Introduction
The trial of Erhard Milch, formerly a Field Marshal in the German Air Force, is officially designated United States of America vs. Erhard Milch (Case No. 2), and was heard by Military Tribunal II in the Palace of Justice at Nuernberg. The proceedings lasted from 13 November 1946 to 17 April 1947, in the course of which period the Court convened 39 times. The prosecution consumed 8 and the defense 28 trial days. A chronological table of the trial follows:
Indictment filed 13 November 1946 Indictment served 14 November 1946 Arraignment 20 December 1946 Prosecution opening statement 2 January 1947 Defense opening statement 27 January 1947 Prosecution and defense closing 25 March 1947 statements Judgment 16 April 1947 Sentence 17 April 1947 Affirmation of sentence by Military 17 June 1947 Governor, U.S. Zone of Occupation Order of the U.S. Supreme Court 20 October 1947 denying writ of habeas corpus
The prosecution introduced into evidence 161 written exhibits, some of which contained several documents. The defense introduced 51 written exhibits. The Tribunal heard the oral testimony of 3 witnesses who were called by the prosecution; 27 witnesses called by the defense were heard by the full court, and 3 before a commissioner. One witness was called by the Tribunal on its own motion. The defendant Milch testified at length in his own behalf.
The members of the Tribunal, and prosecution and defense counsel, are listed on the ensuing pages. Prosecution counsel were assisted in preparing the case by Walter Rapp, Chief of the Evidence Division, Norbert Barr and Bevenuto Selcke, interrogators, and Robert Blakeslie, Nancy Fenstermacher, and Tempa Altman Watson, research and documentary analysts.
The material selected for this volume was principally compiled by Mr. Paul H. Gantt as case editor, working under the general supervision of Mr. Drexel A. Sprecher, Deputy Chief Counsel and Director of Publications, Office, United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. Catherine W. Bedford, Henry Buxbaum, Emilie Evand, Gertrude Ferencz, Helga Lund, Gwendoline Niebergall, and Johanna K. Reischer assisted in selecting, compiling, editing and indexing the numerous papers.
John H. E. Fried, Special Legal Consultant to the Tribunals, reviewed and approved the selection and arrangement of the material as the designated representative of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals.
Final compilation and editing of the manuscript for printing was administered by the War Crimes Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, under the direct supervision of Richard A. Olbeter, Chief, Special Projects Branch, with Alma Soller as editor, Amelia Rivers as assistant editor and John W. Mosenthal as research analyst.
ORDER CONSTITUTING TRIBUNAL II
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) APO 742
16 DECEMBER 1946
GENERAL ORDERS } No. 85 }
PURSUANT TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORDINANCE NO. 7
1. Effective as of 14 December 1946, pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 7, 24 October 1946, entitled “Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals”, there is hereby constituted, Military Tribunal II.
2. The following are designated as members of Military Tribunal II:
ROBERT M. TOMS Presiding Judge FITZROI D. PHILLIPS^{*} Judge MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO Judge JOHN J. SPEIGHT Alternate Judge
^{*} OMGUS General Orders No. 5, 21 January 1947, corrected spelling to Fitzroy D. Phillips.
3. The Tribunal shall convene at Nurenberg, Germany, to hear such cases as may be filed by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or by his duly designated representative.
BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAY:
C. K. GAILEY Brigadier General, GSC Chief of Staff
OFFICIAL: SEAL: G. H. GARDE Office of Military Government Lieutenant Colonel, AGD for Germany (U. S.) Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION: “B” plus 2—AG MRU USFET
MEMBERS OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL II
ROBERT M. TOMS, Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Detroit, Michigan
FITZROY DONALD PHILLIPS, Member, Judge of the Superior Court for the 13th Judicial District of the State of North Carolina
MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO, Member, United States Naval Reserve, on military leave from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
JOHN JOSHUA SPEIGHT, Alternate, Prominent member of the Bar of the State of Alabama
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES GENERAL
Judge RICHARD D. DIXON From 20 December 1946 to 25 March 1947 Major MILLS C. HATFIELD From 16 April 1947 to 17 April 1947
PROSECUTION COUNSEL
CHIEF OF COUNSEL: Brigadier General TELFORD TAYLOR
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL: Mr. CLARK DENNEY
ASSISTANT TRIAL COUNSEL: Mr. JAMES S. CONWAY Miss DOROTHY M. HUNT Mr. HENRY T. KING, JR. Mr. RAYMOND J. MCMAHON, JR. Mr. MAURICE C. MYERS
DEFENSE COUNSEL
Dr. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD Main Counsel Dr. WERNER MILCH^{*} Assistant Counsel
^{*} Brother of the defendant Milch.
I. INDICTMENT
The United States of America, by the undersigned Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, duly appointed to represent said Government in the prosecution of war criminals, charges the defendant Erhard Milch with the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10,[62] duly enacted by the Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945. The defendant Milch between 1939 and 1945 was State Secretary in the [Reich] Air Ministry (Staatssekretaer im Reichsluftfahrt ministerium), Inspector General of the Air Force (Generalinspekteur der Luftwaffe), Deputy to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force (Stellvertreter des Oberbefehlshabers der Luftwaffe), and Member of the Nazi Party (Mitglied der NSDAP). The defendant Milch was also Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe (Generalfeldmarschall in der Luftwaffe) 1940-45, Aircraft Master General (Generalluftzeugmeister) 1941-44, Member of the Central Planning Board (Mitglied der “Zentralen Planung”) 1942-1945, and Chief of the Jaegerstab 1944-1945. The war crimes and crimes against humanity charged herein against the defendant Milch include deportation, enslavement and mistreatment of millions of persons, participation in criminal medical experiments upon human beings, and murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts.
COUNT ONE
1. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises involving slave labor and deportation to slave labor of the civilian populations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Hungary, and other countries and territories occupied by the German Armed Forces, in the course of which millions of persons were enslaved, deported, ill-treated, terrorized, tortured, and murdered.
2. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises involving the use of prisoners of war in war operations and work having a direct relation with war operations, including the manufacture and transportation of arms and munitions, in the course of which murders, cruelties, ill-treatment, and other inhumane acts were committed against members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in custody of the German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control.
3. In the execution of the plans and enterprises charged in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this count, millions of persons were unlawfully subjected to forced labor under cruel and inhumane conditions which resulted in widespread suffering. At least 5,000,000 workers were deported to Germany. The conscription of labor was accomplished in many cases by drastic and violent methods. Workers destined for the Reich were sent under guard to Germany, often packed in trains without adequate heat, food, clothing, or sanitary facilities; other inhabitants of occupied countries were conscripted and compelled to work in their own countries to assist the German war economy and on fortifications and military installations. The resources and needs of the occupied countries were completely disregarded in the execution of the said plans and enterprises. Prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to war operations, including work in munitions factories, loading bombers, carrying ammunition, and manning antiaircraft guns. The treatment of slave laborers and prisoners of war was based on the principle that they should be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the greatest possible extent at the lowest expenditure.
4. The defendant Milch from 1942 to 1945 was a member of the Central Planning Board which had supreme authority for the scheduling of production and the allocation and development of raw materials in the German war economy. The Central Planning Board determined the labor requirements of industry, agriculture, and all other phases of German war economy, and made requisitions for and allocations of such labor. The defendant Milch had full knowledge of the illegal manner in which foreign laborers were conscripted and prisoners of war utilized to meet such requisitions, and of the unlawful and inhumane conditions under which they were exploited. He attended the meetings of the Central Planning Board, participated in its decisions and in the formulation of basic policies with reference to the exploitation of such labor, advocated the increased use of forced labor and prisoners of war to expand war production, and urged that cruel and repressive measures be utilized to procure and exploit such labor.
5. During the years 1939-1945 the defendant Milch, as State Secretary in the Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Air Force, Deputy to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, Aircraft Master General, and Chief of the Jaegerstab, had responsibility for the development and production of arms and munitions for the German Air Force. The defendant Milch exploited foreign laborers and prisoners of war in the arms, aircraft, and munitions factories under his control, made requisitions for and allocations of such labor within the aircraft industry, and personally directed that cruel and repressive measures be adopted towards such labor.
6. Pursuant to the order of the defendant Milch, prisoners of war who had attempted escape were murdered on or about 15 February 1944.
7. The said war crimes constitute violations of international conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 46, and 52 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 31 of the Prisoner-of-War Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.
COUNT TWO
8. Between March 1942 and May 1943 the defendant Milch unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly committed war crimes as defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises involving medical experiments without the subjects’ consent, upon members of the armed forces and civilians of nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control, in the course of which experiments the defendant Milch, together with divers other persons, committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, and other inhumane acts. Such experiments included, but were not limited to, the following:
(A) HIGH-ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS. From about March 1942 to about August 1942 experiments were conducted at the Dachau concentration camp for the benefit of the German Air Force to investigate the limits of human endurance and existence at extremely high altitudes. The experiments were carried out in a low-pressure chamber in which the atmospheric conditions and pressure prevailing at high altitudes (up to 68,000 feet) could be duplicated. The experimental subjects were placed in the low-pressure chamber and thereafter the simulated altitude therein was raised. Many victims died as a result of these experiments and others suffered grave injury, torture, and ill-treatment.
(B) FREEZING EXPERIMENTS. From about August 1942 to about May 1943 experiments were conducted at the Dachau concentration camp primarily for the benefit of the German Air Force to investigate the most effective means of treating persons who had been severely chilled or frozen. In one series of experiments the subjects were forced to remain in a tank of ice water for periods up to 3 hours. Extreme rigor developed in a short time. Numerous victims died in the course of these experiments. After the survivors were severely chilled, rewarming was attempted by various means. In another series of experiments, the subjects were kept naked outdoors for many hours at temperatures below freezing. The victims screamed with pain as parts of their bodies froze.
9. The said war crimes constitute violations of international conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Prisoner-of-War Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and of Article II, of Control Council Law No. 10.
COUNT THREE
10. Between September 1939 and May 1945 the defendant Milch unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity, as defined by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises involving slave labor and deportation to slave labor of German nationals and nationals of other countries in the course of which millions of persons were enslaved, deported, ill-treated, terrorized, tortured, and murdered. The particulars of these crimes are set forth in count one of this indictment and are incorporated herein by reference.
11. Between March 1942 and May 1943 the defendant Milch unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity as defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 in that he was principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with plans and enterprises involving medical experiments, without the subjects’ consent, upon German nationals and nationals of other countries, in the course of which experiments the defendant Milch, together with divers other persons, committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts. The particulars of such experiments are set forth in count two of this indictment and are incorporated herein by reference.
12. The said crimes against humanity constitute violations of international conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.
WHEREFORE, this indictment is filed with the Secretary General of the Military Tribunals and the charges herein made against the above-named defendant are hereby presented to the Military Tribunals.
TELFORD TAYLOR Brigadier General, USA Chief of Counsel for War Crimes Acting on Behalf of the United States of America Nuernberg, 13 November 1946
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[62] See vol. I, this series, pref. pp. III thru XXVIII for basic papers.
II. ARRAIGNMENT[63]
THE MARSHAL: Military Tribunal No. 2 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Marshal will ascertain whether the defendant, Erhard Milch, is present in Court.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, the defendant is present in the Court.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is counsel for the defendant, Dr. Bergold, also present?
THE MARSHAL: Dr. Bergold is also present in the courtroom.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Prosecution may proceed with the arraignment by reading the indictment.
[At this point Mr. Clark Denney read the indictment. See p. 360.]
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The defendant will stand. You have heard the indictment just read?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: And it has been translated into the German language which you understand?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: For more than 30 days you have had in your possession a copy of this indictment translated into the German language?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: You have also had the benefit of Dr. Bergold’s counsel for at least 30 days?
ERHARD MILCH: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Now then to this indictment how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
ERHARD MILCH: Not guilty.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Secretary General will enter upon the records of the Court the defendant’s plea of not guilty. You may be seated.
The Tribunal has set Thursday, the second day of January 1947 for the commencement of the trial of this action. Will the United States be ready on that date?
MR. DENNEY: The Government will be ready at that time, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Dr. Bergold, will you be ready to proceed with the trial on the second of January?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes.
* * * * *
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[63] Tr. p. 7.
III. OPENING STATEMENTS
A. Opening Statement for the Prosecution[64]
MR. DENNEY: May it please your Honors, this defendant is Erhard Milch, Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, State Secretary in the Air Ministry, Generalluftzeugmeister, sole representative of the Wehrmacht on the Central Planning Board, Chief of the Jaegerstab,[65] and member of the Nazi Party.
This man is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in that he took part in the program for the enslavement and ill-treatment of the civilian population of vast territories conquered by the armed forces of Germany and in the employment of prisoners of war in tasks forbidden by the laws and customs of war. He is also accused of the torture and murder of concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war who were made the unwilling subjects of savage and fatal medical experiments.
The life of Erhard Milch is a story of personal and professional betrayal. A man of high intelligence, of great executive ability, he misused these talents to dedicate them to a scheme for conquest and a plan for the enslavement of the world. The 10 years of military service of the defendant from the age of 18 to 28 which took him through the First World War were a perfect preparation for the tasks to come. From 1915 to 1919, Milch was a scout, observer, adjutant and squadron leader in the German Air Force. At the very infancy of military aviation, the defendant began an association which was to last through his entire public career. It was at this time that he learned the needs and the problems of flying men, a knowledge which was to stand him in such good stead in his work as the founder of the Luftwaffe.
The defendant never dissociated himself from the aims and ideals of German militarism. He became one of the silent army of men who remembered, hated, and hoped; but unlike many others, this man did not sit idly by. He did not wait passively for Germany to rise again, he devoted his best efforts towards that end. In 1921, only 1 year after his discharge from the army, we find him working as chief of air operations [flights] in the new business of commercial aviation.
There is no necessity to fill out in detail the successive steps in the defendant’s rise in civilian air transportation—a few broad strokes suffice. The next significant event in his career came in 1925 when he joined the state-sponsored Lufthansa which within 3 years he was to form into the nucleus of a new air force. It is no euphemism that he was called the Father of German Air Transportation.
When Hitler came into power in 1933, Milch acceded to the requests of both Goering and Hitler and assumed the additional duty of State Secretary in the Air Ministry. It was understood from the start, and it was confirmed in 1937, that Milch would succeed Goering as Chief of the German Air Force in the event of the latter’s death or withdrawal. By the time the new Luftwaffe had publicly emerged from such embryos as the Air Sport League, the Air Defense League, and the Flying [Flieger] Hitler Youth, the defendant had become a Generalleutnant (the equivalent of the American major general). The honors which followed: field marshal in the Luftwaffe in 1940, which was gained from 2 months’ participation in the invasion of Norway; Generalluft-Zeugmeister in 1941; member of the Central Planning Board in 1942; Chief of the Jaegerstab in 1944, were proof alike of the evil genius of Erhard Milch and of his complete compatibility with the Nazi ambitions and methods.
This defendant became a member of the Nazi Party in May 1933. His work in the Party was important. He was indeed one of the little group of specialists of whom Mr. Justice Jackson, in his closing address before the International Military Tribunal, aptly said:
“It is doubtful whether the Nazi master plan could have succeeded without their specialized intelligence which they so willingly put at its command. They (speaking of Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and the rest) did so with knowledge of its announced aims and methods and continued their services after practice had confirmed the direction in which they were tending. Their superiority to the average run of Nazi mediocrity is not their excuse. It is their condemnation.”[66]
Various Germans allowed themselves to be absorbed into the Nazi Party for a variety of reasons. Depression, financial and business betterment, ambition, discouragement with the previous political situation, and human weakness in the face of terrorism, all played their part in the recruitment of the Nazi machine. There were few cases in which a man made as clear, as deliberate, and as discreditable a choice of Nazism as did Milch.
The high esteem in which the defendant was held by Hitler and his position within the inner circle of Nazi militarists can be seen from the fact that he was one of a party of fourteen of Hitler’s highest and most trusted officers who attended a conference in the new Reich Chancellory on 23 May 1939, at which Hitler made known to his military chiefs his plans and objectives. (L-79.)
All in all, two points stand out in even a quick survey of Milch’s career: First, he never accepted the defeat of Germany in the First World War; his life between the wars was devoted to the work of placing Germany in a position to challenge the world in the matter of air supremacy; and second, he was a man who was unlikely to allow either difficulty or honor to stand in the way of the accomplishment of his purpose—the objectives of the Nazi Party. If these characteristics are borne in mind, much of the defendant’s fanaticism and the unbelievable savagery with which he adhered to the Nazi plan for conquest at the expense of all values of human decency may be seen as the natural consequences of the acts of a man with his criminal philosophy.
We have then, at the outbreak of the war this man, already within the inner circle, already devoted to the Nazi scheme of things and quite essential to their fulfillment, with a record of organization and with the work of preparation behind him—poised with his companions for the kill. We see the air armadas, which were the labor of his love, helping to shatter Poland within 18 days, helping to reduce the Lowlands to smoking ruins within a few days’ time, assisting in the subjugation of the French military machine and in driving the British from the continent in a period of a few weeks. We see the hordes of the Fatherland racing on and on with the air arm always overhead, preparing the way, until Germany had overrun a territory from the Normandy Coast to Moscow, and from the North Sea to El Alamein.
Then began the occupation, the next step in the plan of the Third Reich—an empire which was to last a thousand years. Over an entire continent there spread the deadly rigor of a “Pax Germanica” in which there was to be one citizen class, one race of supermen, and the balance, one class of slaves. At first the occupation overlords maintained the appearance of legality. They gave receipts for the property they plundered, they offered inducements to the laborers they shanghaied, they went through the mockery of signing contracts which were both illusory and fraudulent. But even this sham disappeared as the war went on, and as early as 1942, the German occupation appeared in public as the ugly thing it was, complete with armed recruiters, military escorts on deportation trains and prison camps for the workers brought into Germany. Mr. Justice Jackson, in his opening address on behalf of the United States of America before the International Military Tribunal,[67] vividly described the character and extent of the slave-labor program in the following words:
“Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible and extensive slaving operation in history. On few other subjects is our evidence so abundant and so damaging. In a speech made on 25 January 1944 the defendant Frank, Governor General of Poland, boasted, ‘I have sent 1,300,000 Polish workers into the Reich.’ (059-PS, p. 2.) The defendant Sauckel reported that ‘out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.’ * * * Children of 10 to 14 years were impressed into service * * *.
“When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were forced into war work in flagrant violation of international conventions (016-PS). Slave labor came from France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and the East. Methods of recruitment were violent (R-124, 018-PS, 204-PS). The treatment of these slave laborers was stated in general terms, not difficult to translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the defendant Rosenberg from the defendant Sauckel, which stated:
* * * * *
“‘All the men’ (prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers) ‘must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure * * *’ (016-PS)”.
Working as we do every day with crimes of unbelievable enormity, we are apt to become quite deadened to the hideous nature of specific crimes. It is, therefore, well to stop and consider the particular offenses with which this man stands charged.
Crimes are best evaluated in terms of the rights they violate. The evil, slavery, which is the deprivation of another’s liberty, is best judged through a consideration of its opposite good, freedom. Freedom is, to an extent, properly regarded as the symbol of human progress, the measure of civilization. Much of man’s history can be expressed in terms of his fight for freedom. Man’s personal freedom is his most precious prerogative, the exercise of his free will is his distinctive function. The building of a legal structure to protect the freedom of the individual is the basic purpose of good government. Men have lived for freedom, worked for it, fought for it, and died for it.
It is precisely because of their destructive effects on the freedom of the individual that governments such as the Nazi German State are so hatefully and essentially evil. The Nazi rise to power is a story of duress which ripened into slavery, first for the people within Germany and then for those in the lands she conquered. The enforced labor program was no expedient forced upon Germany by the exigencies of war. It was a basic concept of the Nazi scheme and the permanent destiny of those who would come under the German yoke.
It is most natural, therefore, that Control Council Law No. 10, which was enacted for the guidance of this and other tribunals which are set up for the trial of the principals in the crime of Nazi Germany, should deal in very severe terms with that most Nazi of all crimes—slavery. Article II, paragraph 1 (sec. b) specifically names among the enumerated war crimes the ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor of civilian populations from occupied territory and the murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war. Paragraph 1 (sec. c) specifies as a crime against humanity, deportation of civilian populations. Article II, paragraphs 2 and 3 proclaim that anyone taking a principal or consenting part in these crimes, or belonging to a plan or enterprise for the commission of these crimes, is guilty of an offense for which the death penalty may be prescribed.
The prosecution will prove that Milch was a principal in the deportation into slave labor of civilian populations from occupied territories. It will show that he was involved in the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war. Evidence will be presented which will prove that he was engaged in plans and enterprises which directly involved the use of slave labor. We will show that this man was as much concerned with the employment of slave labor as was any man in Germany. In his positions as a member of the Central Planning Board, as Generalluftzeugmeister, and as Chief of the Jaegerstab, he had full opportunity to hear all the grim details of the exploitation of slave labor. He participated in decisions and formulated basic policies with reference to its use, and over and above all this he showed his personal animosity and his gratuitous fanaticism in constantly urging the most repressive and cruel measures in the procurement and exploitation of foreign workers.
During the course of this trial, an attempt will be made to distinguish among that which this defendant did as Generalluftzeugmeister, as Chief of the Jaegerstab, as State Secretary for Air, and as a member of the Central Planning Board. At times it will be difficult, if not impossible, to state in just which capacity he was acting at a particular time. We must emphasize now that it is not essential to the proof of this case that we should be able always to specify the exact capacity in which the defendant acted. The multiplicity of his connection with the slave-labor program is his greatest condemnation, and it is because he knew so much and did so much that there can be no excuse for him.
Erhard Milch operated at a policy level high in the chain of command above the work boss and the concentration camp guard. We need not show him driving the workers to their tasks or crowding them into the hovels in which they lived. We are not primarily concerned with the minute details of the slave-labor program which were carried out by minions who obeyed men like the defendant. We were dealing with a planner of a great crime, and it has not been difficult for the law to seek out and punish those who plan as well as those who obey. The law would indeed be derelict if only those were punished who pulled the trigger to kill, or, comparably speaking, ran a slave camp in which people worked an 84-hour week and dragged out a miserable existence under conditions from which death was welcome relief.
This defendant cannot plead in truth that he did not know that the use of slave labor was wrong. He cannot use even the technical excuse, so common among the Nazis, that this was not illegal because the Nazi law authorized it. Official sanction of slavery would have been a law so evil that even the Nazi masters dared not proclaim it. A search through the mass of decrees and pronouncements which passed for law during the regime of Adolf Hitler fails to reveal sanction for slavery of foreign laborers. On the other hand, certain prohibitory laws survived from a more respectable day.
Paragraph 234 of the German Criminal Law (published in 1942 in Munich and Berlin, pp. 364-365) provides that “whoever seizes another by ruse, threat or force in order to expose him in a state of helplessness, or to deliver him into slavery, bondage, or a foreign military or naval service shall be punished for kidnapping by confinement in a penitentiary.” This law was in force during the Nazi regime and was published in the most recent edition of German Criminal Law which we have been able to find.
That maltreatment was commonplace in the course of the enforced labor program in Germany is well known; that starvation, murder, and all types of personal abuses took place is notorious. All of this was found as a fact in the decision of the International Military Tribunal. There can be no question of the responsibility of the defendant for the murders and privations which were the inevitable byproduct of the slave-labor program.
But we need not follow the crime of slave labor down to its last detail in order to show the defendant as the murderer he was. We can and will prove that he directly participated in crimes of which murder was often the intended and on numerous occasions the inevitable result.
The prosecution charges, and will prove, that he took an important, responsible, and essential part in the practice of experiments upon human beings carried out against their wills and in callous disregard of the lives of its victims.
Cut then to bare essentials the charges set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of count two of the indictment and in paragraph 11 of count three can be summarized by the statement that the defendant was officially connected with and took a consenting part in enterprises in which criminal medical experiments were performed upon involuntary subjects.
The nature and extent of these experiments and the fact that they were conducted for the specific benefit of the Luftwaffe will be shown in some detail. We will prove that the defendant was the responsible Luftwaffe officer with ultimate supervisory authority over the experiments. The Court will see that throughout the duration of these experiments, the defendant was constantly treated by all concerned as the ultimate authority within the Luftwaffe in control of the experimental equipment and in charge of certain personnel who were actively engaged in them.
Evidence will be presented which will prove that the defendant was thoroughly informed of the criminal activities of Dr. Rascher, the experimenter, and his associates. We will prove that a conference was held at the defendant’s office, that films were shown there, that communications were sent to him from highest Nazi sources which specifically referred to opposition on the part of “narrow-minded doctors” to the experiments. A web of evidence will be adduced to portray the defendant, as he really was, an active partner in crime. We will show that the defendant authorized the initiation of freezing experiments and that he ordered an extension of the high-altitude experiments for a period of 2 months, during which extended period a number of experimental subjects died.
At the conclusion of the evidence with respect to the medical experiments upon human beings there will remain no doubt that Erhard Milch was a knowing, willing, and active participant in murder.
Throughout the trial the prosecution will place before the Court a number of statements which will portray him as a man who believed no tears should be shed for the victims of total war when German soldiers every day were making the ultimate sacrifice for the Fatherland. This man was not a hard-headed, single-minded production chief whose only problem was to get things done and whose rash statements were the impetuous remarks of an over-worked executive. Milch will be shown as a man who boasted of his responsibility in the hanging of prisoners of war, who urged that any effort on the part of foreign workers to strike during enemy action should be met with rifle fire, who offered protection to slave supervisors who should mistreat their subjects. We will show that he was not too busy to inform himself fully of everything with which he was officially connected and that over and above this he went out of his way to learn the most minute details of matters with which he was very remotely connected.
And now a brief word about the type of evidence with which the prosecution will prove its case. It must be borne in mind that we are not concerned with a single localized incident or with a series of such incidents. The proof which we must show cannot be brought forth from the daily events of ordered society. It must be drawn from the cold ashes of a broken nation. The documents which will be brought into Court have been taken from all corners of a continent. They have one common feature which elevates them in the hierarchy of evidence to a place above the story of sincere but fallible eyewitnesses. These documents are official German records, some of them records of the defendant’s own organizations. In some cases they bear the defendant’s signature or his handwritten initials. In every case they are authentic records compiled by Germans, accurate because there was no reason for falsification or exaggeration, thorough because of a national fetish for attention to detail, reliable because they were made at times when the German fortunes of war were high and their scriveners had no reason to fear that one day they would be confronted with their hand-made records of criminality.
It would seem that at this point there should be some discussion of the various organizations with which the defendant was connected.
We are concerned principally with that part of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, known as the OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe), the High Command of the German Air Force. The Chief of the OKL was Reich Marshal Hermann Goering. His Inspector General and State Secretary in the Air Ministry was the defendant Erhard Milch. As such, from July 1940, he held the rank of field marshal (comparable to the American rank of general of the armies).[68]
The other two branches of the OKW with which we are incidentally concerned were the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), High Command of the Army, and the OKM (Oberkommando der Marine), High Command of the Navy. The army was commanded by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch until December 1941, at which time it was taken over by Hitler. The navy was commanded by Grand Admiral [Admiral of the Fleet] Raeder until 1943, thereafter by Grand Admiral Doenitz.
The Luftwaffe Medical Service came under this defendant in his capacity as Inspector General of the Luftwaffe. The Medical Service was headed by Dr. Erich Hippke until January 1944; thereafter it was headed by Dr. Oskar Schroeder.
There was an experimental institute in Berlin called the DVL which was a technical research institution for aero-research. This was subordinate to the defendant in his position as Generalluftzeugmeister.
We now turn to the Central Planning Board. This was established by a Goering decree, pursuant to a Hitler order of 22 April, 1942. The Board consisted of Albert Speer, Erhard Milch, and Paul Koerner. Later, by a supplementary Goering decree, in September 1943, Walter Funk was added to the Board. Speer and Milch were the dominant members, and Koerner and Funk played comparatively minor roles. The Central Planning Board was, in effect, a consolidation of all controls over German war production. The Board was found by the International Military Tribunal to have “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and the allocation and development of raw materials. * * *”[69] Hand in hand with this goes the corollary of the procurement and allocation of labor. Reich Marshal Goering, in his decree of 22 April, 1942, stated in part——“It (the Central Planning Board) encompasses that which is fundamental and vital. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of its directives”. The Central Planning Board requisitioned labor from Sauckel with full knowledge that the demands would be supplied by foreign forced labor, and the Board determined the basic allocation of this labor within the German war economy. Sauckel was the servant of the Central Planning Board in the procurement of slave labor. There are records of some 50-odd meetings of the Board between the time of its establishment in 1942, and 1945. The defendant was present at all but a few of these meetings and on occasion his was the dominant voice. The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning Board determined the total number of laborers needed for German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually by deportation from occupied territories.
It is worthy of note that Speer was appointed Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions on 2 February 1942, Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation on 21 March 1942, and the Central Planning Board was created on 22 April 1942.
Turning now to the defendant’s position as Chief of the Jaegerstab. The Jaegerstab was formed pursuant to a Speer decree of 1 March 1944, for the purpose of increasing the production of German fighter aircraft, which, because of effective and heavy raids by strategic air forces of Great Britain and America, had suffered a production decrease to a figure below 1,000 planes a month.
Because of this reduced production of fighter planes, Milch had requested Speer to establish a commission to deal with this most vital problem. The commission was created and Speer and Milch were joint chiefs. The Jaegerstab was actually a group of experts, drawn from the various phases of German industry and supplemented by representatives of the various Ministries concerned, such as Labor, Supply, Transportation, Power and Energy, Raw Materials, Health, Repairs, and so forth.
Meetings were held almost daily, in the beginning at the Air Ministry in Berlin and later at Tempelhof airfield in the same city. The Jaegerstab functions were these: the quick repair of plants damaged in bombing or strafing operations, the dispersal of German aircraft plants, and the construction of underground factories for aircraft production.
As it was with the Central Planning Board, so it was with the Jaegerstab, a major problem was the procurement of slave labor. The workers for the Jaegerstab were procured from the Sauckel Ministry, from occupied countries, and from the SS, who supplied concentration camp inmates and Hungarian Jews.
So successful was the work of the Jaegerstab that Speer decided to enlarge its functions to include other phases of armament and munitions production. Accordingly, on 1 August 1944, he issued a decree expanding the functions of the Jaegerstab and changing its name to Ruestungsstab.
The position of Generalluftzeugmeister was taken over by the defendant in 1941, following the death of Colonel General Ernst Udet. In this post the defendant was in charge of all technical research in the Luftwaffe and his was the over-all responsibility for all aircraft production. As such he spoke for the Luftwaffe in the meetings of the Central Planning Board and in conferences with Hitler. It is obvious that here again the procurement of labor was a primary consideration for one who had the complete responsibility for keeping the Luftwaffe in the air.
In the trial before the International Military Tribunal, it was determined that 5,000,000 laborers were deported to Germany. Of these, 4,800,000 did not come voluntarily.
The evidence will show that the defendant’s responsibility was as great, if not greater, than was Sauckel’s. Erhard Milch raised his voice in demanding that foreign labor be procured by any methods and in advocating that cruel and repressive measures be taken by those in charge of these laborers. There is no record of any utterance by him, which can be offered as a mitigating circumstance to his complete complicity in the criminality of the slave-labor program.
The evidence on the altitude and freezing experiments will reveal him as a man completely without concern for the welfare and lives of the wretched, unwilling victims of the criminal tortures conducted for the benefit of the Luftwaffe.
The series of trials, of which this is one, if it is to serve its purpose in exposing and punishing the abuses of Nazidom, must strike hard at the cores of savage German militarism and its technical counterpart, industry for war. Erhard Milch is the foremost example of the union between German militarism and German heavy industry. What useful purpose is served by condemning these two and allowing their sponsors, men like Milch, to go unpunished?
We take it as a fundamental proposition that man is not the helpless product of his environment. Civilization is a lengthy chronicle of men who triumphed over difficulty. Its survival depends on the moral fibre of individuals who can use circumstance, not be determined by it. If society must answer for the actions of men, and not men for the course of society, then, indeed, governments are our masters and not our servants; then, indeed, law dictates but does not express justice. Erhard Milch lived during years of violence and in an evil environment but he was a man well able to overcome these factors and become a force for good. It was by his own free choice that he followed the line of least resistance and became one of the evil spirits who cast a dark shadow of war and crime over Germany and the world. He had a choice between the easy wrong and the hard right—he chose the former. Peace, order, and progress depend on men of sufficient courage to choose at times a hard, just path. Ours indeed is an exacting standard, but the rewards are great, and the alternative is chaos.
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[64] Opening statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript.
[65] See section IV A3, p. 524 ff.
[66] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XIX, pp. 417-18, Nuremberg, 1947.
[67] Ibid., vol. II, pp. 139-140.
[68] See Table of comparative ranks, p. 331.
[69] Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 331.
B. Opening Statement for the Defense[70]
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, I undertake now to present the evidence for the defense. The prosecution has painted the blackest possible picture of the man I am here to defend. It has pronounced a moral judgment on him, even for the period of his life, which, according to the indictment, is not to be judged by this Tribunal.
Because of the great difference between the American and the German people I have no knowledge of whether such a method of prosecution is customary in the United States of America. The good principles of law which were practiced in Germany before 1933 provided that even counsel for the prosecution should not reproach the defendant for anything that is not subject to examination by the Tribunal. The meaning of this is that defense counsel also should be in a position to express his views with regard to these charges. This, according to my opinion, seems to be a fair principle.
Therefore, if it please the Tribunal, it shall be my aim in the course of my submission of evidence to prove by witnesses who have been approved and by the defendant himself that the charges made by the prosecution are incorrect, and I shall aim to prove that also for the charges which are not contained in the indictment.
Erhard Milch has never in his life been a traitor, as a person or in his profession, not even at the end of the National Socialist rule when he himself was threatened as to his life and his honor. As a man of high intelligence and great talent for organization, he always tried to do his best for his people and for the world.
To say of him that he misused his talent and devoted his life to a plan for conquest and enslavement of the world is to have a completely wrong conception of reality. He was never a militarist in the bad sense of the word. Never did he arm secretly before 1933 nor make use of the peaceful instrument of the commercial air fleet for any sinister purposes. He, the man who wanted to devote himself only to the tasks of peace, the man who in his capacity as director of the German Lufthansa collaborated with many European air transport companies and who conceived this collaboration as almost a forerunner of a unified Europe; he, the man who in 1937 devoted all his efforts, together with a few wise and courageous statesmen, to the attempt to bring about a full understanding and a large scale collaboration between France, Belgium, and Germany (unfortunately, the high Tribunal has not given me permission to furnish complete proof for this fact); he, Erhard Milch, truly never tried to enslave the world. If he had succeeded in his plans in 1937, then there would have been no 1938. And, all the more, there would not have been the horrible period of 1939 to 1945, the period in which the battle against intolerance became so hard and so complicated that we might think today that, as in an Arabian tale, this spirit of intolerance freed itself from the bottle and spread itself over so wide an area that, even today, it causes actions which one day must also be condemned by the just and the wise.
I shall prove that from the moment when this man tried, in 1937, to achieve his plans for peace he lost the confidence of his superiors. He never belonged to the intimate circle in which his superiors confided, even less so after 1937. They employed him unwillingly and only because they believed that they could not spare him because of his ability. It is cheap and easy to say now that this man should have denied his superiors the benefit of his talents. We shall prove that he tried to do so. But who can dare to judge with certainty what went on in the heart of such a man who was terribly aware of what dangers threatened his people, once the fateful step of starting the war had been taken? Neither did he want this step nor could he prevent it.
Should he really have chosen the path of revolt, this man who was brought up in a world in which, for all ages, military obedience had been an inviolate law, this man who had a passionate love for his people? How many human beings in any country are capable of breaking the chains of their education, and turn against the laws which have been inviolate for them ever since their childhood?
There is no punishable guilt, perhaps even no moral guilt in the fact that a man cannot free himself from the world of his education. Because it is the very essence of all education to give the man unbreakable laws and to create around him what philosophers call “the environment proper to his own nature.” Therefore, he has not made himself guilty by doing what his education and the conceptions of his environment made him call his duty, in a war which he did not want, which he tried to prevent; and the stopping of which he advised again and again after it had started. This duty, he felt, was to do his work and to prevent the worst which he anticipated, namely, the terrible devastation of his fatherland and its complete and helpless collapse.
I shall prove that he always, even after the war had broken out, concerned himself with questions of defense only; that he wanted to strengthen the fighter force, a defensive weapon with which he wanted to prevent the doom of the German cities. Perhaps, one day, the necessity for this doom will be judged differently. I shall prove that he condemned the attack against Soviet Russia as folly, and that he tried to prevent it. I shall show that in the spring of 1943 he submitted to Hitler detailed proposals for an immediate termination of the war and that he told him without reserve that the war was lost.
If it is true that from that moment onward he made efforts again and again to strengthen the fighter force, and that he took part in the creation of the Jaegerstab, who can reproach him with the intention to prolong the war if it will be proved that he knew that the enemy air forces would make a desert of Germany? Was it inhuman that he tried to prevent this total destruction even if the war was lost? He alone could not end the war. But he could try to prevent the inferno in Germany from becoming full reality. What true lover of his own country in any part of the world would not make the same attempt? Never can he be considered guilty on account of that, and even less so because of the fact that in other countries also voices have arisen and still arise which say that during the destruction of Germany many a thing happened which was not always compatible with military necessity.
Despite the pains he took, his superiors mistrusted him so much that both Goering and Hitler contemplated to have him put out of the way.
I shall show that he never endorsed the theory of the superman and of the master race; that he always remained humane and that he intervened on behalf of friends with disregard for his own security. He never was cruel. It may be that some of the minutes carry wild speeches about him which must strike your Honors who come from a different world and are used to different customs as terrible and incomprehensible. I shall prove to you that in the barracks yards, which made the first impress on the sensitive mind of young Milch, wild expressions were quite common and that in German barracks yards bombastic expressions were considered normal and truly militaristic style. Nobody in Germany did at any time take these expressions at face value. For this human element in particular, the old saying holds true that dogs which bark do not bite.
This man, however, was all the more inclined to use these shocking expressions due to the fact that in a number of accidents he had suffered severe concussions of the brain as a result of which he was more susceptible to fits of anger than other people; all the more so since he was overburdened with work and always frantic because time was too short. But witnesses will appear before this Tribunal who will confirm that no one in his surroundings took these fits of wrath, these crazy words, seriously; that these expressions never went further than the circle of his intimates, and that they in no way had any effect. His raving and yelling would make so little impression that when people around him noticed he was about to have another fit of rage, one would hear the familiar quotation: “In a moment somebody will be hanged again and then nothing happens.”
I shall show that this man knew nothing at all of the many abominable happenings which occurred out in the country, sometimes committed by persons who were under his command, and that, for example, the connection with the experiments at Dachau were so remote and incidental that he could not even surmise what the men there undertook to do. The sphere of his duties was so terrific, the burden of his work so great that he truly would have needed to be a superman if he were expected to have known all that the prosecution finds out today from records and from the examination of the offenders. It is appropriate to use a Latin quotation here with a little change: “Quod est in actis, non semper est in munde.” Not everything that the investigating mind uncovers at a later date and interconnects was so in actual fact. The poet says “Easy for him to speak who speaks last.” This man is charged with letting prisoners be abused and killed. I shall prove that this was not so. I shall even prove that, for example, he did everything possible to protect so-called terror fliers from being lynched. He was a man who tried to attenuate verdicts pronounced by competent courts of justice and who never favored death sentences.
The prosecution charges him with the enslavement of the peoples of Europe. I shall prove that he never aspired to enslavement; that information on deportations and shanghaiing never reached him; and that, on the contrary, information reached him which was bound to confuse his judgment and which permitted him to engage in deeds which now are considered as wrong. Up to this day the opinion still prevails that everybody in Germany knew everything about all the cruelties. Slowly, however, the recognition comes through that this is not correct. In the “Neue Zeitung”, the official organ of the military government, a German anti-Fascist by the name of Arnold Weiss Reuthel, whose book on the concentration camps is considered noteworthy by the newspapers, published an article “On the Psychological Causes.” There he states literally:
“One would have termed anybody who informed the public of such happenings a scoundrel or a lunatic. This also explains why people who did not see these things with their own eyes and did not suffer from them day after day, even today still refuse to believe that they actually happened. Yes, to me too it seems today often a dream and impossible when I think back and try to persuade myself that they really happened, the fearful excesses to which I was a witness during my 5 years in the concentration camp.”
Thus writes, be it noted, a man who suffered for years in a concentration camp himself. It has been proved again and again that the most painstaking secrecy was maintained regarding the atrocities. This is no hollow talk. This is the truth. The actual perpetrators dissembled, denied, lied, in a way that could not have been surpassed in cunning. The documents show you, Honorable Judges, that it was forbidden for Rascher to make reports without Himmler’s authorization. Himmler wanted to draw the veil of secrecy over everything. But even with a Hitler, Sauckel, for example, soft-pedalled all his doings in the procuring of the foreign workers. Regarding this, I will submit evidence.
I shall also show that the assignment of these workers was not a point in any program existing from the outset; that it was exclusively an emergency device which the exigencies of the war forced upon Germany. So at least all this had to appear to him, the man who did not belong to the innermost circle. That he could not think otherwise will be demonstrated to the Court, to the Tribunal.
It is misleading when the honorable representative of the prosecution in his opening speech points out that this man had more to do with the use of forced labor than any other man in Germany. The International Military Tribunal, in its judgment on Speer, whose position, as no one in this courtroom can doubt, was far more powerful and significant than that of this man here, has stated:[71] “Speer’s position was such that he did not have to deal directly with the atrocities and the carrying out of the forced labor program.” On Sauckel, the International Military Tribunal says:[72] “It is nevertheless established beyond all doubt that Sauckel had the over-all responsibility for the slave-labor program.” I shall offer evidence that Sauckel actually also had the sole power over the manner in which the people were recruited and brought to Germany, and over the urgent work for which they were required.
The prosecution submitted much evidence in Document Books No. IA and IB which contain the speeches and decrees of all kinds of persons and offices in Germany and in the territories formerly occupied. In my opinion, however, it never proved that the defendant knew of all these things, much less that he had anything to do with them. I shall prove that he knew nothing of all this and that it was all so far remote from his sphere of action that, logically speaking and considering his numerous tasks, he could know nothing about it.
