Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 07 (part 2 of 3)
“Article II:
Legislative and executive power will, in the future, be exercised exclusively by the Chief of State.
“Article III:
The Free City of Danzig, together with its territory and population, immediately becomes an integral part of the German Reich.
“Article IV:
Until the definite decision about the introduction of the Law of the German Reich by the Führer, all the laws, the Constitution excepted, in force at the moment of the promulgation of the present basic law, remain in force.
“Danzig, 1 September 1939. Signed: Albert Forster, Gauleiter.
“I beg you, my Führer, on behalf of Danzig and of its population, to approve this basic state law and to confirm by Reich statute the reunion with the German Reich.
“Danzig enthusiastically extends to you, my Führer, a feeling of endless gratitude and eternal devotion.
“Heil to you, my Führer. Albert Forster, Gauleiter.”
And now that the documents which establish the actual line of conduct of the fascist conspirators with regard to Poland have been submitted to the Tribunal, it seems to me opportune to refer, be it only summarily, to excerpts from Fall Weiss as well as from the statements and pronouncements by Hitler and Ribbentrop, after which I shall read into the record a new document, which is Exhibit Number USSR-172 (Document Number USSR-172). This document represents the secret notes by Bormann concerning a conversation on Poland which took place in Hitler’s apartment on 2 October 1940.
On 30 January 1934 Hitler made a speech in his capacity of Chancellor of the Reich. It concerned a number of problems, including relations with Poland. There is no need to quote it in detail. At present, only two or three sentences can be of interest to us. I quote excerpts from Document Number TC-70:
“. . . It seems to me that we must show, by a concrete example, that disagreements, however indisputable, need not prevent the finding of a modus vivendi which would serve usefully the cause of peace as well as the welfare of both nations.”
I shall now skip several paragraphs and quote one of the concluding sentences. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, it is pointed out to me, and I intervene for the purpose of getting the record correct, that the document is dated not the 30th of January 1934, but 30 January 1943. Do you agree with this?
COL. POKROVSKY: In my report I see the date 30 January 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: That is right, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall continue the quotation which concludes Hitler’s pronouncement:
“The German Government is resolved and prepared to develop its political and economic relations with Poland, in accordance with the present agreement, in such a way as to ensure that a period of useful co-operation may follow one of fruitless reticence.
“The Chancellor has here expressed his particular satisfaction with the clarification of relations between Danzig and Poland.”
On 26 September 1938 Hitler again spoke of Poland in one of his usual speeches. I consider it essential to quote a short excerpt from this speech—Document Number TC-29:
“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent it.”
I do not consider it necessary to read the entire document, and I will therefore omit a few sentences.
“Precisely a year later it was possible to reach an agreement which, in the first place, definitely eliminated the danger of a conflict for a period of 10 years.
“We are all convinced that this agreement will lead to a lasting pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which have to exist side by side, and neither can eliminate the other.
“A state with a 33 million population will always strive for an outlet to the sea.
“Because of that, a way for understanding had to be found. It has been found and will be more and more consolidated.”
In absolute conformity with this official and, from beginning to end, deceitful speech of Hitler’s, the Defendant Ribbentrop, speaking in Warsaw on 25 January 1939, stated—this quotation will be found in Document Number 2530-PS:
“It is a fundamental part of German foreign policy in accordance with the firm will of the Führer of the German people that the friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based on the existing treaty, be strengthened progressively and deepened.”
Omitting one paragraph of this document, which has already been read in court and submitted to the Tribunal as the Document Number 2530-PS, I wish to repeat only one sentence of it:
“Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with complete confidence upon the solid basis of their mutual relations.”
Need I remind the Tribunal that in the Document L-79 already presented, which is a record of the conference on 23 May 1939 at Hitler’s new Reich Chancellery, among the many other openly aggressive declarations and statements of policy by Hitler, this man uttered the following sentence:
“Thus, there is no question of sparing Poland, and the decision remains to attack Poland at the first opportunity. It is impossible to expect a repetition of the operation against Czechoslovakia. This time it will mean war.”
It must be stated in all fairness that this war was a surprise for Poland only. The fascist conspirators had, for a long time, carefully prepared for it. I now turn to Document C-120, a considerable part of which has already been read into the record. I should like to submit several excerpts from this document concerning the conspiracy of the Hitlerites directed against Poland, excerpts which have not yet been read into the record. I should like to draw your attention to individual sentences, which naturally did not attract the attention of the counsel who offered this document in evidence because they deal with relatively small details. But now these sentences are decisive and are of primary importance. They are highly characteristic and essential to a correct evaluation of the material I am about to present.
In the Document Number C-120 (Exhibit Number GB-41), marked, “for commanding officers only; top secret; matter for Chief of Staff; only through officer; General Headquarters of the Armed Forces WFA 37/39 Chefs (L-Ia)” just preceding the text of the document the subject is indicated as follows:
“Subject: Instructions for the Armed Forces for 1939-1940. Directive concerning the uniform preparation of the Armed Forces for 1939-1940 is hereby restated.”
This sentence clearly and definitely indicates that already previously, that is, before 3 April 1939, there existed some other directives on this very question.
The following is said in Paragraph 3 of the document cited:
“Opinions of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the data for the calendar schedule, will be submitted to the OKW on 1 May 1939.”
Already by 1 May 1939 Germany had a revised, modernized, and detailed plan for an aggression against Poland. And Hitler, while playing the part of one insulted by Poland, waited only for a suitable moment to declare that he had no choice but to destroy the Polish State.
In one of the appendices to the document quoted—it is also listed as Document Number C-120 (Exhibit Number GB-41) but was not read into the record—there is one feature of great importance. The document is signed by Hitler and bears the date 11 April 1939. It was prepared in five originals only. I offer in evidence a copy of the second original.
“Directive concerning the uniform preparation of the Armed Forces for 1939-1940.
“I will expound, at a later date, the future objectives of the Armed Forces as well as the preparations for war which follow therefrom.
“Until the directive becomes effective, the Armed Forces must be ready to accomplish the following tasks:
“I) Securing the frontiers of the German Reich and protection from sudden air offensives; II) Fall Weiss; III) Occupation of Danzig.
“Signed: Hitler.”
I will now read into the record the first paragraph of Appendix 3, entitled the “Occupation of Danzig.”
“The surprise occupation of the Free City of Danzig may come into question—independently of Fall Weiss—in utilization of a favorable political condition.”
I think that we can dispense with the reading of the remaining text of the document.
If it please the Tribunal, it is worthy of note that, according to German plans the occupation of Danzig was regarded either as an integral part of the aggression against Poland or, in case of a different political situation, as a completely independent operation, but in both cases it was planned well in advance.
The same set of documents, listed as Number C-120, includes a top-secret directive intended exclusively for commanding officers and was to be transmitted through officers only. It is important to note that the subject of this document, which I submit to the Tribunal, is indicated as follows: Instructions concerning the uniform preparation for war of the Armed Forces for the years 1939-1940. Just as the previous ones, this document was not intended for a wide circle of readers. It was typed in seven originals only. The fascist conspirators were not very anxious to popularize their planned preparation for war.
And again, in the appendix to directive OKW 37/39, which I have already submitted to the Tribunal and which is entitled, “Special Orders for Fall Weiss,” there is one very significant sentence. I shall read into the Record the penultimate subparagraph of Paragraph 2:
“In case of a public announcement of general mobilization (Mobplan) for the Armed Forces, the mobilization will automatically cover the entire civilian network, including war production. A public announcement, however, of mobilization should not be counted on, should military events be confined to Fall Weiss.”
It seems highly significant to me that the fascist conspirators, though fully conscious of the fact that war was to begin, had planned the execution of their criminal intent without announcing any mobilization.
And finally, I should like to point out that in Keitel’s order to the Armed Forces, Number 37/39, of 3 April 1939, issued in connection with Fall Weiss, the following directives by Hitler were made public:
“I. Operational plan Fall Weiss must be elaborated with a view to the fact that its execution must be possible at any time, as from 1 September 1939.”
We know that the invasion of Poland was, in fact, started on 1 September 1939—in short, on the very first day on which the German Armed Forces had to be fully ready for action.
Operational Order Number 1, 25039, of 21 August 1939, issued to the Command of Naval Group OST, on board the battleship Schleswig Holstein, stated as follows—this document has already been submitted to the Tribunal as a German photostatic copy:
“I. General situation. a) Political: All the armed forces must be defeated by means of a lightning thrust, to enable the creation in the East of a situation favorable for the defense of the Reich. The Free City of Danzig will be declared a Reich city.”
It is worth while to bear this sentence in mind when speaking of the “free expression of will by the Danzig population,” which allegedly aspired to become part of the Reich. It must not be forgotten that this free expression of will had been foreseen by the above operational Order Number 1, to the very day.
To conclude, I consider it essential to read into the record, almost in full, a rather long but exceptionally important document. I have in mind a note by the Defendant Bormann of 2 October 1940, referring to a conversation about Poland. This conversation was held after a dinner which took place in Hitler’s apartment. You will find this note on Page 311, Volume I, Part 2 of the document book:
“Secret; Berlin, 2 October 1940; note.
“On 2 October 1940, after dinner at the Führer’s apartment, a conversation arose on the nature of the Government General, the treatment of the Poles and the incorporation, already approved by the Führer, of the Districts of Piotrokow and Tomassov into the Warthegau.
“The conversation began when the Reich Minister, Dr. Frank, informed the Führer that the activities in the Government General could be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw and other cities had been locked up in the ghetto; Kraków would very shortly be cleared of them.”
I now consider it possible to omit a few paragraphs.
“The Führer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct contrast to our German workmen, are specially born for low labor; we must give every possibility of advancement to our German workers; as to the Poles—there can be no question of improvement for them. On the contrary, it is necessary to keep the standard of life low in Poland and it must not be permitted to rise.
“The Government General must, under no condition whatsoever, be an isolated and uniform economic region; it must not produce independently, even in part, any manufactured goods necessary for its subsistence; the Government General should be used by us merely as a source of unskilled labor (in industries such as brick manufacturing, road construction, et cetera). One cannot change the nature of a Slav, as the Führer has already emphasized. While as a rule our German workers are by nature assiduous and diligent, the Poles are lazy and it is necessary to use compulsion to make them work.
“However, there is no reason to expect that the Government General will become an independent economic region, as there are no mineral resources, and even should such be available the Poles are not capable of utilizing them.
“The Führer has explained that the Reich needs large estates to provide food for our large cities; these large estates, as well as other agricultural enterprises, are in need of labor, and cheap labor in particular, for the cultivation of the soil and for harvesting. As soon as the harvest time is over, the laborers can go back to Poland because should they be employed in agriculture the whole year round they themselves would use up an important part of the crops. The best solution would thus be to import from Poland temporary laborers for the duration of the sowing and for the harvesting. Our industrial districts are overpopulated, while at the same time there is a lack of manpower in agriculture. That is where we can make use of the Polish laborers. For this reason, it would be quite right to have a surplus of manpower in the Government General, so that every year the laborers needed by the Reich could be procured from there. It is indispensable to bear in mind that the Polish gentry must cease to exist; however cruel this may sound, wherever they are, they must be exterminated.
“There must, of course, be no sexual intercourse with Poles. It would consequently be a correct procedure if Polish harvesters, both men and women, came together to the Reich. Whatever the mutual relationships were in their camps would not be a matter of our concern—no zealous Protestant should poke his nose into these affairs.
“The Führer stressed once more that there should be one master only for the Poles—the German; two masters, side by side, cannot and must not exist; therefore, all representatives of the Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds cruel, but such is the law of life.
“The Government General represents a Polish reserve of manpower—a vast Polish labor camp. The Poles will also benefit from this, as we look after their health and see to it that they do not starve, et cetera, but they must never be raised to a higher level, for they will then become anarchists and Communists. It will therefore be proper for the Poles to remain Roman Catholics; Polish priests will receive food from us and will, for that very reason, direct their little sheep along the path we favor. The priests will be paid by us and will, in return, preach what we wish them to preach. If any priest acts differently, we shall make short work of him. The task of the priest is to keep the Poles quiet, stupid, and dull-witted. This is entirely in our interests. Should the Poles rise to a higher level of development, they will cease to be that manpower of which we are in need. In other respects it will suffice for a Pole to possess a small holding in the Government General—a large farm is not at all necessary; he will have to earn the money he requires in Germany. It is precisely this cheap labor we need; every German and every German worker will benefit by this cheap labor.
“A strict German administration must exist in the Government General to keep order in the labor reservations. These reservations mean for us the maintenance of agriculture, particularly of our large estates, and they are, besides, a source of supply of labor.”
I see no necessity to read into the record the exchange of views between those present, although it is mentioned in the document, and I shall go on directly to Hitler’s final statements:
“To sum up, the Führer wants to state once more:
“1. The lowest German workman and the lowest German peasant must always stand economically 10 percent above any Pole.”
I omit the second paragraph and pass to the third which is of great interest:
“3. I do not wish”—the Führer stressed—“that a German workman should, as a rule work more than 8 hours when we return to normal conditions; if a Pole, however, works 14 hours, he is still, in spite of that, to earn less than a German workman.
“4. The ideal picture is this: A Pole must possess a small holding in the Government General which will, to a certain extent, provide him and his family with food. The money required by him for clothes, supplementary foods, et cetera, et cetera, he must earn by working in Germany. The Government General must become a center for supplying seasonal unskilled labor, particularly agricultural laborers. The existence of these workmen will be fully guaranteed, because they will always be used as cheap labor.”
This document deals with the question of Hitler’s attitude towards Poland and the Polish people with such exhaustive clarity that it calls for no further comment.
I wish only to draw Your Honors’ attention to three points.
Firstly, Hitler definitely states and develops in detail the idea that in the new fascist order in Europe the Polish people and the Polish State must be nothing but a Polish labor camp for fascist Germany.
Secondly, Hitler is convinced that the Poles will benefit from such a state of affairs, since the fascist conspirators intend to care for the health and adequate nourishment of the Poles whom they have reduced to slavery. I beg Your Honors to consider the fact that by “adequate nourishment” Hitler understands a state of affairs according to which every Pole should be maintained at an economic level considerably below that of the most wretched German. By “care” he means that the standard of living in Poland should be low and that it should not improve, so that no Pole be engaged otherwise than in heavy unskilled labor, 14 hours a day.
Finally, Hitler sets the task for the extermination of the entire intelligentsia, stating arrogantly that there should exist only one master for the Poles—the German.
In the course of further presentation of documents to the Tribunal we shall prove that Hitler and his followers, in the persons of the participants in the fascist conspiracy, strove to exterminate the Polish people and to reduce the standard of living of the Poles to the most pitiable and beggarly level. Their very existence depended solely on the fact that it assured cheap manpower for the fascist masters.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
[The Tribunal adjourned until 11 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FIFTY-SIXTH DAY Monday, 11 February 1946
Morning Session
COL. POKROVSKY: The Tribunal has at its disposal the diaries of the Defendant Frank.
In the one marked “Diary of the Year 1943, V,” we find on Pages 1070-1072 an important entry; in the Russian translation this passage is on Page 5 of the addenda to the “Excerpts from Frank’s Diaries,” and on Page 321 of your document book, marked in pencil. I quote this passage:
“Kraków, 23 October 1943.
“The Governor General makes a report at the Administrative Academy on ‘The Leadership Principle in Government.’ From the point of view of constitutional and international law, the Government General, as an appendage to Greater Germany, constitutes a part of the territory over which the power of Greater Germany in Europe extends. The sovereignty over this territory belongs to the Führer of Greater Germany and on his behalf it is exercised by the Governor General who, as the deputy of the Führer, possesses all his powers.”
I would like to inform you, Your Honors, of two more documents of a strictly official nature.
In the Reichsgesetzblatt for 1939, Part I, Page 2077—Page 333 of your document book presented by us as Exhibit Number USSR-296 (Document Number USSR-296)—is published the “Führer’s and Reich Chancellor’s Decree on the Administration of the Occupied Polish Territory,” dated 12 October 1939.
I shall read into the record Paragraph 2 of this decree. It consists of two subparagraphs:
“Paragraph 2:
“1. I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Frank as Governor General of the occupied Polish territories.
“2. I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Deputy Governor General.”
In the same Reichsgesetzblatt, but this time for 1940, Part I, Page 399, is published a decree regarding the power to grant pardons in the occupied Polish territories. It is registered with the Tribunal as Document USSR-289 (Exhibit Number USSR-289) and is on Page 336 of the document book. It reads:
“In the occupied Polish territories I delegate to the Governor General of occupied Polish territories the power to confirm death sentences as well as pardons or to reject applications for pardons, with the right further to delegate his powers.”
The power of life and death, the sovereign prerogative, was entrusted in a Poland occupied by the Hitlerites, to the Defendant Frank.
It would not be misplaced to recall that it was this same Hitler who had said that he would show, by the concrete example of a mutual relationship between the Polish and the German peoples, that such a form of intercourse had been found “which would usefully serve the cause of peace as well as the welfare of both nations.”
I have spoken of the kind of example that was intended, and what the welfare was to which reference had been made.
The 6 April 1941 was marked by a new crime planned and carefully prepared beforehand by the Hitlerite conspirators. Without any warning or declaration of war, they attacked Yugoslavia.
The attack on Yugoslavia was a gross breach of Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1928. The Delegations of Great Britain and of the United States have already submitted to the Tribunal a considerable number of documents referring to the subject of the treacherous attack on Yugoslavia. I have only to submit a few new proofs and to establish a connection between these new documents and those already read into the record. Official German documents enable us to reconstitute events with exceptional vividness. In this case German pedantry turns against the authors of the criminal plan.
On 27 March 1941 Adolf Hitler held a special conference regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. On the same day he signed a top-secret Directive 025, for the High Command (Oberbefehlshaber) only. Both documents, filed under Document Number 1746-PS, are among the evidence already accepted by the Tribunal.
Subparagraph 2 of Directive 025 has already been quoted in full in the speech of the Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. The first subparagraph of this document was also read into the record on 7 December 1945. I should like to add a few more lines and read Paragraph 3 into the record. This passage is on Page 337 of the document book. It states as follows:
“In detail I order the following:
“a) As soon as the concentration of sufficient forces is concluded and meteorological conditions permit, all Yugoslav antiaircraft and Belgrade must be destroyed by continuous day and night air attacks.
“b) If possible, simultaneously, but under no circumstances sooner, Operation Marita must be started, with the primary limited objective to seize the harbor of Salonika.”
I believe that three points should be stressed here:
1) The intention of carrying out the total destruction of the capital of the state;
2) The correlation between the aggression against Yugoslavia and the aggression against another country, Greece—the aggression against Greece was coded, as the Tribunal knows, under the name of Operation Marita;
3) The necessity to complete the concentration of German forces as well as meteorological conditions were the factors that determined the time limits for the attack.
As in all previous cases of criminal fascist aggression, we see one and the same thing—the criminal intent of the predatory invader, treachery, and cold calculation.
Preparations for the successive acts which had been carried on over a very long period followed the customary Hitler routine, already disclosed by the prosecutors: Fifth Column activities, the use of the protection of the German minority as a slogan and the lying practice of peaceable declarations combined with unceasing preparations for invasion. As I have already stated, the preparation of the crime was carried on over a very long period and followed the customary Hitler routine already disclosed by the prosecutors.
On 27 March 1941, on the very day when Hitler signed Directive 025, he personally conducted, in Berlin, a special conference on the situation in Yugoslavia. The minutes of this conference were presented by the United States Prosecution on 4 December 1945 as Document Number 1746-PS.
Other documents relating to this conference have also been registered under the same number. At the conference, the objective was determined with absolute precision and a plan of action was presented. You will, Your Honors, find the passage I have quoted on Page 349.
Hitler declared:
“. . . we are not going to wait for any declarations of loyalty by the new government, but to carry out all preparations for the destruction of the Yugoslav armed forces and of Yugoslavia itself as a national unit.
“. . . it is especially important from the political point of view that the blow against Yugoslavia should be carried out with the utmost violence and that its military destruction should be effected with lightning speed.”
And a little further back in the document is stated:
“No diplomatic inquiries will be made and no ultimatum presented. . . . The attack will start as soon as the necessary supplies and troops are ready.”
Thus, Hitler was not in the least interested in the factual attitude of one or the other Yugoslav Government toward Germany, but in the factual destruction of Yugoslavia as a state; and he strove to accomplish this destruction with cruelty and lightning speed.
The operational staff of the OKW, meticulously following Hitler’s directive regarding a cruel and rapid destruction of Yugoslavia, speedily worked out a detailed plan for co-ordinated operations of the German and Italian Armies. It was issued as an official operational directive dated 28 March 1941. I consider it essential to reread three lines of this document, already submitted to the Tribunal under the same Document Number 1746-PS. You will find it on Page 352 of the document book. I read Paragraph 4 of this document into the record.
“. . . The German task is to attack Yugoslavia with the greatest possible concentration of forces, to smash its armed forces and destroy it as a state.”
I cannot but remind the Tribunal of the terminology used by Hitler and the other fascist conspirators. Hitler said, “There can be no question of sparing Poland.” He demanded, “Yugoslavia is to be eliminated as a state, ruthlessly and with lightning speed.” Mercilessness, ruthlessness, extermination of peoples and states: such was the style and meaning of the actions of the fascist conspirators.
The aggression against Czechoslovakia, the attack on Poland, the desire to destroy Yugoslavia, all these were links in the same chain. But the chain does not end with these links.
The task of the next representative of the U.S.S.R. Prosecution will be to show Your Honors that the fundamental purpose of these criminals, the main link in the center of all of the Hitlerite conspiracies, was the attack on the U.S.S.R.
The documents relating to the crimes against Yugoslavia will prove that, in attacking that country, the fascist conspirators strictly followed their customary methods. Even in detail they repeated their earlier crimes perpetrated against Poland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Even in case we did not know who actually organized the attack on Yugoslavia, the very nature of the facts, the sequence of events, the manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, would unmistakably indicate the culprits.
I turn to Document USSR-36, (Exhibit Number USSR-36) under which number I offer in evidence the Official Report of the Yugoslav Government.
The first section, entitled “The Systematic Preparation of the Conspiracy for the Enslavement and the Destruction of Yugoslavia,” contains a series of valuable information. I wish to cite that excerpt from this document which you will find on Page 355 of the document book, Paragraph 4 on Page 3 of the Russian text, 3rd paragraph from the top reads:
“The Government of the Third Reich and the Hitlerite Party secretly organized the German minority. Settled in Yugoslavia by the Austrian emperors over a century ago, the Germans enjoyed as brothers full rights and a cultural autonomy. They had their own schools and their representatives in parliaments as well as in the local government. They numbered half a million (that is about three percent of the total population). From 1920 they had their mass organization—the Swabian-German Cultural Union—‘Kulturbund’ for short. And out of this very organization and through it, as well as out of all the Germans in Yugoslavia, the Nazi Party created a political and military organ for the destruction of Yugoslavia.”
I believe I can skip several lines without loss and quote further:
“In Yugoslavia, the Nazi Gaue were secretly formed and Gauleiter appointed. Under the guise of various physical training and sport associations, Hitlerite units were organized half a million strong. Numerous ‘tourists,’ ‘travellers,’ ‘businessmen,’ and ‘relatives’ came from the Reich—in reality they were Nazi instructors and organizers.”
I skip a number of details which can be disregarded, and pass to the second paragraph of the same section on Page 4—that would be Page 356 in your document book—where the manner is described in which the Fifth Column was further strengthened. I now shall read into the record Paragraph 2, beginning with the second subparagraph:
“The Hitlerites drew into their orbit all the separatist and chauvinistic elements, as for instance, Pavelich’s Ustasha; the Zbor, a movement headed by Ljoteč; the MFRO (the Macedonian fascist movement), headed by Vanca Mihajlovič; and organized them as terrorist organizations with headquarters in Berlin. On the other hand, acting through their agents, Prince Paul, Stojadinovič, Cvetkovič, and Ćincar-Marcovič, they attracted the pan-Serbian centralists and turned them into a terrorist group which, from the vantage points of governmental authority, was ‘peacefully’ to deliver Yugoslavia into slavery by adhering to the Tripartite Pact.”
Further, the report emphasizes the fact that, while organizing numerous branches of the Fifth Column, the Hitlerites continually gave newer and more perfidious assurances about their ostensibly friendly intentions with regard to Yugoslavia. This is discussed in Paragraph 3 on Page 5 of the Russian text; our Document Number USSR-36. You will find this passage, Your Honors, on Page 357 of the document book:
“3. At the time when both the Hitlerite Government and the Party were so thoroughly and with such versatility preparing their conspiracy to invade and occupy Yugoslavia, Hitler seized every opportunity to declare to the whole world, on behalf of the same Government, the same Party, and the whole of Germany, that Yugoslavia could count on them as devoted friends.”
On 17 January 1938, that is, some weeks before the occupation of Austria, Hitler had a meeting with the then Prime Minister of Yugoslavia at which the Defendants Göring and Von Neurath were present. The original document from which I shall quote certain passages was submitted to the Tribunal as Document Number TC-92. The extract which I shall quote further on as documentary evidence, is dated 4 December 1945. You will find it on Page 411 of the document book.
On 4 December 1945 a printed collection of German documents dealing with the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece was offered to you in evidence. In the listing of documentary evidence it is referred to as Document Number TC-92.
On Page 68—and you will find it as I have already stated on Page 411 in your document book, as Document Number 28 of that collection—we have a transcript of the conversations which took place during the conference of 17 January 1938. I consider there is no need to read the entire document into the record. I shall limit myself to the following three remarks made by Hitler on that occasion, “As regards Yugoslavia, Germany is highly interested in the existence of a strong Yugoslavia.” Somewhat later in the course of the same conversation Hitler spoke the second sentence, “Whatever may happen there, Yugoslavia’s present boundary will remain as inviolable as the border on the Brenner is today.” In addition Hitler, at this meeting, made the following statement, “. . . the German nationality group in Yugoslavia was loyal to the Yugoslav Government. . . .”
On 30 January 1939, some weeks before the occupation of the Czechoslovak Republic, Hitler made the following declaration about Yugoslavia in his speech before the Reichstag—this quotation is to be found on Page 412 in your document book:
“. . . a state which since the Great War has more and more attracted the attention of our people, in Yugoslavia. The respect which the German soldier felt for that valiant people in the past, has grown ever stronger and developed into sincere friendship. . . .”
The fascist conspirators considered it useful to include this speech as Document Number 32 in the book from which I just have quoted and presented to the Tribunal as Document Number TC-92.
On 1 June 1939, that is, before the fascist attack on Poland, Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, whom the official report of the Yugoslav Government calls a Hitlerite agent, paid a visit to Hitler. On this occasion, Hitler stated in Berlin—you will find the passage on Page 413 in your document book:
“. . . Germany’s friendship with the Yugoslav nation did not spring up suddenly. It was deepened and strengthened by the tragic complications of the World War.”
Then, after having made a few more statements which are of no interest to the Tribunal, he continued:
“I am all the more confident that now when, as a result of the historic events, we have become neighbors with common frontiers established forever, the friendly relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, trustful and steadfast, will not only secure lasting peace between both our peoples and countries, but moreover will serve as a calming element for our nervous, excitable continent.”
I repeat once more that I quote from the book, Document Number TC-92.
In his next customary speech after the defeat of Poland, before the Reichstag on 6 October, Hitler reassured Yugoslavia of his love of peace and of his friendly attitude in the following words:
“. . . after the annexation had taken place, I assured Yugoslavia in the same manner that her frontier with this country shall be regarded as inviolable by Germany from this moment on, and that we want to live in peace and friendship with her. . . .”
I am now going to read into the record a few paragraphs from Subparagraph 2 on the first section of the report of the Yugoslav State Commission for the investigation of the crimes perpetrated by the aggressors. The excerpts in question begin with Paragraph 3, on Page 6 of Exhibit Number USSR-36 (Document Number USSR-36). In your document book it is Volume I, Section I.
Thus, Hitler regularly gave assurances about friendly relations with Yugoslavia and about the inviolability of her boundaries while, at the same time, his band of conspirators and enslavers were already tightening the ring of war around Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia was completely surrounded by Hitler’s Panzer divisions, and when the government of the Centralist Fifth Column of Prince Paul, Cvetovič, and Maček was ready to join the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941, that is, 10 days before the attack on Yugoslavia, the Defendant Ribbentrop stated as follows—on Page 413 of your document book you will find it, in Document Number 2450-PS:
“Germany herself—and I solemnly state this—has neither territorial nor political interests in this region.”
The Tribunal has already been handed a certified extract from Document Number 72 of the above-mentioned German book.
An official note from the Reich Government of the same date reads as follows—you will find this on Page 415 of the document book:
“Mr. Prime Minister: On behalf and on the direction of the German Government, I have the honor to report to Your Excellency as follows:
“In connection with today’s adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, the German Government affirms its resolution to respect at all times the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. . . .
“Signed, Joachim von Ribbentrop.”
The culminating point in the execution of the breach of faith so cunningly prepared by the fascists is the following statement made by Hitler on 6 April 1941, that is, at the moment when the perfidious and treacherous attack on Yugoslavia had already begun. It is under Document Number TC-92 in your book of documents, on Page 414:
“The German people feel no hatred towards the Serbian people. Above all, the German people see no reason to start a war against the Croats and Slovenes; they want nothing from these peoples.”
Certified excerpts have been handed to the Tribunal from the documents of the German book already quoted on Pages 1 and 4.
At the same time when he was speaking in this manner, the occupation, annexation, and dismemberment of the Yugoslav State was already taking place. Soon after began the bombing of undefended cities, towns, and settlements; forcible evictions; deportations to camps; punitive expeditions; and hundreds of other acts that were a part of the planned extermination of the Yugoslav people, which resulted in the death of 1,650,000 Yugoslav men, women, and children.
On the question of the preparation for the attack on Yugoslavia and the individuals who directly supervised this crime, we have at our disposal two very valuable pieces of evidence.
The first is the original affidavit of the German General Löhr. Prior to and at the time of the aggression against Yugoslavia, he was in command of the 4th Air Fleet. It was precisely his air units which carried out the raids on Belgrade. He is undoubtedly a man well acquainted with the course of operations and its leaders.
On 24 May 1945 General Löhr was taken prisoner by the Yugoslav forces. During interrogations to which he was subjected between 24 May and 6 June 1945 he states—you will find the respective excerpts on Page 416, as excerpts from our Document Number USSR-253 (Exhibit Number USSR-253). We submit the originals of these excerpts to the Tribunal:
“I and my staff went on March 26 to Sofia as the campaign against Greece was about to begin.
“On the following day, 27 March 1941, the coup d’état took place in Yugoslavia. I was called unexpectedly to Berlin, where I received orders from Reich Marshal Göring to prepare for air operations against Yugoslavia. . . .
“After this, preparations against Yugoslavia were begun. At my first meeting with Göring I was not told of the date of the beginning of the war against Yugoslavia. At Vienna, I received a written order in which the beginning of the operations was fixed for 6 April.”
Passing over the rest of the statement, I proceed to read into the record excerpts from the minutes of the interrogation of the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Friedrich Paulus. In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, we submit the original of this interrogation.
Friedrich Paulus was interrogated on 12 January 1946 by the Chief Prosecutors of the U.S.S.R. His testimony is registered with us as Exhibit Number USSR-182 (Document Number USSR-182). You will find the passage quoted on Page 419 of your document book. My colleagues of the Soviet Delegation will probably revert to this document when dealing with subsequent matters. I shall therefore merely quote that part which refers to the preparations for the attack on Yugoslavia.
“It was clear to both German and Hungarian officers that these military preparations must have been based on the preparation of military collaboration between Germany and Hungary.”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that the first interrogatory to which you refer—General Löhr’s—which is contained in Document Number USSR-253, is an official document?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The official document of your Government. The other interrogatory to which you refer, of Field Marshal Paulus, is not an official document, is it?
COL. POKROVSKY: The minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus have been compiled in compliance with all legal standards of procedure applying to such interrogations by judicial organizations in the U.S.S.R. He is interrogated as a witness with the warning that he must tell the truth, in accordance with Articles 95 and 92 of our penal code. These documents, in the U.S.S.R., are considered as absolutely official documents, of full probative value, to be submitted to the Tribunal when necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us where the interrogatory was made?
COL. POKROVSKY: Paulus was interrogated in person in Moscow, on 12 January 1946. This, Sir, must have been pointed out at the beginning of the interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: The date is on the document, but not the place. Go on, Colonel.
COL. POKROVSKY: With your permission, I shall continue my quotation from the minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus, submitted to you:
“It was clear to the Hungarians that Germany’s assistance was in order to prepare the Hungarian Army in good time and in advance for future combined military operations, thus incorporating an ally into its ranks.
“With the later attack on Yugoslavia, which followed this, there was no need for special explanations as to the object of these military preparations.
“It was clear that armed forces were being made ready for war with the U.S.S.R., as the attack on Yugoslavia was part of the operational plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R.
“With the defeat of Yugoslavia, the right flank, which was to be formed at the beginning of military operations against Russia, was secured.”
I shall leave out one paragraph which deals with another subject, and continue to quote:
“The preparation of the combined German-Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia was entrusted to me. On 27 or 28 March 1941 I was called before Hitler at the Reich Chancellery where, besides Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, and Brauchitsch were present. Halder met me with the following words:
“‘The Führer has decided to attack Yugoslavia in order to eliminate the threat to the flank during the offensive against Greece and to seize the main Belgrade-Nish railway line which runs in a southerly direction. But the main objective of the attack on Yugoslavia is to have our right flank secure when later on the Plan Barbarossa shall be carried out.
“‘Your task is to go to Vienna immediately in my special train, and to transmit the orders and explain the situation to Field Marshal List (12th Army Group), General Von Kleist (Panzer group), and Colonel Von Witzleben (Chief of Staff of the 2d Army), who have been called there.
“‘From Vienna, you are to proceed to Budapest and there to co-ordinate with the Hungarian General Staff the strategic employment of the German forces on Hungarian territory and the participation of the Hungarian forces in the invasion of Yugoslavia.’”
The participation of Hitlerite generals of the very highest rank in the treacherous attack on Yugoslavia simply does not fit, in any way at all, into the execution of purely military tasks only.
I shall read one more document into the records, Document Number 1195-PS. You will find it in your document book on Page 423.
On 9 January 1946 four lines were read here from the second section. The time has now come to read it in full:
“Copy. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Operational Staff, Section L, (IV/QU), Number 00630/41; top secret, commanders only; Führer’s headquarters, 12. 4. 1941.
“Reference: OKW/L, (IV/QU), Number 4434/41; top secret, commanders only, of 3 April 1941.
“Provisional Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.
“I. The Führer has issued the following directions for the partition of Yugoslavia:
“1) Former territory of Styria and Carniola.
“The territory of the former Styria, extended to the south by a strip of about 90 kilometers in breadth and 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, will go to Gau Styria.
“The northern part of Carniola, with a borderline running south only as far as the river Sava but north of Ljubljana, according to the attached OKH map, is to become part of Carinthia.
“The High Command of the Army (OKH) is to hand over the territory occupied by the German troops, to the competent Gauleiter, subarea by subarea, as soon as the pacification of the country permits.
“The handing over of the territory occupied by the Italians will be prepared by a letter from the Führer to the Duce and carried out under direct orders from the Foreign Office. Until that time no measures whatever are to be taken on the German side. (Teletype OKH-General Quartermaster, Abt. Kr. Verw., A., Ob. Kdo. 2 I, Number 801/41, top secret, is hereby executed.)
“2) The territory beyond the River Mur (Übermur-Gebiet).
“The territory beyond the River Mur borders closely upon Hungary, conforming with the historic boundary. A later colonization of the German population living in the northwestern part of this territory has been taken into consideration. The handing over of this territory to the Hungarians will be regulated by the High Command of the Army.
“3) Banat.
“The territory from the point where the River Drava cuts the Hungarian boundary to the confluence of the River Tisa with the Danube is to go to Hungary. The territory east of the Tisa will be at first under German protection, as will the territory south of the Danube and east of the general line: confluence of the River Morava and the Danube-Pozarevac-Petrovac-Boljavac-Knjazevac-Kalna. This territory includes the Bor copper mines and the adjoining coal district in the southeast. The above line is considered as the basis and provisional demarcation line. At first, German military government is to be established under the High Command of the Army.
“4) Southern Serbia.
