragraph states, "I affirm that my allegiance is to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and once again I take it that you didn't think that that was the type of oath or affirmation which is set forth in section 349(a) (2)?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Snyder, in reference to the same document, Commission Exhibit No. 913, do you think that Mr. Oswald, when he appeared before you and gave this to you, believed in his mind that this was sufficient to renounce his citizenship?

The CHAIRMAN. How could he tell what was in his mind?

Mr. SNYDER. I really don't know.

Mr. SLAWSON. Do you believe that if you had given Mr. Oswald the opportunity to carry through with the procedures, that he would have renounced his citizenship at that first appearance?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I have every reason to believe he would have.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, I also would like to show you a copy of a passport issued by the United States, which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 946, and ask you whether that is the passport that Mr. Oswald gave to you when he came into the Embassy on October 31, 1959.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a preliminary question about Exhibit No. 913?

This is undated. Do we know the date of the receipt of this by the Embassy?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, Mr. Dulles; the testimony is that when Mr. Oswald came into the Embassy, sir, he handed this document to Mr. Snyder.

Mr. DULLES. That is the first time he came in, he handed this document to you?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

This is undoubtedly his passport; yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you received Commission Exhibit No. 919, which is the second letter from Oswald, the letter dated November 3, 1959, you then prepared and sent to the Secretary of State in Washington an airgram which the Commission has had marked as Commission Exhibit No. 920.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 920 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you the document and ask you whether you prepared the original thereof and sent it to the State Department?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question here?

When Oswald first came in, and either placed his passport on the desk or the table, or you asked for it, did you note that he had overstayed his visa by 5 days?

Mr. SNYDER. I can't recall that I did or did not, Mr. Ford.

Representative FORD. Is that something that you would normally examine and determine under circumstances like this?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, I might if there were some reason to look at it--if it were particularly relevant to something I was thinking at the time or asking about at the time.

In terms of Soviet practice, it is not really too relevant. That is, if the Soviet authorities find it to their interest to keep a person around, then there is no problem. And if they do not, one does not overstay one's visa in the Soviet Union.

Representative FORD. But if it is, for some Soviet reason, a good reason to keep somebody around beyond the time of their visa, wouldn't that be of some interest to us--I mean to the United States officials?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; but, of course, that assumption was already strongly made in the Oswald case by other circumstances in this case. There was no question in my mind that Mr. Oswald was there in Moscow for the purposes for which he stated he was in Moscow, and that this was known to the Soviet authorities, for he said he had applied for Soviet citizenship.

Representative FORD. Is it the usual thing for them to let an individual stay beyond their visa termination date?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, I would say it is not usual. Again, one can never cite a list of specific instances in these things, but I think that when you are working as a consul in Moscow for a couple of years, you have a considerable feel for these things, and that I would say it is not usual--people simply do not overstay their visas in the Soviet Union without the knowledge, by and large, of the Soviet authorities.

And this is because of the nature of the passport registration system at your hotel, and all of this sort of thing. It simply is not normally done by oversight or by lapse either on the part of the individual or on the part of the Soviet State.

Representative FORD. When he presented the passport, or when you were given the passport by him, did you examine it?

Mr. SNYDER. I undoubtedly examined it.

Representative FORD. Where in the passport would this fact be noted that he had overstayed his visa by 5 days?

(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

Mr. SNYDER. It may either be on the original visa or on the police stamp placed in his passport at the time. This is to the best of my recollection.

Mr. COLEMAN. Congressman Ford, as I understand it, one of the stamps in the passport, which would be in Russian, indicates the visa that he got in Helsinki, and also indicates the length of time he was permitted to stay.

Representative FORD. So it is clearly a Soviet document in the passport?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Mr. SNYDER. I could probably find these for you, if you would like.

Representative FORD. When Oswald came in, did you notice anything peculiar about his physical appearance--any bruises, any injuries of any kind?

Mr. SNYDER. No, no; as I said--you may not have been here, Mr. Ford, at the time I made my original comments on his appearance.

He was very neatly dressed, very well composed, and to all outward appearances a respectable-looking young man.

Representative FORD. I was there then, and I was interested because I think we have testimony to the effect, or we have documentation to the effect, that he had tried to commit suicide prior to his coming to the American Embassy for the purpose of renouncing his citizenship. In other words, he had cut his wrist and had been in a Soviet hospital or medical facility. And I was wondering whether you had noticed that.

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir; I did not.

Representative FORD. You did not.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, on November 2 you sent forward Commission Exhibit No. 908, which is the Foreign Service dispatch. You had also sent forth 2 days earlier a telegram advising them about Oswald.

And on November 12 you had sent forth Commission Exhibit No. 920. Now, according to the files that we have, except for Commission Exhibit No. 916, which is the telegram asking where the dispatch was, we have no other communication during this period from the Department to the Embassy giving you advice on what to do in the Oswald case.

Was there any messages that went back to the Embassy, other than Commission Exhibit No. 916, during that period?

Mr. SNYDER. I can't really say, Mr. Coleman, that I have personal recollection. But I have no reason to believe that there was anything else came in, other than what is now in our files.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, would you expect to get some answers to those dispatches that you were sending forward to Washington?

Mr. SNYDER. Not really--not really. The thrust of information in something like this is from the field to the Department. The Department really answered the only thing which I asked them. That is, I told the Department what I intended to do concerning his request for renunciation, and the Department responded to that. And this was really all I would have expected from them at the time.

I would have expected--if the Department had had any information concerning Oswald in its files--I would have expected them to let me know if they had indication, for instance, that Oswald was mentally unbalanced or emotionally unstable or anything else of this sort, anything which might look like a repeat of the Petrulli pattern, I would have expected them to let me know this, so I would know how to handle the case.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, 3 days before Mr. Oswald came into the Embassy, did you have occasion to write a letter to Mr. Boster in Washington, asking him how you should handle these matters of attempted renunciation of American citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. Well----

Mr. DULLES. Is this the first time he came into the Embassy?

Mr. COLEMAN. This is 3 days before he came.

Mr. DULLES. The first time?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SNYDER. I recall writing. I think probably the letter you have in mind--

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you Commission Exhibit No. 914 which is a letter dated October 28, 1959, from Mr. Snyder to Mr. Boster, and ask you whether that is a letter you sent.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 914 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that a copy of the letter that you sent to Mr. Boster?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Doesn't that letter, at the bottom, indicate that you were attempting to get advice on how to handle an attempted renunciation of American citizenship? At the bottom of the first page.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; this is a letter which I wrote to Gene Boster. This letter, I might add, did not refer to any particular case, but was a letter in which I had put down ideas which had been circulating in my mind for some time, based on my initial handling of cases in Moscow. And it was by way of putting down, as I say, some general ideas on the subject, and asking Gene what the Department felt about this general area of notions. It wasn't directed at any particular case.

Representative FORD. Do you feel that the regulations then, as well as now, and the law as well, are archaic in this regard?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, no; it is simply that--not the law, and certainly not the regulations--and certainly not the law, can ever take the place of the judgment of the officer on the spot.

Mr. DULLES. Was this motivated by the Petrulli case?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't think it was. The Petrulli case was a clear-cut case, there was no problem with the Petrulli case, legal or otherwise.

It was motivated, as best I can recall, by my experience with a few other cases. Well, let's say--let's go back a little bit further, in a more general vein. The kind of people, the kind of Americans, and I suppose not only Americans but Frenchmen, Englishmen, and otherwise, who occasionally drift into the Soviet Union and state that they want to roll up their sleeves and go to work for socialism for the rest of their lives, or something of this sort, are usually quite a peculiar kind of person.

In the first place, they are rarely Marxists in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, they don't really know what it is all about. They probably don't know two words about Marxist theories, or Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, or anything else. Even less do they know anything about the country that they have chosen to spend their lives in, theoretically.

Almost universally they have never been to the country before. They speak no Russian. And they are rebounding from something--in some cases, such as the Petrulli case, the man is simply incompetent. In other cases, as in the Webster case, he appears to have been fleeing from his wife and the general responsibilities of his prior position, and finding that he could not escape from them in the Soviet Union either.

In the case of Oswald, a man who, for one reason or another, seemed to have been uncomfortable in his own society, unable to accommodate himself to it, and hoping he will make out better some place else.

At any rate, almost universally, the pattern is of a person who is not acting out of any ideological grounds. He simply doesn't--and I think this is essentially true probably of Oswald--this was my feeling in speaking with him--that Oswald really knew nothing about Marxism and Leninism, that he professed to be modeling his life after.

Mr. DULLES. Isn't it possible, though, from this discussion--maybe this should be asked to your legal adviser--that our procedure under law about renunciation may be in conflict with general international law, because if he comes into the country with an American passport, as an American citizen, I gather under ordinary international law we have to take him back. We are responsible for him. And no renunciation he makes changes that, as the Petrulli case shows.

Now, in the Petrulli case you had a situation where he was incompetent, and you could throw the thing out on the ground he didn't know what he was doing. But in these other cases, maybe you can't.

Mr. SNYDER. Well, in the specific instance and circumstances of the Soviet Union, you obviously have a major problem, there is a major state problem.

Mr. DULLES. That might arise in other cases. Isn't that true in any case--If an American citizen arrives with an American passport, the country where he arrives doesn't have to keep him, does it? Isn't it our responsibility to take him back?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, this is a point----

Mr. DULLES. That is a question of law.

Mr. SNYDER. This is a question of law which I really cannot answer.

And where we have an extradition treaty, I think there is no great problem, perhaps, or at least the problem is somewhat different from where we do not have an extradition treaty, as in the case of the Soviet Union.

And I just don't know whether we are in the last analysis required to take back a person who is no longer one of our citizens, and under circumstances where we do not have an extradition treaty with the nation, where that person now resides.

Representative FORD. Do we have an extradition treaty with the Soviet Union?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Well, we did not at that time, and I don't think we have subsequently. But we did not at that time.

Representative FORD. Do the legal advisers to the Department know whether we have an extradition treaty now?

Mr. CHAYES. We do not have an extradition treaty with the Soviet Union.

The only bilateral treaty we have with the Soviet Union, the Senate has not yet given advice and consent--but the only bilateral agreement is the consular agreement.

But so long as I am on the record here, I don't see how the extradition treaty has any bearing at all on the requirement of taking back a former American citizen who may get into trouble in the other country. That would be a matter governed by general principles of international law, and also one's own humanitarian outlook on the particular circumstance, rather than--or there could be treaty provisions perhaps, commerce and navigation, that might bear on it. But in the usual case, I think not.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question here? It might save time.

Is there any statutory--any statute bearing on this question of renunciation?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper, we just went through that, and it has been put in evidence here, and the statute has been read and it is very simple. All he has to do is go there and renounce before a consul or State officer to satisfy the regulations and requirements of the State Department, and he is out.

Isn't that correct, generally speaking?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Is there any other statute bearing upon the effect of that renunciation with respect to any application or petition he might make later to renew his citizenship in the United States? Is there any?

Mr. COLEMAN. I would assume, sir, if he has made a valid renunciation, he is then just like any other non-American that wants to come into the United States. He has to go through one of the immigration quotas.

Mr. SNYDER. He must get an immigration visa.

Senator COOPER. I remember during the war and after the war we had problems with persons who had become naturalized citizens, and were returned to their countries, and in effect renounced their citizenship in various ways. As I remember, under certain circumstances they could renew their citizenship with the United States. But, as I understand it, there is no provision of law respecting a citizen of the United States who actually renounces his citizenship.

Mr. CHAYES. The issues in all those cases, I believe, were whether the purported expatriating act was actually an expatriating act. Whether they had voted voluntarily or served in a foreign army voluntarily, or something like that.

Senator COOPER. All this matter, the legal side of it, will be put into the record?

Mr. COLEMAN. At 2 o'clock, sir.

Now, Mr. Snyder, after you wrote that letter to Mr. Boster, which is Commission Exhibit No. 914, you received a reply to your letter which was signed by Nathaniel Davis, acting officer in charge, Soviet affairs, dated December 10, 1959, which has been marked Commission Exhibit No. 915.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 915 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, also on December 1, 1959, you sent an airgram to the State Department indicating that you had been informed that Oswald had left the hotel at which he had been staying in Moscow, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you a document which has been identified as Commission Exhibit No. 921, and ask you whether that is a copy of the airgram you sent forward to the Department.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 921 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. In Exhibit No. 921, you stated that you felt that he had not carried through with his original intent to renounce American citizenship in order to leave a crack open. Now, what information did you have which led you to put that in the airgram?

Mr. SNYDER. I am not sure whether this was my statement or----

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, would you look at that, sir?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; this was the statement of the correspondent. The correspondent states that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Oh, you were informing the Department that the correspondent told you that she felt that Oswald may have been leaving a crack open?

Mr. SNYDER. That is right. This crack part here is part of the sentence "correspondent states."

Mr. COLEMAN. Who was the correspondent?

Mr. SNYDER. This was Priscilla Johnson.

Mr. COLEMAN. And I take it you were the one that prepared Commission Exhibit No. 921?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. You also state that no known Soviet publicity on case. I take it you meant by that there had been no mentioning in the Soviet press about Oswald.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Are you saying from the time he came into your Embassy office until the time you wrote that airgram, that there was nothing in the Soviet press about Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that usual in these cases, where Americans attempt to renounce their citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. I think if there is a usual pattern--and, again, this is difficult to use words like "usual" because there are never two cases alike in this sort of thing--but if there is a usual pattern, it is that there is some exploitation of the defector in Soviet public media, usually after the details of his defection have been settled, particularly the detail as to whether the Soviet Union desires to have him.

Up to that point, publicity in the Soviet press probably is not to be expected.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you sent the airgram dated December 1, 1959, to the Department of State, which is Commission Exhibit No. 921, you didn't have any more contact with Oswald until some time in February 1961, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. In the meantime, however, there was correspondence between the Embassy in Moscow and the State Department, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did----

Mr. SNYDER. Well, let me see.

Mr. COLEMAN. I will mark----

Mr. SNYDER. I guess there was. There was one or more welfare and whereabouts inquiries concerning him from his mother, which I think was the bulk, if not all, of the correspondence which we were engaged in between those two periods.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, one such memorandum which went from the State Department to Moscow was a memorandum dated March 21, 1960, which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 922, which indicates that Representative Wright of Texas had made inquiry with respect to the whereabouts of Oswald.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 922 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And attached to the operations memorandum which was marked as Commission Exhibit No. 922 is the letter sent to Congressman Wright, which has been marked as Exhibit 923.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 923 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. And also a letter sent to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 924.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 924 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. In reply to Commission Exhibit No. 922, you prepared and sent to the Department of State an operations memorandum under date of March 28, 1960, which we have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 927.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 927 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. In Commission Exhibit No. 927, you make the statement that the Embassy has no evidence that Oswald has expatriated himself other than his announced intention to do so "and the Embassy is, therefore, technically in a position to institute an inquiry concerning his whereabouts through a note to the Foreign Office."

Do you recall that statement in the operations memorandum?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Was it your thought, then, that based upon all the documents you had and what transpired on October 31, 1959, and the subsequent letter that Oswald sent, that in your judgment he had not renounced his American citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. The statement which I made in that letter--to be quite accurate, as to its content--was made not for the--that is, the statement wasn't directing itself to the question has Oswald lost his citizenship or not, but rather to the question would we have the right in Soviet eyes to ask about the whereabouts of this man. The Soviet authorities took a very strict line that no foreign government had the right to inquire about any resident of the Soviet Union unless he was their citizen. So that my statement was merely--was meant there to support my conclusion that the Embassy, as far as we could see, would have the right in Soviet eyes to ask about the whereabouts of Oswald--because we had no reason to believe he was not our citizen, and, therefore, we had a perfect right to ask about where he might be.

Representative FORD. In other words, in your own mind, at that point, he had not renounced his citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. There is no question he had not renounced his citizenship; yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. You considered that he was still an American citizen as of March 28----

Mr. SNYDER. No evidence to the contrary.

Mr. DULLES. That is, he hadn't taken the procedures required under the law to renounce his citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. He had not renounced his citizenship, and there was no evidence that he had acquired Soviet citizenship. These were the two things under which I think he could possibly have lost his citizenship at that time.

So, for lack of evidence to the contrary, he was an American citizen.

Mr. COLEMAN. On April 5, 1960--you received an operations memorandum from the Department of State, dated March 28, 1960, which we have had marked as Commission Exhibit No. 929. Do you recall receiving that?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 929 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. The second paragraph of that memorandum indicates that a lookout card or file has been opened or prepared.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. What does that mean?

Mr. SNYDER. Never having worked in this end of the Department of State, I can say only what it would mean in general terms--when one says a lookout card has been prepared, it means that an entry has been made in the file in such fashion that should someone look in the file for--under this name or this category, that there would be--that their attention would be flagged by this entry, and their attention would be called to the fact that there is something that they ought to look into. In other words, it is kind of a red flag placed--perhaps red flag is not the word to use here--but it is a flag placed in the file to attract the attention of anyone looking in the file under that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then on May 10, 1960, and again on June 22, 1960, you received two operations memorandums from the State Department making inquiries with respect to Mr. Oswald. Can you identify those?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. You remember receiving those?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. The operations memorandum dated May 10, 1960, was given Commission Exhibit No. 928, and the operations memorandum dated June 22, 1960, has been given Commission Exhibit No. 925.

(The documents referred to were marked Commission Exhibits Nos. 925 and 928, respectively, for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. In response to those two operations memorandums, you, then, on July 6, 1960, sent forth an operations memorandum which has been given Commission Exhibit No. 926, which states that until you get other instructions, you are not going to make any further inquiry or do anything further in connection with Oswald, is that correct?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 926 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then, sir, on February 1, 1961, you received a Department of State instruction which was marked as Commission Exhibit No. 930, which requested the Embassy to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Mr. Oswald's mother was worried about his personal safety, and was anxious to hear from him.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 930 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you ever make such an inquiry of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Mr. SNYDER. No, I think I did not.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you know just when that Department instruction reached the Embassy in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. The date should be stamped on the document.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, on the copy we have, sir, there is no date. I take it you have no independent recollection?

Mr. SNYDER. No; it should have been within a week, though.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it, though, you would say that Commission Exhibit No. 930 went by diplomatic pouch.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. This didn't go by cable?

Mr. SNYDER. No, that is not a telegraphic form.

Mr. COLEMAN. On February 13, 1961, you received a letter from Mr. Oswald, did you not?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you a copy of a letter which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 931, and I ask you whether that is a copy of a letter you received from Mr. Oswald.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 931 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, it would be helpful, I think, if we would pass these around, or if copies would be available to us at the time. Otherwise--at least I am not able to know what is transpiring between the counsel and the witness.

Are there extra copies of these we could have to examine as the exhibit is submitted to the witness?

Mr. SLAWSON. We could have them made up, Mr. Ford. I don't think there are any extra ones right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose before you pass it to the witness you pass it to me, and I will pass it to Congressman Ford, and then over to Commissioner Dulles.

Mr. SNYDER. This letter is presumably the reason why no action was taken on the previous operations memorandum. It was overtaken, presumably, by Oswald's letter.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you indicate for the record what Oswald said in his letter which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 931?

Mr. SNYDER. Perhaps I might just read the letter into the record.

The letter is dated February, no date.

"Dear sirs"----

Mr. DULLES. What year?

Mr. SNYDER. 1961.

"Since I have not received a reply to my letter of December 1960, I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport.

"I desire to return to the United States, that is if we could come to some agreement concernig [sic] the dropping of any legal proceedings against me. If so, then I would be free to ask the Russian authorities to allow me to leave. If I could show them my American passport, I am of the opinion they would give me an exit visa.

"They have at no time insisted that I take Russian citizenship. I am living here with non-permanent type papers for a foreigner.

"I cannot leave Minsk without permission, therefore I am writing rather than calling in person.

"I hope that in recalling the responsibility I have to America that you remember your's in doing everything you can to help me since I am an American citizen.

"Sincerely Lee Harvey Oswald."

Mr. DULLES. That is addressed to the American Embassy in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. It is simply "Dear sirs:" As near as I can recall, it came by mail, through the Soviet mail, addressed to the Embassy.

Mr. COLEMAN. Had you received a letter from Mr. Oswald at a date of December 1960, the way he mentioned in the first paragraph of his letter?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir; we did not.

Mr. COLEMAN. This is the first letter you received?

Mr. SNYDER. This is the first communication since he left Moscow.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would next like to mark as Commission Exhibit No. 933 the reply which you made to Mr. Oswald, which is dated February 28, 1961.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 933 for identification.)

Mr. DULLES. When you say since he left Moscow, that was in----

Mr. SNYDER. November 1959, sir.

Mr. DULLES. November 1959?

Mr. SNYDER. This is what we presume was the date.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Dulles, we have other evidence that he didn't leave until January 7, 1960.

Mr. DULLES. The last the Embassy heard from him was in November 1959?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. You have been shown Commission Exhibit No. 933. Is that a copy of a letter which you sent to Mr. Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. At the same time did you inform the State Department that you had received a letter from Mr. Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. I presume that I did.

Mr. COLEMAN. I have had marked as Commission Exhibit No. 932 a Foreign Service Despatch under date of February 28, 1961, from the Embassy in Moscow to the State Department in Washington. I would like to ask you whether this is the despatch which you sent forth to the Department.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 932 for identification.)

Representative FORD. Do the records show the date that the letter from Oswald was written--yes; February 5--and received February 13. This communication is dated February 28. Is that a long or a short time in communicating with Washington?

Mr. SNYDER. I would say it is a long time.

Representative FORD. Is there any explanation why it is a long time?

Mr. SNYDER. The only thing I could think of is simply that Moscow is a very busy office, and Mr. Oswald's case was no longer the top of my docket.

Representative FORD. Had there been any communication with the State Department in Washington concerning the inquiries of the mother, other than this?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't know, Mr. Ford. The only knowledge I had at the time of inquiries is what I was informed of by the Department. I presume that they informed me of all inquiries--since they could hardly act upon them themselves.

Representative FORD. What is the date of the last inquiry by the mother as to Oswald's----

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, I think the record will show that on January 26, 1961, the mother came to the State Department and as a result of that visit, that inquiry of February 1, 1961, went forward, making the inquiry. It has already been put in as an exhibit.

Representative FORD. This is the trouble not keeping copies available. It is a little difficult to follow the sequence.

Mr. COLEMAN. It is Commission Exhibit No. 930.

Representative FORD. This document, Commission Exhibit No. 930, shows what, as far as you are concerned, Mr. Snyder?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, it shows an interest by Oswald's mother in his whereabouts.

Representative FORD. As of what date, and where?

Mr. SNYDER. It says that Mrs. Oswald called at the Department of State on January 26, 1961; she personally called at the Department to inquire about her son.

Representative FORD. And that was communicated to the Embassy in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. When was it received in the Embassy in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, this doesn't show the date of receipt, but it was sent on February 1, and was received within a week of that time.

Representative FORD. And according to the records, the letter written by Oswald on February 5, 1961, which was received--was received February 13, 1961.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Representative FORD. And this document, Commission Exhibit No. 933, shows a reply was given February 28, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Does that mean it took 8 days to go from Minsk to Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Isn't that an unusually long time?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, not too much of that time is transit time.

Mr. DULLES. That is what I was getting at.

Representative FORD. It also shows it took 15 days to get out of the American Embassy.

Mr. SNYDER. You must remember that in my eyes, as the officer on the spot, Mr. Oswald had no claim to prior action from the Embassy among other cases. And although the consular officer attempts to be as impersonal as he can about these things, in matter of fact it is very difficult to be entirely impersonal.

Mr. Oswald had no claim to any unusual attentions of mine, I must say.

I think that the letter from Oswald from the Metropole Hotel to the Embassy took something like 3 days or 4 days.

Representative FORD. What does that mean to you? Does that mean that his correspondence was intercepted?

Mr. SNYDER. There was no question about that, Mr. Ford?

Representative FORD. Intercepted by Soviet authorities?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; this has been known for years.

Representative FORD. Common practice?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; every embassy there knows the system, and operates within it. All mail from or to a foreign embassy in Moscow goes to a separate section of the Moscow Post Office, called the international section, and this is the screening office for all mail to and from any embassy.

Representative FORD. As far as you know, is that still the process today?

Mr. SNYDER. I am sure it is, sir. The essentials of the Soviet State haven't changed.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a few questions?

I have been examining these exhibits which have been introduced. The first one I have looked at is Exhibit No. 908, which refers to Lee Harvey Oswald's call at the Embassy and your interview with him.

Mr. DULLES. Is that from Moscow to Washington, the State Department?

Senator COOPER. Yes; it is your interview with Oswald.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator COOPER. In this he states that he applied for a Soviet tourist visa in Helsinki on October 14. He applied for citizenship by letter to the Supreme Soviet on October 16, in Moscow. And your report to the State Department said that he appeared at the Embassy on October 31, and presented his request for renunciation in writing.

I assume that you have had other cases of this kind, have you not?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, particularly the Petrulli case, yes; a few weeks earlier.

Senator COOPER. Would it be normal in your judgment that this period of time, from the time he applied to the Soviet for citizenship, the Supreme Soviet, which was on October 16, as he said, it would not be acted upon in 2 weeks?

Mr. SNYDER. I would think it would be highly unusual if it were acted upon in 2 weeks; yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Did others talk to him in the Embassy beside you?

Mr. SNYDER. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Senator COOPER. Did you know whether or not newspaper people, American newspaper people were talking to him?

Mr. SNYDER. I know that Priscilla Johnson talked to him. Whether others got to him, I don't know. He wasn't terribly communicative.

Senator COOPER. Did she tell you she talked to him?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes.

Senator COOPER. But you do not know whether or not other members of the Embassy staff talked to him?

Mr. SNYDER. I have no reason to believe that anyone else talked to him, other than myself, Senator Cooper. That is, at this time. I mean at a later time, Mr. McVickar, I presume, talked to Oswald. He talked to his wife, I am quite sure. I presume that Oswald was with her. But up until the time that I left Moscow, Oswald was my baby, and I don't think anyone else talked to him in the Embassy.

Mr. DULLES. Were there other cases, other than the Petrulli and the Oswald case, where Americans attempted to or did renounce their citizenship while you were in Moscow in this period?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. To whom were you directly responsible in the Embassy?

Mr. SNYDER. My immediate superior was Mr. Freers, Edward Freers, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission.

Senator COOPER. Was he informed about this case?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Who was the American ambassador at that time?

Mr. SNYDER. Ambassador Thompson.

Senator COOPER. Did he know about it?

Mr. SNYDER. I presume he did. Ambassador Thompson knew everything that went on in his shop. If through no other means, both the Ambassador and the DCM, the Deputy Chief of Mission, read the correspondence coming in and out, and this is their basic line of information.

Senator COOPER. In your report, Commission Exhibit No. 908, you stated that he knew the provisions of U.S. law on loss of citizenship, and declined to have them reviewed by the interviewing officer. Is that correct? He said he knew how he could renounce his citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I attempted to explain to him at the time the seriousness of his move, the meaning of it, the irrevocability of it and the section of law applying. He was quite curt in his manner, and apparently among other things, declined to have me read the law to him.

Senator COOPER. Exhibit No. 920 refers to the letter received by the Embassy from Lee Oswald, who was residing in the Metropole Hotel. It does show that it was dated November 3, and received, according to this, on November 12, no, date sent November 7.

This could be a speculation. It appears to me, though, it is a very well written letter. "I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my present United States citizenship be revoked. I appered [sic] in person, at the consulate office of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, on Oct. 31st for the purpose of signing the formal papers to this effect. This legal right I was refused at that time. I wish to protest against this action and against the conduct of the official of the United States consular service who acted on behalf of the United States Government. My application requesting that I be considered for citizenship in the Soviet Union is now pending before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. In the event of acceptance, I will request my government to lodge a formal protest regarding this incident."

Signed "Lee Harvey Oswald."

I would assume that the last sentence referred to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. From your examination and interview with Lee Harvey Oswald, your talks with him, does that letter appear to be one which he had the capacity to write in that language and form?

Mr. SNYDER. That is a difficult thing to speculate on, Senator Cooper. I would say this----

Senator COOPER. It is a very good letter.

Mr. SNYDER. At first blush, I would not say that it was beyond his capacity. He did strike me as an intelligent man. He was certainly very articulate. Actually still a boy, I suppose, in a sense--he was 20 at the time I saw him. He was a very articulate person, and quite intelligent. I don't think from what I saw of him that the letter is beyond his capacity to have written.

There is also an element of it which is very much Oswaldish, and that is the last paragraph, the rather strident tones of it. One finds this in his other correspondence with the Embassy, and in the tone which he took when he first spoke with me--extremely strident tone. It is almost comical in a sense, this last paragraph, in its pomposity, its sonorousness. I am quite prepared to believe that the last part at least is Oswald's.

Senator COOPER. One other question.

In your report you noted that he had made statements about the United States, derogatory statements.

Did he ever direct his statements toward any individual in the United States, any official?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I have no recollection that he directed his statements against anyone, Senator Cooper. I think that if he had, I would likely have reported this matter. As a matter of fact, on the general subject of the molding of his attitudes, he was not very communicative.

Mr. DULLES. Was he technically correct there in his statement--I believe he said that his application was pending before the Supreme Soviet. Is that technically correct?

Mr. SNYDER. That is technically correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, Mr. Snyder, on March 24, 1961, you sent a Foreign Service Despatch to the Department indicating that you had received a second letter from Mr. Oswald on March 20, 1961, and you said that the letter was postmarked Minsk, March 5, and Moscow March 17. I would like to show you a Commission document which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 940, and ask you whether that is a copy of the Foreign Service Despatch which you sent forth to the Department.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 940 for identification.)

Mr. DULLES. Could this be very briefly summarized for the record while it is being read?

Mr. COLEMAN. In this despatch, he sets forth the letter which Mr. Oswald sent, which basically said that it would be hard for him to get to the Embassy in Moscow, and why can't they send the papers to Minsk?

Mr. DULLES. These are the papers about his return?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, papers that he would have to fill out to see if he was entitled to get his passport back.

Would the witness identify the despatch? Is that the one you sent?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; it is.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it that the first answer you got from the Department to your despatch of February 28, 1961, which is marked as Commission Exhibit No. 932, indicating the first letter you received from Oswald, and then the second despatch marked Commission Exhibit No. 940, was a State Department instruction dated April 13, 1961, which was marked as Commission Exhibit No. 934.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 934 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that the despatch which you received?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. And then again on May 26, 1961, you sent another despatch to the State Department indicating that you received another letter from Oswald, and stating that you thought you would return to Oswald his passport, and that has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 936.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 936 for identification.)

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I note a reference in the margin here, in Commission Exhibit No. 934.

Do you know whose handwriting that is in, Mr. Snyder?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir; that is my handwriting.

Mr. DULLES. What does that say?

Mr. SNYDER. It says, "May be necessary give him before he can arrange depart."

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, Mr. Snyder, on or about July 10 or 11, 1961, Mr. Oswald physically appeared at the American Embassy again, did he not?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I saw him once more--I believe once more--possibly twice.

Mr. COLEMAN. Actually he came in on a Saturday, did he not, which was July 8, and then you saw him again on the following Monday, isn't that correct? Didn't you actually see him twice during that period?

Mr. SNYDER. I think that I must have. As I say, I think I must have, because of my review of the record at the time indicates that I think I saw him on the 8th, and the application was taken on the 10th, which means, I presumably saw him twice.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall when he came into the Embassy on the 8th and what he said, and what you did?

Mr. SNYDER. No; in fact, I have no recollection of his having come in at that time, Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. In the course of these two interviews on the 8th and on the 10th, he actually filled out an application for renewal of his passport, did he not?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you handled that application? That is correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I next have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 938, a six page document which purports to be an application for renewal of passport, together with a questionnaire which was attached thereto, and ask you whether that is a copy of the application for renewal which you filled out at that time.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 938 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. With reference to his visit on the 8th, it is possible that he telephoned. Again, I don't know quite what our record shows on that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, to help you refresh your recollection, sir, there has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 935 a Foreign Service Despatch dated July 11, 1961, in which you described the meeting with Oswald. Perhaps you would want to be reading that.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 935 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. This is the interview which I thought I had on the 10th.

Representative FORD. What does it mean in this questionnaire [Commission Exhibit No. 938] where Oswald says, and I quote, "I recived [sic] a document for residence in the U.S.S.R. but I am described as being 'Without Citizenship'"?

Mr. SNYDER. This undoubtedly refers to his so-called internal Soviet passport, Mr. Ford. Every Soviet citizen living in urban areas, and also in the border areas, bears an internal passport which identifies him, has certain other information about him, and bears a notation of nationality. There are, as I recall, three varieties of this. One is for Soviet citizens, one is for citizens of foreign countries, I believe, and another is for stateless persons.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the last category?

Mr. SNYDER. Stateless persons. My mind is not clear at this stage as to whether the passports for foreigners and stateless persons is the same or not. I don't quite recall. At any rate, there is an entry in there which asks to state his nationality. No, it is a separate passport. As I recall the title of it, it is called--it is a separate passport.

Mr. DULLES. Did the Soviet Union ever indicate to the Embassy, as far as you know, that they considered Oswald as stateless, or is that Oswald's own statement?

Mr. SNYDER. The only indication is the internal passport which he had, which was made out by local officials, and which may have been based upon a statement that Oswald himself made to them. He may have regarded himself as being stateless, I don't know, at the time he applied for that document.

Mr. DULLES. And that did not necessarily require, as far as you know, reference to Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Mr. DULLES. You think the local authorities could have done that on their own, and on the information they got from Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; the term "stateless," I might interject here, is used rather loosely by Soviet authorities, because, in the first place, they have clearly no authority and no basis upon which to determine whether a person is a citizen of a foreign state. I mean only the foreign state can determine that.

So that the Soviet authorities had no basis on which to determine whether Oswald was or was not a citizen of the United States or of six other countries.

Mr. DULLES. Except the fact that they had seen his passport and knew of the existence of his American passport.

Mr. SNYDER. On that basis, they would--well, he was certainly an American citizen when he entered as far as they were concerned; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Is a person who is stateless the same as a person who is "without citizenship"?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir; this distinction is only in translation, Mr. Ford.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, in the passport application, at the bottom there is a place where you have to cross out "have" or "have not" in connection with four questions. Could you read into the record the printed part at the bottom of the application?

Mr. DULLES. Would you just clarify for us what application this is?

Mr. COLEMAN. This is the application for the passport renewal which Oswald signed----

Mr. DULLES. For the American passport to return to the United States?

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, this is a renewal of the passport.

Mr. DULLES. A renewal of the passport to return to the United States?

Mr. SNYDER. It says, "I have--have not--been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in, the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted, served in, or performed the duties of, any office, post or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality, either in the United States or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military, air or naval service of the United States in time of war, or of committing any act of treason against or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States; or departed from or remained outside the jurisdiction of the United States for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air or naval forces of the United States.

"If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions are applicable to the applicant's case, or to the case of any other person included in this application, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof."

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, as I read the application, what you did was to cross out the "have not" which means that Oswald was stating that he had done one of those acts which you have read, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. This is what it would mean.

Mr. COLEMAN. Which one of the various acts that you have read was it your impression that Oswald was admitting that he had done?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, there are two possibilities here. One possibility is that the crossing out of "have not" is a clerical error, and that he did not intend to do this.

Mr. COLEMAN. How could that be a possibility. Don't you pretty much negate that possibility by the fact that you did require him to fill out the questionnaire which only has to be filled out if he admits that he has done one of the various acts?

Mr. SNYDER. No; the questionnaire is filled out routinely in Moscow in any kind of problem case.

Mr. COLEMAN. Even though the citizen has done none of the acts which are set forth in the passport renewal application?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; well, I say in a problem case. I don't mean an American tourist coming in to get his passport renewed, on whom there is no presumption of any problem at all. But a person who has resided in the Soviet Union----

Mr. COLEMAN. Is it your testimony this is only a typographical error?

Mr. SNYDER. This is one possibility. The other possibility is that he may have said, "I have taken an oath or made an affirmation or formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state."

He had, on several occasions, you know, stated that his allegiance was to the Soviet Union.

He may have put this down--that is, he may have said "have", having that act in mind, knowing that I knew it, and that there was no need to attempt to hide the fact. This is possible.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall just what you had in mind on July 10 when he gave you that application filled out in the manner it was?

Mr. SNYDER. I am sorry, I don't think I understand the question.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then I will withdraw it and rephrase it. Do you now recall what reaction you had in mind when you received the application which had been crossed out in such a way that indicated that he was admitting that he had done one of the various acts which are set forth on the form?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't. Of course what I would have been concerned with at the time in more detail really is the questionnaire, which is an expansion of this paragraph, and is much more meaningful. So I would have been concerned both with what he said on the questionnaire and with the facts of his case--whether he thought he committed one of these acts is not material to the fact of whether he had committed it or whether he lost his citizenship thereby.

At any rate, my attention would have been directed to the expanded questionnaire in which he had to fill out individual paragraphs concerning each one of these things, and to a determination of the facts in the case.

Mr. DULLES. Do you recall whether or not that striking out was noted at the time the passport application or extension was considered?

Mr. SNYDER. I do not, Mr. Dulles; no.

Representative FORD. Did you have his file out and looking at it, reading it, studying at the time he was there and this came up?

Mr. SNYDER. I presume I did, Mr. Ford, but--I am sure his file was there. But in any event, I was the officer handling his case. Having written virtually everything in the file from the outgoing point of view, I was very well familiar with it.

Mr. COLEMAN. In any event, having received the questionnaire and the application, you determined that Mr. Oswald was entitled to an American passport, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you sent forward the application and the questionnaire in the Foreign Service Despatch of July 11, 1961, which has been marked Exhibit No. 935, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And your recommendation was that the passport should issue--the passport office should issue a new passport, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. I would issue the passport; yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And also on the same day, at the end of the interview on July 10, 1961, you returned to Mr. Oswald the American passport which he had given you in 1959. Is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Didn't you stamp that passport before you returned it to him? I show you Commission Exhibit No. 946 and ask you would you indicate to the Commission----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question before the witness answers this question? Was that application and questionnaire considered in the State Department before the passport was issued, or was the passport issued on general instructions before they received this application?

Mr. SNYDER. I will have to correct a word we used before. It is renewal, and not issuance.

His passport was good for another 2 years if we renewed, and he was applying for renewal of his passport, not issuance of a new one.

In either event, the issuance or renewal would have been done by the Embassy, by me.

Mr. COLEMAN. The problem, Mr. Dulles, is the existing passport he had, by its term, would expire September 1961, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you felt he would not be able to get out of the Soviet Union prior to September 1961, and therefore his existing passport would have to be renewed?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't recall offhand what the purpose of renewing the passport at that time was. There was no prospect of his leaving the Soviet Union at that time, and probably not for quite some time to come, in my estimation, and based upon my experience with other cases he would have required his passport, and I presume this is why I was returning it to him.

Mr. COLEMAN. On July 10, 1961, you did two things with respect to the passport. First, you returned to him his old passport, isn't that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. I think I did. I might reread my despatch and see.

Mr. COLEMAN. And, second, you accepted his application for renewal of the passport.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; my mind is clear on that. Yes; I recall now.

Mr. COLEMAN. When you returned to him his old passport, you first stamped the old passport.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Will you indicate for the record how you stamped the old passport?

Mr. SNYDER. The passport was marked "This passport is valid only for direct travel to the United States." (Commission Exhibit No. 946, p. 6.)

Mr. DULLES. Are you quite clear you returned the passport to him before he made his final plans to return?

Mr. SNYDER. I am not entirely----

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, before you answer the question, I suggest if you look at the Foreign Office Despatch dated July 11, 1961, you will find that you told the Department what you did at the time.

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Could that be read into the record--just what he did say about the handling of the passport at that time--that is July what?

Mr. SNYDER. July 8, 1961.

This was July 8. "Oswald intends to institute an application"----

Mr. COLEMAN. Pardon me. Wasn't it really July 10? July 8 was the day he came over to the Embassy just for a few moments. Then he came back on the 10th.

Mr. SNYDER. I don't know. It isn't clear from my despatch, I would say.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you read----

Mr. SNYDER. Actually, if we knew what day of the week the 8th was----

Mr. COLEMAN. Subject to check, it was a Saturday.

Mr. SNYDER. "Oswald intends to institute an application for an exit visa immediately upon his return to Minsk within the next few days. His American passport was returned to him for this purpose after having been amended to be valid for direct travel--for direct return to the United States only."

Mr. COLEMAN. In that same Foreign Service Despatch you indicated at the end that you were sending to the Passport Office in Washington the application for renewal, isn't that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; that is right.

Representative FORD. May I ask Mr. Snyder--on Commission Exhibit No. 938, where Oswald said, "I have been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state," and so forth--if that was the only statement that was made, what effect would that have had on his application either for a renewal or a new passport?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, it would have the effect of flagging the consular officer to ask some questions, Mr. Ford.

Representative FORD. Would it have automatically disqualified him for renewal or the issuance of a new passport?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Not under the law or the regulations?

Mr. SNYDER. Not to the best of my knowledge. In other words, what he says, to my knowledge, is immaterial to a finding of his loss of nationality. It is the act which counts.

Mr. COLEMAN. I don't think that is quite the Congressman's question. His question is if he had actually naturalized himself, could he be entitled to get an American passport?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, no; of course, if he had committed the act of accepting naturalization in a foreign state, he could not have. He would have lost his American citizenship.

Representative FORD. But limiting your knowledge to what he said in this paragraph, this in and of itself would have precluded either the issuance of a new passport or renewal?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't think we can say that, Mr. Ford, because no matter what he says in there, this does not affect his right--does not affect his American citizenship. It is the determination of facts which determines it. And the only thing this does, really--well, the first thing it does is to alert the consular officer to start asking him some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have a call from the Court. I must go over there now. We have the Court conference at 2 o'clock. Will someone be here to preside at 2 o'clock?

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave, too. We have a quorum call over on the floor of the House. I can be back at 2. But I do have to leave at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be back at 2 to preside until I return from the Court?

Representative FORD. I would be very glad to, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I will be able to be here part of the time this afternoon. But we are voting this afternoon. I don't know exactly what time.

Mr. DULLES. I will be here at 2:30, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, fine.

Representative FORD. May I ask how much longer you intend to go on?

Mr. COLEMAN. I think I can finish in about 4 minutes with Mr. Snyder.

Representative FORD. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Representative FORD. Back on the record.

We will recess now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Afternoon Session

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD EDWARD SNYDER RESUMED

The President's Commission reconvened at 2 p.m.

Representative FORD. The Commission will come to order. Will you proceed.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, we have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 947, which is a covering airgram and another copy of the application for renewal of passport, which is a copy which remained in the Embassy at Moscow until May 29, 1964, when it was sent to the State Department.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 947 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I show it to you, sir, to call your attention that on this copy the "X" is over the "have" rather than the "have not."

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I had originally shown you Exhibit No. 938, which was the other copy of the application for renewal of passport.

I take it when you compare those two copies, you note that one is not a direct offset of the other.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you have an explanation of why on July 10, two separate typings were made of the application for renewal?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. COLEMAN. Also on or about July 11, 1961, at the same time you were interviewing Oswald, the State Department was sending instructions, answering your earlier despatch of May 26, 1961, is that correct?

I show you Commission Exhibit No. 937.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 937 for identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. This communication would have been received after my departure from Moscow.

Mr. COLEMAN. You never saw that communication?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. That communication does indicate, doesn't it, that the State Department was saying, that based upon its records, that Oswald had not expatriated himself, or was still technically an American citizen?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; the one operative sentence there in the communications states, "In any event in the absence of evidence showing that Mr. Oswald had definitely lost United States citizenship he apparently maintains that technical status."

Mr. COLEMAN. But you say you never saw that document?

Mr. SNYDER. No; this arrived after I departed from the post.

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you Commission Exhibit No. 939, the State Department operations memorandum dated August 18, 1961, and ask you if you saw it?

Mr. SNYDER. No; it arrived after I left.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 939 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. On July 8 and July 10, when Oswald was at the Embassy, did you see his wife, Marina?

Mr. SNYDER. Not to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you have any knowledge that she was also in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't really know. I can't say whether at that time I had knowledge that she was or not. I don't ever recall having seen her, no.

Mr. COLEMAN. When you spoke to Oswald on the 8th or on the 10th of July, did he indicate that his wife was in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. I am sorry, I don't know.

Mr. COLEMAN. In connection with the various decisions you have made in this matter, did you consult with anyone?

Mr. SNYDER. I think perhaps the word "consult" isn't quite the word. I kept my superiors informed of what I was doing, and, of course, they did see my communications, and in most cases countersigned them before they went out. But in the sense of asking their opinion of what I ought to do, I don't think so.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did anyone instruct you as to what particular decision you should make in connection with any requests made by Mr. Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. No; this was my responsibility, really. There was no one who was presumed to know more about it at the post than I did. I mean in the sense that I was the officer in charge of that activity.

Mr. COLEMAN. There is one other question, sir.

We have some information that Oswald stated that in 1959, when he was in the hospital, that he was in the same ward with an elderly American. Do you have any idea who the elderly American could have been?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I am afraid not.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would there be any record in the Embassy which would indicate what Americans were in Moscow at that time, and whether there was an elderly American who had been hospitalized?