I ask permission to remark here that in cases of this kind it is perhaps after all not in keeping with the rules of true justice to charge one person with everything that happened somewhere and was committed by someone among a people of eighty million. In my opinion the concept of conspiracy is in such a case inflated to the point of monstrosity. It was created for conditions of a narrower and smaller scope where it was within the framework of a man’s possibilities to keep an over-all view of his associates and their deeds. But to extend the concept of conspiracy over an entire nation and, simultaneously, over numerous organizations with millions of members, that no longer can be commensurate with true justice. This would result in the creation of a conspirator to whom would be ascribed a Godlike stature. That, however, would be a distortion of an intelligent legal thought.
It must, therefore, be demanded that in the case of each document, of each act, with due consideration of the extent of the defendant’s working sphere and, consequently, with due consideration for his working capacity, one should examine whether he could obtain knowledge thereof, whether he could humanly anticipate, examine any of them, and by reason of his authority, could somehow prevent them.
Finally, I shall prove to you that the documents submitted to you as official documents are not exact, not reliable; that they never were examined by the defendant and his associates, and that they contain inaccuracies, distortions, and wilful deceptions.
Regarding the powers and position held by the defendant, a number of witnesses and the defendant himself will attest that his powers were not so great nor so permanent as the prosecution assumes.
We will show that while the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe was subordinate to him in his capacity of Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, this subordination was more a formal than a practical one, that the staff of the Medical Service was not at all subordinate to him and that especially he did not have under his direction the DVL (German Experimental Institute for Aviation).
We shall further prove that even the Central Planning Board did not have the significance that the prosecution assumes, that this agency was much more an advisory and information agency, that it was chiefly occupied with the allocation of raw materials and that only those decisions of the meetings were binding which were summarized in the so-called “Results.”
Finally, we shall show that although, it is true, the defendant was one of the founders of the Jaegerstab, he was not its chief and that his importance in this connection was far less than it would appear on first consideration. The work of the Jaegerstab and of the defendant was aimed solely at the protection of Germany against bombing attacks, and Milch very soon lost all influence in this Jaegerstab.
In the presentation of all this evidence, I would ask the high Tribunal to have in mind one difficulty which, particularly in this case, is nearly insurmountable.
The documents submitted by the prosecution are only parts of a body of material the extent of which can be termed gigantic. When one considers that the Jaegerstab, for instance, from the time of its establishment held daily meetings and that from those meetings only these few stenographic records of a few sessions have been submitted that appear in the document books of the prosecution, then one realizes that not even five percent of the material pertaining to the Jaegerstab has been submitted.
Similar, although perhaps not equally striking, is the situation with reference to the minutes of the Central Planning Board. All these documents which were not submitted are not accessible to me at all. Does not, however, justice demand that the material in its entirety should be available to the defense counsel for examination? Already it has been possible for me to discover in the incriminating documents numerous passages which throw a different light on the indictment. Is it not highly probable, then, that numerous other passages may be found in all of the other material likely to extenuate to a high degree the guilt of the defendant, or which, in any case, might show many things in a better light?
In an ordinary trial with a considerably narrower scope it is much easier for a defendant to conduct his defense than here where material of such volume is at hand that even if he had the best of memories, it would be impossible for him to point out to me, his counsel, where and what kind of exonerating material can be found. That simply surpasses the capacity of the human memory, of the human ability to think.
In passing, I would say that probably in all of the armies which fought in this war the responsible men used strong language during meetings and discussions which, had they all gone down in records, would today cause the milder ones to shake their heads. Wrath, impatience, worry, and anguish because of damages sustained frequently lead responsible persons to wild utterances. What counts is not whether such words are uttered but the deeds which come after such excitement dies away.
The prosecution had many long months to prepare its case. We, the defendant and I, received the real documents on the indictment only in January. It is beyond human capacity to examine everything within such a short period of time with the thoroughness which is necessary to assemble the required counter-evidence. The presentation of argument on the part of the defendant must therefore, be full of gaps. It is particularly difficult in this case because within the short time available for preparation it is impossible to study all the problems which are brought to light as a result of the Dachau experiments. This calls for special technical knowledge which a man such as the defendant, who never studied medicine, simply cannot possess. However, as this trial is held simultaneously with the trial on the Dachau experiments,[73] the danger exists that the important and exonerating facts brought to light there, through the defendant experts and their well informed counsel, cannot be properly appraised in the present case, and in this way the cause of justice is endangered.
All of this I merely say in order to ask your Honors not to lose sight of these angles in judging this present case. Honorable Judges, please bear that in mind also when examining the documents which I shall submit and, giving ear to that extent to the voice of humanity and of justice, lend your assistance to a man who, cut off for so long and bitter a time from all his information and other aids to support his memory, has been called upon to defend himself before you. If at any time the fundamental principle of penal justice, which exists since the days of the wise Romans, should find application, “In dubio pro reo” (In case of doubt favor the accused), it should find strict application in this case. That is what I wanted to tell you as an introduction.
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[70] Opening statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript 27 January 1947. Tr. pp. 494-504.
[71] IMT mimeographed German transcript p. 16614. See also Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. I, p. 332, Nuremberg, 1947.
[72] Ibid., p. 16598. See also Trial of Major War Criminals, vol I, p. 321.
[73] United States vs. Karl Brandt, et al. See vol. I.
IV. SELECTIONS FROM THE DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES OF PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
A. Slave Labor
I. GENERAL SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM IN GERMANY
Prosecution Documents
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page L-79 3 Extract from minutes of Fuehrer 387 conference, 23 May 1939. EC-68 6 Letter from the Ministry of 389 Finance and Economics of Baden, 6 March 1941, containing directives regarding the treatment of Polish farm workers. 3005-PS 7 Extracts from letter from the 392 Reich Labor Ministry to presidents of regional labor offices, 26 August 1941, concerning the use of French and Russian PW’s. EC-194 8 Memorandum of Keitel, 31 393 October 1941, concerning the use of PW’s in the armament industry. 1206-PS 9 Outlines of directives of 395 Goering regarding the employment of PW’s in the armament industry, 7 November 1941. 3040-PS 10 Extracts from secret order of 399 Himmler, 20 February 1942, concerning the commitment and treatment of manpower from the East. 016-PS 13 Letter from Sauckel to 405 Rosenberg, 24 April 1942, and extracts from report on Sauckel’s labor mobilization program, 20 April 1942. 084-PS 16-A Extracts from interdepartmental 408 report of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 September 1942, concerning the status of eastern laborers. 294-PS 19-A Extracts from top secret 411 memorandum, signed by Braeutigam, 25 October 1942, concerning effects of slave labor program. L-61 20 Letter from Sauckel to the 413 presidents of labor offices, 26 November 1942, concerning deportation and employment of Poles and Jews. 1063-D-PS 21 Extract from order of Mueller, 415 17 December 1942, concerning prisoners qualified for work to be sent to concentration camps. 1526-PS 25 Extracts from letter from 416 German-appointed Ukrainian main committee to Frank, February 1943. 407-V-PS 30 Extracts from letter from 418 Sauckel to Hitler, 14 April 1943, concerning labor questions. 407-IX-PS 33 Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 420 3 June 1943, concerning foreign labor situation. 3000-PS 34 Extracts from report rendered 422 to Riecke, Ministerialdirektor in the Ministry of Agriculture, 28 June 1943, on experiences in political and economic problems in the East. 265-PS 35 Extracts from report by Leyser 423 to Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on conditions in the district Zhitomir. 204-PS 39 Extracts from memorandum of a 424 conference, 18 February 1944, concerning the release of indigenous labor for purposes of the Reich. R-103 40 Extracts from a letter from the 426 (German-appointed) Polish main committee to the General Government of Poland on the conditions of Polish workers in Germany, 17 May 1944. 208-PS 55 Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, 428 on the accomplishments of labor mobilization in the first half of 1944. 3819-PS 56 Minutes of a conference on 11 430 July 1944 attended by Milch, concerning the labor problem.
Defense Documents
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page R-124 1 Extract from report on Fuehrer 438 conference attended by Milch on 19 February 1942. R-124 32 Extract from the Fuehrer 438 conference minutes, 21 and 22 April 1942. R-124 2 Extract from the Fuehrer 439 conference minutes of 3, 4, 5 January 1943. 407-II-PS 3 Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 439 10 March 1943, concerning difficulties originating from the draft of manpower in former Soviet territories. R-124 33 Extract from report on Fuehrer 441 conference of 30 May 1943. R-124 4 Extract from report of Fuehrer 442 conference of 11-12 September 1943. R-124 34 Extract from Fuehrer conference 443 of 1-4 January 1944, concerning Speer’s report on the French labor situation.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-79[74] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3
EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE, 23 MAY 1939
Top Secret
To be transmitted by officer only
Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39
Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt. Present: The Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering, Grand Admiral [Admiral of the Fleet] Raeder. Col. Gen. [General] von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen. Keitel, Col. Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) [Lt. General] Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC) Jeschonnek, Col. (GSC) Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt, Capt. [Army] Engel, Lt. Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. [Army] v. Below.
Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.
The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:
1. Analysis of the situation. 2. Definition of the tasks for the armed forces arising from the situation. 3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks. 4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.
Secrecy is the first essential for success. The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form below.
Our present situation must be considered from two points of view: (1) the actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; (2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.
In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.
Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.
Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.
This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany reemerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as “Encroachments”. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.
A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving the problems by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.
We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two other nations—Italy and Japan.
The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.
After 6 years the situation is today as follows:
The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.
The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
The Pole is no supplementary enemy. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.
There is no other possibility for Europe.
Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. [Remember]—blockade!
If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvest we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.
The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labor.
The problem “Polish” is inseparable from conflict with the West.
Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.
It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude of Poland.
The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:
To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-68 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 6[75]
LETTER FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS OF BADEN, 6 MARCH 1941, CONTAINING DIRECTIVES REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF POLISH FARM WORKERS
49-7 Copy
III B 5 C (in pencil) Karlsruhe, 6 March 1941
Minister of Finance and Economics of Baden Provincial [Land] Food Office Dept. A. (Provincial Farmers Association) Confidential Only for Official Business To all District Farmers Associations [Kreis]
Subject: Directives regarding the treatment of foreign farm workers of Polish nationality.
The agencies of the Reich Food Estate, Provincial Farmers Association of Baden, have received the results of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Leader in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the District Farmers Associations. Below, I promulgate the individual regulations, as they have been laid down during the conference and how they are not to be applied accordingly:
1. Fundamentally, farm workers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be accepted any more by any official agency.
2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may not leave the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1 April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.
3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are possible, for riding to the place of work in the field, if a relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.
4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is permitted.
5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish nationality.
6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm workers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in the village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s Office, and then only one day per week. The day, which is determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will also be determined by the Rural Councillor’s Office. This regulation does not change the curfew regulation, mentioned above under No. 2.
7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly prohibited, and wherever it is established, it must be reported.
8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or in the living quarters of the Poles.
9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited.
10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very exceptional cases, by the local police authority (mayor’s office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office or the District Farmers Association, or whether he wants to change his place of employment.
11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as the interests of the enterprise demand it, and as it is demanded by the employer. There are no time limits to the working time.
12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to farm workers of Polish nationality, if instructions and good words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case by an official agency.
13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should if possible be removed from the community of the home, and they can be quartered in stables, etc. No remorse whatever should restrict such action.
14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases when crimes have been committed by farm workers of Polish nationality which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior; it is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who loses his Pole who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a compulsory report will receive another Pole from the competent labor office on request with preference.
15. In all other cases, only the state police is still competent.
For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated if it is established that the necessary distance from farm workers of Polish nationality has not been kept. The same applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly prohibited. Noncompliance of the Reich tariffs for farm workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by the taking away of the worker.
In any case of doubt, the Provincial Farmers Association—IB—will give information.
Forwarding in writing of the above agreement to the farm workers of Polish nationality is strictly prohibited.
These regulations do not apply to Poles who are still prisoners of war and are thus subordinated to the armed forces. In this case, the regulations published by the armed forces apply.
Heil Hitler! BY ORDER: [Signed] DR. KLOTZ
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3005-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 7
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM THE REICH LABOR MINISTRY TO PRESIDENTS OF REGIONAL LABOR OFFICES, 26 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING THE USE OF FRENCH AND RUSSIAN PW’S
Vol. 78-L
Annex 1 to the Decree of the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions
THE REICH MINISTER OF LABOR Va 5135/1277 Nr. 371-4770/41 secret 216/985
Berlin, SW 11, 26 August 1941
Special Delivery
To the Presidents of Regional Labor Offices (including Nuernberg Branch Office)
Subject: Use of Russian PW’s. Reference: Circular of 14 August 1941—Va 5135/1189—.
Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal [Goering], 100,000 men are to be taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom will be filled by Soviet PW’s. The transfer of the above-named French PW’s is to be accomplished by 1 October. Russian PW’s can be utilized only in larger concentrated groups under the well-known, tougher employment conditions. In the civilian field the regional labor offices will have to determine immediately those work projects where French prisoners of war can be withdrawn and replaced by Soviet groups. For the time being, no additional assignment of Soviet prisoners of war can be considered. Initially all replacement possibilities must be completely exhausted. Similarly, all French PW’s no longer needed are not to be channeled into agriculture and forestry any more, but exclusively into armament industry (aircraft industry).
All branches of economic life employing French PW’s, with the exception of armament industry and mining, are to be encompassed in determining those work projects where exchanges are feasible. The absolute necessity that Soviet PW replacements be employed in larger concentrated groups, requires, among other things, special checking of all larger construction projects of any kind (including construction of the Reich railroads, navigational and cultivation projects). Reich Minister Dr. Todt has already consented to the exchange of French PW’s employed by the Reich super highways. In agriculture the exchange can naturally be effected only in the case of large estates (especially estates with outlying farms).
Exchange of PW’s will frequently encounter resistance. The factories concerned will be reluctant to exchange the trained and proven French PW’s for Soviet PW’s. In such cases the labor offices have to draw the factories’ attention to the necessities of state, and to the directive of the Reich Marshal.
As soon as the regional labor offices have determined the work projects affected by the exchange, they will inform the Service Commands Headquarters, indicating how many French PW’s are being made available and how many Soviet PW’s will be needed to replace the French PW’s. Without my express consent not more than 120 Soviet PW’s may be requested for each 100 French PW’s made available. Since the determining factors in the allocation of Soviet PW’s are military and counter-intelligence considerations, final decision about the exchange rests with the Service Commands [Military Districts] Headquarters.
* * * * *
The first 100,000 French prisoners of war shall be channeled into the aircraft industry. * * *
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 8
MEMORANDUM OF KEITEL, 31 OCTOBER 1941, CONCERNING THE USE OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY
Copy Fuehrer Headquarters, 31 October 1941 The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Secret WFSt/Abt. L (II Org/IV Qu [sic] No. 0 2588/41 Secret Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry.
The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date. Its possible extent will by no means correspond to expectations and requirements in view of the great demand.
The Fuehrer has now ordered that also the working power of the Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a great extent by large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers’ goods for every day life, and perhaps rewards for production.
For labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz], the following may be considered as examples:
I. Armed Forces.
a. Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied eastern territories.
b. Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories and in Germany.
c. Large scale employment in units to relieve soldiers in labor service.
II. Construction and Armament Industry.
a. Work units for construction of all kind, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants).
b. Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (perhaps after withdrawal and transfer to other employment of the German workers).
III. Other War Industries.
a. Mining as under II b.
b. Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc.
c. Agriculture and forestry in closed units.
The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of above examples by:
To I. The armed forces.
To II. The Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions and the Inspector General for the German road system, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Labor and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Economic Armament Office).
Commissioners of the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of skilled workers.
To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are—
1. The securing of guards to protect the German people from dangers.
2. Housing in closed camps.
3. Securing adequate nourishment.
The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military counter-intelligence agencies as until now.
OKW (AWA)[76] will furnish the Reich Minister of Labor with blueprints based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz].
Furthermore, the Commander in Chief of the Army is asked to take the necessary measures for the recruiting of voluntary labor in the eastern operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor.
[Signed] KEITEL
Distribution:
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 9
OUTLINES OF DIRECTIVES OF GOERING REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY, 7 NOVEMBER 1941
Draft Rue(IV) Berlin, 11 November 1941 Top Secret 6 Copies—6th Copy
_NOTES ON OUTLINES LAID DOWN BY THE REICH MARSHAL [GOERING] AT THE MEETING OF 7 NOVEMBER 1941 IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY [RLM]_
Subject: Employment of laborers in war industries
The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far, a total of 5 million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.
Directives for employment:
Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into the armament industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.] Belgians: Individual employment, transposition into the armament industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.] Serbs: Preferably agriculture. Poles: If feasible, no individual employment.
Output of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly line work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.
Readiness of Russians to work in the operational area is strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free labor. In Krivoi Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of the factories.
Employment of Russian PW’s
As a rule, employment in groups [geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz]; no individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper. As a rule soldiers in the camp.
One has to distinguish between employment in:
1. Operational area, 2. Reich Commissariats (occupied territories in the East), 3. General Government, and 4. Interior and Protectorate.
To 1: In the operational area take preferably into consideration:
a. Railroads. b. Highway construction. Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PW’s. c. Clearing work. d. Agriculture. The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the feeding of the German people. If necessary Frenchmen and Belgians are to be used for directing the work of the Russian farm workers in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of workers. Transfer of German farmers only where actual success can be expected. e. Railroad-repair-factories, etc.
Best supervision: “Field kitchen”. Quick evacuation from operational area necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (escaping and joining with partisan and robber bands).
Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East Prussia desirable.)
Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.
From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to the armament industry: replacement by prisoner-of-war battalions.
Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction battalions (machine [wood or metal] operators). Investigation by army desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be instituted.
To 2: The same applies to employment in Reich Commissariats.
To 3: The above is also applicable to the General Government.
Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the General Government is not fully utilized and, on the other hand, the machinery cannot be made use of for a long time in other places.
To 4: In the Interior and the Protectorate it would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW’s except the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority:
a. At the top, coal mining industry.
Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant with Russian laborers.
b. Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair shops).
Railroad repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the PW’s. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East.
c. Armament industries.
Above all factories producing tanks and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder, employment in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities.)
The General Armed Forces Office of the Supreme Command Armed Forces [OKW/AWA] is competent for transporting Russian PW’s, employment through “Planning Board for Employment of all PW’s.” If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariats.
No employment where danger to people [fuer Menschen] or their supply exists, i.e., factories sensitive to explosions, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no “solidarity”. German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.
Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses, etc.).
Clothing, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where part of the people live in caverns.
Supply of shoes for Russians, as a rule wooden shoes; if necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.
Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases.
Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians, if possible by selected Russian engineers.
Employment offices for civilian workers to be kept separate from those for PW’s. In this respect the wage problem is to be considered. Furthermore, families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule employment in groups [geschlossener Einsatz].
Some aspects for labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in general.
Rather employ PW’s than unsuitable foreign workers. Draft Poles, Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PW’s, and employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.
General employment of all German women repudiated by the Fuehrer.
Where Russians can be employed, labor service is not to be used. Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War situation to be taken into consideration.
As a matter of principle, central interests precede local interests, therefore no resistance from Reich Commissioners and other local authorities against labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in the homeland.
Savings in wages are to be offset by compensatory contributions [to the Reich] by the respective management.
Express order by the Fuehrer. Under no circumstances may the wage level in the East be raised or assimilated to the wages in western Germany. Strong action is imperative against recruiting agents who offer high wages.
It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of wages for foreign workers.
Foreigners not to be treated like German workers, on the other hand do not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.
The welfare installations of the German Labor Front [DAF] are under no circumstances to be used by PW’s or eastern workers.
All agencies are to promote maximum utilization of Russian manpower.
Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly organized in the operational area. Speed is necessary, as the mass of manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).
Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of escaping prisoners. Especially in and around Berlin, strictest guarding is essential.
[illegible initials]
Distribution:
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3040-PS[77] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 10
EXTRACTS FROM SECRET ORDER OF HIMMLER, 20 FEBRUARY 1942, CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MANPOWER FROM THE EAST
GENERAL COLLECTION OF DECREES [ALLGEMEINE ERLASSAMMLUNG (AES)] Part 2 Secret Printed by RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) I Org Section 2 A III f
Commitment of Manpower from the East. Circular Decree of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior dated 20 February 1942—S IV No. 208/42 (foreign workers).
Enclosed I am sending you general regulations concerning the recruiting and the committing of manpower from the East for your information and careful attention.
I have the following additional directives for the Security Police and the SD [Security Service]:
_A. MANPOWER FROM THE ORIGINAL SOVIET RUSSIAN TERRITORY_
I. General security measures.
1. The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment of foreigners in spite of the special standards of their way of living, since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at the place of work, scarcely be effected. The Security Police is charged with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the possibilities of danger to a minimum. Since enforcements cannot be counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the Security Police within the sphere of their jurisdiction.
* * * * *
III. Combatting violations against discipline.
1. According to the equal status of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations against discipline, including work refusal and loafing at work, will be fought exclusively by the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. The smaller cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work.
2. In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as a rule only with strict measures, that is, with transfer to a concentration camp or with special treatment.
3. The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner.
4. In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at the Reich Security Main Office, stating personal data and the exact history of the act.
5. Special treatment consists of hanging. It should not take place in the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which led to this special treatment.
6. Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested.
* * * * *
IV. Subversive activities against the Reich.
Anti-Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology, propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp may be considered.
V. Criminal violations [Kriminelle Verfehlungen].
1. As a matter of principle, criminal violations—regardless of whether committed inside or outside the camp—shall be punished by state police measures. * * *
2. Criminal offenses [Kriminelle Delikte] are generally to be punished as violations against discipline, that is, the state police measures provided for, shall take place in cases of smaller violations, and special treatment shall take place in cases of crimes—such as, murder, homicide, and robbery.
3. Concerning capital crimes against German persons, punishment by criminal court procedure may, however, in an individual case appear suitable. If the (superior) state police agency considers this opportune, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney, under the provision that pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the perpetrator.
VI. Sexual Intercourse.
Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet Russian territory. Because of their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse occur nevertheless—especially by the individually employed manpower on the farms—the following is directed:
1. For every case of sexual intercourse with our German countrymen or women [deutschen Volksgenossen oder Volksgenossinnen] special treatment is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower.
2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a concentration camp.
VII. Measures against fraternization with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory.
1. Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not directly pertaining to the work and, if possible, to avoid every solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the individual case.
2. If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse or commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested.
3. The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings great dangers to be dealt with by the Security Police; therefore, it should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a rule, the transfer to a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will be proper; this also applies to cases of sexual intercourse.
VIII. Search.
* * * * *
2. When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment.
* * * * *
_B. MANPOWER FROM THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND FOREIGN MANPOWER, NOT OF POLISH ORIGIN, FROM THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT AND FROM THE ANNEXED EASTERN TERRITORIES_
I. General.
1. This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state police. In view of the political attitude of these nations, or ethnic groups [Volksstaemme] toward the Reich on the one hand and their position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the regulations valid for foreign manpower in general, but are subject to special limitations in their way of living.
2. These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of the Secret State Police to be especially watchful about the observation of the mentioned principle. The Secret State Police has to inform the offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual billeting in spite of existing collective quarters, position superior to that of a German worker, etc., must not be tolerated. As far as these people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct will be met with state police measures.
3. This manpower must, however, by no means be put on the same level as the Poles or the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, on account of their nations’ fundamental antagonism toward the Polish people and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to them—especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service among this manpower—since their rather receptive attitude toward the German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled.
* * * * *
III. Fighting against breach of labor contract.
1. The fight against breach of labor contract of this manpower is principally the duty of the Secret State Police.
2. This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of the Reich trustee of labor, with the means at his disposal in the regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are necessary, the Reich trustee of labor will transfer the proceedings to the Secret State Police.
3. In every case, however, it is the task of the (superior) state police agency to check whether the violation of the working duty by this manpower is not caused by the plant through breach of contract as well as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower.
4. In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe repetition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested. In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the Reich trustee of labor has to be informed each time about the decision.
IV. Criminal violations.
* * * * *
3. * * *. Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage are to be punished, as a matter of principle, by state police measures (special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the perpetrator. In these cases it is to be ascertained what the outcome of the trial is; should, against expectations, a death sentence not be passed, a report has to be made to me, attaching copy of the judgment.
Inquiry proceedings concerning other offenses are, as a rule, to be transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all against punishing purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state police measures.
* * * * *
VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans.
1. The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the General Government and from the annexed eastern territories with Germans is punishable by severest penalties. (Changed by Circular Decree dated 23 October 1943.) The workers will be thoroughly instructed through the attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) [not reproduced] in the foreign languages when they report upon their arrival at the local police offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected through the Party administration offices.
2. The district [Kreis] police offices have received instructions to arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report them to the competent (superior) state police agency.
3. For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with Germans, special treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicable for the treatment of the involved German persons.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS[78] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 13
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO ROSENBERG, 24 APRIL 1942, AND EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON SAUCKEL’S LABOR MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, 20 APRIL 1942
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation GBA
Berlin W. 8, 24 April 1942 Mohrenstrasse 65 (Thuringia House) Phone: 126571
[Stamp]
Bureau of Ministry [Ministerbuero] received 27 April 1942, No. 0887 Min. 28/v Dr. K.P. has been informed
Very esteemed and dear Party Member Rosenberg:
Enclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.
Heil Hitler! Yours, [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL 5 copies copy for Mr. Wittenbacher. [Signed] WACHS Chancellory 1 May 1942 [Kanzlei] [Stamp] MISCHKE read: ILFL/KS 4.5.42 filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg
To The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Party Member Rosenberg Berlin
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation 20 April 1942 Sckl./We. The Labor Mobilization Program
* * * * *
The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting armed forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the armed forces and also for the nutrition of the homeland. The raw material as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their allies.
* * * * *
VII. * * * Should we succeed with the help of the Party to convince all the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of the labor mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed to take good care of and keep up the morale of all the men, women, and the German youths who work within the labor mobilization program under extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical and mental capabilities of endurance are concerned and should we furthermore be able, also with the help of the Party, to use the prisoners of war as well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult part of the labor mobilization program.
The Task and its Solution
(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can assure you, nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor problem of all times, especially with regard to figures.)
* * * * *
B. The Solution:
* * * * *
3. The armament and nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign labor.
Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found when I took charge of my mission.
The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well as of agricultural labor in the sector of the German food economy.
All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.
It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose is the occupied territories of the East.
Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.
* * * * *
Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers
The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of labor program in this war.
All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.
It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he has proved himself the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanely, even when we expect useful work of him.
As long as the German armaments industry did not make it absolutely necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the working capacity of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.
* * * * *
Therefore, I want to impress most cordially but also most emphatically upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the labor mobilization program, the necessity to comply with all these necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National Socialist principle:
Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work, that is, for the future of our Nation!
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL [Stamp]
(The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS[79] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 16-A
EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL REPORT OF THE MINISTRY FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES, 30 SEPTEMBER 1942, CONCERNING THE STATUS OF EASTERN LABORERS
Berlin NW 7, Hegelplatz 2, 30 September 1942
Central Office for Members of Eastern Nations Ih (ZO)
Subject: Present situation of the Eastern Labor Problem
* * * The manner and method by which the problems created through the importation of millions of members of the eastern peoples into the Reich are being solved is relevant with respect to two big tasks:
1. the development of the war situation,
2. the enforcement of the German claim for leadership in the East after the end of the war.
* * * * *
* * * The facts which, by the fall of 1942, have been changed only partially or incompletely, are, among other, as follows:
1. The definition of workers from the occupied territories of the USSR was narrowed down to the legal labor and social labor concept of “Eastern workers”; thereby, a particular “employment relationship of a special type” was created among “foreigners”—something which had to be looked upon, by those affected, as degrading.
2. The drafting of eastern male and female workers often occurred without the necessary examination of the capabilities of those concerned, so that 5 to 10 percent sick and children were transported along. On the other hand, in those places where no volunteers were obtained, instead of recruiting them pursuant to labor conscription law, coercive measures were used by the police (imprisonment, penal expeditions, and the like).
3. The allocation to enterprises was not undertaken by considering the occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps.
4. The billeting did not follow the policies for other foreigners, but was done like for civilian prisoners, in camps which were fenced in with barbed wire and were heavily guarded and which they were not permitted to leave.
5. The treatment by the guards was, on the average, without intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were exposed to the ridicule of the Poles and Czechs, among other things.
6. The food was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the eastern laborers employed in industry and mining that, on the average, the good capability of the camp members dropped quickly and many sicknesses and deaths occurred.
7. Payment was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the industrial worker would be left on the average with 2 or 3 RM each week, and the farm laborers with even less, so that the wage transfer to their homes became illusory, not to mention the fact that no procedure was as yet developed for such transfer.
8. The postal service with their families was not feasible for months because of the lack of preparatory measures, so that instead of factual reports, wild rumors arrived in their countries—among others, by way of emigrants.
9. The promises which had been made time and time again in the areas of enlistment were in gross contradiction with the facts mentioned under 3 to 8.
Apart from the natural impairment of morale and working capacity resulting from these measures and conditions, the result was that the Soviet propaganda seized upon this matter and exploited it carefully; for this, an ample basis was provided not only by the actual conditions and the letters which reached the home country [of the workers] in spite of the initial blockade, as well as by stories of fugitives and such, but also by the clumsy publications in the German press about the respective legal regulations. As early as April 1942, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in his note to the enemy powers referred to this, especially in section III of that note in which among other things it is stated:
“The German administration is stamping under its feet the long recognized laws and customs of warfare by ordering its troops to take into captivity the male civilian population, in many places even the women, and to apply to them the kind of regime, which the Hitlerites have introduced for the prisoners of war. This does not only mean slave labor for the captured peaceful inhabitants but in most cases also inescapable death by starvation or death through sickness, corporal punishment, and organized mass murders.
“The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear which has been very widely practiced by the German-Fascist Army at the time of its advance is taking on a mass character; it is carried out at direct orders of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the immediate rear areas during the retreat of the German Army. In a series of documents which have been found by units of the Red Army at the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a reference to the Order of the High Command under No. 2974/41 of 6 December 1941 which orders the deportation of all grown men from the occupied places to prisoner of war camps. * * *
“Sometimes, all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men were torn away from their families, or mothers were separated from their children. Only the smallest number of these deported people have been able to return to their homes. These returnees report about unheard-of degradations, heaviest forced labor, enormous numbers of deaths among inhabitants because of starvation and tortures, about the murder by the Fascists of all the weak, wounded, and sick.”
* * * * *
The effects of this large-scale radio, press, and leaflet propaganda which is based on documentary evidence, a propaganda operating even into German-administered territories, must be considered as one of the main reasons for this year’s stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as the threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the General Government.
In the meantime, after a betterment of the condition of the eastern laborers had been insisted upon, not only by the Main Office for Politics in the Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories, which has been able to find support in the repeated requests by the High Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged with the responsibility for all labor employment as well as the Department of Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision of the eastern laborers—those previously existing legal and police rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 camps in the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. * * *
In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in many cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the Plenipotentiary General of Labor Allocation, the total situation of the eastern laborers (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be considered unsatisfactory, * * *.
There remains such a quantity of grievances and problems that it would be impossible to relate now.
* * * * *
[Signed] GUTKELCH
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS[80] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 19-A
EXTRACTS FROM TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM, SIGNED BY BRAEUTIGAM,[81] 25 OCTOBER 1942, CONCERNING EFFECTS OF SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM
Copy Top Secret Matter of State [Geheime Reichssache] [handwritten:] II 1 1161/44 g Rs. Memorandum
In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the Greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation.
* * * With the instinct characteristic of the eastern peoples, even the primitive person has soon found out that for Germany, the slogan “liberation from Bolshevism” was merely a pretext, in order to enslave the Slavic peoples of the East in her own manner. But lest any doubts at all exist as to this German war aim, the German public is, to an ever increasing extent, unabashedly pointing at this intention. Not only for Germany is the conquered territory publicly being claimed as colonization area, but even for Germany’s bitter enemies, the Dutch and Norwegians. * * *
* * * * *
Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps. Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, while complaints about the treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and English, have not been heard of. It is obvious that nothing was so suitable for strengthening the resistance of the Red Army as the knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to be met. To be sure, the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate of the prisoners of war. However, this improvement is not to be ascribed to political insight, but to the sudden realization that our labor market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany. Now the food question suddenly no longer existed. With the usual unlimited abuse of the Slavic humanity, “recruiting” methods were used which probably have their model only in the blackest periods of the slave trade.
A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or age, the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately that many more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious illnesses and other incapabilities for work. It need not be emphasized that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the resistance of the Red Army; of course, these methods were used only in the Soviet Union, and in no way remotely resembled this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously, the Main Department for Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation. Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost efforts with a minimum of food. Here, as well, not political insight, but merely the most primitive biological knowledge has led to an improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters, movies, restaurants, etc., and may leave the house at the most three hours a week, except for duty purposes.
In addition, there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reich Commissariat itself. With an unequalled arrogance, we put aside all political knowledge and, to the happy surprise of all the colored world, treat the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories as whites of class 2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no social services must be given them. Their sustenance interests us only insofar as they are still capable of labor, and, in every respect, they are given to understand that we regard them as of minute value.
* * * * *
Berlin, 25 October 1942
[Signed] BRAEUTIGAM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-61 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 20
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO THE PRESIDENTS OF LABOR OFFICES, 26 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING DEPORTATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF POLES AND JEWS
Copy
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin S.W. 11, Saarlandstr. 96 26 November 1942
Va 5431/7468/42 g
To the Presidents of the Landes Labor Offices (excl. Labor Office Brandenburg)
Special-delivery letter Secret
Subject: Employment of Jews. Specif: Replacement of Jews in war-essential jobs by Polish labor.
In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, Jews still employed will now be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General Government.
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service has informed me on 26 October 1942, that it is anticipated that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in order to make room there for the resettlement of Germans.
Poles slated for evacuation, as a result of this measure, will be committed to concentration camps and put to work insofar as they are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, if fit for labor, will be transported without their families to the Reich, particularly to Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to serve as replacements for Jews to be eliminated from armament factories.
The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of Polish labor will be deported at once. This will apply first to Jews engaged in unskilled labor since they can be exchanged most easily. The remaining so-called “qualified” Jewish laborers will be left in the industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum.
I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the labor offices concerned accordingly.
To the President of the Landes Labor Office Brandenburg, Berlin W. 62
I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as the removal of Jews allocated for work concerns your district, too, I request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS[82] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 21
EXTRACT FROM ORDER OF MUELLER, 17 DECEMBER 1942, CONCERNING PRISONERS QUALIFIED FOR WORK TO BE SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Berlin, 17 December 1942
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service B. Nr. IV 656/42 Secret
Secret
Distribution—Secret:
All Commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Chiefs of State Police Headquarters
For information:
The Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer [Lt. Gen.] Pohl
All Higher SS and Police Chiefs
The Inspector of Concentration Camps
For reasons of war necessity, which need not be specified here, the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered on 14 December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be committed to the concentration camps before the end of January 1943.
In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:
1. As of now (and for the time being, until 1 February 1943) eastern workers or such foreign workers, who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts, insofar as they do not belong to allied, friendly, or neutral states, are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps under observance of the simplest formalities listed under No. 3. In order to eliminate or forestall complaints by outside public offices, explanations will be furnished, if required, stating that the measures are essential for reasons of public security on the basis of the facts in the individual cases.
2. The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service, and the Chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will make immediate checks, applying especially rigorous and strict standards, on (a) prisons, and (b) labor correction camps. All prisoners fit for work, if at all possible physically and from a humanitarian aspect, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, even if criminal procedures have already been or will be instituted in the near future. Only such prisoners who are to remain in solitary confinement, for investigation purposes, may be left.
* * * * *
By order: [Signed] MUELLER Certified correct. [Signed] HELLMUTH [Seal of Secret State Police] Chief Secretary of Police
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS[83] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 25
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM GERMAN-APPOINTED UKRAINIAN MAIN COMMITTEE TO FRANK, FEBRUARY 1943
Copy
Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytch, Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee
Krakow, February 1943
To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
Your Excellency:
Complying with your request I am sending you this letter, in which I should like to state briefly the critical conditions and the distressing incidents which are creating an especially grave situation for the Ukrainian population in the General Government. * * *
* * * * *
II. Measures of labor procurement.
The general nervousness is enhanced yet by the wrong methods to obtain labor, which have been used increasingly in recent months.
The wild and ruthless manhunt carried on everywhere in towns and country, in streets, public squares, railway stations, even in churches, as well as in homes at night, has badly shaken the sense of security of the population. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized anywhere and at any time by the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and being taken into an assembly camp. The family does not know what has happened to him, until weeks or months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.
I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
a. During such a drive a schoolboy in Sokal lost his life and another was wounded (App. 2).
b. 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity cards, were assigned in Krakow to a transport of “Russian prisoners of war” and delivered into a punishment camp in Graz (App. 3).
c. 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by the labor office in the middle of January, were sent via East Prussia to Pskov in Russia, where most of them died as a result of the very severe conditions (App. 4).
d. Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys from classes (Biala Podlaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieszow) (App. 5).
* * * * *
III. Question of Personal Security.
Of a much worse character are the mass executions of absolutely innocent persons * * *.
* * * * *
Appendix 12
* * * * *
As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews are coming to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian “Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).
The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German authorities and even keep away from the communal kitchens, for fear that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 30
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 14 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING LABOR QUESTIONS
G.B.A.
April 14th, [1943]
Sckl./We.
Forwarded We. [in ink] April 15th
To the Fuehrer Obersalzberg
My Fuehrer,
As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers from the east for the German war economy in the coming months.
The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfilment of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas, too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.
With the addition of about 150,000 workers who furthermore may be obtained from Poland and from the other territories, it will then be possible by summer again to put 5-600,000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1,000,000 workers at the disposal of the armament and other war industries.
I ask for your approval to have the new French workers come into the Reich under conditions similar to those of the last group. I have taken contact with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW).
Since the largest part of the Belgian civilian workers and prisoners of war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my Fuehrer.
1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.
As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich presents a shining example compared to the methods of the capitalist and bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and blunders still occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.
In addition to the foreign civilian workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war are also employed in the German economy.
2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy:
Armament 1,568,801 Mining industry 163,632 Building 218,707 Transportation 199,074 Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544 Other branches of the economy 480,298
In addition to the foreign workers, 5 million male and female German workers were channelled into the German war economy proper through transfer from enterprises unimportant to the war effort, to war-essential industries, etc.
* * * * *
Yours faithfully and obediently, [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
The following persons received a copy of the above version:
Reich Marshal Goering
Reichsleiter Bormann
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels
Additional text on the original letter to the Fuehrer.
Since I will be in the eastern territories on April 20th, I ask you, my Fuehrer, to accept in advance my most sincere congratulations along with those of my district [Gau] and my family.
Let me assure you that the district [Gau] of Thuringia and I will serve you and our dear people with all our strength.
It is the most fervent wish that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete satisfaction.
Faithfully and obediently yours [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 33
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 3 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING FOREIGN LABOR SITUATION
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation 1751/43 [pencilled] forwarded on 6 June 1943
Berlin W 8, 3 June 1943
To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany The Fuehrer’s Headquarters.
My Fuehrer,
I beg to be permitted to read to you [a report] on the situation of the labor allocation for the first 5 months of 1943.
The following number of new foreigners and prisoners of war was for the first time put at the disposal of the German war industry:
January 1943 120,085 February 1943 138,354 March 1943 257,382 April 1943 160,535 May 1943 170,155 ———— TOTAL 846,511
I may remark that it was possible to reach this figure of 850,000 only under great difficulties which had not existed during the previous year and only because all labor allocation agencies, particularly also in the occupied territories, approached their task with the greatest devotion.
Unfortunately, quite a number of our officials and employees became victims of assassination, attack, and the like, by partisans.
In addition to the labor forces put at the disposal of the economy within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were made available within the occupied territories by the agencies of the Labor Allocation Administration to the Organization Todt as well as to the enterprises working for the German war economy in the East and the West. Furthermore, it was possible to assign to the Wehrmacht, in addition to a large number of laborers, some considerable numbers of labor volunteers.
Moreover, by virtue of the order concerning compulsory registration, dated 27 January 1943, the following number of men and women are made available.
│ Men │ Women │ Total February │ 14,594 │ 163,012 │ 177,606 March │ 45,606 │ 494,931 │ 540,537 April │ 19,315 │ 269,374 │ 288,689 May │ 11,485 │ 186,683 │ 198,168 │ ———— │ ———— │ ———— TOTAL │ 91,000 │ 1,114,000 │ 1,205,000
However, approximately 600,000 of these persons are available only for less than 48 hours of work per week.
Altogether German war industry recruited 2,000,000 laborers during 5 months of 1943.
Furthermore, as regards wage control and increase of the output of the laborers in the various European territories, especially in France, negotiations were conducted as well as arrangements made and regulations issued, which enabled us to keep the wage system in the occupied European territories in order to secure, as far as possible, the living conditions of laborers working for German interests, in spite of the difficult conditions created by the war, and to increase production by means of wage regulations also in these territories. The coordination of these measures was achieved through agreements with the respective armament and agricultural agencies, as well as with the Reich Commissioner for Price Control.
Heil! Yours faithfully and obediently, [Signed] SAUCKEL
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3000-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 34
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT RENDERED TO RIECKE, MINISTERIALDIREKTOR IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 28 JUNE 1943, ON EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE EAST
Freitag, Chief of Main Office III with the Commissariat General in Minsk
Minsk, 28 June 1943 Secret!
[stamp] Main Group Food and Agriculture Rec’d. 14 July 1943; no encl. III E 733/43 Secret
To Ministerialdirektor Riecke in Berlin
Subject: Report on experiences in political and economic problems in the East, particularly the Commissariat General White Ruthenia.
* * * * *
* * * The task of the military agencies and, subsequently, of the German administration, is: “Exploitation of the region for the German war economy,” and the motto: “Everything you do for Germany is right, everything else is wrong!”
* * * * *
* * * The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and economic effect * * * From * * * White Ruthenia, approximately 50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be obtained. Considering the total population of 2.4 million, these figures are impossible * * *.
* * * * *
* * * Due to the sweeping drives [Grossaktionen] of the SS and police in November 1942, about 250,000 acres of farmland are left unused, as the population has gone and the villages have been razed.