“The territory inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians goes to Bulgaria, in conformity with the ethnographical boundary. Preliminary delimitation of the frontier, from the military viewpoint, will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Army, which will prepare the handing over to Bulgaria.
“5) Old Serbia.
“The territory of old Serbia will be placed under German military administration under the High Command of the Army.
“6) Croatia.
“Croatia becomes an independent state within its ethnographical boundaries. There will be no interference on the part of Germany with its internal policy.
“7) Remaining territories including Bosnia and Montenegro.
“The political organization of these territories will be left to Italy. Here also the restoration of an independent state of Montenegro can be considered.
“II. The Demarcation of Boundaries:
“1) As far as the demarcation of boundaries has not been laid down in Part I, it will be carried out through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office, the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and the Reich Minister of the Interior.
“The Operational Staff of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (L IV QU) is the executive organ for the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“2) The High Command of the Army will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces its military recommendations relative to the drawing up of boundaries outside the territory of the protectorate south of the Danube, where this has not been already laid down by the Führer.
“3) The War Economic and Armament Office of the OKW will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its recommendations regarding the boundaries of the territory of the protectorate south of the Danube (Part I, Paragraph 3).
“4) As far as the Italians are concerned, the tactical boundaries between the armies hold good in the meantime.
“Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed, Keitel.”
This document, signed by the Defendant Keitel, smashes to pieces the mendacious statement of the nonparticipation of the OKW in the political side of the fascist plan or conspiracy. The German generals, as a body, were not merely an obedient tool in Hitler’s hands.
The OKW, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Gestapo were interwoven into one sole entity. This is also borne out by the next document.
General Nedič, ex-Prime Minister of the quisling Yugoslav Government, in his depositions gives some interesting information on this question.
Before reading into the record a few excerpts from his depositions, I must say a few words concerning four Germans, whom Nedič mentions by name. He speaks of Kraus, Turner, Kiesel, and Kronholz.
Dr. Kraus was chief of the Gestapo South East, with central offices in Belgrade. Dr. Turner was chief of staff of the civil administration department attached to the German Military Command in Serbia. Dr. Kiesel was Dr. Turner’s deputy. Kronholz held no official post. He had lived in Yugoslavia even before the war and was director of the German transport firm Schenker A.G. Subsequently he turned out to be an important German intelligence agent. This information is certified by the Yugoslav Extraordinary Commission for the investigation of German atrocities. After this explanation, I shall read into the record a short excerpt from the evidence of the Serbian quisling, General Nedič. A true copy of the interrogation or rather excerpts from his minutes are registered by us as Document Number USSR-288. I am able to submit to you now, for your perusal, the original of these minutes with Nedič’s signature. Unfortunately I am not in a position to leave it with you in its entirety because it refers to a case concerning Yugoslavia which has not yet been finished, but I can hand it to you for perusal by the Tribunal, while the certified excerpts remain with us as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that you wish to put this document in as evidence and then to withdraw it for the purpose of its being used in some other cases; is that right?
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to submit to you as evidence in this case, the excerpts from the minutes, duly certified by the Yugoslav Extraordinary Commission, in order that the minutes now in your hands, that is—the original minutes—may be returned to Belgrade where they will be presented as a document needed in another case which is still under investigation. I would therefore request you to keep a copy for the Tribunal after you have satisfied yourselves that this copy tallies with the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, if that is so, we must ask you to deposit with this Tribunal a photostatic copy of this document, because, of course, all the documents or photostatic copies which are put in evidence must be deposited with the General Secretary of this Tribunal. So, if you will undertake to have a photostatic copy made of this document and left with the General Secretary, I think the Tribunal is agreed that you may do so, that you may use this document.
COL. POKROVSKY: Will the Tribunal be satisfied with the certified photostatic copy, in addition to the certified excerpts and a photostatic copy of the part which I am about to quote?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
“I came to know Kronholz during the occupation period, before I became Prime Minister. As far as I can remember, he was brought to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. . . . Then Kronholz insisted that I should accept the proposed post.
“Turner received me in the presence of Dr. Kiesel and said that he authorized me, through General Dankelmann, the German military commander in Serbia, to form an authoritarian government. . . .
“Almost simultaneously with the creation of my government, the Germans established contact with a group of Chetniks under the command of Pečanač, who had until then been hiding in the forests. The contact was also established through the Chief of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. Shortly after this, Pečanač arrived in Belgrade, called to see me, and offered his services. That is how my government came to form its first armed units.”
A little farther on, in the same minutes, we find the following record of Nedič’s testimonies:
“As soon as the formation of my government had been proclaimed at the beginning of September 1941, a delegation with authority from Draga Michailovič called on me to start negotiations.”
Nedič enumerates the terms, which are of no interest to us, and then says:
“I, for my part, accepted all these terms and offers. Draga Michailovič received money and the Germans permitted this.”
This is the end of the quotation.
Still another part of this record seems of importance to me; it concerns Nedič’s visit to Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. Nedič stated:
“I noticed that at the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop, a demand was made that I should place all the spiritual and material resources of Serbia at the disposal of the German Reich for the continuation of the war.”
Speaking of this meeting with Hitler, Nedič stated:
“He shouted at me, emphasizing that the order concerning 100 for one not only would have to be altered, but that it should have been increased to 1000 for one. He added also that he was prepared to exterminate the entire population if the Serbians continued to act like rebels.”
The head of fascist Germany wished to control the Slav countries as if they were his own patrimony. Here he was helped by generals, diplomats, industrialists, and intelligence officers. All the acts of aggression were prepared and realized with their direct participation.
I repeat: The German generals as a body were not merely an obedient tool in Hitler’s hands. The Defendants Keitel, Jodl, and Göring personally participated in the planning, preparation, and realization of crimes against peoples and states.
Document 1195-PS added yet another proof in the establishment of this fact. The above named defendants, together with Neurath, Frick, Schirach, Frank, Seyss-Inquart, and Ribbentrop, are directly guilty of the very grave crimes which I reported to the Tribunal.
National Socialism cannot be separated from the idea of war. This is acknowledged by the Hitler slaves themselves.
In other words, Hitlerism and aggressive war are one and the same thing. And if wars are not always planned by military leaders only, it is always they who conduct them. The responsibility for aggression, for aggressive war, for the death of millions, for bestialities, for the destruction of cultural treasures and material wealth, must be borne by all the major war criminals now sitting in the dock.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I would like to ask the Tribunal for a ruling as to a general question of submission of evidence. The Russian Delegation has submitted books which contain statements by generals and statesmen, without these statements being accompanied by an official remark by the Soviet authorities.
The documents which have been given to me today—USSR-149, 150, and 294—are only photostats of handwritten manuscripts. They contain neither a remark which could qualify them as affidavits, nor do they represent testimonies taken before a Soviet official or officer, nor do they represent governmental or official declarations.
I should be grateful to the Tribunal if it would make a decision on this question in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The opinion of the Defense Counsel is that such statements have only the value of a personal presentation by the Prosecution but no probative value.
THE PRESIDENT: May I see the documents?
[The documents were presented to the Tribunal.]
The Tribunal have no objection to the course taken by Dr. Nelte in drawing their attention to these documents at this stage. But they think it will be better for them to wait until the documents are actually offered in evidence before they consider whether or not they will admit them. If and when the documents are offered in evidence, they will then consider whether they will admit them or not.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to present Major General Zorya, State Councillor of Justice of the 3rd Class, who will present the materials on the following theme of “Aggression against the Soviet Union.”
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to point out that the decision of the Tribunal, that every defendant’s counsel should receive, sufficiently in advance, a copy of all documents which are to be submitted as evidence in the course of the proceedings, has not been complied with. It is, therefore, difficult for the Defense to follow the proceedings because the documents submitted have not been distributed in sufficient quantity.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the Tribunal have ever imposed upon the Prosecution the duty of supplying a copy of every document to every member of defendants’ counsel.
You no doubt have before you a copy of the Tribunal’s order upon the subject, and I believe that the order is posted upon the board in the defendants’ Information Center. If I remember correctly, it is that a certain number of originals or photostatic copies shall be deposited in the Information Center, and that a certain number of copies of the documents shall be supplied to the defendants’ counsel, and that, for the rest, the defendants’ counsel must rely upon the fact that every document or part of a document which is put in evidence is read in open court and, therefore, comes through the earphones to defendants’ counsel and will appear in the shorthand notes. We have provided that copies of the shorthand notes shall be supplied to defendants’ counsel as soon as possible after the day on which the evidence is given. Beyond that we have not thought it right to impose a duty upon the Prosecution to supply documents to the defendants’ counsel.
Is that not in accordance with your recollection?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the American Prosecution, the British Prosecution, and also the French Prosecution, in the course of the proceedings, handled this in such a way that enough copies of all documents were made available to the Defense for each defendant’s counsel to have one copy before him. I believe that what is possible for the other Prosecution should also be possible for the Soviet Prosecution, in order to facilitate the work.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a belief on your part which is not strictly in accordance with the Tribunal’s orders. The Tribunal has not made that order, and it may be that the United States and Great Britain have gone beyond the Tribunal’s orders, and have supplied a copy to each defendant’s counsel. But, as I say, the Tribunal has not as yet seen fit to impose that duty upon the Prosecution.
I suppose you don’t really know exactly how many copies of these Soviet documents have been deposited in the Information Center?
DR. LATERNSER: I don’t know the exact number. At any rate, there were not enough for each defendant’s counsel to get a copy of each document, as was the case, so far, with the other Prosecutions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you no doubt understand the very great difficulties of making translations and making copies. I am sure that the Soviet prosecutors will do everything in their power to assist defendants’ counsel, but, as I say, we have not imposed upon the Prosecution the duty of supplying one copy of a translation into German of each document for each defendants’ counsel. I can only express the hope that the Soviet prosecutors will do the best they can.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I remember, when the fact became known that the press had received 250 copies of the documents, you, Mr. President, expressed the opinion that it should then also be possible to distribute 25 copies to the defendants’ counsel. That was, at that time, the opinion of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal’s orders on this subject are in writing and you will find them in the defendants’ Information Center. I have stated my recollection of them; if I am wrong, you can bring me a copy of the document and I will withdraw my statement.
MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): May it please Your Honors, it is my task to present the documentary evidence dealing with the aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, organized by the fascist war criminals now sitting in the dock.
This charge of the crime, mentioned in Subparagraph a, Article VI of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, was formulated in Paragraph 6, Section 4, Count One of the Indictment in the present case, and in Section IV of the opening statement by the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
Among the many criminal wars which German fascism, with predatory aim, waged against the freedom-loving nations, the attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics occupies a place by itself.
It can be safely said that the predatory war against the Soviet Union was the keynote of the entire fascist conspiracy against peace. The aggressive actions on the part of German fascism committed prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R., and in part the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, were, as has been demonstrated by my colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, merely stages on the road to the attack on the Soviet Union.
Ukrainian wheat and coal from the Don Basin, nickel from the Kola Peninsula, and oil from the Caucasus, the fertile steppes of the pre-Volga region and the forests of Bielorussia all played a decisive part in the criminal schemes of the fascist aggressors.
The war against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was also waged by fascist Germany with the intent of enslaving and exploiting the Soviet peoples.
In the war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the animal hatred of the Hitlerites against the Slav peoples found its full horrifying expression.
And finally, German imperialism, appearing in its fascist edition, saw in the seizure of the wealth of the Soviet Union and in its incalculable resources of food and raw materials a base for the realization of their far-reaching aggressive aims to achieve, first, ascendancy over Europe, and, later on, ascendancy over the whole world.
The well-known formula of German imperialism, “Drang nach Osten,” mentioned in the opening statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., was at different times and in many different ways disguised by the fascist criminals, but always, in all their aggressive plans, pride of place was given to the attack on the Soviet Union.
“If new territory is desired”—wrote Hitler in his book, _Mein Kampf_—“in substance it can be secured at the expense of Russia. The new empire must move along the paths trodden by the knights of old.” (Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, Munich edition, 1930, Page 742.)
The fact that having definitely brought fascist aggression to a head in 1939, Hitler began the war in the West, did not substantially change anything in this basic conception of fascism.
Under Document Number 789-PS the United States Prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the transcript of the conference held on 23 November 1939 between Hitler and the members of the German Supreme Command.
At this conference, Hitler, according to his own expression, gave a “survey of the thoughts dominating him in connection with the events to come.”
In the course of this survey he declared—you will find the passage I am now reading on Page 3 in the document book lying on the table of the Tribunal, Page 2 of the Russian text:
“For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West. It came about by force of events that for the nearest future the East dropped out of the picture.”
This statement by Hitler bore witness to the fact that the attack on the Soviet Union remained within the plans of fascist aggression, and the whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most favorable moment for this attack.
It should be noted that this western version of the start of fascist aggression was not considered as the most favorable version by the authors of the aggression.
This same Hitler, exactly 5 months prior to the above-mentioned conference, at another conference of 23 May 1939 (Document Number L-79), while briefing his accomplices on the present situation and political aims, had said—the passage I am now quoting is Page 6 of the document book, “If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanse in the East.”
The vast expanses in the East, according to the aspirations of Hitler’s conspirators, were to play a decisive part during the conflict in the West.
Therefore, when the fascist hordes were unable to force the Channel, stopped at its shores, and were obliged to find new ways of aggression, the conspirators immediately began to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union. This attack was the basis of all their plans of aggression, without which they could not be realized.
I believe it is not necessary to refer to documents of an earlier period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf, where questions connected with the predatory attack on the Soviet Union were formulated long before 1939.
This book has already been presented to the Tribunal, and relevant passages from it were quoted as evidence by our United States and British colleagues.
The Soviet Prosecution desires to submit to the Tribunal a series of documents which bear witness to the fact that the aggression of fascist Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was committed with malice aforethought.
Among these documents there are files from various archives captured by units of the advancing Red Army, statements by fascist leaders published in the press, including those by several of the defendants, and depositions by persons who were in possession of reliable information as to how the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were actually carried out.
The documents of the Soviet Prosecution are presented under the following sections:
1. Preparations for war in Germany itself. 2. Assuring the security of the preparations for war by the intelligence activities. 3. The securing by the fascist conspirators of the participation of the satellite countries in the aggression against the Soviet Union.
I shall begin with Section 1, which I shall call, “Preparations for War in Germany Herself.”
The statements of Hitler and his accomplices demonstrate that the idea of a criminal attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had for a long time been ripe in the minds of the fascist conspirators. But apart from this fact, we are also interested in the question as to when this intention began to take on the concrete form of direct military preparations for the predatory war against the Soviet Union.
On 18 December 1940 the directive known to the Tribunal as directive Number 21, Plan Barbarossa—the document of the United States Prosecution numbered 446-PS—was put into its official form. The moment when the signature of the Supreme Command appears on such a document is the moment which crowns long and intensive work by all who formed the links in the chain of military administration.
This work may not have been governed by written orders. The secrecy camouflaging this work often made it necessary to have recourse to verbal orders. And, on the other hand, many orders of a routine nature, on the strength of an already existing strategic project, became correlated, although outwardly they seemed to have no connection with it.
It therefore appears that, with regard to establishing the actual moment at which military plans for the attack on the Soviet Union began. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: General Zorya, the Tribunal observes that you are about to read a deposition of General Warlimont, who, the Tribunal understands, is in Nuremberg, and the Tribunal considers that, in accordance with the order that it made the other day in another case, in the case of another deposition, that if the defendants’ counsel desired, and you wish to use this deposition, you ought to be prepared to allow General Warlimont to be submitted to the defendants’ counsel for cross-examination.
GEN. ZORYA: I am about to read into the record an extract from the interrogation of General Warlimont. This interrogation was carried out by General Alexandrov of the Soviet Prosecution, and if the Defense desires to call General Warlimont for cross-examination here before the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution will do its utmost to satisfy this request.
THE PRESIDENT: That is, of course, on the supposition that I am right to saying that General Warlimont is in Nuremberg—available in Nuremberg. Go on.
GEN. ZORYA: I am definitely of the opinion that it would be useful, when establishing the actual moment of the beginning of military operations for the attack on the Soviet Union, to resort not to documents only—for not everything is always put down in writing—but to revert to the testimony of people who participated directly in the realization of these preparations.
I should now like to pass on to those depositions of Walter Warlimont which you, Mr. President, have just mentioned. These depositions were given by Warlimont on 13 November 1945. I am presenting them as evidence under Document Number USSR-263.
Walter Warlimont, as is known, was the Chief of the Department of National Defense in the OKW, and later Deputy Chief of the Operational Staff.
I shall read into the Record that part of his deposition which touches on the question before us. I ask you to turn to Page 2 of the Russian text of this document, which is on Page 20 in the bundle of documents presented by the Russian Prosecution on the question, and the answers to questions put to Warlimont:
“Personally, I first heard of this plan”—that is Plan Barbarossa—“on 29 July 1940. On that day General Jodl arrived in a special train at Bad Reichenhall, where Department ‘L’ of the Operational Staff was stationed. Hitler was in Berchtesgaden. This struck us immediately, because General Jodl had, till then, hardly ever, I believe, come to see us. Besides myself, the three other senior officers were ordered to be present.”
I now skip several lines and pass on to Page 3 of the minutes of Warlimont’s interrogation; this will be Page 21 in the bundle of documents:
“I cannot repeat his statements verbatim. The meaning was as follows: Jodl said that the Führer had decided to prepare for war against Russia. The Führer justified this by saying that war had to come one way or another, so that it would be better to prosecute this war in connection with the one already being fought, and, in any case, to start the necessary preparations for it.”
I skip several lines which are not relevant to the question we are dealing with and continue:
“Then or at a later date Jodl declared that Hitler intended to begin the war against the Soviet Union as early as the autumn of 1940, but later he gave up this idea. The reason was that the deployment of the troops at that time could not yet be executed. For this purpose the necessary conditions in Poland did not exist; railways, quarters, and bridges were not prepared for the advance of the tanks; communication lines and airdromes were not organized. . . . Therefore an order was given to establish all the conditions for the preparation and execution of such a campaign.”
To the question put by the Prosecution as to whether this order was issued on 9 August 1941 and called “Aufbau Ost,” Warlimont replied:
“Yes, this order was prepared by the staff leaders in accordance with the instructions of General Jodl. . . .
“In General Jodl’s opinion, the concentration could take place only after all the preparations indicated in this order had been made.”
Further on in his statement, Warlimont said that Plan Barbarossa, originally called “Fritz,” was presented to Hitler on 5 December 1940, after which it was re-edited and issued on 18 December.
I think that the testimony of a man like Friedrich Paulus, a former field marshal of the German Army, who, as is known, was directly concerned both in the preparations and in the execution of Plan Barbarossa, can give considerable help in investigating the preparation of this plan.
I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus, dated 9 January 1946, given in a camp for prisoners of war, and marked Document Number USSR-156, and request that it be accepted as evidence.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I just wanted to remark that I do not possess a copy of the document concerning Paulus. But it seems to be the same statement which it has not yet been possible to give to the defendants’ counsel. If the Soviet Prosecution could give me the statement now, I would then decide if I could present my protest for decision now in the form in which I raised it at the beginning of this session.
[Copies of the document were submitted to Dr. Nelte.]
According to the original before me now, this is a similar statement by Field Marshal Paulus. Paulus has expressed his opinion in a letter to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Delegation has, I assume, now presented the original to you. This photostat bears no official certification by the Soviet authorities, nor is the statement an affidavit which could be admitted as evidence.
Therefore, I ask the Tribunal in this particular case to give a general decision on the question which I raised at the beginning of this session as well, so that in the future the Soviet Prosecution will be familiar with the treatment of such statements by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any answer to what Dr. Nelte has said?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I do.
In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, as expressed in a previous session, the Soviet Prosecution has taken the necessary measures for originals of all the documents of the Soviet Prosecution, or else documents certifying the authenticity of these documents to be placed at the disposal of the Tribunal through the good offices of the General Secretary, with indications of the places where they are to be found.
Moreover, bearing in mind that certain witnesses, whose evidence will be presented in a forthcoming session by the Soviet Prosecution, are of considerable interest and that it is possible that the Defense may wish to cross-examine them, the Soviet Prosecution will take all necessary measures to bring some of these witnesses to Nuremberg in order to hear their verbal evidence. Special interest attaches to the deposition of Paulus, extracts from which I propose to quote in my report, and which must be checked no later than this evening, after which Friedrich Paulus will be brought to the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I understood from what you said, General, that as far as the photostatic copy of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement is concerned, a certificate will be furnished—as we indicated the Tribunal wishes—that the photostatic copy is a true copy of the original, and so far as the question of producing witnesses of importance is concerned, Field Marshal Paulus will be produced as a witness for the defendants’ counsel to cross-examine.
That meets your objection, I think, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: The basic principle of this question, as it appears to me, lies in the fact that official proof should be given that the statements contained in the documents submitted really represent what the persons who made them meant to say. Written statements are never more than a dubious substitute for a personal examination of a witness.
The Defense is fully aware of the difficulties encountered, particularly by the Soviet Prosecution, in producing witnesses where, for instance, reports are to be found. The Defense realizes the fact, but in those cases in which the individuality of the witness and the importance of certain questions really do matter, the personal examination of witnesses should be preferred to any statement. Wherever this is impossible, for reasons which we are unable to judge, it would however, at any rate, be desirable that those people who have made these statements should make them in the form of an affidavit or an interrogatory.
If the Soviet Delegation should produce a certificate to the effect that these statements are corresponding to the original statements, it would not mean that the documents would acquire an increased value in our eyes. We do not doubt for one moment that statements of this kind are in the possession of the Soviet Delegation. The Defense is interested not so much in the formal confirmation of the statements as in the possibility of increasing the material evidence. If the Soviet Prosecution could assist us in this respect, we should be grateful.
THE PRESIDENT: You can go on, General.
GEN. ZORYA: I repeat, I believe that the testimony of Friedrich Paulus can be of great assistance to us in our investigation. I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus to which I have just referred and shall now read into the Record that part of his testimony which refers to the history of the preparation of Plan Barbarossa.
I request you to open the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal on Page 27, and there, in the text of Paulus’ testimony, on Page 2, you will find the passages underlined in pencil, which I now intend reading into the Record. From 3 September. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, General, since it is now a quarter to one you had better not begin this document before the adjournment.
GEN. ZORYA: I obey, Mr. President.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, in pursuance of the statement made by the Soviet Delegation, I will ask for permission to bring before the Tribunal for direct examination the field marshal of the former German Army, Friedrich Paulus, who will be examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.
[The witness, Paulus, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please tell me your name?
FRIEDRICH PAULUS (Witness): Friedrich Paulus.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Would you like to sit down?
GEN. RUDENKO: Your name is Friedrich Paulus?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were born 1898?
PAULUS: 1890.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were born in the village of Breitenau, in the district of Kassel, in Germany?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: By nationality you are a German?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are field marshal of the former German Army?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your last official position was Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army at Stalingrad?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell us, Witness, did you on 8 January 1946, make a statement to the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics?
PAULUS: Yes, I did.
GEN. RUDENKO: You confirm this statement?
PAULUS: Yes, I confirm this statement.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please, tell us, Witness, what you know regarding the preparation by the Hitlerite Government and the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.
PAULUS: From personal experience, I can state the following: On 3 September 1940 I took office with the High Command of the Army as Chief Quartermaster I of the General Staff. As such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and had in addition to carry out the instructions of a general operational nature which he delegated to me.
When I took office I found in my sphere of work, among other things, a still incomplete operational plan dealing with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan had been worked out by the then Major General Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose had been temporarily transferred to the High Command of the Army.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Oberst Halder, turned over to me the continuation of the work which was ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on the following basis:
An investigation was to be made as to the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, with regard to the terrain, the points of the attack, the manpower needed, and so forth. In addition it was stated that altogether about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. It was furthermore to be taken into consideration that from the beginning Romanian territory was to be utilized for the deployment of the German southern army. On the northern flank the participation of Finland in the war was taken into account, but was ignored in this operational plan of the army.
Then, in addition, as a basis for the plan which was to be worked out, the aims—the instructions of the OKW—were given: First, the destruction of those parts of the Russian Army stationed in the west of Russia, to prevent the units which were fit for fighting from escaping deep into Russia; second, the reaching of a line from which the Russian air force would be unable to attack German territory effectively, and the final aim was the reaching of the Volga-Archangel line.
The operational plan which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November and was followed by two military exercises with the command of which the General Staff of the Army entrusted me. Senior officers of the General Staff of the Army were also assigned. The basic strength requirements assumed in these military exercises were: The launching of one army group south of the Pripet territory, specifically from southern Poland and from Romanian territory, with the aim of reaching the Dnieper-Kiev line and south of it; north of the Pripet territory another army group, the strongest, from the area around Warsaw and northward, with the general direction of attack being the Minsk-Smolensk line, the intention being to direct it against Moscow later; then a further army group, namely Army Group North, from the area of East Prussia, with the initial direction of attack being through the Baltic States toward Leningrad.
The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed favorably, supply lines, et cetera being adjusted accordingly. In connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia’s geographic and economic conditions, the Red Army, et cetera. The most significant point here was that no preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our attention.
With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were concluded. Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Obersalzberg; thereupon they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a change in the plan.
PAULUS: [Continuing] Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be postponed by about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this attack then did take place on 22 June 1941.
In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated back to the autumn of 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?
[To the witness] Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?
PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the participation of the satellite states secured?
PAULUS: From personal observation, I can say the following regarding this:
About September 1940, just at the time when I had received this operational study for the attack on the Soviet Union there was planned from the outset the use of Romanian territory for the deployment of the German right or, that is to say, south wing, and that was taken into consideration from the outset. A military mission headed by the then Lieutenant General of Cavalry, Hansen, was sent to Romania. A whole panzer division, the 13th, was transferred to Romania as a training unit. To those who knew about the plans for the future it was obvious that this step could only serve the purpose of preparing the future partner in the war for the task intended for him.
Further, in regard to Hungary:
In December 1940 Colonel Lazslo, the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, came to the headquarters of the Army High Command at Zossen. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization. The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of regrouping its units, which were organized in brigades, into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized troops and of panzer units. The chief of the Organization Division of the General Staff of the Army, then Major General Buhle, and myself advised Colonel Lazslo. At the same time, several Hungarian military commissions were in Berlin, and with them also the Hungarian Minister of War, General Von Bartha, and they discussed armament deliveries to Hungary with German authorities.
It was clear to all of us who were informed as to future plans that all these measures, including the supplying of arms to other armies, were only conceivable at that time if these weapons were to be employed in future military projects.
Regarding Hungary there is a further point:
Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On 27 or 28 March I was called to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated, that is, had been ordered to be present.
When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward through Nish, and then also with an eye to the future—to Plan Barbarossa—to keep the right flank free from the outset.
I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest and to reach an understanding with it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.
On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth, of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved. This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our rear against the Soviet Union.
The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.
As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler’s view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory. I can cite one example: The question of the Dragowitsch oil territory. Later, when the attack began against Soviet Russia, the 17th German Army which was fighting at that point had the explicit order from the Supreme Command to take the Dragowitsch oil fields at all costs before the arrival of the Hungarians.
Regarding this future partner, according to my observation the procedure of Hitler was such that he counted on her certain participation and therefore delivered the armament to her and helped with the training, but that he kept to himself the time when he would initiate the ally into his plans.
Thirdly, the Finnish question. In December 1940 the first visit of the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was made to the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen. Lieutenant General Heinrichs had a conference with the Chief of the Army General Staff, the contents of which I no longer remember; but he made a speech about the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 before the General Staff officers of the High Command of the Army, and the General Staff officers of the Army groups who happened to be present at the time in connection with the discussion of the military exercises.
This speech before these General Staff officers had its great significance at that time because of the fact that it was delivered at the same time that Directive Number 21 of 18 December was issued. This speech was significant, it dealt with experiences won in the war with the Red Army and in addition gave an insight into the value of the Finnish troops as possible future partners in the war.
I took part in a second conference with the Chief of the Finnish General Staff at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen, in the second half of May 1941. The Chief of the Finnish General Staff arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Army. The subject of the subsequent conferences in Zossen with the General Staff of the High Command of the Army was the co-operation of the Finnish forces in the south in Plan Barbarossa—in co-operation with Army Group North—which was to proceed from the deployment area in East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops in the south were to synchronize their movements with the advance of German Army Group North and likewise that the joint advance later against Leningrad should be subject to consultations and agreements depending on the development of events.
Those are the personal observations which I made regarding the first appearance and the enlistment of allies in preparations for the aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the U.S.S.R. carried out—the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces?
PAULUS: The attack on the Soviet Union took place as I have related, according to a plan prepared carefully and well in advance. The troops for this attack were at first assembled in the rear of the deployment area. By special orders they were then moved by groups into jumping-off positions, and then took up their position along the entire long front from Romania to East Prussia for a simultaneous attack. The Finnish theater of war was excluded from this operation.
Just as the large-scale operational plan, as I described it at the beginning, was to a certain extent tried out theoretically, the detailed employment of troops was discussed during military exercises by the staffs of army groups, corps, and divisions and drawn up in orders down to the details long before the beginning of the war.
A large-scale diversion, which was to be organized in Norway and along the coast of France was designed to simulate an invasion of Britain in June 1941 and thus divert Russia’s attention.
All measures were taken not only for operational but also for tactical surprise, as for instance, the prohibition of open reconnaissance on and across the boundary before the beginning of the war. That meant on the one hand, that possible losses which might be caused due to the lack of reconnaissance had to be taken into account for the sake of surprise, but on the other hand it meant that a surprise attack across the boundary by the enemy was not feared.
All of these measures show that it was a question of a criminal attack.
GEN. RUDENKO: How would you define the aims pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: The aim to reach the Volga-Archangel line, which was far beyond German strength, is in itself characteristic of Hitler’s and the National Socialist leadership’s boundless policy of conquest. From a strategic point of view, the achievement of these aims would have meant the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of the line I have mentioned the main areas of Soviet Russia with the capital, Moscow, would have been conquered and subjugated, together with the leading political and economic center of the Soviet Union. Economically, the winning of this line would have meant the possession of important agricultural areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production in Russia, and also the main network of communications in European Russia.
How much Hitler was bent on taking economic objectives in this war can best be shown from an example out of my personal experience.
On 1 June 1942, on the occasion of a conference of commanders-in-chief in the region of Army Group South in Poltava, Hitler declared, “If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grosny, then I must end this war.”
For the utilization and the administration of the territories to be conquered, economic and administrative organizations had already been formed and were kept in readiness long before the beginning of the war.
To summarize I should like to state that the objectives given indicate the conquest of the Russian territories for the purpose of colonization with the utilization and spoliation of and with the resources of which the war in the West was to be brought to a conclusion, with the aim of finally establishing domination over Europe.
GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the criminal initiation of the war against Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: May I please have the question repeated?
GEN. RUDENKO: I repeat the question. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.
Is that what Counsel for the Defense wish to object to?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is what I want to do.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: Of the defendants, as far as I observed them, the top military advisers to Hitler. They are the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; Chief of the Operations Branch, Jodl; and Göring, in his capacity as Reich Marshal, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Economy.
GEN. RUDENKO: In concluding the interrogation I shall make a summary. Have I rightly concluded from your testimony, that long before 22 June the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That is beyond doubt according to all the developments as I described them, and also in connection with all the directives issued in the well-known Green File.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The British?
BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The United States?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants’ counsel?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff, I ask you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a surprise to the defendants’ counsel, at any rate, and I think a consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. I therefore ask to be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of tomorrow morning’s session.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.
GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not object.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don’t know whether any other member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants’ counsel may conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow morning?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will go on with your case.
[The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: General, you won’t, I presume, think it necessary to read any more of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement, will you?
GEN. ZORYA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30 November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence of sufficient interest in our case.
Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army, mentioned Pieckenbrock by name.
I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-228, the testimony of the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen. Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945.
For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record from Pieckenbrock’s testimony, relating to the matter which we are now investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds to Page 34 of the document book.
“I must say”—said Pieckenbrock—“that already since August and September 1940 the Foreign Armies East of the General Staff of the Army began to increase considerably its intelligence assignments to the Abwehr concerning the U.S.S.R. These assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation of war against Russia.
“The more precise dates for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union I learned in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the Soviet Union was fixed for 15 May.”
The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of the former German Army, which was given by him on 28 December 1945. I present those documents under Document Number USSR-230.
I shall at the same time also only read into the record those parts of Bentivegni’s testimony underlined in red pencil, which have a direct bearing on the beginning of military preparations against the Soviet Union. These first two excerpts of the testimony are on Page 37 in the document book which is submitted to the Military Tribunal:
“I learned first of Germany’s preparation for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris. In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris’ office he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938 in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiter in Berlin.
“Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler’s had now begun to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia.”
These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni’s testimony.
And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time of fascist Germany’s military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony of General Müller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-149.
All the material to which I have so far referred emanated from circles of the highest commanding officers of the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: General, on this document of General Müller, does it appear where that document was made and where General Müller is now?
GEN. ZORYA: The photostat bears a date written in General Müller’s hand. This date is 8 January 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Where?
GEN. ZORYA: If I might have a look at the photostatic copy which I have just presented to the Tribunal, I would be able to tell you where the date is written.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are many prisoners-of-war camps. We want to know which one and where it is.
GEN. ZORYA: In a camp located near Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it at all? So far as we are concerned, isn’t it simply a photostatic copy of a writing by somebody?
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified photostatic copy.
Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary. This will be done in the course of several days and all the material will be given in best order to the General Secretary.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?
GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general’s whereabouts.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to consult your colleagues.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request which I made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a decision in regard to this question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already made a decision.
I think it would be better if, when defendants’ counsel go to the place from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before they speak.
I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case. They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document.
This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned, that he undertook—as he had already undertaken—to produce a certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally.
If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be stricken from the record.
DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.
DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the Defense to cross-examine the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19—provided it is an authentic document.
We are affording the defendants’ counsel the greatest assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of very little importance.
DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement, has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination or cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, but we do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding defendants’ counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who has written such a document as this.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
GEN. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about General Müller. General Müller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow region.
May I continue my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to date emanated from circles of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. If I can so express myself, General Müller belonged to the middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany’s preparations against the Soviet Union.
I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the first page of General Müller’s statement. The first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from it:
“The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff officer in the staff of Army Group C at Dijon in France. General Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation armies in France. Besides this, Army Group A (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare ‘Case Sea Lion’ (the invasion of England by Army Group B—Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army Group B was transferred to the East (Posen) during July and was given the following forces, transferred from France—part of the armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army Command (Von Kluge), and 18th Army Command (Von Küchler), plus several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater part of this number was taken from Army Group C (Von Leeb).
“Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.
“Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East.
“The next order which gives evidence of Germany’s preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH called me to Fontainebleau. The Chief Quartermaster I in the General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II (Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff, should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was the leading of training of the above-mentioned 40 divisions which were to be newly created.
“In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into action in the invasion of the Soviet Union.”
Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the Soviet Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German pedantry.
I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus, stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa, was already so far advanced as to render possible the conducting of two military exercises under the direction of Paulus.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I don’t think it is necessary to read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence in the witness box.
GEN. ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Müller’s statement that this system of military exercises, which originated in the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that the entire armed forces participated in the execution of these games which, per se, were already a preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of the statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of documents:
“Insofar”—General Müller states—“as in the future the Army was to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan was to train soldiers and general staff officers.
“Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the military exercises of Rundstedt’s army group at St. Germain, near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of Kiev and southwards. The plan had in mind the intention also of the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military exercise anticipated the conditions of the future order concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will refer later.
“The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the General Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present: Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the 6th Army, Colonel Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wöhler, and of Kleist’s tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of the panzer forces. The military exercises were held at the place occupied by Rundstedt’s army group, approximately between the 31st January and 2d February 1941. The exercise demonstrated the necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces.”
The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the German armies for launching an attack against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.
As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the scene of Directive Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa.
I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.
Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.
This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany’s Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind was brewing against the Balkans.
The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.
The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities.
I here take the liberty of making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock’s testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping of forces from West to East.
I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.
On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni’s deposition, it is said—I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil—beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book:
“In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work for counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place.”
On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues:
“In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig, Königsberg, Posen, Kraków, Breslau, and Vienna.”
And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of the document book, I read:
“In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.
“a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for instance the creation of the necessary counterintelligence groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and paralyzing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organs.
“b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow against Great Britain.
“c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the transfer of troops to the East be kept secret.”