Mr. SNYDER. We kept an informal file of all information relating to the presence of Americans any place in the Soviet Union.

In other words, any time we had a report of any kind, of any level of credibility, we kept some kind of a record. It was known that there were Americans in the Soviet Union under various circumstances against their own will, or persons who might be Americans, or might have had a claim to American citizenship, who might have been dual nationals--one doesn't know. But we would get reports occasionally from a state camp, a labor camp, of a sighting of an American, or a person who claimed to be an American. This sort of thing.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would that information be in a special file in the Embassy, or would it be spread throughout various files?

Mr. SNYDER. No; it was in, as I recall, a separate informal listing. In other words, they were also reported to the Department of State. The chances are that the Department also maintained----

Mr. COLEMAN. Have you any idea what that file might be called, if we were going to ask for it by name--what name we would give so that the people in Moscow would know what we are trying to take a look at?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't. But it would most likely have been under "Welfare and Whereabouts." The files in Moscow, I might say, the classified files are not that extensive. I mean they were one-drawer files for the most part that we officers worked on ourselves, physically.

Mr. COLEMAN. When Oswald came in to see you in 1959, did you have any feeling that somebody was coaching him, or had instructed him what to say or do?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, I think I am accurate in saying at that time I assumed he had been in contact with some level of Soviet representative or official and had discussed his intended actions, and perhaps had had some advice from them as to what to do or how to approach things--in the sense that his words were somebody else's, I don't think I could say, because he gave me the impression, the times I saw him, of an intelligent person who spoke in a manner, and on a level, which seemed to befit his apparent level of intelligence.

However, he did say in my first interview with him either "I have been told what you are going to tell me," or "I am very familiar with the arguments you are going to use on me," or words to this effect, which would be the most direct evidence, shall we say, that he had discussed what he intended to say, and how he intended to handle himself, before he came in to me.

But, in any event, I think it is a foregone conclusion, from what I know of the procedures and things like this, that he was in contact with a Soviet official, he was under somebody's charge in a sense during the time he was there. This was certainly the pattern in the Petrulli case. My whole knowledge of the system and the way it works, the whole internal consistency of it, would lead me to believe that this were the case, unless I had firm evidence to believe otherwise.

Mr. COLEMAN. How about when he reappeared on July 8 and 10, 1961? Did you feel he was being coached at that time in connection with his attempt to get his passport returned to him?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't have any direct evidence that he was coached, I think, in the terms in which you mean. For one thing, his manner of speech and his general approach to the degree that I recall it was, well, less stiff, less formal, and certainly less haughty than it had been on the first occasion. He also didn't use with me the kind of Marxist sloganeering which I got from him on the first interview, which also, I think, is in a sense an evidence of his having been well briefed on his talk with me.

The second time around this was pretty much absent from his conversation.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say you felt he was well briefed on his first conversation with you in 1959, but not in connection with his second?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, again, I cannot say that he was well briefed. I just don't know. But I say, it seemed to me evident at the time that he had discussed with, presumably, a Soviet person or persons what he intended to do at the Embassy, and perhaps the line he should take at the Embassy.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, how do you feel or do you think there is any special significance to the way he entered the Soviet Union from Helsinki in October of 1959?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, there is some significance perhaps, but not a great amount of significance. As most travelers, most tourist travelers come into the Soviet Union on a prearranged tour--many do come from Helsinki. Many of them do not come to Moscow. They go only to Leningrad, spend a day or two, and go back again across the border. It is the shortest entry onto Soviet territory from non-Communist territory.

It was at least one other case, when I was in Moscow, of a person--that is with possible defecting intent, who came into the Soviet Union through Helsinki, and who got his visa apparently directly at the Soviet Embassy, which I think is what Oswald did, although I cannot be sure. But it was my impression at the time that he did not have a prepared tourist tour sort of thing. But I cannot be sure on this point.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you draw any significance from the fact that he was able to come from Minsk into Moscow on July 8, apparently without any difficulty?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I cannot say that he came without any difficulty. He may have had considerable difficulty. It was my feeling that he would have some difficulty in coming to Moscow.

Representative FORD. Did you make any inquiry about that? Did that rouse your curiosity, that he was able to come?

Mr. SNYDER. No; because I expected that he would be able to come, Mr. Ford. As a matter of fact, the letter which I wrote to him in reply to the first letter to me which I received was very carefully worded with this in mind. It was written, for one thing, partly addressed to the Soviet authorities who would read it. And partly to Oswald--which could be used by him in a sense should he run up against real difficulties in getting permission to come to Moscow.

At any rate, I think it was my feeling at the time that he probably could come to the Embassy, although it might cost him considerable difficulty. But I saw no reason to spare him this difficulty.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is there any other information you have which you think the Commission would be interested in in connection with its work and its investigation?

Mr. SNYDER. I can't really--well, let me say that I don't know of any other facts pertinent to the investigation, or pertinent to Oswald in any way which I have not presented, at least not knowingly.

There may well be--there is much that I could elaborate on, on what I have said, relating to Oswald. There are a good deal of small things which perhaps under further questioning might be elicited.

But I am not aware of anything which I have not mentioned and which is in any way pertinent, and which ought to be mentioned.

There are other observations about Oswald and this sort of thing I suppose I could elaborate on to some extent.

Representative FORD. Earlier in the interrogation, Mr. Coleman had you outline what transpired the day that Oswald walked into the Embassy, in the first instance?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. The Commission has in the various papers picked up following Oswald's apprehension and murder, what purports to be his observations or his diary during his stay in the Soviet Union. Have you read any of those?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Representative FORD. He describes in one of these documents his experience that day he came into the Embassy. Would you in some detail relate that again, as you understand what transpired? What time of day it was, where you were, in what office, and so forth. Who was with you, if anybody.

Mr. SNYDER. I might begin, I think, as I began originally, by stating that I don't recall the time of day. But from my knowledge of the facts of the case, and the fact that I told him the Embassy was closed and so forth, it had to have been either a Wednesday or a Saturday afternoon, if not a Sunday. I am told that the date on which he came actually was a Saturday, so I presume it was a Saturday afternoon that he came.

Representative FORD. Don't spare of the detail, because it would be interesting to get your version and his as he purportedly related it in a document of his own subsequently.

Mr. SNYDER. I am not sure whether he was brought in to me or whether I went out and met him at the door and brought him in. I don't recall whether one of my secretaries might have been on duty that afternoon. Normally, she would not have been.

I believe that Mr. McVickar was working in the office adjoining mine. The offices in Moscow are quite small and the door between our offices is usually open. And I think that Mr. McVickar told me he was in the next office.

There was no one in the office with me at the time I saw him.

Oswald was well dressed and very neat appearing when he came in. I don't recall whether he was wearing a suit and shirt and tie. But at any rate, his appearance impressed me at the time. And I recall that he looked very presentable.

He was very curt, very proper. At no time did he insult me or anything of that sort personally. He was just proper, but extremely curt.

Representative FORD. Did he just walk in the door and you were seated at your desk? What was the way in which you first spoke to one another?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't recall whether he was ushered into my office by the secretary or one of the employees, or whether I was told that there was someone waiting for me outside, and I went and got him. It is unlikely that he walked into the offices, because he would have had to walk through two other offices to get to mine.

Well, he stated--he gave me a written statement, which is in the record, almost immediately upon his arrival, I believe.

Representative FORD. That is Commission Exhibit No. 913.

Mr. SNYDER. He stated in effect that he had come to the Soviet Union to live in the Soviet Union, that he desired to renounce his American citizenship, though I don't think he used the word "renounce"--I think he used another word--but that he desired to renounce his American citizenship. That his allegiance was to the Soviet Union.

I think initially this was pretty much what his statement was. And would I please do what was necessary to get this over with.

Well, during this period of the interview, as far as I recall, he was standing. And he may have seated himself some time later in it. But I think for the initial part of the interview, he remained standing and declined to take a seat.

When I began to question him, he then rejoined with words to the effect, "I know what" or "I have been told what you are going to ask me, you are going to try to talk me out of this, and don't waste your time, please let's get on with the business."

I then asked him--I continued to probe and see where I could find a chink in his armor some place.

And I think that the initial chink which I found was regarding his relatives and place of residence in the United States.

I had his passport. I don't recall whether he handed it to me, though he probably did, or whether I asked him for it.

I noted that on the inside of the cover page of his passport his home address had been crossed out.

When I asked him where he lived, he declined to tell me. When I asked him about his relatives--I had noted from his passport that he was 20 years old. When I asked him about his relatives, he also said this was none of my business, and would I please get on with the business.

Well, I told him at that time, or fairly early in the interview, having found this kind of chink I could work on, I told him that I would have to know certainly where he lived in the United States in order to do anything else with his case.

At that stage, he kind of hemmed and hawed a bit and said--well, I live at so and so. And from there on it opened the crack a little bit, and I found his mother also lived at that--that this was the address of his mother, and probing further I found out about his Marine background, and that he had been recently discharged.

I questioned him a bit about where he had applied for his passport, and how he had come to the Soviet Union, and had he gone home to see his mother, and things of this sort.

Some of these questions he answered, and some he didn't. However, he did not seem quite, as I recall--quite so adamant about refusing this kind of question as he did about questions closer to the bone. That is, what knowledge do you have of Marxism, or where did you first come across this, or did you meet someone in the Marines?

Representative FORD. Did you go into those questions in your probing with him?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; this sort of question he parried. I won't say he parried them--he simply refused to answer them. The only thing which he did say in the interview was "I am a Marxist." And I recall telling him then in a jocular vein, which evoked no response, that he was going to be a very lonesome man in the Soviet Union.

But I found at that point, and from there on, that for all I could determine he was completely humorless. And this was my impression of him on the other occasions on which I saw him. He was intense and humorless.

Representative FORD. What prompted the breakup of the interview, or the meeting?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, the interview finally broke up when I couldn't get any more out of him.

Representative FORD. Was he satisfied or dissatisfied with the result of his conference with you?

Mr. SNYDER. I think he was dissatisfied, if anything. I think he had come in there to renounce his citizenship, and had found himself thwarted. It is quite possible, though, this is reading into it things which were not necessarily evident to me at the time. It is quite possible that this was to be his big moment on the stage of history as far as he was concerned. He may have contemplated this for some time, as he said--and thus my refusal at that time to complete his renunciation may have been a hurdle which he had been totally unprepared for.

Representative FORD. Did he demand at any time that this was a right he had to renounce his citizenship, and demand why you would not permit him to proceed?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, I cannot really reconstruct our conversations on that line. But I clearly pointed out to him his right. And he did decline, as I recall, to have me read the law to him. He said he was familiar with it, or something, so that I need not read the law to him. So I pointed out, I believe, at that time he had a right, as any citizen has a right to give up his citizenship if he so desires.

That other consideration is that the consul has a certain obligation towards the individual, and also towards his family, to see that a person--or that the consul at least does not aid and encourage an individual, and particularly a 20-year-old individual, to commit an irrevocable act on the spur of the moment or without adequate thought.

But I told him in any event that the consulate was closed that afternoon, that I had no secretary there to prepare the papers, and that if he would come back during normal business hours I would, of course, go through with it.

So I don't think that he left the room happy--if I can use that term--in his attitude towards me.

I recall probing a bit on the subject of the formation of his attitudes towards Marxism. I developed at this time the impression that he really had no knowledgeable background at all of Marxism. I think I asked him if he could tell me a little bit about the theory of labor value, or something like that, and he hadn't the faintest notion of what I was talking about--I mean something basic to Marxism. And I probed around a bit as to the sources of his attitudes. And I think the only thing he told me at the time was that he had been doing some reading, and that is about as far as I got. On that subject, he simply would not be drawn out.

Representative FORD. Did you ask him anything about his knowledge of the Russian language? Did he volunteer anything?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I did ask him a bit about that. He said he had been studying Russian. And, again, I had the impression--I don't recall--I may have spoken some Russian to him--but I at least formed the impression that he did not know very much Russian. I don't think he could have gotten along on his own in Russian society. I don't think he could have done more than buy a piece of bread, maybe.

Representative FORD. Did he converse with any other member of the staff at the Embassy, to your knowledge, during the time of this first visit?

Mr. SNYDER. No, no; at this time he definitely did not. And I don't think that he did during the time I was there--unless it was simply a passing word with the receptionist, or something of this sort.

But as far as I know, he had no knowledgeable conversation with anyone there.

Actually, there were only--well, when he first came there were only two officers, McVickar and myself, and at the time I left, three officers, with whom he might have talked. And it is inconceivable that either of the other two officers would have talked to him, knowing my interest in the case, or if I were not there somebody would have done so without making a memo for the file and for me of the conversation.

Representative FORD. In retrospect, assuming the tragic events that did transpire last year didn't take place, and this circumstance was presented to you again in the Embassy in Moscow, would you handle the case any differently?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't think so, Mr. Ford. You mean in terms of would I have taken his renunciation? No; I think not.

Representative FORD. In other words, you would have put him off, or stalled him off, in this first interview, make him come back again?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I would have.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. SNYDER. Particularly, since he was a minor. Normally, it would have been, I think, my practice to do this in any event, though. Obviously no two cases are alike, and the consul must decide. But particularly in the case of a minor, I could not imagine myself writing out the renunciation form and having him sign it, on the spot, without making him leave my office and come back at some other time, even if it is only a few hours intervening.

Representative FORD. In one of the despatches I believe you sent to Washington, you indicated that you had informed the press--I don't recall what exhibit that is.

Mr. SNYDER. I think I said, "Press informed."

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 910, sir.

Representative FORD. You say, "Press informed." Is that the same as informing the press?

Mr. SNYDER. No; this simply----

Representative FORD. What is the difference?

Mr. SNYDER. This simply tells the Department that the press is onto the case, and that they can expect something from Moscow on it. The Department hates to be caught by surprise, they hate to read something in the newspapers before they have gotten it back home. And I am simply telling them that the Moscow press corps is aware of Oswald's presence, and that there would likely be some dispatches from the press from Moscow on the case.

Representative FORD. That doesn't mean the Embassy informed the press?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, no.

Representative FORD. How did you know the press had been informed?

Mr. SNYDER. Again right at the moment, I cannot say. At what stage--Priscilla Johnson, I think, was one of the first to be aware of Oswald. Just how she became aware of him, and just where I became aware of her knowledge of him, I don't quite know. But this, I think, was quite early in the game.

Representative FORD. Was he given much attention by the press in Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. I cannot really speak with great authority on the point. I don't think so. This is based on several things.

One, there was very little about Oswald, I think, at the time other than what was sent in by Priscilla Johnson.

Secondly, I believe that Oswald himself had declined to talk to some other press persons of the American press corps.

Priscilla, as I recall, was the only one who seemed to have an entree to him.

Representative FORD. But you did not inform the American press in Moscow of Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Representative FORD. Did you ever talk to any of the American press or any other of the press, about Oswald at this time?

Mr. SNYDER. No; not that I recall, Mr. Ford. It was my normal practice not to discuss cases of this kind. They were occurring all the time in Moscow. If it wasn't one kind it was another. And it was my practice not to discuss the details of such cases with the press simply because the cases--each one being different in any event--the cases were always ticklish. And every little bit helped or hurt in a case of this kind. And the consul needed, to the extent possible, to minimize the forces acting on the case, so that--and the press understood this very well.

Representative FORD. Were you familiar with his interview with Miss Mosby?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't recall that I was. I knew that Priscilla Johnson had seen him and had been seeing him.

But I don't recall that I was aware that Ellie Mosby had seen him.

Representative FORD. You were acquainted with Miss Mosby as well as Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; very well.

Representative FORD. Are any of these stories that these correspondents write on these defector cases ever checked out with your office, or people, in corresponding position?

Mr. SNYDER. Normally not, I would say.

Representative FORD. Were you at all aware of the 5,000 rubles that Oswald was given by Soviet authorities or by an agency of the Soviet Union which is sometimes called, I guess, the Red Cross? Are you at all aware of that?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Representative FORD. Are you aware of that organization in the Soviet Union?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes.

Representative FORD. Would you describe it for us, as far as you know what it is?

Mr. SNYDER. Well----

Representative FORD. 5,000 rubles--excuse me.

Mr. SNYDER. This was the old rubles at that time. No; I don't----

Mr DULLES. For the record, what was the date of the change in the value of the ruble? I think I remember it. It was around 1960--May-June of 1960, I think.

When it went into effect, I don't remember.

Mr. SNYDER. I am sorry, I don't either, Mr. Dulles. It was during my term there. It seemed to me it was in the second half of my tour in Moscow. But I cannot really recall.

Mr. DULLES. I think somewhere in the record that ought to appear. I have an idea it was May of 1960.

Mr. EHRLICH. January 1, 1961.

Mr. DULLES. That is when it went into effect?

Mr. EHRLICH. It was officially revalued.

Mr. DULLES. January 1, 1961--let the record show that--the ruble was revalued, so that it took about 10 rubles to make 1 new ruble.

Representative FORD. So 5,000 rubles in 1959 was not an inconsequential amount.

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, no.

Mr. DULLES. It wasn't very much.

Mr. SNYDER. No; but 5,000 rubles at that time was probably two-thirds to three-quarters of the monthly salary of an average Soviet worker.

Representative FORD. Could you describe----

Mr. DULLES. About $500, isn't it, roughly--10 to 1 in those days?

Mr. SNYDER. Wait a minute; yes.

Mr. DULLES. It was a considerable sum.

Representative FORD. It would be more than a month's salary, then.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; an average month's salary at the time was about 750 rubles, something around there.

Mr. DULLES. I think the legal rate was 20 cents, but the sort of going rate was around 10, I think. I think you could buy tourist rubles around 10, as I recall--10 to the dollar. The legal rate, I think, was 5 to the dollar.

Mr. SNYDER. No; I think the legal rate was 10 to a dollar, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. CHAYES. In the same letter that states the date, which we supplied to the Commission at the Commission's request, it states that the legal rate was 4 to 1 until January 1961. But that was the official rate.

Mr. DULLES. I understand.

Mr. SNYDER. There were different rates. The official rate was not the rate which was used for all things. For instance, we got 10 to 1 for our rubles. The so-called official rate was used, for instance, in clearing foreign trade accounts and this sort of thing.

Representative FORD. Can you tell us your impression of this so-called Red Cross in the Soviet Union?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, again, I cannot speak of--about the Soviet Red Cross with any great personal knowledge. It is not a Red Cross organization in quite the sense in which we know it. It is clearly an organ of the State in a totalitarian state, which means it is not an independent organization, and its policies flow from the policy of the state, and of the central committee.

I don't think that the Soviet Red Cross conducts public fund-raising campaigns, for instance, in the way ours does.

It also is not an organization to which an individual might turn routinely for assistance as he might in our society.

Since the Soviet State does not admit that there is need in the Soviet Union, that there can be poverty or difficulty for which there are not organizations already in existence who are fully competent to deal with such problems, since they don't admit this kind of a situation--they also do not admit of public welfare organs in a sense such as the Red Cross.

Representative FORD. Do you know of any other cases during your period of service there where there were payments by this organization to American citizens, or Americans, those who had given up or tried to give up or failed to give up their citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir; as a matter of fact, the only way in which the Soviet Red Cross impinged upon my experience in Moscow was that they were the organ for handling whereabouts inquiries of persons living in the Soviet Union. If an American citizen wrote to the Embassy asking our assistance in locating a relative in the Soviet Union, this inquiry would go from us to the Soviet Red Cross, who was charged under the Soviet system of things with actually checking into it and letting us know if they felt that was in their interest. This was the only way in which the Soviet Red Cross impinged upon us.

I do recall on a few occasions advising persons who had come into the Embassy in one way or another and who were in dire need that they go to the Soviet Red Cross.

But the reaction of such persons indicated to me that they felt the Soviet Red Cross was not the place to go.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, had you ever heard, while you were in the Embassy in Moscow, the secret police referred to as the Red Cross?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Mr. COLEMAN. You never heard the MVD, for example, referred to in that way?

Mr. SNYDER. No; to my knowledge--I mean there is an organization called the Soviet Red Cross, which carries on at least in the international sphere some of the normal activities of international Red Cross organizations.

The big point of departure is that they on the one hand are not independent organizations as they are in free societies, but they are an organ of the state. And, secondly, I do not think they have the same role internally that our Red Cross organizations do.

Mr. DULLES. Have you heard of it being used in other instances for what might be called extraneous payments--that is, payments not related to Red Cross work?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Is there a policy that you were familiar with, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, for permitting a person to apply for and be given Soviet citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; there is a well-defined way of acquiring Soviet citizenship under Soviet law.

Representative FORD. Was Oswald familiar with that, as you could tell from your conversation with him?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, he obviously was familiar with what one does. That is, he had made application to the Supreme Soviet, which is what one does.

Representative FORD. Did he tell you that?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes.

Representative FORD. He did?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir; this is not something which is common knowledge. One would have to have inquired and found out, and had someone show you or give you the proper form on which to make application, and tell you where to address it, and this sort of thing.

Representative FORD. What did he tell you had happened when he did that?

Mr. SNYDER. All he said was that he had made application.

Representative FORD. He didn't indicate the application had been processed and approved?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I cannot recall what our conversation was on that score. It was quite clear that he had not received Soviet citizenship.

But, also, I would not have expected him to receive it that early in the game. I mean, for one thing the Supreme Soviet does not act on these things on a continuing basis, but acts upon them periodically.

Representative FORD. En masse, so to speak?

Mr. SNYDER. That is right. It has them on its calendar. So many times a year it acts on petitions for Soviet citizenship, presumably.

Presumably before it is sent to the Supreme Soviet with a favorable recommendation by the various Government organs, a thorough investigation is made by MVD and other organs, and various officials presumably at different levels have got to stick their necks out and recommend he be accepted--that sort of thing.

Representative FORD. If you had known that Oswald was in Minsk, what would your reaction have been?

Mr. SNYDER. Serves him right.

Representative FORD. Why do you say that?

Mr. SNYDER. You have never been in Minsk.

Well, in the first place, my own feeling is that there is no better medicine for someone who imagines he likes the Soviet Union than to live there awhile.

Representative FORD. In Minsk?

Mr. SNYDER. Any place.

Representative FORD. I am more particularly interested in Minsk.

Mr. SNYDER. But provincial towns in the Soviet Union are a very large step below the capital, and the capital, believe me, is a fairly good-sized step down from any American populated place.

But the difference between large cities and minor cities, and between minor cities and villages, is a tremendous step backward in time. And to live in Minsk, or any other provincial city in the Soviet Union, is a pretty grim experience to someone who has lived in our society--not necessarily American, but simply in western society. It might be just the same if he lived in Denmark, or some place. I mean to land up in Minsk, working in a grubby little factory is quite a comedown.

Representative FORD. Have you ever been in Minsk?

Mr. SNYDER. I spent about an hour walking around Minsk, between trains, one time.

Representative FORD. Is there anything significant about him being sent to Minsk, as far as you are concerned?

Mr. SNYDER. No, no; the only pattern that I would discern is that it is in all cases to my knowledge--all cases of which I have had knowledge, the invariable pattern of the Soviets is to send defectors somewhere outside of the capital city--to settle them in some city other than Moscow. There have been some minor exceptions to this.

What is the name--the British defector, and the two foreign office men Burgess and McLean. McLean lives or did live, until his death, just on the outskirts of Moscow.

Mr. DULLES. McLean is still alive.

Mr. SNYDER. Pardon me--Burgess. Is Burgess the one married to an American?

Mr. DULLES. Philby is married to an American.

Mr. SNYDER. One of the two, Burgess or McLean, is married to an American.

Mr. DULLES. McLean is.

Mr. SNYDER. I had an interview with McLean's mother-in-law at the Embassy. At any rate, this was one exception.

Representative FORD. It has been alleged that in Minsk there are certain training schools for foreigners, or possibly for citizens of the Soviet Union. Are you at all familiar with that? Is there any information you have on it?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I have not, Mr. Ford.

Representative FORD. Did you ever contact any Soviet officials about Oswald at the time of this first interview?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Representative FORD. Is that unusual or is that usual?

Mr. SNYDER. It is usual.

Representative FORD. In other words, you, in your capacity, would not normally contact a Soviet official about someone such as Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. That is right; yes, sir. In other words, there is nothing at that stage of the game which--for which I would have any reason to go to the Soviet authorities.

Representative FORD. Even the fact that he had a visa 5 days overdue?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, of course, I am already aware in a sense and am acting under my awareness that he is living under controlled circumstances. He is not simply living in a hotel and nobody knows about it. That he is in contact with Soviet authorities, and is there with their knowledge and consent. So that----

Representative FORD. It is implied consent, even though it may not be official as far as the documents are concerned?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, actually, the document itself is quite eloquent on this subject, I think. There is the very negative fact that his visa is 5 days overdue, and he is still there--that speaks pretty loudly for the fact that he is living there without a valid visa, at least without a valid visa in his passport, with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet authorities. It could hardly be otherwise.

Representative FORD. Mr. Dulles, we have a quorum call over on the floor of the House. I will have to leave. Will you take over as Chairman? I will be back shortly.

Mr. DULLES. Very gladly. I have one or two questions.

(At this point, Representative Ford withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. Is there any question as to whether a minor can renounce his nationality?

Mr. SNYDER. To my knowledge, there is not. To my knowledge----

Mr. DULLES. I will withdraw that question and ask Mr. Chayes that when it comes, because that probably is a matter for him rather than for you.

Does the Embassy in Moscow have any facility for learning about or finding out about errant American citizens, or any American citizens that are wandering around Russia? Do they register at the Embassy?

Mr. DULLES. They may.

Mr. DULLES. There is not a requirement?

Mr. SNYDER. No; as a matter of fact, most do. Most that are in Moscow do stop in.

Mr. DULLES. There is a book in the Embassy that they can come in and sign?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Oswald did not sign in the book, I gather.

Mr. SNYDER. I don't think he would; no. There would be no need for him to. He came into the Embassy and spoke to an officer, which is a higher form of registration in a sense.

Mr. DULLES. For the record, how long was it after his arrival in Moscow that he reported to the Embassy?

Mr. COLEMAN. He arrived on October 16, and he didn't go into the Embassy until October 31.

Mr. DULLES. That was about the time his visa--his permission to stay was going to expire?

Mr. COLEMAN. His permission to stay as designated on his visa had already expired.

Mr. DULLES. Was that a 12-day?

Mr. COLEMAN. He was in the Soviet Union 15 days before he went to the American Embassy.

Mr. DULLES. How long was his permit good for?

Mr. COLEMAN. His permit was good for 6 days.

Mr. DULLES, Only 6 days? You, of course, get no word from the Soviet Union when they give visas to Americans to come into the country.

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, no, no; we get no cooperation from the Soviet authorities on anything concerning American citizens--excepting in circumstances where they desire the Embassy's help. A citizen gets sick while he is traveling in the Soviet Union, and they want the Embassy assistance in some way or other. But even in such cases, surprisingly often, we do not hear from the Soviet authorities. We hear from the traveler himself, somehow, but not from the authorities.

Mr. DULLES. Am I correct in my understanding that the State Department, having issued a valid passport for travel abroad, had no way of knowing whether the owner of that passport is going to the Soviet Union or not?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, no.

Mr. DULLES. They have no way of knowing? So they have no way of informing you about it?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Mr. DULLES. I think there is a misunderstanding by a great many American people that there are certain countries that are named on the passport, which at one time I think was the case, but no longer is. As I recall it now an American passport was only stamped "Not good for Hungary," as I believe Oswald's passport was stamped. That has been changed, has it not.

Mr. SNYDER. These stamps are changed a little from time to time.

Mr. DULLES. I will ask Mr. Chayes that question.

Mr. SNYDER. Hungary, North Korea, North Vietnam, and China----

Mr. COLEMAN. Now Cuba.

Mr. DULLES. Could I see that passport for a moment? I think at this particular time this passport was issued, I thought the only stamp was Hungary.

Mr. SNYDER. I think there must have been others, and Hungary was added after 1946.

Mr. DULLES. I will just read this.

"This passport is not valid for travel to the following areas under the control of authorities with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations: Albania, Bulgaria, and those portions of China, Korea, and Vietnam under Communist control."

Now, that speaks as of--this is a printed notice in the passport, and that speaks as of the date of issue of the passport, September 10, 1959. And then there is a stamp--I guess that is printed on the passport--also printed, in a special box, "This passport is not valid for travel in Hungary."

Mr. CHAYES. And then that is superimposed with a void stamp when we took Hungary off the list of restricted areas.

Mr. DULLES. Right. I don't know whether that void stamp was put on in 1959--but it is not important as far as we are concerned.

In any event, this passport, as I understand, is perfectly good to travel to Russia without any notification to the State Department, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. I should state for the record, sir, actually the application which Oswald filed on September 4, 1959, included Russia as a place where he intended to visit.

Mr. CHAYES. On the other hand, the State Department has no mechanism for notifying posts abroad of ordinary travel to those countries.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if it would not be a convenience to you if in the case, let's say, of the Soviet Union, or possibly other Communist countries, just as a routine matter they took off this note from the passport so you would have some record there if anything turned up that this fellow had said he was going to Russia. Maybe that would involve administrative work.

Mr. SNYDER. I can't see what value this would be to a consul.

Mr. DULLES. Well, if a fellow got into trouble you would turn to his records alphabetically and you would find Lee Harvey Oswald in his application said he was going to go to Russia.

Mr. SNYDER. You mean if he gets in trouble in Russia?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. SNYDER. If he gets in trouble in Russia, we know he is there.

Mr. DULLES. You might; you might not. They don't always tell you. You don't think that would be of any particular value, though?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't, Mr. Dulles. Under any circumstances under which it was useful to the Embassy to know whether a person had said he was coming there, we can have the information by cable within 24 hours. So to attempt--it would seem to me--to attempt to notify embassies abroad----

Mr. DULLES. I am not saying embassies abroad. I am saying the Soviet Union.

Mr. SNYDER. But why the Soviet Union and not Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria?

Mr. DULLES. I said the Communist countries, I think, before. I certainly would not do it for Britain, France, and friendly countries. There is no point.

Mr. SNYDER. This would involve a clerical job of major magnitude which from the Embassy's point of view I don't see that it would serve any purpose.

Mr. DULLES. Well, if a young man 20 years old just out of the Marines says he is going to the Soviet Union, isn't that of some significance?

Mr. SNYDER. Not necessarily. I mean in terms of the thousands of people--thousands of Americans who flutter back and forth across the face of the earth----

Mr. DULLES. I am not talking about people floating back and forth across the earth. I am talking about people going to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SNYDER. In other words, if I had looked at Oswald's application at the time he made it, knowing nothing else about it than he had just gotten out of the Marines, I would not think it was so terribly unusual, or of great interest to me that this young boy is taking a trip to a number of western European countries, including the Soviet Union. Nor would there be anything in such knowledge which would in any way I think trigger any action on my part.

Mr. DULLES. Do you have any special instructions other than the ones that you have referred to about the handling of those that renounce their citizenship, or have you covered that, do you think, quite fully? Are there any special instructions that the Embassy in Moscow prescribed?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Mr. DULLES. There are none?

Mr. SNYDER. No; there are none; no, sir. This sort of thing is down to the meat of the consular officer's job. That is, he is out on his own pretty much on something of this sort. He has got to use his judgment, and such experience as he has, and such commonsense as he has.

Mr. DULLES. He has got to know the law, too--he has to know the law and regulations.

Mr. SNYDER. Oh, yes; if you don't know, the first thing you do is look up the regulation and the law and see what your basic requirement is.

In renunciation cases, it is a fairly simple matter--that is, for the consular officer, as far as the law is concerned. He doesn't have a large body of law. He has a specific law which tells him exactly what the conditions are for renouncing citizenship, and that is it.

Mr. DULLES. I differ from you a little bit, in the sense that I don't think if a young fellow 20 years old came in to me and wanted to renounce his citizenship, and if I were doing consular work, as I was at one time--I think I would feel that that was a pretty--rather a tough one to handle.

Mr. SNYDER. I don't say it is not tough to handle. What I meant to say was that the legal basis under which the consul, or within which the consul has to operate----

Mr. DULLES. I will talk to Mr. Chayes about the problem of a minor doing that.

Mr. SNYDER. From the consular's point of view it is a fairly simple one. It doesn't require a lot of legal research.

Mr. CHAYES. Just to have that in the record at this point the statute provides very clearly on the age problem, section 351(b) of the act provides that below 18 years the act specified--the citizen shall not be deemed to have expatriated himself by the commission prior to his 18th birthday of any of the acts specified in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Mr. DULLES. That includes renunciation?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, 6 is renunciation. But he has to assert--within 6 months after obtaining the age of 18 years--he has to assert his claim to U.S. nationality, in order to get this automatically. But I would think the courts would go further and hold that, especially where volunteerism is involved, as in renunciation, below 18 years is the cutoff point--not 21. It used to be 21, but the Congress reduced the age limit to 18.

Mr. DULLES. Well, that covers the point here. Was there anything about the Oswald case in the Soviet press at any time to your knowledge?

Mr. SNYDER. To my knowledge, there was not, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. And the Soviet authorities have given you no information about Oswald that hasn't been communicated to us? You have no other information at all from the Soviet authorities about Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir; I never communicated with the Soviet authorities about Oswald in any form, nor did they ever ask me anything about him.

Mr. DULLES. And you don't know any of the other circumstances under which his case was reconsidered after his attempted cutting of his wrists and suicide? You don't know what channels that went through in the Soviet Union?

Mr. SNYDER. I was not aware of this element of the case.

Mr. DULLES. You were not aware, of course, at that time of this element of the case. Do you know what intourist guides were in charge of him?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know any other case during the period when you were in Moscow of an American who had married a Soviet wife and was given an exist visa as quickly and as easily as Oswald and Marina were given theirs?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't know offhand whether Marina Oswald got her visa, her exit visa, that quickly and easily.

Mr. DULLES. Well, I think that is a matter of record--when she applied and when she got it.

Mr. COLEMAN. The American visa----

Mr. DULLES. This is the Soviet exit visa.

Mr. COLEMAN. You are talking about the Soviet passport? She applied for her passport----

Mr. DULLES. It is a visa to get out.

Mr. SNYDER. It is both. She needs a Soviet passport. They are issued at the same time.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. She applied for her Soviet passport in July 1961, and she was informed that it would be issued to her approximately on December 25, 1961.

Mr. DULLES. About 6 months. Do you know of any case where that has been accomplished in 6 months, other than this case, during your period there? I don't think I ought to ask you about any period other than the period you were in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SNYDER. I think that a review perhaps of a few other of the cases of American citizens marrying Soviet girls during the time I was there might show that 6 months is not a terribly short period. There isn't, again, any standard for things like this. In the first place, so much depends upon the local officials in the beginning of the thing, and whether they drag their feet or don't, and how much pressure they put on the girl to talk her out of it, and all of this sort of business.

My offhand feeling is that 6 months is not an unusually short period of time, but it certainly is getting down to about probably the minimum of our experience with such things.

Mr. DULLES. That is all I have, Mr. Witness.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to offer for the record Commission Exhibits 908 through 940 except for Exhibit 911, which we didn't identify.

Mr. DULLES. Let me take these one at a time.

Exhibits Nos. 908 through 940, except for Exhibit No. 911, shall be admitted.

(The documents heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibits Nos. 908-910, and 912-940 were received in evidence.)

Mr. DULLES. Now, for the record, what about these two numbers that are omitted?

Mr. COLEMAN. When Mr. McVickar testifies he will be able to identify the documents.

Mr. DULLES. You will have these admitted at a later date?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Now, the second category you wanted to have admitted.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to also offer into evidence Commission Exhibit 946 which is the Oswald passport.

Mr. DULLES. It shall be admitted.

(The document referred, to heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit No. 946 for identification, was admitted into evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I offer for the record Commission Exhibit No. 947 which is the second copy of the passport renewal application, which has been identified after lunch.

Mr. DULLES. And Exhibit No. 947, the passport application, shall be admitted.

(The document referred to, heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit No. 947 for identification, was admitted into evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I have no further questions, sir.

Mr. DULLES. We are just starting with a new witness. Won't you go ahead.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Snyder. It has been very helpful to us.

Mr. SNYDER. I hope it has.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McVICKAR

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. John A. McVickar, who is presently principal officer, American Consulate in Cochabamba, Bolivia, was consul in the American Embassy in Moscow in 1959, until at least the middle of 1961.

Mr. McVickar will be asked to testify concerning Oswald's appearance at the Embassy in October 1959, when Oswald announced his intention to renounce his American citizenship.

Mr. McVickar will also be asked to testify concerning his interview of Marina Oswald when she applied for a visa in July of 1961, and his actions in connection with securing a waiver of section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, with respect to Marina Oswald.

Mr. McVickar will also be examined on two memoranda which he has provided the State Department since the assassination of President Kennedy.

At this time I would ask the Chairman to swear Mr. McVickar.

Representative FORD. Mr. McVickar, will you stand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Mr. McVICKAR. I do, so help me God.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. McVickar, will you state your full name for the record?

Mr. McVICKAR. John Anthony McVickar.

Mr. COLEMAN. That is spelled M-c-V-i-c-k-a-r?

Mr. McVICKAR. I have given the court reporter here my card.

Mr. COLEMAN. And what is your present address?

Mr. McVICKAR. American consulate, Cochabamba, Bolivia.

Mr. COLEMAN. What was your position with the American Embassy in Moscow in the fall of 1959?

Mr. McVICKAR. I was one of two officers in the consular section of the Embassy.

Mr. COLEMAN. How long did you remain in Moscow?

Mr. McVICKAR. I was there from June of 1959, until September of 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it you have been shown a copy of the Congressional resolution with respect to the formation of this Committee?

Mr. McVICKAR. I am not sure but I think so. With respect to this Commission?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Mr. McVICKAR. Do you want me to read it now?

Mr. COLEMAN. No, just generally have it available.

Directing your attention to the fall of 1959, did you have occasion to see or to talk to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. McVICKAR. I had occasion to see him and to talk briefly to him. I was present in the office at the time he was interviewed by Mr. Snyder. We had an office about the size of this room with two desks in it, and Mr. Snyder's desk was at one end and mine was at the other, and we did our business in effect in the same room separately, but this was an unusual case, and I recall the man coming in and I recall parts of the conversation.

Mr. COLEMAN. Was the day he came in October 31, 1959?

Mr. McVICKAR. I couldn't say exactly but that sounds just about right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Was it a Saturday?

Mr. McVICKAR. I don't know.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall what time of the day it was?

Mr. McVICKAR. I don't know. It might have been in the morning but I am not sure. I don't know for sure.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did Oswald speak to you at all or was all of his conversation with Mr. Snyder?

Mr. McVICKAR. I think all of his conversation, subsequent conversation, was with Mr. Snyder. As I recall, he said a few words to those of us who were in the office, myself and the secretary, on his way out of the office probably, but I don't really remember very much about that, if he said anything at all.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you tell the Commission to the best of your recollection what he said to Mr. Snyder that you overheard during the conversation of October 31, 1959?

Mr. McVICKAR. In an effort to be helpful I have already, in the form of this memorandum, put everything I could remember down.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, are you referring to the memorandum you prepared on November 27, 1963?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; the two memoranda, the one of November 27, 1963, and of April 7, 1964, but, of course, I will try to recall again. As I recall, he came into the office, and in a rather truculent fashion gave Mr. Snyder his passport and said that he wanted to renounce his American citizenship, and he was unusually nasty about it, and he then--Mr. Snyder talked with him for about I would say maybe an hour, in an effort to draw him out I think. The reasons that he gave were that he was very angry at the United States and that he was no longer under the illusion that we had a good system in the United States. He had seen capitalism and imperialism in operation, and I think that he referred to his tour in the Marine Corps, and I think to--possibly he was stationed in Okinawa.

I think that he did seem to know something about the renunciation process, and it was almost as though he was trying to bait the consul into taking an adverse action against him.

He mentioned that he knew certain classified things in connection with having been I think a radar operator in the Marine Corps, and that he was going to turn this information over to the Soviet authorities. And, of course, we didn't know how much he knew or anything like that, but this obviously provoked a rather negative reaction among us Americans in the consulate section. I don't think I probably can recall anything more than that for sure.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, I take it at the time that Mr. Oswald was in the Embassy in 1959 that you did not prepare a memorandum at that time?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; because it was not my responsibility. I did prepare a memorandum which I have a copy of here, some time later with respect to a conversation I had with the correspondent, Priscilla Johnson, who had been at that time, as of November 17, 1959, in contact with Oswald, and I think she sought my guidance as to how she should handle her contacts with him, and also I think to inform the Embassy through me as to these contacts that she had had.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it the memorandum you refer to is dated November 17, 1959?

Mr. McVICKAR. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. We have marked it Commission Exhibit No. 911. I will ask you whether that is a copy of the memorandum?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is a copy of the memorandum. Is it 911 or 9--excuse me--I would like to call attention to the fact that it seems to me there is an error in the date there in the second paragraph of that memorandum. It says "She told me that on Sunday May 15."

I am almost certain that would have been Sunday, November 15.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, in that memorandum on the second page you have a P.S., and you state that Priscilla J. told you that Oswald has been told he will be leaving the hotel at the end of this week.

Did Miss Johnson tell you that?

Mr. McVICKAR. I feel sure I wouldn't have written that if she hadn't.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you know whether Oswald actually left the hotel the end of the week?

Mr. McVICKAR. I am not sure of the time that he left the hotel, but from what I gather from the record, that must have been about the time that he did leave the hotel and go to Minsk. As reflected in the other memorandum it was rather unclear exactly how long Oswald spent in Moscow, but I think that the record is approximately accurate here, and that this would have been about the time he would have left the hotel.

Mr. COLEMAN. According to other information which the Commission has, which happens to be Oswald's diary so we don't know how accurate it is, it is stated that he didn't leave Moscow until January 4, 1960.

Mr. McVICKAR. That is new to me.

Mr. COLEMAN. You had no such information?

Mr. McVICKAR. I had no such--this is the first time I heard that.

Mr. DULLES. He left the hotel, however, for a period, did he not? He was in the hospital for a period.

Mr. COLEMAN. No, sir; he was in the hospital before he came into the Embassy.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. His suicide attempt was before October 31.

Mr. McVICKAR. Now it says leaving the hotel, but it doesn't say--and I think that would be all the information that would have been available at the time that I wrote that, I think the implication was that he was going to leave town as well, but that doesn't necessarily mean that he wouldn't have spent the ensuing weeks in some other place in the city of Moscow.

Mr. COLEMAN. In the P.S. you also indicated that "he will be trained in electronics." Did you get that information from Miss Johnson?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, yes; I think so, according to this.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did she say any more than just he would be trained in electronics? Did she say what type of training he would get?

Mr. McVICKAR. I am afraid I have no more memory than what is written here. In fact, I didn't even remember that I had written this memorandum until I saw it the other day.

Mr. DULLES. Is the language "he will be trained" or "he had been trained"?

Mr. McVICKAR. "He will be," that is what I wrote.

Mr. DULLES. Is it possible that could have been a reference to past training during the Marines when he was trained in electronics?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; I suspect, that what I meant was, that he would be trained in electronics by the Soviets, but I think that this was a rather sketchy note of the conversation, and I suspect that what she would have said, was that he would be trained in or used in the field of electronics, in such a way probably that they would get the greatest benefit from his knowledge.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, immediately prior to the time that you had the conversation with Miss Johnson, you had had occasion, hadn't you, on November 9, 1959, to attempt to deliver a message from Oswald's half brother to Oswald?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; there is a note in the file to that effect, and I don't really remember that incident very well, just very vaguely. I think that I was given the assignment to attempt to deliver a message. I think the idea was that we would try to see what we could do to get this fellow to change his mind and go back to the United States.

The attitude that we took toward him was, I think, a normal one, as one might toward a very mixed up young person, probably misinformed, and so I think this was an effort to put him back in communication with his family.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to show you a note from the Oswald file dated November 9, 1959, which has been given Commission Exhibit No. 942, and a copy of a telegram to Oswald from John E. Pic, which has been given Commission Exhibit No. 943, and ask you, is that the telegram you attempted to deliver, and is that the note you wrote at the time when you were unable to deliver the telegram to Oswald?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is the note, and I don't necessarily recollect this telegram. It may be that it was in a sealed envelope. I cannot say that I recollect the telegram, but it certainly looks like the probable telegram that would have been delivered, that I would have attempted to deliver at that time.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it that after October 31 of 1959, until Oswald left Moscow, that you had no further contact with Oswald?

Mr. McVICKAR. That is my recollection, yes, that I had no further contact with Oswald. I must say that a great many things did take place in that 2 years.

I, for example, did not recollect, until just the other day when I saw the file, that I had interviewed his wife. But to the best of my recollection I never laid eyes on Oswald again.

Mr. COLEMAN. I think earlier in your testimony you said that you had prepared a memorandum on November 27, 1963, in which you attempted to recall what happened when you were in the American Embassy in 1959, 1960, and 1961, is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. A copy of the memorandum has been marked Commission Exhibit No. 941. I want to ask you whether that is a copy of the memorandum which you prepared, and sent to Mr. Thomas Ehrlich?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is a copy of it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now in that memorandum, on the last page, page 3, the second paragraph, you say: "In short, it seemed to me that there was a possibility that he had been in contact with others before or during his Marine Corps tour who had guided him and encouraged him in his actions."