* * * * *
[Signed] FREITAG
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS[84] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 35
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY LEYSER TO ROSENBERG, 30 JUNE 1943, ON CONDITIONS IN THE DISTRICT ZHITOMIR
The Commissioner General
Zhitomir, 30 June 1943 Secret
Oral report on the situation in the general district [Generalbezirk] Zhitomir, by Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at a conference with Reich Minister Rosenberg, in Vinnitsa, on 17 June 1943.
Mr. Reich Minister,
* * * * *
The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations. Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment of labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force. The population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the transports to the Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems.
* * * * *
To date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to the Reich from the general district Zhitomir. It can be taken for granted that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to approximately 200,000.
* * * * *
The struggle which has to be carried on is hard and full of sacrifices. But it will and must be carried through. Enormous moral forces have been mobilized in the personnel of the civil administration in their daily efforts. The successes which they were able to achieve so far are impressive, particularly with regard to the resistance encountered. May I, therefore, be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank all my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are practically on the front. I can promise your Excellency, that we all shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered.
[Signed] LEYSER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 39
EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE, 18 FEBRUARY 1944, CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF INDIGENOUS LABOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH
The City Commissioner in Kaunas. Kaunas, 18 February 1944. _PROCUREMENT OF INDIGENOUS WORKERS FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH_
Numerous drives for the purpose of recruiting indigenous workers for the Reich have taken place since the entry of German armed forces into the general district [Generalbezirk] Lithuania in June 1941. A few weeks after the entry of the German troops, thousands of Lithuanian male and female farm workers were recruited at the instigation of the military administration, to work for 6 months on large estates in the Gau East Prussia. Unfortunately, the promises made then were not kept. These farm workers were not released after 6 months nor after 12 months; their families remaining behind were left without any support for months; they were for a long time refused a short vacation in Lithuania, and now it is even considered to transfer these farm workers, recruited in 1941 for 6 months, to the armament industry in the Reich.
The second major drive was started by the armed forces in the spring of 1942 and concerned the collecting of approximately 7,000 male workers as so-called transport helpers. The action, which was rushed into without sufficient propaganda preparation, was greatly handicapped by unwise measures on the part of the nervous armed forces command. Thus for instance, the Lithuanians, ordered to the official agencies “only for registration”, were not allowed to return home and were taken away under military escort to the local barracks, leaving them no way of either saying good-by to their families or putting in order their most important personal affairs. No wonder that the enemy propaganda exploited this “blemish” with avidity comparing the procedure with the deportation methods used barely a year ago by the Soviets.
Until most recent times, numerous additional drives have been undertaken for the purpose of obtaining volunteers for the armed forces, the police and the Reich Labor Service, or for obtaining workers for the armament industry in the Reich. * * *
* * * * *
Finally it must be recalled that the indigenous administration in its present form and since its inception has completely failed in the question of procuring workers for the Reich. * * *
* * * * *
3. Gauleiter Sauckel requested that 30,000 indigenous workers for the Reich be recruited at short order and be shipped to Germany. At a conference between the Commissioner General and the First Councillor General [Ersten Generalrat] on 7 September 1943, the latter offered to assume the entire responsibility for the execution of this drive for the native administration and to recruit and ship the specified number of 30,000 workers by 7 November 1943.
* * * * *
4. In the meantime, Gauleiter Sauckel made an additional demand to the effect that the general district Lithuania had to furnish 100,000 native workers (instead of the 30,000 demanded up until now) for the Reich. At a conference with all the general councillors on 24 January 1944, the commissioner general did not leave any doubts as to the fact that this number would have to be furnished regardless of any consideration, even at the risk of leaving many work projects in the general district unfinished and permanently removing workers needed on jobs in the country. The responsibility for the execution of this new drive lies again in the hands of the local administration, and, with the consent of the commissioner general, indigenous conscription commissions have been formed with all district chiefs and all chiefs of judicial and local districts. The total number to be made available has been divided up into contingents, and the quota to be furnished by every mayor or district chief was exactly determined. This is the way the matter looks in the district of the City of Kaunas:
New quota, to be supplied 7,000 workers 20 percent addition 1,400 workers ——————— TOTAL 8,400 workers
In the district of the City of Kaunas, according to the records of my labor office on 1 February 1944, there were 7,000 unfilled jobs in industry and the agencies of the armed forces, police, etc., so that to all intents and purposes 15,400 workers would have to be found in the city of Kaunas alone, in order to comply fully with the demands of the Reich and the local economy. And all that with a total indigenous population of only a little over 130,000.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-103[85] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 40
EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE (GERMAN-APPOINTED) POLISH MAIN COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND ON THE CONDITIONS OF POLISH WORKERS IN GERMANY, 17 MAY 1944
Polish Main Committee 5 Vischer Street, Krakow
Krakow, 17 May 1944
To the Administration of the General Government, Main Department Internal Administration, Dept. Population and Welfare, 13 University Street, Krakow
No. Pa 1/724 ———— 6699/44
Subject: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich.
The living conditions of about 2 million Polish male and female workers in the Reich have given rise to shortcomings which are largely lowering the will and the capacity to work of many workers, endanger their health and even their lives, and also have a strong influence on the situation of their families within the General Government, thus directly affecting the sphere of our own work.
These bad conditions are felt with particular intensity by those groups of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been lodged in large camps [Massenlagern]. With regard to workers on the land, they occur as individual cases and are more easily dealt with. * * *
* * * * *
Food relief allotments—We receive letters from the camps for eastern workers and their large families, beseeching us for food. The quantity and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called fourth category of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a meager addition of potatoes now and then, is a hunger ration for a heavy worker.
Sometimes punishment consists of starvation, which is inflicted e.g., for refusal to wear the badge “East”. Such punishment has the result that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony). The consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and tuberculosis. The spread of tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the community camps, because energy spent in the heavy work assigned to them cannot be replaced.
* * * * *
The quantities of bread and [other] food fixed for Polish children in the camps is thoroughly insufficient for building up substance for growing and developing their bodies. In some cases children up to the age of 10 and even more are allotted 200 grams of bread daily, 200 grams of butter or margarine and 250 grams of sugar monthly, and nothing else (factory in Zeititz, near Wurzen, Saxony). * * *
* * * * *
Care of Children—* * * An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers (camp for eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are cases of 8-year-old, weak and undernourished children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment. * * *
Health Care—The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by many cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to the General Government unfit for work. Their state of health is usually deteriorated past hope of recovery.
The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and malnutrition is not recognized as a disease condition until the illness manifests itself in high fever and fainting spells.
* * * * *
Protection of the Family—Grave depression is caused among the eastern workers by the order forbidding marriage among them within the borders of the Reich. * * * No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.
* * * * *
Religious Care—If under these bad conditions there is no moral support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at least such moral support which the religious feeling of the Polish population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination of religious services, worship, and religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a religious service for other people, and other measures show a certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and outlook of the workers. * * *
* * * * *
[Stamp] THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE
[Signed] [name illegible] President
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 208-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 55
REPORT BY SAUCKEL, 7 JULY 1944, ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1944
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin W8, 7 July 1944 65 Mohren Street Thuring House
Secret
NR 520/44/g Dr. ST/Ka
Special Delivery Letter
To: All Top Reich Authorities The Reich Leader of the NSDAP All Top Army Agencies All Gauleiters
Subject: Accomplishments of the Labor Mobilization in the first half of 1944.
Enclosed I am submitting the total figures on additional manpower placed at the disposal of the German war effort by the German Labor Offices in the first half-year of 1944. They represent only such manpower that was not previously employed in the German war effort.
According to the quota of 4,050,000 laborers set for this year, 2,000,000 new workers would have had to be secured in the first half of the year. Because of increased difficulties in Italy and in the occupied Western countries, regrettably one-half million less than that were found. If despite the known difficult situation it was possible to mobilize 1,500,000 people in the first half of the year, it is solely due to the exertion of all available energy.
Since the Proclamation of 17 February 1944, around 62,000 women have reported for “Voluntary Honorary Service,” and 52,000 of them have already been assigned to work.
Heil Hitler! [Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin, 7 July 1944 New Manpower Placed at the Disposal of the Economy between 1 January and 30 June 1944
A. Entire Economy:
Total 1,482,000
Of these were: Germans 848,000 Foreigners 537,400 War prisoners 96,600
B. Breakdown of allocation of [the persons listed under] A:
Agriculture and Forestry 231,000 Of them, foreigners 156,000 Mining 46,000 Of them, foreigners 34,000 Metal industry 415,000 Of them, foreigners 250,000 All other [branches of] economy 790,000 Of them, foreigners 194,000
C. Origin of foreign labor:
Occupied Eastern Territories 284,000 General Government 52,000 Protectorate 23,000 France, excluding Northern France 33,000 Belgium, including Northern France 16,000 Netherlands 15,000 Italy 37,000 Rest of Europe 77,400
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS[86] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 56
MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE ON 11 JULY 1944 ATTENDED BY MILCH, CONCERNING THE LABOR PROBLEM
_LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON 11 JULY 1944 1600 HOURS_
Name Official capacity Agency Dr. Kuehne Chief of Mil. Adm. [illegible]
(1) Warlimont General of Artillery [Lt. OKW Gen.]
Dr. Kohlhaase Director of Labor Section of the Supreme Commissioner, Adriatic Coast, Trieste
Dr. Landfried State Secretary, Chief of Italy Mil. Adm.
(2) Walter Funk and Albert Speer
Milch [illegible]
(3) Krosigk
(3) Steengracht State Secretary Foreign Office
Abetz Ambassador German Embassy in Paris
Hanel [?] Major General Armaments Commissioner Staff, France
von Linstow Colonel, GSC Military Commander, France
Sass Colonel, GSC General [Plenipotentiary] for Italy
Franssen Major General Armaments Inspector, Belgium
Waeger Major General Armaments Office
Sarnow Ministerialdirektor Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section
Koegel Lieut. Col., GSC Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section
Reeder Chief of Mil. Adm. Brussels
Heider Chief of General Staff Brussels (4) Ley
(5) Sauckel Labor Plenipotentiary Berlin
H. Backe Minister Reich Food Ministry
Marrenbach Chief [of Dept.] German Labor Front
Leyers Armaments Plenipotentiary Italy
Also present:
Ministerial Direktor Klopfer (Party Chancellery) Ministerialrat Froehling Ambassador Rahn Dr. Huber (6) Chief of Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann Colonel Meixner (OKW)
(1) United States vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See vols. X and XI.
(2) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vols. I-XIII, Nuremberg, 1947.
(3) United States vs. Ernst von Welzsaecker et al. See vols. XII, XIII and XIV.
(4) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
Berlin, 12 July 1944
To Rk. 5815 C
Subject: Stepped-up Procuring of Foreign Manpower
Executive Conference, 11 July 1944
Note
Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs and representatives indicated in the attached list of those present. No guarantee can be given for the completeness of the list, as not all participants signed the register.
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers[87] reported by way of introduction on the various proposals on hand by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation calculated to bring about the increase in labor in Germany which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited the theme of the discussion by saying that all possibilities were to be examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be offset, for example, the question of the reestablishment of an acceptable price and wage differential between the Reich and non-German territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion could be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must be examined how the police agencies, regarding the inadequacy of which the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation has serious complaints, could be strengthened, on the one hand, through bringing influence to bear on the foreign governments and, on the other, through reorganizing the indigenous police forces by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, the police or other German agencies. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then gave the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Gauleiter Sauckel.
Gauleiter Sauckel stated that the present deficit of the half-year program for 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be filled by 30 June of the current year, totals 500,000. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were apprentices and women, two categories which cannot be regarded as full-fledged workers. Of the 560,000 foreigners put to work, three-fourths came from the East alone. This result was a scandal considering that the German people now are mobilized for work to the fullest extent and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German authorities in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers were still idling. In mobilizing the manpower we did not exert the necessary severity and, in particular, we were unable to achieve the necessary unity of the German authorities. It was quite improper for German authorities to interfere irresponsibly in the tasks of the GBA [Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation]. He had to have much greater freedom of action, just as was the case in 1942. With the present methods of recruitment for voluntary employment we would not make any progress, for one thing because any volunteers still available exposed themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly hired and decently treated at their jobs, they would do completely satisfactory work. Attention to the wage and price questions connected with the subject was desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If no effective action were taken now, our manpower mobilization program would fail, with the consequence that the combat troops would no longer receive the weapons they need.
State Secretary von Steengracht, Foreign Office, stressed that the Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. The Foreign Office, however, could do nothing except press the foreign governments more or less urgently to meet German demands, and this has been done consistently up to the present. The police power was handled by others who, therefore, would now have to voice their opinion on the subject of the conference.
The Deputy for the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had to put themselves at the disposal of the task to secure manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was not employed exclusively in essential military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be assigned for the purposes of the GBA [Sauckel]. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:
a. The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over the additional task of securing manpower in the partisan areas. Everyone who cannot fully show cause for his presence in these areas is to be seized for labor;
b. When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food, are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the Wehrmacht;
c. The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the areas near the front is to receive special attention with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.
Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and said that he expected that a certain measure of success would no doubt be achieved by these means.
On behalf of the Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France, the Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder, put up for discussion the possibility of expanding the Military Police, now totaling only 70, and of the Civilian Searching Service [Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 strong). If the Military Police were increased to 200, appreciable results could be achieved. Upon inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont promised on behalf of the OKW that the searching service would be reinforced.
On further inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, as to whether the population suitable for work could not be taken along as the troops withdrew from an area, Colonel Saas ([Plenipotentiary] General for Italy) stated that Field Marshal Kesselring had already directed that the population in a zone of 30 kilometers’ depth behind the front was to be “captured”. This measure, however, could not be extended to areas extending farther behind the lines, because of the most severe shock that would be inflicted on the whole structure of these areas, especially in regard to the industry still in full production.
Gauleiter Sauckel was of the opinion that widest circles of the Wehrmacht saw something disreputable in the labor recruiting program. There had been actual instances where German soldiers had endeavored to protect the population from being taken away by German labor recruiting agencies. Therefore it was essential to explain to the front troops the extraordinary importance of labor recruiting. In contrast to the much too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war for the fighting troops, on occupying a new territory, to put the entire population to work at once. The question for the administration thus was not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. It would be necessary to establish a few object lessons, and the passive resistance would quickly change into active cooperation. Nor ought one to shrink from proceeding drastically against the administrative heads [Behoerdenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor recruitment. Not the small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other means too must be applied. Thus it would be advisable to remove a large part of the exceptional Italian crops in order to improve the rations of the German and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the entirely insufficient rations for the Italian military internees who were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute for these military internees gradually altered. This would release a not inconsiderable labor potential.
Reich Leader Dr. Ley underscored these statements and suggested the establishment of a searching service made up by all German forces in the non-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless recruiting in large areas.
These proposals were countered by the following objections:
Reich Minister Funk holds that ruthless raids would entail considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German territories. The same opinion is held by the Chief of the Military Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried, who believes that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers and flee to uncontrollable areas.
Reich Minister Speer states that he had an interest in both promoting increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration, in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually with clean methods.
On behalf of the Military Commander in France, Chief of Military Administration Dr. Michel, referred to the statements of State Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities, exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population.
Ambassador Abetz confirmed these statements. The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail. Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire industries in a body.
The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, declared himself willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.
State Secretary von Steengracht, Foreign Office, commented to the effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.
Ambassador Rahn believes that there is still a sufficient number of workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out, although 2/3 of the Italian territory and population had been lost. He had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was generally successful until the fall of Rome, as could be seen from the fact that it was possible to seize 200,000 Italians for military service. Since that time the situation in Italy had become extremely difficult, however, as the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the Italian people. The German authorities had done what they could to neutralize these effects and to that end had merged all executive power in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of violent methods on a large scale was impracticable because it would cause complete disorder and disrupt production. The best example for this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the strikes in Turin, when 10 percent of all factory labor forces were to be conscripted because they were shirkers. A force of 4,000 Germans was brought together for that purpose. The result was that the food and power supply of Turin was cut off by the resistance movement so that 250,000 workers had to stop working. This could not be tolerated in view of the substantial contribution of the Italian armament industry to the war effort. Field Marshal Kesselring declared that continuation of forced recruitment would cause not only the loss of the armament production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater of war. In the face of this statement the hardiest political will must keep silent. The only thing which could be done was the execution of the forced recruitment in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:
a. The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.
b. To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with machinery and workers.
c. The transfer of wage savings of the Italian workers in Germany to their homeland, which is not functioning well, is to be ensured. For this purpose an automatic procedure is to be introduced which Ambassador Rahn had already proposed in another connection.
d. The system of the induction of age classes will be resumed when the German military authorities consider the time ripe.
In answer to the reported remark of Field Marshal Kesselring, General Warlimont (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The OKW’s approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed.
Gauleiter Sauckel declared that all these proposals were inadequate since they were not suited to mobilize the masses of manpower which he needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in practice since the labor mobilization authorities had at no time limited themselves to any single method. He still had to name as seriously damaging to the execution of the labor mobilization plan the fact that his far-reaching jurisdiction and powers had been made the subject of discussion. What he needed, as already said, was “elbow room”.
At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Gauleiter Sauckel declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which he would consult with the interested parties and which then would be submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for endorsement and translation into law. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation presents his demands as follows:
a. The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among the interested parties and will be carried out jointly.
b. The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation receives permission to establish local security and recruiting machineries for labor recruitment, which will operate on the basis of his orders and directives without interference by other offices.
c. The regulations on recruitment of labor for Germany promulgated by French and Italian authorities are to be given solid foundations by concrete implementation orders which guarantee the most active collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower.
After these statements were made Reich Minister Dr. Lammers closed the meeting, pointing out that he would leave the further handling of the problem to those concerned, as proposed.
[Initialed] L. [LAMMERS]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY MILCH ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION ON VISIT TO FUEHRER HEADQUARTERS ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942_
* * * * *
16. Upon recommendation of Field Marshal Milch, the Fuehrer decides that the 6-month contracts for foreign workers should be dropped and that tax regulations, which stand in the way against this measure, are to be rescinded. Rather, contracts are to be introduced which would provide, in the event of employment of longer duration (exceeding six months), a single lump sum compensation of some kind—also in view of the fact that there would be a corresponding saving of the cost of travel back and forth.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 32
EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES, 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942_
* * * * *
SPEER:
20. The Fuehrer explains clearly in an elaborate form that he does not approve the bad food dispensed to the Russians. The Russians must absolutely be given sufficient food, and Sauckel has to see to it that this food will now be guaranteed by Backe.
21. The Fuehrer is surprised that the civilian Russians are kept like prisoners of war behind a barbed wire fence. I told him that this was due to a decree issued by him. The Fuehrer knows nothing of such a decree. I request the documents pertaining thereto to be included in the forthcoming Fuehrer file and at the same time to see to it that Sauckel will arrange to have the civilian Russians no longer treated like prisoners of war.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 2
EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943
Berlin, 8 January 1943 _POINTS OF DISCUSSION AT THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943_
* * * * *
SPEER:
55. The Fuehrer demands unequivocally that in no case must it be permitted that France be less burdened than Germany. Germany must sacrifice her blood for this war. We must insist that France intensify her economic contribution. Any French workers on that job showing signs of resistance will be deported, if necessary, as civilian internees. At the slightest attempt of sabotage the most rigorous measures must be taken. Any maudlin humanitarianism is out of place.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS[88] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 3
REPORT FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 10 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING DIFFICULTIES ORIGINATING FROM THE DRAFT OF MANPOWER IN FORMER SOVIET TERRITORIES
Teletype 10 March 1943
To the Fuehrer Fuehrer Headquarters
With the urgent request to be submitted to the Fuehrer in person immediately for decision
Subject: Difficulties originating from draft of manpower in former Soviet territories.
My Fuehrer,
You may be assured that the labor assignment is being pushed by me with fanatical will but also with circumspection and with due consideration for economic and technical as well as human necessities and conditions.
Replacement for soldiers who will be relieved and the stockpiling of additional labor needed for the armament programs can and will be carried through, notwithstanding the fact that especially during the last two winter months the greatest difficulties had to be overcome. Yet it was possible to make 258,000 foreign workers available to the war economy for January and February alone despite the fact that in the East transports practically ceased. The employment of German men and women is in full progress.
Inasmuch as the difficulties of the winter months will now gradually disappear, and as preparations were made by me, also the transports from the East can again be resumed in full measure. Although the yield of the registration and employment of German men and women is excellent, the employment of the strongest and most efficient foreigners who are used to work cannot be neglected.
Unfortunately, some of the commanding generals [Oberbefehlshaber] in the East have prohibited the compulsory enrollment of men and women in the conquered Soviet territories for—as Gauleiter Koch[89] informs me—political reasons.
My Fuehrer, in order to enable me to carry out my assignment, I ask that these orders be rescinded. I consider it entirely impossible that the population of former Soviet nationality could be accorded a greater measure of consideration than our German people on whom I have been forced to place very drastic measures. Should it no longer be possible to enforce the compulsion to work in the East, nor to draft labor, then the German war economy and agriculture will likewise no longer be able to fulfil their tasks in full measure.
I myself am of the opinion that under no circumstances should the commanders of our armies give credence to the Bolshevist propaganda of atrocities and defamation. After all, it is to the interest of the generals themselves that replacements for the troops be made in opportune time.
I take permission to point out that—without wishing to discredit their best will—it is impossible to put German women—entirely inexperienced in work—into the place of hundreds of thousands of excellent workers who now have to go to the front as soldiers. It must be possible for me to replace them with people from the Eastern territories.
I myself report to you that all foreign nationals who are working with us are being treated satisfactorily according to humane standards; that they are being treated correctly and fairly; they are being fed, housed, yes, even clothed. Because of my own experience in the service of foreign nations, I am even bold enough to claim that never before have foreign workers been so decently treated anywhere in the world as is being done by the German people during this the hardest of all wars.
I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to cancel orders which prevent the enrollment of foreign male and female workers and to kindly advise me whether my concept of the assignment as laid down herein still is correct.
I ask your permission to report to you in person on several important points of the labor recruitment early next week, possibly on Tuesday.
In lasting gratitude, loyalty and obedience, yours,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 33
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 30 MAY 1943
Obersalzberg, 1 June 1943 Fuehrer Conference on 30 May 1943
* * * * *
SPEER: [Marginal Note] Schieber, Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, Keitel, Waeger.
19. The coal situation causes the Fuehrer to call a meeting with Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, and Keitel.
At this meeting will be discussed the allocation of sufficient labor for the coal district, the removal of Russian prisoners of war from farming and small war industries (insofar as they are employed as unskilled labor) and their replacement by other workers from the Ukraine, Poland, etc.
Furthermore it is intended, if possible, to raise the food rations of the German miners, even above present levels. The Russians are to get plentiful additional rations, which will be individually allotted by plant managers on the basis of efficiency.
Additionally the German workers—and particularly also the Russian prisoners of war—will receive bonuses for higher production in the form of tobacco and similar items.
The details are to be discussed in a preliminary conference so as to establish uniform data as regards quantities, etc., for submission to the Fuehrer.
On no account must we capitulate to existing conditions on the coal question. Coal is the critical basis for maintaining our production and the entire domestic economy.
[Marginal Note] Saur, Kippung, Milch, Dornberger.
20. The Fuehrer desires that in areas which are certainly recurrent targets of enemy air attacks (Ruhr District, Krupp-Essen) about 100 to 200 rocket projector batteries be installed, which experimentally are to fire a steady stream of rockets set for the computed altitude of the enemy formations.
Some of these rockets will, on detonating, loose wire coils. The Fuehrer expects, after all, significant and not only psychological effects from massed, unaimed fire against concentrated air attacks on these targets.
Milch and Dornberger are to state their views on the subject.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 4
EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943
14 September 1943 FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943
* * * * *
DETHLEFFSEN:
16. The Fuehrer brings up the question of air force matériel production and the discussion with Messerschmitt, and asks for my personal intervention with the Reich Marshal [Goering] and Field Marshal Milch to cut down appreciably on the number of aircraft types.
17. The Fuehrer approves Messerschmitt’s recommendation that a monthly conference be held on questions pertaining to developments and productions for the Luftwaffe, on the introduction of new types and modifications with the participation of construction designers and production experts. This is to be discussed with Field Marshal Milch.
MILCH:
18. The Fuehrer is displeased that the long-range Messerschmitt plane had not yet been taken up by the Luftwaffe. M. is said to have been unable to obtain the support of the Luftwaffe for it.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 34
EXTRACT FROM FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944, CONCERNING SPEER’S REPORT ON THE FRENCH LABOR SITUATION
6 January 1944 FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944
* * * * *
[Marginal Note] Kehrl, Waeger.
The Fuehrer has been informed of the differences of opinion with the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. According to my arguments, the principal thing is to exploit the industry of France for Germany to a larger extent, in order to be able to locate there about 1 million additional workers. However, Sauckel is of the opinion that first of all workers have to be brought to Germany.
The Fuehrer explains that in his view the transfer to France is of extreme importance, be it only on account of the possibility to increase the production of iron connected therewith. In spite of this, in his opinion, one cannot do without bringing additional French labor to Germany. It must, therefore, be attempted to find a happy union of both things. In this connection he proposes to designate protected works in France, in order to induce the French to work in these plants just through the pressure of allocation of labor for Germany. Upon my statement that the protected plants have already been established, he affirms again the importance of this institution and the necessity to create here a basis of long-range confidence. He thinks that it is my affair whether I will be able to do without French labor or not; Sauckel could be only happy if I would do without them.
Upon my reply that this is not the only problem, but that also the question of the executive power is involved, since otherwise a loss of prestige for Germany and a disorder in the allocation of French labor would be inevitable, the Fuehrer declares that this is, of course, one of the most important bases for further discussions. I then told him that on 3 January there will be a meeting between Himmler, Keitel, Sauckel, and myself (Kehrl) (is the Foreign Office to be included?), at which these problems will be discussed. Subsequently there shall be a meeting with him, at which the possibility of executive power in France, as far as the allocation, and the transport of French workers to Germany is concerned, will be laid before him. (Kehrl to do advance work, that we also make a claim for executive power for the protection of the factories in France against terror bands.)
-----
[74] The basic importance of this Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 was emphasized by the IMT Judgment. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vol. I, pp. 188 and 200, Nuremberg, 1947.
For translation of entire document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VII, pp. 847-854, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[75] When the prosecution introduced this document in evidence, the following colloquy ensued (Tr. p. 49):
JUDGE SPEIGHT: Do you establish a chain between all of these documents which you read and the defendant?
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, the prosecution, in presenting these documents, has in mind to give an over-all picture of the way slave labor was treated in Germany, going back to the early days showing that this defendant knew because of attendance at the May 1939, conference that slave labor was going to be employed. Then as Air Ordnance Master General, later as Chief of the Jaegerstab, and later as a member of the Central Planning Board, we will connect him with enterprises involving slave labor.
JUDGE SPEIGHT: Very well.
[76] Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. See case of United States vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al., vols. X, XI.
[77] For more complete translation of document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. V, pp. 744-754, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[78] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 46-59, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[79] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 130-146, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[80] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 242-251, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[81] Otto Braeutigam, member of the Economic Political Department of the Foreign Office. As of May 1941 detached by the German Foreign Office to Rosenberg’s Agency, the Eastern Ministry (Ost-Ministerium).
[82] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 778-9, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[83] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 79-93, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[84] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 234-238, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[85] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VIII, pp. 104-107, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[86] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. VI pp. 760-772, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[87] United States vs. Ernst von Welzsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.
[88] After Dr. Bergold read this document into the record he made the following statement (Tr. pp. 520-521):
“Which proves that until March 1943, the commanders in the conquered territories were opposed to the labor conscription, and that it was Sauckel who demanded that this opposition be removed, because he was of the opinion that foreign people had to produce the same as the German people. It is further important that he didn’t declare that to the Fuehrer alone but also to the defendant [witness] Speer and the defendant Milch. Accordingly, the defendant [witness] Speer later on will attest that never before have foreigners been treated so fairly. In other words, he lied to the men who were to work with him.”
[89] 1130-PS. See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 797-799, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
2. THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
_EXCERPT FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 6 JANUARY 1947_[90]
MR. DENNEY: We come now to the part of the proof which places the defendant in the very center of the Slave Labor Program.
We have shown that from the outset of the war and prior thereto, he was thoroughly informed of the Nazi plan for total war, which contemplated the full use of all human material resources within the homeland. We will show he was active in the formation and announcement of decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use. He carried out the master plan for requisition, allocation, and use of human raw material for the war machine. There are words we will have by necessity to repeat as we introduce the documents—requisition, allocation, and use.
Our evidence will show that Milch, a member of the Central Planning Board, belonged to an organization—and here again we have another important word “belong”. He was one of two most essential men in the Planning Board that guided the decisions of that organization.
We will present to the Court excerpts from the minutes of some 12 conferences at every one of which Milch was present, starting with the first held in April 1942 and ending with the fifty-eighth held in May 1944. Actually, he was at all but eight conferences, and we use the figure “eight” advisably. We are not sure, he may have been in some of those. There is no question that he was in every one of those meetings which we introduce here. On occasions when Speer was not present Milch presided. We will show he actively participated when the Central Planning Board arrived at decisions with respect to the request, allocation, and use of this labor.
We will show he was active in the formation of the announcement of decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use of labor. And all of them were prisoners of war and were allocated to the German war effort. Requisition, allocation, and use were the dominating voice. Decisive influence, active participation, forced labor, illegal occupation—these are the words with which we are concerned, and these are the things with which he concerned himself.
Evidence
Prosecution Documents
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page R-124 48-B Stenographic record of the 447 first conference of the Central Planning Board on 27 April 1942.
R-124 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 448 transmitting the statutes of the Central Planning Board.
1510-PS 58 Extracts from decree of 16 450 September 1943, defining the duties of the Planning Office of the Central Planning Board.
3721-PS 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452 September 1945, regarding the jurisdiction of the Central Planning Board.
NI-1098 63 Extracts from affidavit of 456 Fritz Sauckel, 22 September 1946, regarding the jurisdiction of the Central Planning Board.
R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 457 eleventh conference of the Central Planning Board, 22 July 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 459 seventeenth conference of the Central Planning Board, 28 October 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 461 minutes of twenty-first conference of Central Planning Board, 30 October 1942.
R-124 48-B Extracts from stenographic 465 minutes of the twenty-third conference of the Central Planning Board, 3 November 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 467 minutes of the thirty-third conference of the Central Planning Board, 16 February 1943.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 471 minutes of the thirty-sixth conference of the Central Planning Board, 22 April 1943.
R-124 48-A Report of the forty-second 475 conference of the Central Planning Board, 23 June 1943.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 478 minutes of the fifty-third conference of the Central Planning Board, 16 February 1944. R-124 48-B Report on the fifty-third 479 conference of the Central Planning Board, 16 February 1944.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 484 minutes of the fifty-fourth conference of the Central Planning Board, 1 March 1944.
R-124 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498 fifty-sixth conference of the Central Planning Board, 4 April 1944.
NOKW-287 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 499 April 1943, concerning the protection of industry.
R-124 48-A Speer’s minutes of a conference 501 with Hitler on 8 July 1943.
R-124 48-A Extract from the report by Saur 502 of the conference with the Fuehrer, 5 March 1944.
Defense Documents
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page R-124 5 Extract from the stenographic 509 report of the eleventh conference of the Central Planning Board, 22 July 1942.
R-124 6 Extract from the stenographic 510 minutes of the twenty-second conference of the Central Planning Board, 2 November 1942.
R-124 7 Extract from the stenographic 510 minutes of the thirty-second conference of the Central Planning Board, 12 February 1943.
R-124 8 Extract from the stenographic 511 minutes of the thirty-third conference of the Central Planning Board, 16 February 1943.
R-124 9 Extract from stenographic 516 minutes of the thirty-ninth conference of the Central Planning Board, 23 April 1943.
R-124 31 Extracts from the stenographic 517 minutes of the fifty-fourth conference of the Central Planning Board, 1 March 1944.
Testimony
Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert 502 Speer before commission on 19 February 1947
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
STENOGRAPHIC RECORD OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 27 APRIL 1942
Berlin, 27 April 1942
Secret
“THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD” IN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN
1ST CONFERENCE
Present: The three members: Reich Minister Speer, Field Marshal Milch, State Secretary Koerner. Furthermore: State Secretary Dr. Schulze-Fielitz, Ministry of Munitions, Ministerialrat von Normann, Four Year Plan.
Result:
I. The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942—VP 6707 g) is a task for leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters. It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of its directives. The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous institutions difficult to control, but always on individuals and fully responsible persons who are free in the selection of their work methods and their collaboration as far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.
II. Discussion of the situation in iron.
A. The objective is to reach a production of 2,2 million tons per month. In the first place it has to be established whether, after taking into account the excessive requests which were certainly made and of the difficulties confronting an increase of production (coal, transport) the present figures are sufficient (2 million tons). For the distribution in the third quarter these 2 million tons have to serve in any case as a basis.
B. The principles of distribution and the new quotas will be discussed in a subsequent conference with a wider circle of participants (see special protocol).
C. The iron-producing industry will be organized into a Reich association. It is to be established and made to operate as soon as possible. The creation of an interimistic liaison organization (Planning Group Iron) has, therefore, been abandoned. The task of the Reich Association ends with the production of iron and before the distribution of the iron.
D. For the position of president of the Reich Association Iron, Generaldirektor Voegler and Geheimrat Roechling[91] are suggested. Roechling was chosen, the appointment of whom would be approved by the Fuehrer, according to Reich Minister Speer. State Secretary Koerner will submit the proposal to the Reich Marshal [Goering].
III. The reorganization of the Upper Silesian Territory with the object of the highest and best utilization for war economy in mind is urgent. The selection of locations and the determining of capacities in this territory has to be expedited with regard to raw material, transport, and labor.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
LETTER OF 20 OCTOBER 1942 TRANSMITTING THE STATUTES OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. Central Planning Board. Z. P. 1
Berlin, October 20, 1942
Enclosed I send you, for your information, the statutes of the Central Planning Board with the request to support the office of the “Central Planning Board” in every possible way in its work, and to direct, more particularly, your section chiefs and reporters to forward all information requested orally or by writing, in the shortest possible time. By this collaboration of your section chiefs and reporters, the building up of a larger apparatus in the framework of the “Central Planning Board” is to be avoided.
BY ORDER: [Typewritten] WALTHER SCHIEBER Certified: SCHWINGE Ministerialregistrator
[Stamp of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.]
Distribution to—
a. The highest Reich authorities. b. The Reich Protector. c. The Governor General. d. The executive authorities in the occupied territories.
STATUTES OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
1. The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals only with the decision of basic questions. Professional questions remain the task of the competent departments, which in their fields remain responsible within the framework of the decisions made by the Central Planning Board.
2. In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have the execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning Board appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies appointed by each of three members of the Central Planning Board; one of these three deputies shall be appointed chief of the office.
[Handwritten marginal note on left side of the document: “To be forwarded”.]
3. In accordance with the attached Table of Organization [not reproduced], the office appoints reporters. These reporters are at the disposal of all members of the Central Planning Board. The office appoints one reporter to keep the record.
4. Office and reporters have to see to it, above all, and to draw the attention of the Central Planning Board, if necessary, to the required measures, that—
a. All decisive tasks of war economy are achieved quickly, without red tape, and ruthlessly, by mutual adapting of all composing branches.
b. All such work as is obviously without importance for winning the war, be discontinued.
5. Tasks of the office
a. The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning Board in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning Board have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks with the competent departments, etc.
b. On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the office sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central Planning Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that the deadlines fixed are complied with.
c. The members of the office keep the members of the Central Planning Board informed between the sessions.
6. The distribution of work, dealing with incoming mail, etc., is arranged by the office itself. The members of the office sign: “By order” of the Central Planning Board.
7. Tasks of the reporters
Reporters have to keep in constant touch with the departments, with regard to the sectors of work they are in charge of. In the regular sittings of the office they report on the progress made and on the measures which are required for the carrying on of the war economy, especially for the increase in production, for other improvements in the supply with raw materials, and for necessary changes in distribution. They do the preliminary work for the meetings of the board (see also 5 a) and in their working sector they are primarily responsible for the execution, within the established time limits, of the decisions of the Central Planning Board.
Berlin, 20 October 1942.
[Typewritten] MILCH [Typewritten] SPEER [Typewritten] KOERNER
[Stamp] Berlin 6-11-1942 No. L 16-501
Copy to the State Secretary for his information.
[Typewritten] DR. SCHATTENMANN
Certified: Schulz, Reg. Sekr.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1510-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 58
EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1943, DEFINING THE DUTIES OF THE PLANNING OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
Berlin, 16 September 1943
DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1948 OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL FOR ARMAMENT TASKS WITHIN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN AND OF THE REICH MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT AND WAR PRODUCTION CONCERNING THE TASK OF THE PLANNING OFFICE
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has established a Planning Office in my department by decree of 4 September 1943 for the purpose of concentrated handling of all fundamental questions of war economical planning.
In this connection I order:
I
1. The Planning Office prepares the decisions of the Central Planning Board and supervises their execution.
2. In this connection it will especially prepare the distribution to consumers of basic materials (for instance, iron, metals, coal, mineral oil, nitrogen, and other important raw materials).
3. As a working basis for Central Planning Board, the Planning Office has to draw up plans for production and distribution for the entire war economy, the demand schedules being based on the demands of the entire German sphere of power. In this connection imports and exports are to be considered. The entire planning is to be synchronized in advance with the participating departments and specialist offices, taking into account production requisites. The Planning Office will constantly have to summarize and to evaluate the necessary statistical material.
4. The Planning Office will have to submit to the Central Planning Board for decision the proposed assignment of manpower to the individual big sectors of employment (trade industry for war effort [gewerbliche Kriegswirtschaft], traffic, foodstuffs, etc.). It also has to evaluate statistically the carrying through of the assignments.
* * * * *
6. The Planning Office will have to advocate towards the Reich Ministry of Economics the requirements of war industry in connection with the establishment of import and export quotas.
It has to report constantly to the Central Planning Board about the state of imports essential for war economy.
* * * * *
II
* * * * *
4. The Planning Office has to evaluate statistically the industrial and war production existing within the power sphere of Greater Germany or of the states allied with the Reich; it has to develop out of that evaluation proposals for a common exchange of production in order to increase the initial war production.
* * * * *
[Signed] SPEER The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production Plenipotentiary General for Armament Tasks within the Four Year Plan
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3721-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT NO. 41-A[92]
TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, REGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL TAKEN AT NUERNBERG, GERMANY, 1030 HOURS TO 1210 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, BY JOHN J. MONIGAN JR., MAJ., CAC, OUSCC
MAJOR MONIGAN: Principally, what I am interested in are the functions and responsibilities of the Central Planning Board in their relationship to your office and their relationship to industry.
SAUCKEL: I believe that this Central Planning Board was founded about three months after my taking over my office. The Board was founded in accord with a law by the Fuehrer or just upon an agreement between the Fuehrer and Speer and Goering, I don’t know which. The leader and chairman of this Central Planning Board was Speer himself. It was founded to transfer the work from the Four Year Plan to Speer, I think, because Goering was already ill at that time, and there also were difficulties about which I am not informed. Speer always took on the job of making great changes in production and put it under his own direction. Constant members of this Central Planning Board were the State Secretary and Field Marshal Milch, and State Secretary Koerner. These three were responsible for the decisions of the Central Planning Board and for internal matters and they went through this office if they were worked out by other people inside the office. I was only called to this Central Planning Board when my task was discussed, and the demands were put before me and my agencies by Speer, the Four Year Plan [Office], as well as by Milch. The Fuehrer himself told me to fulfil these demands without question. In other words, if Speer asked me for a certain amount of workers, for instance, several thousand, I could not refuse him. The particular minister had to give the number to the Central Planning Board and that was the only place where the number of workers could be discussed. In the Central Planning Board it was decided how many workers I was able to supply to these various sections like Milch and Speer, agriculture, and so on. If it came to an argument, these discussions were brought before the Fuehrer and he then decided himself.
Q. Would the Central Planning Board, in their outline of workers to be provided for agriculture and for Speer and for Milch’s industries, etc., just give you the numbers of workers which they required, or would you get the final destination of the workers too, say panzers [tanks] and machine guns, and so on, from the Central Planning Board?
A. In general, I always got the numbers for the sections in large, except for Speer who always demanded individual allocations of workers to agriculture or mining; in other words, Speer always demanded a certain number of workers for a certain kind of work.
Q. Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in general for the broad field, but in Speer’s work you would get them allocated by industry, and so on. Is that right?
A. The others only received whatever was left over, because Speer told me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer and that I mainly am his man, he mentioned it very often, without reference to the countries involved. It was very unnatural, that process of doing these things. These smaller plants, instead of ordering their workers from the next higher echelons, gave their orders to the very highest, to Speer, who in turn handed them down to the lower ones and to me, and this was the reason for the Rotzettel (red slip) system which had to be fulfilled by me without question. In practice it came to this that if a factory actually didn’t need any workers but Speer demanded them for that factory I had to supply these workers without being able to discuss or to tell him that it would be a waste of manpower; I just had to do it because Speer had complete domination.
Q. When it was determined in the Central Planning Board that say a thousand workers would be required by Speer, how did these workers find their way from all over Germany and Europe into the Krupp factory, for instance?
A. The orders were given from higher echelons down to lower echelons; for instance, the transports were either turned over from one office to another or the lower echelons in Berlin, for instance, got orders to transfer certain men from one factory which happened to be in Berlin to another factory which was also in Berlin. This happened also through the cooperation among the various offices who were headed by Hildebrand. The orders were discussed in a so-called daily schedule of trains which was decided upon in all these meetings.
Q. Well, as I understand it, you would get a requirement for say a thousand workers for panzers, say; now, in Germany certain factories would be making tread, some would be making turrets, and some would be making other things. Now, of that thousand workers needed for tank production some would be working on treads and some would be working on other things. How did they get into the particular factories which were making the specific products?
A. This was accomplished by giving orders recklessly through the various offices. A factory, for instance, got an order to send 20 or 30 men to another place, and they were just ordered to go there. This was the reason for the Notdienstverordnung [Emergency Service Decree] where the workers were forced by a decree to obey any order which was given to them.
Q. After the workers were conscripted inside the Reich and outside, they would be worked according to certain skills and technical specialties, would they not?
A. As far as possible, they were used according to the profession they had been trained in.
Q. And the local Gau labor offices, etc., would have a list of all the workers according to their skills, would they not?