The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of the German Army, Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the activities of the intelligence service of the German Army in connection with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock’s testimony. Pieckenbrock states:
“In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel Lahousen, about measures connected with Plan Barbarossa. During this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I, beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than once had official talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV, Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kienzl. These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of various tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union.”
I now skip one paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement and read further:
“All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task—the intensification of espionage work against Russia—was given to all intelligence organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of all these field Abwehr organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the village Sulajewek. Major Baun, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I. Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line. At the head of staff ‘Wally’ was Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschläger.”
I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement on Page 36 of the document book:
“From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the quarters of Jodl’s deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in a cavalry school in Krampnitz. One particular question settled at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units, Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units among the individual army groups.”
In Pieckenbrock’s testimony which has just been read into the record, special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with which Lahousen’s department had been entrusted, and to special task units known under the code name of Brandenburg 800.
Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen’s deputy in Department II, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the Tribunal as evidence Stolze’s testimony of 25 December 1945, which was given to Lieutenant Colonel Burashnikov, of the Counterintelligence Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows:
“I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under code name ‘A,’ which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the intended attack on the U.S.S.R.
“At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union. This order was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General Warlimont on Keitel’s instructions—I do not quite remember which.)”
I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on:
“It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Abwehr II, in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union.”
I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and to note the following passages in his testimony:
“In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above.
“In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name ‘Consul I’) and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet armies, and also to convince international public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.
“We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr II for subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union.”
I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find Stolze’s testimony:
“Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the immediate command of the head of Abwehr II, Lahousen. Among the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and important military installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army.
“Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Germans from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms and equipment in order to camouflage their operations.
“During the course of preparations for Germany’s attack on the U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, and organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian language.”
Your Honors, the testimonies of Stolze, Bentivegni, and Pieckenbrock, which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa.
I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied nature.
The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German Foreign Office archives, which fell into the hands of advance units of the Red Army. This document is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s letter to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a sheet of note paper with the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the document book before you, you will find this document on Page 52. I read into the record the underlined extracts from this letter:
“28 June 1943; top secret.
“To the Foreign Minister Herr Von Ribbentrop; Berlin; Object: Elections to the Iranian Parliament.
“Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of exercising German influence on the course of the imminent Iranian parliamentary elections.”
And a few lines further on it is stated:
“In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are necessary. . . . It should also be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany.
“I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one million tomans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent by the people whom we are sending there by airplane.
“Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenführer.”
This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.
In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Führer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work.
I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads:
“By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Führer has entrusted the Reich Führer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic, and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Führer has established that the direction of the Intelligence Service, insofar as foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Führer SS had been reached:
“1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Führer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comradely, and loyal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by the diplomatic service is not affected by this.
“2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service.
“3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service? The details of that unification are not really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.
GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler’s Gestapo service ended and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began.
I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the presentation of the next document. The document which I have just read—I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the conduct of intelligence work abroad—also justifies the assumption that under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a whole intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning.
If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of the report, “The Satellites of Germany.”
When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number 446-PS. This part bears the name of “Presumed Allies and Their Tasks.” I should like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it. Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out Part II of this case:
“1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
“The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war.
“2. Romania’s task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area.
“3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to eliminate Hangö.
“4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal being available for the movements of the German northern group not later than the beginning of the operation.”
In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section:
“On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.”
This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators.
There is only one more document which was submitted by the United States Prosecution and which mentioned Germany’s presumed allies in her aggression against the U.S.S.R.
This document, numbered C-39, is entitled “Provisional Case Barbarossa.” It is, as the Defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a timetable for the preparations of Plan Barbarossa after June 1941. This timetable was confirmed by Hitler. The text of this plan is on Page 57 of the document book. In Part II of this document, entitled “Negotiations with Friendly Powers,” we read:
“a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the Turkish frontier.
“b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial, camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.
“c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary.
“d) Two German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of Prosov.
“e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take place as from 25 May.”
Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division.
The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.
General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature were received only from the OKW.
The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the Romanian general staffs.
The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the true aims of high-ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always suit the satellites.
I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233), the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures on Pages 59-62 of your document book.
In connection with Ribbentrop’s speech in Budapest on the subject of Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of this speech—last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document, Page 60 of the document book:
“Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6 September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a policy which no doubt could only appear odious. . . .”
When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive such wide publicity.
Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which will take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FIFTY-SEVENTH DAY Tuesday, 12 February 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you were going to recall the witness who was being called yesterday, Field Marshal Paulus, were you not, so that the defendants’ counsel may have the opportunity of questioning him? Will you do that now?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, according to the wish of the Tribunal the witness is in the Palace of Justice.
[The witness, Paulus, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Field Marshal Paulus, I want to remind you that you should pause after the question that has been asked you before you answer it, in order that the translation shall get through. Do you follow what I mean?
PAULUS: I have understood.
DR. NELTE: Witness, I should like to ask several questions. On 3 September 1940, you came as Chief Quartermaster I to the High Command of the Army; is that correct?
PAULUS: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: Who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time?
PAULUS: It will be very well known to you that at that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.
DR. NELTE: I believe that the phraseology that you have used is not correct because I did not put this question for any other reason than just to explain the situation to the people who are assembled here. It is known to us but may not be known to the Tribunal. Who was at that time the Chief of Staff of the Army?
PAULUS: It was Generaloberst Halder.
DR. NELTE: Were you, as Chief Quartermaster I, the permanent representative of the Chief of Staff?
PAULUS: I was the deputy of the Chief of Staff for those cases which he told me to supervise, and as for the rest I had to execute the tasks with which he charged me.
DR. NELTE: In this case were you especially charged with the adaptation of the plan which we later learned to know as Plan Barbarossa?
PAULUS: Yes, to the extent of which I told you yesterday.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Brauchitsch, your former Commander-in-Chief and superior, in an affidavit presented by the Prosecution has made a statement about the treatment of military plans. With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to ask you to tell me whether this statement by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch is also your opinion. I quote:
“When Hitler decided to use military pressure or force to achieve his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was involved, first received orally a sort of orientation or a corresponding order.”
Is that your opinion also?
PAULUS: I have no knowledge of that.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst Halder, your immediate superior, in an affidavit which also has been submitted by the Prosecution, has said the following about the handling of such military operational things:
“Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time the Chief of the Reich.”
Is that your opinion likewise?
PAULUS: I ask you please to repeat this once more because I could not understand exactly what you meant.
DR. NELTE: It is about the question: Who were the military persons responsible to Hitler in the forming of important plans? In respect to that, Von Brauchitsch said what you have just heard, and Halder said the following:
“Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time the Chief of the Reich.”
Is that so?
PAULUS: We received the orders about military measures from the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Such was the Directive Number 21. I thought that those people held responsibility who were the first military advisers of Hitler in the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
DR. NELTE: If you have seen Directive Number 21, then you must also know who signed it. Who was that?
PAULUS: As far as I can remember, that was signed by Hitler; and Keitel and Jodl initialed it.
DR. NELTE: But, at any rate, signed by Hitler, like all directives—is that correct?
PAULUS: At any rate, most of the directives, unless they were signed by other people in his name.
DR. NELTE: In other words, I may conclude that the man who gave the orders was the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, Hitler?
PAULUS: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: From the statements of Von Brauchitsch and Halder we can see, in my opinion, that the General Staff of the Army with its large machinery was to work out ideas which Hitler conceived, work them out in detail. Do you not believe that?
PAULUS: That is correct. It had to relegate the orders which were given it by the Supreme Command to the proper departments.
DR. NELTE: It is clear that these orders were given to the High Command, that is, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. There was in all planning, as I can see from your statement also, in the execution of such aggressive plans a close collaboration between Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the Army. Is that correct?
PAULUS: This co-operation exists between the Supreme Command and all persons who are charged to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander.
DR. NELTE: From your explanation I believe I can conclude that the incomplete plan which you found on 3 September 1940—that you have developed that, and that then, after you had achieved a certain measure of completeness, you presented it to the Supreme Commander, Hitler, personally, or through General Halder?
PAULUS: The detailed completion of the plan was presented by the Chief of the General Staff or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; then it was either accepted or rejected.
DR. NELTE: That is, it had to be accepted by Hitler or refused?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly yesterday to say that you had already in the fall of 1940 understood that Hitler wanted to attack the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: I said yesterday that the preparation of that plan of operations was the theoretical preparation for an attack.
DR. NELTE: But already at that time you thought that that was Hitler’s intention, didn’t you?
PAULUS: From the way in which this task was started one could see that, after the theoretical preparation, a practical application would follow.
DR. NELTE: Furthermore, you said yesterday that no news of the Abwehr had been received which would prove that there were any intentions of the Soviet Union to attack.
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Did anybody in the circle of the General Staff of the Army ever speak about these matters?
PAULUS: Yes, these matters were discussed. They had serious misgivings about them, but no reports about any visible preparations for war on the side of the Soviet Union were ever made known to me.
DR. NELTE: So you were firmly convinced that it was a straight attack on the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: At any rate, the indications did not exclude that.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must speak more slowly.
DR. NELTE: The witness has said, if I understood correctly, that there were signs which did not exclude these inferences.
PAULUS: The order for the execution of this theoretical study of the conditions for attack was considered not only by myself but also by other informed experts as the first step for the preparation for an attack, that is to say, an aggressive attack on the Soviet Union.
DR. NELTE: In realizing these facts, did you or the General Staff of the Army or the Commander-in-Chief of the Army make any protests to Hitler about it?
PAULUS: Personally, I do not know in what form or whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Army made any protests.
DR. NELTE: Did you, yourself, speak about having any doubts to Generaloberst Halder or to Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch?
PAULUS: If I judge correctly, then I believe that I am supposed to be here as a witness for the events with which the defendants are charged. I ask the Tribunal, therefore, to relieve me of the responsibility of answering these questions which are directed against myself.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Paulus, you do not seem to know that you also belong to the circle of the defendants, because you belonged to the organization of the High Command which is indicted here as criminal.
PAULUS: And, therefore, since I believe that I am here as witness for the events which have led to the indictment of these defendants here, I have asked to be relieved of answering this question which concerns myself.
DR. NELTE: I ask the Tribunal to decide.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you must answer the questions that have been put up to date.
PAULUS: Then may I ask for a repetition of the question, please?
DR. NELTE: I have asked you whether, since you realized that there were serious doubts, you talked to your chief, Halder, or to Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch, about these things?
PAULUS: I cannot remember having talked to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about it, but I did so with the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, who was my superior.
DR. NELTE: Was he of the same opinion?
PAULUS: Yes, he was of the same opinion, that is to say, of the opinion of great anxiety for such a plan.
DR. NELTE: For military or moral reasons?
PAULUS: For many reasons, both military and moral.
DR. NELTE: It is certain, then, that you and the Chief of Staff, Von Halder, realized these facts which would have stamped the war against Russia as a criminal attack and that you nevertheless did nothing against it? In your statement you have said that later you became Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army; is that right?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. NELTE: With knowledge of all these facts just stated you accepted the command of an army which was to push against Stalingrad. Did you have any scruples about being made a tool of that attack which in your opinion was a criminal one?
PAULUS: As the situation at that time presented itself for the soldier, in connection also with the extraordinary propaganda which was put into play, I had at that time, as so many others believed, to do my duty toward my fatherland.
DR. NELTE: But you knew about the facts which were against that opinion?
PAULUS: The facts which became clear to me afterwards, due to my experiences as Commander of the 6th Army which found their climax at Stalingrad, those facts I did not know at that time. Also, about that criminal attack—that knowledge came later, when I thought about all the circumstances, because before I could only see part of the whole.
DR. NELTE: Then I have to consider your expression “criminal attack” or any other expressions for the war mongers—I have to consider that as something that you found out later?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And I may say then that in spite of your having serious doubts and knowledge about the facts which marked the war against Russia as a criminal action of aggression, that in spite of your knowledge, you considered it your duty to take the command of the 6th Army and to hold Stalingrad until the last moment?
PAULUS: I have just explained that at that time, when I took over the command, I did not see the extent of the crime which was considered in the beginning and execution of this war of aggression; that I did not see the entire extent of it and could not see it, as my experiences as Commander of the 6th Army which I was able to gather at Stalingrad have shown to me later.
DR. NELTE: You speak of the extent, but the fact is that you knew the causes. Maybe you were one of the few who knew them. You have not mentioned that.
PAULUS: I did not know then. I knew the instigation of this war to be aggression, from the attitude of the greater part of the officers’ corps. In keeping with the prevailing concept I saw nothing unusual in the basing of the fate of a people and a nation upon power politics.
DR. NELTE: So you agreed to these ideologies?
PAULUS: Not to the tendency which appeared later, but I did not conclude therefrom that the fate of a country could be built upon power politics. It was a mistake that at this time, and in the 20th Century, only the democracies and the concept of the nationality principle were the decisive factors.
DR. NELTE: Would you grant to others also, who were not so near to the sources, the good faith that they only wanted what was best for their fatherland?
PAULUS: Yes, I do, of course.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendants Von Schirach and Funk): Witness, yesterday you mentioned that you consider the Hitler Government as the guilty ones. Is that correct?
PAULUS: Yes, I have done so. . . .
DR. SAUTER: In your written deposition which you made on 9 January 1946—in a prisoner-of-war camp it is said—there is nothing about that; at least, I have not found anything about it so far.
PAULUS: This letter has nothing to do with that. This is a letter to the Soviet Government, in which I explained several questions which came up within the 6th Army in Russia, and several of my own experiences.
DR. SAUTER: In this letter of 9 January 1946, you said explicitly—and I quote:
“Today, when the crimes of Hitler and his helpers are being judged, I find myself obliged to tell the Soviet Government everything which I have known and which may serve as proof of the guilt of the war criminals in the Nuremberg Trials.”
In spite of that, in this written declaration, which is very detailed, there is nothing about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, if you cross-examine the witness on this letter, you must put the letter in evidence, the whole letter.
DR. SAUTER: That is the statement which the witness has given, on the. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I have no doubt it is; all I say is, if you cross-examine him on the letter and put the letter to him, you must put the letter in evidence. You have a copy of the letter?
DR. SAUTER: Yes. It is in the statement which the Soviet Prosecutor yesterday put up to the witness and in regard to which the witness made the statement that he considers it correct and will repeat it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I follow it. I was not sure whether it was actually put in or not or whether it was withdrawn upon the promise to produce the witness. Is the letter actually in?
DR. SAUTER: But the witness has said, after the Prosecutor asked him, that he will repeat that statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Willey, has the letter been put in?
MR. HAROLD B. WILLEY (American Secretary): It has not been put in, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you can go on cross-examining about it, but the document has got to be put in, that is all.
DR. SAUTER: [Turning to the witness.] Now I would like to know, Witness, what you mean by “Hitler Government”? Do you mean the leaders of the Party or do you mean the Reich Cabinet, or what exactly do you mean?
PAULUS: I mean everyone who is responsible.
DR. SAUTER: I would like you to answer the question more precisely.
PAULUS: In my statement yesterday I have only explained what I have seen myself, what I have experienced myself. I did not intend to make any statements about individual personalities in the Government because that would not be within my knowledge.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, but you spoke about the Hitler Government, did you not?
PAULUS: I just meant the concept of the Hitlerite leadership of the State.
DR. SAUTER: Of the Hitlerite leadership of State? That means, first, the Reich Cabinet, does it not?
PAULUS: Yes, inasmuch as it is responsible for the directives given by the Government.
DR. SAUTER: For this reason I would like to know the following:
The Defendant Funk, who is sitting over there, was also a member of the Reich Cabinet and the Defendant Von Schirach is also counted as a member of the Reich Cabinet by the Prosecution. Do you know anything as to whether the Defendant Funk and the Defendant Von Schirach, like you, for instance, knew anything about these plans of Hitler?
PAULUS: I do not know.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know whether, during the war, since you were at the OKW, there were any meetings of the Cabinet at all?
PAULUS: I do not know that either.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know that Hitler, in the interests of secrecy of his war plans, even ordered that at conferences between himself and his military advisers the members of the Reich Cabinet, as for instance Funk, could not be admitted?
PAULUS: I do not know about that.
DR. SAUTER: Did it not come to your knowledge, perhaps through Herr Jodl or through Herr Keitel, that Hitler even forbade that civilian members of the Reich Cabinet should be present at such military conferences?
PAULUS: I do not know anything about that at all.
DR. SAUTER: Another question. After Stalingrad was encircled and the situation had become hopeless, there were several telegrams of devotion sent to Hitler from inside the fortress. Do you know anything about that?
PAULUS: If you speak of telegrams of devotion, I only know about the end, when efforts were made to find a meaning for the catastrophe that had happened there, to find a meaning for all the suffering and dying of so many soldiers. Therefore these things had been depicted as heroism in the telegram, to be forever remembered. I am sorry, but at that time, due to the prevailing situation, I let that pass and did not stop it.
DR. SAUTER: These telegrams were yours, were they not?
PAULUS: I do not know to which telegrams you are referring, with the exception of the last one.
DR. SAUTER: Several telegrams of devotion, in which there was a promise to hold out to the last man; those telegrams about which the German people were horrified. They are said to have your signature.
PAULUS: I request to have them presented to me, because there is nothing known to me about them.
DR. SAUTER: Do you have any idea what was in the last telegram?
PAULUS: In the last telegram there was a short description of what the army had done, of the achievement of the army, and it was pointed out that it did not intend to capitulate, and that that should be an example for the future.
DR. SAUTER: The answer was, I think, your promotion to General Field Marshal?
PAULUS: I do not know that this was the answer.
DR. SAUTER: But you were promoted to General Field Marshal, and you still have that title because the statement which I have submitted to the Court is signed “Paulus, General Field Marshal.”
PAULUS: Well, I have to say. . . . Do you mean this statement?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, this statement.
PAULUS: Yes, I had to take that title which was conferred upon me.
DR. SAUTER: In this statement which I have submitted to the Court as proof, there is the last sentence:
“I bear the responsibility for the fact that I did not give due attention to the execution of the order of 14 January 1943 about the surrender of the prisoners”—namely, all Russian prisoners. . . .
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: “. . . to the Russians, and, furthermore, that I. . . .”
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: “. . . did not devote myself sufficiently to taking care of the prisoners.”—That is to say, the Russian prisoners.
I would like to hear your statement about the following: In that detailed letter why did you forget the several hundred thousands of German soldiers who were under your command and who lost under your command their freedom, their health, and their lives? There is no word about that.
PAULUS: No.
DR. SAUTER: No?
PAULUS: That is not the question in this letter. This letter to the Soviet Government was concerned with what happened to the Russian civilian population in the area of Stalingrad and the Russian prisoners of war. At this time I could not say anything about my soldiers, of course not.
DR. SAUTER: Not one word?
PAULUS: No, I could not speak here, because that had to be done at a different time. Of course, it is so that all the operational orders which led to the terrible conditions of Stalingrad, in spite of my objections. . . . About 20 January, as I said, I had made a report that conditions had reached such a measure of misery and of suffering through cold, hunger, and epidemics as to be unbearable, and that to continue the fighting would be beyond human possibility. The answer given to me by the Supreme Command was:
“Capitulation is impossible. The 6th Army will do its historic duty by fighting to the utmost, in order to make the reconstruction of the Eastern front possible.”
DR. SAUTER: And that is why you continued your efforts in the crime you have described until the very end?
PAULUS: That is correct.
DR. SAUTER: Because, according to your own statements, everything from the very beginning was a crime, which clearly and for a long time had come to your mind?
PAULUS: I did not say that it was clear to me as a crime from the very beginning, but that later I had this impression, as a result of retrospective considerations. My knowledge comes actually from my experience at Stalingrad.
DR. SAUTER: Then I would like to know, in closing: Was it not clear to you from the very beginning, when you were charged with the development of plans for the attack on Russia, as a specialist for such task—was it not clear to you from the very beginning that this attack on Russia could be made only under violations of international treaties, to which Germany was bound?
PAULUS: Yes, under violation of international law, but not under those conditions which developed later.
DR. SAUTER: No, I asked whether it was clear to you that this plan could only be executed by violation of international treaties?
PAULUS: It was clear to me that an attack of that kind could only be made under violation of the treaty which had existed with Russia since the fall of ’39.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions. Thank you.
[Dr. Exner approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I have already told the witness, and defendants’ counsel have been told over and over again, that it is of the utmost importance that they should ask their questions slowly, that they ask one question at a time, and that they should pause between the question and the answer and between the answer and the next question. Will you try to observe that rule, please?
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, in September of 1940 at the OKW you were charged with the execution of an operational study against Russia, that is, to continue work on a plan which existed already. Do you know about how strong the German forces in the East were at that time?
PAULUS: I can only clarify, in the OKH I have. . . .
DR. EXNER: Yes, we have the OKH in mind.
PAULUS: I do not know any longer how strong the forces in the East were at that time. It was at a time shortly after the end of the campaign against France.
DR. EXNER: You do not know about how many divisions were in the East at that time for the protection of the German border?
PAULUS: No, I cannot remember that.
DR. EXNER: In February of 1941 our transports to the East began. Can you say how strong at that time the Russian forces were, along the German-Russian demarcation line and the Romanian-Russian border?
PAULUS: No, I cannot say that. The information which reached us about the Soviet Union and their forces was so extraordinarily scarce and incomplete that for a long time we had no clear picture at all.
DR. EXNER: But did not Halder at that time talk to the Führer frequently about the strength and deployment of the Russian forces?
PAULUS: That is possible, but I cannot remember it, because I had nothing to do with these questions after that time—with the theoretical development of our ideas. In December the operations department of the Army took the work over.
DR. EXNER: At this time you had theoretical war exercises?
PAULUS: That was in the beginning of December.
DR. EXNER: Then you probably used, as a basis of these exercises, information you had about the actual strength of the enemy?
PAULUS: That was just what we assumed about the strength of the enemy.
DR. EXNER: Well, you have collaborated intensively with that operational plan. You have tried it out by theoretical war exercises. Tell me, what was the difference between your work and Jodl’s at that time?
PAULUS: I do not think I am able to judge that.
DR. EXNER: I do not understand. That was General Staff work, was it not?
PAULUS: Yes, it was General Staff work, with which I was charged by the Chief of Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, and the activity of Jodl as Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab. . . .
PAULUS: The difference is that he had a view of the entire situation from the point where he was, whereas I could only see a small section, only that which I needed for my work, and that is all the information I received.
DR. EXNER: But the activity in both cases was one of General Staff preparation for the war?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. EXNER: I would also be interested to know something about Stalingrad. In your written statement, or written declaration, you have said that Keitel and Jodl were guilty with regard to the prohibition of capitulation, which had such tragic consequences. How do you know that?
PAULUS: I just wanted to say it was the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht who was responsible for that order. It had the responsibility, and it makes no difference whether it was one person or another. At any rate, the responsibility was with the office as such.
DR. EXNER: At any rate, you do not know anything about the personal participation of any one of these two gentlemen? You only thought of. . . .
PAULUS: The OKW, which is represented by these persons.
DR. EXNER: Why, when the situation at Stalingrad was so hopeless and terrible—as you have indicated today—did you not, in spite of the order by the Führer to the contrary, try to break out?
PAULUS: Because at that time it was represented to me that by holding out with the army which I led, the fate of the German people would be decided.
DR. EXNER: Do you know that you enjoyed the confidence of Hitler in a special measure?
PAULUS: I do not know about that.
DR. EXNER: Do you know that he had already decided that you would become the successor to Jodl if the Stalingrad operation would be successful, because he did not like to work with Jodl any more?
PAULUS: I do not know about that in this form, but there was a rumor that late in the summer or early in the fall of 1942 a change was planned in the leadership. That was a rumor which the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe told me at that time, but I did not get any official information about that. There was other information, that I should be relieved of the command of that army and should be used to lead a new army group which was to be formed.
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the telegram which you sent to the Führer when you were promoted to the rank of Field Marshal at Stalingrad?
PAULUS: I did not send a telegram then. After my promotion I did not send a telegram.
DR. EXNER: Have you not thanked the Führer in any way?
PAULUS: No.
DR. EXNER: That is quite contrary to statements which other people have made. Witness, you are said to be or to have been a teacher at the Military Academy at Moscow. Is that correct?
PAULUS: That is not right, either.
DR. EXNER: Did you have another position in Moscow?
PAULUS: I was never in Russia before the war.
DR. EXNER: But now, since you became a prisoner of war?
PAULUS: I have been in a prisoner-of-war camp, like my other comrades.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the German Freedom Committee?
PAULUS: I was a member of a movement of German men, soldiers of all ranks and men of all classes, who had made it their aim to warn the German people at the last moment from the abyss, and to arouse them to overthrow this Hitler regime which had brought all this misery to many nations and especially to our German people. I have done that with the proclamation of 8 August 1944.
DR. EXNER: Did you do anything about that before?
PAULUS: No, I did not.
DR. EXNER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness.
[Turning to the witness] Witness, did you not know when you took over your office as Chief Quartermaster I that these preparations which Major General Marx already had begun, and which you then continued, were intended only for an eventual case?
PAULUS: One could think so, of course, but very soon in the course of the work things appeared which made it seem very probable that these theoretical preparations were to be put to practical use. In connection with the formulation of this plan of operations for an attack in which, from the very beginning, we were thinking in terms of using the Romanian area—during that very time we saw the dispatching of the first military mission with training groups and an entire Panzer division, just into that area for which the first theoretical preparations for an attack were being made. Thus, gradually, the impression became intensified that this was a plan which eventually would be executed.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the reason for my question is this: I believe the date which you mentioned, since which the plan was to have already been in existence, the fall of 1940, is a little early, isn’t it?
PAULUS: The documents which I was given for that plan of offense I explained in detail yesterday. They were submitted on 3 September, for upon the basis of these documents everything was developed, and everything was actually executed like that later.
DR. LATERNSER: I mean this: That first this plan was considered or conceived for an eventual case, and then at a later date, after a decision had been taken, it was used.
PAULUS: In retrospect, they fit together in perfect sequence, first the theoretical preparation, and then the practical preparation and execution.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know Directive Number 18 of 12 November 1940, issued by the former Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht?
PAULUS: I cannot remember it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I refer now to a document which has already been submitted by the United States Prosecution, Number 444-PS. [Handing the document to the witness] I submit it to you, Witness. Page 8 is the one to which I am referring.
PAULUS: I cannot remember that I have ever seen this.
DR. LATERNSER: To inform the Court I am going to quote the passage—it is very short—which I have just shown to the witness. It is Page 8 of the Document 444-PS, this paragraph I quote: “5. Russia: Political conferences with the aim of clarifying the attitude of Russia for the near future have been started.”
Witness, after you have seen that passage you will have to admit that I am right in saying that the time at which the decision was taken to attack the Soviet Union must have been later than the time you told us yesterday.
PAULUS: I can only say from my personal experience and my own opinion as I look back now, following the entire development, that there was a clear plan from the beginning, the conception of that plan on 3 September 1940, then the directive of 21 December, and then its execution. Just at which precisely measurable date the decision was taken, I do not know, of course.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know that in 1939 the Soviet Union marched into Poland with very strong forces which bore no relationship—according to opinions of German military experts—with the military problem to be solved at that time?
PAULUS: I only know of the fact that Soviet forces marched into Poland, but I have never heard anything about the size of the forces, nor have I ever heard anyone marvel at the strength of the forces that had taken part in the invasion.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know that before the German deployment on the Eastern border many strong Soviet forces had been deployed along that border, especially very strong Panzer forces in the area of Bialystok?
PAULUS: No, in that form I have never known of this.
DR. LATERNSER: Were not the first divisions from West to East transferred only after very strong Soviet forces already were standing along the Eastern border?
PAULUS: About the relationship of troop movements from West to East—the practical execution of the plan—I do not know anything, because I had nothing to do with the practical execution. First of all, in the months of April and May, because of other duties, I was present in the High Command of the Army for only a very short time.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you said yesterday that at the end of March 1940 there was a conference at the Reich Chancellery, and there Generaloberst Halder gave you several points as a reason for the intended attack on Yugoslavia. You mentioned first the elimination of danger to the flank; second, the taking possession of the rail line to Nish, and you stressed the fact that in case of an attack against Russia the right flank would be free to move.
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Were the reasons for this attack not different ones? Were not there reasons which were more important than those you mentioned?
PAULUS: I do not know of any others.
DR. LATERNSER: As to this attack upon Yugoslavia, was not that also to be done to relieve the Italians?
PAULUS: Yes, of course. That was the initial reason why an operation against Greece was considered, and why that menace to the flank had to be eliminated if we were to push forward into Greece from Bulgaria.
DR. LATERNSER: Was not there at that time some concern about co-operation between Yugoslavia and Greece, which would have put England into the position of being able to land on the Greek coast and thereby gain a way to reach the Romanian oil fields?
PAULUS: Yes, but it would also have been impossible to carry out the Plan Barbarossa, which would have been menaced on its right flank and unprotected.
DR. LATERNSER: I have received different information. In the decision to attack Yugoslavia the Plan Barbarossa did not play the important role which you said yesterday it did.
PAULUS: The Plan Barbarossa could not have been carried out if the area of Greece and Serbia, after reinforcement by the British landing, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we can adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that the interpreters, using the words “question” and “answer” before the question and answer, assist the shorthand writers and the press, and therefore the interpreters may continue to say “question” and “answer” before the question and answer is given. That only makes it more obvious that the real remedy for the difficulties which arise is for the counsel and witnesses to pause after the question has been asked and after the answer has been given, and it seems to the Tribunal that counsel and witnesses ought to be able to hear when the translation of the question has been given, and the witness can then give his answer. And when the translation of the answer has been given, which counsel can hear, he should then put a further question. Is it clear what I mean?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were just speaking of the attack on Yugoslavia. If I understood you correctly, you said that this attack had to be carried out before the Plan Barbarossa could be undertaken, as otherwise there would have been a serious threat to the flanks. Did I understand you correctly?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: You said yesterday that the overthrow of the government in Yugoslavia was the cause for Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia. Do you know whether any plans for such an attack existed even before the revolution in Yugoslavia?
PAULUS: That is not known to me.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you happen to know that particularly the plan of attack against Yugoslavia came at a very inconvenient time, and that it caused a delay of the attack against the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That is exactly what I said yesterday. It caused a postponement of the attack on Russia, which had originally been planned for the middle of May, the weather permitting.
DR. LATERNSER: But then there is a sort of contradiction here, if you say that the attack against Yugoslavia took place at that time although it was inconvenient, as the attack against Russia was to be made.
PAULUS: I do not see any contradiction in that. As I saw the situation then, the Yugoslavian Government had made an agreement with us which placed the railway line from Belgrade to Nish at our disposal, and that after that agreement was concluded, a revolution took place in Yugoslavia which created a different policy. Therefore, this plan of attack was believed necessary to eliminate a danger. In other words, I do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia and to delay Barbarossa form a contradiction. I merely see that one is a prerequisite for the execution of the other.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you present at a conference of the General Staff on the Obersalzberg on 3 February 1941?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Are you aware of the fact that at that time the strength of the Soviet Russian deployment was estimated at 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions, and that this was reported by Generaloberst Halder?
PAULUS: I cannot remember that. Nor am I sure whether Generaloberst Halder was actually present during that conference.
DR. LATERNSER: But, witness, such a conference must have been an unusual one?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: And I believe that that conference must at least have given the impression that a very strong concentration of troops on the Eastern Front was in question.
PAULUS: I myself have at least no recollection of any such impression.
DR. LATERNSER: At the beginning of that attack against the Soviet Union, were you still Chief Quartermaster I?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: As far as I have in the meantime been informed, it is part of the tasks of that service department to make positive suggestions regarding military operations on land, is that correct?
PAULUS: That was once the case during a different division of tasks. At the time when I was Chief Quartermaster I did not get that task as part of my job. The operational department was not under my control but immediately under the personal control of the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff Department, first of all, gave me the task of running the training department and then the organization department, and that was in autumn 1941. Therefore, it was not part of my sphere of activities to make suggestions to the Chief of the General Staff regarding operations which were in progress, or any other operations. I merely had to carry out the special tasks which were given to me.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, can you give information on the subject of how German prisoners of war were treated in the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That question, about which such an incredible amount of propaganda has been made, which led to the suicide of so many German officers and enlisted personnel in the cauldron of Stalingrad, I have obligated myself to consider in the interest of truth. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Cross-examination is questioning on questions which are either relevant to the issues which the Tribunal has to try or questions relevant to the credibility of the witness. Questions which relate to the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union have got nothing whatever to do with any of the issues which we have got to try, and they are not relevant to the credibility of the witness. The Tribunal, therefore, will not hear them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I give a reason why I ask that question? May I make a short statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put that question for the reason that I could ascertain how, actually, prisoners of war were treated, so that a large number of German families, who are extremely worried on that subject, could in that manner be given information on the subject, so that their worries would cease.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that that is not a matter with which the Tribunal is concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Witness, do you know the Defendant Fritzsche?
PAULUS: Yes, I do.
DR. FRITZ: Are you aware of the fact that during the summer and autumn of 1942 he was with your army?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. FRITZ: Witness, in the course of this Trial there was a discussion about the command of the OKW which, as I hear, was also sharply criticized by you, according to which all the captured commissars of the Russian Army were to be shot. Are you aware of that order?
PAULUS: Yes. It came to my knowledge.
DR. FRITZ: Do you recollect that the Defendant Fritzsche, after he had become aware of that order in the course of his duties in the East, made a proposal to you and your I.C. officers, according to which that order should be cancelled as far as your army zone was concerned?
PAULUS: I cannot recollect that incident. I think it is perfectly possible that Herr Fritzsche did discuss that question with my staff, but when I took over that army on 20 January 1942, that order was not carried out in my zone. As far as I know, this order, which in practice did not become operative, was in fact cancelled later on.
DR. FRITZ: Perhaps, so as to refresh your memory, I might ask another question: Do you recollect, perhaps, that Fritzsche suggested to you or your I.C. officers the scattering of pamphlets with a corresponding content over the Russian front?
PAULUS: I personally cannot recollect that, but I consider it perfectly possible that such a discussion with the I.C. officer who was responsible for that sort of thing took place.
DR. FRITZ: Then one last question: As far as you know the character of the Defendant Fritzsche, would you consider it entirely possible and probable that he made this proposal?
PAULUS: Yes, indeed I do.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, in your position you supported Hitler right to the very end, despite the fact that you knew that an aggressive war was being waged. How much could the political leaders know of this?
PAULUS: I cannot answer that question, because it is out of my knowledge.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by political leaders?
PAULUS: May I ask another question in return? What does the defendant’s counsel understand by political leaders, concerning whom he asks the question?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the organization of the Party does not seem to be clear to you. There is an organization of political leaders which is indicted in this Trial. They are to be declared criminal to this extent that, from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter, they may be punished because of their participation in the conspiracy to commit all the acts which are being tried here. This organization of political leaders is composed in such a way that 93 percent are local group leaders with their staffs and all their subordinates.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you can ask this witness about this. He does not know anything about it. He is not concerned with the charge against the political leadership. I do not think that is proper cross-examination at all.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I was going to ask him to what extent these political leaders might have had knowledge, and then I was going to ask a second question, whether he was aware that he, as a witness, has contributed materially to the fact that these people, the political leaders, supported Hitler because they believed in the facade which the witness himself had assisted in setting up.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already answered you that he did not know to what extent the political leaders had been informed.
DR. SERVATIUS: I am also appearing for the Defendant Sauckel, who was responsible for the labor supply.
[Turning to the witness] Have you any knowledge as to whether German prisoners of war were used in Russian armament industries?
PAULUS: I have no authentic or personal information on that subject. The prisoners of war whom I myself have seen, in the camps where I have been, worked for the immediate requirements of the camp or in the near vicinity of the camp. They worked at agriculture or forestry, and I know from the papers that some German units of workers, who had voluntarily formed groups and were working in industry, were proud of the results of their work. But I do not know in what branches of industry these people worked.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): A statement made by you yesterday has already been discussed once more today, namely, how much knowledge did individual members of the German Government have regarding important decisions? I gathered from your reply that you did not consider the Reich Government, regarding its personalities, one homogeneous body. In this Trial the difficulty repeatedly arises that normal conditions are assumed. One is especially prone to the conception that most important political and military decisions, as is otherwise customary, are made within a government body of important persons or within the military supreme command; in other words, that questions are discussed and decided within a group to which belongs a larger number of personalities. Witness, from the knowledge you have gained in your high military rank, could one assume this to be true of Adolf Hitler’s Government? Has Adolf Hitler, in his personality and methods, to speak politely, as a man of an unusual type, chiefly employed a completely different procedure here? Did he not always make his decisions independently or, at most, in closest consultation with a very few assistants, and can we not derive from that that leading personalities in political and military fields had no knowledge of impending events?