Could you indicate to the Commission the basis for making that statement?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, I think it is clear here, and if it isn't I should certainly say, that this last page is in the nature of speculation and an attempt to be helpful.

Now in answer to your question, he gave me the impression, and this was supported by the impressions other people seemed to have at the time through conversation, that he was a very young person to have so many ideas in his head, and to have done so much about them, in effect, in such a relatively short time, and so it occurred to some of us that it may be that he had had some coaching from somebody; but also, I must say, he was an unusual person and apparently sort of an ingrown person, and so it may be that he had conceived and carried out all these things by himself.

But I think that that paragraph in a way sums up that same idea, that it seemed that there was a possibility that he had had some guidance in carrying out this line of action.

Mr. COLEMAN. Does that also explain the sentence in the same paragraph where you say: "On the other hand, there also seemed to me to be the possibility that he was following a pattern of behavior in which he had been tutored by person or persons unknown"?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; the same applies.

Mr. COLEMAN. You had no independent evidence of this at all, did you?

Mr. McVICKAR. I was asked to explain this attitude I had as best I could, and I wrote another memorandum dated April 7, 1964, in which I described to go into this line of thought.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could we have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 958 a three-page memorandum from Mr. McVickar to Mr. Ehrlich, dated April 7, 1964?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 958 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that the memorandum you just referred to?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is the same memorandum.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say this memorandum, Commission Exhibit No. 958, was written in April 7, 1964, after you had been asked to explain your earlier statement concerning following a pattern of behavior in which he had been tutored by person or persons unknown?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is correct. I believe that the Commission asked for this clarification from the Department of State, and it was relayed out to me in Bolivia.

Mr. COLEMAN. In that memorandum you first indicated that you felt that Oswald probably would not know that Helsinki would be a good place to go to try to get a visa into Russia.

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I think so. It is a well enough known fact among people who are working in the Soviet Union and undoubtedly people who are associated with Soviet matters.

But I would say that it was not a commonly known fact among the ordinary run of people in the United States.

Mr. COLEMAN. You also placed some reliance upon the fact that he didn't come in under a $30 per day individual tour or he didn't join a group, is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, now, when you say that he did not do these things, I don't know that he did not do these things. I was merely discussing the fact that the particular type of visa that he obtained might have some significance, and I went into a little bit maybe not in complete detail and maybe not knowing all of the factors, but I tried to go into a little bit of the different kinds of possibilities there might have been.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, if it is established that Oswald got a tourist visa, then I take it that paragraph 2 of your memorandum pretty much disappears because the assumption is that he didn't get a tourist visa, is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; I don't think entirely so. I think you would have to take a look at the amount of time that it would take him to get a tourist visa or any kind of a visa.

But as I say, I can't be sure that it would be very significant. But I think it is a point, however.

Mr. DULLES. How long is the ordinary tourist visa good for?

Mr. McVICKAR. Tourist visas are usually issued for specific periods of time, specific tours. That might be a week or might be a month, and they vary in price with the length of time and where they are going, and also how many people are in the group. If you are going by yourself it is very expensive. If you are going with larger and larger groups it becomes less expensive.

Mr. COLEMAN. You also indicated in the memorandum in paragraph No. 4 that according to your experience Oswald's application to remain in the Soviet Union was relatively quickly accepted by the Soviet authorities?

Mr. McVICKAR. I think item 4 is more or less canceled out by the fact that my memory was inaccurate as to how long he had stayed in Moscow. I think that my paragraph 4 is based on my inaccurate memory that he was there for only about a week, but if he was there for much longer than that, I think that is vitiated.

Mr. COLEMAN. Assuming that he did stay the longer length of time then, I take it you don't think there is any particular significance in the fact that he was able to remain in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; I think that the length of time that he apparently was in Moscow was sufficient for them to make any bureaucratic decision.

Mr. COLEMAN. And in paragraph No. 5 you indicated that he seemed to be surprisingly competent and determined about what he was doing, considering his age and experience.

Could you indicate for the Commission just what he did which led you to that conclusion?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, that goes back to my comment of a few minutes ago. I think his bearing and attitude was unusually confident in a very far away country where the way of doing things is very different from what it is in the United States, and considering presumably he hadn't traveled very much before, and he was very young. I think the word "competent" refers to what seems to be a rather efficiently organized chain of events which began, as I understand it, when he first applied for a passport in the United States in Los Angeles, on September 4, until his apparent appearance in Moscow about October 16, where he applied for Soviet citizenship. And it seems to me, just offhand I would say, that is a fairly well organized movement considering also that apparently he went by ship from New Orleans to Helsinki--that is what I understand--and was determined, as was very evident in everything he said when he was in the office, was determined to do what he was doing.

Mr. COLEMAN. In paragraph No. 8 of the memorandum you place some significance in the fact that he was permitted to belong to a rifle club and practice target shooting while in Minsk.

First, from where did you get that information?

Mr. McVICKAR. I apologize for that in a way. That is complete speculation, and the rifle club was something I read about in the newspaper. I cannot be very accurate about the rifle club business, and I point out in that note that it is not related to my contact with him.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you think it would be unusual from your knowledge of life in the Soviet Union that people would belong to a rifle club and that they could practice target shooting?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I would say so; yes.

Representative FORD. In other words, if it was a fact?

Mr. McVICKAR. If it was a fact.

Representative FORD. That he belonged to a rifle club and did shooting it would be unusual?

Mr. McVICKAR. It would seem to me, yes, particularly for a foreigner, but unusual in any case, I think.

Mr. DULLES. But you did not hear that either from Oswald or from his wife whom you saw later, I believe.

Mr. McVICKAR. No; I did not. It is unrelated to anything except what I heard about the case, and I don't know really about this. I just remember reading about it in the paper, that is all.

Mr. COLEMAN. After November 17, 1959, you had no more contact with Oswald until some time in July 1961, is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is right, and I believe that I didn't have any contact with him in July of 1961. I believe I only had contact with his wife.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; or I did.

Mr. COLEMAN. When did his wife come in in July of 1961?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, as I recall, and as I say, my memory here was completely refreshed by the record, and I see that I have some notes in the file that are undated, but that they were used evidently to write a communication to the Department of State which was dated on August 28, 1961, and so I am confident that this interview must have taken place in say the week before that.

I departed from the Soviet Union about the 1st of September, and things were pretty busy, and I can't remember very much more about it than I can see here in the record.

I do not really remember this interview, and I can only speak about it on the basis of the record.

Mr. COLEMAN. Isn't it possible that you saw her on July 11, 1961?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; because I think what happened, and I think this is reflected in the record. I think what happened was that Oswald himself came into Moscow and was interviewed by Mr. Snyder on July 10, and that he did not have his wife with him, and that he said that he was going to try to get his wife to come to Moscow in the next few days, so that she could be interviewed in connection with the visa, but that in fact she did not appear until several weeks later, some time in August.

Mr. COLEMAN. Are you certain about this, sir?

Mr. McVICKAR. This is the best of my recollection, and I am pretty sure that I read something in the record yesterday that indicates that she was not in Moscow at the time he was interviewed by Mr. Snyder in July of 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. Wasn't it possible that Mr. Snyder talked to Mr. Oswald on July 8, which was a Saturday, and that Mrs. Oswald appeared at the Embassy with Oswald on July the 10th, or on July 11th, 2 or 3 days later?

Mr. McVICKAR. I won't say that it is not possible, and as I say, I don't remember this. But I very much doubt that I would have interviewed somebody in the middle of July and have not written to the State Department about it until the end of August, and I say that honestly. That was not the way we operated.

Mr. COLEMAN. You referred to some handwritten notes you saw in the file. I would like to show you Commission Exhibit No. 945 and ask you whether that is the copy of the notes that you were referring to?

Mr. McVICKAR. That is the copy of them. I do not believe they are dated, and it was with a ballpoint pen. I made this copy for myself from the copy that is in the file.

Mr. CHAYES. Would it be appropriate to point out that there seems to be more on your copy than on his copy?

Mr. McVICKAR. No, these are my own notes. This is exactly what it is here.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, I take it that Commission Exhibit No. 945 is some notes you took at a time when you had an interview with Marina Oswald, is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now you have a notation "was not Komsomol." What does that mean?

Mr. McVICKAR. That I am confident means that I asked her whether she was a member of the Komsomol, which is the Communist youth organization, and this would have been an ordinary question for me to ask a visa applicant because this had some bearing on her admissibility to the United States under the immigration law, and I was apparently satisfied from what she said she was not. There is no other way of really establishing it under such circumstances.

Mr. DULLES. Did she say whether she had at anytime been a member of the Komsomol?

Mr. McVICKAR. I would have undoubtedly phrased my question in such a way as to cover that point, I think.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you ask her whether she was a member of any particular Communist organization?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; and I believe that, as I stated in this report to the Department of State, and I think it appears a little bit in here, that she was a member of a Profcoes, which is probably a combination of English and Russian, but this would have been a labor union, and she apparently was a member of the medical workers labor union when she was in the technical school, and then later in her work since 1957, it says here.

Mr. COLEMAN. When you had this interview wouldn't she then have to fill out or you would have to fill out a form or some type of petition to get her classified as an alien eligible for an immigration visa?

Mr. McVICKAR. This was not the procedure. There is a form of application for a visa, the number of which I forget. But that, under the procedure, was filled out by the applicant at a later date. This initial interview was to obtain in effect the approval of the Department of State from the security point of view for the issuance of the visa, and the interview was in connection with preparing a report covering the points that are of concern to the Department in that connection, and this report was prepared by me, sent in on August 28, 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, I have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 959 a copy of a petition to classify status of alien for issuance of immigrant visa, and it shows it was signed by Lee Harvey Oswald, and that the beneficiary was Marina N. Oswald, and that it was sworn to and subscribed before you on July 11, 1961. I ask you, have you seen that before?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, this is something that I did not recall. But I see that it was also an enclosure to my document which I sent in on August 28, 1961.

Undoubtedly I must then have taken Mr. Oswald's oath on this document on the date specified. This would not have required the presence of his wife, but I am sure then on the basis of what I see here that this must have occurred, but I did not remember it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Since you have that document before you, could you then say that there is a possibility that Commission Exhibit No. 945 was written on July 10 or July 11, 1961, rather than in August as you earlier testified?

Mr. McVICKAR. I would say there is a possibility, but again I doubt it because for one thing I do recall this item in the record which said that she was not present when he came in to the Embassy in July, and I am confident that there would have been no reason to hold up the type of report made here unless it was that she wasn't available for an interview.

But as I say, I couldn't say for sure, but I don't remember, I don't think of any reason that would have caused a delay of this kind unless it had been that she didn't come in. I think it is too bad that I didn't date this note, but I guess I didn't.

Mr. COLEMAN. Can we infer from Commission Exhibit No. 959 that you must have seen Mr. Oswald on July 11, 1961?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I think this would be a safe assumption, but I don't remember anything about it, and it could have been a very routine thing you see, because the way the work was arranged was that Consul Snyder as the officer in charge handled our matters relating to citizenship, and I handled matters relating to visas, and this was a visa matter and he could very well have asked that I take Mr. Oswald's oath on this petition in behalf of his wife, and it might have a very pro forma thing. But I honestly don't remember this incident; but this sort of thing is never done unless the person is present, unless both signing parties are present.

So it would seem to me that this man must have appeared to me and signed this thing and said that it was his legal act, and then I certified to that.

Mr. DULLES. By both signing parties you only mean Oswald and the notary or whoever certifies to it?

Mr. McVICKAR. I being the notary in this case you see. But the beneficiary, Mrs. Oswald, did not have to be present for this thing.

Mr. COLEMAN. There is a possibility she was present?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, I think it is possible; but I rather doubt it frankly, and I doubt it on the basis of what I have said before, that I think I recall seeing in the record that she was not present, and that I don't see why this whole procedure would't have gone through much more quickly if she had been, that is all.

Mr. COLEMAN. You keep on referring to the fact that you recall seeing this in the record. Could you tell me where you saw it, please?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, I can try to find it. I think the best thing would be if I looked at the Moscow official file. Is that right here? Okay; well, maybe I can find it. Is that all right if I take a minute to look through these papers?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF ABRAM CHAYES

Representative FORD. Mr. Chayes, will you take the following oath. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHAYES. I do.

Mr. COLEMAN. The Honorable Abram Chayes is the Legal Adviser to the Department of State. Mr. Chayes will be asked to testify with respect to the files and other information and documents supplied the Commission by the Department of State dealing with Mr. Oswald.

Mr. Chayes will also be asked about the legal correctness of certain decisions made by various offices of the State Department with regard to Oswald, including whether Oswald had lost his American citizenship by his actions in 1959, whether his passport should have been returned to him in July 1961, whether his passport should have been renewed based upon the July 10, 1961, application, whether he should have been issued his 1963 passport, and whether action should have been taken to revoke it in October 1963 as a result of information received by the Passport Office, and whether the Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service acted properly in connection with section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to Marina. Mr. Chayes will also be asked about the lookout card system in the Passport Office.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, will you state for the record your full name?

Mr. CHAYES. My name is Abram Chayes. There is a middle name that I don't use. It is Joseph.

Mr. COLEMAN. Where do you presently reside?

Mr. CHAYES. At 3520 Edmunds Street NW., Washington, D.C.

Mr. COLEMAN. When did you become Legal Adviser to the State Department?

Mr. CHAYES. I think I was sworn in on February 7, 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. So, therefore, anything that happened with respect to Mr. Oswald prior to that time you had nothing to do with and knew nothing about?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I should say that I never heard the name Lee Harvey Oswald until November 22, 1963, so that neither before nor after the time I became Legal Adviser, before the assassination, did I have any direct knowledge about Oswald, nor do I believe I passed directly on any matters in the case, although there may have been some matters that were considered in my office. I am not sure about that, but I took no personal action in the case.

Mr. COLEMAN. Since the assassination your office has had occasion to review the various files which were in the State Department dealing with Lee Harvey Oswald, is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; on November 22, Mr. Ball, the Under Secretary of State, directed me to take in personal charge all the files in the Department that I could find, and to review those files and be prepared with a report for the Secretary the following morning on the general relations of Mr. Oswald and the State Department.

I did take some files, the basic files into my custody at that time, and retained them in my custody, I think, until we sent them to the Commission at the Commission's request. And others than who were working on the matter in the Department had access to the files but had to work in my office on them.

Mr. COLEMAN. On or about May 28, 1964, you had occasion to reassemble the files and deliver another set to the Commission, is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; from time to time between the first delivery, which was probably last December sometime, and just last week we have made other papers available to the Commission as they have come to our own notice. A file search of this kind in a place like the Department of State is a pretty elaborate business.

Only last week we got a whole new shipment from the Moscow Embassy in which they said, "We have sent you before everything that you didn't have duplicates of, but here is a whole bunch of duplicates."

And it turned out that some of them weren't duplicates as appeared just this morning. We made those available as soon as they came in.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it with the covering letter of May 28, 1964, and the description you made of the file together with the other files that you delivered to us just yesterday, that they constitute all of the files that the State Department has?

Mr. CHAYES. As I say, they constitute all that we have been able to find, all the documents we have been able to find after a most diligent search.

I myself did not personally conduct the search, but we directed responsible officers in all the various places where documents might be to give us all the documents they had, and I think we made a very intensive search, and to my knowledge there are no other documents in the Department relating to this matter in any way.

Mr. COLEMAN. Shortly after the Commission was appointed, you had prepared under your direction, and submitted to the Commission a document entitled "Report of the Department of State Lee Harvey Oswald," is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And this document is an examination of the various actions taken by people in the State Department, and your judgment as to the legal correctness of the various actions?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, as you see, the document consists of five subparts. It is an analysis and summary of the documents in the files. We went through the files, looked at all the documents, tried to summarize them for the Commission so as to give the Commission the fullest possible appreciation of the contacts between Oswald and the Department. Where it was necessary to elucidate policies or matters of law in order to give the Commission that appreciation, we have done so, yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. The Report has been given a number of Commission Document No. 2. (Commission Exhibit No. 950.) After that you, on May 8, 1964, sent a letter to the general counsel for the Commission in which you answered certain questions which had been proposed by the general counsel?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; the general counsel sent us a questionnaire with two attachments, attachment A and attachment B. Attachment A referred to matters mostly concerning Russia and the Embassy in Moscow. Attachment B raised questions about matters within the Department, passport and visa offices within the Department. Each attachment contained a series of questions.

Again I think it is more accurate to state that the responses were prepared under my supervision and direction. I, of course, reviewed every response and and none were sent out without my approval. But I was not the draftsman or didn't do all of the work.

Mr. COLEMAN. The first question that the Commission would like to know about and be given some advice on is the question of whether the acts which Oswald performed in October 1959, and shortly thereafter, would in your opinion result in his loss of citizenship.

Mr. CHAYES. In my judgment they would not amount to expatriating acts. The basic analysis is covered in the third part of Commission Document No. 2, entitled "Lee Harvey Oswald--Expatriation."

Representative FORD. On what page is that, Mr. Chayes?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I am sorry, each of the parts begin at No. 1, so it is not very convenient, but it is about halfway through. There is a memorandum entitled "Memorandum Lee Harvey Oswald--Expatriation."

Now, in that memorandum we analyze three sections of the act under which it might be argued that an expatriation took place.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes?

Mr. CHAYES. I say in that memorandum we analyzed the three possible sections of the act under which it might be argued that an expatriation took place, and in each case we conclude, and I think properly, that there was no expatriation. The first section is section----

Mr. DULLES. May I ask one question? This is a formal opinion of your office as Legal Adviser to the State Department?

Mr. CHAYES. I take responsibility for this as my present opinion, yes, sir, and it goes out over my signature. We are not quite like the Attorney General. We don't have opinions that get bound up in volumes.

Mr. DULLES. I realize that it is not a formalized opinion from that angle. Was this ever submitted to the Department of Justice for consideration?

Mr. CHAYES. No; it was not.

Mr. EHRLICH. Actually this report did go to the Department of Justice because it was submitted before the Commission was formed.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; but it wasn't submitted to the Department of Justice for consideration.

Mr. DULLES. For concurrence or anything of that kind.

Mr. CHAYES. For concurrence, no.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, the first section which I assume you address your attention to was section 349(a) (1).

Mr. CHAYES. We could do it that way.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you want to start with 349(a) (6)?

Mr. CHAYES. We started with (a) (6) in the memorandum because there was likely to be a better case under (a) (6) than almost anything else. The reason why one might argue more about (a) (6) than anything else, is that there were written statements by Oswald saying, "I renounce my citizenship" or words to that effect, and they were made in writing, and in a way that appeared to be intended as a formal, considered statement.

But (a) (6) says that a U.S. national may lose his nationality by "making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State."

Now, even if you resolve every other issue in favor of expatriation, that is if you say handing a fellow a letter of the kind that Oswald handed to Mr. Snyder was a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer, it was clearly not on the form prescribed by the Secretary of State, and the courts have been very precise on that.

Representative FORD. Do you have those citations, Mr. Chayes?

Mr. CHAYES. The form we have here, it is called "Form of Oath of Renunciation." It is volume 8 of the Foreign Affairs Manual of the Department of State, and it is an exhibit to section 225.6, and you can see here that it is a fully prescribed form.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you have any case where (a) it was a written statement, and (b) it was given to a consul and yet because it was not on the form prescribed by the Secretary of State, a court has held that it was not a renunciation?

Mr. CHAYES. No case has been decided under 349(a) (6), but the general line of cases under 349 is to resolve every doubt in favor of the citizen, and there are innumerable citations to that effect. I feel quite confident when the statute itself prescribes that the form should be one established by the Secretary, and where the Secretary has in fact prescribed such a form, that one cannot bring himself under (a) (6) unless he uses the form.

Mr. COLEMAN. Wouldn't the two letters that Oswald delivered be considered as making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, which is an act under (a) (2)?

Mr. CHAYES. That would be (a) (2), and we consider that at page 7 of the memorandum, subsection C.

Mr. DULLES. Are we through with all pages up to 7?

Mr. CHAYES. No; we probably go back to 1. But there we do have cases, and the cases are clear that the oath or affirmation or formal declaration under section (a) (2) has to be to an official entitled to receive it on behalf of the foreign state, and even then the courts have been very sticky about holding people to that.

For example, there is one case where a dual national, a Philippine and U.S. national, made an oath of allegiance to the Philippines in the usual form in order to get a Philippine passport, and it was asserted that this was an expatriating act, and the court held no, it wasn't. In re Bautista's Petition, 183 F. Supp. 271 (D.C. Guam, 1960). There is a case where a man took an oath of allegiance to the British Crown, but the recipient of the oath was his employer, private employer, and it was held that that was not the kind of oath that is involved. In The Matter of L. 1 I. & N. Dec. 317 (B.I.A. 1942).

The courts have said that this is a reciprocal relationship in which in order to come under this section, the citizen or the U.S. citizen must offer his allegiance to the foreign state and the foreign state must accept it.

Mr. DULLES. There has to be action on both sides. Unilateral action is not enough if the affirmation is not accepted.

Mr. CHAYES. That is the way I read the cases. Now, of course, if it comes before, if the oath is taken before an official of the foreign state that is authorized to take oaths of allegiance, why then nothing more is needed than that. But making an oath or statement of allegiance to another American or to a private party, whatever his nationality, has been held not to fall within 349 (a)(2).

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you know whether Oswald had to make any statement or take any oath when he got employment in the Soviet Union?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't personally, but it may have been inquired into by the consul when Oswald came back for a renewal passport.

I think the record shows that it was concluded that there was no evidence that he became a naturalized Soviet citizen, and so far as I know, there is no evidence that he in any other way took an oath of allegiance of the kind that would bring him under 349(a)(2).

Even if he had had to do so, for example, in connection with his employment, there are cases which may say that that is not a voluntary oath if it is done out of economic necessity and it will not, therefore, serve to expatriate. See Insogna v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1953); Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F. 2d 551 (3d Cir. 1956); and Bruni v. Dulles, 235 F. 2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In at least one other case, Mendelsohn v. Dulles, 207 F. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 1953), a court held that the plaintiff had not expatriated himself by residing abroad for more than 5 years since he had remained abroad to care for his sick wife, who was too ill to travel.

Representative FORD. I think it would be helpful wherever you say, Mr. Chayes, there are cases, that the record show the citation of the cases.

Mr. CHAYES. I think most of the cases that I am relying on are cited in the memorandum to which I am referring. But there may be others that I am recollecting. If I could have a chance to review the transcript, I will submit exact citations in each case.

Representative FORD. I think that would be very helpful. Otherwise I think the record is----

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; I agree.

Representative FORD. Is not clear or not complete, and as far as I am concerned, and I think the Commission would agree, that you should review the transcript to supply those citations for those particular categories of cases.

Mr. CHAYES. I will be very glad to do so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now do you want to address yourself to section 349(a) (1)?

Mr. CHAYES. Well (a) (1) is obtaining naturalization, and there just wasn't any indication, there wasn't any evidence at all that he had become a naturalized Soviet citizen.

We knew that he applied for naturalization, but even on the basis of his Soviet documents he had not been given Soviet citizenship.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it your testimony is that after reviewing all of the files, your office has determined that Oswald committed no act which would justify the Department stating that he had expatriated himself.

Mr. CHAYES. I think that is right. I more than think that is right. I know that is right. We have reached the conclusion, and I personally have reached the conclusion, that Oswald's actions in the Soviet Union, although he may very well have wanted to expatriate himself at one time or another, did not succeed in doing that.

I think for the record I would like to read here a citation from the case of Stipa v. Dulles decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit--the citation is at 233 F. 2d. 551--which gives some idea of the general attitude with which the courts approach expatriation cases. In that case it said:

The burden of proving expatriation generally is upon the defendant who affirmatively alleges it [that is the Secretary of State] and the burden is a heavy one. Factual doubts are to be resolved in favor of citizenship. The burden of proof on the Government in an expatriation case is like that in denaturalization. The evidence must be clear, unequivocal and convincing. The rule prevailing in denaturalization cases that the facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen equally applies to expatriation cases. American citizenship is not to be lightly taken away.

This is the dominating attitude of the courts in all of these cases. We find, for example, that a group of Japanese Americans, who during the war under the stress of the relocation program, did all of the business of renouncing their citizenship and did it in the most formal kind of a way, and it was clear that they had done it and they had meant to do it and all that sort of thing. When after the war they raised the question of their citizenship status, the court held well, that the emotional stress and strain of the relocation and shock under those circumstances was such that this shouldn't be held against them. Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F. 2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).

So the courts have gone very, very far to uphold the notion that American citizenship is not to be lightly taken away, see e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), and that has affected not only our legal judgment in the particular case, but our general policy which you have heard explained by Mr. Snyder and Mr. McVickar.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you describe for the record what the policy of the Department is when a person appears at a foreign embassy and attempts to expatriate himself?

Mr. DULLES. Before you answer that question may I ask a question. In your memorandum here, relating to the paragraph we have been discussing, there is a footnote that interests me. It says:

"After the assassination of President Kennedy, an official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated to an officer of the American Embassy in Moscow that Soviet authorities had considered Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship but had decided not to approve it because Oswald seemed unstable."

Mr. Coleman, do we have that in our files?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; I think also the American Embassy officer was Ambassador Kohler?

Mr. COLEMAN. It was Stoessel.

Mr. CHAYES. Oh, Stoessel, Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. DULLES. The statement was made to him by an official of the Foreign Office?

Mr. CHAYES. I think he is identified in the telegram; yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Also when the Secretary appears tomorrow I think he will impart some information on what the Soviet Ambassador told him as to the reason why they refused Oswald citizenship.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; I would rather like to put that in the record unless there is some similar reason to the one we had before.

Mr. CHAYES. Could I go off the record for just a moment?

(Discussion off the record.)

(Mr. Coleman's last question was read back by the reporter.)

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I think the basic policy of the Department is a recognition that this is a very grave and serious and irrevocable act that can affect a person's life and does affect a person's life very fundamentally. And so the policy of the Department is to make sure that the person making the renunciation does so with full recognition of the consequences of his action, of the fact that it is a very grave act, and in such a way as to make sure that it is a completely voluntary act in every sense of the word, so that it can be shown not only to be free of any physical duress or coercion, but mental stress and things of that kind.

This is not only true because of the recognition of what it means to the individual, but also because in order to support the denaturalization in court. You have got to be able to show those things under the standards and the general attitude that I have set forth.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it your testimony is that you reviewed all of the files and looked at all of the memorandums or had it done under your direction, and your judgment is that Oswald had not expatriated himself in 1959?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; on the basis of the record that I have in the file.

Mr. COLEMAN. And with that determination made, then I take it that when Oswald appeared at the Embassy in July 1961, and requested that his passport be returned to him, that Mr. Snyder had no other alternative but to return his passport to him, is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. In the absence of any other disqualifying ground, and there wasn't any other disqualifying ground either known to the Embassy in Moscow or available in our own files back home. If Mr. Oswald was a citizen, and was not disqualified in some other way, he was entitled to the passport.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know from studying the records, or otherwise, whether when that request was made by Lee Harvey Oswald, it was referred back to the State Department and reconsidered again?

Mr. CHAYES. Oh, yes; it was. In the first place, the expatriation issue wasn't decided until that time. That is the expatriation issue was open until he came back in and applied for the passport.

The expatriation issue was decided in the first instance by the officer in the field, and then the tentative decision was reported by him back to the Passport Office and the expatriation decision was reviewed in the Passport Office at that time. The file was reviewed for other possible disqualifications, and an instruction went out with respect to the return of the passport.

The field was instructed that when the passport was returned, it should be marked for travel to the United States only, and then when the passport was finally renewed some weeks later, that was also pursuant to a departmental instruction.

Mr. DULLES. Was that reviewed in your office at that time?

Mr. CHAYES. No; it wasn't.

Mr. DULLES. Shouldn't it have been?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't think so, Mr. Dulles. The Passport Office has to make nationality determinations on thousands and thousands of people.

Mr. DULLES. But this is a legal question, isn't it?

Mr. CHAYES. But they have adjudicators in the Passport Office.

Mr. DULLES. They have legal officers.

Mr. CHAYES. Thirty lawyers or something.

Mr. DULLES. They have?

Mr. CHAYES. And two lawyers reviewed this case. There are just thousands of nationality or loss of nationality determinations.

Mr. DULLES. And those are generally all settled in the Passport Office?

Mr. CHAYES. In almost every case.

Mr. DULLES. Some of them may be presented to your office.

Mr. CHAYES. Where they present especially difficult questions of law or general policy of administration; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And this wasn't considered as a case involving particularly difficult questions of law?

Mr. CHAYES. No; I don't think it did then or does now.

Representative FORD. Did the people in Washington who made this review know that on this one particular form, I don't recall the Commission Exhibit, that Oswald said, "I have done this, that," one or the other?

Mr. CHAYES. They would have had that before them. I think that is the form that was sent back to the Department, the one that had "have not" crossed out and "have" was left standing. So they made the determination on the basis of a form----

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 938, for the record.

Mr. CHAYES. Commission Exhibit No. 938, in which Oswald indicated that he had done one of these acts, and then supplied a supplementary questionnaire explaining in fuller detail what he meant.

Mr. DULLES. Do you happen to know who the lawyers were who did this in the Passport Office, and whether they would be available if we should want to see them?

Mr. CHAYES. I think they are on the list to testify.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, those lawyers didn't review the file in 1961. They are the two lawyers that reviewed it in October 1963.

Mr. CHAYES. I see. Well, I can find out if we haven't supplied the names already.

Mr. COLEMAN. I don't think any lawyer reviewed the file in 1961.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, an adjudicator did.

Mr. COLEMAN. It was Miss Waterman. She is not a lawyer.

Mr. CHAYES. I see.

Mr. DULLES. She is coming before us?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. She is a passport adjudicator.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, were have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 929 an Operations Memorandum from the Department of State to the Embassy in Moscow, dated March 28, 1960, which stated that:

"An appropriate notice had been placed in the Lookout Card Section of the Passport Office in the event that Mr. Oswald should apply for documentation at a point outside the Soviet Union."

I would like to show you this Commission exhibit and ask you are you familiar with that memorandum?

Mr. CHAYES. I have seen this, but only since the assassination in my general review of the files.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, has your office made a check to determine whether a lookout card was prepared?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; Mr. Coleman. In connection with the preparation of this memorandum, and the responses to the supplemental questions for the Commission, we did examine the question of whether a lookout card was prepared. I should say again that the matter of preparation of lookout cards is not under my jurisdiction, and my knowledge of this is only from a subsequent investigation.

Mr. COLEMAN. Your examination revealed that a lookout card actually was never prepared, is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. I think we have to say that our examination does not reveal that a lookout card was prepared, and that on balance examining all the relevant considerations, it appears more likely than not that no lookout card was prepared.

Representative FORD. But there was none in the file.

Mr. CHAYES. There was none in the file, but there wouldn't have been anyway, because this lookout card was ordered prepared because there was a doubt as to whether Oswald had expatriated himself. Once that doubt had been removed by an adjudication as it was in July of 1961, the lookout card based on the possibility of expatriation would have been removed.

It might be worth a moment if I could give you some general picture of the lookout card system. Miss Knight will be able to testify in much greater detail than I as to the actual operating----

Mr. DULLES. So that when 1963 came around and there was a further application for a passport, there was no lookout card then found in 1963?

Mr. CHAYES. Nor should there have been.

Mr. DULLES. That is the issue under your procedure.

Mr. COLEMAN. Let me refer back to 1961 when you determined or the Department determined to renew the passport. Now, as I understand it, there was a search made of the Lookout Card Section, and the records that we have reveal that no lookout card was found.

Mr. DULLES. Even in 1961?

Mr. COLEMAN. In 1961.

Mr. CHAYES. I don't think that that can be said that categorically. I think it appears probable that there was no lookout card in 1961 at that time, yes; that is correct.

Mr. DULLES. But in 1961 all of these facts with regard to Oswald were before you, were they not?

Mr. CHAYES. If I could just give some notion of what this system is like.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. The lookout card is an IBM card, an ordinary IBM card, and it should be prepared on anyone as to whom some evidence of disqualification for a passport exists in our files. If the system worked perfectly, anytime there was an unresolved question about the eligibility of a person for a passport----

Representative FORD. Does a defector or an attempted defector fall in that category?

Mr. CHAYES. No; the problem here was that this man had attempted to expatriate himself, and said he was going to naturalize himself as a Soviet citizen, and if he had done either of those things effectively, he would have disqualified himself for a passport.

So there was an unresolved question on the facts known in 1959, or January 1960, whenever it was. And at that point a lookout card should have been prepared for him.

Then in July of 1961, when he came back in in Moscow, and asked for the renewal of his passport, that question of expatriation was then determined, both in Moscow and at home, and it was determined in favor of the applicant. So that the outstanding question was then removed, and if the procedures had gone right, the lookout card also, if it had been prepared, would have been taken out of the lookout file and torn up and thrown away.

Representative FORD. Don't you keep records of what you put in and what you take out?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, the refusal slip which formed the basis on which this memorandum that we are talking about was made. There was a refusal slip which was a direction to the person in the lookout card office to make a lookout card, and also probably whoever made the refusal slip also sent this memorandum to Moscow saying that a lookout card had been prepared.

If you look at the refusal slip, which is retained in the main passport file of Oswald, it doesn't have the notations that it would have had or should have had if a card had been made. So that on the general basis of the evidence, we conclude that it is probable that no card was made. But you can't say that for sure because even if one had been made, it would have been removed when the issue was resolved.

Representative FORD. If it is probable one wasn't made, but there is a possibility, remote as it might be, don't you have some means of recording when a lookout card is removed?

Mr. CHAYES. That notation also does not appear.

Representative FORD. So the probability is increased.

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct.

Representative FORD. That there was no lookout card ever made and put into the file.

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct, sir. All of this is covered in some detail in our response, our written response to the questionnaire, and comes to the same conclusion, and all of these points are enumerated.

Mr. COLEMAN. There is a Commission Exhibit No. 948 where Mr. Chayes under date of May 8, 1964, addressed himself to these problems.

Representative FORD. Is this that which I have here?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Representative FORD. And that is to be in the record?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. We will give it an exhibit number.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Back on the record.

I would like to mark as Commission Exhibit No. 948 a letter from the Legal Adviser to the Department of State to Mr. Rankin dated May 8, 1964.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 948 for identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to ask the witness whether this letter was prepared under his direction together with the attachments.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; the letter and attachments are those which were prepared--I haven't had a chance to examine each right now, but appear to be those which were prepared in my office and under my personal supervision in response to the request of the Commission.

Mr. COLEMAN. In Commission Exhibit No. 948 you explain the lookout card situation.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. You treat with the question of whether a lookout card was in the State Department file on Oswald in 1961.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; I think it is covered in the answers to questions 12 and 13. In particular the answer to question 13 shows the evaluation on which we reached the conclusion that it is probable that a lookout card was not prepared.

Mr. COLEMAN. Was there any other occasion as a result of acts by Oswald that you felt that a lookout card should have been prepared?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. What were those?

Mr. CHAYES. Under the procedures of the Department, once Oswald was given a repatriation loan, as he was on his return to this country in, what was it, May of 1962, a lookout card should have been prepared and should have been maintained in the lookout file during the period when there was an unpaid balance on his repatriation loan, and in that case it appears pretty certainly that no card was prepared. We don't even have in that case a refusal slip indicating a direction to prepare a card.

Mr. DULLES. Can you refuse issuance of a passport when there is an unpaid balance due?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know what the courts would say, but a person who accepts a repatriation loan now signs an agreement that he will not apply for a passport until he has paid the loan.

At the time that Oswald got his loan, the form was a little different, but even then he signed a statement saying that he understood that passport facilities would not be furnished to him while an outstanding balance was----

Representative FORD. Could we have in the record the form that was in existence before and that which is now the form?

Mr. CHAYES. I think you do have it in the report. Again it is in the answer to question 13, page 3 of that answer, if you see there it says, "In the promissory note"--it is about the middle of the page--"which he signed for the loan he stated, section 423.6-5 that 'I further understand and agree that after my repatriation I will not be furnished a passport for travel abroad until my obligation to reimburse the Treasurer of the United States is liquidated.'"

Mr. COLEMAN. You testified that you made a search of the records or you had a search made of the records of the Department, and you conclude that no lookout card was ever prepared.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; we can't find any evidence that a lookout card might have been prepared.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you know why one was not prepared?

Mr. CHAYES. There could have been more than one reason. It could have been simply a bureaucratic oversight. It could have been that they didn't have date and place of birth information on Oswald.

Because of the possibility of identical names, the practice of the Passport Office is not to prepare a lookout card on any individual on the basis of his name alone. They need both name and date and place of birth.

Now, it may have been either that the Finance Office failed to notify the Passport Office because it did not have date and place of birth information, or that it did notify the Passport Office, and because there was no date and place of birth information, the Passport Office did not make a card.

Mr. DULLES. But the Passport Office had that information.

Mr. CHAYES. The Passport Office had the date and place of birth information on Lee Harvey Oswald; yes.

Mr. DULLES. But not on Marina?

Mr. CHAYES. Marina wouldn't have gotten into the Passport Office at all. She is an alien. But they didn't know whether the Lee Harvey Oswald, or they might not have known that the Lee Harvey Oswald that came down from the Finance Office, if indeed it did come down, was the same Lee Harvey Oswald as to whom they had date and place of birth information.

That is the problem. The problem is avoiding the difficulties that would arise if duplicated names put you into the lookout card system.

Mr. COLEMAN. Once the loan had been repaid, would the card have been taken out?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. So, therefore, by the time he applied for the passport in June 1963, the loan had been paid so there wouldn't have been a lookout card in any event.

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct. The lookout card would have been removed, had it been made, on January 29, 1963, 6 months before the passport application, when Oswald finally paid the last of his outstanding loan balance.

Mr. DULLES. Can I ask a question there? Is the lookout card then only prepared in those cases where a passport should be refused irrespective of the moral turpitude or idiosyncracies or whatever else may be the case with regard to the individual?

Mr. CHAYES. There are three cases in which a lookout card is prepared. One is the case you have just mentioned, where a passport should be refused or there is evidence that might warrant refusal that you have to look into further.

The second is if you are a very important person and your passport is supposed to be given specially expeditious treatment.

And the third, if another agency, for example, your old agency or the FBI or any other agency has asked the Department to inform them in case of the passport application by a particular individual, a lookout card will be made. So those are the three categories.

Now, the first category is by far the biggest. There are 250,000 lookout cards, and by far the overwhelming majority of those is in the first category, that is people as to whom there is evidence which would warrant a determination that they should not be issued a passport.

Mr. COLEMAN. Does the State Department have any regulations which set forth the circumstances under which they will refuse a person a passport?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; we have regulations which are set forth, a copy of which is attached to question 17. They appear in volume 22 of the Federal Register.

Mr. COLEMAN. Volume 22, title 22?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; title 22, part 51 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it then that in 51.135 you have the regulation which says that you can deny a passport to a member of a Communist organization, is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I think you have to be careful how you read that. It is a member of a Communist organization registered or required to be registered under section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended.

This 51.135 is a regulation which implements section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, which denies passports to members of organizations required to register.

The only such organization so far against which a final order of registration is outstanding, is the Communist Party of the United States. So, not only technically but actually, membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would not bring you within this paragraph of the regulation.

Mr. DULLES. Or the Communist Party of any other country.

Mr. CHAYES. Of any other country.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is there any other regulation, which the State Department has, dealing with the circumstances under which they can refuse to issue a passport?

Mr. CHAYES. The other regulation covering substantive grounds of refusal is 51.136.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you read into the record the regulation?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; the regulation says:

"In order to promote"----

Well, it is entitled "Limitations on Issuance of Passports to Certain Other Persons."

It reads:

"In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport facilities except for direct and immediate return to the United States shall be refused to a person when it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that the person's activities abroad would (a) violate the laws of the United States, and (b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations, or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

Mr. COLEMAN. In 1963, on June 24 when Oswald applied for a passport, he was issued the passport within 24 hours after the application; is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is there any record in the Department that anyone ever examined Oswald's file to make a determination of whether he should have been issued a passport?

Mr. CHAYES. In 1963?

Mr. COLEMAN. 1963.

Mr. CHAYES. In 1963 the passport was issued on the basis of a simple check of the lookout file under the normal procedures of the Department.

What happens is that when a field office, in this case it was the New Orleans field office, get a series of passport applications, they Telex the names of the applicants and their place and date of birth to the Department, and the Department makes a name check through the lookout card file. That is all. And if there isn't a lookout card in the lookout card file, they authorize the issuance of the passport by the field agency. The field agency has to make a determination of citizenship, of course. But no further action is taken in Washington unless for some reason or other the field agency would wish to send a particular case forward.

Mr. COLEMAN. Since there was no lookout card, I take it we can assume that the June 25, 1963, passport was issued without any----

Mr. CHAYES. Without any examination.

Mr. COLEMAN. Without any consultation of the files on Oswald----

Mr. CHAYES. Exactly.

Mr. COLEMAN. That were in the Department.

Mr. CHAYES. I am confident that that was the case.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask whether there are any lookout cards to your knowledge that are filed under that third section there?

Mr. CHAYES. "Violate the laws or be prejudical"?

Mr. DULLES. That is it; yes.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I don't know for a fact that there are, but if we would make such a determination with respect to some person or group, I suppose lookout cards would be prepared for such a group.

And I would go further and say that probably the authority, you don't need authority to do it, but the theory of preparing cards for defectors which we are now doing under the Schwartz to Knight memorandum, that we referred to a moment ago, is that it is possible that a defector, upon examination of his file, will be shown to fall within one of these categories.

Mr. DULLES. Would Oswald now be considered a defector, or should he have been at that time if the regulations that you now have in effect were then in effect?

Mr. CHAYES. If we had the instruction in the Schwartz to Knight memorandum, yes; there would have been a lookout card on Oswald.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, assuming on June 25, 1963, a person in the Passport Office had examined all of the files that the State Department had on Oswald from 1959 through June 25, 1963, in your opinion could the Department have refused Oswald a passport based upon section 51.136 of the regulation?

Mr. CHAYES. In my opinion, they could not. They could not have refused a passport based on the information in the Oswald file.

Representative FORD. If that is true, how could you have a lookout card now that would have resulted, that would result in a passport being refused?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't think we could. What the lookout card would do would be to refer you to the file. You would look into the file. You might then want some further investigation as to this fellow.

You might, having seen that you were dealing with this kind of a person, want to examine him more fully on his travel plans and so on and so on. That further investigation might turn up some information which would warrant a determination under one of these subsections. But if it turned up nothing but what was in the file, you would have to issue the passport, in my judgment.

Mr. DULLES. That is, lookout cards might well be put in in borderline cases, but when you came to consider the case on all the facts, you would decide in favor of issuance of the passport rather than refusal?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; that is the same thing with the expatriation card which should have been made out for Oswald in 1960. It should have been made out because there was a possibility that he had expatriated himself. But then when he came to apply for the passport, all the lookout card would do is say, "Investigate this carefully and determine this issue."

And as you say, when you got all the facts as in the expatriation situation, you might determine that he had not expatriated himself.

Representative FORD. At least in this case if there had been a lookout card, there would have been a delay.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Representative FORD. That is the very least that would have happened.

Mr. CHAYES. There would have been a delay of a couple of days probably.

Representative FORD. And in this case time might have been important.

Mr. CHAYES. No; if you are talking about this case as it actually happened, time wasn't important at all. He applied for the passport in June of 1963. He got it in June of 1963, and he made no effort to use the passport, nor did he have any occasion to use it, until he died.

Mr. DULLES. It would have been a blessing for us if he had used it, say, in the sense that the assassination might not have taken place, if he had taken the passport and gone to China as he may have contemplated.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, is it your testimony that when the Department knows a person went abroad in 1959, attempted to defect to the Soviet Union, stated that he had information on radar which he was going to turn over to the Soviet, and the difficulty that we had to get him back, it is your opinion that it would not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States for him to be given a passport to go abroad the second time?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I think that is correct without knowing any more about what he intended to do this time on his travels abroad.

You have got to remember that the discretion that the Secretary can exercise under 51.136, is as the Supreme Court said in the Kent case, a limited discretion, although it is phrased in very broad terms.

For example, we have people who are going abroad all the time and making the nastiest kinds of speeches about the United States, or who go abroad for political activity that is completely at odds with the policy of the United States, and may be even directed against our policy. But we could not deny a passport on the grounds of political activities, political associations, speech, things of that kind. So the Kent case says, as I read it and as most others do. I think you have to, in order to apply this section, there are some fairly regular categories, fugitives from justice.

Mr. DULLES. Just one question. If there had been a lookout card in, and then you would reconsider the case in June 1963, when he applied, would you not then normally have notified the FBI and the CIA that here was a returned defector?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

Mr. DULLES. Who was going abroad again?

Mr. CHAYES. No; not unless the FBI and the CIA had asked us to notify them. However, what we might have done would be to use FBI facilities to make a further investigation of the situation. That is possible.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes informed us prior to the commencement of his testimony that he would have to leave at 4 p.m., but would return tomorrow morning to complete it. He will now be excused. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McVICKAR RESUMED

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall, Mr. McVickar, we were trying to determine whether Mrs. Oswald came into the Embassy in July or in August 1961, and you said that if you had an opportunity to look at the State Department file that you might find something which would aid you in recollecting.