A. Yes, there were detailed files about this. This was the basic principle: There were various offices which only were concerned about a certain kind of trade or skill.
Q. So, when you got the request from the Central Planning Board for a hundred thousand men for tank production, would you, through your ministry, tell the various offices that you needed so many welders and so many machine tool people, etc., and then tell them how many of each specialty you wanted?
A. When I got these orders my assistants were always present and they in turn took down the individual numbers required for this kind of work. I also received rosters which pointed out in detail how many people were needed for certain productions and how many were needed in a certain place. There was also, besides the red-slip system, another one, which was a system used after the red-slip system. We called this the Dringlichkeitsstufen—that means the priority system for workers. These Dringlichkeitsstufen, which were divided according to place and kind of work, were given to me in the presence of my assistants and they in turn worked out these plans. The influence of Speer was so great that sometimes he specifically asked for certain specialists from a certain factory to be turned over to another place. It also happened that we were not even told about these things. If we were not able to supply him with workers from inside Germany, we had to take them from the other departments or from foreign countries. There was always a reserve of something like 500,000 people who went to schools where they were trained for the armament production.
Q. That was 500,000 German and foreign workers?
A. Yes.
Q. When a requirement was fixed for Speer or for Milch in the Central Planning Board and they called you in and said we need 500,000, or some number of workers, would they give at that time the breakdown of what kind of workers they wanted, or would they give a blanket request for 500,000 without the listing of specialties?
A. Naturally, they gave a detailed breakdown. For instance, they only asked for miners, but they also asked for specialists in that kind of work.
Q. The requirements would be stated in detail for the kind of work, not only whether it should be a mine worker, but, for instance, a locomotive engineer in a mine, or something like that, would they not?
A. Naturally, since there are many kinds of professions; I, for instance, put in charge of the mining President Dr. Gaertner who was always oriented about the different jobs which were required in that field of work.
Q. Then after you got the detailed specification of the qualifications of the workers desired, would you also get a statement as to what places they would work in, and so on?
A. This was just the remarkable thing about it, especially from Speer; factories were always mentioned and they were also mentioned by priority; for instance, the ones that always were working on the so-called Fuehrer orders had priority over the others. Speer actually controlled the small places, not step by step, but directly from the highest echelon.
Q. So that you would be informed at the Central Planning Board, at least for Speer’s factories, about the specialists and the place to which they were supposed to be sent, is that right?
A. The Central Planning Board determined only the numbers for a certain time, three months or so. These orders were then forwarded to the individual offices, who were working for me, from all kinds of industries; the Central Planning Board met only every two weeks or so.
Q. The Central Planning Board would decide that Speer would get so many hundred thousand and Milch would get so many hundred thousand, and that the agricultural program would get so many hundred thousand. Then, that was agreed upon, if they all agreed upon it among themselves in the Central Planning Board, and had no disputes regarding the number. But if there were disputes, then the Fuehrer would decide?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, after they decided a hundred thousand for Speer, then the section chiefs (in the rings for tank treads, and machine guns, etc.) would meet with your section later and say we need so many hundred thousand, we need 10,000 who are welders and 10,000 who are metal workers, etc., is that right?
A. Yes. A daily conference was held among the different offices where it was decided how many workers were needed for the individual industries. It did not occur that when a factory asked for a certain amount of men, it was like that: Speer said this factory has to be supplied with so and so many workers. In peacetime it was different.
Q. And the requirements of Speer were met as a matter of priority among all the other industries; first Speer and then the others?
A. Yes.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-1098 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 63
EXTRACTS FROM AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1946, REGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
A. 1. I, Fritz Sauckel, born in Hassfurt-Unterfranken on 27 October 1894 was honorary Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS and SA, Reich Governor [Reichsstatthalter], Commissioner for Reich Defense and Gauleiter of Thuringia. Since 1942 I was Plenipotentiary General for Manpower and from 1933 on I was a member of the Reichstag. I state upon oath the following facts which are known to me personally:
* * * * *
L. 1. The Central Planning Board intervened in the problem of foreign workers to the extent of determining priorities and in representing and demanding the requirements of the economics branches consolidated in the Central Planning Board. It also transmitted these demands to the Fuehrer. The competent gentlemen of the Central Planning Board at the same time of course represented their ministries as heads. Thus I am not in a position today to say whether Speer, for instance, spoke in one or the other capacity in connection with any special matter. At any rate the Central Planning Board determined the total labor requirements. In practice I only obtained labor for them.
2. I attended sessions of the Central Planning Board only when questions concerning the mobilization of labor were involved. Sometimes only my representatives, Dr. Timm, Landrat Berk, Stothfang, or Dr. Hildebrand, attended.
3. The competent gentlemen from Speer’s Ministry also attended. Speer had a labor mobilization department where the requirements of industry were collected and confirmed.
4. Milch produced the figures for aviation. The same was done by Speer in his sphere of activity. Speer and Milch, however, also exerted influence on the allocation of workers. How far this came within their capacity as members of the Central Planning Board I cannot say; in any case they did this in their ministerial capacity.
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 22 JULY 1942
Berlin 24 July 1942 Dr. Goe/W
Reich Minister Speer Minister’s Office
Secret _REPORT ON THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE “CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD” ON 22 JULY 1942_
Present:
Reich Minister Speer Field Marshal Milch State Secretary Koerner Kommerzialrat Roechling Reich Association Iron Dr. Rohland Reich Association Iron Von Bohlen und Halbach Reich Association Iron Dr. Langen Reich Association Iron Bergassessor Sohl Reich Association Iron Gauleiter Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Labor Mobilization State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry General Director Pleiger Reich Association Coal Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal Major General Gablenz Reich Air Ministry Colonel Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry Ministerial Director Gramsch 4 Year Plan Ministerial Advisor Normann 4 Year Plan Dr. Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Stellwaag Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Major Wagner Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Brigadier General Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Lieutenant Colonel Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Ministerial Advisor Dr. Wissmann Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Goerner Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions
* * * * *
Securing of food. A net influx of 1 million foreign workers is counted on. This number was not reached in the past months. Even with an influx of more than 1 million in the coming months, the 1-million peak will actually not be surpassed in view of current departures of workers. Food for this 1 million is secured.[93]
To what extent an improvement of the food situation, through a sharper hold on the production outside of Germany, could be accomplished.
* * * * *
Every day a train load of the forces recruited in the East will be directed to the coal mines until the figure of 6,000 is achieved. Prisoners of war are being obtained, at present, from camps in the General Government. 51,000 prisoners of war in the Senne Camp. In the district east of the General Government there are 74,000 prisoners of war available. Up till now an elimination quota of 50 percent of unemployable people has been reckoned with in the allocations to coal mining. It is considered necessary that not too high demands should be placed on the choice of prisoners of war. The Miner’s Union doctors [Knappschaftsaerzte] are to be informed that a different standard is to be established for the prisoners of war than for German miners.
For the consecutive order in which the prisoners of war are to be put to work, it will be laid down, that before the metal workers are chosen, the coal mining in the first place and requirements for the loading and unloading commands in the second place are to be considered.
Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the procuring of the Russian prisoners of war from the camps.
[Typewritten] DR. ING. GOERNER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE SEVENTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 28 OCTOBER 1942
Berlin, 30 October 1942
The Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan Central Planning Board
_REPORT ON THE 17TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 28 OCTOBER 1942, 0930 HOURS_
Increase of Coal Production Allocation of Labor
Coal production in the Ruhr district has increased to 390,000 tons per day. Any further increase depends on whether the requirements for labor are being met. About 104,000 men are required. Furthermore 7,800 men—originally 16-17,000 requirements having been brought down by rationalization—are needed for the supplying industry, 6,800 of these for the machine industry. 5,000 more unskilled workers are furthermore required to secure the transport of mine-timber which is essential for reason of variety [Sortimentsgruenden].
The intake capacity of the mining industry for the month of November is 44,000 prisoners of war, of whom 25,000 are for the Ruhr district, and 12,600 eastern workers, 7,500 of whom are for the Ruhr district. Total requirements so far amount to 191,000 laborers of whom 90,700 were wanted by the Ruhr District. Up to 24 October a total of 123,000 was allocated. These numbers are still to be checked up by the Reich Association Coal (RVK) and Mr. Sauckel.
According to the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, the following number of prisoners of war is at present at hand.
Within the Reich (on the way and in camp) 30,000 Remainder of prisoners of war (outstanding from a total of 60,000 150,000 and promised up to the beginning of December) At camps in the General Government 15,000
Of these the following can be regarded as available up to 1 December:
Within the Reich 15,000 Of the remaining prisoners of war 10,000 From the General Government 7,500 ——— Total about 32,000
Therefore, as compared to the required 44,000, there is a deficit of about 12,000. Moreover, 10,000 civilian laborers from the East can be put up by exchanges from the agricultural sector which is 2,000 less than required so that the November deficit amounts to 14,000 and, in comparison with the total requirements of the mining industry of 104,000, there is a deficit of 62,000. The deficit increases by the smaller number of prisoners of war the size of which is still to be ascertained by the Commissioner of Labor.
The mining industry is in a position to use any amount of eastern labor instead of prisoners of war. Therefore, it is to get preference at the combing-out of the agricultural sector. There is no objection to a temporary accommodation of eastern labor at prisoner-of-war camps (without barbed wire, etc.).
The requirements of the supply industry are to be met by the Red Label method [Rotzettelverfahren]. Constructors are to be provided by canvassing at the French prisoner-of-war camps for officers.
[Typewritten] DR. STEFFLER
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Present:
Reich Minister Speer Field Marshal Milch State Secretary Koerner Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Staatsrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Brig. Gen. Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Lt. Col. v. Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Herr Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Oberberghauptmann Gabel Reich Economic Ministry Colonel Dr. Krull Reich Economic Ministry Oberbergrat Otto Reich Economic Ministry State Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Traffic Ministry Staatsrat Heinberg Reich Traffic Ministry Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan Min. Rat Steffler Four Year Plan Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation Oberreg. Rat Hildebrand Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation Gen. Dir. Pleiger Reich Association Coal Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal Dir. Winkaus Plenipotentiary for Mining Requirements
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF TWENTY-FIRST CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 30 OCTOBER 1942
_EXCERPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 21ST CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor supply and direction of labor held on 30 October 1942, afternoon, at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munitions.
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3
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SAUCKEL: There is but one possibility, and that is, that the moment the Wehrmacht takes prisoners in operational territory, they are to be immediately turned over to us. We will move them away much faster than the Wehrmacht.
MILCH: The correct thing to do would be to have all Stalags transferred to you by order of the Fuehrer. The Wehrmacht takes prisoners and as soon at it relinquishes them, the first delivery goes to your organization. Then everything will be in order.
SAUCKEL: Yes, but we do not have sufficient personnel for guarding the prisoners.
(MILCH: The Wehrmacht should have to provide you with that!)
SAUCKEL: As soon as prisoners of war are taken, they should be placed at our disposal and we would then allocate them in a fair manner. However, with the present method we get nothing or only a fraction of what the Wehrmacht had promised us, although the prisoners had been taken by the Wehrmacht.
TIMM: We can hardly hope to achieve that, since this might have something to do with the convention concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.
MILCH: The man who acts there for you can wear a uniform all right and be a soldier. Only his superior will not be Herr Reinecke but Herr Sauckel.
For psychological reasons emphasis should be placed on first of all covering the requirements of the Wehrmacht branches, without other considerations. The feeling, we don’t get it anyway, has gradually permeated our whole air force industry—and I heard the same about the army. I will admit that these gigantic allocations are completely misjudged. For example, in the Luftwaffe where from an original allocation of 480,000, a balance of 150,000 was left over [per Saldo uebrig]. The plants always look only at the balance [Saldo]. However, there are many plants also who have suffered an actual decrease in manpower, especially in a young industry like ours, which is occupied with the manufacture of very special products. This industry has many young people, of whom many again have been drafted into the Wehrmacht. This drafting is done in such an idiotic way that one actually has to feel ashamed. All three experimenting engineers working on a development which may have an important bearing on the outcome of the war are simply drafted. They are not sent to the front or into training but sit around in the back somewhere and are guarding some camp. No consideration whatsoever is given to individual cases. Of course the plants then call for replacements. The masses cannot fill these breaches, and qualified replacements we cannot supply at all. Herr Dr. Werner, for example, writes a letter to Herr Schieber of which he forwards a copy to me and which states that production figures established in the delivery schedules can no longer be met, owing to the fact that for weeks partially even for months, no manpower has been allocated, and that even current withdrawals cannot be replaced by the labor offices [Arbeitsaemter]. The fact, that we can no longer meet the demands of the rising production, that backlogs are increasing more and more, fills him with rising apprehension. He then goes into details, but always reverts to the same conclusion: everything might be accomplished, we could even get the necessary material; in the final analysis we fail, however, in one important aspect in connection with our whole armament program—the allocation of manpower. If only we had, if only we had—thus it goes all day and in every conference.
I am convinced that many people are beginning to put in fake requests and exaggerate their requirements. There is only one way to straighten out this affair. In my department, I do it this way: if for months a spare part cannot be found, the entire front begins to hoard this article; so, for instance, the tail skid of a Ju 52. Then we proceeded to manufacture triple the amount of the expected requirements, yet no tail skids were available. Ordnance stock piles were filled with it; but they did not issue any. I then said: We will now manufacture nothing but tail skids until we hear shouts not to send any more. Thus, an affair like that gets finally straightened out. And here likewise we must say for once: We will supply the required laborers to the industry, if necessary by depriving other fields. Agriculture, at the moment can spare laborers; it does not need them from 15 November to 15 March of next year. It is just a waste to have to feed them. Only a small number will be needed for the procurement of wood. Thus we are able to generously help industry and later on again replenish agriculture. At the same time we have the advantage of getting fairly well-fed people. As Herr Timm recently explained, prisoners of war from the Ukraine would not serve our purpose; they could not regain their physical strength on what they get to eat in the industry. Even supplying them with better food than we give to our own people would not be sufficient to get them beyond a still weakened condition. In agriculture they get additional food. Don’t muzzle the mouth of a beast when food lies all around it. This is also of advantage to prisoners of war and workers from the East.
However, we have to finally do away with the general feeling: we have nothing and we want yet anything; we have been forsaken by God and the Fuehrer; constantly more and more is demanded of us; how can we still believe in this great program? We can only carry it out if we have such faith in it, as is spoken of in the Bible. In January we started with a monthly production of 2,000 engines; today we have reached 4,000, and in a year and a half I must reach 14,000. That of course is a gigantic achievement for a month. Every engine has at least 1,200 h.p. If in measurements of horsepower I compare the present with the former World War, then the present achievement is 40 times as great. What an immense amount of manpower was available at that time for an industry so totally different from ours! Yet today we must come up to more than three times that, which we have already done. That means, that in airplane engines alone we have to achieve 135 to 140 times as much as we did in the World War. Dr. Werner who is responsible for the engine industry proposed how this can be done. He said: We must apply a mass production scale everywhere, or else we will not accomplish it. He has very progressive ideas in this field. With the airplane engine, it can be done for sure. Crankshafts and connecting rods, etc., we can produce on a mass production scale. Today we manufacture 40,000 connecting rods. However, we still have no machines today that assemble these products individually on the assembly line. The Americans have such machines. We are lacking about 10 construction engineers and 5 mechanics; they just simply cannot be procured. One must for once satisfy the needs of the people again. I have always put them off until November and told them that Sauckel would produce the necessary labor from agriculture.
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SPEER: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times and the news will soon go around.
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SAUCKEL: We talked of taking the waiters out of the restaurants in Germany. But in this respect we have absolutely an abundance in France, the General Government and the Protectorate. As long as we have not skimmed that off, we could not take the responsibility towards the German people for such a measure. Again a cable of the Foreign Minister has burst into my recent negotiations in France stating that under no circumstances should the Ministry Laval be put into peril. The Fuehrer has said: If the French show no good will, then I shall retake the 800,000 French PW’s. If they show good will, then the French wives can follow their husbands to Germany and work there. Of course, he said, I have an interest that Laval remains in power. The Ministry Laval will remain, it depends only on us. And Laval cannot go back after he has reproduced in his speech and spoken before the French passages which he has taken verbally out of my appeal. Only Pétain could bring him to fall. I wish to draw your attention to the fact, however, that in France there is a surplus of young men all of whom we could use in Germany. If we expect our people to accept severest restrictions then we cannot admit such luxuries in Paris as, e.g., small restaurants with bands of 25 musicians and two waiters per table. I am firmly convinced, if we are brutal also against the others then we can extract quite a considerable number of men out of the General Government—I sent an efficient man, President Struwe, over there—and of the Protectorate. This need not interfere with the armament industry over there. There is, therefore, no fear that the demand could not be met.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 3 NOVEMBER 1942
Secret _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 23D CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Concerning the fixing of iron quotas, on 3 November 1942, 1600 hours in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin, Pariser Platz 3
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PLEIGER: * * * For the physical strain on the miners, who practically work two Sunday shifts each month, is such that they could not stand it for another six months. In other words—this is the important point—the quota of approximately 95,600 men is still lacking and must be assigned to work now at last; it was promised to me at one time. The gentlemen of the Ruhr tell me: We have our huts ready. Some of them are not completely furnished, and I reproached the people for it. They answered, however: But you promised us workers for about half a year. We have always been ahead with our huts. How can you reproach us now, our huts were not ready. The workers assigned to us will be taken care of. I would be very thankful if Sauckel would be induced to assign to us the quota of workers.
SPEER: He received the instruction in the last conference of the Central Planning Board to assign workers first of all to the coal-mining industry as well as to the iron-producing industry, for you the amount of 44,000 plus 12,000, plus 7,500 for the feeder industry, plus 5,000 for pit props. The same holds true for Mr. Rohland.
PLEIGER: In our conferences it must always be taken as a basis that the Reichsbahn, with regard to the allocation of cars, is at least in the same position as they were last year.
(SPEER: That’s pretty bad.)
—No, it allocated over 80,000 cars in December.
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SPEER: Can you give me by name any smelters or other people which could be taken out?
(ROHLAND: Yes.)
This would still be another 50 or 100, I guess.
ROHLAND: I figure about 40 men per Martin furnace. If we take away 20 or 15—let’s say 20—as trained Martin furnace smelters, we would have 300 men. 300 smelters could help us a lot. But when will they come?
SPEER: Then we could deceive the French about the industry in such a way, as if we would release among the prisoners of war the rollers and smelters—they have—if they give us their names.
ROHLAND: We opened our own office in Paris. In other words, you mean the French should report the smelters who are prisoners of war in Germany?
MILCH: I would simply say: You will get two people for one of this kind.
SPEER: The French firms know exactly who is a smelter among the prisoners of war. There you should make it appear, as if they would be released. They give us the names and then we take them out. Try it.
ROHLAND: That’s an idea.
MILCH: We in the Luftwaffe and airplane industry will also try to find out: Who is a roller, smelter, or furnace mason.
ROHLAND: But by the time the people arrive, the quarter of the year will be over.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1943
Secret!
Top Secret State Matter
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE[94] OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Concerning Labor Supply on 16 February 1943 at 1600 hrs. at the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions 3, Pariser Platz, Berlin
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TIMM: I should like to say something about the labor supply possibilities. Perhaps you will permit me to emphasize the negative side a little. The greatest difficulties result from the fact that the supply of labor outstanding could not be fully dispatched from the East, but came in in ever diminishing numbers. One may say that they have almost become completely exhausted. Eastern laborers during the last six weeks arrived only in smaller numbers than in former times, so that they can hardly be included to an appreciable amount on the credit side of the supply account. In any case their numbers are small. The foremost reason is that in former months most transports were dispatched from the Ukraine while the main recruitment areas were those which in the meantime have become operational areas, or even are no longer in our hands. The forecasts we made applied to a large extent to the transport of people from the Caucasus district, the Kuban, from areas like Stalingrad. We prepared measures which should enable us to draw more eastern workers again during the following months. I venture to think that we should be able, on a conservative calculation, to transfer during the month of March between 150,000 and 200,000 laborers from the East to the West.
(SPEER: Including or excluding those needed for agriculture?)
Including those needed for agriculture. But in my opinion it will be necessary to apply much pressure, since just those districts are concerned which have been pacified to a certain extent, and for the same reason will not be very much inclined to release labor. This is calculated on the assumption that some labor has to be released also from the eastern and northern parts of the East.
The second area, capable of releasing a considerable amount of labor is the General Government and that for the January estimate which has been drawn up with particular caution as I again wish to emphasize. We expect that the figures will be surpassed rather than not reached. I think we can expect a number of 40,000, of which, it is true, a part will have to be given to agriculture, if we intend no more than to cover the losses which we had to inflict last autumn.
Beyond this it ought to be possible in my opinion to employ within the Reich, and especially for the mining industry, part of the Polish Building Service. I venture to think one ought to enlarge this organization in such a way that more age groups than so far are called up for it, since this procedure is functioning. The younger age groups which in fact are especially suited for mining could be dispatched to the Reich. In this case the supervisors who are provided for the greatest part by the Building Service, will be needed only in very small numbers in the Reich.
The next area would be the Protectorate on which I cannot make a final statement today. We have been promised for the month of March about 10,000 laborers. But I am of the opinion that some loosening-up is possible. The Plenipotentiary will soon in a personal visit take in hand the possibility of this loosening-up.
France is included in the account with 100,000 laborers for March. Messages which I received permit us to hope that this number will be increased in the middle of March. Belgium is included with 40,000, Holland with 30,000, Slovakia with 20,000, who, it is true, are exclusively suited for agriculture, since their share of individual workers has been completely delivered. This item consists exclusively of agricultural laborers, owing to a state treaty. For the remaining part of the foreign areas I included another 10,000. This amounts altogether to 400,000 laborers who should arrive in March. One might be entitled to add for the last month altogether 10,000 prisoners of war. These are men to be drawn from the East. It can be expected that this number might under certain conditions be surpassed, since the High Command intends especially for operational reasons, to take the prisoners of war back to the Reich, particularly from the areas threatened by the enemy.
A former item concerns the fluctuation of labor which certainly amounts to about 100,000 laborers. Then there are items which at the moment cannot be estimated—the yield from the threatened areas and from the “Stoppage-action”. Here I cannot venture to name final figures, but I hope to be able to do so next month.
SAUCKEL: Of course, we regret very much that last autumn we were unable to recruit as much as we would have liked in the areas which now are again in enemy hands. This is partly due to the fact that we were not assisted in the degree we had expected. Moreover we were not able to effect the removal of the civil population which had been planned. These events are an urgent reminder of the fact that it is necessary to employ foreign laborers at once and in great numbers in Germany proper and in the actual armaments industry. You may be certain that we wish to achieve this. We have not the slightest interest in creating difficulties for an armaments office, even for those working for German interest abroad, by taking labor away from them to an unreasonable extent. But on this occasion I should like to ask you to try and understand our procedure. We Germans surely have sent to the front between 50 and 75 percent of our skilled workers. A part of them has been killed while the nations subjugated by us need no longer shed their blood. Thus they can preserve their entire capacity with regard to skilled workers, inasmuch as they have not been transferred to Germany which is the case only for a much smaller percentage than all of us supposed, and in fact they do use them partly for manufacturing things which are not in the least important for the German war economy. If we proceed energetically against this abuse, I ask you to give me credit for so much reason that I do not intend to damage the foreign interests of the German armaments industry. The quality of the foreign worker is such that it cannot be compared with that of the German worker. But even then I intend to create a similar proportion between skilled and workers trained for their job, as it exists in Germany by force of tradition, since it has come about that we had to send men to the front in much larger numbers than we requested France or any other country to do. Moreover we shall endeavor increasingly to bring about on a generous scale the adaptation of the French, Polish, and Czech workers. I do not see for the moment any necessity for limiting the use of foreign labor. The only thing I ask for is that we understand each other, so that the immense difficulties and friction between the respective authorities disappear and the program drawn up by us will by no means be frustrated by such things.
There are without a doubt still enough men in France, Holland, Belgium, the Protectorate, and the General Government to meet our labor demands for the next months. I confess that I expect more success from such a procedure with respect to heavier work or for work where shifts of 10 or more hours are customary, than from relying on the use of German women and men exclusively. We shall have better success by proceeding this way provided the foreign workers still obey, which remains a risk we always run, than by using weaker German women and girls as labor in places of very important armament work, where foreigners may be used for security reasons. * * *
* * * The situation in France is this; after I and my assistants had succeeded after difficult discussions in inducing Laval to introduce the Service Act this act has now been enlarged, owing to our pressure so that already yesterday three French age groups have been called up. We are now, therefore, legally and with the assistance of the French Government entitled to recruit laborers in France from three age groups, whom we can use in French factories in the future, but of whom we may choose some for our use in Germany and send them to Germany. I think in France the ice is now broken. According to reports received they now have begun to think about a possible break-through by the Bolshevists and the dangers which thereby threaten Europe. The resistance which the French Government has hitherto shown is diminishing. Within the next days I shall go to France in order to set the whole thing into motion, so that the losses in the East may be somewhat balanced by increasing recruitment and calling-up in France.
If we receive comprehensive lists in time, we shall, I think, be able to cover all demands by dispatching in March 800,000 laborers.
SPEER: Recruitment abroad as such is supported by us. We only fear very much that the skilled workers extracted from the occupied countries do not always reach the appropriate factories in Germany. It might certainly be better if we acted in such a way that the parent firms of Germany which work with the French and Czech factories would comb out the foreign workers more than before for their own use.
SAUCKEL: We made an agreement with Field Marshal Milch. You will get the factories which are urgently needed for your airplane motors, etc.; these will be completely safeguarded. In the same way I promised Admiral of the Fleet Doenitz[95] today that the U-boat repair firms proper are absolutely safeguarded. We shall even be able to provide our own armament factories on French soil with labor extracted from French factories, in the main from the unoccupied territory where there still are metal works which have their full complement of skilled workers without even having been touched so far.
HILDEBRAND: May I point out at this point that we have to figure that we shall be deprived of the Italian workers this year. This according to present discussions, concerns 300,000 men altogether, or 15 to 20,000 a month. If we deduct the first installment, the remaining ones to a great part are just highly skilled metal workers.
SAUCKEL: This is a request of the Fuehrer, but he has not yet finally decided.
HILDEBRAND: But we have been told to be prepared to lose these men.
SPEER: We ourselves quite support the combing-out abroad. On the other hand we must be entitled—and this was agreed—to exclude or prefer particular kinds of work, e.g., the armor factories. In France we are more and more turning towards giving up finishing processes and stressing the subcontracting. It is the foundries and similar works, e.g., for the use of the aluminum industry, which we wish to use to capacity. We could force the production of Opel, so that in this case Peugeot who manufacture the forged parts for Opel, the parent firm, might demand more labor for this while the rest of their workers would be taken over by Opel.
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 22 APRIL 1943
Dr. Jaenicke Secret
Top Secret State Matter _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 36TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Concerning 1943-44 coal economy plan. Held on Thursday, 22 April 1943, 1550 hours at the Festival Hall at the Zoo, Jebenstr.
* * * * *
SPEER: Throughout the winter we have seen that in the last instance it is coal which provides the basis for all plans we wish to execute in other respects, and most of you are also aware of our intention to increase the manufacture of iron. Here also it will again be coal which in the last instance will tip the scales, whether or not we shall be able to accomplish this increase of iron production. Seen from the Central Planning Board, we are of the opinion that the demand for coal as well as the demand for iron ought to be coordinated in a separate plan, and that this plan ought to receive about the same degree of urgency as the Krauch plan, and that with regard to labor, the conditions required for the execution of that plan must be established. Perhaps Mr. Timm will be able to state how he expects the question of the miners to be developed; unfortunately the miners cannot be taken from the German reservoir, in their place we shall have to use very strong foreigners.
TIMM: At the moment, 69,000 men are needed for hauling that coal. We want to cover this by finding within the Reich 23,000 men, viz., healthy prisoners of war, etc., who are especially suitable for mining—and by dispatching 50,000 Poles from the General Government. Out of these about 30,000 men have been supplied up to 24 April, so that about 39,000 men are still outstanding for January to April. The demand for May has been reported to us at 35,700. The difficulties existed especially with regard to recruitment in the General Government, since in every district surrounding Germany there is an extraordinary resistance to recruitment. In all countries we have to change over more or less to registering the men by age groups and to conscripting them in age groups. They do appear for registration as such, but as soon as transport is available, they do not come back so that the dispatch of the men has become more or less a question for the police.
Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily serious. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against the administration established by us is very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers, and it was just in the last two or three weeks that some of them were shot dead, e.g., the head of the labor office in Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done with the best will remain extremely difficult unless police reinforcements are at hand.
* * * * *
SPEER: These [women] we can use in the Reich. There are a great number of Russian PW’s and laborers who are employed at places where they need not be employed. There can be an exchange. The only thing is to do this with unskilled workers, and not to take the workers from the industry where they were trained with difficulty.
KEHRL: Where we are late in completion of a task, or where we lose an opportunity, we can make up for it. But any coal which we cannot haul at once is definitely lost for use in this war. This is why we cannot do enough to force the allotment to the pits.
SPEER: But not by forcible actions in smashing what we toilsomely built.
(KEHRL: We need not do that!)
You ought to add the conscripted labor.
TIMM: We must endeavor to get German men for working at the coal-face.
KEHRL: We subsist on foreigners who live in Germany.
TIMM: These men are concentrated within a very small area. Otherwise there might be trouble in this sector.
SPEER: There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the Russian PW’s have been distributed, and this statement is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 30 percent. I always complained about this.
TIMM: The highest percentage of PW’s are Frenchmen, and one ought not to forget that it is difficult to employ them at the coal-face. The number of Russians living within the Reich is small.
ROHLAND: In the mines one should exclusively use eastern people, not western ones.
SPEER: The western men collapse!
* * * * *
SPEER: In any case we ought to force the coal production with all our power. I now have here a statement on the distribution of the Soviet prisoners. There are 368,000 altogether. Of these are: 101,000 in agriculture; 94,000 in the mining industry—who are not available in any case; 15,000 in the building materials industry; 26,000 in iron and metal production where they cannot be extracted either; 29,000 in the manufacture of iron, steel, and metal goods; 63,000 in the manufacture of machines, boilers, and cars, and similar appliances, which means in armaments industry; and 10,000 in the chemical industry. Agriculture has received by far the most of them, and the men employed there could in the course of time be exchanged for women. The 90,000 Russian PW’s employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest part skilled men. If you can extract 8-10,000 men from there, it would already be the limit.
KEHRL: Would it not be possible to add Serbians, etc.?
SOGEMEIER: We ought not to mix too much.
ROHLAND: For God’s sake, no Serbians! We had very bad experiences with mixing.
* * * * *
SPEER: Everything depends on the amount of the influx from abroad.
SCHIEBER: If anyway nothing arrives, the mines certainly will get nothing.
TIMM: Gauleiter Sauckel is perfectly convinced that the transports will be on their way within a short time. Now the front has been consolidated at last.
SCHIEBER: We ought to be grateful that the weather has allowed the farmer to keep things going in some way despite the little labor being available to him. For the farmer, the coal supply is just as important as for the whole of the armaments industry. When we discuss tomorrow the nitrogen problem we shall see the same; our first need is coal.
KOERNER: On 1 April we had in agriculture a deficit of about 600,000 laborers. It had been planned to cover it by supplying labor from the East, mainly women. These laborers will first have to be supplied until other laborers are released from agriculture. We are just entering the season where the heaviest work in the fields has to be done, for which many laborers are necessary. Much labor is needed for the hoeing of the fruits, and it is to be hoped that this year the harvest can be started early which would be rendered much more difficult if an exchange of labor would have to take place.
* * * * *
MILCH: We ought to except certain areas of the Protectorate to which the orders are being directed, and extract nothing there until a surplus is found out subsequently. For the time being it cannot be ascertained. There are enough other areas of the Protectorate which are not affected by the industry plan and some labor could be extracted from them at once. We ought to name the places which are excepted from our action.
TIMM: In this the authorities on the other side ought to participate; they are in the best position to tell the places from where nothing must be extracted.
MILCH: If one proceeds as I proposed, and Timm agreed to it, no damage can be done. This ought to be done in any case. For the rest I completely agree; we must now supply the mines with labor. The greatest part of labor which we can supply from the East will indeed be women. But the eastern women are quite accustomed to agricultural work, and especially to the type of work which has to be done these coming weeks, the hoeing and transplanting of turnips, etc. The women are quite suitable for this. One thing has to be considered: first you must supply agriculture with the women, then you can extract the men, laborer for laborer. It is not the right thing if first the men are taken away and the farmers are left without labor for 4 to 6 weeks. If the women arrive after such time they arrive too late.
SPEER: Beyond this we are prepared to release from all parts of the war economy, in exchange for women, any Russian PW’s or other Russian who is employed as auxiliary laborer.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
REPORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 23 JUNE 1943
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Central Planning Board Z.P. 148
Berlin W 8, 24 June 1943 Leipziger Strasse 3
24 copies, 17th copy
Top Secret State Matter _REPORT ON THE 42D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 23 JUNE 1943, 1600 HOURS_
Coal situation
The manpower situation in the coal mining industry, particularly in the hard coal mining industry, is still unsatisfactory, and necessitates an extension of the measures decided upon at the 36th Conference of the Central Planning Board, held on 22 April 1943.
The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations.
1. The present drive, which is to be carried out throughout the German economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of eastern workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50,000 workmen are expected to be made available up to the end of July 1943. This drive is to be accelerated.
Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the Fuehrer—RVK [Reich Association Coal] and GBA [Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation] submitting the necessary figures for the statement to the Fuehrer—that 200,000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the chiefs of the army groups [Heeresgruppenchefs]. The prisoners will be selected on the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation will take charge of them there and then. Provisions are to be made for an extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for manpower, which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943.
The manpower needed by the mining transport industry [Bergbau-Zubringer-Industrie] and by the iron-producing industry may be supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal mining industry have previously been adjusted.
The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a premium system. For this purpose, the present pay restrictions are to be lifted and the manager [Betriebsfuehrer] be allowed to distribute amongst the workers, according to his discretion, one Reichmark per head per day as premium for particular services rendered.
Furthermore, care will be taken that workmen can exchange these premiums, which will be paid out in camp money [Lagergeld] for goods. It is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g., sunflower seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily use, etc.
The Reich Food Ministry in conjunction with the Reich Association Coal and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs will clarify the question whether, beyond that, something else can be changed as far as rations are concerned.
2. Equally, in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more securely to the various factories by means of the distribution of additional ration cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the General Government and the occupied territories in the East. The output demanded of the General Government is to be fixed at the proposed amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then be rated accordingly.
[Typewritten signature] DR. GRAMSCH Present:
Reich Minister Speer Field Marshal Milch Staatstrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Oberbuergermeister Liebel Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Major General Waeger Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Ing. Groener Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions President Kehrl Reich Economic Ministry Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation (GBA) Staatsrat Pleiger Reich Association Coal (RVK) Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal (RVK) Dr. Rosenkranz Reich Association Coal (RVK)
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1944
Secret! _STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Concerning Supply of Labor held on 16 February 1944, 10 o’clock, in the Reich Air Ministry
Present: Milch (for Central Planning Board), Kehrl, Backe, etc.
MILCH: The armament industry employs foreign workers to a large extent, according to the latest figures—40 percent. The new allocations of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation consist mostly of foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up. Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95 percent and higher. Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12 percent by German men and women. 50-60 Ju 52’s which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month. Only 6-8 German men are working on this machine, the rest are Ukrainian women who have beaten all the records of trained workers.
* * * * *
The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s trustworthy hands who will make them work, all right. This is very important for educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who would likewise feel inclined to shirk.
* * * * *
* * * It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners unless we compel them by piece work or have the possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not doing their bit. But if the foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him, at once there is a terrible uproar, the man is put into prison, etc. There are sufficient officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up for human rights instead of war production. I, too, am all for human rights. But if a Frenchman says, “You fellows will all be hanged and the chief of the factory will be beheaded first”, and if then the chief says, “I am going to hit him”, then he is in a mess. He is not protected, but the “poor fellow” who said that to him is protected. I have told my engineers, “I am going to punish you if you don’t hit such a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I shall see to it that nothing happens to you.” This is not yet sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all plant leaders. I should like to see the man who stays my arm because I can take care of anybody who does so. If the little plant leader does that he is put into a concentration camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the factory for the others to see. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
REPORT ON THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1944
[Marginal notes] St. 10-44 VII Top Secret
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Central Planning Board Z.P. 7 g. Rs. Pl. 030053
Berlin, 18 February 1944 W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3
Secret 31 copies, 3d copy [Milch’s initial] M _REPORT ON THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 16 FEBRUARY 1944, ON LABOR ALLOCATION 1944_
The purpose of this conference is to determine the labor needs and resources for the 1st quarter and the whole year of 1944. The session is opened by the discussion of the data submitted by the planning office (see enclosures 1-9). On the basis of the planning office’s estimate of the requirements (enclosure 9) these turn out, after discussion with the individual allottees, to be the following:
First Second-Fourth Quarter-44 Quarter-44 Total in 1000’s Agriculture 70 (1) 70 (2) 140 Forestry and Timber Industry 40 (3) . . (4) 40 Armament and War Production 544 (5) 3,000 (6) 3,544 Air Raid Damages 100 50 150 (7) Communications 85 (8) 265 350 Distribution . . . . . . Public Administration 62 (9) . . 62 Wehrmacht Administration 130 . . 130 ——— ——— ——— 1,031 3,385 4,416
(1) Not including the 200,000 of whom 100,000 each will flow back from industry and forestry.
(2) Not including the demand for seasonal workers amounting usually to 62,000.
(3) 25,000 for forestry and 15,000, including 8,000 women for the timber industry, as against a peacetime requirement of 150,000 male and 40,000 female seasonal workers, although now considerably increased production (1943:70 million cubic meters; 1944:80 million cubic meters) and particularly heavy combing-out through draft.
(4) Starting autumn 1944, the usual necessary transfer from agriculture.
(5) Found to be a priority requirement for February with the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation.
(6) Starting March, 200,000 monthly as compensation for fluctuations—2 million for period March to December 1944. Plus compensation for return to agriculture 100,000 (cp. note 1) including 30,000 retrained workers who perhaps will have to be covered by an over-all exchange system and about 900,000 as replacement for draftees, as reserves for increased programs, etc., making about 3 million men all told for the period from March to December 1944.
(7) 150,000 is the minimum requirement in addition to the hitherto assigned 70,000 OT, 100,000 GB construction and 118,000 workmen to the local and district assignments and 42,000 workers centrally assigned. The mobile formations are to be increased and sometimes to be reinforced by local help, particularly by people unemployed through bombings.
(8) Including 75,000 for the Reichsbahn, 1,000 for inland navigation, 7,000 for motor traffic, 2,000 for minor railways.
(9) Including 27,000 for the Reichspost and 35,000 for the Red Cross.
In this estimate, real fluctuation (departure from work) as well as fictitious fluctuation (change of work location) are taken into account. Fictitious fluctuation is still to be variously estimated in the various branches. For the armament section it is estimated at 50 percent of the total fluctuation (cp. note 6). The total requirements of approximately 4.4 million would thus decrease by up to 1 million. The above estimate of requirements ought, therefore, in no case to exceed the requirements determined at the Fuehrer’s conference on 4 January 1944, comprising only the real fluctuation and amounting to 4,05 million namely:
1. Maintenance of the status of activity in the whole of 2,5 million the war economy including agriculture, taking into account the replacement of deficiencies due to drafts into the Wehrmacht, deaths, illness, expiration of contract, etc. (real fluctuation) 2. For additional armament tasks and removal of bottleneck 1,30 million situations in armament plants 3. Air raid defense constructions, etc. 0,25 million ————— Total 4,05 million
Kehrl is charged with the task of ascertaining the magnitude of real and fictitious fluctuation, and as a basis thereto, on behalf of the Central Planning Board, together with the competent offices, to determine the concepts, “real and fictitious fluctuation,” furthermore the concepts, assignment, reserves [Aufstockung], etc., in a uniform terminology which will be binding for all agencies concerned.
The following resources are the GBA’s [Sauckel’s] estimated coverage of the requirements:
1. With the utmost efforts, other workers can be mobilized 500,000 from German domestic reserves (getting hold of labor unemployed as result of enemy air raids, compulsory registration, shutting down, combing out measures) 2. Recruitment of Italian labor numbering at the rate of 1,500,000 250,000 a month from January to April—1,000,000 and 500,000 from May to December 3. Recruitment of French labor at equal monthly rates, 1,000,000 from 1 February to 31 December 1944 (approx. 91,000 per month) 4. Recruitment of labor from Belgium 250,000 5. Recruitment of labor from the Netherlands 250,000 6. Recruitment of labor from the eastern territories, 600,000 occupied former Soviet territories, Baltic states, and General Government 7. Recruitment of workers from other European countries 100,000 ————— Approximately 4,2 million
In addition, the following possibilities are seen for the mobilization of more reserves: Intensification of employment of women (in England, 61 percent of women between 14 and 65 are conscripted for the war economy, in Germany only 46 percent) especially in agriculture (more stringent application of the Goering ordinance), reduction in number of domestic assistants, reduction of the idle classes (Sauckel-Kehrl-Himmler, in this respect regional round-ups are to be carried out separately for foreigners, men and women) improvement of the sanitary system (saving up to 3 percent), working out of equitable contractual wages with incentive wage premiums. The planning office undertakes in common with the GBA [Sauckel] the examination of these possibilities for an intensified mobilization. Kehrl is moreover commissioned to make a general examination of the question of an improvement of industrial labor assignment. Everyone concerned will transmit their data on faulty assignment of workers to the planning office. If necessary, this question will be handled at a special session of the Central Planning Board.
For the 1st quarter of 1944 the following resources (including a fictitious fluctuation of about 50,000 per month) are given by the estimate of the GBA [Sauckel]:
Assignments in January 145,000 Assignments February-March 500,000 ———— Approximately 650,000
The adjustment of requirements and coverage will be effected at another session of the Central Planning Board.