PAULUS: I must say to that that my military service in the General Staff of the Army did not give me an insight into the methods of the leadership of the State and of the Reich Government. My concept of a governing body of a nation is that of a united group who, regardless of the methods the state intends to use, have such a sense of responsibility toward the people for the deeds of the government, that they will not allow just anything to be done by even the head of the state—in this case Hitler with his usual brutal and autocratic ways—but, even if not required to do so, would themselves intervene in time with the necessary measures, at the very latest as soon as it was clear to the whole world that this government was being led by an insane criminal.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, you belong to the second circle of people which you mentioned. It is an established fact that you have not intervened, and, surely, you would have had important reasons for that. I believe that it would be better if, as far as other personalities are concerned, you would not pass judgment, but would answer my questions as far as actual facts are concerned.
My question was whether, according to your knowledge gained not only in your military position but also in your particular and leading position—whether they were right or wrong is unnecessary for establishing the fact—you knew what the methods in military and political matters were and what they were not. According to your knowledge, were resolutions made by a large body of military and political personalities who met and passed these resolutions, or were decisions generally made and resolutions passed in a very much smaller circle of people, probably sometimes only by Hitler alone?
PAULUS: How decisions of the Reich Government were made is not known to me. Therefore, in my previous answer, I have merely given you my general conception of this question and I believe that I have answered it therewith. I cannot imagine that one man alone could have done everything that was done. In order to exert his influence in a small circle he finally needed the co-operation of his immediate assistants. In other words, it was quite impossible for him to achieve his aims otherwise.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As to the co-operation of his closest assistants, do you believe that some trained minister, a minister of labor or some other minister who was specially trained, was ever consulted by Hitler about his plans for aggression?
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the witness has already said that he does not know how the decisions of the Reich Government were arrived at. What he may think about it is really not relevant. He does not know.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, is it your impression that plans for aggression were made by Hitler many years in advance, or are you of the opinion that they were made to meet certain circumstances, on the basis of the intuition which you say he always had?
PAULUS: That is entirely outside my knowledge. My observations began on 3 September 1940 and continued from that time until January 1942. What I observed during that period is something I explained yesterday. About the time prior to that I am not informed.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Witness, you said just now that you were a member of a body which had the aim of saving Germany from disaster. My question is: What possibilities to carry out these intentions were at the disposal of yourself and the other members of that group?
PAULUS: We had the possibility of making ourselves heard and understood by the German people, and believed it our duty to make known to the German people our view, not only of military events but also of the events of 20 July, and to tell them of the convictions we had since gained. In this regard the initiative came chiefly from the ranks of the army I had led to Stalingrad. There we experienced how, through the orders of those military and political leaders against whom we were now taking a stand, more than 100,000 soldiers died of hunger, cold, and snow. There we experienced in concentrated form the horrors and terrors of a war of conquest.
DR. HORN: Did you have any other possibility apart from propaganda?
PAULUS: Apart from the possibility of making propaganda through radio and those newspapers which we had created, apart from that propaganda to the German people, we had no other facilities.
THE PRESIDENT: What has the Tribunal got to do with this?
DR. HORN: I merely wanted to ascertain what conclusions I could draw on the credibility of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I cannot see that it has any bearing on his credibility.
DR. HORN: It is perfectly possible that we have knowledge of other possibilities which were available, which the witness has not mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that what the witness thought or did when he was a prisoner of war in Russian hands has got nothing to do with his credibility, at least as far as the questions that you have asked are concerned, and they will not allow the questions to be put.
DR. HORN: May I have permission to ask the witness one more question?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. HORN: Did you, during the time you were a prisoner, have an opportunity to place your military experiences in any way at the disposal of anybody else?
PAULUS: In no way, in no case.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I understand that that concludes the cross-examination. Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any more questions?
GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. We consider that the questions have been comprehensively explained.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): General, you said that when you became Quartermaster General of the Army on 3 September 1940, you found an unfinished plan for an attack against the Soviet Union. Do you know how long that plan had been in preparation before you saw it?
PAULUS: I cannot say exactly how long the period of preparation lasted, but I would estimate that it lasted 2 to 3 weeks.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who had given the orders for the preparation of the plan?
PAULUS: I assume that they originated from the same source, namely, the OKW via the High Command of the Army. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army had given to Major General Marx the same documents that he had given me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): At the conferences on the Plan Barbarossa how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were usually present?
PAULUS: The departments concerned, the Operational Department, the Department for Foreign Armies, the General Quartermaster for Supplies, and the Chief of Transportation. Those were generally the chief departments which were involved.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): How many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were familiar with the orders and directives as they were being signed?
PAULUS: In the course of time, that is, up to December, while the actual marching orders were being prepared, more or less, all General Staff officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many had been informed previously, in the individual periods, is something which I can no longer say exactly.
THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I.T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.): What exactly did the General Staff of the German Army represent? Did it deal exclusively with the elaboration of technical questions, was it the apparatus elaborating technical problems according to instructions of the Supreme Command, or, again, was the General Staff an organization which prepared, elaborated, and submitted its findings to the Supreme Command independently?
PAULUS: It was a technical executive body which had the task of carrying out existing instructions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Therefore the General Staff was merely a technical apparatus?
PAULUS: That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as such, was an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of the Army, and not an executive body.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Gen. Nikitchenko): To what extent did the General Staff conscientiously carry out the instructions received from the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: They carried out these instructions absolutely.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did any conflict exist between the General Staff and the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: It is a known fact that certain differences of opinion did exist, although I am unable to explain that in detail. At any rate, I know through my immediate superior that he had frequently had differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Could such officers remain? Did they, in fact, remain in the service of the General Staff if they disagreed with the policy of the Supreme Command?
PAULUS: Political questions did not arise in that connection. Generally speaking, political questions were not discussed in the circle of the Army Supreme Command.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not speaking of political questions in the narrow sense of the word. I am speaking of the policy of planning for war, of the policy of preparations and aggression. That is what I had in mind. Was it intended, in case you know about it, to transform that part of the Soviet Union, occupied by the German Forces?
PAULUS: I never did know what the itemized plans were. My knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were contained in the so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the country.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by exploitation?
PAULUS: The economic exploitation of the country, so that by utilizing its resources one could bring the war in the West to a close and also to guarantee future supremacy in Europe.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did the nature of the exploitation differ from the economic exploitation applied inside Germany?
PAULUS: In that respect I have no personal impressions, since I only led that army in Russia for three-quarters of a year; and I was captured early, in January 1943.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did you know of the directives issued by Government organizations in Germany and by the Supreme Command, concerning the treatment of the Soviet population by the Army?
PAULUS: I remember that instructions did appear, but I cannot recollect the date at the moment. In those instructions definite rules were given for the manner of conducting the war in the East. I believe that this principal decree was included in that so-called Green Folder, but there may have been separate and special orders to the effect that no particular consideration should be shown the population.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by “not to show particular consideration”—or perhaps the translation is not quite correct?
PAULUS: That meant that only military necessities should be considered a basis for all measures that were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Were there any divisions under your command consisting entirely of SS troops?
PAULUS: During the time I led the Army I had no SS troops at all under my command, as I remember. Even in the cauldron at Stalingrad, where I had 20 German infantry, armored, and motorized divisions, and two Romanian divisions, there were no SS units.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the SA did not form units, did they? The SA?
PAULUS: I have never heard of SA units, but the existence of SS units is a known fact.
THE PRESIDENT: And did you have any branches of the Gestapo attached to your army?
PAULUS: No, I did not have those either.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you had any questions to ask, and you said no, I take it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand, and Gen. Zorya approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on, General.
GEN. ZORYA: Yesterday, I stopped at the questions connected with the relations between the fascist conspirators and the Romanian aggressors. It seems to me that now is the most opportune moment to read into the Record the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal.
The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in conformance with the laws of the Soviet Union and I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-153 (Document Number USSR-153) the record of his deposition, which is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between Germany and her satellites. I consider it necessary to read the greater part of these depositions, beginning with the second paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It corresponds to Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I quote:
“Throughout the entire period during which I held office in Romania”—testifies Ion Antonescu—“I followed the policy of strengthening the alliance with Germany and resorted to her help for retraining and rearming the Romanian army. For this purpose I had several meetings with Hitler. The first meeting with Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head of the Romanian State. This meeting took place on my initiative, in Berlin, at Hitler’s official residence, in the presence of the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, and Hitler’s personal interpreter, Schmidt. The conversation with Hitler lasted over 4 hours.
“I assured Hitler that Romania remained true to the previously concluded agreement regarding Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact.
“In reply to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler declared that the German soldiers would guarantee the frontiers of Romania.
“At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration should not be considered as final and thus gave me to understand that Romania could count on a revision of the decision previously taken in Vienna, on the question of Transylvania.
“Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Romania should continue its work of reconstructing the Romanian Army on German lines.
“In the same way I also concluded an economic agreement, in accordance with which the Germans would at a later date supply Romania with Messerschmidts 109, tanks, tractors, antiaircraft and antitank guns, automatic rifles, and other armaments, while they, in return, would receive from Romania wheat and oil for the needs of the German armies.
“To the question put to me as to whether this, my first conversation with Hitler, could be regarded as the beginning of my agreement with the Germans concerning the preparations for war against the Soviet Union—I replied in the affirmative. There is no doubt that Hitler had this fact in mind, when he elaborated his plans for the attack on the Soviet Union.
“In January 1941, through the offices of the German Minister in Romania, Fabricius, I was invited to Germany and had my second meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The following persons were present: Ribbentrop, Fabricius, and the newly appointed German Minister to Bucharest, Killinger. Besides these, Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl were also present as representing the German Armed Forces.
“At the beginning of the conversation Hitler introduced Killinger to me, emphasizing that the latter was one of his closest friends. After this, Hitler described the military situation in the Balkans and declared that Mussolini had appealed to him for help in connection with the Italian failures in the war against Greece, and that he, Hitler, intended to give this help to Italy.
“While on this subject Hitler asked me to allow the German troops concentrated on Hungarian territory to pass through Romania, so that they could render speedy assistance to the Italians.
“Knowing that the passage of German troops through Romania to the Balkans would constitute an unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union, I asked Hitler what, in his opinion, would be the subsequent reaction of the Soviet Government.
“Hitler reminded me that at our first meeting, in November 1940, he had already given appropriate guarantees to Romania and had taken upon himself the obligation of protecting Romania by force of arms.
“I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through Romania might serve as a pretext for military operations on the part of the Soviet Union, and that Romania would then be in a difficult position since the Romanian Army had not been mobilized.
“Hitler announced that he would give orders for some of the German troops intended for participation in the operations against Greece to be left in Romania. Hitler also stressed that, according to the information at his disposal, the Soviet Union did not intend to fight either Germany or Romania.
“Satisfied with Hitler’s declaration, I agreed to the passage of German troops through Romanian territory.
“General Jodl, who was present at this conference, described to me the strategic situation of the German Army and stressed the necessity for an attack against Greece launched from Bulgaria.
“My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.
“At this meeting at which, in addition to ourselves, there were present Ribbentrop and Hitler’s personal interpreter, Schmidt, we reached a final agreement with regard to a joint attack on the Soviet Union.
“Hitler informed me that he had decided on an armed attack on the Soviet Union. ‘Once we have prepared this attack,’ said Hitler, ‘we must carry it out without warning, along the entire extent of the Soviet frontier, from the Black to the Baltic Seas.’
“The unexpectedness of the military attack—Hitler went on to say—would in a short time give Germany and Romania a chance to liquidate one of our most dangerous adversaries.
“As a result of his military plans, Hitler suggested the use of Romanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and, at the same time, he requested me to participate directly in the attack on the Soviet Union.
“Hitler stressed the point that Romania must not remain outside this war, for, if she wished to have Bessarabia and North Bukovina returned to her, she had no other alternative but to fight on Germany’s side. At the same time he pointed out that, in return for our assistance in the war, Romania would be allowed to occupy and administer other Soviet territories, right up to the River Dnieper.
“Since Hitler’s offer to initiate a joint campaign against the U.S.S.R. corresponded to my own aggressive intentions, I announced my agreement to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number of Romanian troops and, at the same time, to increase deliveries of the oil and food required by the German armies.
“Before Hitler and I took the decision to attack Russia, I asked Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding her participation in the war.
“Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their consent to participate in the war against the U.S.S.R. in alliance with Germany. When, exactly, the Germans had agreed on this joint attack with the Hungarians, Hitler did not specify.
“On my return from Munich to Bucharest I began active preparations for the coming campaign.”
Antonescu concludes his testimony in the following manner—I refer to Page 67 in the document book, the last paragraph of the testimony.
“After the Romanian troops under my supreme command had invaded the Soviet territory Hitler sent me a letter in which he expressed his gratitude to me and to the Romanian army for the assistance given.
“Signed, Marshal Antonescu.”
The date of the beginning of Romanian preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. can be established from the depositions furnished by the former Vice Minister, Mihai Antonescu, who was also interrogated by the Soviet authorities upon the request of the Soviet Prosecution: I now submit his testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-152 (Document Number USSR-152). I shall not quote these depositions in detail since their greater part is a repetition of some of the facts described already in the testimony of Ion Antonescu. I shall only refer to a few paragraphs. I would refer you to Page 1 of the testimony which is translated into Russian, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5. This corresponds to Page 68 of the document book:
“In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Studza, left for Germany, where he had a meeting with Hitler.
“During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed the agreement for Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and received Hitler’s promise for the later revision, in favor of Romania, of the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration Treaty.
“The first journey of Marshal Antonescu was the initial step of a policy which subsequently led to a joint German and Romanian attack on the Soviet Union.”
Your Honors, the evidence of the witness, Paulus, as well as the testimonies of Ion Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, which have just been submitted to the Tribunal, justify the Soviet Prosecution in making the following statement:
1. The decision to send to Romania a military mission of the German General Staff for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, in order to prepare for and subsequently to attack the U.S.S.R., was taken no later than September 1940, that is, no less than 9 months prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R. 2. In November of the same year, Romanian war preparations had been fully developed.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I had intended presenting to the Tribunal a statement of General Buschenhagen, general of the former German Army. I do not, however, intend to do so now, since the Soviet Prosecution has the possibility of examining this witness in court during the session. I, on my part, request your permission to have this witness brought to the court for examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, that would be convenient, in view of several technical reasons, and would facilitate the task of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
[The witness, Buschenhagen, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ERICH BUSCHENHAGEN (Witness): Erich Buschenhagen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when and where you were born?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I was born on 8 December 1895 in Strasbourg, in Alsace.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you name your last military rank, please.
BUSCHENHAGEN: I was general in the infantry in the German Army. My last position was that of Commanding General of the 52d Army Corps.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you tell us please, did you on 26 December 1945 appeal to us with a statement in connection with the Helsinki trials?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you confirm this statement now?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I do.
GEN. ZORYA: Will you please tell us what you know about the preparations made by fascist Germany for attacking the Soviet Union?
BUSCHENHAGEN: At the end of December 1940, in my position as Chief of the General Staff of the German forces in Norway, I was called to the OKH, where the then Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, had a conference with the chiefs of general staffs of the army groups and of the independent armies, one of which was mine. At this conference we were informed of the OKW’s Directive Number 21, the Plan Barbarossa, which was issued on 18 December 1940. We were given in lectures the basic reasons for the intended operations against Soviet Russia.
From this directive I learned that troops of my army also would take part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in one speech made by the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, who was then also with the OKH. He spoke at that time about the military actions in the winter war between Finland and the Soviet Union. He drew a picture of the methods of warfare and the fighting value of the Soviet Army and also of the Finnish troops.
General Heinrichs also had conferences with Generaloberst Halder at that time, in which I did not take part myself, but I assume that they were concerned with possible co-operation between the Finnish and German troops in case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. There existed since the fall of 1940 a military co-operation between Germany and Finland, and the German Air Force had made arrangements with the Finnish General Staff for through traffic from northern Norway to the Finnish harbors in the transport of men and material. As the result of conferences, which the German military attaché had held in Helsinki by order of the OKW, this through traffic was extended in the winter of 1940 to a general through traffic of the German Wehrmacht from northern Norway to the Finnish Baltic seaports. In order to carry out this traffic, a German Army administration center was set up in the main city of Lapland, Rovanjemi, and a German army transport unit was transferred to the Arctic Strait of Rovanjemi and Petsamo-Rovanjemi. Furthermore, offices for supply were installed along this Arctic Sea route and along the railroad which led from Rovanjemi to ports on the Finnish south coast.
In December to January 1940-41, I had, with the OKW, discussions about details of the participation of troops from Norway together with Finnish troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.
GEN. ZORYA: Didn’t you also have conferences with the Finnish General Staff about joint operations against the Soviet Union?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I did.
GEN. ZORYA: Tell us, who instructed you to negotiate with the Finnish Government and what course did these negotiations follow?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I had orders and authorizations from the OKW, which was the immediate superior of myself and my army. In February 1941 I received—after the basic facts had been cleared in regard to the participation of the troops from Norway based in Finland—I received the order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch there, personally, with the Finnish General Staff and to discuss with them these operations from middle and northern Finland.
On 18 February 1941 I reached Helsinki and on the 2 following days, I had conferences with the Finnish Chief of General Staff, General Heinrichs, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of the Operations Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola. In these conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations from middle and northern Finland, especially from the area around Kuusamo and Rovanjemi; also from the area of Petsamo. These conferences led to an agreement of the different opinions.
After these conferences I travelled, together with the Chief of the Operation Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, to middle and northern Finland in order to study the area of Urinsalmo-Kuusamo, the area east of Rovanjemi-Petsamo, the terrain, the possibilities for deployment and billeting, and for operations from that sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local Finnish commanders were present. The trip ended on 28 February in Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish border. In a final conference it was determined that an operation from the area of Kuusamo and Helsinki and an operation from the area east of Rovanjemi in the direction of Basikamo would prove successful; that, on the other hand, the operations from Petsamo towards Rovanjemi would have considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff.
As a result of these discussions there was worked out by the German High Command of Norway a plan of operations for an operation from the Finnish areas. The operational study was presented to the OKW and found its approval. It then received through the High Command of Norway the name of “Blaufuchs.”
In May, that is, on 24 May, I met the Finnish Chief of Staff Heinrichs, who had been invited to the Führer’s headquarters at Brandenburg and flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and his chief of the Operational Department of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, a discussion in preparation for another conference at Salzburg.
On the 25th there was at Salzburg a conference between the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl on the one side, and on the other, Lieutenant General Heinrichs and Colonel Tapola, at which the basic plans for co-operation between German and Finnish troops were laid down.
After this conference I travelled, together with General Heinrichs, to Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the Finnish Army. There were also conferences with the General Staff of the Air Force concerning joint questions of the air war and the reinforcement of the Finnish Air Force with matériel. General Heinrichs, after these discussions, also had a meeting with Generaloberst Halder, in which I did not participate.
For the third time I met the Finnish General Staff on 2 June. In my statement of 26 December I said that this conference took place at the end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a matter of fact, it took place on 2 June.
At these conferences, which again took place between General Heinrichs, General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this collaboration were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization; there it was decided that the Finnish mobilization should first take the form of reinforcement of the border patrols, and then the form of further enlistments for the military training of reservists and reserve officers; a decision was also reached about the deployment and formation of German-Finnish forces in such a way that the main Finnish forces, under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim in the south, should operate together with the German Army Group North, coming from East Prussia, in the direction of Leningrad and also towards the east of Lake Ladoga.
The other Finnish forces were to be under the command of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst north of the Rivers Ulo and Ulojoki. For this army of Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst there were three directions of attack; a southern group from the area of Kuusamo through Kerskienski against the Murmansk railroad; the middle group east of Rovanjemi through Salla Kandalaksha and finally, a northern group starting from around Petsamo against Murmansk. There was complete agreement on all these questions and also there were details discussed about exchange of information, about the use of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives of the Air Force about joint questions of air warfare and about the use of Finnish airports by the German Air Force.
After these discussions I returned to Germany in order to work out their results and put them into action on behalf of Germany. Then again, on 12 or 13 July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of conferring with Lieutenant General Erfurt, who was the German liaison officer with the Finnish Armed Forces. We met General Heinrichs at Helsinki and gave him a memorandum on the points which we had agreed upon in previous conferences. He agreed to these points, except for a minor detail. Then I turned over my duties as liaison officer with the Finnish General Staff to Lieutenant General Erfurt, to take up my activities as Chief of General Staff of the German Army in Lapland.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like to ask you a last question. If it is not too difficult for you, will you please indicate what was the exact character of these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General Staff? More especially, at the planning of these operations was the necessity of defense taken into consideration?
BUSCHENHAGEN: All agreements between the OKW and the Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose from the very beginning the participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish territory in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about that. If the Finnish General Staff, to the outside world, always pointed out that all these measures had only the character of defense measures, that was just camouflage. There was—from the very beginning—no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union, for all the preparations that we made pointed in that same direction, namely, the plans for mobilization; above all, the objectives for the attack. Nobody ever reckoned with the possibility of a Russian attack on Finland.
Since, for cogent military reasons, the operations for attack from Finnish territory could start only 8 to 10 days after the beginning of the attack against Russia, certain security measures were taken during and after the attack, but the whole formation and lining-up of the troops was for offensive and not defensive purposes. I believe you can see sufficiently from that the aggressive character of all these preparations.
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor wish to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do defendants’ counsel wish to cross-examine?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in this Trial a group of people are under indictment with the purpose of declaring them criminals. Included in this group, to state it shortly, are all the commanders-in-chief of the several parts of the Armed Forces.
Have you ever had any knowledge before the beginning of the attack against the Soviet Union that an order came out, according to which the captured commissars had to be executed?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you at any time speak to your commanding general, Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst, concerning this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: What opinion did Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and yourself hold concerning this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: That this was a criminal order.
DR. LATERNSER: Since you had that opinion, I would like to ask you whether, within your army, this order was carried out?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Actually it was not carried out.
DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons was it not carried out? Perhaps because the commander and his chief and you, Witness, were of the opinion that this order should not be carried out or because it would not have been practicable, for, as it is known, the Soviet commissars fought until the last and fell and, in cases where they were captured, their papers, which showed them to be commissars, had already been destroyed?
For what reason was this order not actually carried out?
BUSCHENHAGEN: Firstly, in view of the line taken by Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and myself, comments were added to it before it was passed on, in other words, we let the troops know that inwardly we were not in agreement with it—and we found our commanding generals to show a full understanding. Secondly, because of the reason given by you, because, as a matter of fact, not a single commissar fell into our hands, as far as I can remember.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know any other commanders who had the same attitude as you had with regard to this order?
BUSCHENHAGEN: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you answer “no” because you did not speak to others?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I did not speak to others because in Norway I was so isolated from other armies that I had no opportunity of speaking to others.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, aren’t you of the opinion that the great majority of the commanding generals had the same attitude concerning this order as you and your commanding general?
BUSCHENHAGEN: I cannot answer that because I cannot speak the minds of the others.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions? General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-examination?
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
GEN. ZORYA: This morning I had to stop before reading the testimony of Pantazi, Romania’s former Minister of War, which I intend to present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-154 (Document Number USSR-154). Pantazi describes in detail the preparations of Romania for war. I would ask you to accept this testimony as evidence. You will find it on Page 71 of the document book. I shall now read such extracts of this document as are of interest to us:
“Romania’s preparations for war against the Soviet Union began in November 1940 when, in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Antonescu in Bucharest, regarding Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact, there arrived in Bucharest German military missions, consisting of groups of German officer-instructors; those for the army were headed by General Hansen, those for the Air Force by Major General Speidel.
“With the arrival of the German military missions in Romania, the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, General Joanitiu, acting on the orders of Antonescu, issued an order to the army, regarding the admission of German officer-instructors into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganizing and re-educating the Romanian forces in accordance with the code of regulations of the German Army.
“At the same time, and still acting on Marshal Antonescu’s orders, all reserve officers of the Romanian Army were called up for a course of 2 months of retraining and underwent instruction under German direction.
“During the period of the retraining of officers, the General Staff of the Romanian Army drafted a plan for calling up into the Army 12 age groups due for mobilization in case of war, the training of all these groups to be carried out in accordance with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army, to be completed by 1 July 1941.
“The higher Romanian officers underwent similar retraining in their respective branches of the service.
“In this way, under German leadership and prior to the beginning of the war by Germany and Romania against the Soviet Union, the whole of the Romanian Army and Air Force were reorganized and retrained along German lines.”
I shall omit two paragraphs which are of no importance and I pass to the second paragraph, which you will find on Page 72 in the document book. These are also depositions of Pantazi.
THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you have already presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to think you could omit these details of the preparations made in Romania and go on to the place where you deal with the number of German divisions who deployed on the Romanian frontier.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, this question is of importance. I hesitate at present to point out the exact passage which deals with it—it must be on Page 74 in the document book:
“In this connection the following units which were already mobilized and ready for action against the Soviet Union were, in February 1941, on Marshal Antonescu’s orders, directed to the frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia: The 4th Alpine Rifle Division, the 7th, 8th, and 21st Infantry Divisions, the Infantry Division of the Guards, a cavalry corps and another infantry division whose name I do not recall at present. In addition, 3 German divisions, selected from the 21 German divisions moving to Greece across Romania, were sent to the U.S.S.R. frontier.”
I omit several paragraphs. On Page 73 of your book of documents we find the following extract from Pantazi’s testimony, marked in pencil:
“In accordance with instructions from Marshal Antonescu in May 1941, the following divisions were likewise sent to the frontier: The Frontier Division, the 3rd and 1st Alpine Rifle Divisions, the 13th Infantry Division, and a Panzer division. Concurrently with these divisions the Germans transferred to the U.S.S.R. frontier seven German divisions.
“Consequently, prior to the beginning of the Romanian and German attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the frontier between Romania and the U.S.S.R. 12 Romanian and 10 German divisions, totalling up to 600,000 men.”
Thus the documents which have just been submitted to the Tribunal justify the assertion that Romania’s preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union on the directions received from the staff of the fascist conspirators had begun long before they found expression on paper in Plan Barbarossa. Having attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler’s lackeys expected gratitude from their masters for services rendered. On 27 July 1941 Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing gratitude to him and to his army.
I submit to the Tribunal this letter from Hitler, addressed to Antonescu as Exhibit Number USSR-237 (Document Number USSR-237). Hitler writes in this letter—Page 1 of the Russian translation of the letter, Paragraph 3, Page 74 in the document book presented to the Tribunal:
“To congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success is for me personally as great a happiness as it is a satisfaction easy to understand. The winning back of Bessarabia will be the most natural reward for your effort and those of your gallant troops.”
The promises of the fascist bosses were not limited to Bessarabia alone.
I beg for permission to return to the conversation of 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop. This conversation is set forth in a document which I presented as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document USSR-233). I am now referring to Paragraph 3 of the Russian translation of this document—3rd paragraph from the top of this page—which you will find on Page 61 of the document book. It consists of the following entry made by Antonescu:
“I reminded Herr Von Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by him, he raised his glass to the happiness of a great Romania, to which I replied that we have entered into an alliance with the Axis in order to create a ‘Great Romania.’”
What, then, was this “Great Romania” to represent, to which the Defendant Ribbentrop had raised his glass?
This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-242 (Document USSR-242). This document is one of Antonescu’s letters—a copy of a letter—to Hitler, dated 17 August 1941. I request you to read this document into the record, and I consider it necessary to read Paragraphs 2 and 4 from it, which correspond to Page 2 of the Russian translation in the document book in your possession. The corresponding text is on Page 78. I quote Paragraph 2. Antonescu writes:
“In compliance with the wish of Your Excellency, I take upon myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for maintaining order there, and for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary to delineate a boundary to this territory on the north.”
Paragraph 4 of this letter:
“In order to maintain order and to control the economic exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the continuation of the war, I consider it absolutely necessary that unity of command should be established.
“I therefore beg Your Excellency to give precise instructions defining my rights and responsibilities for the administration and economic exploitation of the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding, the maintenance of order and the security of the whole territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper.
“I beg you, Your Excellency, to accept the best assurances from your devoted Marshal Antonescu.”
Two days after this letter was written Antonescu appointed a governor of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of the “Transnistrian” regions.
I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-295 (Document Number USSR-295), the testimony of this “governor,” George Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by the Red Army, and beg you to accept it as evidence.
Alexianu, giving details of his nomination, testifies as follows—Page 2, Paragraph 2, of the Russian text, Page 79 in the document book which is in your possession. I quote:
“Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance of the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which he offered to annex to Romania the Soviet territories extending from the Dniester to the Dnieper which had been captured by the German troops and to establish there their own occupational authorities.”
On Page 80 of the document book at the top of Page 3 of the Russian text of the testimony, Alexianu states that in the summer of 1942 he was present at the Council of Romanian Ministers at which Marshal Antonescu, referring to the successes of the German and the Romanian armies on the Eastern Front, stated:
“It is now evident for us all that I acted rightly when, as early as November 1940 I came to an agreement with Hitler on the joint attack against the Soviet Union.”
However, the generosity of the fascist Führer, who gave Soviet territories away, right and left, to his vassals, diminished noticeably in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.
I have here before me one of Hitler’s letters to Ion Antonescu, dated 25 October 1943. I beg the Tribunal to accept it as evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-240 (Document Number USSR-240). Something like 2 years and 3 months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Romanian satrap on the seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been worrying over the question of organizing a “unified” administration in Transnistria. Circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now writes—I quote the second paragraph from the top of Page 1, which you will find on Pages 82-83 of your document book:
“My further request concerns the essential exploitation of Transnistria, that as a rear theater of operations for Army Groups A and South it should not be hampered by any formal juridical or economic considerations and difficulties. I must further request you to put at the disposal of the German authorities the entire network of the Transnistrian railways. . . .”
As a poor consolation Hitler adds—Page 82 of the document book:
“All military measures . . . have, as their final aim, the preservation of Transnistria for Romania.”
Then even Antonescu, who had so many times subserviently assured Hitler of his submissiveness, reached the end of his endurance. On 15 November 1943 he wrote a lengthy reply to Hitler. In this letter Antonescu wrote unrestrainedly how he fulfilled the will of his master at the expense of his people.
I present Antonescu’s letter to Hitler as Exhibit Number USSR-239 (Document Number USSR-239). His letter is dated Bucharest, 15 November 1943. I quote, beginning with Paragraph 2 of this letter, towards the end of Page 5 of the Russian text. It is on Page 88 of the document book:
“As to the regime in Transnistria we agree with your Excellency that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in the spirit of a banker the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply, et cetera.
“I should like to begin by explaining the causes of my anxiety.
“I do not know whether the truth about the Romanian participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told you: That this war has cost Romania 300,000 million lei; that during this period we gave Germany more than 8 million tons of oil, thus threatening our own national stocks, as well as the deposits themselves; that we are bearing heavy expenses incurred in supporting the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle.”
Here I omit four paragraphs which have no bearing in the gist of the matter and continue to read on Page 89 of the document book.
“Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transnistrian territory is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Romania. Our only desire is that all be in good order and utilized in the most advantageous manner possible. . . .
“As regards the transfer of the Transnistrian railways into German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg Your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion this transfer is not necessary.
“Transnistrian railways, from 1941 to the present day, functioned well under Romanian administration. They always satisfied German demands and their management was always highly appreciated.”
I request you to turn one page of the document book. I now read an extract from Page 90 of the book:
“If the traffic capacity of the Transnistrian railways cannot still be further increased in pursuance to the generally established joint plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for that fact. Here too we kept our obligations.”
And two paragraphs further on, the same page, the following statement is made:
“I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the measures necessary in order to increase the traffic capacity and to improve the organization.
“As I personally was in charge of the organization of the administration and economics of this region, it would be a great mortification to me if the administration of the railways were to pass to German hands, since one would justly say that our incapacity in this respect was the reason for such measure.”
There came a moment in the relations between the two aggressors when the former harmony, based on the seizure of foreign lands and wealth, gave place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the great financial responsibility for the losses suffered as a result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners.
This is revealed by the following document, captured from the personal archives of Antonescu and which I intend to present to the honorable Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-245 (Document Number USSR-245). I should like to read a quotation from this document, which is lengthy but which is very important in enabling us to realize the relationship between fascist Germany and her satellites. This document is entitled, “General Hansen’s Meeting with Marshal Antonescu on 7 July 1943.”
As Your Honors will no doubt remember, General Hansen was the head of the German Military Mission of the German General Staff in Romania. I shall read into the record excerpts from this document, underlined in red pencil, on Pages 92 and 93 of the document book. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible for you to summarize these documents with reference to Romania? Because you have already drawn our attention to a considerable amount of evidence with reference to Romania’s participation, General Antonescu’s statements and other evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be able to go on then to the question of the Hungarian participation—in Document Number USSR-294. What you are reading us now really shows the extent, no doubt, of the Romanian participation, but it is all after the aggression. I thought, from looking at it, that you could possibly go on to USSR-294.
GEN. ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not detract from the case at all.
GEN. ZORYA: I shall summarize this document in a few sentences, and I shall then pass on to the next document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. ZORYA: The sense of this conversation is interesting insofar as it reveals the shameless bargaining which went on between Hansen and Antonescu. The objects of this bargaining were money, war supplies, and human lives. Antonescu, who was beginning to feel the disadvantage of the absence of any kind of proper agreement with Germany, insisted that all subsequent dealings, whether of a material or any other nature, be subjected to appropriate official agreements. He demanded from Germany the delivery of various war supplies either of a technical or, in last analysis, of a monetary nature. And when General Hansen said that Germany had no lei, Antonescu replied, “If you have no lei, give us at least arms and equipment.” That is how the document describes the policy pursued by fascist Germany for extracting the most varied resources from her vassals.
Now, I should like to touch briefly upon certain methods of foreign policy which the Hitlerites used in dealing with their vassals. I should like to dwell on the policy pursued by the Hitlerite conspirators in regard to the question of Transylvania. Holding out the question of Transylvania as bait, the Hitlerite conspirators forced their Hungarian and Romanian vassals to work out their own promotion.
I submit, as Document Number USSR-294, the depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, a former Generaloberst of the Hungarian Army.
Prior to May 1941, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger held important posts in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, prior to September 1942 he commanded an army corps, after which he became Deputy War Minister of Hungary.
Now, I should like to read the deposition of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, concerning the Transylvanian question. The passages which I should like to read into the record are on Page 3 and on the top of Page 4 of the Russian text, which corresponds to Pages 102 and 103 of the document book:
“The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty assumed the form of a decision which was of little profit to Hungary. The district of Megyes-Kissármés, where natural oil could be obtained, was reserved for Romania. In Hungarian political and military circles this was interpreted in such a way that in the Second Vienna Arbitration Treaty Hitler thought himself in alliance with Romania in the war against Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Romania a more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would undoubtedly need Romania’s southern wing which extends to the Black Sea.
“In an official conversation which took place towards November 1940 the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me the following:
“‘The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty has aroused bitter envy of Romania in Hungary, and it is up to us to obtain advantages from Hitler.’”
I would remind you that Antonescu, in his testimony, presented to the Tribunal earlier in the day, said, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler:
“In November 1941 Hitler told me that the final word had not been spoken in the Vienna Arbitration Treaty, thereby giving me to understand that Romania could still count upon a revision of the decision previously adopted on the question of Transylvania.”
However, soon after, while visiting Budapest, the Defendant Ribbentrop expressed an entirely opposite point of view.
I shall present to the Tribunal three documents which illustrate the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Göring under these circumstances. I submit in evidence Exhibit Number USSR-235 (Document Number USSR-235), containing the minutes of one of the subsequent conversations between Antonescu and Hitler, which took place on 3 April 1942. This document will be found on Pages 113-116 of the document book. I shall read some excerpts from this document, on Page 3 of the Russian translation, which corresponds to Page 113 in the document book. I quote:
“I”—Antonescu—“reminded him”—Hitler—“that the Hungarian statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the press after Ribbentrop’s visit to Budapest that should they intervene”—that is, should they send their troops—“Transylvania is to remain Hungarian; such rumors circulate, and they greatly demoralize the Romanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor that such promises had not been made and could not have been made, and that this does not correspond to actual facts.”