Have you had such opportunity.

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I have. I observe two items in here. There is a despatch prepared by Mr. Snyder which says that Mrs. Oswald was expected to come in very shortly. This despatch was prepared I believe on the same day that Mr. Oswald was in the office.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that despatch dated July 11, 1961?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. The record shows it is Commission Exhibit No. 935.

Mr. McVICKAR. And the item is on page 2, and it says, "He is attempting to arrange for his wife to join him in Moscow so she can appear at the Embassy for a visa interview in the next day or two."

And then there is a later despatch dated October 12, 1961, which encloses the text of certain letters addressed to the Embassy by Oswald, and one of them is a letter dated July 15, 1961.

Mr. DULLES. Moscow?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; apparently from Minsk after he had returned.

Mr. DULLES. Oh, Minsk.

Mr. McVICKAR. And it says that; "While we were still in Moscow the foreman at her place of work was notified that she and I went to the Embassy for the purpose of visas."

Well now, it seems clear that she did in fact go to the Embassy in early July, and that this interview that I had with her undoubtedly took place then approximately the 12th or 13th of July.

Mr. COLEMAN. Wouldn't you say that it took place, sir, on the 11th of July?

Mr. McVICKAR. It probably took place then on the 11th of July, except that this despatch here, which was dated the 11th, said that she was coming in, in the next couple of days.

No, no; this says that he appeared at the Embassy on July 8, and so this was probably prepared on the 8th of July.

I would say then it must have taken place on the 11th of July.

Mr. COLEMAN. It is your testimony, therefore, that Commission Exhibit No. 959, which is the petition to classify status of alien for issuance of immigrant visa, was prepared on July 11, 1961?

Mr. McVICKAR. Oh, yes; that is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. That was probably the day that Marina came into the Embassy?

Mr. McVICKAR. Probably the day she came into the Embassy, and probably the day on which I interviewed her.

Mr. COLEMAN. And, therefore, the notes, Commission Exhibit No. 945, were apparently made on July 11?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; apparently made then on July 11. They formed the basis of this later communication of August 28, and I now think that the reason that this was not done sooner, was because it was not an urgent matter, because they had not yet received exit visas, and we were in the process of processing cases that had received exit visas, and were ready to go, and no one could tell when they might get Soviet exit visas.

Mr. DULLES. Which is the chicken and which is the egg here? I mean, do you get your exit visas before you know whether you are going to get into the country of destination, or do you get your permission to go to the United States before you get your exit visa?

Mr. McVICKAR. In an ordinary country you would apply for your American visa, and then apply for your exit visa, or permission to depart from the country, after you had your American visa.

But in this case, in the Soviet Union, it was reversed because it was so difficult to get exit visas.

The American Government never bothered with any of its papers other than to just take record of the interest of the people, until after they had received permission to depart from the Soviet Union at which point we processed their papers expeditiously.

But usually there was very little done in the American documentation until after they had received an exit visa from the Soviet Union.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, you then on August 28, 1961, prepared the Operations Memorandum which has been given Commission Exhibit No. 944; is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that was the date of the memorandum.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now in that memorandum you indicated that Marina had been in to see you; is that correct?

Mr. McVICKAR. The memorandum does not specifically state that. It merely gives data necessary to the determination by the Department of State of the legal status of this individual.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now as the wife of an American citizen, I take it Marina would have the right to come into the country under a nonquota status?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. What were the sanctions imposed by section 243(g), which you referred to in the memorandum?

Mr. McVICKAR. There is a provision 243(g), section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that countries which--and I am just taking this from memory now--which do not accept either at all or readily, I suppose, deportees from the United States may not be granted, the nationals of those countries may not be granted immigration visas.

There is, however, a procedure for waiving these sanctions in individual cases, and as I recall the regulations, there was a procedure for waiving these sanctions in the cases of relatives of American citizens, and in the case of Soviet citizens who wanted to go to the United States.

So Soviet citizens who were relatives of American citizens could receive a waiver of these sanctions.

Is that clear?

Mr. COLEMAN. If the sanctions had not been waived, what would be the effect of refusing to waive the sanctions?

Mr. McVICKAR. If the sanction was not waived, the effect would be a denial, in effect, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, of authority to issue the visa.

The exact legality of this I am not sure, but I know that we couldn't issue the immigration visa because she would not be admitted at the port of entry.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would that mean that Marina could not have come to the United States?

Mr. McVICKAR. It would mean that she could not enter the United States, but it would not mean that she could not depart from the Soviet Union if she had a Soviet visa. And, presumably, maybe at some later time this----

Mr. COLEMAN. Couldn't she have gone to say, Brussels, for example, in Belgium?

Mr. McVICKAR. And then applied for a visa there? This may be.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you have any discussions when you were in the Embassy as to whether if the sanctions imposed by section 243(g) were not waived, that you should send her to Brussels and let her get a visa there?

Mr. McVICKAR. I think that the record shows that there were such discussions, but they did not take place during the time I was there.

Mr. COLEMAN. When did you leave?

Mr. McVICKAR. I left on September the 1st of 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. In this memorandum which is Commission Exhibit No. 944, you indicated that you thought a favorable advisory opinion and approval of the petition is recommended, together with a waiver of the sanctions.

Mr. McVICKAR. Imposed by section 243(g) of the act, yes. This was a routine request which would have been made in any similar case using almost exactly that type of language.

In short, this was the two actions that we had to receive from Washington in order to be in a position to issue this visa.

Mr. COLEMAN. The first action to get the petition granted, that depended upon whether she was ineligible, because she belonged to a Communist organization, didn't it?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is exactly right.

Mr. COLEMAN. As to that in your memorandum you indicated that since she belonged to the Soviet trade union for medical workers, because she had to belong to that to get a job, that you would recommend that the membership be considered involuntary.

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Under section 212(A)(28)(i) of the act?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is it the general practice to indicate that such membership is involuntary when it is connected with employment?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; there are instructions from the Department giving guidance to officers in general terms, that indicate that membership in mass organizations, such as a membership in a trade union, in connection with one's work, that this membership is ordinarily considered to be involuntary, may be considered involuntary.

However, the instructions are also that all of these cases must be referred to Washington with the facts for a determination to be made, and, of course, it might well be that under some unusual circumstances if there was some indication of voluntariness, that, you know, such a membership would render the person excludable.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now you referred to Department instructions. Are those instructions found in the confidential appendix, appendix A to the visa regulations of the Department in 22 CFR 42.91A28 note 3, last issued on December 9, 1960?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I believe so.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you be kind enough to read into the record the instruction referred to?

Mr. McVICKAR. I am reading here from the Department of State's report to the Commission, and it cites the text of that. Do you wish me to read it over?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Mr. McVICKAR. All right, it says this looks like it is "Note 3.3. Membership in mass organizations rank and file membership in proscribed mass organizations, in Communist and Communist controlled countries may in general, if police repression or political or economic discrimination is or was the coercive factor bringing about such membership, be considered involuntary within the meaning of section 212(a)28I(i) of the act unless the alien actively participated in the organization's activities or joined or remained connected with it because of political or ideological conviction. When an alien is refused a visa because of voluntary membership in a proscribed organization of this type the report submitted to the Department pursuant to appendix A22 CFR 42.13 on note 1 should show the circumstances leading to the decision."

I should note that the text of that is confidential, as a part of confidential appendix A.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you interviewed Marina and took the facts, that you determined that her membership in the Soviet Trade Union for Medical Workers was involuntary?

Mr. McVICKAR. It appeared to be involuntary.

Mr. COLEMAN. Suppose Marina had told you that she was a member of the Komsomol, what would you have done then?

Mr. McVICKAR. That comes under a more complicated type of instruction. The membership in the Komsomol may be found to be involuntary and is on occasion found involuntary. But you have to investigate more carefully under the regulations into the nature of the membership, because whereas if a person is a member, works in a factory, everybody in the factory belongs to the trade union.

But if you are going to the university, not everybody is a member of the Komsomol, although a high percentage of them are.

If you are going to say high school, why their membership in the Komsomol is even more in the nature of a minority, and so I had experience in this same matter considering visas for a number of different wives of American citizens, and when the Komsomol was involved, why the results varied considerably.

In some cases it was found that membership in the Komsomol was completely routine and merely because the people really were hoping to get a decent education and a good job and didn't participate in it actively.

In another case I recall, particularly a girl who had been one of the leaders in the Komsomol, and this was clearly beyond the definition of involuntary, and this was part of, was a consideration which entered into the denial of her visa in Washington.

Representative FORD. In that case, the latter one, there was a denial?

Mr. McVICKAR. There was a denial, yes, but this was because--and it is a difficult thing to be in a position to say that somebody's wife shouldn't go with him to the States, but this was the law and the question was looked into with a great deal of detail, and based largely upon this particular other person's statements in a number of interviews, why it is clear, the facts.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, after the memorandum of August 28, 1961, which is Commission Exhibit No. 944, did you have anything else to do with Lee Oswald or his wife Marina?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; I don't think so, because I left almost immediately afterward, and I had nothing more to do with the case.

Mr. COLEMAN. When you made the decision: (1) That Marina's petition for immigration should be granted, and (2) recommended that there should be a waiver of the sanction provided by section 243(g), did anyone tell you or request that you make this decision?

Mr. McVICKAR. Now one thing. I want to be sure we are accurate on my function. I was merely recommending these things. I was not making a decision. I was recommending a favorable advisory opinion from the security point of view from the Department of State. I was recommending the approval of the visa petition to grant her the status under the quota system of the wife of an American citizen, and I was recommending that the immigration service waive the sanctions imposed by 243(g), principally because she was the wife of an American citizen.

But this was my responsibility to make these recommendations, and I did so of my own free will as the officer-in-charge of this particular aspect of the case.

Mr. COLEMAN. No one called you and asked you to do it?

Mr. McVICKAR. No, no; it was my responsibility to look into the matter and make the recommendation and I did.

Mr. COLEMAN. And did you have any other facts in your possession or in your knowledge other than those which were set forth in the memorandum dated August 28, 1961, concerning whether Marina was eligible for admission as a nonquota immigrant?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; as far as I know the facts are as stated right there, and these facts were obtained from here on the basis of an interview with her, a personal interview.

Mr. COLEMAN. I have no other questions.

Representative FORD. Mr. McVickar, in your memorandum dated April 7, 1964, in the first paragraph you say: "Although I now regret that I made no notes on this even then unusual case, the following points seem to me to lend weight to my suggestion especially considering the youth and relative inexperience of the subject."

Was the Oswald case in October of 1959 a then unusual case?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; because we had had only a few people in the category of defectors, and at that point I think we might have had--this was the third one that had come up since I had been there, and the other two were much less aggressive, much less determined, and much less self-possessed people.

One of them turned out to be suffering from various mental diseases, and another one was a very weak individual who had been sort of lead astray by some Russian female agent, but this was a man who had, you know, he came directly and walked in, slammed his passport down. It was an unusual case from the very beginning.

Representative FORD. In the next paragraph you discuss in this memorandum the entry of Oswald into the Soviet Union through Helsinki. Is there any other port of entry into the Soviet Union that is comparable to Helsinki in the context you are using it here?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, yes; there are a number of other ways to get into the Soviet Union. I would think by far the most used one is to arrive at the airport in Moscow. And then frequently used by people who have not very much means, would be to come by rail from Western Europe by way of Warsaw and the port of entry in that case is Brest. One could also come by sea into Odessa. It would not be unusual to arrive by air in Leningrad.

Representative FORD. But in this memorandum in that paragraph you say, "He would have to have known the not too obvious fact that Helsinki is an unusual and relatively uncomplicated point of entry to the Soviet Union (one that the Soviets might well choose, for example, if arranging the passage themselves)."

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes.

Representative FORD. Is there any other port such as Helsinki, in the context you are using it?

Mr. McVICKAR. I am sorry, I hope I haven't confused the record. Of course, when you are actually talking about a port of entry, Helsinki is not a port of entry. It is a point of departure for the Soviet Union, and you could come in and land at the Moscow airport from Helsinki.

What I think--what I was referring to is a point of departure for the Soviet Union which would then be more likely to be Copenhagen, for example, or Warsaw or Vienna. Helsinki is a frequently used one, but it is way up north and it is----

Mr. DULLES. Wasn't he traveling by boat, however?

Mr. McVICKAR. He traveled by boat to Helsinki.

Mr. DULLES. That is where the boat went?

Mr. McVICKAR. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. No; he traveled by boat to Le Havre, France. He then went by boat from there to London but then he flew by plane from London to Helsinki.

Mr. DULLES. He did? He went by plane?

Mr. McVICKAR. I didn't realize that. But he flew from London to Helsinki and then entered the Soviet Union from Helsinki.

Mr. COLEMAN. By rail?

Mr. McVICKAR. By rail.

Representative FORD. What is so unusual and relatively uncomplicated about Helsinki as a point of entry?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, I was thinking of this in the terms of a person who didn't know the situation and wasn't very familiar with it, and I think that it might be more logical to try to fly into the Soviet Union from Copenhagen or directly from London.

It might be more logical for some people to take the train into the Soviet Union through Warsaw.

Mr. DULLES. Where did he get his visa?

Mr. McVICKAR. He got his visa in Helsinki.

Mr. DULLES. That is it then. I think that is the answer to the thing. It is much easier to get a visa right there than go through the mill of a great place like London or Paris or any of the other places.

Representative FORD. So it is the ease of getting the visa.

Mr. DULLES. I would think the ease of getting a visa there. If you could get it at all, you could get somebody to pay some attention to you. There, in London, you would have a much bigger problem, I think.

Mr. McVICKAR. And it may be that the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki is accustomed to processing unusual cases or something. But my point is that if a completely ignorant person might well apply for his visa in Paris or in London, and then go in from there, but you have to know a little bit about what you are doing if you go straight to Helsinki and get your visa there. I am afraid this is a rather marginal point, but I thought it was worth mentioning.

Mr. DULLES. Had he made any attempt to get a visa or to announce that he was going to try to pick up a visa in Helsinki? Do you know if he took any steps at all with the Soviet authorities prior to arriving in Helsinki?

Mr. McVICKAR. This I do not know what is known about that. It did seem to me that he moved very quickly, if he could arrive in Helsinki and then get his visa and go right into the Soviet Union.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, the fact that he didn't go by ship from New Orleans to Helsinki but he went to Le Havre by boat and then to London but then flew to Helsinki, doesn't that change somewhat the thrust of your paragraph?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I must say that it explains a little bit more clearly how he was able to get all this done in such a relatively short time, because he would have saved himself, oh, at least a week of time, I should think, if he got off in France and flew from there on.

Mr. DULLES. Can any ordinary tourist, unknown tourist, just go to Helsinki and get a visa there and pick it up and get into Russia?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; I think an ordinary tourist can go to any one of their Embassies and get a visa.

Mr. DULLES. Do they have authority, do you know, to do that without referring back to Moscow?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; for tourist visas they do, and in fact they can go and get their visas at travel agencies. But it still takes a little time ordinarily to arrange it.

Representative FORD. On page 3 of your memorandum of April 7, 1964, paragraph 8, you say:

"My impression was that in the Soviet Union such a privilege would not have been usual."

You are referring, of course, to the allegations made that he had been a member of a rifle club and did target shooting?

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes.

Representative FORD. Why do you have that impression?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, I was thinking particularly in terms of his having been a foreigner, and of course strictly on the assumption that he did belong to a rifle club, and I don't know that to be a fact.

Representative FORD. Let's assume the fact that he did.

Mr. McVICKAR. Yes; and this again is only based on the impression that I gathered from such contacts as I may have had while I was there, and I had the impression that sporting activities in the Soviet Union are organized as a part of the state effort, and that there might have to be some good purpose to be served by the state for a person to participate in such a club.

And that the usual purpose would be international competition, and that people who are sportsmen in the Soviet Union generally do this, they are given time off from their work to do this kind of thing.

I have heard it said that sometimes they are really almost full time engaged in whatever the sport is, and that they only have another job to be able to say that they have amateur status.

Representative FORD. Have you ever been to Minsk?

Mr. McVICKAR. I have only passed through Minsk on the train several times going back and forth to Poland.

Representative FORD. Do you feel from your experiences in the Soviet Union it was unusual for Oswald to be sent or permitted to go to Minsk?

Mr. McVICKAR. No; I don't think that is particularly unusual. I have a feeling that what they were trying to do probably was, at least a part of what they were trying to do, was to take advantage of his competence and knowledge in the electronic field, and so they probably sent him to a place where they would have technicians qualified to learn from him.

The same thing was done in the case of the immediately previous defector, Mr. Webster, who was a glass expert--what do they call that kind of glass, foam glass?

No, fiber glass. At any rate, he was employed at the fair that we had in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1959, and he more or less defected and he was sent to a glass factory, to work at a glass factory in Leningrad, and it was logical for them to send him there because he could do that kind of work and he could teach them something about how it was done in the United States.

Representative FORD. Do you know of any special kind of schools that might be in Minsk, any particular schools that they might send a person like Oswald to?

Mr. McVICKAR. I only had the impression without being sure of my facts, that he went to a factory where they manufactured electronic equipment. I don't know of any particular school that he might have been going to.

Mr. DULLES. I want to straighten out if I can this question of the delay in the issuance of an exit visa for Mrs. Oswald.

Representative FORD. Mr. Dulles, I do have to leave. Would you take over and preside as chairman.

Mr. DULLES. I want to raise this question. Now the record here in this memorandum indicates that the exit visa to Marina was issued at least 2 months before the State Department gave the entry permit. It seems to me to be contrary to the testimony we have previously had, because in a letter dated March 16--what is this exhibit number?

Mr. COLEMAN. That is Commission Document No. 2. It hasn't been marked as an exhibit yet.

Mr. DULLES. Oh, it has not been marked. I don't understand what that number can be.

Mr. COLEMAN. That is the number, Commission Document No. 2.

Mr. DULLES. Commission Document No. 2 prepared by the State Department. It is stated here that on March 16th the Soviet Affairs Office of the State Department advised the Visa Office of the Department of State, and in that it said that the Soviet had already issued an exit visa. So Marina had the exit visa some time before March 16, 1962.

Do you know the date when the exit visa was granted?

Mr. McVICKAR. Well, sir, I left in September of 1961, and so I don't know the details of this part of the case, but I think it is consistent because--in fact, I did see in the record that the exit visa was received by the Embassy on about January the 12th, as I recall it.

Mr. COLEMAN. 1962?

Mr. McVICKAR. Of 1962, and that, therefore, the Embassy would then have proceeded with the documentation and the processing, some of which had already been initiated to get them out.

Mr. DULLES. So that 5 months of the delay in their getting out was American regulations?

Mr. McVICKAR. Sir, I cannot speak for that part of it because I don't know about that personally. I think it is possible that it may have had something to do with Oswald's personal arrangements and that sort of thing, or maybe the Soviet--I just don't know. I do know that it was our policy to expedite these operations as quickly as possible after these exit visas took place.

Mr. DULLES. I only know that this exhibit that I referred to states, if I can take your date of January 12, 1962, for the date that the exit visa was issued to Mrs. Oswald, the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not agree to the waiver of section 243 (g) until May 9, 1962.

Mr. McVICKAR. That would have been something that had been going on in Washington then, and I just don't know. It may be. I don't know what considerations would have taken place.

Mr. DULLES. So that if we take the time it took them to get their exit visas, you have got to subtract really 5 months for American regulations.

I am not criticizing the regulations or the study that was given to it or whether they did or did not grant it. I am just referring to the question of the time, so that in considering the remarkably short time it took these two to get out, 5 months were American regulations, or approximately 5 months, if the January 12 date is correct. No; it would be 4 months, wouldn't it, February, March, April, May, 4 months were American regulations.

Mr. McVICKAR. It does look as though at that time there was a certain amount of consideration.

Mr. DULLES. I am not blaming anyone for giving this the fullest possible consideration. That is all I have.

Representative FORD. Do you have some exhibits?

Mr. COLEMAN. For the record, Commission Exhibit No. 911 which is the McVickar memorandum of November 17, 1959.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 911 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 941, which is the McVickar memorandum of November 27, 1963.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 941 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 942, which is the note which Mr. McVickar wrote for the Oswald file on November 9, 1959.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 942 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 943, which is a copy of the telegram from John E. Pic to Lee Oswald in care of the American Embassy in Moscow.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 943 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 944, which is the Operations Memorandum, dated August 28, 1961.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 944 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 945, which is a photostatic copy of the handwritten notes which Mr. McVickar made when he interviewed Marina Oswald in the Embassy on July 10 or July 11, 1961.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 945 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Exhibit No. 959, which is a copy of the petition to classify status of alien for issuance of immigrant visa filled out by Lee Oswald on behalf of Marina Oswald in July 1961.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 959 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. And also Commission Exhibit No. 958, which is the memorandum of Mr. McVickar, dated April 7, 1964.

Representative FORD. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to, previously marked as Commission Exhibit No. 958 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Representative FORD. Are we going to admit as exhibits this State Department answer?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; I thought when we finished with Mr. Chayes then we will offer all the exhibits, and during that time I was going to identify the State Department earlier memorandum and the other documents.

Mr. DULLES. All this will then go in.

Mr. COLEMAN. Oh, yes; that is all going in.

Representative FORD. I think it is well to get that one document paraphrased, but I think from what Mr. Chayes said the other one, there shouldn't be any problem.

Unless there is something else the Commission will recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Wednesday, June 10, 1964

TESTIMONY OF ABRAM CHAYES, BERNICE WATERMAN, HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, AND FRANCES G. KNIGHT

The President's Commission met at 9:10 a.m., on June 10, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Gerald Ford, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; William T. Coleman, Jr., assistant counsel; W. David Slawson, assistant counsel; Thomas Ehrlich, special assistant, Department of State; Leon Jaworski, special counsel to the attorney general of Texas; Robert D. Johnson, Legal Department, Passport Division, Department of State; and Charles Murray, observer.

TESTIMONY OF ABRAM CHAYES RESUMED

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will come to order. Mr. Chayes is on the stand. Mr. Coleman, you may continue the examination.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, at the adjournment of your testimony yesterday, we were talking about section 51.136, State Department regulations dealing with the issuance of passports.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you tell us the circumstances in which the State Department feels it can refuse a passport based upon the regulations?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; there are some fairly regular categories of refusals under that section. The first is a violation of a travel restriction. As you know, the section has from time to time placed certain areas out of bounds for travel by U.S. citizens without a specially validated passport.

I think, yesterday, Mr. Dulles read into the record, from the Oswald passport, the then applicable area restrictions. And if a person having a passport violates these restrictions, let's say travels to Communist China without a specifically validated passport, we regard that as warranting the withdrawal of the passport under section 51.136.

Now I have to say that I think in one case, the case of William Worthy, a withdrawal of a passport under those circumstances was sustained. However, when he later traveled without a passport, and then reentered the country without a passport, which is a violation of the passport laws as they read on the books, he was indicted and prosecuted in the district court, convicted, and on appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground that it was unconstitutional to make reentry, without a passport, an offense. That case has not been appealed to the Supreme Court.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that the case that was in the Fifth Circuit?

Mr. CHAYES. I think so.

Mr. COLEMAN. It came up from the Federal District Court in Florida?

Mr. CHAYES. New Orleans, it came up from New Orleans.

Mr. DULLES. This applies to American citizens of course?

Mr. CHAYES. American citizens. Only American citizens can get passports. When we are dealing with aliens, we are in the visa area.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. Now the travel restrictions, the area restrictions are under attack in a number of other cases, that come up in different procedural ways. But we have in the past, and will continue to do so until we are told otherwise, withdrawn passports under 51.136 from people who have violated travel restrictions.

The next category is fugitives from justice. There if a person is under indictment or even if there is a warrant for his arrest, certainly if he has been convicted, we will not issue a passport to him to permit him to depart. In the Kent case, the Supreme Court recognized this as one of the well-defined categories in which the Secretary's discretion to withhold a passport was confirmed by practice and experience.

As I say, the fugitive from justice category is one that operates on the whole within the United States. If a man is abroad and is indicted, we will not ordinarily withdraw his passport abroad or mark his passport good only for direct return to the United States. We never articulated the rationale for that, but essentially it doesn't really fall within our notion of (a), (b), or (c) of 51.136, and our motion is that the remedy against persons abroad who are charged with crime is extradition rather than the use of the passport power to get them returned.

Now, a third category is passport fraud, where someone has in fact acted in one way or another to make fraudulent use of the passport itself. We have withdrawn passports under those circumstances.

Then there is a miscellaneous category, which doesn't include too many. For instance, in one case a man was convicted in the Federal Republic of Germany for attempting to acquire knowledge of state secrets. Another man had been involved in a number of fraudulent schemes in various countries, issued worthless checks. He was arrested in Australia for fraud and subsequently convicted and sentenced to jail there.

Another one paid for his passport renewal with a worthless check. That in itself is perhaps in the passport fraud category. Left the United States paying for his passage with a worthless check. He represented himself to be an employee of the U.S. Government on leave and continued to put out worthless checks, using his passport for identification. We have summarized these actions under these categories in a letter which I sent to Mr. Rankin, on June 6. It contains a list of the actions in these categories in the years 1962-64--through March of 1964.

Mr. COLEMAN. Can the record note that the original of that letter has been given Commission Exhibit No. 949?

Mr. CHAYES. Very good. Now it should be said that there is one category here that does not appear in the list that we have attached to the letter, although it is explained in a paragraph, the third paragraph of the letter, and that is in fact the category that Oswald himself was in, in 1961, when he wanted to come back. That is where there is a person abroad who is in some kind of trouble at the time, or who is anxious to leave where he is and come right back to the United States, as Oswald did.

We issue a passport as the regulation says, for direct and immediate return to the United States. And that action is taken under section 136. But since it is taken abroad, heretofore there has been no central list of the actions of that kind in the Department's files. As a result of the Commission's inquiry a list is being maintained from here on out, but it is not possible without going through a million passport files, to find when action of that kind was taken in the past. I know of a number of cases of my own knowledge where this happened.

For example, one or two, a man and his wife, of the students who went to Cuba last year went on to Morocco, and got into trouble with the Moroccan police and so on, and we marked their passport for immediate return. I am told that the names of those two students are listed under category (a), in 1963 on the list. Their passports were withdrawn because they had violated the travel restrictions, but also, for most of the students we didn't do anything about the passports until they got back to the United States when we withdrew them, but in their particular case, because they got in trouble with the Moroccan authorities and were pretty obstreperous about it, we marked their passport good only for direct and immediate return.

Another case that I remember, in my own experience, was a case of a notorious gun runner in the Congo, who was running guns to the Katangese rebels during the Congo operation, and he was apprehended by the Congolese authorities. We didn't want him to be tried, and the Congolese didn't want to try him if we didn't want him to be tried. On the other hand they didn't want him around there either.

So we marked his passport good for direct and immediate return. In other words, those cases are cases where you can find either some form of trouble which makes the applicant, the passport holder want to go directly home, and us want to make him go directly home, or some very immediate and direct relation to our relations with that particular country. And as I said yesterday, we have taken the view that it can never be done solely, because of political activities or political associations or the exercise of speech. It has to be something beyond that.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it that judgment is effected in part by the holding of the Supreme Court in the Kent v. Dulles case.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; it derives from that. The Kent case said that the Secretary was not entitled without statutory authorization, at least as we have read the case, was not entitled in the absence of statute, to withhold a passport on grounds related to political association and beliefs.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yesterday you testified that you had reviewed all of the State Department files dealing with Oswald, and you paid attention to those files as they existed as of June 1963, and that it was your judgment that the Passport Office could not have refused to issue a passport to Oswald in June 1963.

Mr. CHAYES. It is my judgment that the passport was properly issued in June of 1963; yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. You know that in October 1963, the Passport Office received information that Mr. Oswald had been at the Russian Embassy in Mexico. Would that information have changed the result at all, in your judgment?

Mr. CHAYES. No, sir; that information by itself could not have affected the result. As a matter of fact, as you know, the passport application itself indicated that Oswald wanted to travel to Russia, and the mere fact that he had gone to the Russian Embassy in Mexico, would not of itself have been a disqualifying event.

Representative FORD. Even despite the past history?

Mr. CHAYES. I think that is correct. In other words, by itself it doesn't disqualify the applicant because there is no suggestion here that even--first of all could I review the message that came in on October 16, to the Department. I think I may have it in my own document here.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. CHAYES. All that is suggested here is that he was in the Embassy and he contacted the Soviet Embassy about a telegram which had been sent. Now, there is nothing from that, I don't think, that adds anything or permits us to infer in any way that his travel abroad would be inimical to the foreign policy of the United States or otherwise harmful to the national interest, or that he was going abroad to violate U.S. law.

I think this can be said, and I don't think it should be said in criticism of the people who made the decision at the time, because I think the decision at the time and on the basis of our procedures and on the basis of our experience was proper.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask at that point----

The CHAIRMAN. May he finish? He hadn't finished that statement.

Mr. CHAYES. I was going to say looking at it in retrospect and knowing what we now know, it seems to me it would have been desirable to have had some means for triggering off a further investigation of this kind, of a passport applicant, or a passport holder, on the basis of that kind of information. If the further investigation had turned nothing else up, it seems to me clear that he was entitled to a passport on the state of the file as it then existed.

The only issue is whether the state of the file showed enough to start or to instigate a further investigation of the purpose and plans for his travel abroad. What you could have done is hard to speculate about. You might have called him in and asked him about his travel plans. You might have made inquiries among friends and relatives about his plans, and so on, and that might have turned up evidence that would have suggested that his proposed travel abroad fell within one of these categories and it would have warranted the withdrawal of his passport.

Because of our review of these procedures, in the light of what happened, as we said yesterday, we now have established a defector category in the lookout card file, and people of this kind who apply for passports now won't get them routinely, even though the state of the file as it then exists would warrant the issuance of a passport. But there will be a review of the file and any necessary further or any indicated further investigatory steps, if a defector does apply for a passport. You say why didn't you have those procedures before?

Why did it take this kind of a thing to do it? To stimulate a new procedure? The answer is simply that nothing in our past experience at all suggested anything like this kind of trouble. Of course the ultimate result, the ultimate assassination wasn't related in any way to the passport decisions. But it has drawn our attention more closely to the problem of defectors in this connection.

I should add one general point, and that is when we talk about passports in this context, we tend to emphasize the very, very few bad apples of one kind or another, and they are very few, who are not entitled to passports. But the fact is that the function of the Passport Office is not to deny passports to people. It is to get passports to people. The Passport Office puts out 1 million passports a year. The great overwhelming majority of those people are ordinary American citizens who want to get abroad for business or pleasure, and the ability of the Passport Office to furnish them with passport facilities, in very short order, is of tremendous service, and tremendous convenience to them.

That is the primary function of the Passport Office. It has of course the duty of administering these denial and withdrawal statutes. But that is not its primary function. Its primary function is to get passport facilities to the great bulk of Americans who have legitimate business abroad. It is dealing with a million or more applications a year, and millions of bits of information, like this piece we have just been talking about. I think when you see things in that perspective it is perhaps easier to evaluate some of the decisions and some of the actions taken here.

Representative FORD. But I think you have to turn the coin over. There are millions of passport applications, or a million plus. But there are only very few such as Mr. Oswald, or people in the defector category. So the problem there I don't think is as serious an administrative one as you would tend to imply.

Mr. CHAYES. No; I am not suggesting it is, and in fact I think we have by a relatively simple administrative action taken the steps which will assure that in the future applications from this kind of person will receive a more elaborate review.

All I am saying is that if you ask why that wasn't done before, it is because the experience didn't indicate that there was a problem, and that is because that isn't the main business of the Passport Office. Its main business is not the business of a security agency which goes around focusing or is supposed to be focusing on security problems. Its main business is that of a processing agency.

Representative FORD. But we have vast resources of people in the Government who are, or who do have security as a main business, and it seems to me that it is vitally important that those people and those vast resources somehow tie into the administrative process of denying or refusing passports under unique circumstances.

Mr. CHAYES. They do. That is any of those agencies can levy a request on the Passport Office for notification when a passport is issued to any person. If the FBI or the CIA or the Secret Service or any other security or law enforcement agency is interested, or the U.S. court, the Federal district court or the district attorney's office, any agency of that kind which is interested in knowing whether a particular person has applied for passport facilities may levy a request. That request would be serviced by placing a lookout card in the file which would then automatically involve notification of that agency when that person applied for a passport.

Mr. DULLES. Isn't there a broader point than that though, because the security agencies don't know in all cases what requirements to levy. Now if in this case, for example, in the Oswald case, if there had been this lookout card, and you had notified let's say the FBI and the CIA that the former defector had applied for a passport and might be going abroad, then they can put in a card, and then they can be helpful in following that situation abroad. But they don't know, if they don't know that Oswald is going to apply, they have no way of putting in their requirements.

In certain cases they can. But in a great many cases they cannot.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, let me make two points. First, now under the new memorandum as to defectors, the FBI and CIA and other security agencies will automatically be notified whether they have made a request or not.

Second, as to most people who have lookout cards, the FBI and the other security agencies couldn't care less about whether they apply for passports. Most of the lookout cards relate to loss of nationality, not security issues at all. So that there is a problem both ways. We can't, the Department can't--it could notify the security agencies whenever a lookout card, a person as to whom there was a lookout card applied for a passport.

But in 9 out of 10 cases that would be so much waste paper for the security agency. There has to be a reciprocal effort at cooperation. There is a reciprocal effort at cooperation, and by and large it works very well. By and large when the FBI is interested in somebody, it tells the Passport Office it is interested in them and they want to know if he comes for a passport.

By and large the Passport Office knows people whom the FBI is interested in, and when they apply for a passport or something like that, there is an exchange of information. It is interesting that this CIA report got to the Passport Office. It is a matter of routine. All security reports of this kind that originate in the security agencies, copies go to the Passport Office and are put in the passport file. So that there is a great deal of coordination. But in the nature of things it can't be a perfect system when the two kinds of responsibilities are differently allocated, the security responsibility in one case and the other responsibility in another.

Representative FORD. When did the CIA report of the Mexican trip get into the passport file?

Mr. CHAYES. It is not clear to me here. It is probably about 10-11-63 is what it looks like to me from the date, October 11, 1963. But on the other hand, note that this report--we pay a great deal of attention to the fact that it got into the passport file. But the report itself originated in the CIA.

Copy of it went to the FBI. In other words, all the security agencies themselves knew of this fact. As I say, myself, I think it did not change the character of the file so as to warrant the withdrawal of a passport from the passport administration point of view. But even if we had taken steps to withdraw the passport, it is hard to see how it had any impact on the result at all.

Representative FORD. Leave aside the tragic result. Under your current procedures if such a situation developed, would there be an administrative step taken to try and retrieve the passport?

Mr. CHAYES. Under current procedures what would have happened in June, when he first made application, was that there would have been a lookout card in the file, and before automatically issuing a passport there would have been a review of the file and some further investigative steps. Now that investigation would have inquired into the purpose of travel abroad, and a determination would then have been made whether the purpose of travel on the basis of the file--and remember when we do deny a passport we are then subject to hearing, administrative hearing and judicial review, and we have got to make the denial and the evidence on which it is based stand up in those circumstances--but if we determined that there was a basis then for denial we would have denied it then. So the question wouldn't have arisen later in October. If at the time in June we had determined after investigation that there was no basis for denial, then the passport would have been issued, and if a matter of this kind had come in, there would have been, I suppose, an administrative determination to decide whether, in the light of the earlier investigation, whether this new information warranted any further action or further investigation.

Representative FORD. Would it be your judgment that the June determination, using your new criteria, would have resulted in a refusal of this passport?

Mr. CHAYES. Not on the basis of the file as then existed. It is hard to answer your hypothetical question because under our new procedures there would have been a further investigation that would either have turned up some additional material, or would have left the file in its present state. If there was no additional material suggesting the evil purposes or improper purposes for travel, the decision to give a passport would have been the same as it was on the file. On the basis of the file, the decision was properly made.

Representative FORD. Would you in the June determination have had the files from the Department of State which showed that on October 31 Oswald walked into the American Embassy.

Mr. CHAYES. Oh, yes.

Representative FORD. And said "I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my present citizenship in the United States of America be revoked."

Mr. CHAYES. Oh, yes; the entire file.

Representative FORD. And would it also have had the one of November 3d where he said "I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my present United States citizenship be revoked"?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; It would have had all of that.

Representative FORD. It would have had all of that?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Representative FORD. And it would have had the----

Mr. CHAYES. But it would also have had the determination that he had failed to expatriate himself and that he was an American citizen. I, myself, doubt that an abortive attempt at expatriation would, certainly without more, warrant the denial of a passport to a person who was in fact a citizen.

Representative FORD. And a person who in his application in June of 1963, indicated he wanted to return to the Soviet Union?

Mr. CHAYES. One of the places he wanted to travel to was Russia. I think if you add those two together, and all you have is his intention to travel to Russia, and the fact that he made an abortive attempt to expatriate himself in Russia sometime before, I don't think you have the basis for a finding in terms of the regulation that persons, activities abroad would "violate the laws of the United States, be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations or otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

I think you have got the basis for a finding that this is not a very attractive fellow, but I don't see how you can bring him within any of those categories on the basis of the evidence in the file.

Mr. DULLES. Is it not correct though that when you were trying to get the visa for Mrs. Oswald, you made a very strong case that his continued residence in the Soviet Union was harmful to the foreign policy of the United States, or words to that effect?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, we were very anxious to get him back and I think that is right. In a sense we had him on our hands then. We were in discussion with him. He was in the Embassy and he was very directly our responsibility, so that anything that he did or that went wrong during that period, he was under our protection and we were necessarily involved.

If he went back as a tourist and got into some trouble of some kind or another, we would then have the choice I think to get involved, and we might or might not. The situation it seems to me is different when a fellow is already in trouble and you have taken steps to put the U.S. Embassy in the picture. Then you have a special responsibility if anything goes off the track and you want to take whatever steps you can to shorten the time in which you are bearing that special responsibility.

Representative FORD. I think, Mr. Chayes, however, you are saying or you are inferring that it was a clear-cut decision back when it was determined that he had not given up his United States citizenship.

Mr. CHAYES. It was in July of 1961, when his passport was renewed. We couldn't have had a passport renewal if there weren't such a determination, and in fact there was such a determination.

Representative FORD. There was such a determination?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. That is correct, but it was not a clear-cut case when you look at the steps that he, Lee Harvey Oswald, tried to take.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I don't know----

Representative FORD. It was a determination, but it was not one that was absolutely all black or white.

Mr. CHAYES. No, but once you make the decision on the basis of whatever is before you, he is either a citizen or he is not a citizen, and I think he is a citizen, or was a citizen.

Representative FORD. But the fact that the matter was administratively investigated ought to, I would think under your new regulations, when he applies to go back to the country where he originally sought citizenship, there ought to be some real investigation, and I am surprised that you say that under those regulations, under these facts, he probably would still be given a passport.

Mr. CHAYES. I agree with the first part of your statement, that under the new regulations, as we have developed them in the light of hindsight, there would be a further investigation.

Representative FORD. But you also said----

Mr. CHAYES. And I think there should.

Representative FORD. He would then be given his passport again despite the new regulation.

Mr. CHAYES. But if the investigation turned up no more than what was in the file with respect to his purposes for travel abroad, if we didn't have some hard factual evidence to support a finding that his travel would fall within one of these three categories in 51.136, then the passport would be issued. We have to start from the proposition that the Supreme Court has said that the right to travel is a part of the liberty protected by the fifth amendment, and that the Secretary cannot withhold a passport arbitrarily. Now we have taken the position, I think properly so, that in order to justify withholding under one of these three subsections of 51.136, there has to be a real and concrete showing that the travel either would violate the laws of the United States, be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations, or otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.

Add to that that you can't make that finding on the basis of, let's say, political activity abroad. Suppose we could show, for example, that Oswald was going to the Soviet Union to make a speech before the Supreme Soviet telling how terrible things were in the United States and how bad the U.S. policies toward Cuba were, for example.

Representative FORD. Would that preclude him from getting a passport?

Mr. CHAYES. No. We have people abroad who are doing that all the time. We have got Malcolm X traveling across Africa making one speech after the other about how terrible our policies on the race question are. And it is perfectly clear to me on the basis of the cases--although we might get a little more information in the next couple of weeks, we have a case before the Chief Justice now--but it is clear to me on the basis of the cases so far that if what is involved is speech, no matter how hostile it is to our policies or our objectives, you can't deny a passport for that.

Representative FORD. What about Oswald's statements to either Mr. Snyder or Mr. McVickar that he as a former Marine was going to give information he had acquired as a former Marine to the Soviet authorities.

Mr. CHAYES. That is, of course, a more difficult one. Of course we know he didn't have very much information.

Representative FORD. No, but he was a Marine and he had been trained as an electronics radar specialist. He said he was going to give this information.

Mr. CHAYES. But the second point is that on the whole these criteria look to the future. They look to the purpose of this travel. Now if he had committed an offense against the espionage laws or whatever it was abroad on his past performance----

Representative FORD. This isn't a question of freedom of speech.

Mr. CHAYES. No; I understand.

Representative FORD. This is a question of giving away Government secrets.

Mr. CHAYES. No, no; I don't equate the two at all. But that kind of thing I think would have been the subject of investigation under our new procedures, and might have turned up something. I think if you could have found, for example, that he did in the past give information of this kind, you might be in a different position.

Representative FORD. Was any investigation of that aspect made at the time?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Representative FORD. When he came back and asked for the renewal of his passport?

Mr. CHAYES. No; but what happened was when he returned to the United States--first of all the FBI was kept constantly informed, and as you know kept looking into the Oswald situation periodically from the time he came back.

Mr. COLEMAN. And those reports were in the passport file.

Mr. CHAYES. They were in the passport file, and immediately after he came back, he was interviewed very fully by the FBI, and I think as I recall the file--I haven't reviewed it recently--I think he was questioned on this very point by the FBI, and he said he hadn't given any and they weren't very much interested in it. And the FBI apparently was satisfied with that. They made no further move against him on that basis.

So that we did have whatever information there was.

As I say, although this regulation looks to the purpose of the forthcoming travel and not to the past travel, nonetheless I think it is perfectly appropriate to make inferences on the basis of what he did before. We refused to issue a passport to Worthy when he would not give us assurances that he would observe the restrictions, because on the basis of his past conduct, we were prepared to infer that in the absence of such assurances, he might well disobey the restrictions.

Mr. Ehrlich points out to me that on May 16, 1962--this is one of several such memorandums--our security office sent to the FBI with copies to the other security agencies a memorandum on the subject of American defectors, and their status in the U.S.S.R., and there is a summary of that which covers Oswald. This was just before he came home, I guess.

Mr. COLEMAN. Will you indicate what file that is by the number?

Mr. CHAYES. This is the folder II in the numbering that we gave you, and it is document No. II-6(4), in our number system.

Mr. DULLES. Could you read or indicate what that says about Oswald?

Mr. CHAYES. Oh, yes; it just summarizes his status as of that date and it says:

"Lee Oswald: It has been determined that Oswald the ex-Marine is still an American citizen. Both he and his Soviet wife now have exit permits and the Department has given approval for their travel with their infant child to the U.S.A. There is a problem with his wife, however, in that SOV in the Department is trying to get a waiver of 243(g), which requires that Oswald's wife pick up her visa for entry into the U.S.A. in Western Europe. As soon as this question has been settled, they will be free to travel."

Mr. DULLES. May I clarify one other point?

Mr. COLEMAN. May I ask him a question about that? In that file Mr. Chayes isn't there also another FBI report dated August 30, 1962, which indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald was reinterviewed by the Bureau agents on August 16, 1962, with respect to contacts he had made at the Soviet Embassy in Washington?

Mr. CHAYES. I would have to review the file itself, for the specific details as to dates and so on. I do remember that the FBI in its subsequent inquiries talked to him about his contacts with the Soviet Embassy. He had some, of course, in connection with his wife. They asked him whether he had had any other contacts with the Soviets and so on.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Dulles, you had a question.

Mr. DULLES. This apparently just went to the Bureau, did it not? Did it go to the other agencies?

Mr. CHAYES. I think the----

Mr. DULLES. Yes; it went to the CIA. Copy went to the CIA. I would like to clarify one point. It is not quite clear to me what information about Oswald was in the passport files as distinct from the Department files. I didn't realize that there was much about Oswald in the passport file itself in the absence of, what do you call it, a check----

Mr. COLEMAN. A lookout card.

Mr. DULLES. A lookout card.

Mr. CHAYES. No; the passport file, I am holding it up.

Mr. DULLES. It is a big file.

Mr. CHAYES. It is roman numeral X and it contains in our numbering system 80 documents or something like that.

Mr. DULLES. That was in the passport file itself?

Mr. CHAYES. In the passport file itself. A large amount of the security material is there, and of course the security file would have been pulled too whenever the passport file was reviewed.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know whether that file was reviewed before the issuance of the passport in June 1930 or not?

Mr. CHAYES. 1963.

Mr. DULLES. I mean 1963?

Mr. CHAYES. It was not.

Mr. DULLES. It was not?