[Signed] STEFFLER Present:
Field Marshal Milch State Secretary Koerner President Kehrl Ministerial Councillor Steffler Maj. Gen. Waeger Ministry for Armament and Munitions Teuscher Ministry for Armament and Munitions KVV Chief Bosch Ministry for Armament and Munitions Ministerial Councillor Wissmann Ministry for Armament and Munitions Lt. Col. Schaede Ministry for Armament and Munitions Provincial Counsellor Berk Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation State Secretary Hayler Reich Economic Ministry General of Engineers Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry Staff Engineer Kaufmann Reich Air Ministry Staff Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Transport Ministry Ministerial Director Hassenpflug Reich Transport Ministry Ministerial Councillor Hennig Reich Transport Ministry State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry State Secretary Alpers Reich Office for Forestry Prof. Abetz Reich Office for Forestry State Secretary Gutterer Propaganda Ministry Mayor Ellgering Propaganda Ministry Gen. Weidemann OKW Major Koch OKW
Distribution:
Reich Minister Speer 1st copy Reich Minister Funk 2d copy Field Marshal Milch 3d copy State Secretary Koerner 4th copy President Kehrl 5th copy & 6th Engineer Goerner 7th copy Ministerial Councillor Steffler 8th & 9th copies Maj. Gen. Waeger 10th copy KVV Chief Bosch 11th copy Ministerial Councillor Wissmann 12th copy Provincial Councillor Berk 13th copy State Secretary Hayler 14th copy General Engineer Sellschopp 15th copy State Secretary Ganzenmueller 16th copy State Secretary Backe 17th copy State Secretary Alpers 18th copy State Secretary Gutterer 19th copy Gen. Weidemann 20th copy Major Koch 21st copy Planning Office 22d & 23d copies Registry V.P. 24th & 31st copies
Pla. 160/ 11.2.
List of persons invited to the Conference of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1944:
Chairman: Field Marshal Milch
Participants:
Reich Minister of Economy Funk State Secretary Koerner State Secretary Dr. Backe General Forester Dr. Alpers State Secretary Dr. Ganzenmueller State Secretary Dr. Gutterer President Kehrl Maj. Gen. Waeger Ministerial Manager Dr. Timm (crossed out and replaced by Provincial Councillor Berk) Military Government vice-regent Dr. Bosch Ministerial Councillor Dr. Steffler
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE[96] OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
Re: Labor Supply on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 10 o’clock, at the Ministry for Air Transport
SAUCKEL: Field Marshal [Milch], Gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation “possible” by stressing every nerve of his organization. Already on 4 January I had to report to the Fuehrer with the greatest regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee delivery of the grand total of 4,050,000 men then calculated in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Fuehrer I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to satisfy the demands, at least with regard to the number of laborers, but this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program. Of course, I shall readily agree if I am now told by the board: Now we have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much about figures!
We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to make some general statements and ask for your indulgence.
In the autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I have to state: the program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium, and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these countries themselves. For months—sometimes I visited these countries twice within a month—I have been called a fool who against all reason travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled over whether or not Sauckel was a fool. If one’s work is smashed in such a way, repair is very, very difficult. * * *
* * * * *
* * * Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again including foreign workers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1 million which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that time. Thus we dispatched to the Reich in those two months no more than 4,500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7,000 civilians arrived. This, although from 1 December until today, I have had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians, viz., as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed.
The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was done in olden times for “shanghaiing”, went hunting for men and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words in order to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming, with the help of the Higher SS and Police Leader, a number of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these men. * * *
* * * * *
* * * Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make my work more difficult. According to reports received within the last days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity, and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrand with an inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to extract from French medium and small factories—80 percent of all French factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours—1 million laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased, as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he has here twice the value he has in France. I want to state clearly and fearlessly—the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident. If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to French eyes as a German of whom they may say, Sauckel is here stopped from acting for German armament! * * * On the other hand, I have grounds for hoping that I shall be just able to wiggle through, first by using my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France, Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to ask, is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France! This I have been answered over and over again. How then, am I to regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one solution—the German authorities have to co-operate with each other, and if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must make an example of one case, and, by reason of this law, if necessary put prefect or burgomaster against the wall, if he does not comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany. During the latter quarter the belief in a German victory and in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make has sunk below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new French ministers, especially Henriot [French (Vichy) Minister of Propaganda] will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the situation in France.
In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. * * *
Moreover, I am offended, and this grieves me most, by the statement that I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. * * *
* * * Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with economics and labor supply, inquired of me, why do you fetch these people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply: It is my duty to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer the German armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. It is the flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have always been one of those who says: If only energetic measures are applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions from Thuringia are frequently mentioned in the armed forces report, I can only tell you that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the World War [I] by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland, and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the last quarter at least 1½ million workers whom I would have been able to deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you, Gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived, and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order. How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such collaboration exists. * * *
* * * * *
MILCH: * * * I now proceed to the important question, where are we still able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation, probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are, therefore, at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly convinced and have said several times, if invasion starts, sabotage of all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc. If one had shown the nailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that their supply of arms in the West is rather ample since the English are dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you, Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon as you arrive the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist, they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of the fact that your opposite number, the executive is not able to prevent their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive, as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found out on the other side, I do not think, Party Comrade Sauckel, that you will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are training forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the army, and at the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km. and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their assistance. In the rear there were great masses of men who had retreated in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the duties of the military commanders. There ought to be orders of such lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump; and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers within the quarter ending 30 May. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in Italy, i.e., the number of protected factories, will not be further increased.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to Germany—in other words 2 million—cannot be fulfilled, the employment of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers, however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops, etc.
MILCH: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared with the whole of Italian labor?
SCHIEBER: I think 14 percent, but I don’t have the figures here.
MILCH: Would not the following method be better: We could take under German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell them: Only he gets any food who either works in a protected factory or goes to Germany.
SAUCKEL: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the German worker is in Germany, and the Italian worker too, even if he does not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German worker introducing the “factory sandwich”. When I am in Paris, of course, I go to Maxim’s. There one can experience miracles of nourishment. The Fuehrer still thinks that in these countries only very rich men who can go to Maxim’s are well provided with food. Thereupon I sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our nation has to experience. The average French citizen too can still buy everything he wishes.
(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!)
Yes. Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. Therefore he has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food. This unfortunately is the case.
MILCH: Is there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene at an earlier stage of distribution.
KOERNER: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food; these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure, but they have been fulfilled.
MILCH: But there is a simple remedy, let us cease supplying the troops from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen.
KOERNER: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system. The Frenchmen had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which we cannot touch at all. Every year we increase our food demands to the French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently yielding to pressure, and in proportion to the harvest results, were they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at all. The Italian can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian always has money and deals in the black market, he is in a much better situation than our German worker who practically has nothing but what he gets on his card.
MILCH: But don’t we even send food to Italy?
KOERNER: We are exchanging certain goods.
SAUCKEL: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to Germany.
* * * * *
MILCH: Unfortunately, Reich Minister Speer is not present today. He certainly must have had an opinion about the whole system. His agreement with Bichelonne was to activate an additional labor supply in France itself for our armament with the aid of existing French capacities. We cannot compute the result here of what was achieved by that action. Whether the result he dreamed of has been achieved cannot be decided just yet; that is, have the S-plants given us an increase of armaments which is greater than what we would have achieved if the people had worked in Germany? I would propose that Minister Speer himself one day clarify this problem again. Because if only a negative result had been achieved, he would automatically change his point of view too.
The first question is: Is the percentage of trained people in the S-plants so great that all the others are to be regarded as rubbish? And the second question is: Is it possible at all, with the lack of so-called executive power and differing opinions on this question, to seize and transfer to Germany the remaining 80 percent who are not in the S-plants? So, in view of the general political and organizational conditions in France, would you be able to transfer some 10-15 percent of the best of these 80 percent?
SAUCKEL: I’ll have to get them.
MILCH: Can you do it at all?
SAUCKEL: Today I cannot promise anything. Today I can only do my work.
MILCH: I mean, in reference to the other 80 percent, if your hands are not tied by different circumstances, that first, there is nothing to attract these people to Germany; that second, they reckon with Germany’s defeat in a short time; that third, they are attached to their families and to their country; and that fourth, they shun work because they can still exist, and without it they look on the whole period as a period of transition. On the other hand you have the fact that the army does not assist you and that the German authorities are hostile to each other, a fact which is very cleverly utilized by the French.
SAUCKEL: That has changed since my last visit. All German authorities, the Military Commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Field Marshal Sperrle, have supported me considerably in these affairs.
(MILCH: I refer to the smaller authorities, the executive ones.)
That has been spoiled—pardon me if I have to bring this up—because all departments, even armaments over there, were of the opinion up to 4 January, that my claims and, especially, my figures, were crazy.
(MILCH: But only people who could not understand such figures.)
Up to 4 January it was the same everywhere, from the military commander to the German Ambassador and the German armament departments. Up to then all the agencies in France had in general held the opinion: it has not been decided yet by any means, Sauckel’s figures are not correct, so we have to take it easy here. And that penetrated naturally down to the lower ranks of French authorities too.
MILCH: That is just what I mean about the differences of opinion between you and Minister Speer. You say: The best thing for me is to approach the protected industries; Speer says: Leave those people alone, take 80 percent away from the others. And if one is neutral, one has to say, always with the provision that these 20 percent in the S-plants really achieve something for us, Speer is right when he says: Please do not touch my 20 percent; there are enough among the 80 percent for your use. And now I say: Why do you not take the others? Is it so difficult to approach them?
SAUCKEL: No. I need the people as well. The fact is that Speer’s plants are filling up nowadays. For instance, I received the information the day before yesterday that the urge to work for the protected industries is especially strong in France just now and so the supply of skilled workers to Germany is practically cut off. Skilled workers can only be found in these plants.
KEHRL: May I explain briefly the opinion of my Minister? Otherwise the impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer had been unclear or unreasonable, and I want to prevent this. Seen from our viewpoint, the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943 manufacturing for Germany was done in France only to a relatively modest extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany.
(SAUCKEL: Some were recruited forcibly.)
The drafting started after the recruiting no longer yielded adequate results.
SAUCKEL: Out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.
KEHRL: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this recruitment no longer yielded satisfactory results, we started drafting according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the success was rather good. Up to eighty percent of the age group were registered and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year. Following developments in the Russian war and the hopes raised thereby in the western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; viz., the men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport or by leaving the transport en route. When they found out through these first attempts during the months of July and August that the German executive either was not able or was not willing to catch these shirkers and either to imprison them or take them forcibly to Germany, the readiness to obey the call-ups sank to a minimum. Therefore, relatively small percentages were caught in individual countries. On the other hand, these men, moved by the fear the German executive might after all be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and assistance from the small partisan groups there.
* * * * *
MILCH: Another question. Since now through the transfer of various industries so much is covered by French labor, as in the textile industry, etc., a corresponding number of German workers would necessarily become free as a result of that.
KEHRL: Then they will not be requisitioned here, though they would have been formerly.
TIMM: Nobody is going to be released. Probably other requests will be sent to the same factories.
SAUCKEL: In this respect I must also draw attention to the fact that the German factories which were shut down were much more up to date and probably worked with less personnel than the French factories.
MILCH: But we want all the factories to work for armaments.
KEHRL: That would also result in spreading the risk in case of air warfare.
MILCH: I believe the system to be good, as a still more severe commitment of workers for Germany would have the effect of making a considerable part of them remain over there for good. I wish you had something to back you up so you can have enough power to get it done. I do not think that anyone in France will enforce it.
SAUCKEL: But they will all right, if Germany goes at this thing the right way. It is not the insignificant French workman who should be punished, but the French policeman, who, instead of supplying people to Germany, goes to them beforehand and says: I’m coming tomorrow; you’d better get out. The French subordinate and intermediary authorities have to be punished.
MILCH: Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intention there will be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the prefects, just because these people are afraid that, first, they will be called to account afterwards for it, and, second, because of their patriotism, which makes them say: We must not work for the enemy of our country. Therefore, I would like to have an authority in our administration which would force these people to do it, because then the French could say: If you force us, we will do it, but voluntarily we will not do it. The same applies to Italy. There they say: Who knows who will win, whether it will be Mussolini or Badoglio or the King; only, if you force us, we are ready to do it. Therefore, we have to have something on our side which will exercise this pressure. I don’t see at all why big divisions should be necessary for this. The existing forces should be sufficient to accomplish it.
TIMM: I have the feeling that we are sticking too closely to the figures and are neglecting the qualitative side of the question. The present development may permit us to fulfill our programs with regard to figures, but in the demands made by the factories the important thing for them is to have so many metal workers, etc. Then we practically have to say: You will only get unskilled workers.
KEHRL: We realize that. The plants are getting unskilled workers, at the utmost it may be possible to obtain skilled workers by transferring plants from Italy to Germany.
SAUCKEL: Then in the course of the year the factories will declare: We cannot use these workers. And over against this you have the fact that in France we have a reservoir of unused skilled workers.
MILCH: I am not worrying about that. Naturally our plants will say: We want skilled workers. But they also need a certain number of unskilled workers.
TIMM: Will it not happen that the officers making the demands say one day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled workers which cannot be justified?
MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First, Speer must have the proper perspective to see what has happened as the result of all his agreements.
I can imagine that first the numerus clausus is introduced at once, so that the extent of the output in the S-plants is fixed, and that secondly it is decided later on that if a part of the S-plants has not worked properly after a certain period, they lose their protection again and the people from these plants can be transferred as a unit. I can foresee already now that in air armaments, part of the plants will turn out such bad production that I shall not be interested in keeping them up. So, protection for certain plants will simply be discontinued. And this will have a positive effect on the other plants, too, because they will say: If we don’t do our work properly, we shall be transferred. Now during the transfer it is necessary to see that people really do arrive and do not run away before or during the transfer. If a transport has left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600 persons from this place must be arrested and sent to Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is then talked about everywhere. If actions like this and other similar ones are carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The whole thing would be made easier if we had control of food. The stuff offered by the black market has to come from a certain depot, and there we ought to cut in.
KEHRL: That is difficult. The transport of food by parcel post has taken on extraordinary proportions in France.
MILCH: If I were military commander, I would simply confiscate the whole of the parcel post!
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-D
EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 4 APRIL 1944
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Central Planning Board Z.P. 18 Secr. St. Papers Pl. 030056
Berlin, 8 April 1944 [Signed] DR. GOERNER
Top Secret State Matter _REPORT ON THE 56TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 4 APRIL 1944_
Building Allocation 1944
* * * * *
The Jaegerstab is to get a quota of 550 million including 150 million definitely pledged from the reserve and the air administration is to have a quota of 200 million; both are to be checked against each other. Regarding the air administration quota, precise details (as to specific amounts, number of workers required, quantities of material, etc.) are to be submitted, building projects for the supplying industry (optical glass) are to be transferred to the office of armament supplies, trial projects are to be discussed between the commissioner of building and air H.C., the remaining demands are to be cleared between air chief administration and the Chief of the General Staff.
* * * * *
The quota recipients will be informed of their respective quotas as of guiding figures within the limits of which the commissioner of building may give assignments. The quota recipients themselves are, on the basis of these guiding figures, to re-plan their projects by concentrating on priority issues and to report which of their building projects will have to fall out including the resulting figures. Field Marshal Milch will report to the Fuehrer on the total situation of building. Reports on the quotas Air Ministry, Navy, Army, and Reichsbahn are to be sent to Field Marshal Milch forthwith.
Demands of labor, building materials, etc., as resulting from the quota allocations are to be discussed with the planning office by the quota recipients taking into account such amounts of the quota as were already used up for building purposes since 1 January 1944.
[Typed signature] STEFFLER.
Present:
Field Marshal Milch Reich Minister Funk State Secretary Koerner[97] President Kehrl[98] Dr. Ing. Goerner Min. Rat Steffler
[follow names of 27 others who attended, including Under Secretary Ohlendorf,[99] Lt. Gen. (Artillery) Von Leeb,[100] and Professor Krauch.[101]]
[Signed] STAATSRAT SCHIEBER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-287 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 49
LETTER FROM MILCH TO SAUCKEL, 8 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY
Copy
The Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force St/GL
Secret
File note: 16m 10 No. 220/43 secret (GL/A-W Wi 3 II)
Berlin W 8, 8 April 1943 7 Leipziger Street Tel. 12 0047, Ext. 5530
To the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation Berlin SW 11 96 Saarland Street
Subject: Protection of Industry.
The continuously increasing drafting of German workers from the production as well as from the security teams (plant protection and plant fireguards) make it necessary to assign more and more foreign labor to the factories of the armament industry. This assignment of foreign labor faces the plants of the armament industry with special tasks of security, which cannot be guaranteed with the forces at present at the disposal of the industry. According to what I have found out the statistics of 31 December 1942 have already shown an unfulfilled demand of 15 percent in plant protection personnel. Moreover, the extension of the air force industry brings about a further increase in the requirements for plant protection personnel, an increase which up to now has not been covered by the labor offices.
An investigation I made in a number of plants of the air force industry a short while ago has shown that even after the introduction of the compulsory labor law most of the labor offices could not make the necessary forces available for protection and fireguard tasks, while other labor agencies could not entirely satisfy the needs. The labor office of Halberstadt has even refused to deal with this requirement because these men were required for organizations without productive value.
In the field of the air force industry I already ordered, at the beginning of the war, the 84-hour week for these sectors. So that no further increase can be made with these working hours, for otherwise, there would be an increase of illness which would bring about a further unwarranted weakening in the numbers of the personnel. Even the decree for the securing of the necessary forces of protectory guards, issued by you on 29 December 1942, (File note: Va 5550.917) has not yet shown any results up to now in the field of the armament industry.
Therefore, you are urgently requested to direct the labor offices to place at the disposal of the armament plants, upon their request as quickly as possible the competent forces for plant protection and fireguards, because otherwise normal security in the plants does not seem to be guaranteed any longer.
In the field of air force industry, this would involve approximately 2,500 to 3,000 men.
We ask you to kindly inform us about the steps taken.
Copy, for information, to: OKW W Stb [Economic Staff of the Armed Forces]
BY ORDER: MILCH [Typewritten]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
SPEER’S MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE WITH HITLER ON 8 JULY 1943
Top Secret State Matter Berlin, 10 July 1943 CONFERENCE WITH THE FUEHRER, 8 JULY 1943
* * * * *
17. The Fuehrer laid down in the coal discussion that 70,000 Russian prisoners of war fit for mining work should be sent each month to the mines. He also pointed out that an approximate minimum of 150,000-200,000 fit Russian prisoners of war must be earmarked for the mines in order to obtain the required number of men suitable for this work.
If the Russian prisoners of war cannot be released by the army, the male population in the partisan infested areas should without distinction be proclaimed prisoners of war and sent off to the mines.
At the same time the Fuehrer ordered that prisoners of war not fit for the mines should immediately be placed in the iron industry, in manufacturing and supply industries, and in the armament industry.
The Fuehrer further ordered that he should receive a monthly report giving (a) the total number of Russian prisoners of war, and (b) the number of Russian prisoners of war fit for mining, made available for the mines and a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel as to why the remainder could not be used.
The joint report of Sauckel and Pleiger is also to be sent to me.
[Signed] SPEER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT BY SAUR OF THE CONFERENCE WITH THE FUEHRER, 5 MARCH 1944
Top Secret State Matter Berlin, 6 March 1944 _POINTS FROM THE CONFERENCE (SAUR) WITH THE FUEHRER ON 5 MARCH 1944_
Jointly with Field Marshal Milch, Lt. Gen. of the Air Force Bodenschatz, Colonel von Below
* * * * *
18. Told the Fuehrer of the Reich Marshal’s wish for the future utilization of the productive capacity of prisoners of war by giving the direction of the Stalag to the SS, with the exception of the British and Americans. The Fuehrer considers the proposal a good one and has asked Colonel von Below to arrange matters accordingly.
* * * * *
(Prepared by Saur) (Seen by Speer)
EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DEFENSE WITNESS ALBERT SPEER[102] BEFORE COMMISSION ON 19 FEBRUARY 1947
* * * * *
EXAMINATION
* * * * *
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, I would like to understand the machinery by which labor was brought into Germany beginning with the request by any particular department for any particular number of workers. Let us suppose that someone appeared before the Central Planning Board and said, “I will need fifty thousand men for a factory that I am about to construct.” Now please tell us just what happened. Would you issue an order to somebody? Would he then in turn order someone else and how did these workers finally then arrive in Germany?
WITNESS SPEER: If somebody on the Central Planning Board requested labor, the Central Planning Board did not issue an order that these workers must be supplied, but the Central Planning Board agreed that those workers can be supplied. An order by the Central Planning Board, Sauckel would not have accepted. That is a definite fact.
It is quite clear that the requests for labor did not occur in these long intervals between the meetings of the Central Planning Board, but this had to happen in much shorter intervals and in a constant collaboration with the people concerned, for the enemy air raids and changes in programs which became necessary because of the military situation made these changes very often necessary. Therefore, for the whole of our armament industry and also for certain branches of production outside armament that were in my ministry, we decided on so-called framework contingents, and priority lists were drawn up. I do not know whether you are interested in that part.
Q. Well, not particularly. I want very succinctly a statement as to the steps which ensue after the declaration of someone before the Central Planning Board that he needed a certain number of workers. Who was informed of this request? Who authorized the call for the workers? Who submitted the demand? Who then at the other end gathered the workers? Not in detail—I just want the steps in movement from the Central Planning Board until the men actually arrived.
A. The Central Planning Board did not deal with that matter anymore afterwards. Let us say the request of labor, say, of the coal mining industry——
Q. Yes.
A. ——was reported to Sauckel by the coal mining industry itself. Therefore, one could call a meeting of the Central Planning Board as a statement for Sauckel that such labor is very important for the coal mining industry, and that as far as possible he has to supply them. That is necessary within the framework of economic planning, but beyond that the Central Planning Board did not pursue the matter any further or was not even in a position to do so.
Q. Well, did you know there at the fountainhead of labor—because if you made the request originally, that is what started the machinery in motion—did you not know that bringing in workers forcibly from occupied territories to work in the war operation constituted a violation of international convention? Weren’t you aware of that right at the very source?
A. What I say now is not meant to be an excuse. I really did not know it. Up to the beginning of my trial here, the regulations of international law were unknown to me, and nobody ever drew my attention to the fact that such regulations exist; but I want to say once more, I don’t say this in order to excuse myself, here, but it is a fact that it was like this.
Q. Well, you were certainly quite aware from the decision of the International Military Tribunal just how illegal and improper that was.
A. I took note of it there, and, after all, I received my punishment for it now.
Q. Well, could you not have followed the same line of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal, which, after all, was based upon international convention? You were a man of education, a man of great cultural attainments and of great technical ability, and it was because of these attributes that you were chosen by Hitler to become the Minister of Armaments. Could you not have reasoned that out by yourself? Wasn’t it very clear and obvious?
A. I believe that the general knowledge of the principles of international law can only be brought to the knowledge of a wider circle of legal laymen if after a war legal offenses committed during the war will be revealed by a public trial, and thereby a more general knowledge of offenses against international law becomes known. You know that I was an architect and that such knowledge as I had in the field of law I merely received from newspapers, and I knew, for instance, all about various legal commitments of architects which are fairly extensive as far as construction of buildings goes.
I would say that a great mistake has been committed here by omitting after the First World War to establish international legal conditions by trials, and at the same time to adjust it to the developments of technical warfare instead of which, after the First World War, the whole question of the deportation of labor, for instance, was decided by the highest German courts, and as far as I know, the decision of that court was not particularly lucid. This is how the basis of ignorance is laid in the field of international law, and I believe that many a mistake and many a violation in this war could have been avoided or at least mitigated if a general knowledge of international law had been prevalent.
Q. Would you say that had there been, following the First World War, trials such as those we are now conducting, that you then would have been aware of the illegality of the practices in which you were engaged; or rather, you would have been aware of the illegality of such practices and you then would not have participated in them?
A. I am of the opinion that trials against the responsible men for the First World War after its conclusion would have enlightened the public and myself on the tenets of international law. I do not wish to go as far as to say that I would not have committed these breaches of law, for it is very difficult to excuse one’s self after the event by saying one committed the act only through ignorance of international law. Nevertheless, I should say that the observance of international law would have been possible without losing much momentum in my armament drive. Of course only that part of international law is meant here which deals with the recruiting of labor, whereas the other factor, the so-called legal looting of occupied territories as it is called, there is no doubt that that would have been necessary for an increased output of armaments. Violations of international law as far as the assignment of labor was concerned were in my opinion not only unnecessary, but unreasonable. We would have achieved more if we had observed international law. This is a very complicated topic; I do not know whether you are interested why this should be so.
Q. Well, I merely want you to enlighten me, if you care to, on this specific angle. You are considered a specialist. Now, had there been an international trial following the First World War, and the decision in that trial had been very clear and specific—as was the decision in this trial—you would have then known the limitations very specifically on the conduct of war; and having then known that you couldn’t do certain things, would you then have refused to participate as you did in this World War as a specialist? Having been put on notice that you cannot take labor from other countries forcibly and throw them into the armament industries—knowing all that, would you then have refused to give your services to Hitler in the prosecution of this war?
A. As to the first part of the question I wish to say if a trial and a clear decision had been handed down after the First World War, then certainly somebody would have put the international laws and regulations on my desk; that is to say, he would have informed me of it. The second question—it is not possible to give a simple answer to the second part of the question for when I started my office in 1942 the war in all its aspects had already departed from all existing international regulations. Please don’t misunderstand me if I point out here that economic warfare was waged by the British and Americans with extreme concentration on bombing warfare, which was not a matter of national reprisal because it hit industries in occupied territories. On the other hand the war with Russia had gone beyond the normal limits, if I can call it that. It is difficult for me to say who was the guilty party.
Q. I do not refer to the time after the war had reached such a state that there were no restrictions. I am speaking of the period before the war started. I would like to know whether a man of your education could have been enlisted in a practice which you knew and would then have known was entirely illegal and contrary to international law as well as the precepts and dictates of humanity.
A. I would not have participated if I had known the whole documentary material which became known in our first big trial. If I had known that Hitler since 1938 had prepared for war and had tied the fate of his people to his own to such an extent that his end was the end of his own nation——
Q. I didn’t intend to enter into such a long discussion on this. All I had in mind was that if those in your classification, as specialists, would have observed international law, and would have known clearly what international law was—the restrictions, the limitations and so on—and if we assumed that these specialists were men of character, then, even though Germany had at the helm a navigator who had become mad, he could not have run the ship on to the rocks for the simple reason that you and the other specialists who assisted in the present shipwreck, would have refused to ship on a venture which was so obviously bound for the rocks, internationally speaking. Is that true or not?
A. That is so without a doubt.
Q. And would you go so far as to say that had there been an international trial of the proportions of the one we have just had, and these which are now following, after the First World War, and the knowledge resulting from decisions handed down would have become well-known because of the punishments which would have been inflicted, would you say that that might have served as a bar against a Second World War?
A. I do not wish to say that it could have stopped and Hitler——
Q. If Hitler had not had specialists, Hitler could not have wrecked the world himself. Hitler had to have a Speer and had to have the others who were condemned in the first International Military Tribunal. He could not have done it alone.
A. That’s quite clear, but these specialists were taken into their part of the war without realizing what the connections were and an international trial is not a wholly certain method to prevent a new war; but I think it’s a very essential contribution toward that aim. I am unable to answer your question by saying that Hitler would have been unable to find collaborators if, after the First World War, these trials had been held, but I do wish to say it would have been much more difficult for him, also because our specialists were not very intimately connected with the Party circles.
Q. Well, I think that’s a point I wanted to find out; that, if the specialists had refused to collaborate, knowing that the contribution of their service meant a completely illegal undertaking, then Hitler could not have conducted a war by himself and therefore there could not have been a war?
A. In technical warfare the specialists are decisive factors for the conduct of war, but the specialists are not to be regarded as being the parties principally responsible. They do not have the necessary knowledge of the background, the political background—essential in view of Hitler’s untruthfulness—to see where he is taking the ship.
Q. The ship could go nowhere without you specialists. That’s all.
A. I thank you.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Do you have any questions, Dr. Bergold?
DIRECT EXAMINATION
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, sir, I have. Witness, his Honor has asked you how it would be if a factory, for instance, would need and would request 50,000 workers, which way and in which channel would take this request up to the point in foreign territories where 50,000 foreigners would have been gathered and taken to Germany for that purpose. Isn’t it correct that such a proposal of bringing 50,000 workers to this factory did not mean that 50,000 foreign workers would be brought but meant only that 50,000 workers altogether were brought? That meant German workers as well as foreign workers which were actually already in Germany and employed there and also new recruits? That included all that, did it not?
SPEER: I was deflected from my answer in that particular case and I did not really give an answer to the question. If 50,000 workers were requested for a certain branch in our industry the request gave a figure which did not show how many of them were Germans and how many of them were foreign workers. The bigger part of the workers which were supplied came from what was called fluctuation. Fluctuation meant the transfer of workers from one plant to another. It’s quite clear that production is in a constant development. One always follows the other and in some cases one orders particular workers and then it loses that importance for military reasons. The plan is that some workers available are constantly released and sent on to different plants or industries. A second source was the newly mobilized German workers, I mean the women workers, and a third source was the sending of foreign workers already in Germany, and a fourth source the prisoners of war who were also sent on from one branch to the next, and the fifth source consisted of some that came in from foreign countries. How these various workers from these various sources were distributed among branches, neither my offices nor the factories who had requested workers could find out. That was a matter which had to be decided by the labor exchanges because it took an enormous amount of work to find the proper workers for the proper branches. * * *
Q. Thank you. Witness, do you know that when the French Government, which at that time existed in Paris, had issued an order for the calling up of labor did that mean compulsory labor?
A. These details became known to me during the trial. My tasks were enormous and at that time I did not bother much about details. I cannot say anything about this from my knowledge.
Q. Witness, you must know this; at the time when you had discussions with Mr. Bichelonne, French Minister, I should think that the existence of compulsory labor service in France should have been discussed at that time.
A. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I said quite clearly last time that I knew about the fact that in occupied territories workers were taken to Germany against their free will. The various districts, etc., are not known to me.
Q. No. I mean if such a decree had been issued at all. That’s what I am speaking of.
A. I had to assume that but I wasn’t actually informed about it.
Q. Did you consider the French Government, which at that time was in Paris, France—did you consider it a regular government?
A. This is the same sort of question which his Honor put to me too. I had no basis to find out whether the French Government was legal or not, because these are problems of international law which are beyond me as a layman.
Q. Witness, do you not know that the Government of Pétain had been recognized and was recognized by the American Government, and that the American Government had an ambassador, if I recall correctly—and I am not sure I can pronounce his name—at that time, Mr. Leahy, Admiral Leahy?
A. I know that, but I must say frankly that I did not spend my time thinking about whether the French Government was legal or not.
Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Herr Speer, what I was endeavoring to elucidate, or have you elucidate for us, was not whether you knew if a government was legal or not, if it was recognized internationally or not. I wanted to draw your attention to something quite more fundamental, and that was the employment against its will of population in a war activity, all of which was prohibited by international law. And if you and all the specialists in the Hitler regime knew of the limitation and were thoroughly aware, and the knowledge was so widespread that you couldn’t help but know that it was illegal and that you would be punished if you did it, that is, to bring in workers from another country and put them into war operations—if that were a matter of such general knowledge that every college man and every person that was well read would know of it, would Hitler not have had difficulty in obtaining such a crew to run a ship, regardless of what he may have had in mind as to the illegal port which he hoped to attain by that voyage?
SPEER: I can only speak about the time in which I worked, that is to say, from 1942 onwards. In that time, I am sure that if these legal matters had been made quite clear a large number of technicians or industrial leaders would not have collaborated to the extent they did if they had realized the illegality and the possible punishment.
I would like to stress this particularly for the period from 1943 onwards. From that time onwards, many intelligent people realized that the war had been lost, and from that time onwards it would have made a great impression if in former trials heavy punishment was meted out. Not everybody would have been impressed; certain people would have followed the old line, but the majority of so-called specialists, certainly—
Q.—would have recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do. I understand you to say that the majority of the specialists would have recognized the illegality of what they were asked to do and would have refused. That is what I understand you to say.
A. Yes, that is what I wanted to say.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. Thank you very much.
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 5
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 22 JULY 1942
REPORT OF THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 22 JULY 1942[103]
[page 2 of original] Safeguarding of Food Supplies
A net increase of one million foreign workers is anticipated. This figure has not been reached during the past months. Even if more than one million workers are brought here during the months to come, the limit of one million will actually never be exceeded due to continued losses. Food for this number of workers is guaranteed.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 6[104]
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 2 NOVEMBER 1942
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 22D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT OF LABOR, MONDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1942, 12:00 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH MINISTRY FOR AVIATION
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MILCH: In my opinion agriculture has to be provided with its labor. If, theoretically, agriculture could have been given 100,000 more men, there would be 100,000 fairly well-fed men, while those we get now, particularly the prisoners of war, are not exactly fit for work. If agriculture will get them in time, they will again be able to feed these people up again. However, it will not be very happy about it. * * *
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 7
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 12 FEBRUARY 1943
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 32D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD—THE FOUR YEAR PLAN ON 12 FEBRUARY 1943
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MILCH: Everybody sticks to his old methods until he is literally beaten away from them. However, one must not only beat, one must give advice, too. They must be good experts who will tell people: You will do that this way or that; it is not necessary that you use just this sum. Who does such a thing will never give in and say, I can do with less. Mining has been partly beaten[105] into iron by saying we cannot give you anything but iron on account of the shortage of lumber.
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 8[106]
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1943
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE[107] OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
Subject: Assignment of Labor, 16 February 1943, 16 o’clock, in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin.
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SPEER: We are in complete agreement. You will not receive any list from us for this action but the whole armament industry including the anticipated deliveries will be devoted to this action. The administrations too must be served at the same time. But the authorities including army, air and navy shall not get a single person from the action. This must be adhered to. You know what the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers said: That he must therefore have some new women typists at the Reich Chancellory at once. That makes no sense.
MILCH: Where France is concerned, there exists in France an industry which makes aircraft motors and parts, all complete. We have transferred there all the things which can be made there without endangering secrecy in any way. These are training aircraft, transport aircraft, etc. However, since we want to make the most of the production in other ways, we have moved away part of it to a large extent. As a whole these things must be kept secret from the French but in every part subject to secrecy there are only a few parts which are real secret. The bulk consists of other parts. These have also gone there to a great extent just as we engaged aircraft builders in France to a great extent. We now currently have work waiting in France for several thousand aircraft builders. At the moment the industry working for us there needs, according to its claims, some 20,000 men, who are asked of us, in order to be able to keep to the program. The production is still far behind that which was agreed upon with you in the program. Whereas we in Germany fully carry out our program, only 30 percent of it is carried out in France. In fact it has only begun to function in the last weeks and months after we have been more active there. In principle, we have excluded the State from this whole cooperation with industry and set the German firms to work with the French firms.
Sponsor firms have been appointed so as to make the affair operate. This system is not yet fully completed but has been favorably initiated everywhere and indeed brings quite other returns to some extent. The reproach is always made to us that nearly all Europe is at our disposal. The production we draw from France, with the exception of motor cars, is minute as regards the army. The whole French production potential is not yet fully exploited by us or only to a quite small proportion. If it were necessary for us to produce in France, because in Germany the capacity, space machine tools, etc., which are not convenient for removal are lacking, if the accommodation of the people were not so difficult, etc., we would in fact be reduced to the point of taking everything to Germany and have the work done here. But this would entail too great a decrease in the production in our own country, not to mention the reluctance of the people.
We came to an agreement yesterday. I am very thankful that this matter is now, thanks to yourself, Gauleiter Sauckel, together with Gen. v. d. Heyde and Col. Brueckner, to be settled on the spot. It is difficult to induce Frenchmen to come over here. An official agency alone cannot either appreciate or realize this, only a sponsoring firm can realize it. I therefore suggest that sponsor firms be called upon to cooperate, precisely because in France the sub-contract system is very widespread.
Behind the factory which actually organizes the thing, there are other factories which belong to the semi-finished goods and preparatory industry. This industry, however, can be supervised by our sponsor industries. We should have to assign to our people the task of investigating the individual firms and find out which people are working for our program. All others we annex ourselves. When we have got hold of them and annex them in German industry, that is, only those people who are really necessary to us, it will be possible to utilize them in the right way.
The proportion of specialist workers there is higher than in this country. We have indeed drained a certain number of them into our factories last year because they were the easiest to get. The Frenchmen must work with more specialists than we. We must work with more specialists than the Russian, and the Russian must have still more specialists than the American. In America they can place any simpleton before any machine, he will put it right in a flash. Only the installation requires a specialist. The man need only have arms; a head is a superfluous luxury.
In France the system is quite different. The Frenchman has adapted himself to it and has always indeed had unemployment. A labor organization as we conceive it does not exist. With the same number of Frenchmen and all other installations, facilities, etc., being the same, one will only obtain, as compared with German personnel, half at the most or only one-third of the production, even if the personnel have all good will and zeal. It is a matter of system. This system we cannot simply alter, neither can the sponsor firms, but we must try in this way to obtain from them to a certain extent the additional resources which we need for our industry and armament. By proceeding thus, we can put things right. I believe the sponsor firms have an obvious interest in this. If industry has too many specialist workers there working for us, let us draw upon them ourselves, because we are suffering a great shortage of them. This resource should be left to our firms after this extensive drain on specialist workers has been suffered. We want to raise our armament.
Now to another point. I have today ordered in my jurisdiction that an extensive action should take place; today, when we are counting upon obtaining a great number of women in virtue of the obligatory service whose age limit we hope to see extended to 55. The British have extended obligatory service to the age of 65. The additional 10 years are a trifle exaggerated. Women are not able to go to the machines immediately and perform heavy work. The few days that are necessary for them to instruct the personnel are immaterial. We can still spare that much time if it were not that it would convey to the population an impression to the following effect: Now that we have reported for work, it is months before we are called up. I have ordered, within my jurisdiction, that the women should as much as possible be employed in offices where men are now to be found, for instance in the wage offices, etc. In these, women and elderly men can be easily trained, as they will be able to do without further difficulty. In this way, men in the commercial offices, etc., should be released for the accountancy offices and similar offices. This involves, in the case of industry, over 20,000 individuals and there are other branches besides.
It amounts to quite a considerable number consisting solely of people who, in view of the war economy, are unfortunately necessary now. These men must now be placed at our machines insofar as they are not drafted, that is to say, are not soldiers. These people are more likely to be able to render better service at the machines or in the factories than the women now assigned, insofar as women are disposed to go to the machines. Of course, there will be women who have done such work before and who are now willing to turn to this work but who have not reported for work so far because they have not found it necessary to work for a living on account of the dole.
Where the assignment of women is concerned, I should suggest that, in the process of the action, only those women be assigned for whom work at the machine is not involved if a man is thereby released.
TIMM: The danger lies in this that the draftees were partly to be released without replacement having actually been forthcoming.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That is quite another matter. When female auxiliaries of the Signal Corps are assigned, it is not additionally but only in the proportion that soldiers are released thereby. There are indeed several 100,000 men in the signal corps of the army and air force. In our department, 250 to 300,000 have been such. Whether there are so many now, I do not know. They are all young men fit for combat. I have always campaigned against this and said: one ought to assign women preferably so as to release soldiers. If that is done now, it will really release a large number, it does not matter whether for the workshop or for the front. Of course, there is a front somewhere in the East too. This front will be maintained for a certain time. The only useful thing the Russian will inherit from the territories evacuated by us will be the people. It might be better in principle to withdraw the population in time as far as 100 km. behind the front. The whole civilian population will move back to 100 km. behind the front. Nobody will now be assigned to trench [digging] work.
TIMM: We tried to withdraw the population of Kharkov. 90 to 120,000 people were required by the fortress commandant of Kharkov for trench work alone so that in some cases we had to organize whole convoys.
WEGER: Actual demolitions were even carried out.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: But that is done by the engineer corps. There is definitely no more hope that more prisoners of war will come from the East.
SAUCKEL: The prisoners taken are used there.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We have made the request that there should be a certain percentage of Russians with us in the antiaircraft artillery. 50,000 altogether are expected. 30,000 are already there as gunners. It is a funny thing that Russians must operate the guns. The other 20,000 are still missing. I received a letter from the High Command of the Army yesterday saying: We can no longer turn over a single one, we have too few ourselves. So this thing will not turn out so successfully for us.
SPEER: It would be advisable to make the draft of women somewhat clearer in the press.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: That would primarily have to be placed in the foreground. In this respect the question is whether I will receive the accounts from our industry in time. The matter is bound to be settled some time. There will be no deception. People who want to deceive also deceive now, whether they have this personnel or not, whether their accounts are up to date or not. The other people are honest. The mass has not engaged in deception. Whether we are a little backward in checking prices will not be very important. The most important thing is to work. We know what is produced abroad, having now received the figures. The Russian actually makes 2,000 aircraft a month in the way of front-line aircraft. This figure is far higher than ours. This must not be forgotten. We must get to the assembly line and produce quite other figures.
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 9
EXTRACT FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 23 APRIL 1943
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 39TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
Subject: Food Situation and Armament Industry.
Held on Friday 23 April 1943, 9:30 A.M. in the Festival Barrack near the Zoo, Jebenstrasse
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MILCH: I am convinced that there are more Russian prisoners of war. At that time 4,000,000 were captured. A large part of them died, however the number of those who are still living is higher than we are told now. We reckon here with hundred thousand Russian prisoners of war in the agriculture. Altogether, we have 300,000 of them in the Reich. During the First World War I had 200 Italian prisoners of war with me. These prisoners were to be turned over, however, we kept ours by reporting them dead in order to keep them. And these people also wanted to stay in spite of the fact that we told them that they would be reported dead even to their families. We dragged these prisoners around with us till the end of the war.
KEHRL: If the food supplies of the labor brought in from abroad are taken from the German rations then, while we think that we are very rich for having these people, the German rations are in reality reduced, and the decrease in the working capacity of our own workers does more harm than the good done by the new people.
SPEER: But from the figures of this incoming labor we have to deduct those who leave the country because of expired foreign agreements, and the others which we lose because of cases of death or illness. On the whole the increase of labor in our total war economy is not at all so very important. (Interpolation: the more labor we fetch from the East, the more this total figure will increase.)
BACKE: But there is a limit, too, in the number of men we can absorb. At that time we were told that one million was to be taken into the country, from the East. Now we have already got several millions.
MILCH: You cannot count that way. Before all these measures in the second year of the war, the air force had 1.8 million men and today it has less than two million. The whole air armament which is a considerable part of the total war armament, in the course of the war or in the last 2½ years of the war has not even increased by 10 percent. In reality the total increase in this field amounts to about 125,000 to 150,000 men. We are always looking for those people. That is our main problem.
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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 31
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE[108] OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor Allocation on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 1000 hours, at the Reich Air Ministry.