In this way Hitler juggled with promises to encourage his satellites.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
GEN. ZORYA: The next document, which I am submitting to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-183 (Document Number USSR-183), concerns the Transylvanian question and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of a conference between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which took place at the frontier on 10 February 1942. I am asking the Tribunal to accept this record as evidence. This document, taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu, was captured by the advancing Red Army. I do not consider it necessary to read the entire document into the record, and I shall merely confine myself to a few excerpts. Will you please open your document book on Page 116, where there is a record of the conference between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg of 10 February 1942. I quote:
“He openly introduced the subject of the Order of Charles the First which Herr Von Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through various German official channels in our country, as well as through the Romanian officials accredited to the German Government.”
I pass to the next page, Page 117 of the document book. I quote:
“I told Herr Von Dörnberg that I would not be able to grant this award until Herr Von Ribbentrop, at the very first opportunity, made a public declaration also to Romania, a declaration which would bolster up the faith of the Romanian people in their struggle for the cause of justice and for their legitimate claims in the Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant him this award on condition that it be made public only after he had made this declaration.
“Herr Von Dörnberg asked for time to reflect on the matter.
“Next day, before entering the railway coach, he asked me to hand him the decoration, telling me that Von Ribbentrop wanted it and requesting me not to divulge our conversation to Ribbentrop, since he now promised to make the award public only upon the fulfillment of my conditions. On this condition I gave him the decoration, without the appropriate certificate.”
Thus Ribbentrop was prepared to disclaim his Budapest statement on receipt of the Romanian order.
I have also at my disposal a record of a conference between Antonescu and Göring. Will you kindly turn to Page 118 of the document book. Unfortunately, this document, discovered together with other documents in Antonescu’s personal files, previously mentioned by me, is undated. We submit this document as found. I present it as Exhibit Number USSR-238 (Document USSR-238), and I am reading one excerpt only. I quote:
“During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshal Göring was very reticent on the problem of Transylvania. On the way, in the car, he said to the Marshal”—that is to Antonescu:
“‘After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania, which is actually more German than Romanian or Hungarian.’”
We may, presumably, agree that on this occasion Göring had expressed the viewpoint of the fascist conspirators on the problem of Transylvania with a sufficient degree of truthfulness.
With a view to concluding the clarification of Germany’s mutual relations with her vassal, Romania, I should like to emphasize the subject of crude oil. In this field, Romania was one of Germany’s principal suppliers.
Both before and during the war the Hitlerites extracted oil from Romania by all possible means. Antonescu, by the way, refers to this in one of his letters which has already been read into the record. I shall now submit two documents which sufficiently prove how important this question was to Germany, and how significant it was considered by the Hitlerites themselves. As Exhibit Number USSR-244 (Document Number USSR-244), I present an urgent telegram from the Defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonescu and received by the latter on 31 October 1942. I shall not explain in detail how this document was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu, in the same way as the previous one. I now read this telegram into the record and would ask you to accept it as evidence—to be found on Page 119 of the document book:
“Telegram to the German Mission for direct transmission to Marshal Antonescu.
“Herr Marshal! In the name of the Führer I approach Your Excellency with a request for your personal intervention in the matter of accelerating, as far as possible, the delivery of the maximum possible quantity of fuel to the Italian Fleet, which is absolutely essential to the latter for the continuance of military operations in the Mediterranean.
“The absence and lack of all means of transport for further operations have resulted in a critical situation in North Africa, and the transport of supplies depends entirely on the delivery of adequate quantities of fuel.
“I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum degree those deliveries of fuel to Italy, which are exclusively reserved for supplying the fleet called upon to maintain important positions in the Mediterranean for the purpose of the joint warfare.
“I have chosen this method of direct appeal to you because I am sure that your personal intervention will result in the assistance required.
“Yours in comradely esteem, signed Keitel, Field Marshal.”
Allow me now to submit the telegram which Antonescu sent in reply to Keitel. Please turn to Page 120 of the document book, Exhibit Number USSR-244(a), (Document Number USSR-244(a)).
THE PRESIDENT: Could you summarize the contents of this document.
GEN. ZORYA: I can summarize the contents of that telegram in two sentences. In reply to the Defendant Keitel’s tearful appeal to increase to the maximum degree the fuel supplies, Antonescu replied, in a wire addressed to Keitel, that he would meet his engagements in full, but that the supplies previously requested by the German officials had already been delivered and that it was impossible to send any more. If something could eventually be saved from the quantities used inside Romania then perhaps, somehow or other, Romania might be able to help her allies. On the whole, Antonescu begged General Keitel to accept his expressions of regard and high esteem, but would not give him any more oil.
Allow me to remind you, Your Honors, that in October and November 1942 Rommel’s fate was being decided in North Africa, and that at the same time the Red Army was barring Germany’s advance on the Grozny and Baku oil fields on the borders of Mozdok. It is obvious that the Germans lacked sufficient quantities of crude oil.
I shall read one extract from the minutes of a conversation which took place on 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop, which has not, as yet, been read into the record. I have previously submitted to the Tribunal the record of this conversation as Exhibit Number USSR-233. I ask you to turn to the end of Page 51 and to Page 52 of the document book, which corresponds to Page 4 of the Russian text. There you will find the following lines. In reply to Ribbentrop’s question on the subject of crude oil, Antonescu stated:
“As for crude oil, Romania has contributed the maximum which it was in her power to contribute; she can give no more. The only way out of the situation would be to seize territories rich in oil.”
We should note here that Antonescu was not at all original in his idea of seizing other people’s territories, rich in oil.
I am asking Your Honors to refer to Pages 121-129 of the document book. There is one document taken from the private office of the Defendant Rosenberg, which is entitled, “About the Organization of the Caucasus.” I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document Number USSR-58), and I would ask you to accept it as evidence. In July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg formulated the German opinion on this question—Page 122 of the document book as follows:
“Germany is interested in creating a stable position in the entire Caucasus in order to secure the safety of continental Europe, that is, to safeguard for herself the link with the Near East. It is only this link with the oil fields that can make Germany and the rest of Europe independent, in the future, of any coalition of maritime powers. The aim of German policy is to control the Caucasus and the adjoining lands to the south, both politically and militarily.”
Will you please turn to Page 124 of the document book as well as to Page 4 of the Russian text of the document from which I am quoting. The same idea is formulated there by the Defendant Rosenberg with extreme clarity. I quote, “Economically, the German Reich must take all oil into its hands.”
Your Honors, I shall not dwell in detail on the relations between the fascist conspirators and their other satellite, Finland, inasmuch as the witness, Buschenhagen, offered sufficiently conclusive evidence on this question; and the Tribunal has probably already got some definite ideas on the subject. I just want to remind the Tribunal that according to Paragraph 3, Section 2, of Plan Barbarossa, Finland was to cover the advance of the German landing of Group North, consisting of units of the 21st Group, which was due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate jointly with that group. According to Plan Barbarossa, the liquidation of the Russian forces at Hangö was also assigned to Finland.
I would also like to remind the Tribunal that Section 2 of the temporary Plan Barbarossa, which has been presented to the Tribunal by the American Prosecution as Document Number C-39, mentions Finland’s participation in the war; as I have already reported to the Tribunal, the following sentence is to be found in this section, which corresponds to Page 52 of the document book. “The preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May.”
I should also like to invite your attention to the following paragraph of the same document, Page 58 of the document book:
“Provision has been made for transportation from the Reich to Norway of one security division and 18 artillery battalions, and for transportation to Finland of one reinforced infantry division complete with army corps units. Of the units, one infantry division, two mountain divisions and the SS Group North are designated for Case Silver Fox.
“It has been planned, on the outbreak of military operations, to bring by rail, through Sweden, a further division for the attack on Hangö.”
I consider that I am now justified in stating that the date of 25 May 1941, indicated in the temporary Plan Barbarossa as the date on which the negotiations with the Finnish General Staff were opened, was incorrect. The indication of this date, which did not correspond to reality, was an attempt to disguise the preparations for aggression, presenting them to the outside world as preparations for a so-called preventive war.
In addition to the testimony of the witness, Buschenhagen, already given to the Tribunal, I shall now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-229 (Document Number USSR-229), the depositions of a former colonel of the German Army, Kitchmann, which I beg you to accept as evidence.
Kitchmann held the office of military attaché in the German Embassy at Helsinki since 1 October 1941. You will find this testimony on Page 130 of the document book. I shall read a very short extract therefrom into the record:
“A long time before 22 June 1941, the German Government and the High Command of the German Armed Forces jointly carried out secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General Staff of the Finnish Army and prepared the attack on the Soviet Union. I learned about the preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union by the German and Finnish Armies under the following circumstances: On my arrival at Helsinki in October 1941, as acting German military attaché, I had numerous conversations with Major Von Albedill, the aide of the German military attaché who formerly served in the Military Attaché’s Department in the OKH, General Staff of the Army.
“Albedill acquainted me with the situation in Finland and its military and political background, since Major General Rössing, the military attaché, was seriously ill and receiving treatment at the health resort of Merano in the Tyrol. In the course of these conversations Albedill told me that already in September 1940, Major General Rössing, acting on an order of Hitler and of the German General Staff, had organized the visit of Major General Taloela, Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the Führer’s headquarters in Berlin. During this visit an agreement was reached between the German and Finnish General Staffs for joint preparations for the attack and for warfare against the Soviet Union.
“In this connection General Taloela told me, during a conference at his staff headquarters in Aunus in November 1941, that he, acting on Marshal Mannerheim’s personal orders, had—as far back as September 1940—been one of the first to contact the German High Command with a view to joint preparation for a German and Finnish attack on the Soviet Union.”
I ask your permission to conclude herewith the presentation of the documents concerning the relations between fascist Germany and her satellite, Finland, since—I repeat—Buschenhagen’s testimony has relieved me of this necessity.
I should like to make one brief résumé:
Buschenhagen’s testimony disposes of all attempts to assert that the war waged by Finland was a separate war and was disassociated from the war aims of fascist Germany. Finland’s entry into the war had been envisaged in the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded to the aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers. The Finns, like the other satellites of Germany, waged war in the hope of gaining whole regions and republics of the Soviet Union.
At the conference of 16 July 1941 Hitler spoke of the Finnish claims to Eastern Karelia, the Leningrad region, and the city of Leningrad. In proof of this fact I refer to Document Number L-221 presented by the United States Prosecution. The extracts quoted from this document will be found on the corresponding page of the document book, Page 141.
Romania and Finland were two German satellites discussed in full detail in Plan Barbarossa. The part these countries played in the plans of German fascism was determined not only by the desire to utilize their war potential—which without doubt was of some importance—but also by their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the Soviet Union.
The documents presented to the Tribunal bear witness to the fact that the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for attack against the U.S.S.R. had been carefully plotted by the fascist conspirators, in the same way as were all the preparations connected with Plan Barbarossa.
The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in Plan Barbarossa. However, this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the fascist conspirators.
I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus—although he has already testified before the Tribunal—which formulates very clearly. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You aren’t going to give us Paulus’ affidavit over again, are you? We have already had Paulus’ evidence in full.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I have already mentioned that this is on Page 182. It is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy of this record may be produced before the Tribunal now and, furthermore, it is on Page 143 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual oral evidence; we don’t want his interrogation.
GEN. ZORYA: But I really need one particular paragraph of his testimony in order to show the connection between the subsequent documents relating to Hungary and the contents of my statement. It is just a few lines.
THE PRESIDENT: It must surely be cumulative, is it not?
GEN. ZORYA: That which was presented to the Tribunal, I could express in my own words, in two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus has already said?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes. Do forgive me! I have just been told that Colonel Pokrovsky has already read that extract into the record. I shall therefore merely give a very brief summary of the extract and then pass on to a further subject and shall not repeat myself.
I have in mind, on the one hand, those paragraphs of Paulus’ affidavit which state that the leading factor of Hungary’s policy was the full recognition of Germany’s leading rule and that it was determined by two basic factors, that is, the aspiration to territorial conquests with the help of Germany and the fear of the growing power of Romania as Germany’s ally; and, on the other hand, I have in mind that passage where Paulus states that Hitler was far more prudent in disclosing his plans to Hungary than to the other satellites, because he considered the Hungarians as garrulous. It is true that Paulus immediately adds, on Page 2 of his affidavit, that:
“The essential reason was Hitler’s unwillingness to give Hungary a chance of seizing the oil fields in the Russian oil district of Dragovitch.”
Following the opening of the offensive against the Soviet Union, the Supreme Command of the Army, the OKH, issued an order to the 17th Army to seize Dragovitch prior to the arrival of the Hungarians.
Further, Paulus describes the circumstances of his negotiations with the Hungarians regarding armament supplies. This—all this—has already been mentioned by Colonel Pokrovsky. I wish only to refer to the fact that this testimony of Paulus’ has undoubtedly lifted a corner of the veil of mystery shrouding the mutual relations between the German and Hungarian aggressors.
In this connection, I consider it imperative to return to the depositions by Ruszkiczay-Ruediger which are already at the disposal of the Tribunal. This document has been presented as Exhibit Number USSR-294.
Touching on the occupation by Hungary of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1939, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger testified—see Page 2, Paragraph 3 of the Russian text of the depositions which can be found on Page 101 of the document book. I quote the following—the quotation is underlined:
“This took place not long before the outbreak of the German-Polish war. It then appeared as if economic advantages and a new liberation from the Trianon Treaty were, for Hungary, the primary objectives.
“But from the time when the region of the Transcarpathian Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia, we began to attach a perfectly different significance to this region by military preparations concerning this area. It was clear to us, the high-ranking officers, that the political leadership both of Germany and Hungary also considered this region strategically important for future military operations against Soviet Russia.”
On Page 9, Paragraph 2 from the bottom, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger tells us of a conference which took place at the end of March 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Bartha, outlined the objectives of the war with Yugoslavia. Among these objectives Bartha pointed directly to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a possible ally of the Soviet Union.
However, a more complete picture of Germano-Hungarian relations, which were determined by the preparation of an attack against the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major General, Esteban Ujszaszy. From 1 May 1939 to 1 July 1942, Ujszaszy was Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years, he had inside information on the secrets which shrouded this preparation. Some of the things which he knew, he communicated to us in the document which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-155 (Document Number USSR-155). I ask you to accept this document as evidence.
I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy’s statement which may clarify the question at issue. Beginning from Page 2 of the Russian text—this corresponds to Page 149 of the document book—we find Section 2 entitled, “Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War against Soviet Russia.” Paragraph 1 of this section is devoted to “Halder’s letters.” I quote:
“In November 1940 the German military attaché in Budapest, Colonel Günther Krappe of the German General Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, Henry Werth. Krappe brought a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, Generaloberst Halder.
“In that letter Halder informed Werth that in the spring of 1941, ‘Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if necessary by force of arms, to adopt a definite position in order to exclude, at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear. In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to participate if only in her own interests.’”
Werth replied that he agreed with Halder’s concept but drew attention to the lack of equipment in the Hungarian Army, which, at that time, was not ready for war against Soviet Russia. His request, on the whole, was for the completion, by Germany, of Hungary’s armaments. He was informed of Halder’s letter and Werth’s reply thereto, by General Werth in person. After that a Hungarian armament commission was invited to Berlin. It consisted of officer-specialists from the Main Ordinance Supply Division of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defense, and in December 1940 the commission left for Berlin. The Hungarian requests were as follows. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: General, couldn’t you pass on to December 1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defense to come to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I am passing on to this paragraph:
“In December 1940, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed forces (OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, invited the Hungarian Minister of Home Defense, General Carl Bartha, to come to Berlin in order to: a) discuss personally the problem of armaments; b) elaborate a plan of military and political collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of 1941.
“This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal Hungarian Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel in the General Staff Alexander Homlok. At the same time, I received a similar invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Foreign and Defense Sections of the OKW.”
I omit a long list given by Ujszaszy of persons who accompanied Bartha on his trip, and I read further from Page 151 of the document book:
“The information which we received follows:
“In the spring of 1941 the position of Yugoslavia will be clarified, the menace of a Russian Soviet attack in the rear eliminated. . . . For this purpose the Hungarian Honved Army, reinforced by the delivery of 10-centimeter field howitzers and with up-to-date tanks for a ‘Mobile Brigade’ will be ready for action. For the war against Russia, Hungary must make available 15 operational units (including 3 mobilized, cavalry, and Panzer units); she must also complete, by 1 June 1941, the erection of fortifications in Transcarpathian Russia, assist the advance of the German troops in the area adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers and facilitate the deployment and the passage of supplies for the troops through Hungary. The details for the operational preparation will be determined later by representatives of the German General Staff about to be sent to Hungary. As a political compensation for her participation, Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Soviet Russia (the ancient Principality of Halicz) and the land at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, up to the River Dniester.”
In March 1941 Eberhard Kienzl, a colonel of the German General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final arrangements about the question of attack on Yugoslavia.
This is what Ujszaszy has to say on the matter—Page 5 of the Russian text, Paragraph 3, from the bottom of Page 152 of the document book:
“The Colonel of the German General Staff, Eberhard Kienzl, detachment Foreign Armies East in the OKH (High Command of the Army), arrived in Budapest in March 1941 bringing with him a letter from Generaloberst Halder to Generaloberst Werth. This letter contained an insistent request on the part of Germany that Hungary should participate in the possible war against Yugoslavia by mobilizing the following army corps: I. Budapest, II. Szekesfeherwar, III. Szombathely, IV. Pecs, V. Szeged, and in the war against Soviet Russia by mobilizing 15 operational units, including 1 cavalry division, 2 mechanized brigades, and 1 mountain (rifle) brigade.
“The letter announced the imminent arrival in Budapest of a German delegation, headed by Lieutenant General Paulus, for discussing combined operations and the deployment of German troops against Yugoslavia through Hungarian territory.
“In reply to this letter General Werth issued an invitation to the German commission, held out prospects of Hungary’s participation in the war against Yugoslavia and of producing, for this purpose, 3 army corps, that is, the 1st, 4th, and 5th.
“Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in principle, promising at least to mobilize the 8th Army Corps (Kressikosice) as well as the mechanized operation units demanded by Halder.
“I was informed personally about this exchange of correspondence by Colonel of the German General Staff, Kienzl.”
THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I cannot see that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal whether Hungary was going to put one army corps, or two army corps, or three army corps against the Russians. It was absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we are to believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December 1940, was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany’s disposal, for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units?
It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely cumulative. It doesn’t add anything in the least to what you have already given us, and you could go on to the next document, which is Number USSR-150 (Exhibit Number USSR-150). Everything up to there is simply the negotiations between members of the German and Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the Hungarian Army were to be used.
GEN. ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that the presentation of the documents on this question should be restricted.
THE PRESIDENT: The next one is 150?
GEN. ZORYA: The Ujszaszy document contains certain information pertaining not only to the number of units pledged by Hungary to Germany in case of war with the Soviet Union; but there is, for example, an indication as to what methods in the preparation for war were being used by the fascist clique in Hungary, in agreement with the Hitlerite conspirators. I consider it imperative to dwell on these methods, and that is why I request your permission to quote certain passages in this document.
What I now have in mind, for instance, is the falsification of the information regarding the number of Soviet units concentrated on the Hungarian-Russian border.
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on.
GEN. ZORYA: Page 155 of the document book reads as follows:
“My immediate superior, General Laszlo, as chief of the operational group ordered the second section of the General Staff to prepare a situation report according to which 14 Soviet Russian operational units were concentrated on the Hungarian border, including 8 motorized units. This situation report was prepared by Colonel Cornel Hidai, of Intelligence.
“I should like to point out that according to subsequent explanations supplied by the second section of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, there were only four Soviet operational units actually concentrated on the Hungarian border. This circumstance I truthfully reported to Generaloberst Werth and General Laszlo, but the latter altered my truthful, objective report in accordance with his wishes.”
Further, Ujszaszy speaks of plans for provocation drawn up by the militarist clique in Hungary for the purpose of creating incidents abroad to justify an attack on the Soviet Union. Ujszaszy states—Page 10, Line 4 from the top of the document, Page 157 of the document book:
“These plans emanated from Lieutenant General Fütterer, from his assistant Lieutenant Colonel Frimond, and from General Laszlo. They proposed that, if necessary, German aircraft, camouflaged as Russian planes, should bomb the eastern border districts of Hungary, with bombs of Soviet Russian origin.”
And finally, Ujszaszy describes the events of the few days preceding the attack on the Soviet Union—this is Page 11 of the document, Page 158 of the document book:
“On 24 June 1941 (if I remember correctly), at 12:30 noon, I was informed that Soviet Russian planes were bombing Raho in Carpathian Russia and firing on trains in the vicinity with machine gun fire. On the same afternoon news reached us that Soviet Russian planes were bombing Kassá (Košice). The Crown Council, with the Regent in the chair, met on the same evening and, on the strength of Soviet Russia’s provocation, decided to declare war on that country. I am convinced that the bombarding was carried out by German planes with Russian markings. My conclusion was based on the following facts:
“a) Lieutenant General Fütterer and the German propaganda machine publicized this bombing on a very vast scale.
“b) Lieutenant General Laszlo immediately gave me orders, through the Propaganda Subsection of Section 2 of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, to obtain photographs of such fragments of the ‘Soviet Russian bombs’ as could still be found and to publish these photographs in the press of the fascist countries.
“c) Lieutenant General Fütterer, General Laszlo, and Lieutenant General Frimond spread, by a whispering campaign, the rumor that Slovakian pilots in Russian service had bombed Kassá (Košice). The excellence of the hits was explained by the fact that these pilots were well acquainted with the terrain.”
This happened, according to Ujszaszy, on 24 June 1941, at 12:30 p.m. We have a document that establishes the fact that long before this date the participation of Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union had been decided. The document presented to the Tribunal and which contains the depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger explains the reasons for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be that Ruszkiczay-Ruediger’s viewpoint is not shared by everybody, but still, as it is the testimony of the Hungarian Deputy Minister of War, this statement can, of course, not be devoid of interest.
On Page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger states that towards the end of May 1941 he received an order to supply, first of all, the troops concentrated in the Transcarpathian Ukraine; 2 days afterwards a secret meeting of the army corps commanders took place at the headquarters of General Werth, Chief of the General Staff, at which the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was announced.
I quote from the testimony of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger—Page 108 of the document book and Page 9 of the document itself. I am only quoting the passages underlined, in order to save time. I quote:
“. . . General of the Infantry Werth gave us an account of the military and political situation.
“It appears that an attack against the Soviet Union by Germany is forthcoming, in which Romania and Hungary will take an active part on the side of Germany.”
Ruszkiczay-Ruediger further points out that:
“The decision to declare war was taken by the Council of Ministers, after Premier Bardossy and Minister Bartha had made their reports, and was ratified by the Crown Council. The question was not submitted to Parliament. “These decisions of the Council of Ministers and the Crown Council caused no surprise at all, and were the result of the voluntary military collaboration with Germany which had actually existed for many years past.
“The Hungarian General Staff and the political leaders of Hungary as from the beginning of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as their mainstay in their plans of revision. Afterwards followed the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine and the strategic organization of this region as a military base in preparation for an attack on Soviet Russia.”
Ujszaszy, in his report, mentioned the German military attaché in Budapest, Krappe. The former Lieutenant General of the German Army, Günther Krappe, was the German military attaché in Budapest from November 1939 to 30 April 1941. After that, Krappe commanded the 10th Corps of SS troops of the Army Group “Vistula,” and was captured by Red Army units.
I request the Tribunal to accept in evidence a statement made by Krappe in January of this year and presented as Exhibit Number USSR-150 (Document Number USSR-150). It should be noted that the main circumstances mentioned in Krappe’s statement coincide with those on Ujszaszy’s report. I shall therefore read only a few excerpts from Page 4 of Krappe’s document, corresponding to Page 165 of the document book:
“In October 1940 I was ordered by the OKH to report on the conditions of fortifications in the region bordering Russia, that is, in the Carpathian Ukraine. The Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel Laszlo, informed me that, so far, there were only simple antitank obstacles in existence, varying in depth from 1 to 2 kilometers and that the construction of barracks for quartering troops had just begun. The necessary surveys for building concrete pillboxes along the border and the highways would be made during the winter and in the spring of 1941 it would be possible to proceed with the actual construction. It appeared to be a question of raising some 6 million pengö.
“General Werth gave me permission to make an automobile trip through Munkac to Urzok Pass. . . .
“I communicated the results of the inspection trip and of the information obtained from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin. Some time later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary sums for the building of these fortifications had already been allotted.”
In order to save time, Your Honors, I shall briefly expose the remaining part of Krappe’s testimony. An agreement was reached with the War Minister, Von Bartha, to organize war communications and war transports of the German Army in Hungary. In connection with this a special organization therefore arrived which was entrusted with these transports. At the same time, Your Honors, permission was received to establish jointly with the postal services, a special communication system for military needs, and, furthermore, a number of German officers were attached to the Hungarian Army for the interchange of experiences and instruction of the troops. Krappe states that as from December 1940, Hungarian industry was reorganized and worked for the increase of the German military potential. General Leeb, the Chief of the Armament Department, was in charge.
In concluding the presentation of documents concerning the setting up of an aggressive bloc against the Soviet Union by the fascist war criminals, I consider it necessary to make a few comments of a general nature as derived from these documents.
The fascist conspirators began to adopt immediate measures for securing the participation of Romania, Finland, and Hungary in the preparation for the predatory attack on the Soviet Union at least as early as September 1940, when a military mission was sent to Romania.
The negotiations concerning the military preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union, in each of these countries, were mainly concluded during the period September-December 1940. The negotiations were conducted by the general staffs of the German and the satellite armies. The subject of the negotiations in each case was of a purely military character, such as the retraining of the troops, the transportation of military units, the coordination of strategic plans, the deciding on the number of divisions needed to attack the Soviet Union, et cetera.
Such character of negotiations testifies to the fact that there existed between the fascist Government of Germany and the Governments of Romania, Finland, and Hungary, a preliminary agreement with regard to aggression against the Soviet Union even before the negotiations began.
And, finally, the documents submitted reveal that to each of these countries, one way or the other, the fascist conspirators had promised some territory belonging to the Soviet Union.
I should like to point out one more circumstance.
In order fully to grasp the consequences of the predatory fascist attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, it is not enough to confine ourselves to Plan Barbarossa. This is a strategic plan, a plan for military attack, a plan for the beginning of aggression.
And close on the heels of the attack followed, as it is well known, the so-called “assimilation” and “organization” of the occupied territories. The plans for the “assimilation” and “organization,” which were plans for the extermination of the peaceful civilian population and the plundering of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, were also prepared in advance, in the same way as Plan Barbarossa.
The Soviet Prosecution declares that the documents at the disposal of the Tribunal, and especially such documents as the directive of 13 March 1941 (Document Number 447-PS), signed by the Defendant Keitel; the order for the application of military jurisdiction, dated 15 May 1941 (Document Number C-50), also signed by Keitel; the propaganda directive for Plan Barbarossa (Document Number C-26); and others, testify to the destruction not only of legal but of all moral standards of behavior by the hordes of the fascist usurpers on the temporarily occupied Soviet territories, this destruction having been premeditated and planned long before the attack on the Soviet Union.
Even before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites had decided and outlined in appropriate paragraphs of these instructions, directions, and orders, the terroristic methods for dealing with the civilian population and the measures and means for plundering the land of the Soviet Union and reducing it to a colony of the Third Reich. And when war did break out and the whole secret was laid bare, the fascists did not hesitate to publish all these plans in their press.
I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-59 (Document Number USSR-59), an article, published on 20 August 1942, in Das Schwarze Korps, an SS paper and organ of the Reich Führer of the SS. This article, entitled, “Should We Germanize?”—Page 180 of the document book—states openly:
“The Reich Führer of the SS chose the following slogan for one of the editions of the newspaper Deutsche Arbeit, devoted to the problems of resettlement in the East:
“Our duty in the East is not Germanization in the former sense of the term, that is, imposing the German language and the German laws upon the population, but to ensure that only people of pure German blood should inhabit the East.”
This negation of Germanization is not new. However, falling from the lips of the Reich Führer of the SS, acting as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of the Volkstum, it becomes an order. Such is the exact meaning of these words.
The rejection of the idea of germanizing the population of the occupied territories, and the assertion that the East should be inhabited only by people of pure German blood, signified, in practice, the mass extermination of Soviet citizens, their spoliation and their deportation to slave labor, the annihilation of centuries of Russian culture, and the destruction of our cities and villages. I shall confine myself to what I have just said, as the same theme, or rather themes, have already been elaborated and will be presented to the Tribunal by my colleagues.
On 22 June 1941, after prolonged preparations, the German fascist hordes hurled themselves on the Soviet Union. One hundred and seventy divisions, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, started the invasion.
The military problems connected with the attack were formulated in Plan Barbarossa:
“The German Army should be ready, even prior to the end of the war with England, to defeat Soviet Russia by operating with lightning speed.
“To this end the Army will have to utilize all units at its disposal, with the sole reservation that the territories occupied must be adequately protected against all unexpected eventualities.”
Plan Barbarossa foresaw the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of cutting off the possible retreat towards the interior of all Red Army units still fit for battle and of permitting the German fascist invaders speedily to reach a line of combat which would place the land of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force.
As an ultimate aim, Plan Barbarossa provided for the strengthening of the Astrakhan-Archangel line, the destruction by bombardment of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and finally, the capture of Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?
[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FIFTY-EIGHTH DAY Wednesday, 13 February 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: Please continue.
GEN. ZORYA: Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dwelt on the fact that Plan Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of excluding the possibility of a retreat into the interior of such Red Army units as were still capable of fighting, and of obtaining, by rapid action, a combat line for the German-fascist invaders which would place the regions of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. The final aim, according to Plan Barbarossa, was fortification of the Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt and, as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow.
The political aims which determined the military plans were formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly at the meeting in Hitler’s headquarters on 16 July 1941. This document was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number L-221. You will find it on Page 141 of the document book. At this meeting Hitler, Göring, Rosenberg, Keitel, and other fascist conspirators were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union.
The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, the Bialystok Forests and the Kola Peninsula, were declared as “annexed” to Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Romania, while Finland was to acquire Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad region.
As you well know, Your Honors, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent their real piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting at general headquarters, on 16 July 1941, Hitler, for instance, said that it was most important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, when offering reasons for their actions, to ascribe them primarily to tactical intentions.
The Defendant Rosenberg stated, 20 June 1941, at a conference on the Eastern question—a record of which was presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number 1058-PS—that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when one slogan or another could be given publicity. This particular excerpt from Rosenberg’s declaration you will find on Page 17 of the Russian text of the document, which corresponds to Page 201 in the document book.
Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of value for our investigation to refer to some statements by the fascist war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible to make public some of their political aims. In 1941-42 the fascist hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union on an extensive scale and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the Volga. The specter of a “Greater Germany” ruling the world appeared as a beacon before the eyes of the Hitlerite conspirators. It would appear that the opportunity had arrived about which Defendant Rosenberg spoke when, from the standpoint of the fascist criminals, it was possible that “certain political slogans could be made public.”
I presented to the Tribunal, under Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document Number USSR-58), a document from the archives of the Defendant Rosenberg’s office relating to questions of German policy in the occupied regions of the Caucasus. Once again I ask you to refer to this document. I turn to Page 203 in the document book and Page 9 of the Russian text, which is the translation of this document.
Rosenberg, on 27 July 1942, solved the Eastern problem in this fashion, and I quote:
“The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely conceived military frontiers for Germany. The Ukrainian problem consists in securing food supplies for Germany and Europe and supplies of raw materials for the Continent.
“The problem of the Caucasus is primarily a political task, and its solution means the expansion of continental Europe, under German leadership, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East.”
On 27 November 1941 the Defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the international situation. The text of this report was published in Number 329-A of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt. I present this report as Exhibit Number USSR-347 (Document Number USSR-347).
Ribbentrop said in this report:
“I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of Soviet Russia and of the occupation of the far greater part of European Russia in 1941, as follows:
“First, from a military point of view, England’s last ally on the Continent has thereby ceased to exist as a significant factor. Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become unassailable in Europe. And powerful forces will be released.
“Second, in the economic field the Axis powers, together with their friends, which means the whole of Europe, have achieved independence from countries overseas. Europe has once and for all been freed from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw materials of European Russia can fully cover the needs of Europe. Its war production will serve Germany’s war economy and that of her allies, as a result of which Europe’s war potential will increase, and increase more powerfully. The organization of this gigantic area is already in full swing.
“Thus, the last two decisive prerequisites for the victory of the Axis and its allies over England have been created.”
I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same subject. It is Goebbels’ speech in Munich, published on 19 October 1942 in the main organ of the Nazi Party, the Völkischer Beobachter, South German edition. The text of this speech is presented to the Military Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-250 (Document Number USSR-250). That is on Page 205 in the document book. In his address Goebbels said:
“Over and above that, we have captured the most important grain, coal, and iron ore producing regions of the Soviet Union. What the enemy has lost we now possess. And since what the enemy lacks has come to us, it is, according to Adam Riese, of double value. While in the past we were a people without space, this is today no longer the case. Today we have only to give a shape to this space conquered by our soldiers, to organize it, and render it useful to us; and this requires a certain period of time. But if the English were to contend that we have lost the war because we have lost time, then this contention will only prove how completely they have misunderstood the entire situation. Time only works against those who have no space and no raw materials. If we make use of our time to organize the space we have conquered, then time will work not against us, but for us.”
Your Honors, that which Goebbels, the Defendants Ribbentrop, and Rosenberg said about exploiting the space captured by the soldiers, took on, at the OKW, the shape of plans for further aggression.
In this respect the following document—which I now submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336 (Document Number USSR-336)—is of interest and I ask you to accept this as evidence. This document is a letter from the Staff of the German Navy to the commanding generals of Groups West, North, and South. This document was discovered in German archives by the Allied troops. The letter, which you will find on Page 209 in the document book, is entitled, “Objectives for the Further Conduct of War upon the Termination of the Campaign in the East.” It is numbered 1385/41 and is dated 8 August 1941.
In those days the fascist conspirators considered that victory over the Soviet Union was really only a question of time; and they, therefore, planned for further aggression. This letter which I am about to quote begins with the following words:
“The Naval Operations Staff has just received the draft about further intentions on termination of the campaign in the East.
“The following declarations describe these intentions in broad lines and are only intended for the personal information of the commanding generals and the Chiefs of Staff.”
There follows Part 2, Paragraph P, the eight subparagraphs of which detail the plans to be carried out on the termination of the campaign in the East.
I omit, Your Honors, the first two subparagraphs dealing with the tasks of the so-called pacification of the Occupied Eastern Territories and with the assignment to other fronts of troops which had become available.
Subparagraph 3 details the intentions of the fascist conspirators in North Africa. I quote:
“Strengthening of the Armed Forces in North Africa with a view to rendering possible the capture of Tobruk. In order to guarantee the passage of necessary transports according to plan, attacks by the German Air Force on Malta should be resumed.
“Provided that weather conditions cause no delay and the service of transports is assured as planned, it can be assumed that the campaign against Tobruk will begin in mid-September.”
In August 1941 the Hitlerites intended, with the aid of fascist Spain, to seize Gibraltar during the same year. Subparagraph 4 of Part 2 of the letter just submitted to you envisaged that:
“Plan Felix, that is, the seizure of Gibraltar with the active participation of Spain, must be executed in 1941.”
The Hitlerites planned the execution of an attack against Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt. Subparagraph 5 of the above-mentioned letter states as follows:
“If, once the termination of the campaign in the East has been made known, we succeed in bringing Turkey to our side, an attack on Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt is foreseen after a minimum period of 85 days for the preparation of the necessary forces and a preliminary securing of the Chersonese passes and an improvement of Anatolian transportation routes through Turkey, with German help.”
Two subparagraphs later, we find, in the same letter, in Subparagraph 8, a possible variation of this plan:
“If, even after the defeat of Soviet Russia, it would still prove impossible to bring Turkey over to our side, a southward thrust through Anatolia would have to be carried out against her will.”
Your Honors, in the plans of fascist aggression Egypt played a large part. It is mentioned in Subparagraphs 6 and 7 of Part 2 of the letter quoted. Subparagraph 6 mentions—I quote word for word:
“An attack on Egypt from Cyrenaica, after the fall of Tobruk could probably not be carried out before the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.”
Subparagraph 7 stated:
“If the collapse of Soviet Russia creates the necessary conditions, an advance by a motorized expeditionary force through Transcaucasia, in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and in the direction of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt is envisaged.
“Because of weather conditions, this attack will only become possible at the beginning of 1942.”