Mr. CHAYES. It was not, because what happened then was that the Telex came in from New Orleans. The only thing that you do is go to the lookout card file. There was no lookout card. In the absence of a lookout card, routine approval goes out and the passport was issued from the New Orleans office. If there had been a lookout card, then the lookout card would have sent them back to the file. There was no lookout card because the file as it then stood didn't have anything in it that warranted the denial of a passport, and under our then procedures we didn't have a flag for people of this kind to stimulate a further inquiry or investigation.

Mr. DULLES. Isn't it usual in issuing a passport though to look, in addition to the lookout card, to look at the file you have on the individual?

Mr. CHAYES. No, sir; unless there is a lookout card, the passport is issued automatically on the basis of the local agency's determination of citizenship. There has to be evidence of citizenship.

Now let me say there are different ways in which this can come up, because for example a man may apply for a passport before a clerk of the court and that application would be forwarded to the Department. But even then the Department adjudicator would first look at the lookout file. If there is no card in the lookout file, all he would do is determine whether the application was complete, and whether satisfactory evidence of citizenship was presented, and whether on the face of it, you know, the oath was properly taken or any supplementary questionnaire resolved doubts.

And then would issue the passport. If there were a supplemental questionnaire or something like that, then he would probably go to the file.

In our agency there are special passport issuing offices. New Orleans is one of the big ones, we have one in New York, we have some others, there the system is very routinized.

Daily, and sometimes more than once daily, the agency will telegraph by Telex the name, date, and place of birth of its applicants, the people who have come in that day to make an application.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could we mark as Exhibit No. 952 the teletype that came in on Oswald. I think that would help the Commission to indicate how it comes in.

(Commission Exhibit No. 952 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. You had better explain the "NO" which is beside Oswald's name. name.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; well here you see the Telex coming in from New Orleans, and there are 25 names on it with date of birth beside each name, and it is interesting that opposite Lee Harvey Oswald is capital letters "NO" which might be rather interesting except that it stands for New Orleans, and every Telex that comes from New Orleans has that mark on it. It is covered by our abbreviations manual, and one of your investigators made, of course with our knowledge in our office, but not in the Passport Office, a surprise visit to the Passport Office to make sure that they were, in fact, putting NO on these things, and they are.

That is the designation of the office.

What happens is when these 25 names come in, the lookout file is searched for those names, and if there is no lookout card, then a responding Telex is sent back. It says here 561, OW561. That is this one, "All okay." OW is office to Washington. WO is Washington to office. So the control number of the outgoing from Washington is WO38, and it says that on your OW561, all the names were okay.

Now it is interesting, the Telex came in and it is stamped June 24, 4:19 p.m.--June 24, 1963. It went out June 25, 10:57 a.m. and these 25 people all got the passports.

Now it is only on the basis of that kind of a system that you can get out a million passports in a way that really provides first class service to the American people. Miss Knight in her administration of the office, which extends back into the previous administration, has cut down the time from something like 2 weeks to 24 hours in most of the cases.

Mr. DULLES. Could the Passport Office itself prepare a lookout card on its own initiative on the basis let's say of a file like the Oswald file?

Mr. CHAYES. It would have prepared a lookout card on any person as to whom the file suggested that there were grounds for withdrawal, or denial of the passport.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, at this point could we mark as Commission Exhibit No. 951 the existing standard operating notice which was in effect on February 28, 1962, of the Department with respect to the lookout card system?

(Commission Exhibit No. 951 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you describe Commission Exhibit No. 951?

Mr. CHAYES. This is the standard operating notice which covers the categories, and if you look at them they relate each category to a ground of potential disqualification.

Mr. DULLES. As of what date does this read?

Mr. COLEMAN. February 1962.

Mr. CHAYES. Now we have added by the Schwartz to Knight memorandum of recent date a defector category which differs slightly from the others in that in all of the other categories something in the file already suggests that the person may be ineligible for a passport. The defector category would simply stimulate further investigation in the case of application by such a person, and would automatically trigger notification of the other security agencies.

Mr. DULLES. How do you define the defector category, do you know?

Mr. CHAYES. I think we have the----

Mr. DULLES. Would that have covered Oswald? That is what I am interested in.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; well, it was in fact designed to cover Oswald, so that----

Mr. DULLES. It probably would have.

Mr. CHAYES. It would, but defector is not a statutory term or one that has real technical significance. I have said in my own discussions with people who have asked for guidance in administering this memorandum and others that it is not necessarily related to an attempted renunciation of citizenship or anything else. It involves the kind of thing that if there were a war on would be treason.

In other words, it involves something like aid and comfort to the enemy or attempted aid and comfort to the enemy. The only thing is the enemy isn't technically an enemy because we are not at war. But that requires some judgment to decide which ones you put in and which ones you wouldn't.

Mr. DULLES. There is a definition we could get though and put it in the record.

Mr. CHAYES. No, no.

Mr. DULLES. There is no definition?

Mr. CHAYES. If you look at the Schwartz memorandum, it says that the Oswald case highlights the necessity of maintaining up-to-date lookout cards in the files of the Passport Office, "for persons who may have defected to Communist countries or areas or redefected. Subsequent to the Oswald incident, I requested the Department of Defense to furnish this office with identifying information on military personnel in this category. Information with respect to these military personnel has now been received from all three services and copies are attached.

"On the basis of the attached information, please bring up to date the lookout cards of the Passport Office."

And then it simply lists the names of the people that came over from the military.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, is the document we have marked Exhibit No. 951, the standard operating notice as of February 28, 1962?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. In the attachment in category K you have "Known or suspected Communists or subversives" as a category on which there should be a lookout card.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Wouldn't Mr. Oswald have fallen in that category, based upon the passport file?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't think so. There is nothing to indicate that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party. Maybe you would have regarded his Fair Play for Cuba activities as falling within the notion subversive. I have to say that I think K dates from an earlier period before the Kent Case, in which we were denying passports very broadly to a category of people who might be called subversive. Rockwell Kent himself, Brehl, the other defendant, people as to whom there was no real membership information, but who had generally, what had been thought of as having subversive views or connections.

With the Kent and Brehl cases, it may well have been that that category fell into some desuetude. I think it is worth inquiring of Miss Knight whether that category was maintained after the Kent case, or whether we simply took those out.

Mr. COLEMAN. In the Commission Exhibit No. 951 you also have another category, category R, which reads: "Individual's actions do not reflect to credit of U.S. abroad." Would you say that based upon the Oswald file as it existed in the Passport Office as of June 1963, that he would not fall in that category?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't think so when you are thinking about what this means. I don't think one person in a billion abroad knew Oswald or had any such experience with him or anything else. This isn't really a reflection on the United States. I suppose if you construed it that way, if somebody got drunk on the Champs Elysees he ought to be in that category. I don't think you can really construe it that broadly. It has to mean I am sure someone who has a really notorious course of conduct like the kind of thing that I summarized for you on the three people in the so-called other category when we were talking to earlier--my letter of June 6.

Representative FORD. If you really are equating someone who is intoxicated in Paris with Oswald----

Mr. CHAYES. No; I am not equating them in the quality of their conduct, but for the purposes of this category "Do not reflect credit on the United States abroad" I think what that must involve is some very notorious course of conduct which a lot of people have had a chance to see, which has somewhat serious consequences of the kind that I summarized here "convicted for attempting to acquire knowledge of state secrets in Germany, fraudulent schemes, convicted for fraud," that kind of thing.

Here is a fellow who left a trail of bad checks, using his passport as identification and claiming to be a U.S. employee. All I am saying is that category R, although it is a catchall category, I would conceive is construed or should be construed narrowly.

Let me say further, I probably should not be testifying to this so much anyway because these categories are guidelines, are operational guidelines. They don't have legal consequences. And I think you ought to ask Miss Knight, who has the operational responsibility, whether the way I conceive this is correct. I may misconceive it, but I think in essence these categories are related to grounds of disqualification, and unless the conduct specified comes within the range of being a ground, a basis for disqualification, I don't think the lookout card would be made up.

Mr. COLEMAN. Don't you have a category X, which is called "catch card," denotes limited lookout validity, not necessarily refusal situation?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. So perhaps Oswald could have been put in there, couldn't he, in that category, based upon the file?

Mr. CHAYES. It is possible, and I suppose that is exactly what we are now doing with defectors.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you know what category----

Mr. CHAYES. I think you ought to inquire from Miss Knight about that.

Mr. COLEMAN. I also take it you wouldn't know what goes in categories O and P, O being "orange card, includes recent master list" and P being "project Carry."

Mr. CHAYES. I don't personally know at all.

(Discussion off the record.)

Representative FORD. Let me ask you this, Mr. Chayes. Were Oswald's various applications and various approvals ever handled as a special case as far as you know?

Mr. CHAYES. The only applications that were handled as a special case were the ones made in Russia for the return of his passport in the first instance, and then the renewal of his passport. Those were handled as a special case, both in the Embassy and in the Department.

Although I don't think very high ranking officers passed on them in the sense of Assistant Secretaries or something like that, nonetheless they where handled at very responsible levels in the Department. The political desk was consulted as well as the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and a very deliberate and special decision was made.

The subsequent application, the June 1963 application, was handled as a matter of routine.

Representative FORD. The application in the Embassy for renewal or reissuance, was that handled more expeditiously or less expeditiously than other defector or attempted defector cases?

Mr. CHAYES. I couldn't say. I couldn't say because I don't have any experience in it against which to measure it. As I reviewed the file it seemed to me to be a fairly normal kind of a file for a matter of this kind. When I say "this kind" I don't mean other defectors because I have never seen any of that.

But the reporting seemed full enough, and the response came back in time. But they didn't seem to be accelerated. There were always adequate supporting memorandums indicating consultation within the Department on broad enough basis.

Representative FORD. How long did it take from the actual time that he made the application in Moscow until it was finally approved?

Mr. CHAYES. He made the application on----

Mr. COLEMAN. This is the passport?

Representative FORD. Yes; in Moscow.

Mr. COLEMAN. He made it July 11, 1961. At that time Mr. Snyder returned to him his existing passport. The new passport, namely the one he got to travel back to the United States, was not issued until May 1962.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Though the instruction that it could be issued was submitted, sent forward to the Embassy, certainly by the end of 1961.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; they were submitted subject to the Embassy being satisfied on certain points.

It ought to be stated also that, according to the record at least, the passport was returned to him, in July, July 11. It was marked at that time "good for travel only for direct return to the United States." But the purpose of returning it to him was so that he could apply to the Soviet authorities for an exit document, because he believed and our people in Moscow concurred, that he couldn't get an exit document unless he had a U.S. passport.

Representative FORD. An exit document for himself?

Mr. CHAYES. For himself.

Mr. DULLES. I note in this file, looking at your passport file which is very complete, that in his passport application of June 1963 he gives as his approximate date of departure, I assume departure from the United States, as October-December 1963. Is it the practice of the Department to issue passports for persons who are not leaving for 3 or 4 months?

Mr. CHAYES. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Anytime?

Mr. CHAYES. Anytime you want a passport, if you are entitled to one, you get it. And you keep it even after you return. I mean if he had used it, gone out of the country and returned, if it is still within what is it, the 3-year period now, the passport is a valid passport and he can depart again in the absence of some action taken looking towards withdrawal. So that these are ambulatory documents, and there are many people who just automatically--I don't say Oswald did this, obviously he didn't, but there are many people who automatically renew their passport when it runs out so that they always have travel documentation.

Representative FORD. Are there any other defector or attempted defector cases where the person came back and tried to get his passport? How long did it take in those cases to go through this process?

Mr. CHAYES. You mean comparable to the June application?

Representative FORD. No; I am talking of the Moscow application.

Mr. CHAYES. I think we did submit a report on that. Well, I am sorry, we didn't. We did inquire whether there were any defectors who were in the situation of the June application. We found that there was one, and he was also issued a passport routinely. But I can supply for the record the information as to the others.

Representative FORD. I think it would be helpful.

Mr. CHAYES. You would like to know the time from application to grant of passport in the Soviet Union for defectors or attempted defectors who were trying to get back then to the United States?

Representative FORD. Yes; if we could have that for the record.

Mr. CHAYES. We will be very glad to submit it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, turning your attention to the question of the admission of Marina Oswald to the United States as a nonquota immigrant, I take it that since she was the wife of an American citizen, she would be entitled to nonquota immigrant status unless she was disqualified because she was a member of a Communist organization, is that correct?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; unless she was subject to one of those disqualifications in 212(a)(28).

Mr. COLEMAN. Now the first decision that was made by the Embassy was that her membership in the particular trade union was involuntary, and therefore she was not disqualified?

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it you reviewed the record and you concur in that judgment?

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct. It would also be made, and be made automatically in the case of persons belonging to trade unions not in leadership positions in the trade union, and where there is no external evidence of active participation, because membership in the union is a condition of employment in those places in the Soviet Union, and our regulations cover the point precisely.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now the other decision that was made was that the Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service would waive the provisions of section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which provision says that a visa could not be issued from Moscow because the Attorney General in 1953 had placed Russia among those countries that refused to accept Russian citizens that we wanted to send back to Russia.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; 243(g) is a sanction which the act provides against countries, not against people. It is not a disqualification for a person. If 243(g) had not been waived, Mrs. Oswald would simply have gone to Rotterdam and gotten the same visa from our consulate in Rotterdam. It is a sanction against the country which is levied when, as you say, the Attorney General determines that the country refuses to accept people whom we deport who are their nationals. It gets back a little to the point you were making yesterday about what obligation one has to accept his own nationals back from another country.

Mr. DULLES. That is a general rule of international law, isn't it, you are supposed to do it.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; as a general rule of international law I suppose one should accept his own nationals, but people who have expatriated themselves wouldn't be nationals and therefore we wouldn't have to take them back.

In any event--that is a little digression--but this sanction is a sanction designed to penalize a country which has refused to receive back its own nationals when they are deported from the United States. That sanction was brought into play by the determination of the Attorney General made on May 26, 1953.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder whether in addition to the information that Mr. Ford has requested, you could give us information, oh, say covering the last 5 or 10 years----

Mr. CHAYES. I think we have already.

Mr. DULLES. I haven't said what I want it on. With regard to the time that has elapsed between the application of a Soviet woman married to an American citizen, the time that is taken from her application to the time that that application has been favorably acted upon by the Soviet Union. In this case as far as I understand it, the Soviet Union gave permission for Mrs. Oswald to come either in December 1961 or January 1962, and that because of this particular sanction you have just been discussing, it wasn't really cleared up until May. And therefore that the delay was in part a delay due to American regulations rather than to Soviet regulations.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, her processing in the Soviet Union from the time she first started to try to get back----

Mr. DULLES. That is it.

Mr. CHAYES. Until she got an exit visa was about 6 months. It was just under 6 months.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. We have answered in our answers to your----

Mr. COLEMAN. It is a Commission Exhibit No. 960 which was just marked, where Mr. Chayes, under date of May 26, 1964, answered various questions which were asked, to determine whether there was anything unusual in the way that Marina and the Oswald applications were handled by the Soviet Union and we will make that part of the record.

(Commission Exhibit No. 960 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. DULLES. Does that cover this particular point?

Mr. COLEMAN. It covers the point not for 10 years but for 3 or 4 years.

Mr. CHAYES. If I can read into the record this answer, it says----

Mr. DULLES. Which answer is that?

Mr. CHAYES. Question 3, attachment A.

The relevant part is "In the immediate post-war period there were about 15 marriages in which the wife had been waiting for many years for a Soviet exit permit. After the death of Stalin the Soviet Government showed a disposition to settle these cases. In the summer of 1953 permission was given for all of this group of Soviet citizen wives to accompany their American citizen husbands to the United States. Since this group was given permission to leave the Soviet Union, there have been from time to time marriages in the Soviet Union of American citizens and Soviet citizens.

"With one exception it is our understanding that all of the Soviet citizens involved have been given permission to immigrate to the United States after waiting periods which were in some cases from 3 to 6 months and in others much longer."

So that I think what Mr. Snyder said yesterday was that 6 months was par for the course. It wasn't an unusual delay, and it was fairly low as those things went, but not something that would give you any surprise. There were a number of other 6-month ones and there were some less.

Mr. DULLES. For our records I wonder if it would be possible to be a little more specific, I mean to furnish us information that would be a little more specific on this point, because it is very hard for us to tell of the numbers how many had less than 6 months and how many had more than 6 months.

That is the point that has been raised often you know in the press, and the charge has been made that this is very suspicious, that this was done so soon. I think our records ought to show a good deal of specification what that record is. I mean this is very helpful in a general way but it is not very specific.

Mr. CHAYES. We can do that. The further answer farther down on the next page, page 2, says for example that "In a most recent case of this type a Soviet woman married an American citizen in December of 1963 and received an exit visa about 2 months later."

Mr. DULLES. That is very helpful.

Mr. CHAYES. But we will get a detailed account for the Commission.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, as I understand it, section 243(g) itself says nothing about the power of the State Department or Immigration and Naturalization Service to waive its provisions.

Mr. CHAYES. The State Department doesn't waive the provisions. I should start by saying that 243(g) is a section administered by the Justice Department and the Attorney General has primary responsibility for interpretation and administration. The Attorney General has from the beginning interpreted 243(g) as involving waiver power. I had never had occasion to examine the question at all until this matter came up, and I have made only a cursory examination, but I think the judgment is sound that there is waiver power under 243(g).

Mr. DULLES. May I just ask one question there. Our file that I have before me, and your very helpful paper----

Mr. COLEMAN. Commission Document No. 2.

Mr. DULLES. Commission Document No. 2 doesn't indicate really the basis on which the Texas authorities were holding up the visa. Does that appear anywhere in the record?

Mr. CHAYES. I don't know. It may appear in our attachment B answers. In essence it was that they thought this fellow had behaved pretty badly and he wasn't entitled to any special consideration.

Mr. COLEMAN. That is why at this time I would like to read into the record part of the regulation under which they will waive. It says:

"If substantial adverse security information related to the petitioner is developed, the visa petition shall be processed on its merits and certified to the regional commissioner for determination whether the sanction should be waived.

"The assistant commissioner shall endorse the petition to show whether the waiver is granted or denied and forward it and notify the appropriate field officer of the action taken."

In other words, that since some derogatory information was in the file, and since Oswald was the petitioner, the initial decision made by the field officer of the Immigration Service was that the waiver should not be granted.

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. I assume that that was motivated probably in one of the letters from the Texas immigration office to the Department of Justice or the Immigration Service here.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; well what happened, the record was referred to the immigration field officer in Texas, and the record was the history of the fact that Oswald had defected or attempted to defect, and the statements he had made. So they, therefore, made the determination on the field level that they would not waive the sanction.

Mr. CHAYES. That is right. The sanction was waived only after urging from the Department.

Mr. DULLES. Yes, that appears in this Commission Exhibit, this document that I have referred to. But we do not have in our files the letter of the Texas immigration authorities first refusing as far as I know.

Mr. COLEMAN. We will have that. That testimony will be put in through Miss James and Miss Waterman.

Mr. DULLES. They have that. All right, if they supply that, that will be adequate.

Mr. COLEMAN. So I take it that, in your judgment after reviewing the file, you think that the waiver should have been granted?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I think there that it was not an improper exercise of discretion. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. Just one other question. Is there any policy in the Department to delay the acceptance of attempted renunciation of citizenship?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, delay, I don't know that there is a stated policy that you put the person off. The general policy of the Department is first I think to discourage renunciations, to make it clear that the person has a right to renounce, but nonetheless to discourage them.

Secondly, the policy is that the consular officer should assure himself that the person seeking to renounce his citizenship is acting soberly, rationally, and with full awareness of the meaning and consequences of his act. And for that purpose the consular officer can use any means within his judgment. He can talk to the person. He could invoke a cooling-off period or ask a person to sleep on it or something of that kind. It seems to me how the policy is implemented is something for the particular case. If somebody came up in England and had just married an earl or something like that and said "I want to be an English citizen now" and was in full possession of her faculties apparently there probably wouldn't be much worry about it, although even then the consul would go through a routine of trying to assure that the person knew and understood fully what she was doing.

Mr. DULLES. Is that routine prescribed, should it be prescribed do you think now in the light of hindsight in this situation?

Mr. CHAYES. No; I think in each case it will depend so much on the situation with the particular person. If a person comes in and he is very agitated or something of that kind, it might dictate a totally different approach than a different kind of thing.

Mr. DULLES. Wouldn't it be useful though to give--I don't want to suggest what the Secretary of State should do in this, but in the light of this experience, would there not be some benefit possibly in giving people in the field the result of the experience gained in this particular case?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, the general approach, and other matters related to it, are touched on in orientation courses for consular officers and so on. I think as I look on Consul Snyder's actions, that he behaved very much like a responsible Foreign Service officer.

That happened long before I was in the Department, so I can say that without any involvement. But it seemed to me that he did just what he should have done, despite the unfortunate aftermath. And it shows to me, at least, that the training and orientation that these people are getting is right, is serviceable, and they are able to handle these situations as they come in.

Mr. DULLES. I realize that you ought not to prescribe hard and fast rules, that there is a broad range of discretion that should be exercised here. But I just raise the question as to whether a good deal of experience hasn't been gained in this case in that very field.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, it may very well be that more attention to that particular aspect should be given in the orientation courses and so on. Those things tend to reflect what is hot at the moment you know, and if you haven't had trouble with something for a pretty long time, it tends maybe not to get mentioned.

Representative FORD. If Oswald had persisted that day, October 31, in demanding the form that is a prerequisite under your definition for renunciation, would Snyder have been required to give it to him and permit him to sign it?

Mr. CHAYES. I think if it had been in ordinary office hours when the consulate was open for business, and if Snyder was satisfied that he was competent, that Oswald was competent, he would have to give him the form, yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Does Snyder have the authority to make a determination of competency?

Mr. CHAYES. No; he doesn't have the authority to make a determination of competence, and I suppose it is possible at some point to get the issue tried in court. But I think a consular officer would probably be acting within his discretion if he saw somebody who was drunk or raving or something and just said, "Well, I am not going to give you this until I am sure that your action is your act." After all, when the consul accepts the oath, he is certifying that it is the act of the person in a meaningful sense, and so if he thought that the person was incompetent, I think he would have discretion not to give the oath. But I put that far aside because in the particular case here, Mr. Snyder made it perfectly clear that he had no reason to doubt that Oswald was fully competent.

And so if Oswald had been there at a time when the office was open, or had returned at a time when the office was open, and had persisted in his demand, I think Snyder would have been under an obligation to give him the form.

Representative FORD. The only technical reason or basis upon which Snyder could have denied Oswald the right that day was the fact that it was on a Saturday, a non-working-hour period of the Embassy.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; I think he had every right to try to dissuade him, or persuade him not to act or persuade him to think it over and come back the next day. But if after all of that Oswald still had said "But I want to do it now" and if the office was open for business, then I think he would have had to do it.

Mr. DULLES. I think it might be useful if it has not been done to introduce at this point as an exhibit the form of oath of renunciation. Here is the formalized oath and I think it would be well to have this in our records unless it is already in our records.

Representative FORD. I agree.

Mr. COLEMAN. No; it isn't. Could we say it will be marked as Commission Exhibit No. 955 and place this sticker on that page, photostat it and then just send it back?

(Commission Exhibit No. 955 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Representative FORD. When Oswald came back on November 3, I believe, which was a regular working day----

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Commissioner, he did not come back on November 3. He merely wrote a letter.

Mr. CHAYES. Wrote a letter. He never came back.

Representative FORD. Are all of the employees, Mr. Snyder, Mr. McVickar, and the others who had any firsthand contact with the Oswald case in this area, were they State Department employees?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; these two men who were the only ones who did see him directly, I think the secretary, their secretary also saw him, but had nothing to do with him except as a receptionist. These two men were Foreign Service officers and are now Foreign Service officers.

Representative FORD. In the strictest term.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; members of the Foreign Service, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Representative FORD. Could you tell us in a bit more detail the process that you followed or the procedure that you carried out when you first got into the Oswald case.

You mentioned yesterday you got a call or you were directed by I believe the Secretary of State or by somebody in higher authority to take certain steps. Will you tell us who called you, what you did in the first 3 or 4 days?

Mr. CHAYES. It was the evening of the day, perhaps about 5 o'clock on the day of the assassination. It may have been somewhat earlier, because I think I remember I went home for an hour and then came back to carry out this assignment. Mr. Ball, once it became known that Oswald had some history as a defector----

Mr. DULLES. Ball is the Under Secretary of State.

Mr. CHAYES. He was then the Acting Secretary because the Secretary of State as you recall was on a plane over the Pacific. So he was the Acting Secretary. But even if he had been the Under Secretary he is my client.

Representative FORD. He still had some authority.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; he directed me to gather together the files in the Department on Oswald, and to prepare a report to be available for him the first thing in the morning covering as best we could within that time span the contacts that Oswald had with the Department.

We got the passport file. We got the security office file. We got the special consular services file which covered Mrs. Oswald's visa and the repatriation loan. I think those three files were the ones that we had. It may have been there was a smaller fourth file, but I think those three were the ones.

Representative FORD. What would that smaller fourth file be?

Mr. CHAYES. I can't remember. It was duplicates if it was anything. Oh, that is right, we had a visa file and an SCS file so those were the four. The SCS file, that is Special Consular Services in the office, in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Representative FORD. You got this order on or about 5 o'clock the 22d of November?

Mr. CHAYES. The 22d; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And you issued orders to have these files brought in, or did you go and get them yourself?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

Representative FORD. Or what happened?

Mr. CHAYES. I issued orders to have them brought in. I called--I am trying to think how we got them. [Turning to Mr. Ehrlich.] Did you go down and get them? Mr. Ehrlich and Mr. Lowenfeld, another of my people, we worked through the night on this, the three of us all together and it may be that the two of them went down to get them. I don't think we just called over the telephone and asked them to be brought up.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. CHAYES. It is my recollection that one of these two gentlemen, either Mr. Ehrlich or Mr. Lowenfeld acting for me, went down to pick up the file. Mr. Ehrlich thinks he recalls that one of the files was already being examined by the Secret Service or the FBI, the passport file. My own recollection, which I am sure of, is that later on in the evening, about 8 o'clock or 9 o'clock, we established contact with the FBI and they came over and read the files in our office at the same time we were reading them. Now actually there was nothing in any of the files that wasn't duplicated in the others in essence. I mean much of our files consisted of FBI or CIA reports.

Much of their files consisted of these letters and documents that you have seen that we had come into possession of when Oswald attempted to renounce.

We worked, as I say, through the night. One thing that we did other than go through the files was to go down to the lookout card file to see whether there was a lookout card for Oswald. We got Mr. Johnson, who is the General Counsel of the Passport Office, to open up the lookout card file which is a large room that has a combination lock on the door, and is also plugged into a general alarm system, got into the room and examined the lookout card file and found that there was no card for Oswald.

This was the first experience I had ever had with the lookout card file, and I said all the things that you have said here, why wasn't there a card. But we were very careful in doing that to record, Mr. Lowenfeld, Mr. Ehrlich and I and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Schwartz all went in and we all mutually recorded what steps we took. I think there are notes of that, if anybody is interested in them, but I don't think there is any need to see them.

Nothing of significance happened. We did find----

Mr. DULLES. May I ask is the passport office under you as Assistant Secretary and Legal Adviser?

Mr. CHAYES. No, sir; the passport office is under Mr. Schwartz.

Mr. DULLES. Under Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. CHAYES. It is Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Mr. DULLES. And he is directly under the Secretary of State.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; he is Assistant Secretary. His chain of command goes through the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, but he like I has the rank of Assistant Secretary and he operates a bureau just as I do. The Legal Adviser's office is a separate bureau.

We did prepare a 10- or 12-page document by dawn the next day which in fact is the basis of this report, the Commission Document No. 2.

Mr. COLEMAN. We will give that Commission Exhibit No. 950, your first report.

Mr. CHAYES. The one we did overnight?

Mr. COLEMAN. No; the one that you sent us. It is Commission Exhibit No. 950. It has been given a number.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if the witness would identify this and verify the circumstances under which it was prepared?

Mr. CHAYES. This report, Commission Exhibit No. 950, is not the one that we prepared overnight. This is the report we prepared for the Department of Justice before the Commission was appointed when the Department of Justice itself was looking into the matter.

What I say is that Commission Exhibit No. 950 is essentially an expansion and elaboration of the document that we prepared that night.

Representative FORD. There have been fears expressed by some that somehow we don't have before the Commission all of the documents that are in the hands of the Department of State or any other agency pertaining to Oswald. You can only testify as to the Department of State. Do you testify that we have been given everything that was at any time in the files of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. CHAYES. To my knowledge that is the case. However, let me say again what I said at the beginning of the testimony. We have constantly and persistently gone around to all the places in the Department, and that has been done under my supervision, and we have made very aggressive efforts to assure that every office or subdivision of the Department that might have documents pertaining to Oswald should give them to the Commission, through me to the Commission.

I think there was one stage where perhaps that wasn't understood, but we got that corrected. Then later on, as I say, there was the Moscow Embassy just sent us a whole load of documents. They said "We think you have got duplicates of all of these so we didn't send them in earlier" and it turned out that some of them we didn't have duplicates of. I now think--as I say, it is very hard to prove a negative, but we have made all the efforts that I think are humanly possible to get these documents out of the files, and I think you have them all, with the exception of some documents originating in other agencies where by arrangement with the staff they are getting those documents from the originating agency.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, at this point could we mark as Commission Exhibit No. 956, a letter from you to Mr. Rankin under date of May 28, 1964, in which you sent us a complete copy of the files, and in which you numbered each one of the files from file I through XII, and then within each file, each document was numbered and there was also indicated the number of pages which would be in each particular document? Will you identify that?

(Commission Exhibit No. 956 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; we sent that letter, a copy of which is Commission Exhibit No. 956, in response to the request of the staff in order that we would be able exactly to answer this kind of question.

I should add that I think we sent some additional documents since then, those that came back from Moscow in response to our last request.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would next like to mark as Commission Exhibit No. 954, a letter from Mr. Chayes to Mr. Rankin under date of June 4, 1964, in which you sent us the file which you recently received from the Moscow Embassy and indicated that that file would be marked file XIII.

(Commission Exhibit No. 954 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; that is the letter and it contains also the text of the Moscow telegram explaining that they thought all the documents they were pouching were duplicates.

Mr. COLEMAN. With the files you gave us or sent us along with Commission Exhibits Nos. 956 and 954, as far as you know you have sent the Commission every file which the State Department has, referring to Oswald?

Mr. CHAYES. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. Were you in general charge, under the Secretary, of the correspondence which has been carried on with the Soviet Union inquiring as to Oswald and to obtain such information as we could from the Soviet Union with respect to the Oswald case?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I talked with the Secretary about the Commission's interest in making an approach to the Soviet Union, and then he made the decision that the Department was willing to proceed with that approach. I participated in the drafting of the documents, and I participated in the transmissions to the Commission. But the approach was made by the Secretary himself, and I did not observe the approach.

Mr. DULLES. Was that made orally as well as in writing or should we ask that of the Secretary of State?

Mr. CHAYES. You can ask it of the Secretary and I think you would get a fuller answer from him, but he did make an oral presentation at the time that he handed the note, and the Chief Justice's letter, to the Russian Ambassador.

Mr. DULLES. In view of your knowledge of this situation, do you think that we have got all we can get from the Soviet Union or is there any other way in which we could get anything additional?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, I think probably, the best respondent to that question would also be the Secretary. I think it probably has to be recognized that the decision to give what documents were given was a carefully considered decision, probably made at very high levels within the Soviet Government, and not done lightly or without an examination of alternatives, and therefore, it seems to me unlikely that one would be able to change any such decision.

But again I say I am really not the best man to ask that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chayes, just two other documents I would like you to identify for the record. One is your letter of May 8, 1964, which has been marked Commission Exhibit No. 948, which answers certain questions directed to you by Mr. Rankin, and it is the document that you referred to several times in your testimony.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; this is my letter, Commission Exhibit No. 948. It contains the answers to the questions which were in attachment B to Mr. Rankin's letter, and concern essentially matters within the United States and within the State Department here.

Mr. COLEMAN. Your answers to attachment A were in Commission Exhibit No. 960. We have already identified that in the record.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; that is correct. There was a delay between the two letters because attachment A involved questions about activities in Russia, and some questions about the Soviet Union, and although we prepared the answers in the first instance in the United States in the Department, we wanted to send the replies to the Soviet Union for review by our Embassy there. And that accounted for the time discrepancy in the answer to the two attachments.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then in the attachment A we also asked you a question in reference to a memorandum from Mr. McVickar and you under date of April 24, 1964, sent us Mr. McVickar's memorandum which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 958. But I would like to mark as Commission Exhibit No. 953 your covering letter.

(Commission Exhibit No. 953 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; this is my letter. It is dated April 24, 1964, and it is marked Commission Exhibit No. 953, and it clears up a factual question that was left at large in Mr. McVickar's memorandum.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to offer for admission into evidence Commission Exhibits Nos. 948, 950, and 949. I would also like to note that the attachment to Commission Exhibit No. 952 was marked as Commission Exhibit No. 958 and has already been admitted into evidence.

Mr. DULLES. They shall be admitted.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 948, 950, and 949 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. DULLES. May I ask this question? Have all of these been previously identified in the testimony.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, sir; they have been identified and marked.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Back on the record. That is all the examination I have of Mr. Chayes. I do want to express my appreciation and thanks for the detail in which he gave us information and the method in which he answered all the questions.

Representative FORD. I have no further questions.

Mr. DULLES. I have no further questions. Thank you very much. You have been very full, very frank, very helpful.

Mr. CHAYES. I am glad to do what I can.

TESTIMONY OF BERNICE WATERMAN

Mr. DULLES. Would you kindly rise and raise your right hand.

Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Commission is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Miss WATERMAN. I do.

Mr. DULLES. Would you please advise Miss Waterman of the general purpose of the testimony we will ask of her.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Waterman was with the Department of State until 1962, at which time she retired. Miss Waterman was the adjudicator in the Oswald case, and she is being called to testify with respect to certain memorandums and actions she took in connection with Lee Harvey Oswald. These actions dealt with the question whether he had expatriated himself, and whether a passport should be reissued to him in 1961. And also she has some information concerning the waiver for Marina under 243(g).

Mr. DULLES. Miss Waterman, I wonder if you would just give us a brief outline of your experience with the State Department.

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I entered the Passport Office in March of 1926, and I was there until I retired in February 1962, and during that time I progressed from the position of typist to working on citizenship cases, and became an adjudicator.

Mr. DULLES. Can you hear?

Miss WATERMAN. Then I became in charge of a section adjudicating citizenship cases from certain places. I continued in citizenship work until I retired.

Mr. DULLES. Would you proceed, Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Waterman, I have had marked 25 documents beginning with Commission Exhibit No. 957 and going through Commission Exhibit No. 982, and just before you came in, I showed you a set of those files. Have you had opportunity to review those files?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I did look over the State Department file. I don't mean State Department files, I mean Passport Office files on Oswald.

Mr. COLEMAN. And I take it that you would agree that every one of the documents I showed you was a document which you prepared, or was a document which was sent to you and you had occasion to read it prior to the time I gave it to you today?

Miss WATERMAN. I believe so.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now would you tell the Commission the first time, to the best of your knowledge, that you heard the name Oswald and in what connection?

Miss WATERMAN. Well it was rather seeing it in connection with the----

Mr. COLEMAN. I call your attention to Commission Document No. 961, which is the second document in the folder I gave you, a telegram dated November 2, 1959.

Miss WATERMAN. The telegram--this is a reply.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; I am talking about the telegram dated November 2, 1959.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I recall from examination of the file that on November 2, 1959, I saw the telegram from the Embassy at Moscow reporting that Mr. Oswald had called there, and that was sent for reply. Sent to me for reply.

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you Commission Exhibit No. 910, which is a copy of a telegram from Moscow to the Secretary of State, dated October 31, 1959, and I ask you whether that is the telegram you saw on November the 2d?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; this is the telegram, and this is the telegram to which I prepared an interim reply on the same day received, November 2, 1959.

Mr. COLEMAN. And the reply that you prepared is Commission Exhibit No. 961. That is the telegram of November 2? It is the second document in the file before you.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And that telegram indicated that it was prepared----

Mr. DULLES. Miss Waterman's file doesn't have the exhibit numbers on it so you will have to identify it in some other way.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. That telegram shows that it was prepared by you because your name appears in the lower left hand corner, is that right?

Miss WATERMAN. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now below that you indicate "Clearances EE: SOV: V. James in substance paraphrased by telephone." Will you indicate to the Commission what that notation means?

Miss WATERMAN. This is a telegram, isn't it?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss WATERMAN. Well, as I recall all telegrams which we dispatch to Embassies or offices within the Iron Curtain countries were sent at least with the lowest classification, official use only, and we had previously received instructions that the telegrams which we prepared on any subjects going to the offices in the Iron Curtain countries should be cleared with the desk officers of the appropriate divisions, that is EE and so on.

Mr. DULLES. Geographical divisions?

Miss WATERMAN. Geographical divisions, yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you identify for the record who Miss V. James is?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, Virginia James, an officer in EE.

Mr. COLEMAN. EE means?

Miss WATERMAN. Eastern Europe.

Mr. COLEMAN. And SOV?

Miss WATERMAN. SOV, Soviet Division.

Mr. COLEMAN. So the Commission Exhibit No. 961, which is a telegram----

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Indicates that the telegram was at least communicated to and cleared by the Soviet desk in Washington before it was sent out?

Miss WATERMAN. Well yes; I think that one reason that it was always cleared was that the geographic divisions were particularly interested in the wording of our replies. I think they just wanted the general idea of whether or not we were using the proper classification.

Mr. COLEMAN. And in that telegram of November 2, 1959, you advised the Embassy in Moscow that if Oswald insisted on renouncing U.S. citizenship, that the statute precludes the Embassy from withholding his right to do so regardless of his application pending with the Soviet Government, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now thereafter did you have anything else to do with the Oswald matter prior to March 1960? To help you, Miss Waterman, March 1960 was the time in which you prepared the refusal card.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes--refusal sheet.

Mr. COLEMAN. Between sending this telegram on November 2, 1959, and March 1960, did you personally have any knowledge or anything else that was going on as far as Oswald was concerned?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, not certainly unless it is in the file. I would think that in the meantime we received some kind of further report from the Embassy, but I am not----

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, we have had marked and put in the record the various reports that were received, and you say that as all the reports came in that you had opportunity to read them?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; of course that isn't too long from the latter part of 1959 to 1960. Quite often in cases of this nature, the appropriate Embassy might submit reports which didn't need replies, just information submitted.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, there was a report submitted by the Embassy on November 2, 1959, which has already been identified as Commission Exhibit No. 908.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And I assume that you received a copy or saw that report?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then on or about March 25, 1960, you had occasion to prepare a card which has as its head the name or the word "Refusal."

Miss WATERMAN. That is not a card. That is a sheet.

Mr. COLEMAN. That is a sheet which is marked as Commission Exhibit No. 962. Now will you indicate to the Commission the circumstances under which you prepared that card and why you prepared that card?

Miss WATERMAN. This was prepared after the receipt, I believe, of further correspondence from the Embassy, which indicated that Oswald was--that it would be possible that he might want to return to the United States. And it was customary to make this red refusal sheet in our office.

Mr. COLEMAN. What was your office?

Miss WATERMAN. In the adjudication part of the office, to put a flag on the case for future reference.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you made the refusal card which has been marked----

Miss WATERMAN. Not a card.

Mr. COLEMAN. Pardon me, refusal sheet----

Miss WATERMAN. Refusal sheet.

Mr. COLEMAN. Has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 962, what would be the next step in the system to make sure that Mr. Oswald could not use his passport or come back to the United States without the Department having notice?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, in the case of this being a classified file, the file would have been returned to the Classified File Section as I recall, and there would be a note on there to please index the refusal sheet, and then if there were any other instructions, for instance, another office might want the file or ask for it, if no one wanted it, we would ordinarily ask to have the refusal sheet carded and the case filed.

Mr. COLEMAN. As a result of the preparation of the refusal sheet, would someone else or you have a responsibility to prepare something which is called a lookout card?

Miss WATERMAN. At that time, at least--I don't know what the procedure is now, I have no idea; at that time, at least, the refusal card as I call it, or lookout card would have been prepared in the Records Section of the Passport Office. In other words, a part of the section which handled the files.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you prepared the refusal sheet which is Commission Exhibit No. 962----

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I wrote that myself.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you then give--how would the records section know that a lookout card should be prepared?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, for one thing the refusal sheet would be placed on top of the file, and I am sure there would be a note to flag the attention of the records people that a refusal was there to be carded.

But in any event, it would be on top of the file, and there would have been nothing on the right hand margin. There would have been no name. There would have been nothing put on there in our particular office.

Mr. COLEMAN. In other words, you say----

Miss WATERMAN. In our adjudication part.

Mr. COLEMAN. Are you saying that Oswald, Lee Harvey, would not have been----

Miss WATERMAN. No, no; the sheet was completely blank as to the margin. At no time would anything have been entered there, in our adjudication part.

Mr. COLEMAN. In Commission Exhibit No. 962, you then say when you physically prepared the refusal sheet, the only thing that was prepared is the typewritten material, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. The typewritten red sheet. If you have the file, it is right here.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say that after you prepared that, you would physically place that red sheet on the top of the passport file, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, now this was placed--I think there was a communication which went out at the same time.

Mr. COLEMAN. You are talking about the Operations Memorandum dated March 28, 1960?

Miss WATERMAN. I am talking about the Operations Memorandum, yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 963?

Miss WATERMAN. Now that would have gone to file, to the file with this Operations Memorandum, and the Refusal Sheet.

Mr. COLEMAN. You prepared the Operations Memorandum also?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; now I see that was mailed 3 days after it was prepared. In the meantime someone else was looking at it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Was it your responsibility actually to see that the lookout card was prepared?

Miss WATERMAN. No; I wouldn't think so, no.

Mr. COLEMAN. Who would have that responsibility?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, in the first place the cases were examined by the records people before being filed, and no one would certainly be supposed to file a Refusal Sheet without an indication that he had had a card made.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would the indication that the card was made be put on the refusal sheet?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you look at the original of the State Department records?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I am looking at it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Was it put on the refusal sheet?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, it looks to me as if someone started to handle this for the refusal card, or lookout card as you call it, because the name was typed on.

Mr. COLEMAN. It was written on.

Miss WATERMAN. Written on, yes. I believe that to complete that operation, the designation of the citizenship designation of the Department of State at that time at least, 130, should have been placed on there.

Mr. COLEMAN. What does 130 mean?

Miss WATERMAN. That is the Department's classification of citizenship.

Mr. COLEMAN. By looking at that file, is there anything else that you can examine to be able to tell the Commission whether in your judgment the actual lookout card was ever prepared?

Miss WATERMAN. No; I wouldn't be able to say. I do notice here that the case was called for from the files a few days after it went to file, and that apparently was occasioned by a new communication coming in from our Embassy at Moscow.

Mr. DULLES. Who called for it, can you tell from that?

Miss WATERMAN. Apparently we received--this was called for from--here is a call slip right here. I am looking at it. Which means that something new had been received and we wanted the file again.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you tell me the number that is on that call sheet? You are looking at file X. It is file X she is looking at?

Mr. EHRLICH. Yes.

Miss WATERMAN. X-64.

Mr. COLEMAN. X-64.

Miss WATERMAN. I might say that in the meantime during the time from November 1959 up into 1960, beginning about early in February 1960, I was replaced in this section or branch by an attorney and a member of the bar, and at this time I was then the assistant of the section, and not the head of it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, was the attorney that replaced you G. W. Masterton?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to ask you to identify Commission Exhibit No. 983.

Is that a copy of the sheet you referred to, to indicate the file had been called for?

Miss WATERMAN. That is right. A new report had been received and our control clerk, we call her, our person looking after the records in our particular section had made that call slip for the file.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is there anything else in the original file which you could look at to try to advise us whether you think in your judgment a lookout card was ever prepared?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I wouldn't be able to know. All I could say is it is very surprising, because it seems to me that we had--well, I could not say how many lookout cards and refusal cards on all kinds of subjects. And I can only guess that this file was caught up in some large number of files that were on hand to have refusal cards or lookout cards made, or something of that nature, or that the process of having the card made was interrupted by the receipt of the new material from our Embassy at Moscow.

Mr. COLEMAN. But----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question?

Who would make out lookout cards in the normal process? Would it be quite a number of people, or one particular office?

Miss WATERMAN. I am not sure about that, Mr. Dulles. That was completely another area, and I don't know.

Mr. DULLES. Outside of the Passport Department entirely, was it?

Miss WATERMAN. Oh, no.

Mr. DULLES. In the Passport Department?

Miss WATERMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Miss Knight could tell us that.

Miss WATERMAN. In the records part of the Passport Office.

Now, at one time I know that the cards were made in a certain area. Then I know that later on, and probably prior to this time, we had been requested not to forward any kind of classified files to the usual place for having these cards made--we should forward them to the Classified Files Section, which would take it up from there, and give them to the proper person to have a card made.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Waterman, it is your testimony that based upon the red refusal sheet that you prepared, and also the operations memorandums which have been marked respectively Commission Exhibit No. 962 and Commission Exhibit No. 963, that you had done all you were supposed to do, and that the file then should have been passed over to somebody else, and a lookout card should have been prepared?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes, yes; that was our procedure at that time at least.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, after March 28, 1960, and prior to February 1961, in that period, did your department, or did you take other actions in connection with the Oswald case, with the hope that you would finally be able to reach a decision on Oswald, as to whether he had expatriated himself or not?