SAUCKEL: * * * I have a Gau armament supervisor in Thuringia and I have just been inspecting the plants in Thuringia. At the railroad car factory in Gotha I have set things going so that within a few days it will be turning out 20 percent of its production again. Everything has been done. But one thing you must bear in mind: Labor allocation as an institution must be independent and must remain so. Furthermore I must ask you not to support constantly the opinion of the armament inspectors: Sauckel must be put under the control of the Ministry then everything will be better. Gentlemen, please see to it that that does not happen this year. As a National Socialist of long standing I am determined to cooperate unreservedly with you, the Minister for Armament and Production, indeed with all those gentlemen, but, in consideration of the difficulty in this sphere of work I must be given the amount of freedom to make decisions of my own which was guaranteed me by the Fuehrer’s decrees and those of the Reich Marshal. I would never have taken on the task without these decrees, because I know it cannot be accomplished without them. I beg you therefore, to create such an atmosphere as is necessary among the lower ranks too so that the Gau labor offices in the first place may be recognized as organizations which are entrusted to me and put at my disposal for keeping the labor commitment in order on the lower levels. * * *
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: I would like to insist on the fact that, in the future also, the S-plants be checked; for the S-plants form a suction pump, and, since it is known all over Italy and France, that whoever works in the S-plants is protected from any interference on my part is proved by the following fact. During the first three months I wanted to take out of Italy 1 million people before 30 May. In these two months hardly 7,000 men have come. That is just the difficulty. The bulk goes to the S-plants, and only the dregs are left for employment in Germany. I would like to achieve yet, that for the important plants in Italy, at least the number of S-plants be restricted, that is that the number of S-plants be not increased.
SCHIEBER: In Italy for every protected plant there is an agreement made. Over, beyond the situation on 15 February or 10 February, S-plants are established only with the approval of the services under me. We have them registered, and only when we aim at an agreement are they declared protected plants.
SAUCKEL: Now the question arises: If in such a protected plant there are more hands than are needed according to German standards, could they be handed over?
SCHIEBER: They are to be combed through but the people combed through are to be put only in other protected plants. Down there in Italy in your services there is a demand for 7,000 hands and more. The gentlemen are right to laugh at us saying: What does that mean, you want people, but at the same time our great task must be the transfer of people! I spoke with Leyers on Sunday and told him that I wished to have a conversation with the Gauleiter about this matter: If the labor offices state that there is still a certain surplus of hands employed, a commissioner appointed by General Leyers must then visit the respective plant together with a commissioner of Gauleiter Sauckel’s; they must examine the situation, and these two gentlemen must then come to an agreement, as to the people they remove from plants. * * * Besides these promises concerning nutrition have not been kept to the extent we wished. The extra food, as we had planned it has not yet appeared at all so that there is no incentive felt; apart from this certain inner evolutions are influencing industry at present in Italy, with the result that especially the leading workmen who are so valuable for us partly fail to come to the factory any more. They wait patiently until, during the next three or four weeks, the elections and convocations in the factories concerning socialization and the introduction of commissars, etc., are over. * * *
SAUCKEL: In Italy, it seems, things are going on smoothly in general, but not yet in France.
MILCH: When workmen are transferred how are their families ensured?
SAUCKEL: Automatically.
SCHIEBER: That is quite easy. If it is possible in any way, we shall have the whole personnel transferred to another factory. * * *
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: Years ago we made an investigation like this in France and saw that in German armament production, corresponding to districts A and B, some 600,000 workers were occupied out of the total of some 2½ to 3 million metal workers we had anticipated. Therefore there must still be some more metal workers hidden in France, people who were formerly in metal trades.
MILCH: So 75 percent are still free, and 25 percent are tied up in the S-industries.
SAUCKEL: We have to deduct the prisoners of war who are now in Germany. But there are hundreds of thousands of skilled workers who, according to the agreements made, have returned to France and Belgium month after month.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: In reply to that I must ask you the following: What do you want to do now in Germany? In Germany you now have plane construction, the manufacture of highly expensive apparatus, complicated engine construction, you have here in general the most complicated manufactures in the world. If I brought the scum of French manpower to Germany for you what would you get as regards production? We of the Labor Allocation were always of the opinion in the French industries we must under all circumstances maintain a certain level of the trained workers and a certain degree of production. And we wanted to compel these French industries to lower their level of a hundred percent skilled personnel for the benefit of the German industries which have been bled of their skilled hands.
As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I considered my task to be not the transfer to Germany of the scum of Europe, but the bringing of efficient manpower. But a part of your gentlemen in France, and in your Ministry too, had no understanding for this. That I must say quite plainly. It would be mere child’s play for me to bring you the refuse of Europe if you would be satisfied with it. I would simply grab all the whores and gigolos in Paris and put them at your disposal, then I would not have to touch your armament industries. But if I have to provide you with real workers who will prove efficient in Germany, then in France—and that was just my program—we must do the same as we did in every German plant and in every German enterprise: when a German company is split in two, some of the good workers and some of the bad ones had to be given up and not just the bad workers. And French armaments never were harmed thereby. It is a fact, is it not, that a French worker of quality produces the double amount if he is put in a German factory under German discipline, with German supervision and German welfare?
If we agree to re-examine all S-plants—and that is all I ask—and if we take out all superfluous expert workers and assistant workers, then we put them at the disposal of the other French enterprises which need them, to the extent that they need them, and when they are satisfied, I have to request that if I am to carry out my program, then from these plants too, workers must be transferred to Germany. If that is not approved of and it is insisted that the severe formula be observed: S-plants are out of question for labor commitments to Germany, then, according to my experience, this program of January 4 can hardly be achieved. Then you are responsible for the decision of what was better at the end of this year, to have these people in France or in Germany. That is the responsibility you have to bear and which I shift from my shoulders. I was told: Why did you not take the Russian workers away in time, now they are in the Russian regiments. Exactly the same would happen here. My opinion is that the introducing of S-plants was altogether a great mistake which is damaging to the general interests of Germany. The French government jumped to that with the greatest cleverness. * * * That is the way we did it the first year, and up to 700,000 Frenchmen came to the Reich according to the program. These were all decent French workers. From the fall of this year on this came to an end. No more skilled French workers came, nor any others either. It was the entire collapse of the labor allocation built up on the slogan: From now on no worker needs to go from France to Germany.
* * * * *
KEHRL: The consideration which originated at that time with Minister Speer and which led to the arrangement with Bichelonne was the following: If I cannot transfer the people by force from France to Germany to the extent necessary, which is shown, by developments now, and if at the same time I run the danger of having the people leave the plants in which they are now working for fear of being taken by force, then it is a lesser evil for me to try and put these people to work in France and Belgium, in which case I do not have to use German force to get them across the frontier. Then at least I am sure that the people are not running away from the plants in the first place and secondly that additional employment will be brought there.
He sent an invitation to Minister Bichelonne. The conferences took place between the 16th and 18th September. The question was put to Bichelonne to what extent the shifting of industries would be possible, and what additional productions he could place, etc. This caused a change in the policy of production. So far Minister Speer had chiefly shifted to France all the urgent armament productions in those fields in which the German capacity was insufficient. Now he said: I will not only shift this to France, but I will also shift really important war production, which is carried out at present in Germany with German labor, so that I can release German labor in Germany and have this production carried out in France, Belgium, and Holland. There is sufficient capacity in this field in France and labor is also available in sufficient numbers. Therefore a large part of the work can be accomplished there and I can release the people in Germany. Thereby I am serving two ends: in the first place I am setting free German labor and secondly I am utilizing the French workers who are not working at all now because industry is at standstill. And there is still a third factor, that Frenchmen will be ready of their own accord to carry out such production as serves the welfare of the civilian population, because with such work they are no longer in danger of air raids and they are not working directly for the war. So that they will not be considered as traitors to their country, but are working for the advantage of their own country.
This development has been encouraged in the meantime. The time is still too short to make any definite statement as to the results. In some fields the results are already quite exceptional. In some instances we have transferred up to 50 percent and more of the total German requirements to the West and the manufacturing is done there. The transfer figures are rising rapidly from month to month. The coal and power questions are of course great obstacles. We hope, however, to overcome them in the course of this year, because by the middle of the year we shall have increased 25 percent of the power supply in France by water power, the necessary constructions for which will be finished by them, and by the end of 1944 hydroelectric stations will be ready and they will be equal to 50 percent of the present French power production.
The idea in fact is this: to carry out there the work which up to now has been done here and to release thereby German labor. There is yet another reason for this. It has been pointed out by you time after time, Gauleiter, that in these sections of industry, it is not easy to change the workers. According to the Field Marshal’s description of the situation, there is especially a lack of managers and supervising personnel in the works and only German workmen can be considered for such, and every worker, even if technically he is not so suitable, will serve for purposes of management supervision and will lend some backbone to the plant.
As regards the question of the S-plants, Minister Speer put the following question to Minister Bichelonne: Are you in a position to provide the labor for such an extensive shifting program, which involves a certain risk? To which Bichelonne, from his standpoint quite rightly replied: If the people are not running away into the woods for fear of being deported to Germany I shall get them to work in French plants. From this discussion there resulted the idea of protected plants which, as you said, were supposed to represent a protection against Sauckel. Whoever is there is working for Germany and may not be deported to Germany. You said that these plants worked like a suction pump. That is just what they were meant to do. Labor was to be drawn in with a suction process so that the plants were full to capacity and could work for us. The existence of the S-plants cannot and may not be undermined. It is backed by the German promise which was given in all solemnity and which was supported by the signature of my Minister.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: May I again draw attention to the matter of volunteers and to the entire process of the allocation of French labor. There was never any program carried out in France on a voluntary basis, but the programs have been carried out for the Todt Organization the building of fortresses in France, on the one hand, and for the assignment in France to the plants working for Germany and also to the plants working for transferred industries according to concrete agreements which I made with the French government, on the other hand. The French government fulfilled these conditions last year. It appointed people for the western fortifications and for the Atlantic fortifications, it appointed people for the plants and it appointed people for Germany. In the fall of last year, towards the end of summer, Laval declared for the first time that he was not going to send any more people to Germany and from then on only very few Frenchmen arrived in Germany.
* * * * *
TIMM: Will it not happen that the offices making the demands say one day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled workers which cannot be justified?
MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First Speer must have a survey of what has happened as the result of all his agreements.
* * * * *
-----
[90] Tr. pp. 161-162.
[91] Defendant in case of Government of France vs. Hermann Roechling. See Vol. XIV.
[92] DR. BERGOLD, Milch’s defense counsel, objected as follows (Tr. p. 134): “May it please the Tribunal, I would like to make a final objection against the introduction of the exhibit just submitted by prosecution, namely 41-A, for the following reason: this is an interrogation of Sauckel, who, in conformance with the sentence passed upon him, was executed. I am of the opinion that such an interrogation cannot be used as evidence here, for, since Sauckel was executed, I have no possibility whatsoever to ask him to appear here before the Tribunal as a witness and to cross-examine him concerning his statements. In this statement there are certain things which are not correct, and, due to the fact that the person who made them is dead, they cannot be corrected. The International Military Tribunal frequently ruled that statements made by witnesses and affidavits can only be introduced when it is possible for the defense counsel to bear these persons as witnesses, and to ask prosecution to produce these people for cross-examination. This is absolutely impossible in the case of Sauckel, and I should like to ask the Tribunal to issue a ruling on whether or not these statements can be used as evidence here.
The Court ruled as follows (Tr. p. 194):
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Court has determined that under the Charter and the Ordinance this exhibit is admissible. Its weight, however, in view of the peculiar circumstances attending it, is, of course, still for the Tribunal to determine. This ruling is made after conference with the judges of Tribunal I, who had a similar problem presented, and who made the same ruling as this Tribunal now makes.
MR. DENNEY: If your Honors please, that question will come up again, because we have interrogations and affidavits from other defendants in the first trial, who have since either been executed or have taken their own lives.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The Tribunal feels that the very broad scope of the section of the Charter and the Ordinance dealing with the admission of evidence justifies the admission of this exhibit.
[93] Defense introduced this paragraph as Defense Exhibit 5. See pp. 509-10.
[94] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by the defense as Defense Exhibit 8. See pp. 511-15.
[95] Defendant before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.
[96] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by the defense as Defense Exhibit 31. See pp. 517 to 523.
[97] Defendants in case of United States vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.
[98] Same as note above.
[99] Defendant in case of United States vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al. See Vol. IV.
[100] Defendant in case of United States vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See Vols. X, XI.
[101] Defendant in case of United States vs. Carl Krauch, et al. See Vols. VII, VIII.
[102] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 17 Feb. and 4 Mar. 47, pp. 1136-1186, 1445-1457.
[103] Prosecution introduced other portions of this report as Prosecution Exhibit 48-A. See pp. 457-59.
[104] Prosecution also introduced this document.
[105] Defense counsel, Dr. Bergold, explained (Tr. p. 523):
“This document shows that the defendant liked to use strong language. It refers merely to the allocation. He speaks of ‘beating’, yet he does not mean this literally but figuratively. The high Tribunal will remember at one time he spoke of whips being used to force certain people to use suggested methods. That is not what he meant.”
[106] Dr. Bergold stated (Tr. p. 530): “This document is submitted to show that Field Marshal Milch was very much endeavouring to leave the French workers in France with their own firms and only to transfer orders over there. The International Military Tribunal has accounted as exonerating circumstances in the case of Speer that he established in France the protected plant system (Speer Betriebe); so far as Milch is concerned, we wish to point out that he did the very same thing for the airplane industry and that he tried to act in a reasonable way. I also wish to say that the man always had in mind reasonable economic propositions. Finally the document proves that individual remarks made were of no consequence whatsoever, that they were only verbal flourish which did not lead to any results. For instance, in the case of antiaircraft batteries, the conference passes that point over, which is shown by the last words of Speer and Milch. It is simply a marginal remark. I will also prove that he did not say that on this occasion and that the minutes were changed, because he had difficulties with Goering. I shall show that this passage, criticizing Goering, was taken out of the report because at that time serious difficulties arose between him and Goering.”
[107] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by the prosecution as Prosecution Exhibit 48-A. See pp. 467-71.
[108] Another portion of the minutes of this meeting was introduced by the prosecution as Exhibit 48-A, See pp. 484 to 498.
3. THE JAEGERSTAB[109]
_EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE JAEGERSTAB, 13 JANUARY 1947_[110]
MR. KING: If your Honors please, the prosecution begins now the presentation of that phase of its case dealing with the defendant Milch’s participation in the Jaegerstab. I might add that that has to do with the slave labor phase of the Milch case.
First, I wish to say a few words about the background of the Jaegerstab. The Jaegerstab was formed on 1 March 1944 by decree of Albert Speer issued pursuant to an order of Adolf Hitler. Our evidence will show, however, that it was the defendant Milch who conceived and instigated the formation of the Jaegerstab.
The purpose of the Jaegerstab was increased production of fighter aircraft. Fighter plane production had suffered severe set-backs due to British and American air attacks. Defendant Milch and his Luftwaffe had also suffered in the battle for new raw materials.
Fighter aircraft were Germany’s principal defense against bombing raids. Early in 1944 the defendant Milch had concluded that without adequate fighter protection the entire German armament industry would soon be destroyed. After repeated urgings, Milch was finally successful in his efforts to create a special commission of top officials from various ministries to undertake a special effort in the field of fighter production.
The Jaegerstab, therefore, was actually a concentration of experts drawn from various ministries. Our evidence will show that the defendant Milch and Speer were designated as the joint chiefs of the Jaegerstab with Karl Adolf Saur acting as Chief of Staff.
The methods adopted by the Jaegerstab in the execution of its tasks were (1) transfer of German aircraft industry underground, (2) the decentralization of German aircraft industry, (3) quick repair of bombed-out plants.
Our proof will show that the labor for this program, which was the decisive consideration in the discussions of the Jaegerstab, was obtained from three sources: (1) Sauckel Ministry, (2) concentration camps, (3) direct recruitment from occupied countries.
Evidence
Prosecution Documents
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page NOKW-017 54 Extracts from the minutes of 527 the conference with air force engineers and chief quartermasters under chairmanship of Milch, 25 March 1944. NOKW-261 70 Chart of the organization of 535 the Jaegerstab drawn by Saur with letter of transmittal to prosecution staff, 14 November 1946. 1584-III-PS 71 Correspondence between Himmler 537 and Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning the use of concentration camp prisoners in the aircraft industry. R-124 48-E Extracts from the minutes of 539 discussions between Saur and the Fuehrer, 6 and 7 April 1944. NOKW-247 61 Appointment of Field Marshal 540 Milch as Goering’s plenipotentiary for the intensification of air force armament. F-824 57 Order of Field Marshal von 542 Kluge regarding compulsory recruitment of labor in the West, 25 July 1944. NOKW-337 75 Extracts from transcript of 544 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference of 6 March 1944. NOKW-338 75 Extracts from transcript of 545 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference on Friday, 17 March 1944. NOKW-346 75 Extracts from transcript of 546 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference under chairmanship of Field Marshal Milch on Monday, 20 March 1944. NOKW-388 75 Extracts from transcript of 547 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference of 28 March 1944. NOKW-334 75 Extract from transcript of 550 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference of 25 April 1944. NOKW-362 75 Extracts from transcript of 552 stenographic minutes of Jaegerstab Conference on the occasion of the 5th trip of the “Hubertus Undertaking”, 2 and 3 May 1944. NOKW-390 75 Extract from transcript of 553 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference of 4 May 1944. NOKW-442 75 Extract from transcript of 554 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference on 5 May 1944. NOKW-361 75 Extract from transcript of 554 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference during the 6th journey of the “Hubertus Undertaking” from 8-10 May 1944. NOKW-336 75 Extracts from transcript of 555 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference on 26 May 1944. NOKW-359 75 Extracts from transcript of 557 stenographic minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference on 27 June 1944. NOKW-320 73 Extract from interrogation of 558 Karl Otto Saur on 13 November 1946, concerning the use of concentration camp prisoners in Jaegerstab construction. NOKW-266 76 Affidavit of Fritz Schmelter, 559 19 November 1946, concerning the organization of the Jaegerstab.
Defense Documents
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page Speer Ex. 34 17 Order of Hitler, 21 April 1944, 560 delegating to Dorsch authority for Jaegerstab constructions. NOKW-337 12 Excerpts from the stenographic 561 minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference on 6 March 1944 in the Reich Air Ministry. NOKW-338 13 Excerpts from the stenographic 562 minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference presided over by Field Marshal Milch on Friday, 17 March 1944, 1100 hours, in the Reich Air Ministry. NOKW-365 15 Extract from the stenographic 563 minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference, 12 April 1944. NOKW-334 16 Extracts from stenographic 564 minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference, 25 April 1944. NOKW-442 21 Extract from the stenographic 565 minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference, 5 May 1944. NOKW-336 23 Excerpts from the stenographic 566 minutes of the Jaegerstab Conference on Friday, 26 May 1944, at 10:00 o’clock.
Testimony
Extracts of testimony of defense witness Fritz Schmelter 567 Extracts of testimony of defense witness Xaver Dorsch 583
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-017 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 54
EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH AIR FORCE ENGINEERS AND CHIEF QUARTERMASTERS UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF MILCH, 25 MARCH 1944
[Handwritten note] To my files Mi. Secret _MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH AIR FORCE ENGINEERS AND CHIEF QUARTERMASTERS UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON SATURDAY, 25 MARCH 1944, AT 10 O’CLOCK_
Dr. Koppert/Lm. 25 March 1944
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Gentlemen! I welcome you. I have called you together here in order to discuss with you questions of importance for our German defense.
Beginning with the year 1942, the Luftwaffe put special emphasis upon a considerable increase in the number of fighter planes produced each month which at that time amounted to 200 to 220. It was possible, by July of last year, to exceed the figure of one thousand as the norm, in accordance with our program. Then the heavy raids, especially against our armament industry, began first against the preliminary industry [Vorindustrie] in the Ruhr, then against our fighter and airplane industry itself. The enemy enumerated 65 completely destroyed fighter factories and factories producing parts for fighters in his lists. Beginning in the middle of 1942 we undertook extensive evacuations, and did so to small localities above ground, smaller places, and the like. In so doing, about 4½ million square meters of factory space, productive space, were evacuated. That was the maximum that could be accomplished with the means at our disposal. We were lacking in transport space, we were lacking in machine tools, and primarily we were lacking in skilled workers and managerial forces, more of whom are of course needed in a dispersed system of manufacture than in a centralized system. The extraordinary drafting into the Wehrmacht and just at the end also the SE 3-drive deprived the Luftwaffe armament industry of its key personnel. We have in our employ today approximately 60 percent foreigners and 40 percent Germans, whereby one has to take into consideration that the women work in the factories only half a day. Therefore, the ratio of Germans to foreigners becomes considerably more unfavorable. The ratio is gradually approaching 90 percent foreign with 10 percent German supervising them. The rest of the Germans are concentrated in development factories and the like.
The enemy has now adopted a definite plan—as you as soldiers know yourselves and learn constantly from foreign news—of destroying aircraft production first, and mainly the production of fighter planes and night fighters, in order to be able to deal with Germany as he pleases. The enemy believes that this stage has almost been reached now. There is, however, still some confusion in his news reports. One day he expresses his amazement that the German fighter planes did not appear. Then again the newspapers receive a secret directive: “Unpleasant surprises do occur, so do not emphasize so strongly that the enemy has already disappeared from the air.” On the whole, however, the enemy hopes that it has come to the point where Germany’s backbone has been broken or that at least that stage has almost been reached where the enemy has been granted the possibility of dealing with Germany as he pleases.
Another plan our Western enemies have concerns the questions surrounding the concept of the invasion. The invasion and its success would of course also be favorably influenced by a destruction of German anti-air raid defenses.
We of the Luftwaffe armaments have been asking for over a year already that a strong home defense in the air be set up. We have made efforts to establish the prerequisites necessary for this, namely, the providing of sufficient planes to serve as day and night fighters. * * * Being fully aware that the strength of the Luftwaffe alone is insufficient both as regards quotas and with respect to the workers, etc., in order to bring about an extensive change in the field of air armaments, we applied to Minister Speer and his colleagues to undertake a common special effort in this field. The establishment of a Ruhr staff served as an example for us; it was established at the time when the industry in the Ruhr area seemed to be entirely put out of commission by the continuous raids. At that time the Ruhr staff was set up and the necessary quotas, buildings, etc., were put at its disposal. Thereby the entire situation was changed. Minister Speer and his colleagues, fully aware that without air armaments and without air defense the rest of the armament industry would very soon be destroyed and become useless, agreed to this plan enthusiastically and with initiative. Thus it came about that a definite proposal was made to the Reich Marshal and the Fuehrer: the Jaegerstab was created. The order of the Fuehrer provides clearly that the fighter plane program which the Jaegerstab is starting has priority over all other fields of armament, which means, to be sure, that other important armaments are not to be infringed upon by it. * * *
* * * * *
The Jaegerstab is made up as follows: the direction is in the hands of Reich Minister Speer and myself. Deputy for both of us, and at the same time our chief of staff, is Hauptdienstleiter Dipl. Ing. Saur, who is sitting on my left. Saur is the man who carried out the large-scale armament program for the army and the navy in the Speer Ministry in recent years in an exemplary manner. Saur again and again during the past year and a half succeeded in raising the production figures in all important fields and sometimes even in multiplying them.
Further, I name only the leaders of the Jaegerstab. We have put the question of over-all planning in the hands of Dr. Wegener. Construction matters will be directed by Dipl. Ing. Schlempp. The evacuation underground will be in the hands of SS Gruppenfuehrer Kammler. The supply, one of the most essential factors, and everything in the way of semi-manufactured material that comes to our factories for completion, will be taken care of by Director Schaaf, deputy to Staatsrat Dr. Schieber, the chief of the armament supply office [Ruestungslieferungsamt] in Speer’s Ministry. Dr. Schmelter will take care of labor commitment. Sites suitable for dispersal, confiscations, etc., will be in the hands of Ministerialrat Speh of the armaments supply office. Gruppenfuehrer Nagel of the Organization Speer will be in charge of transportation. The supply of power will be in the hands of General Director Fischer. Engineer Lange will be in charge of machinery, Mr. Nobel of repairs. Reich railroad questions will be in the hands of the President of the Reich railroad, Pueckler. Post Office: Oberpostrat Dr. Zerbel. Health matters: Dr. Poschmann. Social welfare: Dr. Birkenholz. Special problems for Me 262 and steel power units: Captain Dr. Krome. Raw materials and quota system: Dr. Stoffregen. Questions of technical simplification, etc.: Oberstabsing. Klinker. Office manager: Petri.
* * * On the spot the individual gentlemen are then told, supported by the combined authority of the state, the Wehrmacht, and the Party, that is, Saur and me—Speer is unfortunately still on sick leave, otherwise he would also be present—what it is all about. That takes ten minutes. After ten minutes the individual members of the Jaegerstab disappear and get together with the men from the factory who are competent for their sphere of activity. Thus, all pertinent questions are dealt with in the conferences about the commitment of labor, and all competent men, who have anything to do with the commitment of labor meet, especially the president of the competent Provincial Labor Office. Thus it is determined on the spot, in the individual spheres, what the factory lacks. If the circumstances require it, it is immediately demonstrated to the factory that their requests are nonsense. Unreasonable demands and excessive claims are revised. Well-founded demands are immediately filled. While the discussions are still going on, telegrams are sent to the different offices, and the people are already set to work. In general, the people arrive in 24 hours. Unfortunately there are exceptions, for which the Wehrmacht sector is responsible. The Wehrmacht does not work as smoothly and beautifully as civilian offices. It is an error to believe that civilian offices are more bureaucratic than military offices. On the basis of my continuous and extensive experience I can assure you exactly the opposite is true.
* * * * *
* * * Our entire German ball-bearing industry, and that outside Germany, was eliminated one hundred percent by the enemy in a, I must say, brilliant attacking operation: Erfurt, Schweinfurt, Frankfurt on the Main, Stuttgart, Italy. We were faced with the question whether without ball bearings we could produce new planes at all, new tanks, or whether we had to capitulate as an armament industry. For ball bearings are an indispensable factor in modern armament industry. One finds and needs them everywhere, even in places where one does not think of them at first. Now it became apparent, thank God, that the branches of the Wehrmacht had hoarded ball bearings and roller bearings in such large masses that we got along for three months with the hoarded material alone. In this case it was lucky that we still had so much, that so many ball bearings had been hoarded. I have to admit that. But that is not the normal way. It is certain that in the whole period up to now too many spare parts have been requested just in order to gather such hoards. And this in spite of the fact that not everything has been attained by far, but only very large stocks. I should like to say that with the material you have, 20 to 30,000 planes could be newly built or newly equipped without further ado. That is how much material you have! And this does not concern large parts; for in that field I was always strict—it concerns rather all the accessories and apparatus. In considering these figures one has to know that about 52 percent of the total man-hours are spent in equipping a plane and only 48 percent in building the aircraft frame and the engine. Only then does one realize fully the importance for us of all that small junk that is lying around all over. It is not necessary that the troops always take along all their spare parts. * * *
Gentlemen, in this connection I may call your attention to another important point. If I visit an office and find out that something is being hidden there, then I ask for the death penalty for such a crime today! That is fraud! That is sabotage of the German armament industry!
* * * * *
Then there is still the human factor. We often had considerable difficulty with the human factor. The fluctuation there is very considerable. The quota of the Luftwaffe in the distribution of manpower is constantly lowered. The foreigners run away. They do not keep to any contract. There are difficulties with Frenchmen, Italians, Dutch. The prisoners of war are partly unruly and fresh. These people are also supposed to be carrying on sabotage. These elements cannot be made more efficient by small means. They are just not handled strictly enough. If a decent foreman would sock one of those unruly guys because the fellow won’t work, then the situation would soon change. International law cannot be observed here. I have asserted myself very strongly, and with the help of Saur I have very strongly represented the point of view that the prisoners, with the exception of the English and the Americans, should be taken away from the military authorities. Soldiers are not in a position, as experience has shown, to cope with these fellows who know all the answers. I shall take very strict measures here and shall put such a prisoner of war before my court martial. If he has committed sabotage or refused to work, I will have him hanged, right in his own factory. I am convinced that that will not be without effect.
Anyhow, the strangest things occur in the treatment of the workers. It is said that the people collapse, and then one has to find out that they have a furlough of three or four days every eight weeks. That is dirty business of the first order and treason to the country! Then perhaps a construction battalion arrives and is supposed to be put to work. The commanding officer, perhaps some overfed grade-school teacher, declares that the men must drill and must take part in sports! Damn it, the fellows are there to work so that the maximum amount of work will result. One has to act very strictly here. A construction battalion was ordered to Regensburg. The commanding officer was one of those scholars who said he could not billet the men in peacetime conditions and, therefore, he refused to start work. Such a guy should be convicted by a court martial and hanged. I would be grateful if the gentlemen would proceed in that manner. As with me in industry, so every stupidity is possible everywhere else also. As chief, one has to take up these matters. I know what kind of obstacles become apparent. There is bureaucracy. It is not easy to go against bureaucracy. But we have to cut through that also, and if you, Gentlemen, proceed with the right attitude here, then we are already assured of success.
* * * * *
* * * In saying this I do not even consider the fact that the workshops have first-class personnel, whereas we in the Luftwaffe armament industry have Russians, French prisoners of war, Dutch, and members of 32 other nations. Obtaining interpreters alone presents a big difficulty there. * * *
A further question concerns the efforts for housing the machines. That is very important, and I would be very grateful if you would think this matter over also. In this manner you would not only facilitate the question of spare parts but also the scarce supply of materials. Each fighter plane contains about one ton of aluminum. Every small bomber contains four tons of aluminum; and a larger bomber, seven to eight tons. The captured bombers contain eleven to twelve tons of aluminum. There are in any case tremendous amounts of material involved here. Let us take twelve tons as normal for an American heavy bomber, or let us say only ten tons, and let us assume that we actually shoot down 500 such American bombers a month and that we can salvage them over our own territory; that alone means 5,000 tons of aluminum, 5,000 tons: that is 25 percent of the aluminum quota at the disposal of the Luftwaffe. You can see how important these questions are, too. We can certainly count on more Americans being shot down in the future because we will have more fighter planes.
* * * * *
I further ask for support by the Luftwaffe physicians. With all the rabble that we have among the foreign workers there is of course a lot of shirking. At the moment the Russians—that is, the Russian prisoners of war—are feigning a lot of fatigue and illness. The incidence of sickness of one-and-a-half to two percent which we have had up to now has at least doubled and in some factories it has been increased to eight, nine, and ten percent. That is, of course, done by previous agreement. There the official physicians must undertake an examination and if the physicians, who have to be very strict, find out that it is not true, then we return the fellows to work by means of the whip. Then the whip serves as cure.
A further request which is very important from the point of view of leadership! Sometimes we do not know in case of an alert what orders we want to give for our factories. If a factory knows that it is about to be attacked, and it has a few trench shelters but does not have a bomb-proof shelter or the like, then the people simply run away from the factory, automatically at each raid, after the first one, and they usually cannot be caught the next day, either. That applies particularly to the foreigners. We have, therefore, now issued the following order, and have equipped the superiors accordingly with weapons and pistols: as soon as a factory which has already been attacked a few times can count on the raids being aimed at that particular factory again, then the personnel leave the factory; but in closed groups by shops, under the leadership of the man in charge of the shop, and, to the extent that they are German personnel, they leave singing military songs. The people are led away from the factory to a distance of 1,000 or 1,500 meters. There they have to lie down in slit trenches and watch their factory from there, so that they can immediately rush to it after the raid in order to help and to save what can be saved. That is the only correct way to do it. * * *
* * * * *
Gentlemen, you come from the fronts, and some of you were perhaps surprised to see how Berlin looks. I recommend to you, if you still have time today, to drive around in a bus and see Berlin. The center still looks quite nice. But have a look at other districts of Berlin too, or look at Frankfurt or Duesseldorf or whatever all of these places are called, in their present condition; then you will admit to me that the population will not be able to endure this condition permanently; not that there is any danger of a revolution or any such thing as we know it from 1918. But at a certain point a human being just cannot endure any more. It is quite surprising how the population has endured this thing so far or how it always gets on its feet again, when it is led in the proper way by true leaders (Fuehrer) who, thank God, are present among the people through the Party and the rest of the leadership. But you must not forget, Gentlemen, the war of nerves has reached a point which causes us in the leadership group worry. The people cannot endure that forever.
One does not have to see only how the people are working—I have told you that—but also how they live, where they are living today, how they are sleeping today. There are hundreds of thousands of Berliners who have not known any heating for months, who have not been able to take a bath for months, who have not been able to shave with warm water for months, and the like. They are happy if they can still put their warm coffee [Plirsch] in their stomachs in the morning and at noon their soup. And with that they work seventy-two hours. It is a damned difficult affair. Whoever does not understand that and whoever does not say on this occasion: From now on our work will be done quite differently than was the case so far, is a miserable wretch in my opinion. And everyone of us and everyone you appoint has to be trained to accomplish in this sphere what the others have been accomplishing for a long time. We have to do that, we have to increase our production so that we can push the enemy back in the next few weeks and months in the same way as he has advanced to Berlin and farther, step by step.
* * * * *
Please go wherever you are going and knock everybody down who blocks your way! We cover up everything here. We do not ask whether he is allowed to or whether he is not allowed to. For us, there is nothing but this one task. We are fanatics in this sphere. We do not even consider letting anything at all distract us from that task. No order exists which could prevent me from fulfilling this task. Nor shall I ever be given such an order. Now, do not let anything deter you, and get your people to the point that no one deters them. If there is a little hindrance from below, this is not due to ill will but to stupidity. Gentlemen! In the fifth year of war stupidity is a crime!
* * * * *
Gentlemen, I know, not every subordinate can say: For me, the law no longer exists, but he has to have someone who covers up for him, not out of cowardice; but if you act according to the spirit of the old field service regulation, “Abstaining from doing something hurts us more than erring in the choice of the means,” and if, moreover, you keep in touch and immediately clarify difficult points so that something can be done, then we are willing to accept the responsibility, whether this is the law or not. I see only two possibilities for me and for Germany: Either we succeed and thereby save Germany, or we continue these slipshod methods and then get the fate that we deserve. I prefer to fall while I am doing something that is against the rules but that is right and sensible and be called to account for it and, if you like, hanged, rather than be hanged because Papa Stalin is here in Berlin, or the Englishman. I have no desire for that. I would rather die in a different way. But I think we can accomplish this task, too. We are in the fifth year of war. I repeat: The decision will come within the next six weeks!
Heil Hitler! (End: 12:20 hours)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-261 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 70
CHART OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JAEGERSTAB DRAWN BY SAUR WITH LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO PROSECUTION STAFF, 14 NOVEMBER 1946
Nuernberg, 14 November 1946
K. O. Saur
TO: Mr. King, via Prison Office.
In accordance with your request enclosed please find the organization chart of the Jaegerstab which was founded by decree of Reich Minister Speer on 1 March 1944. The chart was drawn up from memory.
The working methods of the Jaegerstab are disclosed in their essence by the following paragraph from the Armament Staff Charter issued by Reich Minister Speer on 1 August 1944.
“Also in the future in order to prevent the Armament Staff from developing gradually into an extensive agency, the regulation concerning the purely personal membership will be maintained, as was the case for the Jaegerstab. The technical work will be done, therefore, in the office and agencies to which the personal members belong, under the responsibility of the competent office chiefs or agency directors.”
The ministries and their offices or agencies responsible for the different tasks are mentioned individually in the organization chart.
For reasons of clarity, the Jaegerstab, as liaison office, has been framed in red; the technological office, which then was under my own responsibility has been framed in blue. [See legend on chart.]
[Signed] SAUR
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 71
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIMMLER AND GOERING, 9 MARCH 1944, CONCERNING THE USE OF CONCENTRATION CAMP PRISONERS IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
1879/44 Secret 9 March 1944
Field-command office
Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944.
5 copies, 5th copy Top Secret State Matter Most honored Reich Marshal,
Following my teletype letter of 18 February 1944, I herewith transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.[111]
This survey indicates that at the present time about 36,000 prisoners are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total of 90,000 prisoners is contemplated.
The production is being discussed, established, and executed between the Reich Ministry of Aviation and the Chief of my Economic Administrative Main Office, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS Pohl.[112]
We shall render assistance with all forces at our disposal.
The task of my Economic Administrative Main Office, however, is not solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation industry, as SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of the required working speed through constant control and supervision of the work-groups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in enlarging our responsibility through a speeding up of the total work better results can definitely be expected.
We also have for some time adjusted our own stone quarries to production for the air force. For instance, in Flossenbuerg near Weiden the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg, which saw in the availability of our stonemason shops and labor forces after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4,000 prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2,000 men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter Me 109.
In Oranienburg we are now employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel works for construction of the He 177. With these we are supplying 60 percent of the total crew of the plant.
The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8,000 prisoners.
We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2,500 women are working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and rudder control. The plant has adjusted the total aerial production to employ prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500 rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are increasing employment to 4,000 women. The performance of the women is excellent.
In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn (Brno) we produce also for the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant supplies 14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for Me 109 to the Messerschmitt Corporation, Augsburg.
The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to subterranean locations requires further employment of about 100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of 14 February 1944 are already under way.
I shall keep you, most honored Reich Marshal, currently informed on this subject.
Heil Hitler! [Initialed] H.H. [HEINRICH HIMMLER]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-E
EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SAUR AND THE FUEHRER, 6 AND 7 APRIL 1944
Top Secret State Matter
The Chief of the Technical Office TA Ch S/Kr
Berlin, 9 April 1944 _MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FUEHRER ON 6 AND 7 APRIL 1944_
* * * * *
16. Reports made to the Fuehrer by myself [Saur] and Field Marshal Milch, based on tables and drawings, as to the achievements of the Jaegerstab stressing the satisfactory cooperation of the new organization with all offices and plants. Reported in detail that plans have been made for the best part of transfers, and that, as a first installment, the decentralization above ground will be completed by August, and, as the second installment, that the most vulnerable plants will be underground by the end of the year.
17. Field Marshal Milch reported on the result of a construction staff meeting of the Central Planning Board according to which the most important building projects only could materialize due to a great tension in general conditions. In spite of this, the Fuehrer demands that the two huge buildings of 600,000 square meters each should be erected with all speed. He agrees that one of these buildings is not to be made from concrete but—according to our suggestion—will be set up as an extension of, and close to, the Middle Plant [Mittelwerk] as a so-called “Middle-Building” [Mittelbau], and that this plant will be placed under the direction of the Junkers Works. Plans have to be made without delay to secure production in bottleneck items of the Junkers Works, production of Me 262 at 1,000 per month, and fighters at 2,000 per month.
Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders and equipment, the second big building project should not be set up in German territory but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferably on gravel base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian, or Dutch territory. The Fuehrer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Fuehrer asks that an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer himself will contact the Reich Leader SS and will give an order that the required 100,000 men are to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that the building organization of the Industry Association Silesia [Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien] was a failure, the Fuehrer demands that these works must be built by the O.T. [Organization Todt] exclusively and that the workers should be made available by the Reich Leader SS. He wants to hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the men concerned.
* * * * *
The Fuehrer agrees that these items may be used as a basis for future conferences.
[signed] SAUR [typed] (SAUR)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-247 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 61
APPOINTMENT OF FIELD MARSHAL MILCH AS GOERING’S PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF AIR FORCE ARMAMENT
Copy
The Reich Marshal of Greater Germany Chairman of the Reich Defense Council
Berlin, June [sic] AUTHORIZATION
The war situation calls for the utmost intensification of the armament capacity of the German Air Force within the shortest time. The goal of the measures to be taken has to be the fourfold increase of the present production in all branches of air force armament. I commission the State Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation, Field Marshal Milch, with the speediest execution of this intensification of armament ordered by the Fuehrer. To secure the attainment of the end at which we aim I confer herewith the most extensive power of authority on Field Marshal Milch within the sphere defined as follows:
1. Shutting-down and seizure of factories, decisions about expropriations and forced leases, seizure and expropriation of construction material in agreement with the Plenipotentiary General for Construction, erection of auxiliary buildings exempted from restricting provisions of the building police, of the office for the supervision of industry, of air-raid protection, social institutions, etc., as far as these provisions are incompatible with the fast completion of the building projects.
2. Confiscation, expropriation, and renting of machinery of all kinds and its distribution to the armament factories of the Luftwaffe. Forced transfer of workers who are unemployed or employed in industry of any kind whatsoever, this not only for the erection of the buildings but also for allocation to Luftwaffe armament factories.
3. Confiscation of raw materials absolutely essential for the Luftwaffe program; only superfluous raw materials may then be distributed in the manner as now. This refers especially to light metals and gasoline.
4. Removal and transfer of key personnel of the entire armament industry irrespective of existing contracts under private law; cancellations of or changes in existing powers of authorization, and issue of new powers; creation of industrial associations, patent associations, merger of companies; creation of new companies, and separation of uneconomically working firms and their coordination or subordination to better managed firms.
5. Deviation from existing regulations about the financing of the war and premiums in cases where the utmost intensification of output cannot be achieved otherwise. In this connection due consideration has to be given to the economical situation and to the financial capacity of the firms involved.
6. All decisions of and all measures taken by my plenipotentiary on the basis of this authorization have to be regarded as if they were ordered by me. These decrees and measures have priority in respect to all other official directions and decrees as far as these are not compatible with the speediest execution of the intensification of the production capacity.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT F-824 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 57
ORDER OF FIELD MARSHAL VON KLUGE REGARDING COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT OF LABOR IN THE WEST, 25 JULY 1944
Secret [Stamp]
2_a_ [Handwritten]
Headquarters, 25 July 1944
546 [Handwritten]
Commander in Chief West Section IaT No. 1731/44 secret
Reference: 1. OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1) Qu.2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret of 8 July 1944 (distributed only to Commander in Chief West and the Military Commanders.)
2. OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1) Qu.2 (West) No. 05431/44 secret of 19 July 1944.
(File Notes)
Subject: Procurement of Labor in the West.
With Ref. to 2, Chief OKW has ordered:
“The communication of Field Marshal Von Kluge of 8 July, addressed to the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production, crossed with my order of the same day.” (OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm. 1) Qu. 2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret).