This document, which I have just presented to the Tribunal, shows the turn of events intended by the fascist conspirators had the Red Army not put an end to their aggression. The fascist aggressors hoped to destroy the Soviet Union in a lightning war, to seize her wealth, to subjugate the Soviet people, and, by these means, to open for themselves the road to world domination.
Now, Your Honors, I have come to the end of my presentation. In concluding the presentation of documentary evidence regarding the aggression of the fascist conspirators against the Soviet Union, may I ask the Tribunal’s permission to sum up briefly as follows:
1. The criminal intent of attacking the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of plundering the Soviet Union and exploiting its riches for purposes of further German aggression was conceived by the fascist conspirators long before the actual launching of the attack.
2. The military preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were conducted by the fascist criminals for at least a year and embraced not only Germany, but also satellite countries, particularly Romania, Finland, and Hungary.
3. The execution of the criminal designs of the fascist aggression consisting of the extermination of the peaceful population, the plunder of the Soviet Union, and the wresting of its territories, was planned long before the attack on the Soviet Union.
Fortunately for all freedom-loving nations in the world, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet people, and their Red Army completely overthrew all the fiendish plans of the fascist aggressors. The Red Army not only withstood and stopped the fascist aggression; but, together with the armies of its allies, brought Hitler Germany to complete catastrophe and the fascist war criminals to the dock.
I thus end my presentation, Your Honors.
COL. POKROVSKY: Your Honors, my task today is to present to you material on the “Criminal Violation of the Laws and Customs of War in the Treatment of Prisoners of War.”
Before beginning the presentation of evidence relative to the overwhelming guilt of the defendants in regard to the persons who were captured by the German Army, I consider it essential to make a few brief remarks.
As early as the end of the last century, the Hague Convention of 1899 established certain rules regulating the rights and responsibilities of belligerents in regard to prisoners of war. In pursuance of the provisions of the 1899 Convention, a number of states drew up the necessary instructions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. I would like to cite three or four sentences taken from such instructions:
“The exclusive aim of the prisonership is to prevent the further participation of prisoners in the war.
“A State may do everything necessary for the holding of prisoners, but nothing more. . . .
“Prisoners of war may be employed to perform moderate work in conformity with their social position. . . .
“In any case, such work must not be detrimental to health and must not be of a humiliating nature. It must not contribute directly to military operations against the native country of the prisoners. . . .
“Prisoners of war lose their freedom but retain their rights. In other words, military confinement is not an act of mercy on the part of the captor, but the right of disarmed persons.”
It may surprise you to learn that the instructions cited are those issued by the German General Staff in Volume 18 of the circular published in 1902. The principle of humane treatment of prisoners and wounded servicemen was further developed in the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929.
Germany’s adherence to these conventions was definitely reflected in the German law regarding wartime courts-martial. I have in mind, particularly, the German law of 17 August 1938, and, in particular, Part “e”, Articles 73 and 75, which contain direct reference to the Convention of 1929. That was at a time when Hitlerite Germany had already begun the execution of her aggressive plans.
As the Tribunal will remember, the 23rd Article of the Hague Convention of 1907 states, “. . . it is forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms and possessing no means of defense, has unconditionally surrendered.”
It cannot be said that the brief code of the laws of war, which was, in fact, drawn up at The Hague and Geneva, encompassed the whole range of questions relating to the laws of war. The authors of these documents had, therefore, inserted the following proviso, and I will cite this excerpt:
“Until the opportunity presents itself of issuing a more complete code of the laws of war, the High Contracting Parties”—and I would remind the Tribunal that Germany was one of those contracting parties—“consider it appropriate to affirm that, in cases not provided for in the rules established by them, the population and the belligerents remain safeguarded by the principles of international law insofar as these principles ensue from the customs, laws of humanity, and dictates of public conscience in force between civilized nations.”
I should like to emphasize that in the appendix to the Convention on the Laws and Customs of Land War (Second Peace Conference, 1907), Article 4 of Chapter 2, concerning prisoners of war, states as follows—and you, Sir, will find the quotation on Page 4 of the document book, where it is underlined with red pencil:
“Prisoners of war remain in the custody of the enemy government and not of the individuals or troops which had captured them.
“They must be treated humanely.
“All their personal belongings except arms, horses, and military papers, will remain in their possession.”
It may, therefore, be considered definitely established that the governments of a number of states, including Germany, had unconditionally recognized their obligations to insure conditions under which prisoners of war should not suffer from arbitrary actions on the part of members of the Armed Forces of any state. The natural conclusion presents itself that in cases of violations of this obligation, the responsibility for any crime against a prisoner of war and especially for a definite system of crimes against the dignity, person, health, and life of prisoners of war, must fall on the government of the country which had signed the Convention.
In the light of the facts which I shall submit to you, on the basis of irrefutable documents, Germany’s solemn undertakings in regard to prisoners of war will appear to be nothing but unparalleled and cynical mockery of the very conception of treaties, laws, culture, and humanity.
I present to the Court, as our Exhibit Number USSR-51 (Document Number USSR-51), a note submitted by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., dated 25 November 1941, concerning the outrageous atrocities committed by the German authorities against Soviet prisoners of war; and I quote several extracts from this note, which you will find on Page 5 of the document presented to you:
“The Soviet Government is in possession of numerous facts testifying to the systematic outrages and atrocities committed by the German authorities against Red Army soldiers and against commanders of the Red Army. Lately these facts have become particularly numerous and have positively cried to high heaven, thereby revealing once again the German war machine and the German Government as a gang of bandits who utterly ignored all codes of international law and all laws of human ethics.
“The Soviet Military Command is aware of numerous cases of the subjection of captured Red Army men, the majority of them wounded, to savage torture, ill-usage, and murder at the hands of the German Military Command and German military units. Captured Red Army men are tortured with bars of red-hot iron; their eyes are gouged out, their feet, hands, fingers, ears, and noses are hacked off, their stomachs ripped open, and they are tied to tanks and torn asunder. Enormities and shameful crimes of this sort are committed by German fascist officers and men along the whole front, wherever they may be and wherever men and commanders of the Red Army fall into their hands.
“For example, in the Ukrainian S.S.R., on the Island of Khortitsa, on the Dnieper, after the German troops were forced to retreat by the Red Army, the bodies of captured Red Army soldiers who had been tortured by the Germans were found. The prisoners’ hands had been cut off, their eyes gouged out, their stomachs ripped open. In a southwesterly direction, in the village of Repki in the Ukraine, after the Germans had retreated from the positions they had occupied, the bodies of Battalion Commander Bobrov, Political Officer Pyatigorsky, and two privates were found. Their arms and legs had been nailed to stakes, and on their bodies five-pointed stars had been cut with red-hot knives. The faces of the dead men were cut and burnt. Near these bodies was found the body of a Red Army man whom the Germans had captured the previous day. His feet were burnt and his ears were cut off. When our units captured the village of Kholmy, on the Northwestern front, the mutilated bodies of Red Army men were found. One of these had been thrown into a bonfire. This was Private Adrei Ossipov of the Kazak S.S.R. At Greigovo Station (Ukrainian S.S.R.), German units captured a small group of Red Army men and kept them without food or drink for several days. A number of the prisoners had their ears slashed off, eyes gouged out, and hands cut off, after which they had been run through with bayonets. In July of this year, at Schumilino Station, German units captured a group of severely wounded Red Army men and put them to death on the spot. In the same month, in the vicinity of the town of Borisov, (Bielorussian S.S.R.), the Hitlerites captured 70 severely wounded Red Army men and poisoned them all with arsenic. In August, near the township of Zabolotye, the Germans captured 17 severely wounded Red Army men on the battlefield. For 3 days they gave them no food. The 17 men, their wounds still bleeding, were then tied to telegraph posts, as a result of which three of them died. The remaining 14 were saved from certain death by the timely arrival of a Soviet tank unit commanded by Senior Lieutenant Rybin. In the village of Lagutino, in the vicinity of Bryansk, the Germans tied a Red Army man to two tanks and tore him to pieces. At a point west of Bryansk, not far from the Collective Farm, ‘Red October,’ 11 charred bodies of men and officers of the Red Army captured by the fascists were found. The arms and back of one of these Red Army men bore traces of torture with a red-hot iron rod.
“There are a number of cases on record where the German Command has driven captured Red Army men in front of their advancing columns, during an attack, on pain of shooting. Such cases in particular have been registered in the vicinity of the Vybor State Farm, in the Leningrad region; in the vicinity of Yelna, in the Smolensk region; in the Gomel region of the Bielorussian S.S.R.; in the Poltava region of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and in a number of other places.
“Wounded and sick Red Army men in hospitals which fell into the hands of the German invaders were also systematically subjected to outrageous indignities, torture, and savage ill-usage. On innumerable occasions defenseless sick and wounded Red Army men in hospitals have been bayonetted or shot by the fascist fiends on the spot. Thus, at Malaya Rudnya, in the Smolensk Region, fascist German units captured a Soviet field hospital and shot the wounded Red Army men, and the male and female hospital attendants. Among the victims were Privates Shalamov and Asimov and Lieutenant Dileyev, who were wounded, and Verya Boiko, a 17 year-old hospital attendant, and others.
“There have been numerous cases of the abuse and violation of woman’s honor when female hospital nurses and hospital workers fell into the hands of the Hitlerite invaders.”
There are many similar facts in the same note. Then it continues:
“Marauding is rife among the men and officers of the Hitler army. When the cold winter weather sets in, marauding assumes a mass character, the Hitlerite robbers stopping at nothing in their quest of war clothing. They not only strip warm clothes and boots from the dead bodies of Soviet soldiers; but divest wounded men of literally all their warm clothing—felt boots, boots, socks, jerseys, quilted jackets, and warm caps—leaving them stark naked. They did not even stop at taking the women’s warm clothing from killed or wounded hospital nurses.
“Red Army prisoners were starved to death; they were left without food for weeks or issued infinitesimal rations of moldy bread or rotten potatoes. Depriving the Soviet prisoners of war of food, the Hitlerites compelled them to rake the garbage cans for remnants of food which the German soldiers had thrown out or, as happened in a number of camps, including the camp at the hamlet of Malaya Korma (Bielorussian S.S.R.), they fling the carcasses of horses over the barbed wire fence to the Soviet prisoners of war. In the Vitebsk camp, in Bielorussia, the Red Army prisoners received almost no food at all for 4 months. When a group of Red Army prisoners sent to the German Command a written request for food to keep them alive, a German officer inquired as to who wrote the statement. Five Red Army men who affirmed that they had written it were shot on the spot.
“Similar cases of unbridled tyranny and brutality are to be observed in other camps, Shitkiv, Demyan, and others.
“The German authorities and the German Government have established a savage regime in the camps for Soviet prisoners of war, with the object of mass extermination of Soviet prisoners of war. The German High Command and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture have issued a regulation establishing a food ration for Soviet prisoners of war far inferior in quantity and quality to that for prisoners of war of other countries. For instance, this ration consists of 6,000 grams of bread and 400 grams of meat per month, which dooms the Soviet prisoners of war to a painful death from starvation.
“While enforcing this disgraceful and obviously unlawful regime for Soviet prisoners of war with inhuman cruelty, the German Government is doing its utmost to conceal from the public the regulation it issued on this question. Thus, in reply to an inquiry made by the Soviet Government, the Swedish Government stated that the information concerning the aforesaid regulation of the German Government published in the European and American press was correct, but that the text of this regulation had not been published and was therefore not available.”
The regulation which had not been available for the Swedish Government in the autumn of 1941 has now become available for the International Military Tribunal.
I assume that a very important circumstance is that these regulations were distributed through two channels: The High Command and the Nazi Party. In such a way, the extermination by starvation of the Soviet prisoners of war captured by the Germans had been planned and carried out both by the German High Command and by the Nazi Party.
I present to the Court these documents which were not available some time ago, as a heavy load on the scale of the Prosecution. On Page 17, Your Honors, you will find the document which has been cited by me. It bears the Document Number D-225 (Exhibit Number USSR-349):
“High Command of the Army, Army Equipment and the Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Training Army.
“Berlin, 6 August 1941.
“Subject: Food ration of Soviet prisoners of war.
“The Soviet Union did not subscribe to the agreement of 27 July 1929, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. Consequently we are not obliged to supply Soviet prisoners of war with food corresponding in quantity or quality to the requirements of this regulation. Taking the general food situation into consideration, the following rations for Soviet prisoners of war were established, which rations were considered adequate according to medical findings:
“The ration in the camps for the prisoners of war (not employed on essential work) amounted to:
“1. Bread, 6 kilograms; meat, 400 grams; fat, 440 grams; sugar, 600 grams, for 28 days.
“2. For prisoners doing special work: Bread, 9 kilograms; meat, 600 grams; fat, 520 grams; sugar, 900 grams, for 28 days.”
A similar regulation, headed, “Food Ration for Soviet Prisoners of War,” was sent as secret information by the Chancellery of the Nazi Party on 17 December 1941. I shall quote only one sentence from that Party directive, which you will find on Page 18 of the document book:
“An open discussion of the question regarding the food supply of the prisoners of war either orally or in writing is forbidden because of the possibility of enemy propaganda.”
Furthermore, the authors of the document emphasize that there is no danger of any substantial deterioration of the food supply of “our German people.” I consider that the hint is sufficiently clear. The document was distributed to the High Command of the Army, to the commands of corps areas, to the military authorities in Bohemia and Moravia, and to military commissioners in a number of cities.
The fascist conspirators established particularly low rations for men of the Red Army. On the basis of their own estimates the monthly ration for Soviet prisoners of war was 42 percent in regard to fats, 66 percent in regard to sugar and bread and 0 percent in regard to meat, as compared with the amount of food provided for prisoners of war from other armies fighting against Germany. Moreover, there was a special note in the directive itself. You will find the special note on Page 19 of the document book:
“If the ration for non-Soviet prisoners of war is reduced, the ration for Soviet prisoners of war must be lowered accordingly.”
But even these starvation rations, which could not sustain the life of an adult person, more often than not existed only on paper.
I present another document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-177 (Document Number USSR-177). . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I do not think it matters very much, but when you said “0 percent” in regard to meat, when you were dealing with the percentage, was that correct? Because in setting out the amount of food which they were allowed, or were supposed to be allowed, there was 400 grams of meat for ordinary men and 600 grams of meat for other men doing special work, and I do not see how 400 grams can be 0 percent of the ration allowed to other non-Soviet prisoners.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right, Sir. I have the same figures here, but there is no contradiction here at all. I am reporting to the Tribunal now that there were several directives, and the first one appears to be the best for the Soviet prisoners of war. It states that 400 grams of meat was the ration. The next directive, which established the percentage of food supply for the Soviet prisoners of war and others, shows 0 percent. As far as I understand it, if there was not meat for all of the prisoners of war, the Soviet prisoners would not receive any meat at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Then you say that the words “on the basis of their own estimates” are referring to some estimates other than the estimate which you give. It does not matter about that, but I understand you to say that there are other estimates which show they did not give them anything. Please proceed.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right, Sir.
I present to the Tribunal one more document dealing with the same question. That is Exhibit Number USSR-177. You will find it on Page 21 of your document book. This is a record of a conference of the Reich Ministry of Food (REM) under the direction of State Secretary Backe and Ministerial Director Moritz. The document is dated 24 November 1941, 1630 hours. Among those who took part in the conference were representatives of various departments, in particular General Reinecke—probably the Tribunal will remember that it was Reinecke who headed that particular phase of the work dealing with the prisoners of war—and Ministerial Director Mansfeld. The subject under discussion was the supply of food to Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers. I quote—Page 21 of your document book:
“1. Types of food.
“Attempts to produce a special Russian bread have proved that a useful mixture consists of 50 percent rye bran, 20 percent residue of sugar beet, 20 percent cellulose flour and 10 percent flour made of straw or leaves.
“Meat not usually employed for human consumption can never sufficiently satisfy a demand for meat. Russians must, therefore, be fed entirely on horse flesh and on the meat of animals which had not been adequately slaughtered and which, at present, is issued in double quantities on the ration cards.
“With the present technique of fat production, inferior fats no longer exist; the Russian will, therefore, receive good edible fats.”
These derisive words can scarcely pass unnoticed. Russian prisoners of war, who had been receiving “meat not usually employed for human consumption,” were now receiving on their starvation rations only “meat which is today issued in double quantities on ration cards”; and instead of fats they were to get certain substances which can only be used for food because of “the present technique of the fat production.” And these products are called “good edible fats.”
The second part of the document is entitled “Rations.” I quote; the part being cited by me is on Pages 21 and 22 in your document book:
“Since there is a great discrepancy among the estimates of the present experts of the Health Administration, the Reich Office of Public Health, and the Army Medical Inspectorate as to the necessary caloric requirements, a final decision concerning the ration will be made in the course of the week by a smaller circle of experts. Seven days of flour soup as a transition diet and cancellation of the words ‘without work’ are from now on decreed for such Russians as are at present in German camps.
“III. The number of Russians whom the Reich Ministry of Supply can supply with food.”
I should note here that this sentence means, “The number of Russians whom the Reich Ministry of Food (REM) can provide has now been established.”
“State Secretary Backe was noncommittal in answer to persistent questioning by General Reinecke and Ministerial Director Mansfeld.”
It seems to me useful to point out that there is on the document a note in pencil to the effect that:
“It is requested to follow up the matter of the rations because State Secretary Backe is, apparently, beginning to lose his nerve.”
The signature is illegible.
It seems to me that this note vividly discloses the arguments that were going on over establishing a norm. Not by accident does it speak here of the wide discrepancy in the estimates concerning necessary caloric requirements of the experts of the Reich Health Administration and the Army Medical Inspectorate. As the Tribunal will remember, the witness Blaha testified in reply to my questions that almost all prisoners of war who died of starvation in the Dachau Camp were men of the Red Army. I shall submit evidence showing that the Dachau Camp was not an exception in that respect.
On 27 April 1942 the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. was forced to submit a new note. I present this note in our exhibit under Number USSR-51 (Document Number USSR-51). You will find the place I am referring to on Page 13 in your document book where it is marked in red pencil for your convenience. I quote:
“The Soviet Government now has at its disposal many hundreds of new documents confirming the bloody crimes committed against Soviet prisoners of war, dealt with in the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. dated 25 November 1941.
“It has been incontrovertibly established that the German Command, desiring to take revenge for the defeats inflicted on its army in the last few months, has everywhere introduced the practice of physical extermination of Soviet prisoners of war.
“Along the entire length of the front, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, bodies of slain Soviet war prisoners and tortured war prisoners have been discovered. In almost every case these corpses bear traces of the horrible torture which precedes murder. In dugouts from which Red Army troops have driven the Germans, in fortifications, and also in populated centers, bodies of Soviet prisoners are found who have been murdered after savage torture. Facts like the following, recorded in affidavits signed by eye-witnesses, are being uncovered with increasing frequency.
“On 2 and 6 March 1942, on the Crimean front, in the Lilly region at 66.3, village of Jantora, the bodies of nine Red Army men who had been taken prisoner were found so brutally tortured by the fascists that only two of the corpses could be identified. The nails had been drawn from the fingers of the tortured prisoners of war, their eyes had been gouged out and the right breast of one corpse had been completely cut out; there were traces of torture by fire, numerous knife wounds, and broken jaws.
“In Theodosia scores of bodies of tortured Azerbaijanian Red Army men were found. Among them were Ismail-Zadch Jafarov, whose eyes had been gouged out and ears slashed off by the Hitlerites; Kuli-Zadch Alibekov, whose arms had been dislocated by the Hitlerites, after which he had been bayonetted; Corporal Ali Ogly Islom-Mahmed, whose stomach had been ripped open by the Hitlerites; Mustafa Ogly Asherov, who had been bound to a post with wire and died of his wounds in this position.”
And then, in the same note, is cited:
“In the village of Krasnaperovo, (Smolensk region) attacking units of the Red Army found 29 dead and two naked bodies of captured Red Army men and officers, none of whom had a single bullet wound. All the prisoners had been knifed to death. In the same district, in the village of Babaevo, the Hitlerites placed 58 captive Red Army men and two women ambulance workers in a haystack and then set fire to the hay. When the people who had been doomed to death attempted to escape from the flames, the Germans shot them.
“In the village of Kuleshovka, the Germans captured 16 severely wounded men and officers, stripped the prisoners, tore the dressings from their wounds, tormented them with hunger, stabbed them with bayonets, broke their arms, tore open their wounds, and subjected them to other tortures, after which those who were still alive were locked up in a house, which was then set on fire.
“In the village of Strenevo of the Kalinin region, the Germans locked 50 wounded captive Red Army men in a school building and burnt them to death.
“In the town of Volokolamsk the invaders forbade Red Army men who had been locked on the fifth floor of house Number 3/6 Proleterskaja Street to leave the house when a fire broke out. Those who attempted to leave or to jump from the windows were shot. Sixty prisoners perished in the flames or were killed by bullets.
“In the village of Popovka (Tula region), the Germans drove 140 captive Red Army men into a barn and set fire to it. Ninety five perished in the flames. Six kilometers from Pegostye Station, in the Leningrad region, the Germans, in the course of their retreat, under pressure of the Red Army troops, used explosive bullets to kill over 150 Soviet war prisoners after frightful beatings and savage torture. On most of the bodies the ears had been slashed off, the eyes gouged out, and the fingers chopped off, while several had had one or both hands hacked off and their tongues torn out. Stars had been cut out on the backs of three Red Army men. Not long before the liberation of the town of Kondrovo, Smolensk region, by units of the Red Army in December 1941, the Germans executed over 200 Red Army prisoners of war whom they had taken through the city, naked and barefoot, to the outskirts, shooting on the spot those who were exhausted and unable to walk any further, as well as those local citizens who gave them bread on their way through the city.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
COL. POKROVSKY: In their desire to exterminate as many Soviet prisoners of war as possible, the Nazi conspirators excelled themselves by inventing newer and ever newer methods of extermination. The note states:
“Of late a number of new cases have been established in which the German Command made use of Soviet war prisoners for clearing mine fields and for other hazardous work. Thus, in the district of the villages of Bolshaja and Malaja Vloya, for 4 days the Germans drove scores of prisoners lined up in close ranks, back and forth over a mine field. Every day several prisoners were blown to pieces by mines. Provision is made for this method of killing prisoners in the orders of the German Command. Order Number 109 to the 203rd Infantry Regiment states:
“‘General Field Marshal Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, has ordered that apart from military operations, the search for mines and the clearing of mine fields be done by Russian prisoners, with a view to sparing German blood. This also refers to German mines.’”
The marauding mentioned in the previous note is regarded not only as something possible, but is proclaimed as obligatory to all the soldiers of the German Army. The People’s Commissar refers to the following documents issued by the German Command, in stressing the fact that this marauding, done in wintertime, doomed the Red Army men to freeze to death:
“An order of the Staff of the 88th Regiment of the 34th German Infantry Division, headed ‘Situation with Respect to Clothing,’ imposed: ‘Boots should be removed from Russian prisoners of war without hesitation.’
“That this order is not an accidental one is seen from the fact that even before the perfidious attack on the U.S.S.R., the German Command provided for recourse to this system of supplying its troops.
“Among the documents of the 234th Infantry Regiment of the 56th Division, a circular was found numbered 121/4 and dated 6 June 1941, bearing the heading, ‘On the Principles of Supply in the Eastern Areas.’ This circular states on Page 8:
“‘You must not count on being furnished clothing. Therefore it is particularly important to remove serviceable boots from prisoners of war and to make immediate use of all suitable clothing, underwear, socks, et cetera.’”
The note points out:
“The Germans, with a view to exterminating Soviet prisoners of war, deprived them of food, condemned them to slow starvation and in some cases used a bad quality food. Soviet authorities have in their possession Order Number 202 of the Staff of the above mentioned 88th Regiment, which states:
“‘Carcasses of horses will serve as food for Russian prisoners of war. Such points where carcasses of horses have been dumped are designated by signs. They can be found along the highways in Malo-Yaroslavets and in the villages of Romanovo and Beloussovo.’
“Order Number 166/41 to the 60th Motorized Infantry Division is quite outspoken in demanding the mass murder of Soviet prisoners of war. This order states:
“‘Russian soldiers and noncommissioned officers are extremely courageous in battle. Even small isolated units are always ready to attack. Therefore no humane attitude towards the prisoners is permissible. The destruction of the enemy by fire or by cold steel must be continued until he is rendered completely harmless. . . .’
“The regulations issued by the German Command on the treatment of Soviet war prisoners, under Number 1/3058, contain the following instructions:
“‘At the slightest sign of insubordination energetic and direct action must be taken. Arms must be used ruthlessly. Bludgeons, canes, and whips must not be used. Leniency, even towards obedient and hard-working prisoners only indicates weakness and must not be indulged in.’”—from Point 2.
“‘At work the distance to the prisoner must always be such as to permit of immediate recourse to arms.’”—from Point 3.
“All this proved to be insufficient. The Order of the High Command of the German Army, dated 14 January 1942 and issued in the name of Hitler as Commander-in-Chief, states”—Paragraph 2:
“‘All clemency or humaneness towards prisoners of war is strictly condemned. A German soldier must always make his prisoner feel his superiority. . . . Every delay in resorting to arms against a war prisoner harbors danger. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army hopes that these directions will be fully carried out.’
“The Soviet Government continues to receive reliable information on the condition of captive Red Army men in the German-occupied territories of the U.S.S.R. as well as in the German rear, and in the German-occupied European countries. This information testifies to the further deterioration of the regime instituted for captive Red Army men, and that they are particularly bad off in comparison with the war prisoners of other countries. It further testifies to the mass dying of Soviet prisoners of war from starvation and illness, from foul indignities and bloody cruelty systematically applied to the Red Army men by the Hitlerite authorities who have long since violated the most elementary requirements of international law and human ethics.”
The note specially stresses the fact that the inhuman atrocities and the cruelty perpetrated by the German fascist gangsters against the Soviet war prisoners exceed the atrocities of Genghis Dhenghis-Khan, Baty, and Mamay.
In spite of that the note, which you will find on Page 14 of the document book, states:
“. . . In spite of all that, the Soviet Government, true to the principles of humanity and respect for its international obligations, has no intention, even in the given circumstances, of applying retaliatory repressive measures against German prisoners of war, and continues, as heretofore, to observe the obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union with regard to the regime for war prisoners specified by the Hague Convention of 1907, which was likewise signed but so perfidiously violated in every one of its points by Germany.”
Later I shall quote a document written by a group of German prisoners of war. The authors of the document, on one hand, by a series of new facts, have added to the number of atrocities committed by the conspirators against the Soviet war prisoners; and on the other hand, they have confirmed that the Soviet Command is true to the principle of humanity in its attitude towards the German captives.
The military victory of the democratic powers opened the innermost secrets of Hitler’s archives. Along with a large number of documents that raise the curtain on the criminal plans of the conspirators, we have also obtained a wide opportunity of interrogating living witnesses. A whole series of questions become finally clear as, and when, the witnesses’ depositions are being cross-checked with the documentary archives. Much new evidence has also been received by us on the subject of the crimes against the prisoners of war.
Some information with regard to the criminal Hitlerite practice of exterminating the Soviet prisoners of war appeared as of 27 April 1942, in the official communication of V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the U.S.S.R.
I shall here prove that this crime was part of the general conspiracy and was planned in advance of the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. The Tribunal will see that the regime for war prisoners was really the sum total of diverse methods for their extermination. Let us turn to the testimony of the witnesses.
The former Chief of Staff of the OKH, Franz Halder, interrogated on 31 October 1945, testified—I submit to the Tribunal an excerpt from this document, Exhibit Number USSR-341 (Document Number USSR-341):
“Witness: ‘Prior to the attack on Russia, the Führer called a conference of all the commanders and persons connected with the Supreme Command on the question of the forthcoming attack on Russia. I cannot recall the exact date of this conference. I no longer know whether it took place before or after the invasion of Yugoslavia. At this conference the Führer stated that the methods used in the war against the Russians will have to be different from those used in the war against the West.’”
I beg your pardon, I have forgotten to tell you that the place which I quoted from was on Page 24 of your document book.
“Investigating Officer: ‘What else did he say?’
“Witness: ‘He said that the struggle between Russia and Germany is a Russian struggle. He stated that since the Russians were not signatories to the Hague Convention, the treatment of their prisoners of war does not have to follow the articles of the Convention.’”
DR. NELTE: Your Honor, Generaloberst Halder is in the military prison here at Nuremberg, and he is a very important witness not only to the testimony at hand but also in general. And I believe, according to our principles, which have been formulated by the High Tribunal in connection with Article 21 of the Charter, it might be important to hear this witness personally rather than use written testimony; and I ask the Tribunal to decide this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, did you wish to make any answer to Dr. Nelte’s request?
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will submit to him my consideration in this case.
The testimony of Halder is of importance to us in one respect only, namely, that he states the fact of a special conference called by Hitler before the war; a conference at which the question of the treatment of Russian prisoners of war attracted particular attention. This fact also finds confirmation in other testimonies which were submitted by us to this Tribunal; and, therefore, I think that there is no reason and no need for examining this witness, since this interrogation may cause further delay as it will refer to this question only and the German Defense Counsel may ask unnecessary questions. In case the German Defense Counsel would consider it advisable to request the Tribunal to bring witness Halder here for cross-examination, it should be proper for the Defense to submit to the Tribunal, in accordance with established procedure, an application and explain for what reason it wants to cross-examine Witness Halder. The Tribunal would then have occasion to discuss this application and to grant it should they deem it proper to do so.
That is all I wanted to point out concerning this question.
[There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that if the interrogation of General Halder is to be used, and it has been used, that General Halder must be brought for cross-examination, provided it is true that he is in Nuremberg.
When a witness is called he is liable to cross-examination and the only reason for allowing interrogations to be used is on account of the difficulty of bringing witnesses to Nuremberg. Therefore, if an interrogation is allowed to be used and the witness is in Nuremberg, the witness must be produced for cross-examination. I mean, of course, at a time which is convenient to Counsel.
Colonel Pokrovsky, if this witness, General Halder, is in Nuremberg, you will have him brought here at a time which is convenient to you during the presentation of your case.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Court, we will finally find out where Halder is at the present time and, if he is really in Nuremberg, he will be produced as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: We must here note a common fascist lie. Hitler was intentionally misrepresenting facts. That the Soviet Union had pledged to follow the statutes of the Hague Convention is generally known. Even the criminal code of the Soviet Union provides for the defense of the rights of prisoners of war, in accordance with international law, and those guilty of violations are considered criminally responsible. The note of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. M. Molotov, on 27 April 1942, once again mentions the obligations of the Hague Convention which the Soviet Union had pledged to follow. To that note I have already referred.
Continuing, I shall again quote from Halder’s deposition concerning Hitler’s speech. You will find it on Page 24:
“Furthermore, he”—Hitler—“said that in view of the political level of the Russian troops”—at this point several dots follow in the original—“to be brief—he said that the so-called commissars should not be considered prisoners of war.”
It is impossible not to remark here that, owing to the superior political consciousness of the Red Army soldiers, the Hitlerites saw a commissar or a communist in almost every prisoner of war. Then there is recorded the following question of the investigating officer and the reply to it:
“Investigating Officer: ‘Did the Führer say anything about an order which should be issued on the subject?’
“Witness: ‘What I have just said was his order. He said that he wanted it carried out even if no written order followed.’”
After Halder’s deposition, in the document book on your table, there is an extract from the deposition of the former Deputy Chief of the Operations Section of OKW headquarters, General Warlimont, dated 12 November 1945. He was testifying on oath before Lieutenant Colonel Hinkel of the American Army. This document is the result of work accomplished by our American colleagues. The American Prosecution has kindly placed this document at our disposal, which we in turn submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-263(a) (Document Number USSR-263(a)). I think the Defense Counsel wishes to submit another request to the Tribunal. I therefore cede my place.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President! Regarding General Warlimont, we have the same reasons which I just mentioned regarding Generaloberst Halder. General Warlimont is also present in Nuremberg and is at your disposal for examination in the court. Concerning the importance. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to request now?
DR. NELTE: My application consists in the request to disallow the use of the document which the Soviet Prosecutor has just wished to read out loud, and to direct that the witness, Warlimont, now present in Nuremberg, be called as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has just ruled that the interrogation of General Halder may be used, but if it is used—and it is being used—he must be submitted for cross-examination by counsel for the defendants. What more do you want?
DR. NELTE: I am not speaking about Generaloberst Halder but about General Warlimont.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already ruled upon General Warlimont; that he had to be called—that is, only yesterday or the day before.
DR. NELTE: I believe that this ruling has escaped the memory of the Soviet Prosecutor, otherwise he would not be reading this document out loud but would be introducing General Warlimont to the Court in person.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the ruling of the Tribunal was that the Prosecutor should be entitled to use the interrogation, but if he did so, he must submit the witness for cross-examination. Therefore, the Soviet Prosecutor is entitled to read the interrogation and General Warlimont will then be produced for the purpose of cross-examination.
DR. NELTE: Is he obliged to do this or may he use his own discretion?
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose he might use his own discretion and call the witness if he wanted to and not put in the interrogation.
You see, Dr. Nelte, the position of the Tribunal is this. If the prosecuting counsel chooses to call the witness and not to use the interrogation, of course, he calls the witness, examines the witness, and the witness is liable to cross-examination by Defense Counsel. If, on the other hand, the prosecuting counsel wishes to use the interrogation, which he already has, he can do so; but if the witness is available in or near Nuremberg, he must still be produced for cross-examination.
The discretion which Counsel for the Prosecution has is as to whether they use an interrogation which they already have or call the witness. But in either case, the witness, if he is here, must be produced for cross-examination.
DR. NELTE: The witnesses, Generaloberst Halder and General Warlimont, are both in Nuremberg and at our disposal. I merely wish to know whether the date when he is to be presented depends on the discretion of the Chief Prosecutor. We are interested in the possibility of holding the cross-examination when the Prosecution has read out the written statement.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought that was a matter you might settle with the prosecuting counsel as to whether you wish to cross-examine him directly after the interrogation has been presented or after a short delay. If I were to say that he is to be cross-examined immediately after the interrogation has been put in probably Defense Counsel would say he wanted time to consider the interrogation. But you can surely settle that with Colonel Pokrovsky.
DR. NELTE: Then I will deal with Colonel Pokrovsky on this matter. Thank you.
COL. POKROVSKY: I take the liberty of starting from the point where I broke off. We now present to the Tribunal Exhibit Number USSR-263(a), consisting of the minutes of the interrogation, under oath, of the witness, Warlimont, given to Lieutenant Colonel Hinkel of the American Army. I do not intend to read this document into the record in full. Warlimont, in many cases, repeats Halder. The important thing is that he confirms two facts in their entirety:
(1) That it was Hitler who conducted the meeting of which we were informed by Halder’s testimony. (2) That, even before the war, Hitler had issued a directive to shoot prisoners of war; pointing out that special units were to be created for this purpose and that the SD would follow the Army.
Warlimont further testified—I quote, and Your Honors will find the excerpt which I quote on Page 26:
“He”—that is Hitler—“further said that he did not expect the officer corps to understand his orders, but he demanded that they obey his orders unconditionally.”
We have some more testimonies, those of Lieutenant General of the German Army, Kurt von Österreich. He was the former Commander of the Prisoner of War Section of the Danzig Military District. He personally handed his testimonies to the representatives of the Red Army on 29 December 1945. His testimonies, registered as Exhibit Number USSR-151 (Document Number USSR-151), are contained in your document book. I shall read certain excerpts into the record:
“I began my work as Commander of the Prisoner of War Section at the headquarters of Military District XX (Danzig) on 1 February 1941.
“Prior to that I was the commanding officer of the 207th Infantry Division, located in France.
“It was towards March 1941 that I was summoned to Berlin to attend a secret meeting at the headquarters of the OKW. This conference was conducted by Lieutenant General Reinecke, then Chief of Headquarters’ Prisoner of War Section.
“Over 20 chiefs of the district prisoner of war sections from various regions attended this conference, as well as several staff officers of the headquarters. I cannot, at present, remember the names of these officers.
“General Reinecke told us, as a great secret, that a tentative invasion of the Soviet territory had been planned for the beginning of summer 1941 and that in this connection the OKW had elaborated essential measures, including the preparation of camps for Russian prisoners of war expected after the beginning of operations on the Eastern front.”