Miss WATERMAN. I don't think there was too much going on in the file in 1960.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, I would like to call your attention to----

Miss WATERMAN. But in 1961----

Mr. COLEMAN. Before we get to 1961, I would like to call your attention to the memorandum from Mr. White to Mr. Hazelton, dated July 20, 1960, and the next document, which is a handwritten piece of paper, dated 2-15-61.

Do you have that? Your number should be X-49.

I show you the document which is marked in your file X-49, and it has been given Commission Exhibit No. 965.

Now, is that your handwriting on that document?

Mr. EHRLICH. Might I interject at this time? In looking at the originals of these I notice that X-49 is actually two memorandums. They were photostated as one, and thus probably you cannot actually read either one.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, I am referring to the one on top. Is that your writing "took initial action, action"----

Miss WATERMAN. No; that is Mr. Masterton--the memorandum on the little larger size below was a memorandum, informal memorandum, which I sent to my section chief, Mr. Masterton.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you indicate what you said in your memorandum?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I said, "Mr. Masterton, SCS, is writing to mother on welfare aspect of Lee Harvey Oswald. Last two paragraphs of Moscow dispatch 585, 2-8-61 appeared to be for PPT reply."

I believe that was a letter which had been prepared in SCS--you know what that is.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss WATERMAN. And had been forwarded to our office for clearance, for our initial, before it was mailed, to reply to some inquiry of the mother.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, on top of that memorandum you read, that you prepared, there is another memorandum, isn't there?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, could you read that into the record?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; "SCS. Took initial action on action copy, case of split action. Copy our action to go to SCS."

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you know or do you have any knowledge what they meant about case is split action?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, it has been a long time since I have seen the material. But I believe that the mother, Mrs. Oswald, in writing to the Department, to the Secretary, probably brought up various questions about her son. Now--questions which related to his welfare or physical repatriation, or something of that type, which would come under the jurisdiction of the Special Consular Services, should be answered there. Any inquiries which were about his citizenship or his passport, anything that came within the purview of the Passport Office, should have a reply drafted by Miss Knight's office, or elsewhere in the office.

Mr. COLEMAN. In other words, you are saying that the phrase, split action, on Commission Exhibit No. 965, doesn't mean that----

Miss WATERMAN. The decision was split; no.

Mr. COLEMAN. It just means that different offices in the Department would have to make different decisions, or take different action?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; and I think that most of Mrs. Oswald's letters were quite involved, and brought up several questions.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Then the next document which I want to ask you questions about is your X-55.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. That we have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 966.

Now, this letter, though signed by Miss Knight, was prepared by you?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And it was a reply to an inquiry made by Congressman Wright?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. With respect to the Oswald case.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; this was--we probably either received a memorandum from SCS or telephone call, something of that sort.

Mr. COLEMAN. The next contact you had with the Oswald case was as a result of the Embassy Despatch dated February 28, 1961, which is X-42(2).

Miss WATERMAN. Are you talking about the Department's Despatch?

(At this point, Mr. Dulles reentered the hearing room.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; despatch. The Foreign Service Despatch.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; our despatch to the Embassy.

Mr. COLEMAN. I beg your pardon. It is a despatch from the Embassy to you.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; that is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Which we have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 967.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. When that was received in Washington, you got a copy of it, did you not?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I think--we seem to have the original in our file.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; you saw the document?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And then as a result of seeing the document on March 27, 1961, you prepared a draft of the instruction which should go to Moscow in response, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And that is in the file as X-46, and we have marked it as Commission Exhibit No. 968. And the draft that you prepared which was attached to Commission Exhibit No. 968 is the next document, which is X-47, which we have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 969, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. You mean the copy of the----

Mr. COLEMAN. The proposed State Department instruction.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I see that.

Mr. COLEMAN. And it indicates on the copy that the original was not sent, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. That is right. Nothing was sent.

Mr. DULLES. Can I get this clear now? I am not sure--which was the document that was not sent?

Mr. COLEMAN. That is X-47 (Commission Exhibit No. 969).

Mr. DULLES. Could you identify that for the record--because just reference to documents in our record would be meaningless to the reader. I think we ought to identify each document as we can, because I am lost completely.

Mr. COLEMAN. It is Commission Exhibit No. 969, which is a draft of the State Department instruction to be sent to the Embassy in Moscow, as a result of the Embassy's dispatch of February 28.

Mr. DULLES. And this was drafted on March 27, was it?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And you, I gather, Miss Waterman, drafted this?

Miss WATERMAN. I drafted this, and then apparently we had--everyone had second thoughts on some of the statements in there, and I believe that it was at this time--wait a minute.

We sent this to Miss Knight's office for the special attention of Mr. Hickey.

Mr. COLEMAN. And is that the memorandum dated March 31, 1961?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; that is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Which has been given Commission Exhibit No. 970.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And from that memorandum, you indicate that your proposed instructions were that, one, that the passport should be mailed back to Mr. Oswald only under proper safeguards----

Miss WATERMAN. Now, are you talking about what wasn't sent or what finally was?

Mr. COLEMAN. The memorandum of March 31, 1961.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; these memorandums were prepared by my superiors. In other words, this looked a little different and more important by that time.

Representative FORD. In other words, the State Department document No. X-42 came back to you from higher authority?

Miss WATERMAN. No; I prepared the instruction, and I sent it to Mr. Kupiec, who by that time was in charge of our section--Mr. Masterton having been given other duties. And this went into the office of the Chief of our Division, of the Foreign Adjudications Division. And Mr. Cacciatore, who was the Assistant Chief of the Division, drafted a memorandum in Mr. White's name to go to Miss Knight's office, and that is a memorandum of March 31, 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, that has been given Commission Exhibit No. 970.

It is in your files as X-42.

Miss WATERMAN. Right.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you had no part in connection with the drafting of that memorandum?

Miss WATERMAN. No, no; our branch had sent the case to our Division Chief, either to comment or authorize the mailing of the instruction which I had prepared.

Mr. COLEMAN. And then after this memorandum of March 31, 1961, was drafted, a decision was finally reached in the Department as to the form of the State Department instruction which is in your file as X-38?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And we have marked it as Commission Exhibit No. 971.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes

Mr. COLEMAN. And that is the instruction that was actually sent to the Embassy?

Miss WATERMAN. Sent to the Embassy; yes. That was a replacement of the instruction which I had originally drafted, and I redrafted that according to the dictates of the memorandums which had been exchanged with our office and Miss Knight's office.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question here, Mr. Coleman?

On the memo of March 31, 1961, Commission Exhibit No. 970, the last sentence reads as follows: "For the best interests of the United States, therefore, and as the possession of a passport might facilitate his obtention of an exit visa it is believed that we should do everything within our power to facilitate Oswald's entry into the United States."

Who would have prepared the March 31, 1961 memo that contained that quotation?

Miss WATERMAN. That was prepared by Mr. Cacciatore, who was the Assistant Chief of the Foreign Operations Division, in which I worked. And Mr. John White was his superior, and Mr. White initialed the memo going to Miss Knight's office, to Mr. Hickey.

Mr. DULLES. Who is Mr. Hickey?

Miss WATERMAN. Who is he?

Mr. DULLES. I meant at this time what was his position?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I believe at that time his title was--I wouldn't like to say definitely--I believe he was the Deputy Chief of the Passport Office.

Mr. DULLES. Under Miss Knight?

Miss WATERMAN. Under Miss Knight, yes.

Mr. DULLES. I would like to ask one question about X-38(2).

Mr. COLEMAN. That is Commission Exhibit No. 971.

Mr. DULLES. That is the cable sent--cable of instructions sent on the Lee Harvey Oswald matter to the American Embassy in Moscow. This relates to----

Miss WATERMAN. Now, you are talking about the State Department instruction?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct. In paragraph 2 there is reference to the circumstances under which his passport can be returned, and there is this phrase: "His passport may be delivered to him on a personal basis only."

What does that mean?

Miss WATERMAN. I think it meant deliver it to him in person.

Mr. DULLES. I see--deliver it to him in person.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I think those are the words of Mr. Hickey. I believe that somewhere in the file there is a memorandum which Mr. Hickey returned to Mr. White's division, giving his views.

Mr. DULLES. And that may be qualified by the last sentence here, suggesting that it would not be wise to send it through the mails?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; in other words, the memorandum which Mr. Hickey returned to us, with our proposed instruction, was used as a basis for our action.

Mr. DULLES. It was to be given to him personally, and not transmitted through the mails.

Miss WATERMAN. I think that is what it means.

Mr. COLEMAN. And, also, the State Department instructions were that he was to get the passport only after the Embassy had thoroughly questioned Oswald regarding the circumstances of his residence in the Soviet Union, and his possible commitment of an act or acts of expatriation?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Waterman, I note on the side of the State Department instruction a notation that CIA furnished copy "on case by me, 10-5-61."

Do you know who wrote that, and what that means?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I think the person has initialed it who wrote it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Who is CHS?

Miss WATERMAN. I think that is Mr. Seeley--Mr. Carroll Seeley.

Mr. COLEMAN. Carroll H. Seeley, Jr.?

Miss WATERMAN. If that is the way his name is listed in the book.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is he an attorney in the Passport Office?

Miss WATERMAN. I don't know what he is now. So far as I know, he was an attorney at that time. He was in--in the Legal Division of the Passport Office.

Mr. COLEMAN. I also note in the next paper which is attached to Commission Exhibit No. 971 we have marked as Commission Exhibit 972, there is a reference sheet----

Mr. DULLES. What is that paper?

Mr. COLEMAN. It is physically attached.

Mr. DULLES. You see, exhibit numbers won't appear----

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, it is a reference sheet dated 10-5-61, which indicates that a Thermofax copy of the Department of State Instruction No. A-173, dated April 13, 1961, was sent to the CIA.

Is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. I know nothing about that. That is something that was entirely outside of our Adjudication Division, our Foreign Operations Division.

Mr. COLEMAN. But the reference indicates that it was prepared by Robert D. Johnson, Chief Counsel, Passport Office, under date of 10-5-61, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. I am looking at it. Yes. But that was nothing that emanated from our part of the Passport Office.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you prepared and had sent forward the Department of State instruction dated April 13, 1961, you then, on or about May 26, 1961, received the Embassy Foreign Despatch of that date, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes, yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And that despatch, which is your No. X-34, has been given Commission Exhibit No. 973, states that the Embassy had received another letter from Oswald, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I am looking at a copy.

Mr. COLEMAN. And also the despatch----

Mr. DULLES. Would you identify that a little bit?

Mr. COLEMAN. The despatch is from the Embassy to the Department of State, and it is Commission Exhibit No. 973, written by Mr. Snyder on May 26, 1961, and it indicates, one, that the Embassy has received another letter from Mr. Oswald, and it also indicates that Oswald was married to a Russian woman, and it indicates that Oswald has informed the Embassy that he had an internal Soviet passport in which he was designated as "without citizenship."

And the Embassy Despatch actually has as a copy the letter which Mr. Oswald sent to the Embassy in May 1961.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you received that in Washington some time shortly after March 26, 1961.

Miss WATERMAN. We received it in our particular office on June 12.

Mr. COLEMAN. As a result of receiving----

Mr. DULLES. Just one second.

June----

Miss WATERMAN. I am going by our automatic clock stamps on the reverse of the original.

Mr. DULLES. You received it on June 12?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; we received it in our action office June 12, 1961.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you received it, you then considered whether the Embassy should return to Mr. Oswald his passport. And your decision as finally made is reflected in the State Department instruction dated July 11, 1961, which is your X-31, which has been marked Commission Exhibit No. 975, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I am looking at a copy.

Mr. COLEMAN. In those instructions, you said that Mr. Oswald could be given his passport, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, yes--because we are in effect agreeing with the suggestion of the Embassy. We are telling the Embassy that we----

Mr. COLEMAN. You are agreeing with their despatch of May 26, 1961, which has been identified for the record as Commission Exhibit No. 973.

Miss WATERMAN. What is this word?

Oh--"seek."

Mr. COLEMAN. Is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. What was your question again now?

Mr. COLEMAN. I am saying what you were agreeing to was the proposed action of the Embassy as set forth in its Foreign Service Despatch dated May 26, 1961?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; but I see we also note that the Embassy intended to contact the Department again before granting any documentation to Oswald.

Mr. DULLES. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Back on the record.

Mr. COLEMAN. I note on Commission Exhibit No. 975, which is your X-31, that on the side there is written "Pink copy of this sent to EE:SOV Miss James, BW7-17-61."

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I am looking at that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall whether Miss James asked you to send her a copy, or did you just send her a copy without being requested?

Miss WATERMAN. No; I would not recall, really. We tried to keep--since there were many interests involved here, we did try to keep the geographic division up to date on what we were doing, so that they would have more or less a complete picture of the case.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then I would like to next call your attention to your document which is X-28.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. That is a memorandum which you prepared, Commission Exhibit No. 978, in which you state that Miss James called and said that she wanted to know what reply had you made to the Moscow despatch 29, July 11, 1961, in the case of Oswald. And you stated that the draft reply was in preparation, and you also said that Miss James said that the communication should be cleared with the SOV, and then you make a comment that you never heard that the Passport Section's citizenship decisions should be routed to SOV for clearance.

Miss WATERMAN. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Nevertheless, you indicated in the memorandum that you would indicate that the SOV had a special interest in the reply to the despatch, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; that is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you discuss with anybody in the Department Miss James' request?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I don't recall. I don't know. I wouldn't recall right now.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, is this the only time, to your knowledge, where the SOV had made a request in connection with a passport?

Miss WATERMAN. Oh, no; I would not say that. I don't think so; no. I think probably a great many of our communications went out as office memoranda, and they received copies of them in the Division anyhow.

But I think this was probably more to avoid confusion in having classified files be traveling around the different areas of the Department. We could send a copy of an "OM" without trouble. But handing the files around was another matter. And we didn't put them around any more than we had to.

Mr. COLEMAN. The next document in the sheaf of papers I gave you is the Operations Memorandum dated August 18, 1961, prepared by you----

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And we have given it Commission Exhibit No. 979.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. In that you indicate that you concur in the conclusion of the Embassy that there is available no information and/or evidence to show that Mr. Oswald has expatriated himself under the pertinent laws of the United States.

Miss WATERMAN. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you review the entire files which you had in the Passport Office on Oswald before you wrote this memorandum?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; our file was all together.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you also had the benefit of the various Embassy Despatches which were sent prior to August 18, 1961?

Miss WATERMAN. Oh, yes.

Well, the part that concerned his citizenship, certainly, was with our file.

Mr. COLEMAN. And reviewing the whole file, you, as the adjudicator, determined on August 18, 1961, that there was nothing in the file which would show that Mr. Oswald had expatriated himself?

Miss WATERMAN. That is correct.

Representative FORD. When you say "no information and/or evidence to show that Mr. Oswald"----

Miss WATERMAN. No information or evidence.

Well, that is the way I worded it. No information or evidence. We would have to have evidence to hold up any action on him. And, in addition to having no evidence, we also had no information.

Representative FORD. Did you have the information that he had come in and presented a statement to Mr. Snyder that he wanted to renounce his citizenship?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; but he hasn't done so. There was no place that he could have done so, except at the Embassy, under a specified form, and upon specified documents.

Representative FORD. In other words, you were relying upon the need for this particular document?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, in the first place, when he came in--as I believe Mr. Snyder said, or whoever reported from the Embassy--and threw down his passport, he apparently was a disgruntled young man--and that is not the first time a passport has been thrown down on a consular officer's desk. And I think that we had--no--in other words, it looked as if he were already regretting his first action. He was weakening a little bit because he was not being accorded any kind of recognition in the Soviet Union.

In other words, he was----

Representative FORD. But the subsequent evidence, where you say he was changing his mind, came about 2 years later. On the other hand, there was some evidence, when he first went to the Soviet Union, October 31, 1959, that he at least had an intention to renounce his American citizenship. He simply had not signed the actual form that is prescribed by the regulations.

Miss WATERMAN. That is right. He had not.

And there was no indication that actually he intended to do that. He apparently derived some kind of satisfaction from his appearing at the Embassy with an ambiguous statement. But there was nothing there to show that he actually had an intention of renouncing his citizenship under the law.

Representative FORD. I must differ with you. That first statement that he submitted was not very ambiguous.

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I think probably he made several. But, in any event--he----

Representative FORD. I do think I ought to read what he said on October 31.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I believe I recall that.

Representative FORD. Here is a letter or a statement in Lee Harvey Oswald's handwriting, which says:

"I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my present citizenship in the United States of America be revoked.

"I have entered the Soviet Union for the express purpose of applying for citizenship in the Soviet Union, through the means of naturalization.

"My request for citizenship is now pending before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

"I take these steps for political reasons. My request for the revoking of my American citizenship is made only after the longest and most serious considerations.

"I affirm that my allegiance is to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Signed, "Lee Harvey Oswald."

I don't think that is very ambiguous.

Miss WATERMAN. Well, perhaps not. But the procedure was explained to him, and he, as I recall, took no interest in completing any forms to make his renunciation of American citizenship official.

Representative FORD. The only question that I raise, Miss Waterman, is in light of this evidence, your statement that there is available no information and/or evidence to show that Mr. Oswald has expatriated himself under the pertinent laws of the United States----

Miss WATERMAN. I think that is correct. I think the statement is correct.

Representative FORD. That is a very technical response, or technical statement. I think there was evidence that he had placed before Government officials his desire to renounce his citizenship.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did anyone advise you or instruct you that you should make the adjudication that you made as reflected in the August 18, 1961, memorandum, or is this a decision that you made after you had reviewed the file?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I made the decision and prepared the communication which went through my superiors, and they apparently agreed with me.

Mr. COLEMAN. Can you, by looking at the file, particularly the document marked X-27, which is the Operations Memorandum dated August 18, 1961, tell us what superior reviewed the memorandum before it went forth to the Embassy?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; the initials there, HFK, are Mr. Kupiec, who was my area chief, and I believe that up at the top, on the second line of the Operations Memorandum, opposite "Department of State" I believe that those were the initials of Mr. White, who was in charge of the Foreign Operations Division. And then this was also cleared in our Legal Division.

Now, that would not be for citizenship purposes, but it would be there for reference.

Mr. COLEMAN. And who was CHS?

Miss WATERMAN. That is the same person you mentioned awhile ago, Mr. Seeley.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then as a result of determining that there was no evidence or information showing that Mr. Oswald had expatriated himself, you then indicated that the passport of Mr. Oswald could be renewed, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question here, Mr. Coleman?

Referring again to the memorandum of August 18, 1961, the first paragraph, where you say, "We concur in the conclusion of the Embassy that there is available no information and/or evidence to show that Mr. Oswald has expatriated himself under the pertinent laws of the United States"--where is their documentation, if any, that the Embassy has come to that conclusion?

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, I think she is referring to the despatch of July 11, 1961, which is identified as Commission Exhibit No. 935.

Representative FORD. Do you come to that conclusion based on the total content of the July 11, 1961, memo from the Embassy in Moscow, or something specifically set forth in that memorandum?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I think all of the material together. In other words, Oswald was not documented as a Soviet citizen. Apparently he didn't expect to be. The Embassy had questioned him. And, in addition to their knowing that during his visits to the Embassy itself he had not expatriated himself, they received no information from him in what questioning they could do that he had performed any act at all to expatriate himself under U.S. laws.

Representative FORD. Mr. Coleman, do you have that paper we had yesterday, where the cross-out was present?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, sir; here it is.

Representative FORD. On Commission Exhibit No. 938, Oswald crossed out "have not"----

Mr. DULLES. What is the date of that, Mr. Ford?

Representative FORD. It is dated----

Mr. COLEMAN. July 11, 1961, and it is Oswald's application for renewal of passport.

Mr. DULLES. I remember the paper. That is subsequent to this document here that we are discussing now.

Mr. COLEMAN. Done at the same time. The State Department document shows--I mean the Embassy document shows that one of the covering material sent to the State Department was the application for renewal of passport executed by Oswald July 10, 1961.

Mr. DULLES. And this was sent with their dispatch of July 11, 1961, which we are now discussing.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Did you have that document at the time you wrote the statement, "We concur," and so forth?

Mr. COLEMAN. Which is Commission Exhibit No. 979.

Miss WATERMAN. What is the date?

Mr. COLEMAN. It is your X-27.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I think we had that. Because we referred to it.

Representative FORD. Well, does that statement, the way it is set forth there, raise any questions about whether there was any information or evidence about his expatriation?

Miss WATERMAN. His questionnaire discloses no information.

Representative FORD. But what about the statement on the first page?

Will you read it, for the record--the printed part?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; "I have been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state." Well, of course, that would be prepared by the Embassy. I think they just crossed out the wrong one.

Representative FORD. But all we can go by is what we see.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you examine the original in the State Department file, and see what was crossed out there?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes--"I have not." I think that was an Embassy error.

Representative FORD. That is a fairly important error, though.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; it is.

Representative FORD. Will you read the full text of what is shown there as it is shown on the original?

Miss WATERMAN. "I have been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted, served in or performed the duties of any office, post or employment under the government of a foreign state, or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality, either in the United States or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military, air or naval service of the United States in time of war; or of committing any act of treason against or of attempting by force to overthrow or of bearing arms against the United States; or departed from or remained outside the jurisdiction of the United States for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States. If any of the above mentioned acts or conditions are applicable in the applicant's case, or to the case of any other person included in this application, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof."

Representative FORD. That is signed by Lee Harvey Oswald.

Miss WATERMAN. That is signed by Lee Harvey Oswald. And his statement here indicates and shows the performance of no such act as is described on the first page of the application.

Representative FORD. Any one of those conditions, however, in that statement would indicate that he had renounced his citizenship?

Miss WATERMAN. It could. But, in other words, he now says----

Representative FORD. He says some place in there he is without nationality. Did you have that at the time----

Miss WATERMAN. "I am described as being without citizenship." That is right. In other words, it is questionable whether the Embassy should have crossed out "have not." In other words, he might have said I have done this, but his explanation----

Representative FORD. That is what the document shows.

Miss WATERMAN. But his explanation clearly shows that he had not.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know whether that was noted at the time, or deemed to be a clerical error, or how did you interpret that crossing out of that particular line there?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, in any event--I actually cannot recall, Mr. Dulles. But the questionnaire, which was also under oath, at the Embassy, would be the material part here. And there is no information in here to show that he had been naturalized. He said he was not known as a Soviet citizen, he did not have a Soviet passport. And as for the other items of possible expatriation, I don't see how they could have applied to him, in any event.

Representative FORD. Mr. Coleman, I suggest that, to make the record complete as to what the evidence was in the file, that we have reprinted in the record at this point Commission Exhibit No. 912, because it was a followup statement by Oswald on the status as he saw it of his citizenship at that time.

Mr. COLEMAN. You want the reporter to print physically in the record Commission Exhibits Nos. 912 and 913, the two Oswald letters?

Mr. DULLES. Just one question. I note here this is typed out. The line I saw had been marked out. I think it is a fair inference that this was typed out, since the typing was probably done in the American Embassy. He had no typewriter. There is a fair inference that might have been a mistake.

Representative FORD. All we can go by is what the record shows.

Mr. DULLES. I think we ought to clarify that through the record in Moscow, because the record is not good at this point.

Mr. EHRLICH. There is another copy, as you know, that came in from the Embassy that we sent to you that showed in fact--it was not a carbon, it was a separate one, in which the "have" was----

Mr. COLEMAN. That is Commission Exhibit No. 947.

Mr. EHRLICH. That was in the Embassy. It was not in the Department.

Mr. DULLES. There the "X's" were above everything, but probably were intended to mark out the "have."

Representative FORD. Is Commission Exhibit No. 938 the original?

Representative FORD. This is a photostat of the original?

Miss WATERMAN. The original is in the Department's file.

Mr. COLEMAN. Congressman Ford, the original document is right physically in front of you.

Representative FORD. That one is crossing out his "have not." It is very clear.

Mr. DULLES. And on this one, which is the copy in the Embassy files, the crossed out is above all three. It apparently was intended to be crossed out, the "have."

(At this point, Representative Ford withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. COLEMAN. We just thought the record should--you recall we asked Mr. Snyder a question about this, and he said he didn't know whether it was a typographical error, or just what the reason for it was.

Miss Waterman, would you be kind enough to look at the document in your file which is X-30, and could you look at the original, in the original State Department file?

Now, we have marked it as Commission Exhibit No. 977.

Now, the second page of the document that we have has inserted a sheet of paper called a passport office lookout file. Is that stamped physically on the back of the first page?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. That indicates that the document was received on July 19, is that correct? There is a stamp on there?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; July 19.

Mr. COLEMAN. There is another stamp on there, August 3, 1961.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I see that.

Mr. COLEMAN. You also have the lookout file on the Passport Office, is checked under "No Lookout (refusal) File Record."

Do you see that?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I see it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Does this mean that when someone ordered a search of the lookout record file in July or August, 1961, that there was no lookout file record on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Miss WATERMAN. Apparently so. That was probably done automatically. The records people probably did that.

Mr. COLEMAN. This was prior to the time when you had made your decision there had been no expatriation, is that correct?

Miss WATERMAN. I will have to look at this.

Mr. COLEMAN. Your recommendation wasn't made until August 18, 1961.

Miss WATERMAN. That is what we were replying to. That is one of the communications that we were acknowledging, yes, that is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, should there have been a lookout card when the search was made in July 1961, on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, I would say that if one were made, it would have been in there.

Now, I don't know that I always would have examined the reverse of every dispatch. If I had examined the reverse of that despatch, I probably would have noted it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, what I am saying, as a result of the refusal sheet that you prepared in 1960, when the lookout section made the search on August 3, 1961, should there not have been a lookout file at that time on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Miss WATERMAN. Are you talking about a lookout card?

Mr. COLEMAN. A lookout card, yes.

Miss WATERMAN. A lookout card would only have referred to this file.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss WATERMAN. Which we already had, and which we already determined had no evidence of expatriation.

Mr. COLEMAN. I am suggesting that you did not make that determination until August 18, 1961.

Miss WATERMAN. Well, Mr. Coleman, the card itself would have been totally immaterial to the decision we made here, inasmuch as we had the entire file, and also our refusal--the refusal sheet would be in here.

As I said, that was not for expatriation. It was just to flag an adverse--possible adverse interest in the case.

Mr. DULLES. But there has been testimony given here before, Miss Waterman, that when the question came up later of the issuance of a passport, since there was no lookout card, this file was not consulted.

Miss WATERMAN. Well, that could be. That was, I believe--I believe that was after I had anything to do with the file.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; I know. You cannot testify as to that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, Miss Waterman, would you be kind enough to turn over to the next document which you have before you, after the August 18, 1961, memorandum?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And that is in the file--your file as 1X-24. It has been given Commission Exhibit No. 980.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. And will you note that there is some typewritten material that appears on the first page which says, "Attached report is a summation of Subject's background and case since he renounced U.S. citizenship and sought Soviet citizenship in the fall of 1959. As his citizenship status does not appear to be resolved, copies of the report are furnished to both PPT and VO."

And the attachment is an FBI report.

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Written on the side in your handwriting, I assume, is the word "incorrect."

Miss WATERMAN. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall when you wrote that on that paper?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, probably when I saw it. I would not recall when I wrote it, but it would be--the statement--my inference there that the statement in this memorandum is what you might call a misnomer would have been correct at any date.

Mr. DULLES. Who wrote this memorandum which you indicated was incorrect?

Miss WATERMAN. I have a line there "renounced U.S. citizenship." In other words, somebody who had nothing to do with the adjudication of the case or citizenship had made a statement in there that this person had renounced, and that is a rather poor thing to have in the file which is going around to various places in the Department or possibly elsewhere. And I did write that on, with reference only to his renunciation.

Mr. DULLES. With reference to that one statement?

Miss WATERMAN. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. And then on December 28, 1961, you drafted a memorandum which purports to be from Miss Knight to Robert F. Hale, in which you indicated that any inference in the memorandum of July 27, 1961, which is the document I have just asked you about----

Miss WATERMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. That Oswald was not a citizen of the United States is incorrect.

Miss WATERMAN. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you prepared----

Miss WATERMAN. In other words, this memorandum which I did make the notation on was sent to other parts of the Department, and we wanted to correct that impression, that there was any evidence of expatriation by Oswald, by renunciation of U.S. citizenship, or any other way.

Mr. COLEMAN. That has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 981, which is the memorandum of December 28, 1961, in which you made the statement that any inference that Mr. Oswald had--was not a citizen of the United States was incorrect.

Mr. WATERMAN. Well, yes; well, that is self-explanatory.

Mr. COLEMAN. Then on the same day you drafted an operations memorandum to be sent to the Embassy in Moscow in which you said that the Passport Office approves the manner of the Embassy's replies to Mr. Oswald with respect to passport facilities for him in the future. Is that correct? That you drafted that memorandum?

Miss WATERMAN. Yes; I drafted that.

Mr. COLEMAN. That has been given Commission Exhibit No. 982.

That is December 28, 1961. It is the last document.

Now, after December 28, 1961, did you have anything else to do as far as the Oswald matter was concerned?

Miss WATERMAN. I don't think so, except perhaps sending a copy of some document or letter to our files--because I had only about a month's work in the Department. I left work on February 2, 1962, and that was the last day I had with any kind of performance of duties.

I might have marked some paper or something of that sort.

But I don't recall any action. If the file shows it, I took it. But, otherwise, I don't remember.

Mr. COLEMAN. When you took the various actions we have discussed this morning with respect to Mr. Oswald, were you acting under instructions of anyone that this was the decision you would have to make because someone else in the Department wanted you to resolve the question this way?

Miss WATERMAN. What do you mean?

Do you mean outside of the Passport Office?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss WATERMAN. Outside the Passport Office?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; I am just asking you for the record.

Miss WATERMAN. I know. But you mentioned--such as who?

Mr. COLEMAN. Did anyone call you up and say, "Miss Waterman, this is the way you have to resolve this case"?

Miss WATERMAN. Oh, no. Oh, no.

Mr. COLEMAN. And you made the decisions you made based upon the record and your judgment as to what you thought the law was and what the facts were?

Miss WATERMAN. Certainly.

Mr. DULLES. Did you consult anyone in connection with reaching that decision in the Oswald case?

Miss WATERMAN. Well, Mr. Dulles, in preparing this correspondence, as I have told you, the correspondence was prepared for the signature of my superiors, and if they didn't agree with what I wrote, that was all right with me. But that was my impression, and I believed there had been discussion among persons in our immediate office. And while----

Mr. DULLES. Your decision, then, is not final. It is subject to review by your superiors in matters of this kind?

Miss WATERMAN. That is right.

But in no event--I don't know of any--as I say, my connection with the case closed, and I never heard in the press or any other place that indicated that Oswald expatriated himself and that he wasn't entitled to a passport.

Mr. COLEMAN. Your decision wasn't in any way influenced by the fact that Miss James told you that this was a decision that would have to be made or anything like that?

Miss WATERMAN. Certainly not. They have absolutely nothing to do with citizenship--nothing.

Mr. COLEMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DULLES. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, before we close the testimony of Miss Waterman, I would like to move for the admission of Commission Exhibits No. 957 through Commission Exhibit No. 983, which were the documents that we marked.

Mr. DULLES. They shall be admitted.

(The documents heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibits Nos. 957-983, were received in evidence.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to thank Miss Waterman for coming in.

Mr. DULLES. We thank you very much, Miss Waterman.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Afternoon Session

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

The President's Commission reconvened at 3:30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary Dean Rusk, we wanted to ask you a few questions about this matter in any particular detail you wanted to answer. Mr. Rankin would you inform the Secretary the areas we intend to cover before we ask the questions.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I think the particular area that we would be interested in with the Secretary is just as to whether, or his knowledge of whether there was any foreign political interest in the assassination of President Kennedy?

We have been getting the information in regard to other matters concerning the State Department from other of his associates and colleagues and employees of the Department, and we are going to complete that and it has been helpful to us and I think we can rather limit the inquiry to that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; very well.

Mr. Secretary, would you rise and be sworn, please. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Secretary RUSK. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please, and Mr. Rankin will ask you the questions, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chief Justice, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to be just as helpful as possible to the Commission. I am not quite clear of testimony in terms of future publication. There may be certain points that arise where it might be helpful to the Commission for me to comment on certain points but there--it would be a very grave difficulty about publication, so I wonder what the Commission's view on that is.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, our purpose is to have available for the public all of the evidence that is given here. If there is any phase of it that you think might jeopardize the security of the Nation, have no hesitation in asking us to go off the record for a moment, and you can tell us what you wish.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir, I am at your disposal.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chief Justice, could I make a suggestion in that connection?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Would it be feasible to have a discussion here of the points that are vital from the point of view of our record, and so forth, and maybe a little informal conversation afterward to cover the other points.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a recess for a few moments then.

Mr. DULLES. I thought between the two wouldn't that be easier than put the two together.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, will you give us your name and address, please?

Secretary RUSK. Dean Rusk, 4980 Quebec Street, Washington, D.C.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are the Secretary of State for the United States?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. You have occupied that position for some time?

Secretary RUSK. Since January 22, 1961.

Mr. RANKIN. In that position you have become familiar with our foreign relations and the attitude and interest in some degree of other countries that we deal with?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; within the limitations of the possibilities, it is at least my task to be as familiar as possible with those things.

Mr. RANKIN. In your opinion, was there any substantial interest or interests of the Soviet Union which would have been advanced by the assassination of President Kennedy?

Secretary RUSK. I would first have to say on a question of that sort that it is important to follow the evidence. It is very difficult to look into the minds of someone else, and know what is in someone else's mind.

I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union considered that it had an interest in the removal of President Kennedy or that it was in any way involved in the removal of President Kennedy. If I may elaborate just a moment.

Mr. RANKIN. If you will, please.

Secretary RUSK. As the Commission may remember, I was with several colleagues in a plane on the way to Japan at the time the assassination occurred. When we got the news we immediately turned back. After my mind was able to grasp the fact that this event had in fact occurred, which was the first necessity, and not an easy one, I then, on the plane, began to go over the dozens and dozens of implications and ramifications of this event as it affects our foreign relations all over the world.

I landed briefly in Hawaii on the way back to Washington, and gave some instructions to the Department about a number of these matters, and learned what the Department was already doing. But one of the great questions in my mind at that time was just that question, could some foreign government somehow be involved in such an episode.

I realized that were this so this would raise the gravest issues of war and peace, but that nevertheless it was important to try to get at the truth--to the answer to that question--wherever that truth might lead; and so when I got back to Washington I put myself immediately in touch with the processes of inquiry on that point, and as Secretary of State had the deepest possible interest in what the truthful answer to those questions would be, because it would be hard to think of anything more pregnant for our foreign relations than the correct answer to that question.

I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence indicating that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy nor in any way participated in any such event.

Now, standing back and trying to look at that question objectively despite the ideological differences between our two great systems, I can't see how it could be to the interest of the Soviet Union to make any such effort.

Since I have become Secretary of State I have seen no evidence of any policy of assassination of leaders of the free world on the part of the Soviets, and our intelligence community has not been able to furnish any evidence pointing in that direction.

I am sure that I would have known about such bits of evidence had they existed but I also made inquiry myself to see whether there was such evidence, and received a negative reply.

I do think that the Soviet Union, again objectively considered, has an interest in the correctness of state relations. This would be particularly true among the great powers, with which the major interests of the Soviet Union are directly engaged.

Mr. RANKIN. Could you expand on that a little bit so that others than those who deal in that area might understand fully what you mean?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I think that although there are grave differences between the Communist world and the free world, between the Soviet Union and other major powers, that even from their point of view there needs to be some shape and form to international relations, that it is not in their interest to have this world structure dissolve into complete anarchy, that great states and particularly nuclear powers have to be in a position to deal with each other, to transact business with each other, to try to meet problems with each other, and that requires the maintenance of correct relations and access to the leadership on all sides.

I think also that although there had been grave differences between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, I think there were evidences of a certain mutual respect that had developed over some of the experiences, both good and bad, through which these two men had lived.

I think both of them were aware of the fact that any Chairman of the Soviet Union and any President of the United States necessarily bear somewhat special responsibility for the general peace of the world.

Indeed without exaggeration, one could almost say the existence of the Northern Hemisphere in this nuclear age.

So that it would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an act.

It has not been our impression that madness has characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.

I think also that it is relevant that people behind the Iron Curtain, including people in the Soviet Union and including officials in the Soviet Union, seemed to be deeply affected by the death of President Kennedy.

Their reactions were prompt, and I think genuine, of regret and sorrow. Mr. Khrushchev was the first to come to the Embassy to sign the book of condolences. There were tears in the streets of Moscow. Moscow Radio spent a great deal of attention to these matters.

Now they did come to premature conclusions, in my judgment, about what this event was and what it meant in terms of who might have been responsible for it--and ideological effect has crept into that.

But I had the impression that the regret was genuine and that the ordinary Soviet citizen joined with ordinary people in other parts of the world in feeling the loss of the President in a very genuine sense.

Mr. RANKIN. There has been some suggestion that possibly the leadership of the Soviet Union would not have been politically interested in the death of the President but possibly a distant wing of the Party might have been so involved.

Can you give us any light on that, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. By suggestion you mean rumor?

Mr. RANKIN. In the newspapers, and things of that kind, rumor.

Secretary RUSK. I haven't been able to put a rational structure behind that possibility. If there are dissident elements their primary problem is within the Soviet Union.

If these dissident elements were aiming to change the present Government of the Soviet Union or its leadership or to return to an early range of policy by the elimination of present leadership or seizure of control, I don't quite see how the elimination of the President of the United States could contribute to that purpose.

I would also suppose that in their kind of system such elements would be under pretty close supervision and surveillance and they would have limited opportunities for the kind of action that would be organized in a way in this direction, although that is a matter of some speculation.

But, I would doubt very much that such dissident elements would have a motive or very much of an opportunity. Again, I have seen no evidence pointing in that direction.

Mr. RANKIN. How could you tell us in regard to Cuba in the same general way, your opinion and knowledge of any information or credible evidence?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would again repeat that the overriding consideration is to make every possible effort to find evidence and follow the evidence to wherever it leads.

I think it is, at least for me, more difficult to try to enter into the minds of the present leadership in Cuba than, perhaps, even of the present leadership of the Soviet Union. We have had very few contacts, as the Commission knows, with the present Government of Cuba.

But again, I have seen no evidence that seems to point in that direction.

There were some exchanges, with which the Commission is familiar, that seemed to be--seemed to come to another conclusion. But I would think that objective considerations would mean that it would be even greater madness for Castro or his government to be involved in any such enterprise than almost for anyone else, because literally the issue of war and peace would mean the issue of the existence of his regime and perhaps of his country might have been involved in that question.

We were under the impression that there was very considerable concern in Cuba as to whether they would be held responsible and what the effect of that might be on their own position and their own safety.

But I have seen no evidence that points to involvement by them, and I don't see objective facts which would seem to make it in their interests to remove Mr. Kennedy.

You see, this embarks upon, in any event it would embark upon, an unpredictable trail for them to go down this path, but I would think again the Commission would wish to examine the evidence as it has been doing with meticulous care and follow the evidence in these matters.

Mr. RANKIN. After the assassination, did you have direct communications with Ambassador Thomas Mann while he was still Ambassador at Mexico?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; we had a number of exchanges with Ambassador Mann connected with the presence in Mexico of Mr. Oswald.

I say those messages, and over a period of some days had daily consultations about them with our Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson. Mr. Johnson is my principal representative in our dealings with the various intelligence and security agencies of the government and with the Pentagon, and he has an office very near mine on the seventh floor of the Department of State.

These exchanges raised questions of the most far-reaching character involving the possibility of the implications of another government, and so I had a very deep personal interest in that at the time.

Our principal concern was to be sure that the FBI and the CIA who were the principal agencies investigating this matter would have every possible facility at their disposal, and would--and that our Ambassador would be given the fullest support from us in facilitating the investigation at the Mexican end.

So I was for a period, until this particular trail ran its course, very much involved in those exchanges.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any commentary that you want to make about those exchanges other than what you have given us?

Secretary RUSK. I think not, sir. I think that the materials, the information developed in those exchanges are before the Commission, and I believe the Commission has had a chance to inquire into them both as I understand both here and in Mexico with the appropriate agencies and I would think that the Commission's conclusions on that would be more valuable than mine because I have not put together all the pieces to draw finished conclusions from them.

Mr. RANKIN. One of the Commissioners saw a newspaper story shortly after the assassination saying "The Voice of America beaming its message into Russia immediately blamed the reactionary rightwing movements after Kennedy's death."

Do you know anything about that matter or what the source of it might have been?

Secretary RUSK. No; I have not anticipated that question so that I could have a chance to investigate it, but I will, if I may, Mr. Chief Justice, file a report with the Commission on that point.

I can say now that there was never any policy guidance from the Department of State or from the leadership of the Voice of America suggesting that any broadcasters take that line.

It is possible, and this is purely speculative at the moment, that the Voice of America in repeating a great many news accounts, as it frequently does in its overseas broadcasts, may have repeated some news accounts from this country, among which might have been a story to that effect from one source or another, but I would like if I may, sir, an opportunity to investigate that point and make a report to the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do that, Mr. Secretary.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question? Have we received in the Commission all of the Voice of America broadcasts that were made over a period of 2 to 7 days involved in this incident?

Mr. RANKIN. I don't know of any.

Representative FORD. I think the Commission ought to have them for our own analysis as well as the analysis of the Secretary of State.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that under your jurisdiction?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; indeed I could provide that.

Mr. RANKIN. If you will, please.

Secretary RUSK. The Commission might also be interested in either digests or the fuller materials on world reactions to the President's assassination.

I have here, for example, a daily summary of the 26th of November 1963, on foreign radio and press reaction which gives some interesting treatment about this behind the Iron Curtain.

I would be happy to furnish the Commission with any material of that sort which you might wish.

Mr. RANKIN. We would appreciate having that.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Representative FORD. Would that include the Voice of Moscow or whatever they call it over there?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. From the outset of the events that took place?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; you might just wish to look at the first two or three paragraphs here to get a sample of the kind of summary that that involves.

Mr. DULLES. Was that prepared in the Department or by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service?

Secretary RUSK. This particular one is from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. We also have another one. We also have another one from within the Department which is also available in terms.

Representative FORD. I think it would be useful to have both for a period of about a week or so. I realize this is a summary covering several days. I think I saw that at the time.

Mr. RANKIN. There was another statement in the paper apparently purporting to be official that one of the Commissioners asked me to ask about and that was the Washington Post, Sunday, November 24, 1963, which was quoted by the Commissioner as, "Today in Washington State Department officials said they have no evidence indicating involvement of any foreign power in the assassination."

Do you know anything about that or can you give us any information?

Secretary RUSK. That was the view which we took at the time in consultation with the investigative agencies. We did not then have evidence of that sort nor do we now, and the implications of suggesting evidence in the absence of evidence would have been enormous.

Representative FORD. I don't understand that.

Secretary RUSK. Well, for us to leave the impression that we had evidence that we could not describe or discuss, when in fact we didn't have the evidence on a matter of such overriding importance could have created a very dangerous situation in terms of----

Representative FORD. Wouldn't it have been just as effective to say no comment?

Secretary RUSK. Well, unfortunately, under the practices of the press, no comment would have been taken to confirm that there was evidence. I mean, that would have been the interpretation that many would have put upon no comment.

But, Mr. Ford, I think the key thing is that at the time that statement was made we did not have such evidence. I mean, this was a factual statement at that time.

Representative FORD. But, at that time, this was 2 days after the assassination, you really didn't have much time to evaluate all of the evidence.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is correct. But if the evidence or the known facts had changed certainly that type of statement would have changed.

In other words, such statements are based upon the situation as known at the time the statements are made.

Representative FORD. This statement then appeared in the Sunday morning, November 24 issue or edition of the Washington Post. That was a statement issued certainly on the 23d of November because it had to be in order to get in the Sunday edition of the Post. So, that is 24 hours after the assassination.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, and this statement was made on the basis of such information as was available to us in the first 24 hours.

Mr. RANKIN. I was also asked to inquire whether that was an official statement if under your responsibility or if you could tell me who would be responsible for it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would have to check the actual source of the statement. But I would have no present doubt that it was an officer of the Department who was authorized to make that and for which I would be fully responsible.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question in connection with that?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. There was some evidence presented here quite recently when the district attorney of Dallas was here with regard to a message from Washington, from the White House to the attorney general of Texas, who was also here the other day before the Commission, on this point: A rumor had reached Washington that in preparing the indictment there, they were going to put in some reference to an international conspiracy. As a matter of fact, when that was run down it was not a correct rumor. But when that reached Washington, the reaction was rather strong and I think entirely understandable, and word went back to Dallas from high quarters that that should not, hoped that that would not be included in the legal proceedings and papers that were filed in connection with the assassination of the President and charging----

Mr. RANKIN. Unless there was evidence to support it.

Mr. DULLES. Unless there was evidence to support it. And the district attorney, who was here, testified that he had never considered adding that into it, putting that in the proceedings because if you put it in you had to prove it, and it is not necessary at all. All you need to do is allege a murder with intent, and so forth, and so on. So that that was all pretty well cleared up.