From this it is evident that, by order of the Fuehrer, under suspension of orders to the contrary, the wishes of the Plenipotentiary for Labor [Sauckel] and of Reich Minister Speer must, in principle, be carried out. Further, to my teletype, the following additional general directions apply in future, as a result of the conference of ministers in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July, about which the Commander in Chief West will have been informed by the military commander:
Rejecting justified misgivings with regard to peace and security in the interior of the country, seizures must be carried out wherever the opportunities referred to in my above-mentioned teletype offer themselves. As the only limitation, the Fuehrer has ordered that no forcible means shall be employed against the population in the actual combat area as long as it [the population] shows itself prepared to assist the German Armed Forces. However, recruiting of volunteers from among refugees from the combat zone is to be carried out vigorously. Moreover, every means is justified to seize as much labor as possible otherwise, apart from [using] the powers granted to the armed forces.
In order to render as effective as possible the measures which have been introduced, the troops are furthermore to be instructed in general as to the necessity of the organization for conscription of labor in order to put an end to the open and covert resistance which has arisen in many instances. The field commandants and the offices of the military administration must give wide support to the representatives of the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation and refrain from encroaching on their sphere of activity.
I now direct that the necessary orders in this sense be given and that I be constantly informed about the measures taken and their execution.
Indorsement of Commander in Chief West:
In accordance with this, Commander in Chief West has reported the following to the Chief of the OKW on 23 July 1944:
1. I have authorized the execution of the Sauekel-Laval agreement of 12 May in spite of misgivings because of interior security.
2. I will issue more detailed directives for the execution of the measures in the combat zone in accordance with OKW/WFST/Qu. (Adm.1)/2 (West) No. 05201/44 secret of 8 July 1944.
The Commander in Chief West [Typewritten] VON KLUGE Field Marshal
Additional orders will follow.
For the Commander in Chief West The Chief of Staff BY ORDER (illegible signature) Colonel, GSC
Distribution: High Command Army Group B High Command Army Group G Armored Group Command West Mil. Cmdr. in France Armed Forces Commander in Belgium and northern France
For Information:
Commander in Chief West/Ic [Intelligence] IaT (Draft)
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-337[113] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 6 MARCH 1944
SS MAJOR: [unidentified] I have already discussed with Lt. Col. Diesing our requirements according to our construction plan in the immediate program. From tomorrow 5,000 prisoners will be in readiness to carry out this measure. For that we need 750 guard personnel.
* * * * *
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We must distribute our German people as key personnel. That is, out of three construction companies we can probably make ten complete ones by introducing 70 percent foreigners.
SS MAJOR: They must be skilled workers. In handling the prisoners, it appears best that we should give 5 to 10 of them to one man who knows his job.
SAUR: The construction companies will be dissolved to provide key personnel for teams 10 times or even 100 times their size. That is a question which must be clarified by 10 a.m. tomorrow between the Plenipotentiary General for Construction and the air force construction units on one side and Kammler’s construction staff on the other. That will be clarified by tomorrow and he then must say what he needs. The Todt Organization must take part in the discussion, but I cannot consent to the inclusion of the Todt Organization in the matter as a third leading organization, as we would get confused. The Todt Organization must bleed with the rest. It is the same as your construction companies. It is the donor but he is the organizer and usufructuary. He is by all means the usufructuary. For besides being organizer, he is the usufructuary for the construction sites of the Plenipotentiary General for Construction.
SS MAJOR: Therefore it is important that these construction companies should be under military leadership!
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: * * * We further appealed to the Fuehrer that we should get the 64 miners who are in Berchtesgaden, as the work there will probably soon be finished. He made the suggestion that we, like the SS, should also train miners in the greater degree and mentioned the figure of 10,000 who would have to be trained one after another because they could not all be trained at once.
SAUR: The SS should be told that the training of miners should rest entirely with them because the SS runs the best mining school.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: We must also ask the SS to get more miners from Italy and Slovakia.
SAUR: * * * We must bring more order into the PW base camps [Stalags]. We have made a proposal that the PW base camps should be transferred to the SS. The Italians and eastern peoples should be treated more roughly.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-338[114] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944
* * * * *
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: * * * We already count on 100,000 men for the tasks of the Jaegerstab. To transfer them would mean breaking into the rest of the armament economy to an unheard-of degree.
(SAUR: 100,000 without Kammler!)
Including the labor we give Kammler but not including the concentration camp people.
SAUR: Right from the beginning we realized that 200,000 men would be transferred.
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: I have just spoken to Prinzel about it. It is absolutely necessary that the few German key personnel at our disposal should be taken with the concentration camp inmates or with the other subjugated people in such a proportion as will guarantee the best use of this valuable German strength * * *.
* * * * *
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN: I am always getting demands for German labor. For example: Here are 5,000 concentration camp inmates, give me 1,000 German workers. I do not fulfill these requests in this proportion; otherwise my German labor would soon come to an end. We have filled only a fraction of the positions. I distribute German workers only in the ratio of 1:10.
* * * * *
MILCH: The air force stresses the importance of getting the whole cave for the purposes of manufacture. * * *
PORSCHE: * * * I shall talk to Weiss again about our getting more concentration camp people for finishing off the work.
(DIESING: We probably shall not get them.)
I’ll get them from the Reich Leader. I already have 3,500. Two of Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl’s men are going to France to prepare everything locally with regard to housing and feeding.
* * * * *
NOBEL: Can one be responsible for foreigners working as airfield control personnel? The repair works say: yes!
(MILCH: Not as pilots!)
I do not think that is intended. The repair works said yesterday that it would be a help to them if foreigners could be used as airfield control personnel. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-346 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON MONDAY, 20 MARCH 1944
* * * * *
SAUR: * * * As far as Hungary is concerned, I should be grateful if the Field Marshal would call up Mr. Sauckel and tell him that the whole group mobilized in Hungary should be primarily at the disposal of the Jaegerstab. Large construction [of entrenchments] columns [Schanz Kolonnen] must be formed. The people have to be treated like prisoners. Otherwise it won’t work.
* * * * *
SAUR: Where are the 54,000 Czechs?
MAHNKE: Of the 58,000 Czechs, 17,000 have been earmarked for Czechoslovakia. 31,000 are intended for the Reich, and after that 26,000 have been divided among the special commissions [Sonderausschusse]. 31,000 were for power units.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-388 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 28 MARCH 1944
* * * * *
NOBEL: The labor situation in the repair sector is very unsatisfactory. Of the 2,000 people promised me before from the Action Sauckel, not one has yet arrived. There is no point in saying that people should apply to the armament department [Ruestungskommando]. The armament departments and inspectorates [Ruestungskommandos and Inspektionen] have not got anybody. If these men are not roped in by higher authority, the repair workshops cannot get any labor. My people are not in a position to stop production because we have not received any men since 11 March.
MEMBER OF THE JAEGERSTAB: I brought this matter up yesterday with Ministerialdirigent Dr. Timm of the office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, and told him that we handed in our request on 17 March, but had not yet received any laborers. He could not tell me anything but will let us know today. I will ask Schmelter, who is coming to this meeting later, to follow up the matter.
MILCH: Tell Schmelter, that if I can help in any way by calling Sauckel, etc., he should let me know.
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: I have received such high demands, for instance today over 3,000, tomorrow over 5,000, and the day after, again over 4,000, that it cannot possibly be that the labor is really needed, or else the firms do not understand the program. What has been received from you, Mr. Lange, has been passed on. It is also to be expected that these laborers will come within the next 10-14 days. I have arranged with Sauckel that I shall give out red tickets for the most urgent demands, first of all a consignment of 10,000. That will do to begin with. These red tickets will have priority, even over other red tickets. Of course, that will cause difficulties over skilled workers. When we have a picture of the number of skilled workers we need, we must decide from which branch of manufacture we can remove them, for Sauckel does not have so many skilled workers. Those who have already arrived are, for the most part, from the East. That is still the most prolific source. Very few come from the West and they are slowly starting to come from Italy. There are comparatively few skilled workers among them. So we must decide what factories are to be closed or restricted and where we shall take away the skilled workers. I can only let you have details in a few days when I have a complete picture of requirements.
NOBEL: If I must speed up repair work in a limited time, I need the labor at once. Since 16 March not one of the 2,000 people that Sauckel was going to send has arrived. That is already two weeks ago. They tell me that if they have to deliver 50 machines they must have 60 people today or tomorrow. But that won’t work because I have not got the people. I have always said—you will not get skilled workers. They answer—then give us others. If we do not fulfill these demands, their confidence in the Jaegerstab will be undermined. This morning I shall get material from Hansen & Company in Muenster. The labor office there is not yet clear about the set-up of the Jaegerstab and the priority of the fighter program. It is the result of the bureaucracy of the authorities. My men have to argue with the authorities and thereby lose valuable time.
SCHMELTER: It is now customary, if one fails to produce something to put the blame on the labor office. I remind you of the Messerschmitt affair.
(MILCH: That is not so in all cases.)
Assuredly! The gentlemen were with me on Saturday. They had got back 50 tool makers from the army into the bargain, which they had had in the meantime, and said nothing about. First, they could not employ them, secondly, they did not need them, and thirdly, they got them elsewhere. Furthermore Sauckel puts the people at the disposal of the repair department. It was immediately reported that the labor offices worked too slowly.
MILCH: You will make things easier for yourselves if you build up gradually a small reserve of a few hundred people, at first 500 which you can later raise to 2,000 so that you can cover immediately any need that arises. Then our work will gain the respect of others. At the moment it is like this—either we must transfer people and leave a gap where it is less vital, or wait until the people are brought in by Sauckel. When one sees the figures that Sauckel has produced and ascertains what the armament industry has received, the comparison is ridiculous.
SCHMELTER: A letter is on the way from the minister to Mr. Sauckel. During the first three months Sauckel has brought in between 300,000 and 400,000 people, but not even a miserable 66,000 red tickets could be honored.
MILCH: I personally cannot get over it! Take the help away from the housewives! In the past year 800,000 domestic servants have been negotiated and we are fighting for 2,000 men!
SCHMELTER: In one year the demand for female domestic servants in Germany has risen by 200,000, the demands of the armament industry during the same period by 600. I have arranged that transports that come from abroad are directed straight to the points of greatest need.
MILCH: Every week 2,000 people come from the East.
(SCHMELTER: Most of them go into agriculture.)
The Jaegerstab has priority over agriculture. Can you not intercept them?
SCHMELTER: I have arranged that. The 2,000 are disposed of; some of them are already at work. But it does not always happen that the reports of the firms are 100 percent correct. We have often checked that up. It often happens that firms take the people and put them into another branch of production but still shout for people for the high priority processes.
(NOBEL: That is not the case in my repair industry!)
FRYDAG: Yesterday, I was in Wiener-Neustadt. The works have a considerable assignment and a hefty increase. Merely in order to get out of the room unscathed I gave them 200 men from the airframes industry.
SCHMELTER: In Wiener Neustadt there was a demand for 1,000 or 1,500. A thousand were supposed to come from Air Fleet 2 in Italy. An engineer official, Weidinger, was going to produce them. On Sunday I received a phone call to the effect that the engineer official could not produce them.
FRYDAG: That is quite right. But you must put yourself in the firm’s place. The firm must have these people.
SCHMELTER: Then I must see to it that I take them from somewhere else.
MILCH: You know our position. We are convinced that you do everything you can. But we must now commit a robbery. We can no longer operate along legal lines.
(SCHMELTER: That is the only possibility.)
There will be abuse but we must accept that.
SCHMELTER: I shall go tomorrow to Mr. Sauckel and tell him that he must give the fighter industry the next transport of workers from the East. The proposal that the fighter industry should not give back the laborers it received who originally worked in agriculture has been turned down by Sauckel. I am commissioned to inform you of this.
MILCH: That is out of the question. Nothing shall go out of the fighter industry!
SCHMELTER: I am commissioned to say that he must have this labor back again.
MILCH: Later, not now! One more thing. We must protect all the factories working for the fighter program. We must say to them: You must not give up people for anything whatsoever except on command of the Jaegerstab. None can touch you, not even the local labor offices and the ministerial authorities; requests for personnel must all be directed to the Jaegerstab. We must put that out clearly as an order.
(PETRI: That is already in previous minutes.)
SCHMELTER: May I request that this order should be extended to the management and repair personnel of the electricity and gas works.
MILCH: I can only do it for the Jaegerstab. I am not doing it for the bomber and other branches either as we have only that special authority.
SCHMELTER: I should like to ask that it should only be done for manufacture and not construction.
MILCH: Agreed! We must write a letter to Keitel of the OKW and a letter to Sauckel saying: Requests are to be made only directly to the Jaegerstab.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-334[115] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 25 APRIL 1944
* * * * *
[page 27]
WEGENER: I have a question for Schmelter: Has the question of the transfer of western Europeans been clarified?
WERNER: On this subject I can say that it is especially difficult for BMW [Bavarian Motor Works], because we can only transfer Russians and concentration camp inmates, and the guards for these are mainly Belgians and French.
* * * * *
WEGENER: As far as I can remember, 200 key personnel are needed for Markirch.
MILCH: Perhaps that must be brought before the Fuehrer again.
SCHAAF: Saur came back and said there was no more to be said on this subject to the Fuehrer.
MILCH: That is out of date now. I have discussed with Saur the fact that we cannot keep up this state of affairs. Saur is of my opinion. It must be discussed once more with the Fuehrer. I can discuss it again with the Reich Marshal. We shall do what we can, but we cannot throw everything into confusion without due consideration. How should we then manage to produce! I am convinced that the Fuehrer will agree as soon as we can put these people reasonably into barracks so that they do not come into contact with the population.
* * * * *
SCHAEDE: Whenever French key personnel are brought to Lorraine, they run away without fail in a short time. This one must tell the firm. Already they do not come back from leave.
MILCH: It will only work if we put these workers into barracks. We cannot exactly treat them as prisoners. It must appear otherwise, but it must be so in practice.
* * * * *
MILCH: I am personally convinced after talking to the Fuehrer that he will agree as soon as it is made reasonable. The people should not be able to mingle with the population and to conspire. Nor should they be allowed to run around free, so that they can cross the frontier every day. Both practices must be stopped.
* * * * *
HEYNE: I have two short points. Yesterday Maehrisch-Truebau was removed from the program because the Quartermaster General told me the previous night that it was possible to move in on the morning of 28 April. The matter is already progressing. Last night I was called up again because the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs did not quite agree with the new accommodation in Brunswick of the prisoners from Maehrisch-Truebau for some reasons of security.
I should like to ask Major Kleber, who was also yesterday announced as Mr. Saur’s liaison officer with the OKW, to exert some pressure here.
Apart from that, General Schmidt said that there were also some fighter units and suchlike in the barracks; that he could not move out as quickly as that; he would not take orders; otherwise he would go to the Reich Marshal.
MILCH: I am of the opinion that that must be done at once. It’s all the same to me if individual people do object. Protest does not interest me at all, whether from the Chief of Prisoners of War Affairs or from our side.
Kleber, would you be so good as to take care of this?
KLEBER: As far as prisoners of war are concerned I can take care of it, but not where it concerns the air force. That must be handled separately.
MILCH: Naturally. This matter must be handled by us. There was in fact, another proposal but we do not want it. Otherwise someone else will come complaining.
KLEBER: I should like to transfer the prisoners further off to Brunswick.
MILCH: I think it is an excellent idea for the prisoners to go there if Brunswick continues to be attacked.
* * * * *
SAUR: I must come back again to the question of western European workers. Make an energetic attempt to make a compromise within the factories. I think it will work out. I do not think the Fuehrer will give in even if we put the French into barracks. He has spoken so firmly and for reasons which I cannot but recognize. I am all the more thankful that permission has been given for the Protectorate. I am going to see State Minister Frank on Friday and I shall discuss with him the whole question of dispersal in the Protectorate. I shall like Schmelter to accompany me to Prague on Friday to discuss the question of transfer of workers.
MILCH: I said before that we wanted to carry out the transfer within the factories. Then if something is left over, we should have to approach the Fuehrer again, but only on condition that they are in barracks and that there are replacements for them.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-362 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE 5TH TRIP OF THE “HUBERTUS UNDERTAKING”, 2 AND 3 MAY 1944
* * * * *
[Page 65]
MILCH: * * * I also ask that every time the civilian population is attacked [Translator’s note: by low-flying aircraft], in private cars, on [rail] roads, etc., the local offices make reports accordingly. The Fuehrer has ordered extremely severe measures against these enemy crews who harass the civilian population. There is not the slightest military necessity for this and the Fuehrer intends absolutely to act according to the Japanese pattern. (Enthusiastic applause!) We must only take cases individually so that we have the necessary material and can produce it. We owe that to our boys who are prisoners over there, who will be held as hostages unless we have proper proof.
* * * * *
[Page 110]
SCHNAUDER: * * *
1. At the Heinkel factory at Barth there are 3,300 workers, consisting of 300 Germans and 3,000 concentration camp inmates. Of the 3,000 concentration camp inmates, 1,500 are men. In order to maintain their working capacity it is necessary to evacuate these men too during daylight air attacks. However, there are not enough guards and sometimes there is a deficit of as many as 20. As guards cannot be drawn from any other source, it has been decided that the factory is to arm as guards certain men from its own ranks to guard the concentration camp inmates. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-390 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 4 MAY 1944
* * * * *
SAUR: 12. Can the arrival of the reported 50,000 Italians be relied on? By what date will the first transport arrive? This wording is, frankly, unintelligible. It was quite clear that the 50,000 Italians were coming so that the transport facilities were guaranteed long ago. How did such a report get into the minutes of 14 April?
(Comment: The camps into which these people are to go don’t even exist yet!)
We shan’t get any further like this! Inform Mr. Schmelter.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Are they coming via Sauckel?
SAUR: No. This is our own undertaking. Pueckel has clarified various doubtful points with Nagel and got ready a large number of vehicles and now all that comes to nothing. Schmelter must report on it tomorrow, not in the sense of whether it can be done, but that this and that must be done, and by such and such means.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-442[116] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 5 MAY 1944
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: Then the transport of the Italians. 50,000 Italians have not yet been transported. It was due to the fact that the escort for the transport has not yet been appointed. The conversation yesterday with the Plenipotentiary in Milan proved that the transport should leave today for this place Woerl (?) [sic] where further distribution will be undertaken. I booked another call this morning but did not get through. I hope to be able to give more details tomorrow.
MILCH: Has a proper reception center been set up in Woerl?
(SCHMELTER: Yes.)
Is it assured that the number of those leaving is in reasonable proportion to those arriving? * * *: [sic] That shall be. A man has been appointed by Schmelter to travel down there especially and control directly the conscription of civilians.
MILCH: Is there someone at the Escort Detachment Headquarters in Italy responsible for seeing that people do not get out and run away during the journey?
* * * [sic] That is what the escorting personnel is there for.
(MILCH: Someone of standing?)
Dr. Wendt is responsible for the whole undertaking.
MILCH: I am of the opinion that, if anyone jumps out, he should be shot; otherwise a thousand will get on and only twenty will arrive there. The Gendarmerie and all military posts must look out for those who abscond on the journey. They will be arrested at once and will appear before a court martial.
(End of meeting 1225 hours).
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-361 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE DURING THE 6TH JOURNEY OF THE “HUBERTUS UNDERTAKING” FROM 8-10 MAY 1944
* * * * *
GABEL: We must have 1,000 underground workers at once.
SAUR: Definitely.
BORNITZ: The Erzberg [ore mine] has, furthermore, a loss of from 1,400 to 1,500 men per annum due to climatic conditions. It goes up as high as 1,500 meters.
SAUR: Do you give the men up systematically, and to whom?
BORNITZ: Not systematically. They collapse, report sick, and the foreigners do not come back. Some escape too, as in the mountain country it is not possible to seal everything hermetically.
(Comment: A year ago the labor potential of a large concentration camp was thoroughly gone into. That possibility must not be entirely disregarded).
GABEL: Careful! Concentration camp internees are not strong enough to be able to work underground.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-336[117] PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 26 MAY 1944
* * * * *
[Page 31-32]
REICH MINISTER SPEER: With regard to construction it is important that we should not start more building than we can supply labor and equipment for. Equipment is of secondary importance. We must not continue with the mistakes we found in the air force armament industry when we took over, i.e., the beginning of no end of buildings for which, at that time, only 20 to 30 percent of the necessary labor was available.
SAUR: That is the case now unfortunately. We have at least 3 times as many buildings under construction as we have labor available.
REICH MINISTER SPEER: What is the news about the Hungarian Jews?
KAMMLER: They are on the way. At the end of the month the first transports will arrive for surface work on the surface bunkers.
* * * * *
[Page 33]
SCHLEMPP: * * * Dorsch said yesterday that he wanted to bring 100,000 Jews from Hungary, 50,000 Italians, 10,000 men from bomb damage repair, also 1,000 from Waldbroehl (?) [sic]; then he wanted to get something from Greiser’s zone by negotiation, then 4,000 Italian officers, 10,000 men from South Russia and 20,000 from North Russia. That would be 220,000 altogether.
REICH MINISTER SPEER: We have often made such calculations; but the people never came.
* * * * *
[Page 34]
KAMMLER: For all these measures [Translator’s note: A and B construction measures which were the responsibility of the SS], I must take in 50,000 more people in protective custody [Schutzhaeftlinge].
* * * * *
[Page 43]
REICH MINISTER SPEER: We shall carry out a special operation [Sondereinsatz] of our own in order to build up reserves of manpower [Schwerpunkte]. It will bring in 90,000 men in three installments of 30,000.
* * * * *
It will be experts who are called up. And it would be a good thing if one linked up with it the conscription of tool makers within the firms so that one would have a body of tool makers in the armament industry. These people would get leave from this group and would function as armed forces employees. If we make them armed forces employees we have the advantage of being independent of Sauckel’s offices.
* * * * *
[Page 80]
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: How long do the Italian PW’s actually work here?
SCHMELTER: As long as the factory works. There is a regulation that PW’s must work so long.
FIELD MARSHAL MILCH: Could you not look into this? You can see people on the streets about 4 or 5 o’clock and nobody after that.
(SCHMELTER: I can look into it!)
I do not believe that any Italian prisoner of war works 72 hours.
* * * * *
[Page 81]
SCHMELTER: * * * Dorsch will accompany me to Greiser to try and get 20 to 30 thousand men out of him.
REICH MINISTER SPEER: Kammler had his doubts about that before.
REPRESENTATIVE OF KAMMLER: He didn’t think the 100,000 Jews would come.
SCHMELTER: To that I can add the following. Till now two transports have arrived at the SS camp Auschwitz. For fighter construction we were offered only children, women, and old men with whom very little can be done. * * * Unless the next transports bring men of an age fit for work the whole action will not have much success.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-359 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 75
EXTRACTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 27 JUNE 1944
* * * * *
[Page 27]
SCHMELTER: I have another small point to bring up. I said once before that we had fairly large numbers of English and American “Terror Flyers” in air force camps, who cannot be used. It is a matter, in all, of about 17,000 people, approximately half officers and NCO’s who do not need to work. That means that there are 6 to 9 thousand men in camps who just sit about doing nothing. The suggestion that they should be put to work has now been turned down on the grounds that it concerns especially intelligent people trained in collecting information and, apart from that, inclined to acts of sabotage.
SAUR: Can we put them into the manufacture of component parts?
LANGE: Perhaps we can employ them in underground factories.
SAUR: We could employ them in the manufacture of component parts. Who is responsible for this matter?
KRAUSE: The Commission for Prisoners of War; it comes under the Quartermaster General.
SAUR: Will you undertake to put this matter in order? These people must be put at the disposal of the component parts industry. That would be an unbelievable help to us.
SCHMELTER: It must be laid down that these people all go into fighter production or into the component parts industry. Otherwise a part will be sent off elsewhere. The people in question are excellent people, good material.
* * * * *
[Page 31]
SCHMELTER: I have a few more points. Up till now 12,000 female concentration camp internees, Jewesses, have been demanded. The matter is now in order. The SS has agreed to deliver these Hungarian Jewesses in batches of 500. Thus the smaller firms, too, will be in a position to employ these concentration camp Jewesses better. I request that these people should be ordered in batches of 500.
MAHNKE: How many are still there?
SCHMELTER: There are still enough there.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-320 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 73
EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF KARL OTTO SAUR ON 13 NOVEMBER 1946, CONCERNING THE USE OF CONCENTRATION CAMP PRISONERS IN JAEGERSTAB CONSTRUCTION
Q. Were special factories built after the creation of the Jaegerstab?
A. All building of factories above the ground was stopped, and subterranean factories were built. We divided approximately 30 factories into 700 individual workshops to avoid offering targets for attacks.
Q. What kind of workers were used for this construction?
A. The construction was divided into three parts: the two Kammler parts, (a) new construction underground, and (b) expansion underground, and the Todt Organization part.
Q. This expansion program was directed by Kammler,[118] then?
A. Parts (a) and (b) were directed quite independently by Kammler. He had full authority from Goering as of 4 March 1944 and was then made a member of the Jaegerstab. * * * The whole affair was carried out by Kammler alone.
Q. And the workers who were used for this purpose were concentration camp prisoners?
A. To my knowledge, they must have been concentration camp prisoners.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-266 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 76
AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SCHMELTER, 19 NOVEMBER 1946, CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JAEGERSTAB
I, Fritz Schmelter, swear, testify, and state:
1. That, since about January 1944 until April 1945, I held, in the end, the office of Ministerialdirigent in the Ministry for Armament and War Production (Ministry Speer); that as Ministerialdirigent I was in charge of the Division for Labor Assignment, and from December 1944 until April 1945 of the Central Department for Labor Assignment and Labor Output, and that, as a holder of these positions I was also a member of the Jaegerstab.
2. That Milch and Speer together were in charge of the Jaegerstab; that Saur was the Chief of Staff and was, in this capacity, the immediate subordinate of Milch and Speer.
3. That during its existence the Jaegerstab met almost every day and that these meetings were presided over in most cases by Milch, in the beginning, and later on by Saur; that Speer was very rarely present and only on special occasions; that these meetings took place, first, in the Reich Air Ministry and after this was destroyed in the barrack at Tempelhof.
4. That in the meetings of the Jaegerstab the supply of labor for the Luftwaffe was discussed; that, for the Jaegerstab, the labor requirements necessary to the industry of the Luftwaffe were discussed with the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation (Ministry Sauckel); that Sauckel satisfied these requirements as far as possible; that the Chief of Staff, in the Jaegerstab, Saur occasionally also distributed the available labor to the different Luftwaffe plants.
5. That in the year of 1944 the air raids made it necessary to decentralize many of the plants of the Luftwaffe; that this decentralization was ordered by the Jaegerstab; that many factories of the Luftwaffe were transferred into subterranean buildings and that for the completion of these subterranean buildings concentration camp inmates and Jews were also used; that the whole building program of the Jaegerstab was established and controlled by this Jaegerstab itself.
6. That the above facts are personally known to me; that these facts are known to me on account of the position I held and the responsibility it gave me in the Jaegerstab and in the Ministry Speer.
I have read the above statement which consists of two pages in German, and I state that this is the full truth, to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have had the opportunity to make changes and corrections in the above statements. I have given this testimony voluntarily, without any promise of reward and without being, in any way, forced or threatened.
Nuernberg, 19 November 1946. [Signed] DR. FRITZ SCHMELTER
TRANSLATION OF SPEER EXHIBIT 34[119] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 17
ORDER OF HITLER, 21 APRIL 1944, DELEGATING TO DORSCH AUTHORITY FOR JAEGERSTAB CONSTRUCTIONS[120]
Copy
The Fuehrer
Fuehrer’s Headquarters 21 April 1944
To the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and Head of the Todt Organization, Reich Minister Speer
Berlin W 8
I delegate Ministerialdirektor Dorsch, Chief of the Todt Central Office, to carry out the erection of the six fighter production buildings ordered by me, while retaining his other functions in your sphere of work.
You are to be responsible for taking care of all the prerequisites necessary for the speedy erection of these buildings. You are particularly to effect the best possible coordination with the other war-essential buildings, if necessary referring to me for a decision.
[Signed] ADOLF HITLER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-337[121] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 12
EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON 6 MARCH 1944 IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY[122]
* * * * *
SAUR: I see a great many unknown faces and I do not know what business all these gentlemen have here. I suggest that a check be made at the door and that the showing of passes be mandatory. Otherwise there is danger that other people may sneak in here. I demand therefore a stricter control under all circumstances. Furthermore I would ask that gentlemen remain at meetings only as long and no longer as their business makes it necessary. I would therefore request that each gentleman report his presence and state whether he has any matters of general interest. These things could then be taken up first and that would settle that and the man could leave. We only want one gentleman for one subject, not a whole bunch of them.
* * * * *
SAUR: Does the term “construction company”[123] exist at all? I think it does not exist.
DIESING: We have construction companies with the Luftwaffe, among them masons, slaters, window fitters, etc. That is how we arrived at the term “construction company”. We cannot again withdraw the six construction companies which we have taken from Berlin. For each building site we need approximately 100 skilled people, this on the basis of a fixed distribution key and we do not know where to get them.
* * * * *
MILCH: Now we come to the question of foreign exchange. Here the Fuehrer has announced his consent that the requests of the Slovaks to purchase antiaircraft guns, etc., be complied with. Saur has reported orally how many antiaircraft guns have actually been finished and how far we have exceeded the program. This is a good and acceptable method for us.
We have furthermore approached the Fuehrer in order to obtain the 64 miners, at present employed at Berchtesgaden, since the work there should soon be finished. He said that we, like the SS, should train miners on a larger scale too, and named the figure of 10,000 to be trained in successive shifts because one cannot train them all at the same time.
SAUR: The gentlemen of the SS should be told of this, that the entire training of miners is supposed to be done by the SS because the SS has the best school for that.
MILCH: Furthermore we must ask the SS to get hold of further miners from Italy and Slovakia.
SAUR: Barowski (?) [sic] must know that! This question must be cleared up at once, today, in order to agree on the selection with the SS.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-338[124] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 13
EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1944, 1100 HOURS, IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY[125]
* * * * *
[Page 13]
STOBBE-DETHLEFFSEN:[126] Probably you have not understood me quite correctly. When I asked this question, I did not have in mind the projects of 600,000 and 800,000 square meters,
(SAUR: But I did!)
but the original 60,000 square meter works. I now ask: shall these 60,000 square meter works now be simply cancelled in consideration of the big works, and are they no longer to be taken into consideration? This seems hazardous to me because we must make the following distinction. The construction capacity of underground works in mountains and caves is entirely different from the one to be reckoned with at such concrete works. It is available for concrete works and consequently it should be used. It was not as if we had to go into caves or worm ourselves into the mountain. The question of the big works is a very difficult one for us from the point of view of capacity. It alone requires another 25,000 workers. We reckon already now 100,000 men for the tasks of the Jaegerstab. To switch to some other work would constitute an inroad of unheard of proportions into the remaining armament economy.[127]
(SAUR: 100,000 without Kammler!)
Including the manpower we give Kammler, but without the people from concentration camps!
* * * * *
MILCH: We have been ordered to carry out these two construction projects by the Fuehrer. If I now take a higher compression ratio and thus attain much higher figures, even this higher figure would not prevent us from having to deal with further shifting afterwards, besides concrete works and cave works, smaller caves, tunnels, etc. It is now doubtless correct to ascertain: (1) What has to be constructed, (2) for whom it has to be constructed, (3) where it has to be constructed. We have to distribute it in such a way that we can efficiently cope with manpower and all the other questions, power, transportation, etc.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-365 DEFENSE EXHIBIT 15
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 12 APRIL 1944
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE PRESIDED OVER BY HAUPTDIENSTLEITER SAUR, LATER ON PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH, ON WEDNESDAY, 12 APRIL 1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY
* * * * *
SAUR: Please tell this to Schmelter. We are in an incredible situation as a result of lack of manpower. Here we are in the middle of the month already, and the 10,000 people allocated to us according to red slips have not arrived yet. A way must be found to assure priority for red-slip matters over all other allocations. Tell Herr Schmelter to contact Gauleiter Sauckel today. Going further than that, the discontinuation, transfer, or concentration of every other type of production must be brought about by us at once.
SCHAAF: The 4,000 people from Kahla!
LANGE: Schmelter’s people complain particularly because they have no means of making pressure demands to Sauckel which will also be complied with.
SAUR: Field Marshal, the best thing would be for you to approach Sauckel yourself since he is the man in charge of labor allocation.
MILCH: I shall tell him that the 10,000 red slips were not honored.
BALCKE: On that I can report that the requests were sent out on the 5th and that on the 11th they had not yet reached the labor offices. The way is long, it is true. Therefore it is not yet possible for the people to be employed.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-334[128] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 16
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 25 APRIL 1944
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE OF 25 APRIL 1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY
PRESIDED OVER BY FIELD MARSHAL MILCH
Herr Saur does not appear until towards the end of the meeting.
* * * * *
WEGENER: I have a question for Schmelter: Has the question of the transfer of west European workers been settled?
WERNER: On this I can say that especially for the Bavarian Motor Works matters are particularly difficult because we can transfer only Russians and concentration camp inmates, and the staff used for supervision consists mostly of Belgians and Frenchmen.
* * * * *
KREUTZ: Mueller declared at one time—and he believed he could do it—that he would try and shift a part of the head personnel within the concern.
SCHAEDE: If you bring the French key personnel to Lorraine, I can guarantee you that they would run away within the shortest possible time. That must be told to the firm. Even now they do not return from their vacation.
MILCH: It will work only if we place these people into barracks. It is true we cannot treat them as prisoners of war; the outward appearance must be different, but in actual practice that is just what it must be.
SCHAEDE: I merely wanted to suggest to the firms to take along as few French people as possible so that they would not lose them altogether, and rather follow the system of Mueller.
MILCH: Exactly. And if then there are still some left one can say that this will be limited in terms of time, perhaps to several months, and that in return certain advantages will be granted to them because they will be subject to certain deprivation of their freedom.
* * * * *
MILCH: As early as today at noon, we may face the situation that Bavarian Motor Works at Allach is completely destroyed and that we have to get out. Then we cannot deal with things such as 200 or 300 French people who cannot come to Lorraine. That must be explained to the Fuehrer once more. Otherwise, I see no possibility for carrying through our assignment.
Personally, I am firmly convinced—after the conversations with the Fuehrer—that he will then consent provided it is done in a sensible way. The people must not sit together with the population and they must not be able to conspire. Nor should they have sufficient freedom of movement to be able to pass the green border line. Both of these things must be prevented.
In compensation for these restrictions we can, on the other hand, give these people something and make them happy—be it even only cigarettes.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-442[129] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 21
EXTRACT FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE, 5 MAY 1944
THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 5 MAY 1944, 10 O’CLOCK IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: I was supposed to report on the employment of labor in the penal institutions.[130] The Minister of Justice has not yet forwarded the complete list of workers available in the penal institutions. I have made another inquiry. Dr. Schmelter (?) [sic] has appointed Attorney Karl as special official in charge. He is the liaison to the Reich Ministry of Justice. * * *
HEYNE: Such conversations have taken place. They do not get us anywhere. The thing we need is a listing of all localities showing how large a number of prisoners are yet available there. Then we must see whether they are required there. Herr Schmelter planned to concentrate the skilled workers in those spots. There are only 2-3 percent skilled workers in all among all prisoners. That is too little.
MILCH: I suggest you are going to submit to me today a letter to Thierack, to wit: Taking into consideration the extraordinary urgency of the work in connection with the Jaegerstab we need this assistance. We have failed for a long time unfortunately to obtain the compilation from the authorities concerned. We need such and such data. I ask him to concern himself personally with the matter and to let us have the material in the very near future.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NOKW-336[131] DEFENSE EXHIBIT 23
EXCERPTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE JAEGERSTAB CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, 26 MAY 1944, AT 10 O’CLOCK
* * * * *
(Minister Speer and Field Marshal Milch entering.)
MILCH: I welcome our Minister Speer for the first time in the circle of the Jaegerstab, and would like to express my special happiness and at the same time yours, that you, dear Speer, are again with us, well, cheerful, and in the old creative spirit.
This machinery, created by your orders, accomplished excellent things in the three months of its existence. It has made special efforts to bring the production of fighters and all that goes with them to a high level.
* * * * *
SCHMELTER: The reports of the board of examiners show that a larger number could be deducted from the plants belonging to the Luftwaffe if one succeeds in establishing joint direction for the department of plane construction, the technical plant groups and companies. Up to now they exist separately under three different commands and leaderships, and that would make it possible to deduct more workers. The board of examiners thinks that hundreds of laborers could be deducted if a single command would be established. This must be done by Field Marshal Milch.
MILCH: The Quartermaster General to whom all are subordinate! No one is subordinate to me.
* * * * *
(SCHMELTER: Probably they will work in plants where people do not work for 72 hours.)
Isn’t it possible—to avoid injustice toward our workers—to have our other plants work too, not all of them for 72 hours, but perhaps up to 64 hours? That should suffice if all would do it.
SCHMELTER: I prepared already for the conference of the chiefs of the various offices the suggestion that working hours in civilian production should be increased. There are still many production plants working only 48 hours.
MILCH: Then one can equalize and we need not work all the time for 72 hours.
* * * * *
EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS FRITZ SCHMELTER[132]
DIRECT EXAMINATION
[Tr. pp. 717-734]
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, will you give us your first name and your last name?
WITNESS SCHMELTER: Fritz Schmelter.
Q. When were you born?
A. On the first of March 1904.
Q. What was your position at the end of the war?
A. At the end of the war, I was Central Department Manager at the Ministry of Armament.
* * * * *
Q. Thank you. Witness, when and in what position did you have to do official business with the defendant?
A. I had some dealings with him on official business after 1944 when I became Chief of the Amtsgruppeneinsatz in the Ministry of Armament. I saw him again after the Jaegerstab was formed, that is, after March 1944.
Q. In your position in the Ministry of Armament, did you have anything to do with the Central Planning Board?
A. I had something to do with them insofar as the chief of staff of the armament office was concerned. He was my chief. I had to write down the necessary figures concerning labor assignments when I accompanied him to certain sessions of the Central Planning Board as assistant.
Q. What month was that, approximately?
A. As far as I can remember the first session in which I participated was in February or March 1944. I did not always participate in these sessions, only in a few of them when I accompanied the man I mentioned before.
Q. Did the sessions of February and March 1944 deal with labor assignments?
A. Yes.
Q. During these conferences, were they trying to clear the numbers or the figures which were announced by Sauckel?
A. In one of the conferences I remember they wanted to make Sauckel a proposal concerning the distribution of labor he wanted to provide. I remember that the Central Planning Board had a written proposal submitted to him concerning requests about labor assignments. Sauckel said that he would acknowledge this proposal but would take care of the distribution personally.
Q. Did they, during these sessions, try to find out whether the numbers and figures Sauckel reported were correct? If he mentioned figures which were too high, did they speak about those matters in this conference?
A. I do not remember that day. But I know that in various conferences the question of reliability of the figures played a great part. There was always a difference between the figures Sauckel reported and those Speer reported.
Q. Did this apply to figures which Sauckel mentioned as having already been brought in or did it apply to figures on labor still to come?
A. That applied particularly to the numbers of laborers who had already been brought. It was not possible to try to control the number of laborers wanted because it was only something that was being planned, nothing else.
Q. That is correct, but from previous experiences, weren’t they in a position to find out that Sauckel’s promises were not being kept?
A. At the time they doubted that the figures which Sauckel reported could ever be brought in.
* * * * *
Q. Is it correct that in your position, as a member of the Speer ministry, or in your capacity as a member of the Todt Organization, you very often participated in the staff meetings of Sauckel?
A. Every month Sauckel would call such a staff meeting where representatives of the most important labor assignment ministries took part. I almost always participated in those meetings.
Q. What other ministries apart from the Ministry of Armaments participated in those conferences?
A. The Air Ministry, the OKW, the Ministry of Economics, the Agricultural Ministry, and I do not think I can remember anything further.
* * * * *
Q. Did the defendant Milch ever participate in those sessions?
A. No. Those were conferences in which the experts of the ministries took part; not the leaders and not their representatives, either.
Q. Who was the chief of the Air Ministry?
A. Goering.
Q. At these staff conferences, did Sauckel ever make any statements saying he brought the laborers voluntarily to the Reich?
A. I remember that Sauckel repeatedly said approximately the following:
“They say that I am forcing laborers to come to Germany. Once somebody said I went to foreign countries with a lasso and caught people and brought them over to Germany. They said I forced them to come to Germany.”
Furthermore, he said:
“I declare all those things are not true. The laborers are brought to Germany by me on the basis of contracts with other governments, as far as there are governments in those occupied territories, or on the orders of the local military commanders or other local German agencies.”
He asked us to tell our superiors his opinion on that question.
* * * * *
Q. Is it known to you that there was an agreement with the French Government according to which one prisoner of war would be released to France for two laborers.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it known to you that the French workers during their activity in Germany got leave once in a while?
A. Yes.
Q. A leave to France?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they ever return from their leave or did they just stay there?
A. The greater part came back from their leave; quite a number did not come back. Part of the laborers who went on leave did not come back. Some of them came back.
Q. Was that the larger part that came back or the smaller part?
A. I did not hear any figures concerning that. As far as I know the greatest of them came back. According to the factory manager, the larger part always came back, but of course I have no exact figures.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you then joined the Jaegerstab. Do you know anything about the creation of the Jaegerstab?
A. Approximately on the first of March, I do not remember the exact date, I was asked by my chief of staff to go to the Air Ministry where Milch and Mr. Saur were present. He said the air armament was so badly damaged by the air raids that there had to be a fighter program. For that purpose a staff needed to be developed to hold daily conferences which would be necessary in order to increase the fighter production or at least bring it to the same level that it used to be. A number of gentlemen from air as well as from the armament industry were designated to participate in these sessions and to report to their offices what had taken place and put orders into effect.
As a representative of the Armament Ministry, I was assigned to labor assignment. Later on I heard that this Jaegerstab was under the management of Speer and Milch and that Saur was the manager of the Jaegerstab. Later on there were conferences almost daily, first at the Air Ministry and later on at a barracks at the Tempelhof, near Berlin. They dealt, first of all, with the production of the fighters and with all the questions in connection with the fighters and also with labor assignment.
Q. Who directed these conferences?
A. At the beginning Milch participated almost regularly in those sessions and he was the one that actually led or presided over the conferences; formally, that is, Mr. Saur was the speaker most of the time. Mr. Speer very seldom, according to my recollection perhaps three of four times, participated in those sessions, which on those particular days were transferred to the Armament Ministry.