I omit 3 paragraphs and shall go on to several details of greater importance:
“On this occasion he ordered us to construct open air camps surrounded only by barbed wire in such cases where there would be no time to construct roofed-in barracks for the Russian prisoners.
“Moreover, Reinecke gave us instructions as to the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, directing us to shoot without any warning those prisoners who might attempt to escape.”
In my opinion, the next two long paragraphs can be omitted in order to save time.
“After some time”—I pass on to Page 28 of your document book—“I received a directive from the headquarters of the OKW confirming Reinecke’s instructions to shoot without any warning all Russian prisoners attempting to escape. I do not now remember who signed this directive.”
The witness further testifies how he was called, either towards the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 to a conference in Berlin of the military district chiefs on prisoner-of-war affairs. The conference was conducted by Major General Von Graevenitz. The question under discussion was what to do with those Russian prisoners of war who were unable to work as the result of wounds or exhaustion. I think it might be useful to quote a few lines. They are on Page 29 in your document book:
“On the proposal of General Von Graevenitz this question was discussed by several officers present, including doctors, who stated that such prisoners of war unable to work should be concentrated in one place—either in camp or in hospital—and killed by poisoning. As a result of this discussion General Von Graevenitz ordered us to murder war prisoners incapable of work, using for this purpose the camp medical personnel.”
The witness asserts that when he arrived on duty in the Ukraine in the summer of 1942, he learned there, as he says—you will find these two lines on Page 29, “A method of murdering Russian prisoners of war by poisoning is already adopted there.”
The witness quotes actual figures, actual facts connected with this crime. I think it important to note a reference to this fact quoted on the fourth page of the Russian text, third paragraph from the top, on Page 29 of your document book:
“When I was in the Ukraine I received from headquarters a top-secret order signed by Himmler, directing that, as from August 1942, Russian war prisoners must be branded with a special mark.
“Russian war prisoners were kept in concentration camps under severe conditions, were poorly fed, subjected to moral outrages, and died of hunger and disease.”
Österreich names facts which confirm this testimony. The following episode is revealingly characteristic. I quote the second paragraph of the fifth page; it is on Page 31 in your document book:
“In the beginning of 1942 when an echelon of Russian war prisoners was being moved from the Ukraine to the city of Torun, approximately 75 people died there, the corpses of whom were not taken away but left in the railway car together with the living. . . . About 100 prisoners of war who could not bear these conditions and tried to escape were shot.”
These and similar cases are known to the witness. He enumerates them, but I do not think it is necessary to cite all of them to the Tribunal. They are all alike.
THE PRESIDENT: Please, proceed.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. I thought the members of the Tribunal were deliberating. I, therefore, interrupted my report. Thank you.
Österreich also speaks about directives which provide for the shooting of all political commissars of the Red Army, Communists, and Jews. Such an arrangement practically opened the way for the extermination of any Soviet prisoner of war under the pretext that he was suspected of belonging to the Communist Party or if he looked like a Jew.
In rounding up General Österreich’s testimony it is necessary to quote a sentence mentioned, as I believe, by the Commander-in-Chief, General Field Marshal Von Reichenau, in “The Conduct of the Army in the East.” I submit this document to the Tribunal as our Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number USSR-12). This quotation is on Page 33 in your document book, “Supplying the civilian population and the prisoners of war with food is a misunderstood humanitarian act as well as . . .” I submit to the Military Tribunal this despicable directive of Hitler’s Field Marshal and request it be accepted as evidence. This document is registered under Number USSR-12.
Three of Hitler’s high-ranking officers confirmed that even at the beginning of the war, at a special conference. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us if this order was issued by Field Marshal Von Reichenau? By the general himself?
COL. POKROVSKY: The order is signed by General Field Marshal Von Reichenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Was it captured or what?
COL. POKROVSKY: This document was one of the trophies captured by the Russian Army.
THE PRESIDENT: By the Russian Army?
COL. POKROVSKY: By the Russian Army.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. POKROVSKY: Three of Hitler’s high-ranking officers have confirmed that already at the beginning of the war the question of exterminating Soviet prisoners of war was settled during a special conference. They—the witnesses—differ slightly in detail, but the fact itself has been quite definitely established. The sentence which I quoted from the directive of Field Marshal Reichenau also confirms that even the supply of food to the soldiers of the Red Army taken prisoner by the Germans was considered as “unnecessary humanity.”
It is useful perhaps to submit to you Document Number 884-PS (Exhibit USSR-351). It bears the signature of Warlimont and a postscript by the Defendant Jodl. The document was drawn up at the Führer’s headquarters on 12 May 1941. It said, “OKH had submitted the draft of a directive dealing with the treatment of responsible political workers and similar persons.” You have this quotation on Page 35 in the document book, as well as the two following excerpts which I am going to quote.
The draft foresaw the “removal” of persons of this category. The decision whether a prisoner of war falls into the group “to be removed” is up to the officer. The document states; “By an officer with authority to impose punishment for breach of discipline.” Thus, any junior officer was endowed with powers of life and death over any captured Red Army soldier, regardless of his rank or service. Paragraph 3 of this document states:
“Political commissars of the army are not recognized as prisoners of war and are to be liquidated, at the latest, in the transient prisoner-of-war camps. No evacuation to the rear areas.”
The Defendant Jodl added the, for him, characteristic postscript—you will find it on Page 37 of the document book:
“We must reckon with possible reprisals against German airmen. It would, therefore, be better to consider all these measures in the nature of reprisals.”
General Österreich’s testimony concerning the existence of the order to brand Soviet prisoners of war is fully confirmed. I submit to the Tribunal, as Exhibit Number USSR-15 (Document Number USSR-15), Order Number 14-802/42, given by the Chief of Gendarmerie of the Vice Governor in the Region of Styria. It is stated in the order that it is a question of disclosing the order of the Chief of Police. The first paragraph of the order of the chief of the regular police states—the paragraph quoted is on Page 38 of the document book:
“1. Soviet prisoners of war are to be branded with a special and lasting mark.
“2. The brand is to consist of an acute angle of about 45 degrees with a 1-centimeter length of side, pointing downwards on the left buttock, at about a hand’s width from the rectum. This brand is to be made with the lancets available in all military units. Indian ink is to be used as coloring matter.”
The third paragraph underlines that, “Branding is not a sanitary precaution.”
It is stated in Paragraph 5 that, together with all Soviet prisoners of war now entering the regions of the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and the province of the Governor General commanded by the German Armed Forces, all the remaining prisoners of war in the area of the Supreme Army Command (OKW) up to September 1942 are to be subjected to branding.
The same directive was issued to the presidents of the regional labor offices and the Reich Inspectors for Allocation of Labor. In this Document Number 1191-PS, Page 40 of the document book, it is stated that the order of the OKW, dated 10 July 1942, was brought to the attention of the presidents of regional labor offices and to the Reich Inspectors for Allocation of Labor.
Our documents numbered USSR-121, 122, and 123 are excerpts taken from orders issued by the German military authorities, such as regimental and divisional commanders, and confirm that the prisoners of war, in order to “spare German blood,” were forced to clear mine fields and carry on work which endangered their lives. Order Number 16641 of the 60th German Infantry Division states, in explanation of the bestial treatment of the Soviet warriors:
“Russian soldiers and noncommissioned officers are very brave in battle. Even a small isolated unit will always attack. In this connection a humane attitude towards the prisoners is not permissible.”
This quotation is on Page 44 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that already, have we not, or an almost identical one?
COL. POKROVSKY: You are right, Sir, I quoted this excerpt as a part of the note of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Molotov; and now I quote it as part of a special German document. I consider that it is an unprecedented event in history when, instead of respecting an enemy for his military valor, the senior officers of Hitler’s army, in reply to such military valor, ordered their subordinates to treat this same enemy ruthlessly and inhumanly.
In the document submitted to you as Number 3257-PS (Exhibit Number USSR-352), there is a sentence directly relating to my theme. It has been read into the record. Document 3257-PS is a secret report of the Armament Inspector in the Ukraine, dated 2 December 1941, and addressed to the Chief of Armament Section of the OKW. It states—the excerpt quoted is at the end of Page 45 and the beginning of Page 46 of your document book:
“Living conditions, food, clothing conditions, and the health of the prisoners of war are bad; mortality is very high. We may reckon on the fact that during this winter people will perish at the rate of tens and even hundreds of thousands.”
I submit a document under Document Number D-339 (Exhibit USSR-350). The chief camp and factory physician, Jäger, having inspected the camp in Naeggerath Street, informed the medical department of the Central Administration of Camps, in a top-secret medical report on 2 September 1944—you will find the excerpt quoted on Page 47 of your document book—as follows:
“The prisoner-of-war camp in Naeggerath Street is in an atrocious condition. The men live in dustbins, in kennels, in ovens no longer used, and in huts made by themselves. Food is barely sufficient. Krupp is responsible for shelter and the food supply. Medicine and bandages were so scarce that in many cases medical treatment was completely impossible. The blame for this appalling state of affairs rests on the permanent camp.”
In the files of the Defendant Rosenberg was found, among other documents, one numbered Document 081-PS (Exhibit USSR-353). As far as we can understand, it is a letter from Rosenberg to Keitel, dated 28 February 1942, on the subject of the prisoners of war. A copy found in Rosenberg’s files is unsigned, but there is no doubt that such a letter was either addressed to Keitel or prepared for dispatch to the chief of the Armed Forces. The letter states that the fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a tragedy on an enormous scale.
I will now read into the record the second sentence of the fifth paragraph of the Russian text—you will find it on Page 48 of the document book:
“Out of 3,600,000. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: I think the United States read this letter, did they not?
COL. POKROVSKY: The document has been partially read, but I would ask permission to read part of a short excerpt a second time, since it is of importance to my further report. It will, quite literally, only take a minute and a half of our time.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have been preventing other prosecuting counsel from reading documents which have already been read and we are directed by the Charter to conduct an expeditious trial; and I do not really see how it can be expeditious if documents are read more than once.
COL. POKROVSKY: This document, which is already known to the Tribunal, presents a very clear picture of what happened in the camp. The author of this letter states that attempts had been made by the population to supply the prisoners with food but that in most cases the attempts were foiled by the energetic opposition of the camp commanders.
There is no reason to suspect the author of that letter of piling on the agony, or of having any liking for the Soviet people. On the contrary, there is every reason to state that the question has not yet been fully elucidated. This document, addressed by one defendant to another, enables us to imagine the acts that took place in the camps for Soviet prisoners of war.
I began by presenting to you documents of German origin, and this with a definite aim in view. After you have been informed of the attitude of the Hitlerites themselves towards the Soviet prisoners of war and as soon as you have learned however briefly, what the camps for the Soviet prisoners looked like from the words of the Hitlerites themselves, it will be easier for you to estimate the probative value of the documents of non-German origin.
I stop, because it seems to me the Tribunal wants to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a convenient time to adjourn.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel, the Tribunal proposes to adjourn at half past four this afternoon, as they have some administrative work to do.
COL. POKROVSKY: I return to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union for the investigation of atrocities committed by the German fascist invaders in Smolensk and in the region of Smolensk. The greater part of this report is dedicated to the mass annihilation of prisoners of war by the Germans. I should like to read into the Record excerpts from this document, submitted to you as Exhibit Number USSR-56 (Document Number USSR-56), Page 6, Paragraph 4 from the top; you will find it on Page 58 of our document book. It reads as follows:
“The German fascist invaders systematically exterminated the wounded and captured Soviet citizens. Physicians A. N. Smirnov, A. N. Glasunov, A. M. Demidov, A. S. Pogrebnov, and others, formerly interned in the war prisoners’ camp, stated that on the road from Vyasma to Smolensk the Hitlerites shot several thousand people.
“In the autumn of 1941 the German occupational forces drove a party of prisoners of war from Vyasma to Smolensk. Many of the prisoners were unable to stand, as a result of continuous beating and exhaustion. Whenever the citizens attempted to give any of the prisoners a piece of bread, the German soldiers drove the Soviet citizens off, beat them with sticks and rifle butts, and fatally shot them. On the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Street, on the Roslavskoye and Kievskoye high roads, the fascist blackguards opened a disorderly fire on a column of prisoners of war. The prisoners attempted to escape, but the soldiers overtook and shot them. In that way nearly 5,000 Soviet people were fatally shot. The corpses were left lying about the streets for several days.”
It is not difficult to see that this extract fully coincides with the statement in Document Number 081-PS, which has already been read into the Record, the contents of which I once before related to the Tribunal very briefly and in my own words.
We are completing the document only by factual evidence. On the same Page 6—which corresponds to Page 58 of the Document Book—two lines lower down, it is said:
“The German military authorities tortured the prisoners of war. On the way to Smolensk and especially at the camp, the prisoners were killed by tens and hundreds. In Prisoner-of-War Camp Number 126, the Soviet people were subjected to torture; sick people were sent to heavy labor; no medical assistance was rendered. The prisoners in the camp were tortured, forced to do work beyond their strength, shot. About 150 to 200 people died every day of torture, by starvation, typhus and dysentery epidemics, freezing to death, exhausting work, and bloody terror. Over 60,000 peaceful citizens and prisoners of war were exterminated in the camp by the German fascist invaders. The facts of the extermination of the imprisoned officers and men of the Red Army and of the peaceful citizens were confirmed by the testimony of physicians imprisoned in the camp; Smirnov, Shmouroff, Pogrebnov, Erpoulov, Demidov, hospital nurses Shubina and Lenkovskya, and also by Red Army soldiers and inhabitants of the city of Smolensk.
“Thousands of prisoners of war were shot in the camp under the directions of Sonderführer Eduard Gyss.
“Sergeant Gatlyn brutally avenged himself on the prisoners. Being aware of the fact, they tried to keep out of his way. So Gatlyn dressed in the uniform of a Red Army soldier, mixed with the crowd, and, having picked himself a victim, would beat him half dead.
“Private Rudolf Radtke, a former wrestler from the German circuses, prepared a special lash made of aluminum wire, with which he beat the prisoners black and blue. On Sundays he would come to the camp drunk, throw himself on the first prisoner he met, torture and kill him.
“Emaciated and exhausted Soviet invalids were forced by the fascists to work at the Smolensk power plant. Many occasions were observed when prisoners, worn out by starvation, would collapse under the strain of work beyond their strength and were immediately shot by Sonderführer Szepalsky, Sonderführer Bram, Hofmann Mauser, and Sonderführer Wagner.
“There was, in Smolensk, a hospital for prisoners of war; Soviet doctors working at that hospital stated: Up to July 1942, the patients lay unbandaged on the floor. Their clothes and bedding were covered not only with dirt but with pus. The rooms were unheated and the floors of the corridors coated with ice.”
A report of a medico-legal examination is appended, Your Honors, to the statement of the Extraordinary State Commission which I have just quoted. Experts such as Academician Burdenko, member of the Extraordinary Commission, Dr. Prosorovsky, chief medico-forensic expert of the People’s Commissariat for the Care of Public Health in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Doctor of Medical Sciences, Smolianov, Professor of Forensic Medicine at the Second Moscow Medical Institute, and other specialists, conducted—from 1 to 16 October 1943—numerous exhumations and medico-legal autopsies on the corpses in Smolensk and the vicinity of Smolensk. A great many mass graves were opened which contained the corpses of such persons who had been killed during the German fascist occupation. The number of corpses which were found in these graves was between 500 and 4,500 at each place where such mass executions took place.
I shall read into the Record only such excerpts from the findings of the experts’ investigation as have a direct bearing on my subject. You will find the paragraph which I am now quoting on Page 61 of your document book, corresponding to Page 9 of our Exhibit Number USSR-56 (Document Number USSR-56).
“The corpses found in the pits were for the most part either partially or completely-naked, or else clothed in worn-out underwear; only in the minority of cases did the bodies disinterred wear clothes or military uniforms.”
It is stated in Paragraph 2 on the next page of the Document Number USSR-56—page 62 of the document book—Paragraph 2:
“Identity documents were found in 16 cases only—3 passports, 1 Red Army book, and 12 military identity ‘medallions.’ By ‘medallions’ I mean the small tube-like cases, not unlike a needle case in appearance, issued to each soldier in the Red Army. A document giving the soldier’s name, his father’s name, surname, and rank, together with his home address, is slipped into this tube.
“In some cases partly preserved articles of clothing and tattoo marks alone could help in establishing the identity of the deceased.”
This circumstance confirms the fact that the Germans endeavored to make the identification of their victims impossible, as demanded in special German directives. The first paragraph on Page 11 of Document Number 56, corresponding to your Page 63 in the document book, says:
“The autopsies performed on corpses taken from graves in the area of the large and small concentration camps at Plant 35, of the former German hospital for prisoners of war, of a sawmill, and of concentration camps near the villages of Becherskaya and Rakytna, revealed that, according to the data of the autopsies, death in an overwhelming majority of cases could be ascribed to hunger, starvation, and acute infectious diseases.
“An objective proof of death from starvation, over and above the total absence of all subcutaneous fatty tissues, as disclosed during the autopsies, was the discovery, in a number of cases, of grassy substances, remains of rough leaves and plant stalks in the abdominal cavity.”
On the same page, but rather lower down, in Paragraph 4, we read:
“The considerable number of burial-pits opened (87), filled with masses of corpses, together with the estimated differences in the time of burial, differences ranging from the second half of 1941, 1942, and 1943, testify to the systematic extermination of Soviet citizens.
“The victims, in an overwhelming majority of cases, were men and men mostly in the prime of life, that is, between the ages of 20 and 40.”
Somewhat lower, on the same page:
“Special attention was attracted by the fact that the exhumed corpses, with few exceptions, regularly lacked footwear. Clothing, too, was absent, as a rule, or consisted of worn-out underwear or parts of outer garments. The natural conclusion drawn from these facts is that the removal of clothes and footwear of any value had become the usual and officially recognized procedure preceding the extermination of Soviet citizens.”
In conclusion, the commission deals with the means of extermination, that is, shooting, asphyxiation by gas, and so forth. All this is not new to us and it is not necessary at present to read this part of the conclusion.
In our document, Exhibit Number USSR-6(c) (Document Number USSR-6(c)), minutes are quoted from the report of the medico-legal experts as well as the findings of the board of medical experts. We find them on Pages 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the document. I shall set forth, in brief, the contents of the minutes and shall quote a few words from the findings. According to the minutes, the Hitlerites had set up a large camp for prisoners of war in the town of Rawa-Ruska, 52 kilometers northeast from the city of Lvov. In this camp a large number of Soviet and French prisoners of war were interned, and there they perished; they were shot, died of infectious diseases, or starved to death. The commission of medico-legal experts opened up a large number of graves. Some of these graves had been camouflaged by green shrubs and grass. A considerable number of bodies unearthed were dressed in military or semi-military clothing. In some cases identity medallions of Red Army soldiers were discovered inside the clothes. The ages of the prisoners whose bodies were recovered from the graves ranged from 20 to 40 years.
It is said in the findings—the extract quoted is on Page 70 of the document book:
“The data of the autopsies performed on the exhumed bodies justify the conclusion that bodies of Soviet prisoners of war had, in effect, been buried in the forementioned graves. The burial was on a mass scale. The bodies were placed in each grave at a rate of 350-400 corpses (the grave measuring 7 by 4 meters), in layers, one layer on the other. The bodies were buried in the clothes they had worn at the time of death. The absence of footwear on all the corpses indicates that the Soviet prisoners, when alive, were kept unshod or else that their footwear was removed after death. The prisoners were interned in appallingly unsanitary conditions, since all the clothing found was vermin-infested. Judging by the clothes, death, in the majority of cases, must have occurred during the cold season of the year. Nevertheless, practically no warm clothing was found on any of the bodies. To escape the cold, the prisoners of war had dressed in two or three sets of summer uniforms, had wrapped themselves up in sacking, towels. . . .”
I omit a few sentences from this statement and wish to read into the Record the part dealing with the total number of corpses. It is on Page 70 of your document book:
“The number of graves (36), their size, and the number of bodies discovered justify us in believing that from 10,000 to 12,000 bodies of Soviet prisoners of war were buried in this area. The degree of their decomposition points to the fact that the corpses had been buried underground for about 3 years, that is, the time of burial must be placed somewhere in the late autumn or in the winter of 1941-1942.”
A special section of the report of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union for the determination and investigation of atrocities committed by the German fascist invaders in the city and region of Orel—which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-46 (Document Number USSR-46)—records the mass extermination of prisoners of war carried out over a long period of time.
The prisoner-of-war camp was set up in the city jail of Orel. After the Hitlerite invaders had been driven from Orel, the Extraordinary Commission was able to secure the testimony of doctors who had been in this camp and who had fortuitously escaped with their lives. Included in this report are the personal observations of a member of the Extraordinary State Committee, Academician Burdenko, who personally examined people liberated by the Red Army from the camp, from the camp premises, and from the so-called camp hospital. The general conclusion is that in the camp of Orel and in others the Hitlerites bodily exterminated the Soviet people with characteristic German thoroughness.
The prisoners received 200 grams of bread and a liter of soup made from rotten soy beans and moldy flour. The bread was baked with an admixture of sawdust. The camp administration, doctors included, treated the prisoners atrociously. I should like to quote a few excerpts from the report of the commission, and I shall start from Paragraph 5, Page 2 of the document, which you will find on Page 72 of the document book:
“The camp commander, Major Hoffmann, flogged the prisoners and forced persons exhausted by hunger to carry out heavy manual work in the local quarries and in the unloading of ammunition.
“Boots and shoes were taken from the prisoners and replaced by wooden clogs.
“In the winter these clogs became slippery and the prisoners, when walking, and especially when going up to the 2d and 3rd floor, would slip on the stairs and be lamed.”
Dr. H. I. Zvetkov, a former inmate of the prisoner-of-war camp, testified as follows. I quote, and you will find the excerpt quoted on Page 72 and at the beginning of Page 73:
“I can only describe the attitude of the German Command towards the prisoners of war, during my stay in the camp at Orel, as one of deliberate extermination of manpower in the person of the prisoners. The food ration, which at best contained a maximum of only 700 calories, led, when work was hard and beyond their strength, to complete exhaustion of the organism (cachexia) and to death. . . .
“Despite our categorical protests and our struggle against this mass murder of the people of the Soviet, the German camp doctors, Kuper and Beckel, maintained that the diet was perfectly satisfactory. Moreover, they denied that the oedemata from which so many of the prisoners suffered were due to starvation and quite calmly ascribed the condition entirely to heart or kidney troubles. The very mention of the term ‘hunger oedema’ was forbidden in the diagnosis. Mortality in the camp assumed mass proportions. Of the total number of persons murdered, 3,000 died of starvation and of complications arising from malnutrition.
“The prisoners lived in indescribably appalling conditions. The overcrowding was incredible. Fuel and water were completely lacking. Everything was infested by vermin. From 50 to 80 people were crammed into a ward 15 to 20 square meters in size. Prisoners would die at the rate of five or six per ward, and the living would have to sleep on the dead.”
It is further said that a particularly terrible regime existed for those included in the category of recalcitrants. They were put into a special building, named the death block. The inmates of this block were shot on schedule, five to six persons being taken to execution every Tuesday and Friday. The German physician Kuper was one of those present at the shootings. Academician Burdenko established that in the so-called hospital people were exterminated in the same manner as in the rest of the camp.
In the penultimate paragraph, on Page 3, we read—members of the Tribunal will find this passage on Page 73 of the document book:
“The scenes which I had to witness defy all imagination. My joy at the sight of the liberated people was marred by the fact that their faces bore an expression of utter stupor. This made me think, ‘What is the matter here?’ Evidently the sufferings they had undergone erased from their minds all distinction between life and death.
“I observed these people for 3 days and bandaged their wounds while moving them from the camp, but the mental stupor remained. Something similar could also be seen on the faces of the doctors during the first few days.
“People perished in the camp from disease, starvation, and floggings. In the so-called ‘hospital’ prison they died of wound-infection, sepsis, and starvation.”
On the 2d day of May 1945, there was captured in Berlin a member of the SS, Paul Ludwig Gottlieb Waldmann. The son of a shopkeeper, Ludwig Waldmann, he was born in Berlin on 17 October 1914. From information received, his mother, up to the time of his capture, was living in the city of Brunswick, Donnerburweg 60.
He testified personally to facts known to him regarding the mass extermination of Soviet prisoners of war. He witnessed these exterminations while working as a driver in different camps and himself participated in the mass killings. His testimony is on Page 9 of Exhibit Number USSR-52 (Document Number USSR-52), entitled, “Camp Auschwitz.” He provides more detailed information on the murders in the camp at Sachsenhausen.
Towards the end of summer 1941, the Sonderkommando of the Security Police in this camp exterminated Russian prisoners of war daily for a whole month. Paul Ludwig Gottlieb Waldmann testified—you will find the excerpt I am quoting on Page 82—that:
“The Russian prisoners of war had to walk about one kilometer from the station to the camp. In the camp they stayed one night without food. The next night they were led away for execution. The prisoners were constantly being transferred from the inner camp on three trucks, one of which was driven by me. The inner camp was approximately one and three-quarters of a kilometer from the execution grounds. The execution itself took place in the barracks which had recently been constructed for this purpose.
“One room was reserved for undressing and another for waiting; in one of them a radio played rather loudly. It was done purposely so that the prisoners could not guess that death awaited them. From the second room they went, one by one, through a passage into a small fenced-in room with an iron grid let into the floor. Under the grid was a drain. As soon as a prisoner of war was killed, the corpse was carried out by two German prisoners while the blood was washed off the grid.
“In this small room there was a slot in the wall, approximately 50 centimeters in length. The prisoner of war stood with the back of his head against the slot and a sniper shot at him from behind the slot since the sniper often missed the prisoner. After 8 days a new arrangement was made. The prisoner, as before, was placed against the wall; an iron plate was then slowly lowered onto his head. The prisoner was under the impression that he was being measured for height. The iron plate contained a ramrod which shot out suddenly and pole-axed the prisoner with a blow on the back of the head. He dropped dead. The iron plate was operated by a foot lever in a corner of the room. The personnel working in the room belonged to the above-mentioned Sonderkommando.
“By request of the execution squad, I was also forced to work this apparatus. I shall refer to the subject later. The bodies of prisoners thus murdered were burned in four mobile crematories transported in trailers and attached to motor cars. I had to ride constantly from the inner camp to the execution yard. I had to make 10 trips a night with 10 minutes’ interval between trips. It was during these intervals that I witnessed the executions. . . .”
It is a long way from these individual murders to the death factories of Treblinka, Dachau, and Auschwitz, but the tendency, the line of action are identical. Methods and extent of the killings varied. The Hitlerites endeavored to discover ways and means for the rapid mass extermination of human beings. They spent much time on the solution of this problem. To realize their ambition they began to work on the solution even prior to their attack on the Soviet Union by inventing different implements and instruments of murder, while peaceful inhabitants and prisoners of war alike ended up as victims of Hitler’s executioners.
I present to the Tribunal the report of the Extraordinary Commission on the German atrocities in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. This is Exhibit Number USSR-7 (Document Number USSR-7). Here, as in other places, the mass extermination of Soviet prisoners of war formed part of the savage plan of the fascist aggressors. I shall quote a few sentences from Page 6 of this document. In your copy it is marked with pencil, on Page 86 of the document book:
“In Kaunas, in Fort Number 6, there was a camp, Number 336, for Soviet prisoners of war. The prisoners in the camp were subjected to cruel torture and insult, in strict accordance with the inhuman ‘directions to the supervisors and escorts attached to labor detachments.’ The prisoners of war in Fort Number 6 were doomed to inanition and death from starvation.
“The witness, Medishevskaja, informed the Commission: ‘The prisoners of war were terribly starved; I saw them pluck grass and eat it.’”
I omit a few sentences and read on:
“At the entrance to Camp Number 336, there still exists a board with the following inscription in German, Lithuanian, and Russian: ‘All those who maintain contact with prisoners of war, especially those who try to give them food, cigarettes, or civilian clothes, will be shot!’
“There was in the camp at Fort Number 6 a ‘hospital’ for prisoners of war which in reality served as a point of transfer from the camp to the grave. The prisoners of war thrown into this ‘hospital’ were doomed to death.
“According to monthly statistics of sickness among the prisoners of war in Fort Number 6, from September 1941 to July 1942, that is, over a period of 11 months only, the number of dead Soviet prisoners amounted to 13,936.”
I shall abstain from reading the list of graves opened; I shall merely quote the sentence indicating the sum total of the graves. “All told, 35,000 prisoners of war were buried in these graves, according to the camp documents.”
Besides Camp Number 336, in the same town of Kaunas, there existed another, unnumbered camp on the southwestern border of the airfield. It is stated, in connection with this camp, that:
“As in Fort Number 6, starvation, the lash, and the truncheon reigned in this camp. Exhausted prisoners of war, no longer able to move, were carried out every day beyond the precincts of the camp, placed alive in previously prepared pits, and covered with earth.”
The last three lines of the left column, on Page 6 of the Document. Number USSR-7—Page 86 of your document book—state as follows:
“The records, documents, and testimonies of witnesses enabled the commission to establish that here, within the precincts of the airfield, nearly 10,000 Soviet prisoners had been tortured to death and buried.”
The report mentions one more camp, Number 133, near the town of Alitus, and a few more which had been established in July 1941 and existed up to April 1943. In these camps the prisoners froze to death. When unloaded from the railway coaches, such prisoners of war who were unable to walk were shot out of hand. The remaining prisoners were tortured until they lost consciousness, hanged by their feet on chains, brought back to consciousness by having cold water dashed over them; then the whole process would be repeated all over again.
Giving the sum total of prisoners murdered, the commission writes—the few lines which I am about to quote are likewise on the same page, 86, of the document book:
“It had been established that no less than 165,000 Soviet prisoners of war were executed by the Germans in the above-mentioned camps of the Lithuanian S.S.R.”
The extermination of Soviet prisoners of war was, quite literally, carried out in every camp. Thousands of Soviet soldiers likewise perished in the extermination camp of Maidanek. The second paragraph of Page 5 of the joint Polish and Soviet communiqué of the Extraordinary Commission, which is presented to you as Exhibit Number USSR-29 (Document Number USSR-29)—corresponding to your Page 92 of the document book—states that:
“The entire bloodstained history of this camp begins with the mass shooting of Soviet prisoners of war, organized by the SS in November and December 1941. Out of a group of 2,000 Soviet war prisoners, only 80 remained alive. All the rest were shot except a few who were racked and tortured to death.
“Between January and April 1942 more transports of Soviet prisoners of war were brought to the camp and shot. Nedzelek Jan, hired to work in the camp as a truck driver, testified:
“‘About 5,000 Russian prisoners of war were exterminated by the Germans in the winter of 1942 by the following method: They were taken from their barracks in trucks and driven to the pits of a former stone quarry, and in these pits they were shot.’
“Prisoners of war of the former Polish Army, captured as far back as 1939 and imprisoned in various German camps, were already concentrated, in 1940, in the Lublin camp on Lipovoja Street and were soon after transferred, in batches, to the extermination camp of Maidanek, where they suffered the same fate: systematic torture, murder, mass shooting, et cetera.
“The witness, Reznik, testified as follows:
“‘In January 1941, we, a party of approximately 4,000 Jewish prisoners of war, were placed into railway coaches and sent to the East. . . . We were brought to Lublin, unloaded and handed over to the SS. About September or October 1942, it was decided that only those people who were qualified as skilled plant and factory workers, and therefore needed in the town, were to be left in the camp on Number 7 Lipovoja Street, while the rest, and I among them, were transferred to Maidanek Camp. All of us already knew—and knew far too well—that deportation to Maidanek meant death. Of this party of more than 4,000 prisoners of war, only a few individuals, who had managed to escape while engaged in work outside the camp, remained alive.
“‘In the summer of 1943, 300 Soviet officers, including two colonels, four majors, with the remainder consisting of captains and senior lieutenants, were brought to Maidanek. The officers in question were shot in the camp.’”
Huge camps for the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war had been organized by German fascists in the territory of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. The report of the Extraordinary State Commission for the investigation of atrocities committed by the German invaders on the territory of this republic—we present to the Tribunal this report as Exhibit Number USSR-41 (Document Number USSR-41)—contains the following data on the extermination of 327,000 Soviet prisoners of war. I quote excerpts from Page 7, on the right column of the above-mentioned report. You, Sir, as well as the other members of the Tribunal, will find the excerpt on Page 97 of the document book:
“In Riga, the Germans organized a camp, Stalag 350, for Soviet prisoners of war, on the premises of the former barracks on Pernovskaja and Rudolf Streets, which existed from July 1941 to October 1944. There Soviet prisoners of war were kept in inhuman conditions. The building where they were lodged had neither windows nor heat. In spite of heavy forced labor from 12 to 14 hours a day, their rations consisted only of 150-200 grams of bread and so-called soup made of grass, rotten potatoes, leaves of trees, and other refuse.”
In my opinion, it is necessary to stress the monotony of the rations issued to the prisoners of war. Testimonies given by witnesses coincide entirely with the official directive on the quantities of food allotted to the prisoners of war, which I have already read into the Record today.
A former prisoner of war, P. F. Yakovenko, who was imprisoned in Stalag 350, testified—this is on Page 97 in your document book; forgive me, I forgot to mention it:
“We were given 180 grams of bread, half consisting of sawdust and straw, one liter of unsalted soup made of unpeeled rotten potatoes. We slept on the bare ground and were eaten up by lice. Between December 1941 to May 1942, 30,000 prisoners of war perished in this camp from starvation, cold, flogging, typhus, and shooting. The Germans daily shot prisoners of war who, owing to weakness or illness, were unable to go to work; they mocked at them and beat them without any reason at all.”
G. B. Novitzkis, who had worked as senior nurse in the hospital for Soviet prisoners of war in Number 1, Gymnastitcheskaya Street, testified that she had repeatedly seen patients eat grass and tree leaves in order to quell the pangs of hunger.
“In sections of Stalag 350, on the territory of a former brewery, and in the Panzer barracks, over 19,000 persons perished between September 1941 and April 1942 alone, of starvation, torture, and epidemics. The Germans also shot wounded prisoners of war. In addition, Soviet prisoners of war perished en route to the camp, since the Germans left them without food or water.”
A female witness, A.V. Taukulis testified:
“In the fall of 1941 a transport of Soviet prisoners of war, consisting of 50-60 coaches, arrived at the station of Salaspils. When the cars were opened, the stench of corpses spread over a great distance. Half the men were dead; many were at the point of death. Men who were able to climb out of the coaches dashed towards water, but the guards opened fire and shot a score or two of them.”
I shall not enumerate other facts which took place in Stalag 350, I shall merely read into the Record the final sentence, referring to this camp. I fear that there is a misprint in this sentence in your document book. If I am not mistaken, your document book mentions the shooting of 120,000 Soviet prisoners. This figure is inaccurate; in the original document, which I shall now read into the Record, another figure is mentioned, “In Stalag 350 and in its branches, the Germans tortured to death and shot over 130,000 Soviet prisoners of war.”
On Page 97 of your document book you can find the following part of this report:
“There was a camp for Soviet prisoners of war, Stalag 340, in Daugavpilce (Dvinsk), known among the internees and the town’s inhabitants as the ‘Death Camp,’ where in 3 years over 124,000 Soviet prisoners of war perished from starvation, tortures, and shootings.”
The butchering of prisoners of war by German executioners usually began on the way to the camp. In the summer, prisoners of war were transported in tightly-closed wagons, in winter in freight coaches and on platform trucks. Masses of prisoners perished from hunger and thirst. They suffocated in the summer; they froze in the winter.
Witness T.K. Ussenko stated:
“In November 1941 I was on duty, as signalman, at the station of Most, and I saw a transport, consisting of more than 30 coaches, move into the ‘Kilometer 217’ siding”—this was the name given to that particular part of the track—“Not a living soul was discovered in the coaches. No fewer than 1,500 dead bodies were unloaded from this transport. They were dressed in nothing but their underclothes. The corpses lay around the railway track for nearly a week.”
The hospital attached to the camp was likewise dedicated to the extermination of prisoners of war. Schoolteacher V. A. Efimova, who worked at the hospital, told the Commission:
“It was rarely that any one left this hospital alive. Five shifts of grave-diggers, selected from among the prisoners, carried the dead to the cemetery in handcarts. It frequently happened that a man who was still alive would be thrown into the cart and six to seven corpses or bodies of executed people piled on top of him. The living were buried with the dead. At the hospital sick people, tossing in delirium, were bludgeoned to death.”