Mr. DULLES. Did that ever reach your attention, did you know anything about that?

Secretary RUSK. I don't personally recall that particular message. I do recall----

Mr. DULLES. That took place, I think before you got back, because that took place on the evening of the 22d.

Secretary RUSK. I didn't arrive until----

Mr. DULLES. You didn't get back until the 23d?

Secretary RUSK. Until the early morning of the 23d.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I do recall being concerned if several different authorities and agencies undertook investigations that would cut across each other's bow or make it difficult to elicit the cooperation of people outside the United States whose cooperation we might need in matters of that sort, I felt myself at that time there ought to be a complete and absolutely thorough investigation by the most responsible authorities and I was glad to see that brought into some order at the time but I don't remember the particular message you are talking about.

Representative FORD. Could you check to see if somebody in the Department of State made such a call or made such a contact?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I will be be glad to.

Representative FORD. And if so so report it for the proceedings?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, indeed; I will be glad to.

Mr. CHAYES. I may be able to supply some information to the Commission on this point because during the night of the 22d when we were examining the data in my office, the files, I did receive a call from Mr. Katzenbach who said that they had heard at the Justice Department, that there was a possibility that this kind of an element would get into the indictment, and said that--I can't remember the exact words that he used--but he conveyed to me that he regarded this as not very good, in the absence of evidence to support it, and said that he was seeking to have Mr. Saunders, who is the U.S. attorney in Dallas, admitted to the councils of the State officials there so that they could discuss these matters as time went on. And that he would try to, I don't know exactly again what he said, but that he would try to see that in the absence of evidence no such allegation was made in the indictment.

I didn't in any sense authorize, and I certainly couldn't direct him to do anything of this kind but my recollection of my reaction is that I acquiesced fully in what he was proposing to do, and raised no objection to it.

I think at sometime during that evening I reported this conversation to Mr. Ball. I am less clear about this part of the recollection, but I think I did report the conversation to Mr. Ball, much in the same way as I am reporting it to you, and he saw no objection either.

I think that is the entire State Department side of that particular transaction.

Representative FORD. Would you check, however, Mr. Secretary, to see if there is anything further in this regard?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I will.

Representative FORD. Do I understand that you or somebody for you is to summarize the USIA Voice of America broadcast that went out for the first 3 or 4 days subsequent to the assassination and that would be submitted for the record?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, indeed. And we can, of course, have available to the Commission such tapes or transcripts as we have of all those broadcasts in full, but I think we can start with the summary and then you can have the other materials if you wish to follow up particular points.

Representative FORD. Would they be voluminous, the originals?

Secretary RUSK. I would think they would be fairly voluminous, but not unmanageably so.

Representative FORD. I would say for at least the first 24 hours it might be well to have the full text of the USIA Voice of America material that was sent out.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Representative FORD. Do I also understand for the record that we are to have this or others like it showing what the press reaction was throughout the world?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Now, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service material would be much more voluminous because there we are receiving broadcasts in the clear from most broadcasting countries. But we will be in touch with your staff to show them everything that we have, and they can have any part of it they wish or we will be glad to give any help in terms of digesting or summarizing.

Mr. RANKIN. We have been furnished some information, considerable information, about the attitude of the foreign press as it was recited and has come to the attention of the people from time to time, but I don't believe we have right close, the Voice of America we don't have right close to the date of the assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. I read a sizable file on that that came from the State Department and very early in the life of the Commission that seemed to encompass all of the statements that were made around the world at that time.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Representative FORD. This document which you handed me, Mr. Secretary, is for Tuesday, 26 November 1963. Are these done on a daily basis?

Secretary RUSK. I think that one was a summary of the first 2 or 3 days, but I would----

Mr. DULLES. Summaries are done from time to time and there are daily reports from Foreign Broadcasting Information Service covering the Soviet Union and the satellites and another volume covering China and southeast Asia, and so forth and so on.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, could you give us a brief description of that, we have been calling it this and these.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; this is a daily report or rather a supplement to the daily report put out by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in what is called its world reaction series.

This apparently is a supplement to the foreign radio and press reaction to the death of President Kennedy, and the accession of President Johnson, prepared on 26 November 1963.

This is a daily report, the subject matter of which varies from day to day, but I will be glad to draw together not only such digests as we have, but also to see what we have retained in terms of the actual broadcasts from other countries so that although it may be voluminous it might have some material of interest to the Commission or its staff.

Representative FORD. I think it would be particularly pertinent as far as the Soviet Union or any of the bloc countries or Cuba, anything in this area that could be pulled together and included in the record, which I think would be very helpful.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

Representative FORD. I have the recollection that some people have alleged that Castro either prior to or subsequent to the assassination, made some very inflamatory speech involving President Kennedy.

Do you have any recollection of that?

Secretary RUSK. I don't have a recollection of a speech specially related to time. He has made more than his share of inflamatory speeches about this country and its leaders. But I will be glad to furnish the Commission a schedule of his speeches, and the character of these speeches and the texts if we have them during this period.

Representative FORD. There was one that I vaguely recall, either prior to or subsequent to the assassination that some people construed to be directed specifically at President Kennedy, and I think if there was such a speech that the Commission ought to have it and it ought to be analyzed by the staff and by the Commission.

Secretary RUSK. We will be very glad to look into that and furnish you with speeches made during this period or during a substantial part of the period on both sides of the November 22 date.

I gather the Commission has Mr. Danielle's interview with Mr. Castro on the subject. You have the published report of that.

Mr. DULLES. Was that the long interview with Castro?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; that was as close to any reflection of a thing that he might have said personally about this that went beyond the kind of broadcast speeches you referred to that I have seen, but----

Mr. DULLES. Do you have that available?

Secretary RUSK. We certainly can get it.

Mr. DULLES. It was in the press I guess at the time. Maybe you have a fuller copy than we have.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; it was a rather extensive interview.

Mr. CHAYES. I think the staff has it already.

Secretary RUSK. I see.

Mr. RANKIN. I think Commissioner Ford is referring to that speech of Mr. Castro which is sometimes called the slip-of-the-tongue speech that referred in a way that may have some implications in it. I think that might help you to identify it, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. It might be well for me, just to complete the sense of the atmosphere, to accompany that with the timing and the nature of statements and speeches that were being made on our side as a part of this continuing rather acrimonious discourse with Cuban leadership. But I will provide full information on this.

Mr. RANKIN. We would appreciate it so it would give a complete picture.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Representative FORD. Do I understand now, Mr. Rankin, that what the Secretary provides will be put in the record as exhibits?

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer to do that if that is satisfactory, as a part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; it might be admitted.

Representative FORD. There is one question that I think ought to be cleared up, you mentioned Mr. Mann who was our Ambassador at Mexico at that time. The way the record stands now it could be construed by somebody who wanted to so construe it that the country in which he served us was involved in what he was reporting. I think it ought to be made clear that is not the case.

Secretary RUSK. That is absolutely correct, sir. We never had the slightest view that Mexico was involved in this. The problem, the question arose because Mr. Oswald had been in Mexico, and was known to have been in touch with some Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. But the Mexican authorities gave us complete and the most helpful cooperation in full investigation of this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. Had you finished?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; I have.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are we ready to go back on the record?

All right, the Commission will be in order.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I should like to offer in evidence at this point Commission Exhibit No. 984 being the communication from yourself as Chairman of the Commission to the Secretary of State, dated March 11, 1964, and the Note Verbale in regard to the inquiries of the Soviet Union.

And Commission Exhibit No. 985 being the responses of the Soviet Union, including all of the medical as well as all other responses together with the transmittal letters from the Soviet Union and from the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under those numbers.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 984 and 985 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. I would like to assign, Mr. Chief Justice, Commission Exhibit No. 986, if I may, to those prior communications from the files of the Soviet Embassy in Washington that were furnished to us by the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under that number.

(Commission Exhibit No. 986 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Commission Exhibit No. 986 will be the copies of the records from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that were supplied to the Commission earlier by the State Department as a part of the records that were furnished to us by the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were the ones that were voluntarily offered by the Russians before any request was made of them?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under that number.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, will you tell us whether you know of any credible evidence to show or establish or tending to show any conspiracy either domestic or foreign involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?

Secretary RUSK. No; I have no evidence that would point in that direction or to lead me to a conclusion that such a conspiracy existed.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, gentlemen?

If not, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chief Justice and gentlemen.

TESTIMONY OF FRANCES G. KNIGHT

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.

Mr. Coleman, will you state to Miss Knight, please, the reason we asked her to come here today?

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Frances G. Knight is the head of the Passport Office of the State Department.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. We want to ask her concerning the standard operating notice with respect to the lookout card system which was in effect as of November--as of February 28, 1962, and we also wanted to ask her concerning the decision of the Passport Office that Mr. Oswald had not expatriated himself and, therefore, he should be reissued his passport.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn, Miss Knight?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss KNIGHT. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated. Mr. Coleman will ask you the questions.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Knight, will you state your name for the record?

Miss KNIGHT. Frances G. Knight.

Mr. COLEMAN. What is your present address?

Miss KNIGHT. Home address?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. 2445 Wyoming Avenue NW.

Mr. COLEMAN. What is your present position?

Miss KNIGHT. I am Director of the Passport Office in the Department of State.

Mr. COLEMAN. How long have you occupied that position?

Miss KNIGHT. Since May 1, 1955.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you have any independent recollection of having ever looked at any files dealing with Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the time of the assassination?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to mark as Commission Exhibit No. 989 a memorandum from Frances G. Knight to Mr. William O. Boswell, which bears the date of December 26, 1961, and is found among the State Department file No. XI, document No. 12 and ask you whether you have seen the original of that document? (Commission Exhibit No. 989 was received in evidence.)

Miss KNIGHT. Sir, you want to know whether I personally saw this before it went out?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. This is a little difficult to answer. There are a great many communications that go out over my name particularly a memo of this sort, which would be prepared in the Passport Office, and I would--I might sign it or if I were not in the office at the time my deputy might sign it for me.

But these communications usually go out over my name.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, Miss Knight, does that document----

Miss KNIGHT. This one looks as though it was initialed by me because it has the type of a "K" that I make.

Mr. COLEMAN. That document indicates that it was prepared by Miss B. Waterman, is that correct?

Miss KNIGHT. There is no indication here, sir. It was prepared in the foreign division of the Passport Office, but there is no indication on this communication as to the individual who prepared it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you be kind enough to read what is on the memorandum into the record, please?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; the memorandum is addressed to "SY," Mr. William O. Boswell from PPT--Frances G. Knight, subject "Lee Harvey Oswald."

"We refer to the Office Memorandum of July 27, 1961, from SY which stated that the subject 'renounced United States citizenship'. Mr. Oswald attempted to renounce United States citizenship but did not, in fact, renounce United States citizenship. Our determination on the basis of the information and evidence presently of record is that Mr. Oswald did not expatriate himself, and remains a citizen of the United States."

The blue file copy would indicate who prepared this memorandum in the Passport Office and who signed it.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you have the file copy?

Miss KNIGHT. I don't think we have it with us, do we? [Note: The file copy was shown to Miss Knight.] The memorandum was prepared by Mr. H. F. Kupiec, who is in the Foreign Operations Division of the Passport Office. It was signed for me by Mr. Hickey, who is the deputy.

Mr. COLEMAN. You have no independent recollection of ever having seen that document prior to the assassination?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you ever participate or make any decision as to whether Lee Harvey Oswald lost his citizenship?

Miss KNIGHT. No.

Mr. COLEMAN. In 1959?

Miss KNIGHT. No.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you ever make any personal decision or participate in any decision as to whether he should be reissued a passport in July 1961?

Miss KNIGHT. No.

Mr. COLEMAN. I, therefore, take it you personally had nothing or you can't recall anything that you had to do with Lee Harvey Oswald up to the time of the assassination?

Miss KNIGHT. No; I had nothing to do with the papers that were involved at that time.

Mr. COLEMAN. But the decision that he had not renounced his citizenship was made in your department?

Miss KNIGHT. It was made in the Passport Office by the citizenship lawyers. The two persons who were primarily involved were members of the staff, of long-standing service and with a great deal of experience in citizenship law and in expatriation.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you state the names, their names for the record?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; Miss Bernice Waterman, and Mr. John T. White.

Both of those employees have now retired from the Passport Office.

Mr. COLEMAN. You said both were lawyers?

Miss KNIGHT. Miss Waterman was not a lawyer but she worked directly under Mr. John T. White who was a lawyer in charge of the Foreign Operations Division.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, since the assassination of President Kennedy, have you had occasion to review the passport file.

Miss KNIGHT. Well, the first time that I actually had an opportunity to look through the passport file was last Saturday.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you get a chance to read each document in the file?

Miss KNIGHT. I read through the file; yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you have occasion to form any judgment whether based upon the information that was in the file you would have reached the same decision as Waterman and White did with respect to Oswald?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; I certainly did. From that standpoint, I did go through the papers carefully. I am convinced that insofar as any expatriative act is concerned that we made the only decision that we could. The same decision was reached by the consul who interviewed Mr. Oswald in Moscow, at the Embassy, and I think, with all the facts on record, we had to come to the conclusion that Oswald did not perform any expatriative act.

(At this point, the Chief Justice left the hearing room.)

Miss KNIGHT (continuing). May I ask one question, please?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. I have a statement here, some notes that I prepared this morning which are based on the information I read in the file. These are some comments I would make and I think they may be helpful to you. Could I refer to them or possibly read them to you?

Would that be all right?

Mr. COLEMAN. That would be fine.

Miss KNIGHT. After reading the file----

Mr. COLEMAN. And by "file" you mean the passport file?

Miss KNIGHT. The passport file of Lee Harvey Oswald, I would say the handling of the case would break down into three separate actions: One, the adjudication of his citizenship; two, the documentation of his repatriation loan, and, three, the issuance of a passport to Oswald on June 25, 1963.

As I understand it, the Commission has been furnished with detailed information covering all these actions, and in addition we have supplied replies which were prepared in the Passport Office by our staff to the specific questions that were posed by the Commission.

My comments on the citizenship and expatriation phase of the Oswald case are these: Insofar as the Oswald citizenship status is concerned, it is my firm belief that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his statement to the U.S. consul in Moscow, that he wished to divest himself of U.S. citizenship, did not do so.

At no time did he sign the required documents which were available to him for that purpose. Oswald was a 20-year-old ex-Marine, and the U.S. consul made it quite clear in his despatches to the Department, that Oswald was arrogant and aggressive, and angry and unstable.

I had not had the opportunity to read the file until last Saturday, because it was taken out of the Passport Office on November 23, 1963. However, I do not recall----

Mr. DULLES. By whom?

Miss KNIGHT. It was asked for and sent to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Mr. Abba Schwartz. I want to make a correction on that date. It was on November 22 that the file was taken out of the Passport Office. Late at night, I believe.

I do not recall that the file, the passport folder, contained any information that would tag Oswald as a U.S. Communist, or a Communist sympathizer prior to his visit to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and there is no record that he engaged in any public denunciation of the United States.

During the time Oswald's citizenship status was in question, that is from the time he had advised the U.S. consul in Moscow that he wished to renounce his citizenship, to the time it was determined he had not committed an expatriative act, a period of almost 2 years, his file was flagged and according to our records a lookout card was ordered for the lookout file.

On March 28, 1960, the Passport Office advised the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that "An appropriate notice has been placed in the lookout card section of the Passport Office in the event that Mr. Oswald should apply for documentation at a post outside the Soviet Union."

Mr. COLEMAN. We will note for the record that document you are referring to--I think it is the Operations Memorandum of May 23, 1960--has been given Commission Exhibit No. 963.

Miss KNIGHT. In view of the volume of our work it would be impossible at this late date for a clerk in the Passport Office to remember whether a card was actually made or not made. Apparently no card was found in the 1961 search of the lookout file, but again it is possible that such a card was misfiled. It is also possible if a card was made it was destroyed in error, but whether there was a card made or not has no bearing on the final outcome of the decision regarding the Oswald citizenship.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there. Would you prefer to read this entire document first?

Miss KNIGHT. No; it is easier----

Mr. DULLES. Is it conceivable that the lookout card could have been removed in 1961 when his passport was extended to return to the United States?

Under your procedure would that have been done?

Miss KNIGHT. Under our procedure when he was issued the passport that card would have been removed; yes. So that in 1961 there would not have been a card in the file.

Mr. COLEMAN. Even though the passport was issued specifically saying it was only good for return to the United States and only good for 1 month.

Miss KNIGHT. That is right.

The passport was limited and could not be used beyond the time it was limited for.

Mr. DULLES. Would that have caused the card to be removed?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Issuance of that passport, even a limited passport would have resulted in the card being withdrawn?

Miss KNIGHT. The card would have been withdrawn at the time that his citizenship was adjudicated, and when it was found that he had not expatriated himself. The card which was put in the file related only to his citizenship status.

Mr. DULLES. That is what--somewhat earlier, that is several months before the passport was extended?

Miss KNIGHT. Oh, yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. That would mean when he came back into the United States and he then reapplied 2 days later for another passport it would have gone through routinely and you would not have picked up the fact that it was Oswald the defector that was now going to go back out of the United States?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, that would be possible, I think; yes.

The experienced citizenship attorneys in the Passport Office, as well as the U.S. consul in Moscow determined individually that Oswald had not expatriated himself. His passport was renewed in May 1962, and limited for return to the United States.

In the adjudication of his citizenship, we can only deal with the facts on record. The fact is that Oswald did not avail himself of the prescribed procedure to renounce his U.S. nationality.

In applying for his passport renewal, he stated under oath that he had not committed an expatriative act. He denied an earlier statement that he had applied for Soviet citizenship, and produced some evidence that he had never been declared a Soviet citizen.

Now, as far as the repatriation loan is concerned, the recording of such a loan in the Passport office is a very routine procedure.

Apparently there is some question as to whether a lookout card was inserted in the lookout file at the time that the repatriation loan was made to Oswald. The Passport Office must depend on the Office of Finance to inform it with regard to repatriation loans. We require certain information such as the name of the individual, the place and date of birth, and other information which will identify the individual in our files.

It is very important that this information be complete and accurate to guard against embarrassing situations which could develop from misidentification.

The criteria for the procedure were developed over several years by the Office of Finance in cooperation with the Passport Office. Memorandum between the Passport Office and the Office of Finance have been provided to the Commission.

The important one is dated January 16, 1962, and spells out the criteria that we established by mutual consent. The Passport Office was and is directly concerned with only two actions in repatriation cases.

The insertion of an accurate and identifiable card in the lookout file and the prompt removal of such a card when the loan has been repaid.

Between August 1961 and December 1962 there was a purge of our lookout file because the cards were so shoddy and unreadable that they had to be refreshed.

We call them cards. But they actually were not cards, merely slips of pink paper 3 by 5 inches which were very badly worn and torn.

More than 1 million applications are cleared over this file annually, and it was imperative for us to find a system which would provide fast and accurate clearances.

During the renovation of this lookout file we found over 3,000 cards relating to repatriation loans which were unidentifiable. They had been in the file for decades, and they were of no value. They failed to give us any leads to either the passport or security files. The individuals involved may long since have passed to their reward. We did not know what had happened to them so we took these cards out of the files.

The record indicates that the Finance Office did not have Oswald's place and date of birth, and did not advise the Passport Office of the repatriation loan.

There may have been efforts to obtain the information necessary to make up a lookout card and this may have been suspended because Oswald started a series of payments within 10 weeks of the loan.

In any case, the Passport Office was notified when the loan was fully paid about 6 months later, which was January 1963. Had a card been placed in the lookout file it would have been removed upon such notification.

In other words, there would have been no card in the files relating to the repatriation loan at the time Oswald made his application for a passport at the New Orleans Passport Agency on June 24, 1963.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Knight, when Oswald was issued the June 1963 passport, I take it that there was no reference made to his passport file, is that correct?

Miss KNIGHT. No reference was made to his passport file. When he made his application at the New Orleans agency it was handled in a routine manner which I believe has been described to the Commission in some documents we prepared for you. Oswald's name was included in a list of applicants sent by teletype from New Orleans to Washington for clearance over the lookout file.

It was cleared within a day. There was no card relating to the repatriation loan because Oswald had made his final payment on the loan 6 months prior to his application for the passport.

There was no lookout card relating to loss of nationality because it had been determined by that time he had committed no expatriative act and therefore did not lose his citizenship. There was no lookout card on Oswald indicating that he was under indictment or wanted by an investigative agency or by the police. There was no fraud committed, and there was no evidence that he was a member of the Communist Party or active in it. In other words, there was nothing on record in our files in June 1963 which would have given the Passport Office any reason for delaying or denying Lee Harvey Oswald a passport.

Mr. COLEMAN. Is it your testimony that if when the teletype had come in from New Orleans, and someone in your office had gone and looked at the passport file, and found out that Oswald attempted to defect in 1959 and had made the statements that he made at the Embassy in 1959, that nevertheless you feel that under the existing regulations you would have to issue him a passport?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; we would. We wouldn't have had a lookout card based on that at the time of his application for a passport because all the situations we mentioned were resolved by that time.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to show you a Commission document which has already been marked as Exhibit No. 951, which is the standard operating notice of the passport office, dated February 28, 1962, and ask you are you familiar with this document?

Miss KNIGHT. Excuse me for a second, please. There is one subsequent to this.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; but that is the one that was in effect as of June 1963, isn't it?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Attached thereto is a list which indicates the various categories for the lookout card.

Miss KNIGHT. That is right.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you look at category K, and I would like to ask you whether the information which was in the file on Mr. Oswald, including the FBI reports, which were in the file of June 1963, should have caused Oswald to be put in category K?

Miss KNIGHT. No; I don't think so.

Mr. COLEMAN. How about category R?

Mr. DULLES. Could you read category K?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; certainly. "K" is "Known or suspected Communist or subversive". And "does not include those falling within categories O and P".

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you tell me what "O" and "P" categories are?

Miss KNIGHT. "O" is a category of cards in which the FBI has special interest. And "P" is also a project of the same sort.

Mr. COLEMAN. Has the FBI ever put defectors in that category?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; we are given the names and we put a lookout card in the file. But we are not told the reason why. We simply advise the agency involved.

Mr. COLEMAN. In other words, if the FBI merely sends you a report on a particular person, that wouldn't cause you to put someone in "O" and "P"? It is only when the FBI says put the person in "O" or "P"?

Miss KNIGHT. Only when a request is specific.

Mr. COLEMAN. How about category "R", if you will put that in the record.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question first, what is the criteria for the determination as to whether or not a person is a Communist?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, the criteria are based on the information that we get from the investigative agencies regarding his activities and membership in the Communist Party.

I think that it would help you very much if, for instance, I would spell out what the lookout file actually is and how it operates in the Passport Office and just what the categories mean to us. This would only take a minute and I think this would clarify things.

Mr. COLEMAN. I have picked out the categories that I think you would have to consider, and that is the reason I put the question to you.

Miss KNIGHT. The purpose of the file is rather important because it is twofold. Its principal role is to identify the applications which require other than routine adjudication in determining an applicant's eligibility for passport services. The second role of the file is to identify certain incoming applications and to insure expeditious action on them.

As background, I think it is important to know, that prior to 1955 the lookout file was part of a master index comprising 20 million 3 by 5 inch cards.

Mr. DULLES. 20 million?

Miss KNIGHT. 20 million. Within this voluminous file were 600,000 pink slips. Now these were known in those days as "catch cards," and these were withdrawn in 1958 to establish the nucleus of the present lookout file.

The reason for doing so was quite obvious. It was impossible and totally impracticable to clear every passport application across a 20 million card file which was expanding at the rate of 1 million cards a year.

Cards at that time were being made for every applicant and his relatives who were listed on the passport application. Every individual whose name appeared in any investigative report which was sent to the Passport Office, whether or not the individual applied for a passport; every individual who appeared before an investigative committee of Congress, whether or not he applied for a passport; as well as persons whose names appeared in such situations as gambling raids, lottery winners, and so forth. These were all in the passport file, and part of the master index.

File experts from the General Services Administration estimated at that time that 30 percent of this master index was misfiled.

By a program of refinement in 1959 and 1960, the lookout file was reduced to 415,000 cards. We felt we were reasonably safe in disregarding catch cards on persons who were a hundred years old or over. So these were eliminated from the files.

From the standpoint of accuracy in identification, the cards that remained still left much to be desired in the file.

Now again I would say these were not "cards" in any sense that they had physical substance. They were 3 by 5 inch slips of tissue-thin pink paper. They were very mutilated and many of them were totally illegible.

Many of them were of no significance since they contained no identifying data, such as place or date of birth, no full names, no reason for the inclusion in the file. As far as we could determine they were not related to anything in the Passport Office.

So further culling and screening reduced this basic file to the present size of 250,000 cards.

This project was very----

Mr. DULLES. Is that two or four?

Miss KNIGHT. 250 now.

Mr. DULLES. 250. It is different.

Miss KNIGHT. We had reduced it to 450,000 and we culled it some more and it is now 250,000.

Mr. DULLES. That is a reduction from the earlier 450,000?

Miss KNIGHT. That is right. This project was very time-consuming and tedious but it had to be done, and it was completed in 1962, at which time we transferred all the data on the cards we considered active onto a permanent IBM key punch card system which was coded and legible.

To relate this file, this tremendous file, to the Oswald case, I think it should be remembered that the Passport Office is not a police organization, nor is it an investigative agency. We must depend on other sources in and out of the Government to supply us with the information which we must adjudicate under the criteria of the passport regulations.

When we issued a passport to Oswald in June 1963 we felt that he had not expatriated himself and that determination was made.

Mr. COLEMAN. In 1963 you didn't make any judgment at all. He just wasn't in the lookout file so you just issued it. You didn't make any independent judgment at that time in 1963, did you?

Miss KNIGHT. If we had thought he had expatriated himself we would have had a card in his file.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; but in 1963 no decision was made.

Miss KNIGHT. There was no question raised. There was never a question at that time.

Mr. COLEMAN. It was never a question because your Office never looked at the file.

Miss KNIGHT. Not at the file, but his application was checked over the lookout cards.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. Oswald didn't owe money to the Government, and he was not involved in fraud or criminal activity. So, in retrospect, I feel that Oswald could have had a catch card inserted in the lookout file under a very broad and undefined category which is right here, as number "R" and that is, "Individuals whose actions do not reflect credit to the United States abroad," but for practical reasons this category is very narrowly construed in view of the hundreds of U.S. citizen bad-check artists, the drunks, the con men, the psychotics who travel worldwide, and so forth.

My office is deluged with requests from irate U.S. citizens returning from abroad asking us to do something about some of the people they find traveling overseas.

We have no such authority, and we are not in a position to determine the good or bad behavior of U.S. citizens here or abroad.

(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

I think it is a debatable question as to whether Oswald fell into this broad category of "R" and finally there was no request in the file from any Government agency or any area of the Government for a lookout card on Oswald for this reason or any other reason at the time that his 1963 passport was issued.

Mr. DULLES. Who finally determines whether a lookout card should be made? Would you determine that or in your office?

Miss KNIGHT. That would be determined within our domestic operation division, our foreign operation or our legal division. An adjudicator, for instance, is the first person to make a decision.

Mr. DULLES. If the FBI or CIA asked you to put in a card you would do it?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; and this is part of "O" and "P" project.

Mr. DULLES. Would you read again that paragraph about Communist or Communist sympathizer?

Miss KNIGHT. Category K is, "Known or suspected Communist or subversive."

Mr. DULLES. And you interpret that pretty narrowly?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes.

Representative FORD. Why do you interpret it narrowly?

Mr. DULLES. Well, this goes back to a question of passport regulations and the decision, the Supreme Court decision in the Kent-Briehl case and passport denials. I believe we sent you the regulations currently in effect.

Mr. COLEMAN. The record will note that it is attached to Commission Exhibit No. 948, which is the letter from Mr. Chayes.

Miss KNIGHT. Would you like an extra copy of it?

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a further question there? When you issue a passport limited solely to returning to the United States, isn't that some indication that you don't want the fellow traveling around abroad?

Miss KNIGHT. There would be some indication, yes, but there may be many reasons for it. It may be a general indication that he should not be traveling around abroad.

Mr. DULLES. So that normally you wouldn't issue a passport with that limitation and then let him come right into the Passport Office and reissue a passport to go abroad.

Miss KNIGHT. Well, if it is a case which merits a stop card we wouldn't do it. But in this case of Oswald----

Mr. DULLES. In this case would there be a stop card?

Miss KNIGHT. In the case of Oswald?

Mr. DULLES. No; I mean in the case of anybody who is abroad and you issue him a passport only to travel back to the United States, to get him back to the United States, if then in the next week he went into the Passport Office and wanted a passport to travel back to Europe, which means Russia if he wants to go to Russia, would you issue him a passport or would you not?

Miss KNIGHT. I think that depends very much on the record that we would have on him.

The issuance of passports is pretty well defined in the new regulations. I would say that a decade ago a passport application for Oswald would have been denied, or at least it would have been substantially delayed.

But this was prior to the Supreme Court decision of June 16, 1958. Prior to that there was very little challenge to the Secretary's discretionary authority in the issuance of passports.

But I think it is important to realize that the Supreme Court in its decision held that there was no legislative authority for the Secretary's regulations in denying a passport to persons supporting the world Communist movement. The Court stated in that decision that the freedom of travel is indeed an important aspect of the citizen's liberty.

Since that time Congress has made numerous attempts to provide legislation to curb the travel of U.S. Communists, and those citizens whose travel abroad is not in the best interests of the United States, but for one reason or another Congress has failed to pass any such legislation.

On January 12, 1962, the Secretary of State promulgated passport regulations which provide for the confrontation and full discovery in all cases involving the curtailment of passport privileges.

So, as a result, the Department's decisions in all passport cases have to be based on an open record.

It is quite evident that these regulations make it virtually impossible to deny passports to U.S. Communists because the source and record and details of their nefarious activities are not an open record, as you well know, and quite obviously they cannot be made an open record by the Government.

Mr. COLEMAN. Don't you have a specific statute and a specific regulation which says that if a person is a member of the Communist Party after it has been required to register that you have to deny him a passport?

Miss KNIGHT. This is true, but with these regulations, we are directed to issue passports to active members of the Communist Party despite the fact that section 6 of the Internal Security Act prohibits the issuance of passports to those individuals whom we have reason to believe or know are members of the Communist Party.

Mr. COLEMAN. What regulation requires you to issue them a passport?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, the Department's regulations are very specific on this point. They state and I quote, "In making its decision"----

Senator COOPER. Could you identify the regulation?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; it is 51.138(b).

Would you like me to read that section?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. All right.

"(b) The applicant shall, upon request by the hearing officer, confirm his oral statements in an affidavit for the record. After the applicant has presented his case, the Passport Office shall review the record and advise the applicant of its decision. In making its decision, the Passport Office shall not take into consideration confidential security information that is not made available to the applicant in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section. If the decision is adverse to the applicant, he shall be notified in writing, and the notification shall state the reasons for the decision. Such notification shall also inform the applicant of his right to appeal to the Board of Passport Appeals under section 51.139."

Mr. COLEMAN. What in there says you have to issue a passport to a person that you know is a member of the Communist Party after there has been a decision that the Communist Party has to register under the 1950 act?

Miss KNIGHT. In accordance with these regulations we cannot consider information in the passport file if that information is confidential and can't be used in open court or in an open hearing. The information on persons who are involved in the Communist activities is, for the most part, confidential information and cannot be revealed in open court.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say, if you have an FBI report which says that "Mr. So and So" is a member of the Communist Party, and that is in your record, and if he applies for a passport, you have to issue him that passport?

Miss KNIGHT. Under the regulations of the Department we would have to issue him a passport if the information in the FBI report cannot be made public.

Representative FORD. There has to be information which is confidential, however?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, the information in the report and the determination as to whether that information can be made public and can be used in court is made by the investigative agency that provides it.

Representative FORD. Well, if the agency, the security agency has a card issued by the Communist Party to this individual, and that information is given to the applicant, you can still deny this passport under section 51.135, can't you?

Miss KNIGHT. You mean if the FBI, let's say an FBI report, gave us information that the person is an active member of the Communist Party?

Representative FORD. That he has actually, just for illustrative purposes, a card issued by the Communist Party and the Department gives this information to the applicant, it is not confidential, it is given to the applicant, can't you deny a passport under section 51.135?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; yes.

Representative FORD. Well, then, I think the answer is that you do have authority to deny passports to Communists where the information----

Miss KNIGHT. Is made available.

Representative FORD. Is made available.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; where the information is made available and can be used in an open hearing.

But from a practical operation, this is very difficult to do because most of the information in the FBI reports is confidential and by bringing forth their informers they certainly destroy their security.

Mr. COLEMAN. Miss Knight, the same regulation that is in effect today was also the regulation in effect in 1963, isn't it?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, as of March 14, 1964, didn't the Department establish another category for lookout cards, namely for defectors?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; we have that. I think that was provided to the Commission.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, you do that under whatever authority that you had as of 1963, don't you? You haven't been given any additional congressional authority, have you?

Miss KNIGHT. No; but we haven't denied passports to any of them, either.

Mr. COLEMAN. Does that mean that despite this memorandum from Mr. Schwartz to you under date of March 14, 1964, if a known defector came in and asked for a passport, you would issue him one today?

Miss KNIGHT. No; we wouldn't issue. A card would be put in the lookout file to indicate that this person was a defector, and in such a case the file would go to Mr. Johnson's office, our legal counsel. It would be referred to his security branch, and be adjudicated. However, I don't believe that a passport could be denied to them on the basis of that.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, you know that in October 1963 the Passport Office received information that Mr. Oswald had been down to the Russian Embassy in Mexico?

Miss KNIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would that fact cause the Department to attempt to revoke a passport which had already been issued?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir; because there are many U.S. citizens who go to Soviet Embassies, and the fact he went there may have been for the purpose of getting information; it certainly was not a reason to deny a passport.

Representative FORD. There aren't many people like Lee Harvey Oswald, with a record of that background. It would seem to me that that, the availability of that information, ought to have flagged some interest some place in the State Department or the Passport Office.

Miss KNIGHT. Well, in my opinion, passports are being issued today to individuals whose activities and past record of behavior are patently more detrimental to the security and best interests of the United States than any report or any record that we had in the file of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Representative FORD. That may be true, and I might agree with you, but we can only deal with the specific case, and it concerns me that this information which was made available, somehow didn't get some attention in the Passport Division.

Miss KNIGHT. I think my answer to that is that there was attention given to it but there was no action that could be taken on it.

The fact that we gave attention to it is beside the point.

If we had had a lookout card in the file, and under different circumstances, there may have been some reason for seeking further information. I do know that the FBI was reviewing his file at regular intervals, and I think the file shows that.

To get the full import of our action one would have to read the security files and the records of certain individuals to whom we have been forced to give passports, and put them beside the Oswald file. The comparison would be very interesting.

Senator COOPER. Might I ask just a few questions?

First, let me say I missed part of the testimony because I was in the Senate and could not come here until after we had voted.

I am now looking at Federal Register, Title 22--Foreign Relations, Chapter 1: Department of State, part 51, dealing with passports. This title refers to the issuing officer.

Who is the issuing officer? Does that mean you or those who are under you, who are responsible to you?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, this is a question. Up until recently, I think the director of the Passport Office was considered the issuing officer. However, passports are issued in the name of the Secretary of State, who has the authority and the responsibility on passports.

Senator COOPER. And you are responsible to the Secretary of State?

Miss KNIGHT. Through the echelons.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Now, Representative Ford and Mr. Dulles have gone into this, as well as counsel, but I would like to pursue it just a little bit.

Section 51.135, entitled "Denial of passports to members of Communist organizations," states, "A passport shall not be issued to, or renewed for, any individual who the issuing officer knows or has reason to believe is a member of a Communist organization registered or required to be registered under section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended."

Was there any evidence in the files of Lee Harvey Oswald which could give to the issuing officer either the knowledge that he was a member of a Communist organization or such evidence as would lead the issuing officer to believe that he was?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Why do you say that?

Miss KNIGHT. Because, there was nothing in the passport file or in the reports that we received from investigative agencies that would indicate that he had any Communist leanings or any Communist affiliations prior to his sojourn in the Soviet Union.

Senator COOPER. There wasn't anything in his file from the reports of the State Department concerning his defection to Russia and his return which indicated that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Or a Communist organization?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Was there anything in the files from the FBI or any other security agency which would give you that information?

Miss KNIGHT. None that I saw; no, sir. I do know that there were two recent intelligence reports from the FBI, and they were dated October 31, 1963, and October 25, 1963, and these were logged into the Passport Office on November 20, 1963, and on November 22, 1963, respectively.

Senator COOPER. They were then, of course, would have been, received in the office after the time.

Miss KNIGHT. That was the date of the assassination.

Senator COOPER. After the time that the passport had been renewed.

Mr. COLEMAN. That included the information that he was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Miss KNIGHT. That is correct, and these were referred to us by the Office of Security, and then on 5:30 a.m. on November 23, 1963, these reports were called for on an urgent basis by the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and we delivered them to him at approximately 7:30 that morning.

I never saw these reports and no one in the Passport Office had an opportunity to read them or see them.

Senator COOPER. The point I am making is, am I correct or are you correct, when you say at the time Oswald's passport was either issued or renewed to make the trip to Mexico City, that there was no evidence in his files of any kind which would indicate that he was a member of a Communist organization?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir; there was nothing in the file.

Senator COOPER. What weight would you give to the fact that he had defected and had returned to the United States, and had claimed once that he wanted to renounce American citizenship? Would that be a fact to which you would give weight in determining whether or not you believed he was a member of the Communist organization?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; I understand your question. I did not adjudicate the Oswald citizenship case. But I would say that the adjudicators must have taken into consideration his instability which was reported in the dispatches, his attitude, his age, he was 20 years old at the time, and the fact that when he finally made his appeal to come back to the United States, he denied that he had asked for Soviet citizenship, that he was considered a Soviet citizen, and he further denied that he had offered anybody information.

He denied practically everything that he, in very bad temper, had told the consul that he was going to do. This, I think, is fairly well established in the document he signed, and which was sent to us when his passport was renewed and limited for return to the United States.

Senator COOPER. I am first directing my attention to the issuance or renewal of the passport which enabled him to go to Mexico City. I want to keep on that for a moment.

Miss KNIGHT. He didn't have a passport for Mexico City.

Senator COOPER. Not a passport for Mexico City.

Mr. COLEMAN. He had the passport in June 1963.

Senator COOPER. Yes; to go over to Cuba and different places.

Miss KNIGHT. We did not know, and there was nothing, I think I am right about this, there is nothing in our files to indicate that he went to Cuba or that he went to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. I understand this was brought out.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes; that is true.

Miss KNIGHT. Is that right?

Mr. DULLES. Not until October 1963.

Mr. COLEMAN. Even then, Mr. Dulles, they didn't know. The notice they got from Mexico only stated that he had been at the Soviet Embassy and not that he had been over to the Cuban Embassy.

Mr. DULLES. Is that correct?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes.

Senator COOPER. The point I am trying to develop at some point in 1963 prior to the assassination he went to the office in New Orleans.

Miss KNIGHT. That is right, the New Orleans Passport Agency.

Senator COOPER. And he secured a passport there.

Miss KNIGHT. He applied for a passport.

Senator COOPER. To travel, applied for a passport, to travel in a number of countries.

Miss KNIGHT. That is right.

Senator COOPER. And that was issued to him.

Miss KNIGHT. That is right.

Senator COOPER. On the following day?

Miss KNIGHT. That is right.

Senator COOPER. At that time, of course, the issuing officer was under the restrictions of the regulations here that we have been talking about. What would the officer--would the officer in New Orleans have any information available to him?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. About Oswald?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir; the operation works like this: New Orleans is one of eight passport agencies in the United States. They are connected with the main office by teletype. Oswald made an application for a passport at the New Orleans agency, and they TWX'd to us, his name and identification--that is, date and place of birth, and so on. His name was one on a list of names. There may have been 15 or 20 of them.

Mr. COLEMAN. The record shows there were 25.

Miss KNIGHT. 25.

These names were then checked over the lookout file which I have explained here.

Senator COOPER. Here in Washington?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes; and if there is no card in the lookout file, it is presumed that he is clear, because if we had information that he was an active Communist, or that we had reason to believe that there should be further check on him, this would have been reflected in the lookout file. There was no such card in the file.

Senator COOPER. All right. At that time, then, when he had made his application and the information was sent to your office, there was no lookout card?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Which would indicate that he was a Communist or a member of a Communist organization, registered, and so forth. And did you have such a system then?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Of lookout cards?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; we have had that system for a long time.

Senator COOPER. Was your reason for not having a lookout card for Oswald, that there wasn't anything in his file to indicate that he was a member of a Communist organization?

Miss KNIGHT. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. Is that the reason?

Miss KNIGHT. That is correct. Because the FBI reports which had come to the Passport Office during his sojourn in the Soviet Union and after, did not indicate that he was a Communist. As a matter of fact, they were concerned with several other things, his mother's concern regarding his whereabouts, the fact that he had made a declaration that he wished to become a Soviet citizen; and the question of expatriation. But there was nothing in the files to indicate that he had had any contact or any active part in the Communist Party.

Senator COOPER. The fact that he had married a Russian girl and brought her to the United States have any significance in the determination that the issuing officer would have to make?

Miss KNIGHT. No.

Senator COOPER. You are sure that the FBI nor any other security agency had placed any information in that file which would fall within the scope of this first section dealing with, applicable to passports?

Miss KNIGHT. I am sure of that; yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Have you yourself examined those files?

Miss KNIGHT. I examined the file last Saturday for the first time.

Senator COOPER. And do you know who had charge of the file?

Miss KNIGHT. The file was in the Passport Office up until November 22, the day of the assassination.

Senator COOPER. Where did it go then?

Miss KNIGHT. It went to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, to Mr. Schwartz.

Senator COOPER. Who is in charge there?

Miss KNIGHT. Mr. Schwartz. He is the Administrator.

Mr. EHRLICH. I might add he turned them over immediately, he turned them over to Mr. Chayes who was authorized to take charge of all files and they were maintained in the Office of the Legal Adviser.

And anyone in the Department who wanted to review them was free to do so but we kept them all in one place.

Senator COOPER. Have you been testifying?

Mr. EHRLICH. I have broken in.

Senator COOPER. Just for the purpose of the record identify yourself.

Mr. EHRLICH. I have not been sworn in. My name is Thomas Ehrlich, I am Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser to the Department of State.

Mr. DULLES. I might add Mr. Chayes testified in some detail that he was asked by Mr. Ball, Acting Secretary of State, on the night, afternoon, late afternoon and late evening of the assassination, to get all the files regarding Oswald together and to prepare for him and the Secretary of State, who was returning the next morning, a detailed report on the whole Oswald case, and I assume that the file went from you to Mr. Schwartz, to Mr. Chayes.

And from there Mr. Chayes collected reports from other sources.

Miss KNIGHT. That is right.

Senator COOPER. I am not questioning any fact that these people testified to but I think for the record it is important to know where the file was and whether or not it is the same file, with the same papers in it that were in existence on November 22, which you turned over to your superior.

Miss KNIGHT. Well, of course, we presume all the papers are in there. The file was pretty thick, and, of course, it takes time to go over the papers. We had not time to look at the file or to check it, and there is no way of knowing whether any papers were taken in or out.

Mr. COLEMAN. Senator Cooper, we have the files and we also have letters from Mr. Chayes that to the best of his knowledge and ability every piece of paper which the State Department had which in any way bore on Oswald has now been turned over to the Commission and those letters were marked today.

Senator COOPER. I go a little further.

Look at 51.136, "Limitations on issuance of passports to certain other persons.

"In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport facilities, except for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be refused to a person when it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that the person's activities abroad would: (a) Violate the laws of the United States; (b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations; or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

Now, at the time this passport was issued to Oswald in New Orleans, was there any information in his passport file about his conduct in New Orleans in connection with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

Miss KNIGHT. There was nothing in the passport file on that. It is my understanding that there were two FBI reports that had come in and they were logged into the Passport Office on November 20 and November 22.

Senator COOPER. I know, but I am thinking of June 24, 1963. This decision to issue a passport to Oswald to go to Mexico and various other countries was made on when?

Mr. COLEMAN. June 24, 1963.

Senator COOPER. Was there any information in his file relative to his participation in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. The first information that came to the office came in November?

Miss KNIGHT. November 20 and 22.

Senator COOPER. And November 22.

Miss KNIGHT. And I think, Senator, you would be interested to know that these FBI reports are sent to us by the Office of Security.

A large volume of these reports come to us in the Passport Office on a very routine basis.

The last 6 months of 1963 over 3,000 such reports were received, that is 500 security reports a month, and in order to be effective and to render the ultimate in security these reports should be read by individuals who are knowledgeable; who are trained to spot information of security significance.

The staff that is assigned to this task is very limited, and it is heavily overburdened with many assignments, some of which take priority to the reading of reports, and it is physically impossible for the present staff of our legal division, which is headed by Mr. Johnson, to read and analyze the information in these reports as promptly and as thoroughly as should be done.