Q. You just said that Milch at the beginning had the formal leadership. From what time on did that cease?
A. After the transfer into the Armament Ministry, or rather, into the Caserne at Tempelhof—I don’t remember the date—Milch did not participate as regularly as he did before. At those conferences, after the transfer of the fighter staff into the Armament Ministry, he only participated once or never.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, concerning the conferences of the staff, there were always verbatim records taken. Is that known to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Apart from those minutes, were any other minutes taken?
A. Yes. An extract of the verbatim record—I want to call it a “result record”—was compiled and these records were sent to all of the offices which were interested in those conferences. Those verbatim records which were taken down by stenographers during the session, according to my knowledge, were sent only to Mr. Speer, and of course they remained with both Saur and Milch. In other words, very few copies were made.
Q. Were these verbatim records ever controlled?
A. No, I don’t think so. I don’t believe that the large records were read or checked by someone else.
Q. Can one say then that the decisions of the Jaegerstab were contained in the records?
A. Not only the decisions but also the more important deliberations that took place. However, when decisions were made, then they were included in the result records.
Q. During these conferences did it ever occur that the participants were not always present?
A. That happened very often because the sessions lasted for a long time and it happened many times that I, for instance, was called out and ordered to take care of my business, at least by telephone, and the members of the Jaegerstab themselves did not always participate in the conferences, but later on—that is, from May on—they had representatives or deputies replace them.
Q. Did those sessions often result in individual discussions?
A. That happened once in a while, particularly when technical questions were discussed where very few experts could say something.
Q. I shall now proceed to the labor assignment within the Jaegerstab. How did the Jaegerstab deal with questions of labor assignment?
A. Along with all the production discussions of other programs, labor assignment questions were discussed at the sessions of the Jaegerstab. I had the task, concerning these labor assignment questions, to pass them through my office chief and so far as the tasks I had with the Jaegerstab overlapped my other duties and tasks with other organizations; in other words, if you want to know exactly or if you want to have a detailed description of what my tasks were in general—
Q. I want to know what you had to do with the labor assignment of the Jaegerstab and what was your main task there; otherwise, we will be here about an hour or so.
A. Among other things, we had the task, on the basis of the reports of the various factories which came over the Armament Inspectorates to me, to write up a proposal how those red slips were to be distributed on each individual production. In the Jaegerstab, I also had the task to distribute those red slips in such a way that the most important factories would get the necessary number of red slips. The red slips were orders to the labor assignment offices or agencies of Speer; in other words, to the Armament Inspectorates and to the armament commandos, and were given from Sauckel to his labor assignment agencies which were to provide preferentially the necessary amount of workers on the basis of those red slips. I furthermore had the task to take care of transfers of laborers who already were in the armament industry by giving respective orders to my agency and requesting Sauckel to carry out the transfer. Since in the fighter production, the question, in the first place, concerned skilled workers only; transfers of this kind were carried out. Skilled workers were no longer assigned to us by Sauckel in 1944. My main activity, therefore, concerned transfers from one of the industries to the other, and as regards the Jaegerstab, in transfers from the destroyed bomber factories or from other aircraft types to the fighter factories which were working full time.
I finally had the task to deal with deliveries of armament to the Wehrmacht soldiers and I had to take care of those. In 1944, through several actions, many laborers were withdrawn from the armament industry and delivered to the army. That concerned particularly skilled workers. It was my task then, together with those responsible for the production, to take care of the distribution in such a manner that the armament industry be hampered as little as possible in their production.
Q. Is it known to you that Milch tried to see to it that no one from the fighter factories had to go to the Wehrmacht?
A. Yes, from all the factories, and particularly from the fighter factories, they tried to send as few laborers as possible to the army. At the beginning, in the early days of the Jaegerstab—in other words, in the months of March and April, approximately—we tried to relieve the fighter program from delivering laborers to the Wehrmacht. Later on, this was very difficult. I know, however, that Milch tried his very best to give as few people as possible to the Wehrmacht from Jaegerstab production, that is, of the Jaegerstab factories.
Q. Witness, you just said that, concerning the request for assignment of workers, you made suggestions to Sauckel. In these meetings there is a statement by Saur that says, “We take care of the labor assignment.” What is correct now? Did you just request them or did the Jaegerstab actually take care of the assignment?
A. The Jaegerstab was not able to give orders to offices which did not belong to the Speer Ministry or to the Air Ministry. In Jaegerstab, very often Saur and perhaps Milch—I can’t remember, concerning Milch—used such words. In reality, however, it was quite different. I appeared at Sauckel’s and I was ordered to tell him about the creation of the Jaegerstab and its importance concerning the fighter production, with the request that when labor was distributed, the Jaegerstab production should be considered in first place. An order to Sauckel was never given by me and I am sure that Sauckel would certainly not have followed my request, particularly as he always and repeatedly stressed the point that he was independent and was responsible only to the leader of the Four Year Plan and Hitler.
Q. When Saur made such a statement, “We take care of the labor assignment,” why do you think he said that?
A. Well, once in a while such strong words were used. I never took this statement very seriously and I didn’t react to it because I knew exactly that nothing would happen afterwards, and nothing really happened. I was sure that the labor assignment should have been taken care of by the Jaegerstab, but it was impossible to take care of that for one single production. Everyone who had something to do with labor assignment could understand that.
Q. Witness, you just spoke concerning boasting remarks. Is it known to you that Milch often used such strongly exaggerated boasting remarks during these meetings?
A. I don’t remember single statements made by Milch but I am sure that they occurred. What I wanted to say now is that it appeared to me that Milch very often, particularly concerning the industry and his own generals, wanted to boast in order to play the strong man. I believe, however, that these statements did not always make the impression he wished to create.
Q. Do you mean to say that they were not taken seriously?
A. Well, not quite seriously, anyway.
Q. Were you present during the conference of the Jaegerstab where Milch made a long speech to the air force engineers and the quartermaster chiefs?
A. I was there part of the time. I remember now. That was the session which took place in the Air Ministry—there were 100 people there at the time, and I have to remind you of the fact that I wasn’t present during all those conferences.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, the prosecution introduced a document during the trial where Goering gives Himmler a fighter group in exchange for the use of concentration camp inmates which were put at the disposal of the air force armament. Do you know anything about that?
A. What fighter group do you mean?
Q. I mean a squadron—a whole squadron was placed at the disposal of the SS, and Goering wanted to have concentration camp inmates from the SS. Do you remember anything about that? It was on the 15th of February 1944.
A. I can’t remember that exactly. Goering, that is the Luftwaffe, put a great number of soldiers at his disposal for immediate production. They got their leave. But if there ever was such an exchange of concentration camp inmates, I do not know today anymore. It could be possible; however, I can’t tell for sure.
Q. Witness, is it known to you that in the Jaegerstab they were often transferred from the construction sector of the Plenipotentiary for chemistry?
A. No. In any case, I don’t know that this was done to a considerable extent. It is possible that it also was said during my presence that the Plenipotentiary for chemical industry had too many workers in the construction sector and a few of them had to be transferred; lots of complaints were made. However, I can’t remember anything concrete.
Q. Witness, can you remember that Milch tried to be able to free certain engineers from Hitler who were working in Berchtesgaden?
A. I believe I can remember that. The question of engineers was discussed very often because this was a big bottleneck in the construction sector. I remember also that, concerning the construction works in Berchtesgaden, it was discussed in this connection and that one hoped to be able to get not only engineers but other skilled workers from the construction works carried out in Berchtesgaden for Hitler.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, is it known to you that the use of concentration camp inmates was carried out in closed groups?
A. Yes, as far as the SS used concentration camp inmates, outside of their own factories, this was obviously only done in larger groups of about 500 to 1,000.
Q. Is it possible that during constructions a few miners or engineers were concentration camp inmates?
A. When the rest of the workers were not concentration camp inmates, then, according to the regulations of the SS, personally, I don’t believe that there were certain concentration camp inmates in there, and I don’t know of any such cases. I know that the SS always required that the concentration camp inmates be taken in large numbers and that they should be assigned in groups and billeted in groups.
Q. In other words, is it possible that the SS also used people of their own as miners, apart from those concentration camp inmates?
A. I couldn’t tell you, because I did not know the situation with the SS. However, that is possible.
* * * * *
Q. The question was: If the SS ever used miners from their own ranks and if they trained them?
A. No. I don’t know anything about that either.
Q. Do you know if the SS had a miners’ school?
A. No. I don’t know that either. I never heard of any miners’ school. The miners learned by experience.
* * * * *
[Tr. pp. 743-759]
Q. What do you know about labor utilization of English and American prisoners of war? That is to say, Americans and British who were captured in Germany?
A. In 1944, that is to say, in my time, no new prisoners of war were used because we didn’t capture any more. So far as I know, British and American prisoners of war were not used in armament factories. Repeatedly, proposals in this direction were made also in the case of noncoms and officers. In the case of officers—it was Polish officers, if I recall, no change in the regulations was made, so far as I recall. Instructions were transmitted to the OKW, but I do not know if anything came of them.
Q. I come now to your two sworn affidavits of 19 November 1946; Prosecution Exhibit 76 is a sworn affidavit of yours of that date. NOKW-266, dated 19 November, * * *.
* * * * *
Q. Did you know that in 1944, in order to protect the aircraft industry, underground and protected factories were built?
A. Yes.
Q. You know who gave the original order for this?
A. So far as I know, the order for this relocation of industries in subterranean plants was given by the Jaegerstab itself. I was not competent in this matter, but naturally I took part in the discussion of the Jaegerstab and heard it there. I heard that it was decided that a bombed-out factory should be relocated to a different place which the Jaegerstab would determine.
Q. That’s no answer to my question. Witness, I asked: Who gave the original order for the construction of these subterranean factories? Do you know that?
A. If I may repeat; you want to know who ordered in the first place that these plants should be transferred to subterranean factories? That I do not know.
Q. Do you know Herr Kammler?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know from whom he received the order to construct these special subterranean factories?
A. Here again I do not know precisely who gave him the original order. In any event, at the first beginning of the Jaegerstab, Kammler became a member and was commissioned to undertake the construction of subterranean buildings for Jaegerstab protection. The Jaegerstab pointed out to him individual objectives and he reported from time to time how many square meters were now ready. But who first originally gave these orders to Kammler, whether it was Himmler or Hitler or some agreement or something like that, I don’t know.
Q. Was Kammler commissioned into the Jaegerstab because of an order of Himmler or because of some special order elsewhere?
A. I am not able to say. I assume that Himmler also gave him an order. The individual orders, what he was to build, he received from the Jaegerstab.
* * * * *
Q. Did Kammler, within the Jaegerstab, represent Himmler?
A. I do not know his powers or his functions and I cannot say. He was in the construction sector. That I know, but Himmler had charge of more things than construction.
* * * * *
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Will you try to answer these questions as simply and briefly as you can? Were Russian prisoners of war used in the armament industry?
WITNESS SCHMELTER: In the armaments plant Russian prisoners of war were also employed. At what they were employed, I do not know, since they were already there when I came and I did not myself inspect the plants.
Q. Did you ever see Russian prisoners of war either manufacturing or transporting munitions of war?
A. In plants and in transports? No. Neither in plants nor in transports did I see Russian prisoners of war.
Q. That question is perfectly clear and you understand it?
A. I shall repeat it. I was asked whether these prisoners of war worked—whether I saw them in plants or in transport.
Q. That’s right.
A. And I answered in the negative.
Q. Were Russian prisoners of war used in the decentralization of the Luftwaffe after the heavy bombings?
A. Not that I know of. So far as I know, after the heavy bombings Russian prisoners of war were no longer available. They had already been assigned elsewhere. I do know that after the heavy bombings, that is, in the year 1944, new Russian prisoners of war were not used in armaments or in the bombed out factories. It is, of course, possible that the local labor offices used Russian prisoners of war for this purpose, but we in the central offices knew nothing of this.
Q. Will you answer the same questions as to Polish prisoners of war?
A. So far as I know, Polish prisoners of war consisted solely of officers. Only officers were available. The others had been freed. The officers, however, in contradiction to many wishes that were expressed, were not used. At least if they were, I know nothing of it.
Q. Will you answer the same questions as to Hungarian Jews?
A. Hungarian Jews, among other things, were used in the construction of fighters—fighter planes. Female Hungarian Jews were also used in the actual construction of fighter planes.
Q. Were they voluntary workers?
A. No. Those were inmates of concentration camps, prisoners at the disposal of the SS.
Q. So the Hungarian Jews who were employed in the manufacture of fighter planes were forced to work in that connection?
A. The Hungarian Jews, so far as I recall, were offered by the SS to be employed in armament production. At first there were 1,000 of them or 500 who were employed. Then a number of plants said that they wanted such workers and they were then allotted by the SS to these plants and there they were obliged to work.
Q. Then the SS, which was one branch of the German military establishment simply dealt out the Hungarian Jews to anybody who needed them?
A. No. The Hungarian Jews, like all concentration camp inmates, were housed in camps that were either in or near the plants and which were constructed by the SS. They were then taken to work every day, and after the work they were again brought back by the SS to the camps. Also, the supervision of the work, for security reasons, was carried out by the SS. So far as the technical side of it was concerned, it was carried out by the representatives of the plant.
Q. Of course you don’t claim they were paid for their work?
A. That I do not know. I only know the general regulations concerning concentration camp prisoners, and I know them in part. I know that these prisoners, at least toward the end, also received some sort of wages. What the payment was, I do not know. I do know that the plant had to give the SS a certain amount for each prisoner, but what the prisoner himself received, I do not know.
Q. Do you know whether these Hungarian Jews worked through any contract with a foreign government, as was the case in France?
A. Let me repeat the question whether Hungarian Jews worked on the basis of an agreement with a foreign power—foreign government. Was that the question?
Q. Yes.
A. Not that I know of.
Q. I have no other questions. One more question please. You said that you know that Russian prisoners of war were working in the armament factories but you didn’t know what kind of work they were doing.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever see them in any of the factories?
A. No.
Q. What do you think they were doing?
A. I guess some of them were engaged in construction. So far as skilled workers were concerned they were certainly working at tasks that they were qualified to do. So far as they were unskilled workers they might have been doing almost anything.
Q. If they were working in munitions factories they were doing something to manufacture munitions, were they not?
A. If they worked in munitions factories then they must, of course, have had something to do with manufacturing munitions. Even if they only worked in the courtyard, or something like that, they still had something to do with the manufacture of munitions.
* * * * *
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Witness, did you ever know of any prisoners of war, especially Russians, being used to man antiaircraft guns?
A. In the construction or in the use of the antiaircraft?
Q. In the use of antiaircraft.
A. Yes, I have heard of that. I heard that Russian prisoners of war were used to man antiaircraft guns of that sort.
Q. Do you have any idea how many were used for that purpose?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Did you ever see them being used for that purpose?
A. No.
Q. On what fronts were they used?
A. I believe they were used on the home front, not on the actual battle front, but that is simply my opinion.
Q. Against American planes, British planes, and Russian planes?
A. They shot at whatever planes were over Germany.
* * * * *
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, you spoke of female Jews. When were these female Jews employed?
A. I do not know the precise date. It was the summer of 1944. In my estimation, it must have been May.
Q. Let me show you Document NOKW-359, Prosecution Exhibit 75. It is the next to the last document of the prosecution, Stenographic Minutes of the Jaegerstab Meeting of 27 June 1944. You said: “I have a few more points. Up until now 12,000 female concentration camp internees, Jewesses, have been demanded. The matter is now in order. The SS has agreed to deliver these Hungarian Jewesses in batches of 500. Thus the smaller firms, too, will be in a better position to employ these concentration camp Jewesses. I request that these people should be ordered in batches of 500.”
Is this the point from when onward these females were used?
A. Yes. It must have been about this time. The difficulty was the following: The SS demanded that the females should be delivered in batches of thousands only. Most factories could not use such a large number of females. Consequently, the SS was asked if it could not deliver them in smaller groups. That is the reason.
Q. Witness, is there a difference between the concept of “Ruestungsfabrik”, which means armament factory, and “Munitionsfabrik”, which means a munitions factory? Is there a difference in Germany?
A. “Ruestungsfabrik” took care of all sorts of armament production, materials, finishing up the deliveries and so on and so forth. “Munitionsfabrik” is the narrower concept and contents itself with the manufacture of munitions only.
Q. Did the “Munitionsfabrik” belong inside the concept of “Luftruestung”, air armament?
A. So far as the “Luftruestung” is concerned, they did, yes. The limitation of these concepts was not, however, uniform. Unfortunately, we had very few uniform concepts. They were often misused.
Q. Were factories that made sheet metal and so on, armament factories? Did they fall under the concept of armaments?
A. They did, yes.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
* * * * *
CROSS-EXAMINATION
MR. DENNEY: In one of these interrogations, on 30 December 1946, you were asked what the Jaegerstab did to bring workers from Hungary into Germany; do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall that you made reference to certain trips of the Jaegerstab to Hungary?
A. Yes.
Q. You made this statement: “The Jaegerstab, during its existence, made at least a total of 10 to 12 trips”?
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. All right. You were asked this question: “Who was in charge of these trips?” And your answer was: “So far as I remember, it was Milch. Milch participated in most trips of the Jaegerstab.”
A. In most of them, yes.
Q. In the same interrogation on 30 December, the record indicates that you made this statement: “I know about 100,000 workers from Hungary; however, these were Jews who were allocated to construction. I know nothing about 8,000 workers who evidently were skilled workers, intended for the fighter production program.”
A. Yes.
Q. You were then asked: “Is it known to you that these 100,000 Jews were used by Todt in the interests of the Jaegerstab?” and you made the following answer: “Yes, that is known to me.”
A. Yes.
Q. You were interrogated on 24 January and asked this question: “Do you know whether the Luftwaffe, in the Luftwaffe industry, used concentration camp prisoners, not in the building program, but for production?” and your answer was: “I don’t know. I don’t think so, except for women. The SS once offered us a lot of women. The difficulty was that, at first, at least 1,000 and later 500 were to be employed. Various firms got women after that, and I think that Heinkel, in Oranienburg, used concentration camp prisoners, not only women, but all the inmates.”
A. Yes.
Q. The answer was yes, if your Honor please. And Heinkel was an airplane factory, was it not, producing the Heinkel plane?
A. Yes.
Q. On November 15, of last year, you were asked if you knew that Himmler used concentration camp inmates for the underground buildings of the Jaegerstab, and your answer: “Yes. You mean the finished buildings, do you not?” And then you were asked: “The underground ones, the completion of the existing caverns or tunnels, or the like, where concentration camp inmates were employed?” and your answer: “Yes.”
A. Yes.
Q. And you were also asked: “Were these constructions built in the interest of the Luftwaffe?” Your answer: “These new constructions? Yes.”
A. Yes.
Q. The next question: “Exclusively in the interest of the Luftwaffe? And did the orders for the new constructions come from the Jaegerstab?” Answer: “Whether other constructions were also built there? Probably, yes.” Question: “I am only interested in the Luftwaffe.” Answer: “Also for the Luftwaffe. I do not know whether for others. I would not like to pin myself down.”
A. Yes.
Q. Later you were asked: “Do you know that prisoners of war were at all employed in air armament?” and you stated: “Yes, I should like to say, the armament plants. The air armament also employed prisoners of war in its plants.”
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. In reply to a question: “What was Field Marshal Milch’s position in the Jaegerstab?” you stated, “There were two chairmen in the Jaegerstab, Speer and Milch. In the first session, or rather in most of the sessions, Milch participated personally; Speer did not. Speer was present only in exceptional cases. In his position, Saur, who was at the same time manager, initiated the contact with the rest of the armament industry. Milch was Chief of the Jaegerstab, besides Speer.”
A. Yes.
Q. In the same interrogation of 15 November you made the following statement: “Assignment of labor was involved in every question including every question of production.”
A. Yes.
Q. On 26 November you made the following statement when you were interrogated: “Mobilization of manpower as a matter which is closely connected with production was very much discussed. Everybody had a word to say, had a request for something and they suggested or said I could do better, etc.”
A. Yes.
* * * * *
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, as to the trip to Hungary, were you present when the committee went to Hungary?
A. No, I traveled only as far as Prague and returned.
Q. Do you know the purpose of this trip to Hungary?
A. Not precisely. I know that there was a question of production to take place in Hungary, but precise information I do not have.
Q. Do you know that there was a definite contract with Hungary?
A. I heard about that subsequently.
Q. Did you then hear that this trip had the purpose of bringing Hungarian Jews to Germany?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. The prosecutor spoke to you of 100,000 Jews. Did you know that these were to be used by Mr. Dorsch?
A. Yes.
Q. And, as far as the tasks that he had, mainly for the construction of bombproof factories?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether the Jaegerstab ordered these 100,000 Jews or whether somebody else did?
A. The employment of these 100,000 Jews in this construction organization took place on Hitler’s orders. I, myself, was not present at this discussion. Dorsch, however, was present and told me that Hitler had ordered—had said Himmler had 100,000 Jews for bombproof factories and was to make them available.
Q. Do you know whether and in what number and when these Jews arrived to carry out this construction work?
A. I do not know precisely the dates. It was in the summer of 1944. Nor do I know whether all of them arrived. Once I concerned myself with the question regarding the guarding of these people. At that time the SS did not have enough guard personnel and Hitler ordered Keitel to provide 10,000 soldiers which were to be withdrawn from the eastern front and to make them available to the SS so that they, the SS, would have the necessary guard personnel. Thereafter, I heard nothing further about the matter and assumed that the Jews for the most part were employed. I deduced this from the fact that I otherwise should have heard of it probably.
Q. I discussed just yesterday with you whether these buildings were ordered by the Jaegerstab. I do not need to return to that question. Were these constructions used exclusively by the Jaegerstab or for other advantages, such as armored cars?
A. Originally they were exclusively planned for fighter construction but I do recall that, as time went on, there were also discussions of using them for other manufacture, for instance, tanks, and this construction was to take place in these buildings. Since, however, I had nothing to do with this professionally, I can only report on this from hearsay. In other words, I know nothing precisely.
Q. The prosecutor quoted to you a statement of yours from an interrogation; I shall ask you now did you make the statement in the interrogation that Milch was responsible in air armament to seek out workers individually?
A. I don’t know how I should understand the word “seek out”; if you mean that he went to foreign countries and searched for them personally, then of course that is wrong. I did state in that interrogation that during my activity in the Jaegerstab in March 1944 no individual actions in foreign countries were carried out by Milch or the Jaegerstab. The manpower was provided by Sauckel exclusively, or to the extent that they were prisoners by the SS, or prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht.
Q. And then they were transferred, as you said yesterday, to other sectors?
A. Yes.
Q. You also said in this interrogation that in most of the meetings Milch was present.
A. At the beginning, I said.
DR. BERGOLD: I have no further questions.
EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS XAVER DORSCH[133]
DIRECT EXAMINATION
[Tr. p. 1361-1379]
DR. BERGOLD: Please state to the Court your first and last name?
WITNESS DORSCH: Xaver Dorsch.
Q. When were you born?
A. 28 December 1899.
Q. What was your last position in the German Reich?
A. I was Deputy Chief of the Todt Organization, in the Speer Ministry.
Q. On the 28th of December 1946 you signed an affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
DR. BERGOLD: Your Honor, this is Document NOKW-447, Prosecution Exhibit 74.
Q. Witness, you made the following statement:
“As deputy of Minister Speer in his capacity as Chief of the Todt Organization, I received from Hitler, at the end of April 1944, an order to construct with the Todt Organization six bombproof fighter factories, of which two should have priority.” Can you tell me about the history of this construction?
A. Yes, but I must go into detail.
Q. Proceed.
A. Approximately eight months before this date, I made a suggestion to Minister Speer about how bombproof fighter factories above ground could be built, in this way, not only to secure manufacture, but also so that they would be more secure against bomb damage while being built.
The source was that the Todt Organization in France was doing a similar construction job as a launching site for V-2 bombs. Speer told me that I should take the plans with me on my next visit to the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, and two weeks later I was with Speer, visiting Hitler, and after other matters had been discussed, and before going, Speer mentioned this matter and Hitler said: “We must absolutely achieve bombproof aircraft factories because there is danger that transportation might be attacked, and then we cannot make up the time we have lost.” Hitler wanted large-size, big scale units, in which planes and fighters could be protected from the beginning to the end, because he saw a danger in the fact that transportation could be attacked and interrupted, and then the different parts, if they were made in various factories, could not be assembled.
He said that he imagined the matter roughly as follows: In narrow mountain valleys in Saxonian Switzerland, for example, caves could be dug which would provide these bombproof factory installations. Then Speer said, “Dorsch or the Todt Organization has another suggestion.” Speer said that, and I then submitted to him my plans for the special Todt Organization construction, which, as I said, had already been built in France, and I also pointed out to him that such factories, even as they were being built, were relatively safe against bomb attack.
This was roughly eight months before this date in April on which this commission of which I spoke in my affidavit was given to me. Hitler said to me that it was a matter of indifference to him according to what system these things were built, but that it was important to him that something really serious should be done.
On the next day there was a discussion on the same theme with Goering. Speer’s representative Dethleffsen, as Plenipotentiary for construction matters, and the leader of the main committee for construction, Gaertner, were present. I had to explain again the thought behind this special construction which I was proposing. Goering was enthusiastic and said that that was the solution and that the Todt Organization should begin immediately with that construction. Thereupon Speer said, “The Todt Organization cannot build these factories because it builds only outside the Reich, with the exception of the Ruhr district, and in the Reich itself the Main Committee for Construction should carry out the construction,” and for that reason, he had called the two gentlemen I mentioned above. Goering also said that it was indifferent to him who built the factories, that the important thing was that they should be built soon.
In April of 1944, I was visiting Speer near Meran when a call came that I should immediately go to Hitler. Speer asked me if I had any idea what was afoot, but I did not. I immediately went to Berchtesgaden. There Hitler asked me, “What has become of your fighter production?” I told him that I did not know precisely, because in the Reich the Todt Organization did not do the constructing but another organization. He was greatly excited and said roughly, that he had heard enough about this other organization, that he did not want it, and he demanded that the Todt Organization should take over that construction immediately.
Then the plans were fetched overnight from Berlin. I explained the whole system to him once more. I told him that I could only carry out this construction if it were given priority above all other construction as far as workers, machines, building materials, trucks, and so on—whatever is needed in construction—were concerned. I was given assurances that that priority would be given me, and I then took over this construction project.
I was able to assure myself that the Hauptausschuss Bau—the Main Committee for Construction—which had been in charge before I took over had begun constructions at three locations. On one of these we immediately stopped work, because both architecturally and, as the Jaegerstab told me, technically the factory was no good.
Q. Witness, you then said that the wish to build these bombproof fighter factories by the Todt Organization was communicated to you by the Jaegerstab. What do you know about that personally?
A. I know the following: The Jaegerstab, as far as the entire work of the Plenipotentiary for construction was concerned, was not satisfied with the work. Saur complained continuously about how work dragged on and asked me repeatedly to step in and do something. He called me to his meetings in the Jaegerstab and asked me to develop further plans. I was called up continuously by other gentlemen. I remember Major Dr. Krohmer, who also asked me to step in, and again and again I had to say that that would not do because, I said the Todt Organization did not carry out construction in the Reich. I was pressed continuously by the Jaegerstab, because it was the organization that would benefit from these constructions.
Q. Do you know whether Milch went in that direction too, or only Saur?
A. That I cannot say. I did not speak about that to him myself. I did speak with Saur and a few other gentlemen—I believe with Schlempp who was later representative of the Todt Organization in the Jaegerstab.
Q. When was that first pressure on the part of Saur? Was that before March of 1944?
A. Yes. That was even earlier, but I cannot say precisely. It might have been in February even.
Q. Do you know whether Saur visited the Fuehrer on this matter?
A. I was not present, but I assumed that it must have been so. I cannot prove it, however.
Q. So. This afternoon you told me what you thought Milch’s function was in the Jaegerstab. You used a rather striking expression. Would you like to repeat it here?
A. I called him “the breakfast director”. I ask the defendant to pardon the expression. He shouldn’t hold it against me.
Q. What do you mean by this “breakfast director”?
A. Well, it is sort of difficult for me to tell that.
Q. Milch won’t be angry.
A. Well, I only saw him at a Jaegerstab meeting once, when he invited me and when he asked for the support of the Todt Organization. He explained to me the general situation. He told me what his worries and troubles were, but the real work, the whole functioning of the thing, I don’t believe he concerned himself with. That is why I used the expression “breakfast director,” but perhaps that was a little exaggerated.
Q. I quite understand. After the end of April 1944, when you were commissioned with these construction matters, what did you do?
A. As I told Hitler very exactly, I took Todt Organization units from France and from the Atlantic Wall.
Q. How many were there?
A. 2,000 or 3,000—I cannot remember.
Q. Your affidavit says 10,000.
A. No, that is incorrect. That cannot have been the number in France. The second time that I went to the Plenipotentiary General for chemistry, Prof. Krauch, and told him of the serious situation, and I finally brought him to the point of giving me 15,000 workers from his department.
Q. What workers were those?
A. First of all, in the Baltic States—that was a Todt Organization itself—I took away most of the German workers, and took some elsewhere as additional workers, engineers, experts of one sort or another, machinists. Then came the attack on Leuna on the 10th or 12th of May 1944. That was on the occasion of the first attack on Leuna. I had a talk with Hitler at that time. He said, “This cannot be tolerated—that, at the very moment when we are so in need of oil, workers are taken away from Leuna”.
I then answered him that, first of all, I had undertaken this measure before the air attack, and secondly, it was not a question of cutting down on oil production, but of oil capacity. Hitler took over and said, “No, that cannot be”. Then Speer said, “If we don’t get the workers, we can’t do the building”. Hitler said, “Quiet down, you will get 50,000 Italians,” and then I said, “I don’t believe that”, and I said that for the following reasons: We, the Todt Organization, had such workers from Italy for the construction program Riese in Silesia, but we did not do this via Sauckel but by applying to Italian firms to take over construction commissions in Germany, and then they automatically brought their workers, their directors and architects, and so on, with them particularly after we had assured them that we with our organization—that is to say, with the Todt Organization in Italy—would take care of paying wages, paying for the hospitalization fees, insurance, and so on, but at the moment when workers were fetched by Sauckel, I understood clearly that workers such as we needed would not be provided in any considerable numbers. At any rate, I told Hitler, “I do not believe in these Italian workers, and I won’t believe in them until they have crossed the Brenner Pass.” He then said to me, “You can believe in them because tomorrow Mussolini is signing an agreement that 1,000,000 workers will come to Germany.”
* * * If I may mention it, it is also worthy of mention, that in January, the beginning of January, I was at a conference with Hitler, or rather, I did not take part in it, but I knew of it. There, a new worker contingent was demanded, and in this conference Hitler himself named the number of 250,000 workers for the construction; for aircraft construction. In other words, it wasn’t Speer but Hitler who demanded those workers, especially, and it is possible—that, at any rate, is the way I construe it now—that he was thinking of these fighter plants. Then I asked Hitler to permit me to use 10,000 Todt Organization workers from Southern Russia. I must mention that here, because I did that as Speer’s representative with Hitler. I could not have said to Speer that he should give me these 10,000 workers. I had to do that through Hitler, because the commanders in chief, in this case the commander in chief of the army group in Southern Russia, were in charge of these people and they had to be released by them. Thereupon these 10,000 workers got under way toward Germany. However, they unfortunately arrived very slowly and some of them never got to the fighter plant, but were taken over by Speer to make ball bearings in Wellen, in Thuringia, and then, when no workers came, the plants were to be built by Hungarian Jews. I do not know precisely when it was, but I do remember an armaments conference in Linz—I guess it was about the middle of June or maybe later, but I can’t say for sure—and it was then that the first ones began to arrive.
Q. Were they approved by Hitler?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, when you of the Todt Organization fetched Italians on your own initiative, were they volunteers or were they more or less forced labor?
A. Precisely in Italy, we had a remarkable achievement because as a matter of principle we turned to Italian firms, gave them commissions and they provided the workers. I believe I can say that the Todt Organization was known for taking model care of its workers. For instance, in Norway and Holland, the Dutch or Norwegian Todt worker received higher wages than the German Todt worker who was working right beside him. I could make extensive statements on that if I wanted to, or if I were given the opportunity.
Q. But that is not an answer to my question, whether they were volunteers or forced labor?
A. They were not forced. They were brought by their firms.
Q. Through the Italian firms?
A. Yes, that was the intention from the very beginning, so that the Italian firms could provide their trained and expert personnel to us, and, in this way, they were simply volunteers; they did much better work than if they were forced.
DR. BERGOLD: No further questions.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
MR. KING: Witness, you stated that Milch was only present at a few of the early meetings of the Jaegerstab. May I ask you—
A. What I said refers only to those meetings of the Jaegerstab at which I was present and that was perhaps four or five.
Q. Now, you said, in your affidavit, which has been submitted as a prosecution exhibit referred to by Dr. Bergold, that you received an order for the construction of fighter factories at the end of April 1944?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall being present at a conference at Berchtesgaden with Goering, among others, on the 19th of April 1944?
A. I cannot say whether that was the precise date, but I did take part in some such conference.
Q. Do you recall who was present at that conference?
A. Yes. Goering was there, Milch was there, the others I’m not sure about. Saur—I’m not sure he was there. I knew for sure that Milch and Goering were present, but as to the others I no longer recall.
Q. Do you recall what was discussed at this conference?
A. The construction of fighter plants was discussed then, and, if I remember, Goering pointed out that the Todt Organization was to receive all sorts of support but I do not remember the details at the moment.
Q. And a few days later, on 21 April 1944, you received the order from Hitler to build the six fighter plants?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall that possible sources of labor were discussed at this meeting? That is, labor for the construction of the fighter factories?
A. I should like to assume that, but I do not remember precisely. Probably all sorts of conditions and possibilities were discussed, but I cannot answer this precisely.
Q. You were discussing a large-scale construction; you must have known where this labor was to come from. Can you tell me what possible sources were discussed at that meeting?
A. I do not know whether or not that question was discussed at this conference. I assume that it was, but that was such a long time ago that it is impossible for me to recall these details. But I was clear in my own mind about that fact. That we needed so and so many workers was of course obvious. I did make the demand that this construction program should receive top priority and I stated previously that I wanted primarily German workers, which was then done, and in the sector of the Plenipotentiary General for chemistry I wanted to take some workers; that was the way in Germany that you got workers. Later, when we of the Todt Organization took over the construction program in Germany, we saw that a large number of construction offices had so little manpower that they had to stop production and there again we found workers. The whole situation was somewhat unclear because when we took over building these fighter factories, the entire construction was turned over to the Todt Organization, and no one could take the responsibility for such important constructions unless he could control the direction of the whole construction program, but, with the best will in the world, I can’t recall the details. There were so many conferences, one followed the other so rapidly, I do not any longer recall.
Q. Who was your representative at meetings of the Jaegerstab?
A. Schlempp, first of all; even before I was commissioned with this task, he was the technical adviser or expert on construction. Saur asked me at that time to regard him as the liaison man between the Todt Organization and the Jaegerstab. Then, about the middle of June, Schlempp became group leader of the unit in Prague, for which reason I provided one of my best men, namely, Knipping and I used him in what had previously been Schlempp’s capacity.
Q. Do you recall that Schlempp, and later Knipping, reported on the progress of it to the Jaegerstab?
A. I am convinced that they did, because that was their job.
* * * * *
Q. Now can you give me percentagewise the breakdown of this labor by groups, that is, prisoners of war labor, foreign labor, concentration camp labor, German labor?
A. That I could only do with the most general estimate, with vagueness. In the case of Kaufering, there were perhaps sixty percent from the concentration camps; however, prisoners of war, as far as I know, were not there at all. The rest must have been Germans. In Muehldorf, where the second factory was, the breakdown was roughly the same, but I really cannot say. I visited each one of these factories only twice. Because of the transportation situation of the Rhine bridges and the hydrogenation plant situation, I did not have the time to visit them.
Q. Now did you obtain any of this labor for the construction project? Do you recall obtaining any of this from Schmelter?
A. I take it that Hitler himself had approved these workers. Our request went to Schmelter, and he was working his own men in that Todt Organization, and in the Jaegerstab, and it was his job to settle the details when they should come, and what they should be paid, and such matters. That was Schmelter’s job, and Schmelter was told that this is a technical staff, and he knew that Hitler had approved the workers, and so it was his job to take care of the details, and to inform the Einsatzgruppe what it should do. I did not carry much of these things in detail after that.
Q. Now do you recall how large a construction was at Kaufering? I am speaking both at Kaufering I and Kaufering II?
A. You mean the technical construction?
Q. Yes.
A. There was one main hall in Kaufering I, three hundred meters long, ninety meters wide, with six stories. Kaufering II conducted production later, but everything was concentrated in Kaufering I.
Q. Do you recall how much of this construction was completed?
A. I should think three-fourths. At the last time I visited this construction shortly before the collapse, the machines were being set in on one side of the building, and that is as far as it went.
Q. And to whom was this plant allocated?
A. That I cannot say. In my opinion the Messerschmitt, but I must be careful in what I say here, because in the last week before the collapse there were negotiations with the armament staff. I cannot remember what that situation was in Kaufering, but in Muehldorf there was constant talk of putting Buna in there. That changed continuously, dependent on the war situation. Once Speer wanted to set up a steel foundry in the fighter factory in the Rhineland, which was later changed.
Q. Please answer the question. Now in these inspections at Kaufering, do you recall any Luftwaffe representatives who inspected these construction sites?
A. That I don’t know. I cannot say. A colonel of the Luftwaffe was there but in his capacity as representative of the armament commando or of an armament office.
Q. Now getting back to this meeting of 19 April 1944, do you recall that Speer was present there?
A. No.
Q. How were your relations with Speer at that time?
A. They were tense. Speer did not regard the Todt Organization as a sort of construction organization. To make a statement, I should have to go into great detail on this subject.
Q. I think that suffices. Now with regard to the recruitment of these fifty thousand Italians, which you discussed with Dr. Bergold, do you recall who was to handle the recruitment of those Italians for work in the Reich?
A. To be sure that I do not make any false statement, is it your concern who recruited the fifty thousand Italians that Hitler approved of?
Q. My concern is through what channel were these Italians that were promised Hitler by Mussolini, through what channels were they recruited?
A. That was to be taken care of by Sauckel, but through the Todt Organization, who had their office in Italy apply to Italian firms ultimately, and that was done through the Todt Organization office in Italy.
Q. Now with regard to these Italians, do you know what provision was made for the guarding of those that were to arrive, that is, en route?
A. Of that I know nothing, because they did not arrive. They were not watched, or guarded at all. They were free workers, there was no reason to guard them.
Q. Now, Witness, outside of Kaufering, can you tell me where and under what names these other fighter factories were to be located?
A. In Muehldorf, and then there was a factory in Vaihingen.
Q. Just a minute. Now with regard to Muehldorf, can you tell me what that was to be used for, who was it to be used by?
A. First it was thought of as a fighter factory, and then, a few weeks before the collapse, there was a conference of the armament gentlemen in Munich, at which it was agreed that it could be used for the manufacture of Buna; in other words, they changed their minds.
Q. What time did that conference at Munich take place?
A. That must have been about the end of March 1945.
Q. Now, with regard to Muehldorf, can you tell me where, primarily this labor was coming from?
A. These were Hungarian Jews. There were Germans there. Where they came from, that I don’t know.
Q. Well, now, with regard to these Hungarian Jews, can you tell me whether that was a result of a special action in Hungary?
A. I don’t believe so, but I don’t know. We were only told that we were going to receive Hungarian Jews. They were already in Germany, if I remember, but where they came from I don’t know because I didn’t concern myself with it.
Q. But you do recall that Hungarian Jews were used on that site?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, with regard to these other factories, we have covered Kaufering and Muehldorf, can you tell me the location of the others?
A. Vaihingen—that was a factory that was already under construction before the Todt Organization stepped in.
Q. Witness, where was that located?
A. V-a-i-h-i-n-g-e-n, and it is in Wuerttemberg.
Q. And how large was that construction?
A. It was a building about 100 meters by 60, four, five stories high.
Q. And do you recall what type of workers was used in that construction?
A. Concentration camp inmates, but I don’t know the number.
Q. And that was in Thuringia?
A. No, in Wuerttemberg.
Q. Now do you recall that any of these factories was to be located in the Protectorate?
A. One was to be erected there, yes, in the neighborhood of Prague but so far as I know they never got around to it. Perhaps the ground work was carried out and the machines were shipped there, but the factory itself was not actually built. Then there was to be another one in the Rhineland. I have already mentioned that.
Q. Witness, with regard to this factory in the Protectorate, can you give me the code name for that factory?
A. No, I don’t know it. It was about 50 kilometers north of Prague.
Q. And that was to be used by what company?
A. I can’t say, I don’t know.
Q. Can you give me any indication of the size of that factory?
A. The one north of Prague? Yes. That would have been about the same size as Kaufering, roughly, but, as I say, I really don’t know whether they got construction under way there.
Q. But you were to construct it?
A. Yes, it would have been done under my supervision, or under my direction. I was Speer’s representative and chief of the Todt Organization.
Q. But you don’t know how far along or whether construction was initiated there?
A. I cannot say for sure. I suppose that they started the construction, but so far as I know they really did not actually get this factory built.
Q. Now, with regard to this factory in the Rhineland, can you tell me where that was to be located?
A. I can’t remember the name any more. I was there once, and I can perhaps locate it on the map. It was west of the Rhine, 70 or 80 kilometers, but I can’t remember the name any longer. It was under construction, and then the construction was interrupted by military events, that is, about the time when the Americans entered the Rhineland on the Ruhr. Nor do I know whether concentration camp inmates were used there.
Q. Do you recall whether foreign labor was used?
A. In this factory? That I cannot say.
Q. You don’t recall constructing any factories for Wiener-Neustadt?
A. No.
Q. Or for the automobile works at Steyr, in Austria?
A. No.
Q. Focke-Wulf, in Bremen?
A. No, in Bremen we only built a U-boat factory.
Q. Do you recall constructing any factories for Heinkel?
A. That I don’t know. I wasn’t really interested in such questions, because I received the data from the Jaegerstab, and the Jaegerstab did the actual construction. The engineer of the Todt Organization built the house, and then the Jaegerstab took care of the rest. There were no discussions on my part with construction firms. Moreover, I didn’t even have time to carry out such things.
Q. But you got your labor through Schmelter, who was a member of the Jaegerstab?