The eternal question that we are faced with is a matter of diminishing returns. It is almost impossible to staff the Passport Office 100 percent for security and with knowledgeability of everything that goes on, and in the course of the year the Passport Office puts in thousands of hours of overtime, uncompensated overtime, trying to catch up with this work and believe me, this makes little or no impression on the vast amount of paperwork, the reading, the reporting and the analyzing of reports which come in to us.

Senator COOPER. I can see your problem.

But now, assuming that this report from the FBI about Oswald's activities in New Orleans with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in which he was distributing material, and had been arrested, and was operating under assumed names, had been known, had been in the file at the time the application for a passport to go to Mexico and other countries had been made, would that have been of any significance?

Miss KNIGHT. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. In determining whether or not a passport should be issued?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; very definitely. If those reports had reached us prior to the passport application we certainly would have put a card in the file.

As a matter of fact, it seems to me that if they had come to the Passport Office we would have advised the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs that this had become a Cuban case. These are handled by Mr. Schwartz personally.

Senator COOPER. Do you know when the report from the FBI concerning Oswald's activities in New Orleans in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee reached the State Department rather than the Passport Division?

Miss KNIGHT. When it reached the Department, I don't know. I think maybe Mr. Ehrlich might know.

Mr. EHRLICH. I will look to see if I have it.

Miss KNIGHT. I have the dates of them.

Senator COOPER. Will you give the date?

Miss KNIGHT. The date of the reports?

Senator COOPER. The date when it was sent, when it was received.

Miss KNIGHT. The reports were dated October 31, 1963, and October 25, 1963, and they were logged into the Passport Office on November 20, 1963, and November 22, 1963.

Senator COOPER. All of those dates are after the date of the issuance of the passport?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. I have just one more thing I want to inquire about.

Are you familiar with the--were you the Chief of the Passport Division at the time Oswald returned from Russia to the United States?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Who was empowered to issue passports in Moscow to Oswald?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, it was the consul, but he would not issue a passport or, in this particular case even limit the passport for return to the United States, without clearance from our office.

Senator COOPER. Then when Oswald made his application to return to the United States and to secure a passport to return to the United States, that application had to be cleared by the division, your division, in Washington?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes.

Senator COOPER. Did you make the determination as to whether the passport should be issued to him?

Miss KNIGHT. I personally did not. This was made by experienced citizenship lawyers.

Senator COOPER. By whom?

Miss KNIGHT. The decision was made by experienced citizenship lawyers in the Foreign Operations Division of the Passport Office. It was determined that Oswald had not expatriated himself. He had signed the necessary papers and he answered the required questionnaire under oath, and to the satisfaction of the Passport Office. Both the consul, who had an opportunity to talk to Oswald, and the citizenship lawyers, who handled the case in the Passport Office, were in agreement that he had not expatriated himself.

Mr. DULLES. Those details are in the file in considerable extent.

Mr. COLEMAN. Senator Cooper, for the record let me note we have Oswald's passport which is Commission Exhibit No. 946 and it states on page 15 thereof that the passport was renewed on May 24, 1962, and it expired on June 24, 1962, and it also stated when Mr. Oswald came into the United States on June 13, 1962.

Senator COOPER. I have just two more questions then.

One, at the time you issued the passport that Oswald was issued in New Orleans to go to Mexico and the other countries there was no requirement at that time that a lookout card be fixed to his file as a defector?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Whatever decision has been made on that has come since that time?

Miss KNIGHT. When you say "defector," the answer to that is in the questionnaire.

Senator COOPER. When I say "defector," was there any regulation, I mean in the Department, which required any special attention to be given to a defector----

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. With regard to the issuance of passports?

Miss KNIGHT. No, sir; and we cannot deny them passports.

Senator COOPER. My last question is, is it your statement that at the time you issued the passport in Moscow for his return to the United States, at the time the passport was issued in New Orleans, 1963, for his trip to Mexico and other countries, that there was nothing in the regulations relevant and nothing in the files which precluded you from issuing a passport to him?

Miss KNIGHT. This is my opinion; yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I have no other questions.

Mr. DULLES. I have no further questions.

Mr. COLEMAN. Thank you, Miss Knight. We appreciate your coming in.

(Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Thursday, June 11, 1964

TESTIMONY OF MRS. LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND HARRIS COULTER

The President's Commission met at 9:45 a.m., on June 11, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, DC.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Gerald Ford, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Harris Coulter, interpreter; Leon Jaworski, special counsel to the attorney general of Texas; William McKenzie, attorney for Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald; and Charles Murray, observer.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. LEE HARVEY OSWALD RESUMED

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.

Shall we reswear Mrs. Oswald?

Mr. RANKIN. I would think her former swearing would be sufficient, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You consider yourself under oath, do you, Mrs. Oswald?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Mrs. Oswald, we would like to have you tell about the incident in regard to Mr. Nixon that you have told about since we had your last examination. Could you tell us what you know about that incident, first, when it happened insofar as you can recall?

Mrs. OSWALD. I am very sorry I didn't mention this before. I prefer that you ask me the questions and that will help me to remember what there is.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us what Mr. Nixon it is, was it Richard Nixon, the former Vice President of the United States that you were referring to?

Mrs. OSWALD. I only know one Nixon and I think it was Richard Nixon which it was all about.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you fix the date when this occurrence did happen? Approximately?

Mrs. OSWALD. It was a weekend before he went to New Orleans and after the Walker business I think. But I might be mistaken as to whether or not this was a weekend because I am basing this on the fact that my husband was home and he wasn't--wasn't always employed and he was at home weekdays as well sometimes, so I can't be entirely sure that it was a weekend.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you place the place of the various homes you had that this happened?

Mrs. OSWALD. Neely Street.

Mr. RANKIN. At the Neely Street house. Do you know what time of day it occurred?

Mrs. OSWALD. This was in the morning.

Mr. RANKIN. Who was there?

Mrs. OSWALD. Just my husband and me.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you describe in detail just what happened. Mrs. Oswald, when you are answering the questions will you try to break up your answers, and let the interpreter try to translate; I think it will be helpful in not having the interpreter have to try to remember everything of a long answer. Do you understand me?

Mr. DULLES. May I suggest also, Mr. Rankin, that I think it would be preferable that the record be in the first person, that is, the interpreter translate just as she said it.

I was looking over the earlier record and that is the way it was over the earlier record and it went quite well.

Mrs. OSWALD. It was early in the morning and my husband went out to get a newspaper, then he came in and sat reading the newspaper. I didn't pay any attention to him because I was occupied with the housework.

Then he got dressed and put on a good suit. I saw that he took a pistol. I asked him where he was going, and why he was getting dressed. He answered, "Nixon is coming. I want to go and have a look." I said, "I know how you look," or rather, "I know how you customarily look, how you customarily take a look," because I saw he was taking the pistol with him rather than I know how you look in the sense that you are dressed, how you look at things is what I mean.

Mr. RANKIN. Had it come to your attention, Mrs. Oswald, that Mr. Nixon was going to be in Dallas prior to that time?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; it did not.

Mr. RANKIN. Had you seen anything in the newspapers or heard anything over the radio or television?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; we didn't have TV. I didn't see this in the newspaper.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know what newspaper it was in which your husband read this report?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; Dallas Morning News maybe. It was a morning paper.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether there was any information at all in the papers about Mr. Nixon planning to come to Dallas about that time?

Mrs. OSWALD. I didn't ever read the newspaper and I did not know; therefore, didn't know whether there was any information in the newspapers prior to this time about Vice President Nixon's arrival in Dallas.

Representative FORD. Could we establish the date more precisely, either by the newspapers or by testimony from Mrs. Oswald?

(At this point, the Chief Justice left the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mrs. Oswald, can you help us by telling how many days it was before you went to New Orleans that this incident occurred?

Mrs. OSWALD. What day did I go to New Orleans?

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall that your husband went to New Orleans on April 24?

Mrs. OSWALD. April 24? My husband?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; and you went at a later date with Mrs. Paine, do you remember that?

Mrs. OSWALD. I remember it was about 2 weeks before.

Mr. RANKIN. Two weeks before April 24?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; but when was the incident with Walker?

Mr. RANKIN. April 10 was the Walker incident. Does that help you?

Mrs. OSWALD. This is a short distance, you know, I think maybe----

Mr. RANKIN. So you think it had to be sometime between April 10 and April 24?

Mrs. OSWALD. This may be 10 days or more. I think it was closer to the time when my husband left for New Orleans than it was to the incident of General Walker. I think it was less than a week before my husband left for New Orleans. I did not think up this incident with Nixon myself.

Mr. RANKIN. What do you mean by that, Mrs. Oswald?

Mrs. OSWALD. I had forgotten entirely about the incident with Vice President Nixon when I was here the first time. When you asked me the questions about it, then I remembered it. I wasn't trying to deceive you the first time.

Mr. RANKIN. What did your husband say that day about Richard Nixon, when he got this gun and dressed up. Did he tell you anything about him?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; I just didn't know what to do, you know.

Mr. RANKIN. How did you know he was interested in doing something about Mr. Nixon at that time?

Mrs. OSWALD. My husband just said that Nixon is coming to Dallas.

Mr. RANKIN. Then what did you do?

Mrs. OSWALD. First I didn't know what to do. I wanted to prevent him from going out.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything to him?

Mrs. OSWALD. I called him into the bathroom and I closed the door and I wanted to prevent him and then I started to cry. And I told him that he shouldn't do this, that he had promised me.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you referring to his promise to you that you described in your prior testimony after the Walker incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; that was the promise.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall the bathroom, how the door closes? Does it close into the bathroom on Neely Street or from the outside in?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember now. I don't remember. I only remember that it was something to do with the bathroom.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you lock him into the bathroom?

Mrs. OSWALD. I can't remember precisely.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall how the locks were on the bathroom door there?

Mrs. OSWALD. I can't recall. We had several apartments and I might be confusing one apartment with the other.

Mr. RANKIN. Is it your testimony that you made it impossible for him to get out if he wanted to?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember.

Representative FORD. Did he try to get out of the bathroom?

Mrs. OSWALD. I remember that I held him. We actually struggled for several minutes and then he quieted down. I remember that I told him that if he goes out it would be better for him to kill me than to go out.

Mr. DULLES. He is quite a big man and you are a small woman.

Mrs. OSWALD. No; he is not a big man. He is not strong.

Mr. DULLES. Well, he was 5 feet 9, and you are how tall?

Mrs. OSWALD. When he is very upset, my husband is very upset he is not strong and when I want to and when I collect all my forces and want to do something very badly I am stronger than he is.

Mr. DULLES. You meant mentally or physically?

Mrs. OSWALD. I am not strong but, you know, there is a certain balance of forces between us.

Mr. DULLES. Do you think it was persuasion, your persuasion of him or the physical force or both that prevented him from going?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't think it was physically, physical prevention because if he--I couldn't keep him from going out if he really wanted to. It might have been that he was just trying to test me. He was the kind of person who could try and wound somebody in that way. Possibly he didn't want to go out at all but was just doing this all as a sort of joke, not really as a joke but rather to simply wound me, to make me feel bad.

Mr. McKENZIE. Mr. Rankin, if I may interpose here for a moment. Mrs. Oswald has been interrogated at length by the FBI in connection with this particular incident--the Nixon incident. I feel confident that the FBI has made a written report insofar as her testimony is concerned in their interrogation, but for purposes of the record I have no objection whatsoever for the FBI report to be included in the record as part of the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you, Mr. McKenzie. We will incorporate those reports as a part of the record in regard to this incident, if that is agreeable to the Commission.

Mr. McKENZIE. The reason I say that is because of the fact that those interrogations were conducted at an earlier date and closer to the actual incident, the state of time to the actual incidents than her interrogation here today, and insofar as dates are concerned I think that her mind would be clearer on those dates, and I likewise know that at that time a Russian interpreter was there.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McKenzie, I think with the members of the Commission here that I want to ask a number of questions about this incident because of its importance so they can observe the witness as well as have the benefit of her testimony.

Mr. McKENZIE. Mr. Rankin, in no way am I suggesting otherwise but if it would help the Commission in evaluating her testimony and evaluating the evidence that it has had heretofore in prior testimony we have no objection to those reports being a part of the record in any way.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you.

Mrs. OSWALD. I might be mistaken about some of the details of this incident but it is very definite he got dressed, took a gun, and then didn't go out. The reason why there might be some confusion in my mind about the details because it happened in other apartments in which we lived that we quarreled and then I would shut him in the bathroom, and in this particular case it may not have happened quite that way, but there is no doubt that he got dressed and had a gun.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you remember what you said to him and what he said to you at that time?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember now but I told the FBI precisely.

Mr. RANKIN. And were your reports to the FBI in regard to this incident accurate, truthful, and correct?

Mrs. OSWALD. They were correct as far as I could remember. The only detail as far as my memory served me--the only detail which might be confused is the one with the bathroom.

Mr. RANKIN. Had your husband said anything before or did he say anything at that time in regard to Mr. Nixon showing any hostility, friendship, or anything else?

Mrs. OSWALD. Showing any hostility or friendship toward Mr. Nixon?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; toward Nixon.

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember him saying anything--I don't remember but he didn't tell me. I don't remember him saying anything of that sort. I only remember the next day he told me that Nixon did not come. Excuse me.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mrs. OSWALD. The FBI suggested that possibly I was confused between Johnson and Nixon but there is no question that in this incident it was a question of Mr. Nixon. I remember distinctly the name Nixon because I read from the presidential elections that there was a choice between President Kennedy and Mr. Nixon.

Representative FORD. Where did your husband get the pistol that morning; do you remember?

Mrs. OSWALD. What, where?

Representative FORD. Where.

Mrs. OSWALD. My husband had a small room where he kept all that sort of thing. It is a little larger than a closet.

Representative FORD. Did you see him go in and get the pistol?

Mrs. OSWALD. I didn't see him go into the room. I only saw him standing before the open door and putting the pistol in his pocket.

Representative FORD. Do you recall which pocket he put the pistol in?

Mrs. OSWALD. It was not in a pocket. He put it in his belt.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Had you and your husband ever discussed Mr. Nixon at a previous, at any previous time?

Mrs. OSWALD. No. No.

Mr. RANKIN. What else happened about this incident beyond what you have told us?

Mrs. OSWALD. He took off his suit and stayed home all day reading a book. He gave me the pistol and I hid it under the mattress.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything more than you have told us to him about this matter at that time?

Mrs. OSWALD. I closed the front door to the building that day and when we were quarreling about--when we were struggling over the question of whether or not he should go out I said a great deal to him.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him then?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember.

Mr. RANKIN. Just tell us in substance?

Mrs. OSWALD. I really don't remember now. I only remember that I told him that I am sorry of all these pranks of his and especially after the one with General Walker, and he had promised me, I told him that he had promised me----

Mr. RANKIN. Did he say anything in answer to that?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember.

Mr. DULLES. As I recall, in your previous testimony there was some indication that you had said that if he did the Walker type of thing again you would notify the authorities. Did that conversation come up at this time with your husband?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; I said that. But he didn't go at that time and after all he was my husband.

Mr. DULLES. Does--do you mean you said it again at the time of the Nixon incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; I told him that but you must understand that I don't speak English very well, and for that reason I used to keep a piece of paper with me, and I had it, you know, what piece of paper I am talking about. At that time I didn't know how to go in police station: I don't know where it was.

Mr. McKENZIE. Was that the passport?

Mrs. OSWALD. No. After the incident with Walker----

Mr. RANKIN. Was that paper the Walker incident note that you have described in your testimony?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Representative FORD. When you put the pistol under the mattress, what happened to the pistol from then on?

Mrs. OSWALD. That evening he asked for it and said that nothing was going to happen, and that he said he wouldn't do anything and took the pistol back. And put it into his room.

Mr. DULLES. Did you keep the, what you call, the Walker note with you all the time or did you have it in a particular place where you could go and get it and show it to him?

Mrs. OSWALD. I had it all the time. I kept it in a certain place initially and then I put it in the pages of a book.

Senator COOPER. Mr. Rankin, would you ask the witness to state again what Lee Oswald's promise was to her that he had made at the time of the Walker incident?

Mr. RANKIN. Will you relate the promise that your husband made to you right after the discovery of the Walker incident by you?

Mrs. OSWALD. This wasn't a written promise.

Mr. RANKIN. No.

Mrs. OSWALD. But in words it was more or less that I told him that he was very lucky that he hadn't killed--it very good that he hadn't killed General Walker. I said it was fate that--it was fated that General Walker not be killed and therefore he shouldn't try such a thing again.

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say in answer to that?

Mrs. OSWALD. He said perhaps I am right. I myself didn't believe what I was saying because I didn't believe that he was fated. I was just trying to find some way of dissuading my husband to do such a thing again. Do you understand what I mean?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Did he say that he would or would not do that again, that is what I want to know.

Mrs. OSWALD. At the time I did definitely convince him that I was right, and at the time he said that he would not do such a thing again.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, when you talked to him about the Nixon incident and persuaded him not to go out and do anything to Mr. Nixon, did you say anything about your pregnancy in trying to persuade him?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say about that?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; I told him that I was pregnant.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you observe his action at the time of this Nixon incident, how he acted?

Mrs. OSWALD. How he reacted to this?

Mr. RANKIN. How he reacted to your interfering with him.

Mrs. OSWALD. At first he was extremely angry, and he said, "You are always getting in my way." But then rather quickly he gave in, which was rather unusual for him. At the time I didn't give this any thought, but now I think it was just rather a kind of nasty joke he was playing with me. Sometimes Lee was--he had a sadistic--my husband had a sadistic streak in him and he got pleasure out of harming people, and out of harming me, not physically but emotionally and mentally.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us substantially all that happened about this Nixon incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. That is all I can remember.

Representative FORD. Can you tell us why you didn't mention this incident to the Commission when you appeared before?

Mrs. OSWALD. There were an awful lot of questions at that time, and I was very tired and felt that I had told everything and I don't remember, I can't understand why I didn't mention this. It would have been better for me to mention it the first time than to make you all do more work on it.

Mr. DULLES. At the time of this incident did you threaten to go to the authorities in case your husband did not desist in his intention?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; I said that.

Senator COOPER. I may have to go--could I ask a few questions? Mrs. Oswald, will you repeat what your husband said that morning when he dressed and got the pistol?

Mrs. OSWALD. I asked him where he was going and why he was getting dressed. He answered. "Today Nixon is coming and I want to go out and have a look at him."

I answered, "I know how you look," and I had in mind the fact that he was taking a pistol with him.

Senator COOPER. Did he say anything about what he intended to do with the pistol?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Senator COOPER. Did you ask him if he intended to use the pistol against Mr. Nixon?

Mrs. OSWALD. I told him that, "You have already promised me not to play any more with that thing." Not really play, but, you know--I didn't mean, of course, just playing but using the pistol. Then he said, "I am going to go out and find out if there will be an appropriate opportunity and if there is I will use the pistol." I just remembered this and maybe I didn't say this in my first testimony and now it just has occurred to me that he said this.

Senator COOPER. Did your husband say why he wanted to use the pistol against Mr. Nixon?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Senator COOPER. Did he say where he intended to see Mr. Nixon?

Mrs. OSWALD. He didn't say. He just said in Dallas, and since Nixon was coming to Dallas.

Senator COOPER. When he was talking to you about seeing Mr. Nixon and using the pistol, what was his attitude? Was he angry or----

Mrs. OSWALD. He wasn't angry. He looked more preoccupied and had sort of a concentrated look.

Senator COOPER. Now, from the beginning, from the time that he first told you that he was going to use the pistol, until the time that you say he became quieted, did he again make any statement about using the pistol against Mr. Nixon?

Mrs. OSWALD. I told him that I didn't want him to use his gun any more. He said, "I will go out and have a look and perhaps I won't use my gun, but if there is a convenient opportunity perhaps I will." Strike "perhaps" please from that last sentence. I didn't have a lot of time to think of what we were actually saying. All I was trying to do was to prevent him from going out.

Senator COOPER. How much time elapsed, if you can remember, from the time he first told you that he was going out and when he finally became pacified?

Mrs. OSWALD. This was maybe 30 minutes. The whole incident took maybe 20 minutes. It was about 10 minutes I took--15 minutes maybe. 15 minutes, it took maybe 10 minutes for him to be prepared to go out and then the incident in the bathroom took maybe 5 minutes until he quieted down. It doesn't mean I held him in the bathroom for 5 minutes because I couldn't do that but the general discussion in the bathroom.

Senator COOPER. You said he stayed at the house the remainder of the day. During the remainder of the day did you discuss again with him the incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; no.

Senator COOPER. Did he say anything more that day?

Mrs. OSWALD. No. He read a book.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know what book it was, by chance?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember. It was some kind of book from the public library. He had a two-volume history of the United States. This is not from the library, this was his own book.

Mr. DULLES. The incident occurred, you said just a few days after he had told you he shot at General Walker?

Mrs. OSWALD. It was about 10 or 12 days after the incident with General Walker, perhaps about 3 days before we left for the departure for New Orleans. This didn't happen right after the incident with General Walker. It happened rather closer to a time when we departed for New Orleans.

Mr. DULLES. The General Walker incident made a very strong impression on you, didn't it?

Mrs. OSWALD. Of course. I never thought that Lee had a gun in order to use it to shoot at somebody with.

Mr. DULLES. Didn't this statement that he made about Vice President Nixon make a strong impression on you also?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't know. I was pregnant at the time. I had a lot of other things to worry about. I was getting pretty well tired of all of these escapades of his.

Mr. DULLES. Was there any reason why you didn't tell the Commission about this when you testified before?

Mrs. OSWALD. I had no--there is no particular reason. I just forgot. Very likely this incident didn't make a very great impression on me at that time.

Mr. DULLES. Now, before the death of President Kennedy, of course, you knew that your husband had purchased a rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. You knew that he had purchased a pistol?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And a knife?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; what kind of knife?

Mr. DULLES. Did he have a knife?

Mrs. OSWALD. He had a little pocket knife; I think.

Mr. DULLES. You knew that he had told you that he had tried to kill General Walker?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And, of course, as you said you heard him make a threat against Nixon.

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Did you have some fear that he would use these weapons against someone else?

Mrs. OSWALD. Of course; I was afraid.

Mr. DULLES. What?

Mrs. OSWALD. Of course; I was afraid.

Mr. DULLES. You thought that he might use his weapons against someone?

Mrs. OSWALD. After the incident with Nixon I stopped believing him.

Mr. DULLES. You what?

Mrs. OSWALD. I stopped believing him.

Mr. DULLES. Why?

Mrs. OSWALD. Because he wasn't obeying me any longer, because he promised and then he broke his promise.

Mr. DULLES. Would you repeat that?

Mrs. OSWALD. Because he wasn't obeying me any more. He promised and, he made a promise and then he broke it.

Mr. DULLES. That is my question. Having been told that--isn't it correct he told you that he shot at General Walker? He made a promise to you that he wouldn't do anything like that again, you heard him threaten Vice President Nixon, didn't it occur to you then that there was danger that he would use these weapons against someone else in the future?

Mrs. OSWALD. After the incident with Walker, I believed him when he told me that he wouldn't use the weapons any longer.

Mr. DULLES. I remember you testified before and I asked you if you had heard him threaten any official or other person and your answer was no.

Mrs. OSWALD. Because I forgot at that time about the incident with Nixon.

Mr. DULLES. I want to ask you again: In view of the fact that you knew--in view of the fact that he had threatened Walker by shooting at him, and he threatened Vice President Nixon can you not tell this Commission whether after that he threatened to hurt, harm any other person?

Mrs. OSWALD. Nobody else. Perhaps I should be punished for not having said anything about all this, but I was just a wife and I was trying to keep the family together, at that time. I mean to say. I am talking, of course, of the time before President Kennedy's death. And if I forget to say anything now, I am not doing it on purpose.

Mr. DULLES. I am just asking questions. Will you say here that he never did make any statement against President Kennedy?

Mrs. OSWALD. Never.

Mr. DULLES. Did he ever make any statement about him of any kind?

Mrs. OSWALD. He used to read and translate articles from the newspaper about Kennedy to me and from magazines, favorable articles about Kennedy. He never commented on them and he never discussed them in any way but because of his translations and his reading to me he always had a favorable feeling about President Kennedy because he always read these favorably inclined articles to me. He never said that these articles never were true that he was a bad President or anything like that.

Mr. DULLES. I didn't catch the last.

Mrs. OSWALD. He never said these articles were not true or that President Kennedy was a bad President or anything like that.

Senator COOPER. I think you testified before that he made statements showing his dislike of our system of government and its economic system.

Mrs. OSWALD. He used to complain about the educational difficulties and about the unemployment in the United States and about the high cost of medical care.

Mr. McKENZIE. Right there, please, may I, Mr. Dulles when did he complain of those things, was this in Russia or was it in the United States after you returned from Russia?

Mrs. OSWALD. After our return from Russia. When we were living in New Orleans after returning from Russia.

Mr. McKENZIE. Did he likewise make such complaints about the American system while you were living in Russia after you were married?

Mrs. OSWALD. He used to tell me that it was difficult to find a job and to get work in the United States but nonetheless we would be better there than we were in Russia. Excuse me. He was the kind of person who was never able to get along anywhere he was and when he was in Russia he used to say good things about the United States and when he was in the United States he used to talk well about Russia.

Senator COOPER. You knew, of course, because of the incidents in New Orleans that he did not like American policy respecting Cuba.

Mrs. OSWALD. He was definitely a supporter of Cuba. This was something which remained with him from Russia.

Senator COOPER. Did he ever say to you who was responsible or who had some responsibility for our policy toward Cuba?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Senator COOPER. Had he ever mentioned President Kennedy in connection with our Cuban policy?

Mrs. OSWALD. Never to me.

Mr. DULLES. Did he ever say anything----

Mrs. OSWALD. He might have discussed this with Paine.

Senator COOPER. With who?

Mrs. OSWALD. Mr. Paine, husband of Ruth Paine.

Senator COOPER. He might have done what now?

Mrs. OSWALD. With the husband of Ruth Paine.

Senator COOPER. Why do you say that, did you ever hear him talking about it?

Mrs. OSWALD. He used to talk politics with Mr. Paine. I don't know what they were talking about because at that time I didn't understand English.

Senator COOPER. Did you mean, though, to say that you believed he might have discussed the Cuban policy with Mr. Paine.

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; especially after we returned from New Orleans.

Senator COOPER. Why? Why do you make that statement?

Mrs. OSWALD. Because we only saw Mr. Paine once or twice before we went to New Orleans. And there was more opportunity to see Mr. Paine after we came back.

Senator COOPER. But my question is what makes you think he might have talked to Mr. Paine about Cuba?

Mrs. OSWALD. I think, sir; because after returning from New Orleans this was his favorite subject, Cuba, and he was quite--a little bit cracked about it, crazy about Cuba.

Senator COOPER. You mean he talked to you a great deal about it after you came from New Orleans?

Mrs. OSWALD. Well, in New Orleans he used to talk to me endlessly about Cuba, but after we came back he didn't talk to me about it any longer because I was just sick and tired of this.

Mr. DULLES. "He" in this case is your husband?

Mrs. OSWALD. That is right. I really don't know about what he talked with Mr. Paine. I think that they were talking about politics, that is to say my husband with Mr. Paine because my husband used to tell me afterwards, "Well, he doesn't understand anything about politics." "He is not too strong on politics."

And, therefore, I think they were probably talking with the American political system and the Russian political system and comparisons between them. I think that Mr. Paine could probably tell you more about this than I can.

Senator COOPER. That is all I want to ask for the time being.

Mrs. OSWALD. I think that Mr. Paine knows more about my husband's political attitudes toward the United States than I do.

Mr. RANKIN. You said the FBI asked you whether you could have been mistaken about it being Mr. Nixon that your husband was interested in going and seeing and maybe doing something to with his gun.

Do you know what Mr. Johnson you were asking about?

Let me rephrase the question.

You said the FBI asked you whether you might have been mistaken about Mr. Nixon and whether it might have been Mr. Johnson instead of Mr. Nixon that your husband was interested in doing something to with his gun.

Do you know what Mr. Johnson was being referred to?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; I didn't know who Johnson was. I am ashamed but I never knew his name. I am ashamed myself but I didn't know who Johnson was.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't know that the FBI was asking about the then Vice President and now President Johnson?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; I never heard of Johnson before he became President.

Mr. DULLES. And you are quite sure----

Mrs. OSWALD. Maybe I am stupid, I don't know.

Mr. DULLES. And you are quite sure that your husband mentioned the name of Nixon to you----

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; I am sure it was Nixon.

Mr. DULLES. That morning?

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether this Nixon incident occurred the day before your husband went to New Orleans?

Mrs. OSWALD. It wasn't the day before. Perhaps 3 days before.

Mr. McKENZIE. Mr. Rankin, may I ask a question?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. McKENZIE. Mrs. Oswald, you say or you said a few minutes ago that Mr. Paine knew or knows more about your husband's attitude about the United States than you do. Why did you say that?

Mrs. OSWALD. Because my husband's favorite topic of discussion was politics, and whoever he was with he talked to them politics and Mr. Paine was with him a fair amount and I am not sure they talked about politics. They went to meetings of some kind together, I don't know what kind of meetings.

Mr. McKENZIE. Do you know where the meetings were?

Mrs. OSWALD. In Dallas. After they came back from some meeting my husband said to me something about Walker being at this meeting, and he said, "Paine knows that I shot him."

I don't know whether this was the truth or not. I don't know whether it was true or not but this is what he told me.

Mr. McKENZIE. Would they go in Mr. Paine's automobile?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; it was about 2 days after this incident with Stevenson or the next day, or maybe it was the same place, or the next day that a meeting was held where General Walker appeared.

Mr. McKENZIE. It was the day before.

Mrs. OSWALD. The day before? The day after. I think there was 1 day's difference between them, either it was the day before or the day after.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say that there were a number of political meetings----

Mrs. OSWALD. Excuse me; but I think this was on Friday. I think that Lee was at this meeting on a Friday.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say there were a number of political meetings that your husband went to----

Mrs. OSWALD. Excuse me; this was October 24.

Mr. RANKIN. With Mr. Paine?

Mrs. OSWALD. A week after his birthday--this was Friday. I think it was a week after my husband's birthday about October 24 or something like that or the 25th.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Reporter, can you give her the question that I asked?

Mrs. OSWALD. Excuse me, please.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mrs. OSWALD. I only know about this one.

Mr. RANKIN. Did the FBI tell you that the reason they were asking about whether there was a mistake as to whether it was Mr. Nixon or Vice President Johnson was because there was a report in Dallas papers about Vice President Johnson going to Dallas around the 23d of April?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; they did tell me this. They said that at this time there was only one announcement in the newspapers of anyone coming and that was Vice President Johnson.

Mr. RANKIN. But you still are certain it was Mr. Nixon and not Vice President Johnson?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes, no. I am getting a little confused with so many questions. I was absolutely convinced it was Nixon and now after all these questions I wonder if I am right in my mind.

Mr. RANKIN. Did your husband----

Mrs. OSWALD. I never heard about Johnson. I never heard about Johnson. I never knew anything about Johnson. I just don't think it was Johnson. I didn't know his name.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you husband during the Nixon incident say Mr. Nixon's name several times or how many times.

Mrs. OSWALD. Only once.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, you said that your husband went to get the pistol in the room. Will you tell us what room that was that he went to get the pistol?

Mrs. OSWALD. It was a small sort of storeroom. Just to the left off the balcony as you come in; it is just on the left from the balcony.

Mr. RANKIN. Was it out, was the pistol out in the room or was it in a closet?

Mrs. OSWALD. This room contained only a table and some shelves, and the pistol was not on the table. It was hidden somewhere on a shelf.

Representative FORD. Was the rifle in that room, too?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Where was the rifle in the room?

Mrs. OSWALD. Sometimes it was in the corner, sometimes it was up on a shelf. Lee didn't like me to go into this room. That is why he kept it closed all the time and told me not to go into it. Sometimes he went in there and sat by himself for long periods of time.

Mr. DULLES. By closed, do you mean locked?

Mrs. OSWALD. He used to close it from the inside. I don't remember what kind of lock it was. Possibly it was just a--some kind of a tongue----

Mr. McKENZIE. Latch.

Mrs. OSWALD. Latch or something like that.

Mr. DULLES. How could he close it from the inside and then get out?

Mrs. OSWALD. When he was inside he could close it from the inside so that I couldn't come in.

Mr. DULLES. But when he came out could he close it from the outside so that you could not get in?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; from the outside it couldn't be locked.

Representative FORD. When you went to New Orleans and packed for the trip to New Orleans, did you help to pack the pistol or the rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. No, no; Lee never let me pack things when we went for trips. He always did it himself.

Representative FORD. Did you see him pack the pistol or the rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Representative FORD. Did you know the pistol and the rifle were in the luggage going to New Orleans?

Mrs. OSWALD. I stayed for some time with Ruth Paine after he left for New Orleans and I don't know whether they were in his things or they were in the stuff which was left with me.

Representative FORD. At the time Mrs. Paine picked you up to go to the bus station, did you intend to go by bus to New Orleans at that time?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Representative FORD. While you were living on Neely Street you didn't tell us before of any extensive rifle shooting at Love Field or rifle practice at Love Field. Can you tell us more about it now?

Mrs. OSWALD. Lee didn't tell me when he was going out to practice. I only remember one time distinctly that he went out because he took the bus. I don't know if he went to Love Field at that time. I don't--after all this testimony, after all this testimony, when I was asked did he clean his gun a lot, and I answered yes, I came to the conclusion that he was practicing with his gun because he was cleaning it afterwards.

Representative FORD. Did he take the rifle and the pistol to Love Field or at the time he went on the bus?

Mrs. OSWALD. Only the rifle.

Mr. McKENZIE. Just a minute. Let me ask her a question. May I ask a question?

Representative FORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. McKENZIE. Representative Ford, I wasn't here as you know when Mrs. Oswald testified before. I have been with her when she was interrogated by the FBI relative to practicing the rifle shooting. This is the first time that I have heard the use of the words "Love Field." Has there been prior testimony by Mrs. Oswald here that he was practicing at Love Field, because the reason I ask this is because she has steadfastly in the past told me and the FBI that she didn't know where he went to practice and that is the reason I wanted to know.

Mr. RANKIN. The record is----

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't know where he practiced. I just think that the bus goes to, went to Love Field.

Mr. RANKIN. Her testimony before was that the bus that he took, that she knows about when he went, was a bus that went to Love Field, and she thought he went to some place in that area to do his practicing.

Mr. McKENZIE. The reason I ask the question, Mr. Rankin, is because I don't believe there is any practice area at Love Field for rifle practicing.

Mr. RANKIN. Well, the investigation that the Commission has made shows that there is a place near Love Field where people do shooting and practicing.

Mr. McKENZIE. Not at Love Field.

Mr. RANKIN. It is right adjacent, in the neighborhood.

Mrs. OSWALD. Once we went out with Kathy Ford with the children to watch airplanes landing and these airplanes made a tremendous noise and for that reason I thought that maybe my husband was practicing somewhere in that area because you couldn't hear the sound of shots. I don't know if there is any place near there where one can practice shooting, though. This idea just came to me a little while ago when we were out there, watching the airplanes because it was a couple of weeks ago that this happened. Just sort of a guess of mine.

Mr. DULLES. How did he pack the gun or conceal the gun when he went out on the bus toward Love Field?

Mrs. OSWALD. Are you talking about the gun or the rifle?

Mr. DULLES. I am talking about the rifle.

Mrs. OSWALD. He used to wrap it up in his overcoat, raincoat.

Mr. RANKIN. So that the record will be clear on this, Mr. McKenzie, the prior testimony did not purport to indicate that Mrs. Oswald thought he was practicing right on Love Field where the airplanes were landing or anything like that. It was that he took that bus and took the rifle and came back with the rifle and that the bus went to Love Field and the investigation has shown that there is at least one place in that immediate neighborhood where there is gun practice carried on.

Mr. DULLES. Is there testimony, Mr. Rankin, as to more than one trip or should we get that from the witness?

Mr. RANKIN. She testified right now she only knew of this one although she knew of his cleaning his guns a number of times. She just testified to that. Do you want more than that?

Mr. DULLES. I thought the record was a little fuzzy. Maybe you should clarify it.

Mr. McKENZIE. I think you should ask the question.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us, Mrs. Oswald, how you thought your husband might have been practicing in the area near Love Field or how you concluded that he might have been practicing with the rifle in the area near Love Field.

Mrs. OSWALD. Only because that is the bus, only because that is where the bus goes. He never told me where.

Mr. RANKIN. And you don't know whether he was practicing at a place near Love Field or some place between where he got on the bus near your home and Love Field; is that right?

Mrs. OSWALD. No; I don't know, even now I don't know where it is.

Senator COOPER. Can I just ask a question? Do you know how many times he took the rifle from your home?

Mrs. OSWALD. Well----

Mr. DULLES. You are speaking of Neely Street.

Mrs. OSWALD. I only saw----

Senator COOPER. When you were living on Neely Street--strike that. You have told about his taking the rifle from the house on Neely Street and then later cleaning the rifle. Do you know how many times that occurred?

Mrs. OSWALD. I saw him take the rifle only once when we were living on Neely Street but he cleaned the rifle perhaps three or four times, perhaps three times--three times.

Senator COOPER. Did he ever tell you that he was practicing with a rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. Only after I saw him take the gun that one time.

Senator COOPER. Did you ask him if he had been practicing with the rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes, I asked him.

Senator COOPER. What did he say?

Mrs. OSWALD. He said yes.

Senator COOPER. Did he ever give any reason why he was practicing with the rifle to you?

Mrs. OSWALD. He didn't give me a reason. He just said that for a man it is an interesting thing to have a rifle. I considered this some kind of a sport for him. I didn't think he was planning to employ it. I didn't take it seriously.

(At this point, Senator Cooper left the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. At the time of the Nixon incident did you know who Mr. Nixon was?

Mrs. OSWALD. I didn't know what position he held. I thought he was Vice President.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever check to see whether Mr. Nixon was in fact in Dallas anytime around that date?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Mr. RANKIN. After the day of the Nixon incident did you ever discuss that incident again with your husband?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Mr. RANKIN. Did the Nixon incident have anything to do with your decision to go to New Orleans to live?

Mrs. OSWALD. After the incident with Walker it became clear to me that it would be a good idea to go away from Dallas and after the incident with Nixon insisted--I insisted on it.

Mr. RANKIN. After the Nixon incident did you ever discuss that Nixon incident again with your husband?

Mrs. OSWALD. No. I don't know why. Perhaps it didn't make a very strong impression on me and that is why I didn't mention it in my first testimony. Perhaps it is because the first incident with Walker made such a strong impression that what happened afterward was somewhat effaced by it. I was so much upset by this incident with General Walker that I only just wanted to get away from Dallas as fast as possible.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss the Nixon incident with anyone other than your husband before the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever consider telling the police about the Walker and Nixon incidents?

Mrs. OSWALD. I thought of this but then Lee was the only person who was supporting me in the United States, you see. I didn't have any friends, I didn't speak any English and I couldn't work and I didn't know what would happen if they locked him up and I didn't know what would happen to us. Of course, my reason told me that I should do it but because of circumstances I couldn't do it.

Mr. RANKIN. When did you first tell something about the Nixon incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. It was after the assassination; we were in Martin's house and I think Robert was there also. That is when I first mentioned that. I don't remember whether I told them both at the same time or told Martin first and Robert second or Robert first and Martin second.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know about when that was with reference to the time you moved in with the Martins?

Mrs. OSWALD. I think it was in the first month. I don't remember which day it was, though.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall whether you first told Robert about it some time in January of this year?

Mrs. OSWALD. I think it was earlier than that, early in December. Perhaps in the beginning of January, but I think it was before New Year's.

Mr. RANKIN. If Robert has stated that it was on a Sunday, January 12 of this year, do you think he is in error then?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't think that Robert would make a mistake. I might make a mistake myself but I don't think he would make a mistake because he doesn't have quite as many, because he has not been in contact with quite as many of these events and doesn't have quite as much to remember as I have. And in general, I have a bad memory for figures.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss the Nixon incident at anytime with Mr. Thorne or Mr. Martin, your agent?

Mrs. OSWALD. I told Martin about it but I don't think I told Thorne about it, and if Thorne learned about it it must have been from Martin.

Mr. RANKIN. You just related how you told Mr. Martin about it and the occasion in your testimony a moment ago; is that right?

Mrs. OSWALD. I am certain that these were the circumstances in which I told Martin about this. Whether or not the--it's possible I was just talking with Martin and his wife about Lee and it just came into my mind and I don't remember whether Robert was there or not, or whether I told Robert later.

Mr. RANKIN. Did anyone at anytime advise you or tell you not to tell the Commission about this incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. Martin told me that it is not necessary to mention this. But when they were asking me here in the Commission whether I had anything to add to my testimony, I really forgot about it. When Martin and I were talking about it he said, "Well, try not to think about these things too much."

Mr. RANKIN. Did he say anything about why it wasn't necessary to tell about this incident?

Mrs. OSWALD. I don't remember. I don't think he told me why. Maybe he told me and I just didn't understand because I didn't understand English very well.

Mr. RANKIN. When you were telling about the Nixon incident you referred to your husband's sadistic streak. Do you recall that?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us a little more about that, how it showed?

Mrs. OSWALD. Anytime I did something which didn't please him he would make me sit down at a table and write letters to the Russian Embassy stating that I wanted to go back to Russia. He liked to tease me and torment me in this way. He knew that this--he just liked to torment me and upset me and hurt me, and he used to do this especially if I interfered in any of his political affairs, in any of his political discussions. He made me several times write such letters.

Mr. DULLES. I have just one question: What did you or your husband do with these letters that you wrote? Did any of them get mailed or did they all get destroyed?

Mrs. OSWALD. He kept carbons of these letters but he sent the letters off himself.

Mr. DULLES. To the Russian Embassy?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; he didn't give me any money to buy stamps. I never had any pocket money of my own.

Mr. RANKIN. But the letters to the Embassy you are referring to are actual letters and requested--requests--they weren't practice letters or anything of that kind to punish you, were they?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; they were real letters. I mean if my husband didn't want me to live with him any longer and wanted me to go back, I would go back, not because I wanted to go back but I didn't have any choice.

Mr. RANKIN. I misunderstood you then because I thought you were describing the fact that he made you write letters as a part of this sadistic streak that would never be sent but what he actually did was have you prepare the letters and then he proceeded to send them, is that your testimony?

Mrs. OSWALD. He did send them and he really wanted this. He knew that this hurt me.

Mr. RANKIN. Those are the letters to the Russian Embassy we have introduced in evidence in connection with your testimony; is that right?

Mrs. OSWALD. Yes; those are the letters.

Representative FORD. Did he ever show you replies to those letters?

Mrs. OSWALD. At first--yes; there were. At first I didn't believe that he was sending off those letters.

Representative FORD. But you did see the replies?

Mrs. OSWALD. I received answers from the embassy.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, I will turn to another subject, Mrs. Oswald.

Mr. DULLES. Would you like to have a 5-minute recess? We will proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, Mrs. Oswald, I would like to ask you about the Irving Gun Shop in Dallas.

Mrs. OSWALD. The what? I don't know anything about this at all.

Mr. RANKIN. Your counsel tells me I should correct that, that Irving is not a part of Dallas. It is the city of Irving. A witness has said that you and your two children and your husband came into a furniture shop asking the location of a gunshop in that area in Irving, and after appearing there that you and your husband, with your husband driving the car, along with your two children, got in the car and went up the street in the direction of where the gunshop was. Did you recall any incident of that kind?

Mrs. OSWALD. This is just a complete fabrication. Lee never drove a car with me. Only Ruth Paine drove a car with me. And I never took my baby with me.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever go into such a furniture store in Irving?

Mrs. OSWALD. Never.

Mr. RANKIN. That you recall?

Mrs. OSWALD. I was only twice in a store in Irving where they sell, like a cafe, where you can buy something to eat and where they sell toys and clothes and things like that; a little bit like a Woolworths, a one-story shop but without any furniture in it.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know a Mrs. Whitworth who works in a furniture store in Irving?

Mrs. OSWALD. I was never in Irving in any furniture store.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know a Mrs. Whitworth?

Mrs. OSWALD. It is the first time I have ever heard that name.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know a Mrs. Hunter, a friend of Mrs. Whitworth?

Mrs. OSWALD. No.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever go on a trip with your husband to have a telescopic lens mounted on a gun at a gunshop?

Mrs. OSWALD. Never. No; this is all not true. In the first place, my husband couldn't drive, and I was never alone with him in a car. Anytime we went in a car it was with Ruth Paine, and there was never--we never went to any gun store and never had any telescopic lens mounted.

Mr. RANKIN. Did the four of you, that is, your husband, you, and your two children, ever go alone any place in Irving?

Mrs. OSWALD. In Irving the baby was only 1 month old. I never took her out anywhere.

Representative FORD. Did you ever go anytime----

Mrs. OSWALD. Just to doctor, you know.

Representative FORD. Did you ever go anytime with your husband in a car with the rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. I was never at anytime in a car with my husband and with a rifle. Not only with the rifle, not even with a pistol. Even without anything I was never with my husband in a car under circumstances where he was driving a car.

Representative FORD. Did you go in a car with somebody else driving where your husband had the pistol or the rifle?

Mrs. OSWALD. Never. I don't know what to think about this.

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