When an epidemic broke out in the camp, the Hitlerites drove to the airfield all the prisoners from any barrack where typhus patients had been discovered and shot them. About 45,000 Soviet prisoners of war were thus exterminated.
Appalling facts are quoted in the documents of the Extraordinary State Commission, which investigated the crimes of the German fascist invaders in the neighborhood of Sevastopol, Kerch, and at the health resort of Teberda. I shall read into the Record some data from our Exhibit Number USSR-63(5) (Document Number USSR-63(5)). At the Sevastopol prison, the German fascist command organized a hospital for sick and wounded prisoners of war. Here the Soviet warriors perished in masses. I shall quote a few sentences, which you will find in your document book on Page 99:
“At the time the hospital was organized, the sick and wounded were not given any water or bread for 5 or 6 days by the Germans, who cynically said: ‘This is the punishment for the specially stubborn defense of Sevastopol by the Russians.’
“The wounded brought in from the battlefield were given no medical aid. Soldiers and officers were thrown on the cement floor, where they lay bleeding for 7 and 8 days on end.
“During the defense of Sevastopol, a military hospital and a medico-sanitary battalion, Number 47, were installed in the vaults of the champagne factory at Inkermann. After the retreat of the Red Army, a large number of wounded soldiers and officers were left behind in Vault Numbers 10, 11, 12, and 13, since there had been no time to evacuate them. When the German savages captured the factory, they all became drunk and set fire to the vaults.”
I omit a whole number of facts, the majority of which, strictly speaking, should have been specially reported to the Tribunal. I pass on to the description of the last crime mentioned in the statement of the commission. I pay special attention to it because it describes the brutal extermination of a very large number of wounded Red Army soldiers. You will also find this excerpt on Page 99 of your document book:
“On 4 December 1943 there arrived at the station of Sevastopol, from the city of Kerch, three transports of wounded prisoners of war belonging to the Kerch landing forces. Having loaded them on a 2,500-ton barge moored in the southern bay near the landing stage, the Germans set fire to it. The heart-rending screams of the prisoners filled the air. Women who were not far from the barge could render no assistance to the wounded, since they were driven from the site of the fire by gendarmes. Not more than 15 men were saved. Thousands perished in the fire.
“On the following day the same barge was loaded with 2,000 men from among the wounded brought from Kerch. The barge sailed from Sevastopol in an unknown direction, and all the wounded in it were drowned at sea.”
I repeat that I am omitting a considerable number of facts established by the commission.
There is but little difference in character between the documentary evidence already read into the Record and the data on the atrocities perpetrated by the German fascist invaders on Soviet prisoners of war in the region of Stalino. In our Number USSR-2(a) we find, among a lot of other documents, two documents about the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war. The first document is dated Stalino, 22 September 1943, and is submitted by a special commission with the President of the Stalinozavodsk Regional Council of Workers’ Deputies at its head. I shall read into the Record that part of the document which contains items of interest to us. The official report begins in the left-hand column of Page 3 of Document USSR-2(a), and the extracts which I am reading into the Record are printed on Page 108 of your document book:
“The circumstances of the case: In the Stalinozavodsk district of the town of Stalino, in the Lenin Club, the German fascist invaders organized a camp for Soviet prisoners of war; at times there were up to 20,000 men in this camp; the camp commandant, a German officer named Gavbel, established an intolerable diet for the Soviet prisoners of war.
“Examined as witnesses, Ivan Vasilyetch Plakhoff and Konstantin Semyonovitch Shatzky, former prisoners of war who had been interned in this camp and managed to escape, testified that prisoners of war were starved; a loaf of bread weighing 1,200 grams and made of poor-quality, burned flour was issued to eight men; once a day one liter of hot liquid food was issued, consisting of a small quantity of burned bran, occasionally mixed with sawdust. The premises in which the prisoners of war were housed had no glass in their windows; in summer and winter alike, even in the coldest weather, only 5 kilograms of coal per day were allowed for heating purposes. This amount could not, of course, heat the vast premises where up to a thousand prisoners lived in a perpetual draught. Mass cases of frostbite were observed. There were no baths. Generally speaking, people did not wash for 6 months and were overrun by enormous quantities of vermin. In the hot summer months the prisoners suffered from the heat. They were left without drinking water for 3 to 5 days on end.”
The regime in the camp organized in the region of Stalinozavodsk was, as is clear from the extracts read into the Record, precisely the same as the regime in other German prisoner-of-war camps. This has been proved beyond all doubt by the discovery of general directives.
The following excerpt shows that, over and above these directives, camp commanders had opportunities for committing atrocities themselves, each man according to his own particular method, and yet remained unpunished. On Page 105 of your document book you will find the following extract which I am now quoting:
“Prisoners of war were beaten with sticks and rifle butts on the slightest provocation, and a punishment of 720 strokes with the lash was imposed for any attempt at escape; the strokes were administered over a period of 8 days—30 strokes of the lash at a time—morning, noon, and evening. At the same time, the culprits were deprived of their bread ration, while the liquid ration was halved.”
Mortality in the camp following this regime was enormous. In winter, up to 200 persons died every day. Epidemics broke out in the camp. Numerous cases of oedemata—the result of hunger and death by starvation—were registered.
The guards derived much pleasure in degrading the prisoners of war by setting one against the other. Thus Shatzky testified that he was flogged by German policemen, receiving 120 strokes with the lash and 15 with sticks, for disobeying the order to flog his fellow prisoners of war. The floggings were supervised by German officers.
Provisions brought by civilians for handing to the prisoners of war did not reach them. The commission came to the conclusion that no fewer than 25,000 Soviet prisoners of war were buried in the grounds of the camp and of the central polyclinic. This conclusion is based on the measurement and number of graves and on the evidence of witnesses.
Mass killings and murders of prisoners of war were also organized by the German fascist invaders in another town in the Don Basin, Artemovsk. A special commission, consisting of the military prosecutor of the town of Artemovsk, of the priest of the Pokrovskaya Church, Ziumin, of representatives of the intelligentsia, public organizations, and army units, drew up an official report on the mass murders of Soviet prisoners of war organized by the fascist invaders. This official report is on Page 4 of Exhibit Number USSR-2(a). It is also on Page 105 of your document book. It is said in the report:
“In November 1941, soon after the occupation of the town of Artemovsk by German fascist invaders, a prisoner-of-war camp was established in the territory of the small military town lying beyond the northern station, housing 1,000 captured Red Army prisoners of war.”
I omit one paragraph and pass on to the question of living conditions in the camp:
“In the spring of 1942 prisoners of war, driven desperate by hunger, used to leave the camp and, creeping on all fours like animals, plucked and ate grass. In order to deprive the men even of this modicum of food, the Germans fenced off the camp building by a double row of barbed wire, with a distance of 2 meters between the rows and barbed wire entanglements placed between them.”
I omit one paragraph and am preparing to read the conclusions into the Record:
“Twenty-five graves were discovered near the camp—three of them mass graves. The first grave measured 20 by 15 meters; it contained the remains of about 1,000 corpses. The second grave measured 27 by 14 meters and contained the remains of about 900 corpses. In the third grave, 20 meters by 1, the remains of up to 500 corpses were discovered; and in the remaining graves, from 25 to 30 in each, making up, all told, a total of some 3,000 corpses.”
In the neighborhood of the small farm of Vertyatchy, in the Goroditschtchensky region of the Stalingrad area, the Hitlerites established a prisoner-of-war camp. Here, as in other camps, and with their customary and characteristic sadism, they exterminated the war prisoners of the Red Army.
I present to you, as evidence, our Exhibit Number USSR-63(3) (Document Number USSR-63(3)), which contains an official report of 21 June 1943. It is duly drawn up and certified and contains the following information—this is on Page 110 of the document book:
“As a result of the atrocious regime, at least 1,500 Soviet prisoners of war perished of starvation, torture, sickness, and executions in the camp near Vertyatchy, during the 3½ months of its existence.
“The Germans forced the prisoners to work from 14 to 16 hours per day, and fed them once a day, the ration consisting of 3 to 4 spoonfuls of stewed rye or a ladleful of unsalted rye soup together with a piece of horse carrion.
“A few days before the arrival of the Red Army the Germans ceased to feed the prisoners altogether and condemned them to death by starvation. Nearly all the prisoners suffered from dysentery. Many had open wounds, but the prisoners received no medical assistance whatsoever.”
I omit one paragraph and pass on to the next, which deals with the humiliating treatment of prisoners of war:
“Germans mocked the patriotism of the Soviet prisoners of war by forcing them to work on German military constructions, to dig trenches and dugouts, and to build mud huts and shelters for military technical equipment. The Hitlerites systematically humiliated Soviet prisoners of war by making them kneel before the Germans.”
It is noted in the official report that the commission examined material evidence: tools used for the torture of Soviet prisoners of war, a leather thong and dagger, picked up among the disarmed bodies, with the well-known Hitlerite slogan “Blood and Honor” (“Blut und Ehre”). The circumstances in which the dagger was discovered give every possibility of understanding what was meant by German “honor” and for whose blood the dagger was intended.
The documents of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union relating to the town of Kerch describe the characteristic crimes of the Hitlerite invaders. I submit to the Tribunal the documents of the Extraordinary State Commission as Exhibit Number USSR-63(6) (Document Number USSR-63(6)), and I shall read several extracts into the Record. In your copy they are all marked so as to enable the Tribunal to follow the text quoted—Page 115.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might break off now.
[A recess was taken.]
COL. POKROVSKY: On Page 115 of the document book you will find the excerpt I am about to quote from the testimony of Citizeness P. Y. Bulytchyeva:
“Citizeness P. Y. Bulytchyeva, born in the city of Kerch in 1894, testified:
“‘I witnessed how our Red Army prisoners of war, both soldiers and officers, were repeatedly driven along the street and how the weak and wounded were shot out of hand by Germans in the street itself when, through sheer debility, they fell out of the ranks. Many times I witnessed this terrible scene. Once, in the freezing cold, I saw a group of exhausted, ragged, and barefooted prisoners driven along. Those who attempted to snatch the pieces of bread thrown to them by the citizens were beaten up with rubber truncheons and rifle butts. Those who fell under the blows were promptly shot.’”
I am omitting a few sentences which, in my opinion, need not be read into the Record.
“At the time of the second occupation, when the Germans broke into Kerch again, they began to avenge themselves with even greater fury on perfectly innocent people.”
The witness testifies that the fascist butchers first of all avenged themselves on the military personnel and that they beat wounded soldiers to death with rifle butts. On the same page, 115, you will find the following excerpt:
“The prisoners of war were driven into large buildings, which were then set on fire. Thus, the Voikov school was burned down, together with the club for engineering and technical workers containing 400 soldiers and officers of the Red Army.
“Not a man succeeded in escaping from the burning building. All those who attempted to save themselves were mowed down by machine gun fire.
“Wounded soldiers were savagely tortured to death in the small fishing village of Mayak.”
Another woman witness who lived in this village, A. P. Buryatchenko, testified:
“On 28 May 1942 the Germans shot all the peaceful inhabitants who had remained in the village and had not succeeded in hiding. The fascist monsters mistreated the wounded Soviet prisoners of war, beat them with rifle butts, and then shot them. In my home, the Germans discovered a girl in military uniform, who resisted the fascists, crying, ‘Shoot, you vipers, I die for the Soviet people and for Stalin, but you, you monsters, will die a dog’s death.’ This girl patriot was shot on the spot.”
There is, in the district of Kerch, the stone quarry of Adjimushkaisk. Red Army soldiers were exterminated and poisoned by gas. N. N. Dashkova, a woman from the village of Adjimushkaisk, testified:
“I myself saw the Germans, who had caught about 900 Red Army soldiers in the quarry, first ill-treat and then shoot them. The fascists used gas.”
I omit several sentences. On the same page, 115, you will find the following quotation:
“At the time of the occupation a camp for Soviet prisoners of war, housing over 1,000 captives, was set up in the Engels Club. The Germans ill-treated them, fed them only once a day, drove them off to heavy labor beyond their strength, and shot on the spot all those who, exhausted, fell by the road.”
I consider it essential to quote a few more testimonies. N. J. Shumilova, a woman from the hamlet of Gorki, testified:
“I myself saw a group of prisoners of war being led past my courtyard. Three of them were unable to move and were promptly shot by the German escort.”
P. I. Gerassimenko, a woman living in the hamlet of Samostroy, testified:
“Many Red Army soldiers and officers were driven to our village. The area which they occupied was surrounded by barbed wire. Here, naked and barefoot, they perished from cold and hunger. They were kept in the most frightful and inhumane conditions. By the side of the living lay the bodies of the dead, and these bodies were not moved for days on end. Such conditions rendered life in the camp still more intolerable. The prisoners were beaten with rifle butts, flogged by the lash, and fed on refuse. Any inhabitant who attempted to give food and bread to the prisoners was beaten up, while prisoners attempting to hand over these gifts were shot.”
In a Kerch school, Number 24, the Germans set up a camp for prisoners of war. A. N. Naumova, a school teacher, testified as follows concerning the regime in the camp:
“There were many wounded in the camp. These unhappy people, though bleeding profusely, were left without any help. I collected medicine and bandages for the wounded, and their wounds were dressed by a medical orderly from among the captives. The prisoners suffered from dysentery since they were fed hog-wash instead of bread. People dropped from exhaustion and disease; they died in agony. On 20 June 1942 three prisoners of war were given the lash for attempting to escape from the camp. The wounded were shot. In June one of the escaped prisoners was caught and executed.”
Koshenikove, a teacher in the Stalin School, in the area of the factory kitchen and Voikov works, witnessed the execution of a group of Red Army men and officers. In 1943 the German criminals drove Red Army prisoners all the way from the Caucasus. The entire road from the ferry to the town, a distance of some 18 to 20 kilometers, was littered with the dead bodies of Red Army men. There were many sick and wounded among the prisoners of war. Whoever was unable to walk, either through exhaustion or sickness, was shot on the way.
Among other facts there is one which deserves special attention:
In 1942 the fascists threw 100 Red Army prisoners of war, alive, into the village well of Adjimushkray; their bodies were subsequently extracted by the inhabitants and buried in a communal grave in the sacred brotherhood of death. This information is contained in the same report, extracts of which I have just quoted to you.
On 29 January 1946 the witness, Paul Roser, was cross-examined here before the Tribunal. He testified that in the course of 4 months, out of 10,000 Russians, whom he had seen as prisoners of war in the German camp at the city of Rawa-Ruska, only 2,000 remained alive.
We possess evidence from yet another eyewitness of the numerous atrocities and endless tortures inflicted on the prisoners of war at Rawa-Ruska. Witness V. S. Kotchan, who was duly interrogated according to the procedure prescribed by our laws, testified before the captain of the guard of justice, Ryshov, on 27 September 1944—the minutes of his interrogation are hereby submitted to you as Exhibit Number USSR-6(c) (Document Number USSR-6(c)):
“I worked under the Germans as a digger at the prisoner-of-war camp for Red Army soldiers, from December 1941 to April 1942.”
This is on Page 124 of the document book. I omit a few lines irrelevant to the matter, and I quote further:
“This camp was set up by the Germans in the barracks near the railway. The entire area of the camp was surrounded by barbed wire. According to personal statements by the prisoners of war, the Germans drove from 12,000 to 15,000 men into this camp. While we were working, we watched the Germans mock the Red Army prisoners of war. They fed them once a day on unpeeled, frozen potatoes baked in their skins and covered with dirt. They kept the prisoners of war in the cold barracks all through the winter.
“I know for a fact that, when the Germans drove the prisoners of war into this camp, all clothes, overcoats, boots, and shoes which were at all serviceable were taken from the prisoners, leaving them barefoot and in rags. The prisoners of war were taken to work daily under escort from 4 to 5 in the morning and kept working until 10 o’clock at night. Then, worn out, cold, and hungry, the prisoners were marched back to their barracks, where doors and windows had purposely been left open all day so that the frost might enter these barracks and freeze the prisoners to death. In the morning, under the supervision of German soldiers, hundreds of corpses would be taken away in a tractor by the prisoners of war; they were buried in previously-prepared pits in the forest of Volkovitch. When the prisoners were marched off to work in the morning, under escort, the Germans would place a detachment of soldiers armed with rifles and stakes by the exit gates of the camp; they pole-axed them with stakes, stabbed them with bayonets, and chased the hungry and exhausted prisoners who were unable to move properly.”
The same witness describes also some other German atrocities:
“The German camp administration brought out completely-naked prisoners of war, bound them with ropes to a wall surrounded by barbed wire and kept them there, in the cold of the December winter, until they froze to death. The air of the camp resounded continually with the groans and cries of people maimed by rifle butts. Some were pole-axed with rifle butts on the spot.
“When, starving and exhausted, the prisoners were brought to the camp, they would hurl themselves on a heap of rotten and frozen potatoes. This, in turn, would be followed by a shot from the German escort.”
I present to the Tribunal, under the same Number USSR-6(c)—Page 120 of the document book—the deposition of a French prisoner of war, Emilie Leger, a soldier of the 43rd Colonial Infantry Regiment, Serial Number 29. In his deposition the camp at Rawa-Ruska is called the “famous camp of lingering death, Stalag 325.”
It appears to me that this phrase serves, as it were, as a supplement to the testimonies of witnesses Roser and Kochau. The Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal a considerable quantity of material disclosing as well numerous crimes of the Hitlerite invaders perpetrated against prisoners of war in the territory of the Lvov district.
It seems to me sufficient to read into the Record extracts from the evidence submitted by D. Sh. Manussevitch, and I wish to state that this evidence is confirmed by the testimony of two other witnesses: F. G. Ash and G. Y. Khamaydes. I am presenting all three documents as Document Number USSR-6(c).
Witnesses Manussevitch, Ash, and Khamaydes worked for some time in the detachment which cremated the dead bodies of men shot by the Germans in the region of Lvov and particularly in the Lissenitzky camps. Witness Manussevitch states—I quote, beginning with Line 20 at the bottom of Page 2 of our Number 6(c), and on Page 129 of your document book:
“When we (the Brigade of Death) had completed the cremation of the corpses, we were conveyed at night in cars to the Lissenitzky forest, opposite the yeast factory at Lvov. There were about 45 pits in this forest, containing the bodies of people previously shot in 1941-42. There were between 500 and 3,500 bodies in the pits. These were not only the bodies of soldiers of the Italian, French, Belgian, and Russian armies, that is, of prisoners of war, but of peaceful inhabitants as well. All the prisoners of war were buried in their clothes. Therefore, when digging them out of the pits, I could recognize the dead by their uniforms, insignia, buttons, medals, and decorations, as well as by their spoons and mess cups. All these were burned once the corpses had been exhumed. As in the camp at Yanovsky, grass was sown on the site of the pits, and trees and dead tree trunks were planted so as to erase any trace of the crimes, which are certainly unprecedented in the history of mankind.”
In addition to the testimony of the victims and of many Soviet citizens we have at our disposal the testimonies of members of the German Armed Forces. I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-62 (Document Number USSR-62) a document which was signed by more than 60 persons belonging to different units and branches of the German Army. We find their signature on written protests addressed to the International Red Cross in January 1942. We also have a communication of the International Red Cross acknowledging the receipt of this document. In this letter they mentioned facts relating to the criminal treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, of which they had personal knowledge. The persons who signed this protest were themselves prisoners of war at Soviet Camp Number 78. Their protest is the result of the comparison made by the authors of the document between the treatment meted out to Soviet prisoners, which they had seen for themselves, and the treatment they received at Camp Number 78. I will quote a few excerpts from this document—the text with the following words—Page 135 of the document book:
“We, the German prisoners of war of Camp Number 78, have read the note by the Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, Mr. Molotov, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in Germany. We might consider the cruelties described in that note as impossible had we not witnessed such atrocities for ourselves. In order that truth should prevail, we must confirm that prisoners of war—citizens of the Soviet Union—were often subjected to terrible ill-treatment by representatives of the German Army and were even shot by them.”
Concrete examples of crimes known to the authors are quoted further on in the text. Hans Drews, of Regenwalde, a soldier of Company 4 of the 6th Tank Regiment, stated:
“I am acquainted with the order issued by Lieutenant General Model to the 3rd Tank Division to the effect that prisoners should not be taken. A similar order was issued by Major General Nehring, commanding officer of the 18th Tank Division. Two days prior to the attack on Russia we were told at the briefing session of 20 June that in the forthcoming campaign wounded Red Army men should not have their wounds dressed, since the German Army would have no time to bother with the wounded.”
The fact of the preliminary issuance of this order also has been confirmed by a soldier of the 18th Tank Division Headquarters, Harry Marek, a native of the neighborhood of Breslau:
“On 21 June, a day before the beginning of the war against Russia, we received the following order from our offices:
“‘The commissars of the Red Army are to be shot on the spot, since there is no need to stand upon any ceremony with them. Neither is there any necessity to bother ourselves unduly with the Russian wounded; they must be finished off immediately.’”
Wilhelm Metzick, a soldier of the 399th Infantry Regiment of the 170th Division, from Hamburg-Altona, quotes the following case:
“On 23 June, when we entered Russia, we came to a small hamlet near Beltsa. There I saw with my own eyes how two German soldiers shot five Russian prisoners in the back with submachine guns.”
Wolfgang Scharte, a soldier in Company 2 of the 3rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, a native of Gerhardtschagen, near Brunswick, testified concerning the question of exterminating the Red commissars of the Red Army:
“On the day before we opened the campaign against the Soviet Union, the officers told us:
“‘If on the way you should happen to meet Russian commissars—they can always be recognized by the Soviet star on their sleeve—and Russian women in uniform, they must be shot immediately. Anyone failing to do so and to comply with this order will be held responsible and punished.’
“On 29 June I myself saw representatives of the German Army shoot wounded Red Army men lying in a field of grain near the town of Dubno. After this they were run through with bayonets to make quite sure that they were dead. German officers stood nearby and laughed.”
Joseph Berndsen of Oberhausen, a soldier of the 6th Tank Division, stated; “Even before entering Russia we were told, at one of the briefing sessions, ‘Commissars must be shot.’”
Jacob Korzillias, of Horforst, near Treves, a German officer, a lieutenant of the 112th Engineer Battalion of the 112th Infantry Division, certified:
“In a village near Bolva, 15 wounded Red Army men were thrown out of the hut where they were lying, stripped, and bayonetted on the order of Lieutenant Kierick, adjutant of the 112th Engineer Battalion. This was done with the knowledge of the division commander, Lieutenant General Mitt.”
Alois Goetz, from Hagenbach-am-Rhine, a soldier of Company 8 of the 427th Infantry Regiment, stated, “On 27 June, in a forest near Augustovo, two Red Army commissars were shot on the order of the battalion commander, Captain Wittmann.”
On Page 3 of our Exhibit Number USSR-62 we find the following statement by Paul Sender of Königsberg, a soldier of the 4th Platoon of Company 13, Infantry Field Artillery, attached to the 2d Infantry Regiment—Page 137 of the document book:
“On 14 July, on the road between Porchov and Staraya-Russa, Corporal Schneider, of Company 1 of the 2d Infantry Regiment, shot 12 captured Red Army men in the gutter. When I questioned him on the matter, Schneider answered, ‘Why should I bother with them? They are not even worth a bullet.’ I also know of another case.
“During the battles around Porchov, a Red Army man was captured. Shortly after he was shot by a corporal of Company 1. As soon as the Red Army soldier fell, the corporal took from his knapsack all the food in it.”
To conclude the reading of excerpts from the protest of the German prisoners of war, I should like to quote two more depositions by Fritz Rummler and Richard Gillig, respectively. We find their depositions at the bottom of Page 4. Fritz Rummler, a native of Strehlen in Silesia and a corporal of Company 9, Battalion 3, of the 518th Regiment of the 295th Infantry Division, reported the following cases—this excerpt is on Page 138 of the document book:
“In August, in the town of Zlatopol, I saw how two officers of the SS units and two soldiers shot two captured Red Army soldiers after first taking their army overcoats from them. These officers and soldiers belonged to the Panzer tank forces of General Von Kleist. In September the crew of a German tank on the road to Krasnograd crushed two captured Red Army soldiers to death with their tank. This act was inspired purely by lust for blood and murder. The tank commander was a noncommissioned officer, Schneider, belonging to Von Kleist’s Panzer forces. I saw how four captured Red Army soldiers were questioned in our battalion. This happened at Voroshilovsk. The Red Army soldiers refused to answer questions of a military nature asked by the battalion commander, Major Warnecke. He flew into a rage and with his own hands beat the prisoners unconscious.”
Corporal Richard Gillig, of the 9th Transportation Platoon, of the 34th Division, stated:
“Many a time I witnessed the inhuman and cruel treatment of Russian prisoners of war. Before my own eyes and on the orders of their officers, German soldiers removed the boots from the captured Red Army soldiers and drove them on barefooted. I witnessed many such facts at Tarutino. I was an eyewitness of the following incident: One prisoner refused to surrender his boots voluntarily. Soldiers of the escort beat him till he could no longer move. I saw other prisoners being stripped, not only of their boots, but of their uniform clothing, right down to their underwear.”
I omit a few sentences and go on to the end of the statement.
“I saw, during the retreat of our column, near the town of Medyn, German soldiers beating up captured Red Army soldiers. One prisoner was very tired and unsteady on his legs. A soldier of the escort raced up to the captive and started kicking and beating him with the butt of his rifle. Other soldiers followed his example and the prisoner dropped dead when we reached the town.”
The statement reads on:
“It is no secret that, in the front line of the German Army division headquarters, specialists existed whose work it was to torture Red Army soldiers and Soviet officers in order to force them, in this manner, to disclose military orders and information.”
I submit to the Tribunal the photostat of this statement. You can see that there are 60 signatures appended to it by members of the German Armed Forces, with the indication of the regiments and smaller subdivisions to which they belonged.
I submit to the Tribunal four photographs of German origin. Each of these photographs was taken by Germans; time and place when the photographs were taken are indicated. One photograph shows the distribution of food; the third and fourth are pictures of the prisoner-of-war camp at Uman.
THE PRESIDENT: Where are the pictures?
COL. POKROVSKY: If I am not mistaken, you have been given the photostat of the statement, but not the photographs.
THE PRESIDENT: This is not a copy of the photographs; these are the signatures of the 60 German prisoners.
COL. POKROVSKY: The photographs will be submitted immediately. They have evidently, by an oversight, not been included in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is obvious from the first picture that the food distributed is insufficient. Men are practically fighting for the right of getting at it. The second photograph shows hungry Soviet prisoners of war wandering round an empty barn and eating the oil cakes stored for cattle food and which they had discovered. As to the third and fourth photographs, I can submit to the Tribunal important testimony by the witness, Bingel. Excerpts from his testimony have a direct bearing on the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
I interrogated Bingel myself and I now submit the minutes of his interrogation to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-111 (Document Number USSR-111), dated 27 December 1945. Bingel, who formerly commanded a company in the German Army, testified—I quote an excerpt from Page 8 of the minutes of his interrogation—as follows:
“A: Tn one of my reports I made a statement concerning the regime inside the prisoner-of-war camp at Uman. . . . This camp was guarded by a company of our subsection of the 783rd Battalion, and I was therefore familiar with everything which occurred in the camp. It was the task of this battalion to guard the prisoners of war and to control the highways and railroads.
“‘This camp was calculated to hold, under normal conditions, from 6,000 to 7,000 men; at that time, however, it housed 74,000 men.’
“Q: ‘Were there barracks?’
“A: ‘No. It was formerly a brickyard and consisted exclusively of low sheds for drying bricks.’
“Q: ‘Were the prisoners of war housed there?’
“A: ‘It can scarcely be said that they were housed, since each shed, at the utmost, could not contain more than 200 to 300 men; the rest had to sleep in the open.’
“Q: ‘What was the regime like at that camp?’
“A: ‘The regime in that camp was definitely peculiar. The existing conditions gave one the impression that the camp commander, Captain Bekker, was quite unable to handle and feed so large a number of men. There were two kitchens in the camp, although they could hardly be called kitchens. Iron barrels had been placed on stone and concrete floors, and the food for the prisoners was prepared in these barrels. But the kitchens, even if operating for 24 hours on end, could only prepare food for approximately 2,000 people daily. The usual diet for the prisoner was very insufficient. The daily ration for six men consisted of one loaf of bread which, again, could scarcely be described as bread. Disturbances frequently arose during the distribution of the hot food, for the prisoners—and there were 70,000 of them in the camp—struggled to get at the victuals. In cases like these the guards resorted to clubs—a usual procedure in the camp. I obtained the general impression that in all the camps the club was inevitably the foundation of all things.’”
Please forgive the digression, but I have been told, Your Honor, that two photographs are attached to the Record and that their authenticity is certified. I am now submitting them to the Tribunal. The other two will be handed to you very shortly. I continue to quote from the Record:
“Q: ‘Do you know anything about the death rate at the camp?’
“A: ‘Sixty to seventy men died at the camp daily.’
“Q: ‘From what causes?’
“A: ‘Before the epidemics broke out one mostly spoke of people being killed.’
“Q: ‘Killed during the distribution of food?’
“A: ‘Both during the distribution of food and during working hours; generally speaking, people were being killed all day long.’”
Bingel was interrogated by us for the second time, and he was shown the photographs of the camp at Uman. These are the same photographs that you now have in your hands, Your Honors. He was then asked the following question, “The camp shown here, is it the one you spoke about, or some other camp?” After this he was shown photographs from a negative, 13×18, of 14 August 1941 and from a negative, 13×22, of the same date. Bingel replied:
“Yes, this is the camp of which I spoke. As a matter of fact, this is not the camp proper but a clay pit belonging to the camp; here the prisoners were housed as soon as they arrived from the front. Later on they were assigned to various sections of the camp.”
“Q: ‘What can you tell us about the second photograph?’
“A: ‘The second one shows the camp photographed from another angle, that is, from the right side. The buildings shown here were practically the only brick buildings in the camp. These brick buildings, though quite empty and undamaged, with excellent and spacious quarters, were not used for housing the prisoners of war.’”
It is difficult to say whether or not that what the Hitlerites did to the Soviet prisoners of war at the so-called “Grosslazarett” of the town of Slavuta, in the Kamenetzk-Podolsky region, should be considered as the limit of human vileness. Be that as it may, the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war by the Hitlerites at the “Grosslazarett” is one of the darkest pages in the annals of fascist crime.
I submit to the Tribunal, as Exhibit Number USSR-5 (Document Number USSR-5), the report of the Extraordinary State Commission, and I shall read into the Record several excerpts from the report itself, as well as from the appendices thereto.
“On the expulsion of the fascist hordes from the town of Slavuta, units of the Red Army discovered, on the site of the restricted military area, the establishment which the Germans called the ‘Grosslazarett’ for Soviet prisoners of war. Over 500 emaciated, critically sick men were found in the ‘Lazarett.’ The interrogation of these men and the special investigation carried out by medico-forensic experts and by experts of the Central Institute for Food, of the People’s Commissariat for Health in the U.S.S.R., led to a detailed reconstruction of the extermination of an immense number of Soviet prisoners of war in that appalling institution.”
You will find the passage I am about to quote on Page 153 of the document book:
“In the fall of 1941, German fascist invaders occupied the town of Slavuta, where they organized a ‘Lazarett’ for wounded and sick officers and men of the Red Army, under the name of Grosslazarett, Slavuta, Teillager 301.
“The ‘Lazarett’ was located about 1½ to 2 kilometers to the southeast of Slavuta and occupied 10 three-storied stone buildings. The Hitlerites surrounded all these buildings by a strong barbed wire fence. All along the barbed wire, 10 meters apart, towers were built, in which guns, searchlights, and guards were placed.
“The administrative staff, the German doctors and the guard of the ‘Grosslazarett,’ the latter represented by the commanding officer, Captain Plank (later replaced by Major Pavlisk), the deputy commander, Kronsdorfer, Captain Boye, Dr. Borbe, with his deputy, Dr. Sturm, Master Sergeant Ilseman, and Technical Sergeant Bekker carried out a mass extermination of Soviet prisoners of war by imposing a special regime of hunger, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions, by torture and direct murder, by depriving the sick and wounded of all medical assistance, and by subjecting utterly exhausted men to heavy labor.”
The Extraordinary State Commission refers to the “Grosslazarett” as the “Hospital of Death.” I shall quote a short excerpt from a section under the selfsame name. It is on Page 3 of the Russian original and on Page 153 of the document book:
“The German authorities concentrated at the ‘Grosslazarett’ 15,000 to 18,000 severely and slightly wounded Soviet prisoners of war, together with prisoners suffering from various contagious and noncontagious diseases.
“To replace the ranks of the dead, fresh batches of sick and wounded prisoners of war were continually brought in. On the journey the captives were tortured, starved, and murdered. The Hitlerites threw out hundreds of corpses from each car of the incoming transports as they reached the ‘Lazarett.’”
According to data received from the investigating commission, 800 to 900 dead bodies would be thrown out of each train as it unloaded at a branch line. A further report of the Commission states:
“Thousands of Soviet prisoners on the march perished from hunger, thirst, lack of care, and the savage club-law of the German guards . . . as a routine practice the Hitlerites would greet a group of prisoners at the ‘Lazarett’ gates with blows from rifle butts and rubber truncheons, after which the new arrivals would be stripped of their leather footwear, warm clothing, and personal belongings.”
In the next section, on the same page, the State Commission reports that infectious diseases were deliberately spread among the prisoners of war by German medical officers in the “Lazarett”:
“In the ‘Grosslazarett’ the German medical officers artificially created an incredible state of overcrowding. The prisoners were forced to stand close to each other; they succumbed to exhaustion, dropped down, and died.”
The fascists resorted to various methods for reducing the living room in the “Lazarett”. A former prisoner of war, I.Y. Chuazhev, reported that:
“The Germans reduced the floor space in the ‘Lazarett’ by firing off submachine guns, since the prisoners, perforce, pressed more closely to each other; then the Hitlerites pushed in more sick and wounded and the door was closed.”
The premeditated spreading of infectious diseases in this death camp, derisively named a “Lazarett,” was achieved by extremely primitive means:
“Patients suffering from spotted fever, tuberculosis, or dysentery, severely and lightly wounded cases, were one and all put in the same block and the same ward.”
In a ward intended, under normal conditions, to hold not more than 400 patients, the number of spotted fever and tuberculosis cases alone amounted to 1800.
“The rooms were never cleaned. The sick remained, for months on end, in the same underclothes in which they were captured. They slept on the bare boards. Many were half-undressed, others entirely naked. The buildings were unheated, and the primitive stoves, constructed by the prisoners themselves, fell to pieces. There was no water for washing in this ‘Lazarett,’ not even for drinking. As a result of these unsanitary conditions, the ‘hospital’ was, to a monstrous extent, overrun by lice.”
Annihilation by the premeditated spreading of diseases went hand in hand with starvation. The daily food ration consisted of 250 grams of ersatz bread and two liters of so-called “Balanda soup.” The flour used for baking the bread for sick and wounded prisoners of war was brought from Germany. Fifteen tons of flour were discovered in one of the “Lazarett” storerooms. The factory-packed paper bags, containing 40 kilos each, bore a label with the word “Spelzmehl.” Samples of this ersatz flour were sent for analysis to the Central Food Institute of the People’s Commissariat for Public Health of the U.S.S.R.
I present the document dealing with the annihilation of Soviet prisoners of war by the Hitlerites in the “Grosslazarett” as Exhibit Number USSR-5(a), (Document Number USSR-5(a)). On Pages 9, 10, and 11 of this document the Tribunal can see the photostat of the Central Food Institute’s report.
This report was established on the one hand on the basis of an analysis made by the field military laboratory and, on the other hand, on the basis of an analysis carried out in the Central Food Institute itself. Sample bakings of bread were made from the ersatz flour and from the ersatz flour mixed with a small addition of real flour. It seems that it was impossible to bake a loaf with ersatz flour alone. The Institute’s report states:
“It is evident that the bread was made with the addition of a certain quantity of natural flour for binding the dough. A diet of this so-called ‘bread,’ in the absence of all other food and food products of a full dietetic value, inevitably led to starvation and acute exhaustion.”
The analysis proved that the “flour” consisted of nothing but straw chopped evenly though rather roughly. Some particles were 2 and some 3 millimeters in length. Under the microscope, in every optical field of vision—according to the report—we discovered, “Together with food and vegetable fiber, minute quantities of grains of starch, resembling grains of oats in structure.” The Institute came to the conclusion that “The use of this bread, owing to the irritant action of the soft crumb, resulted in diseases of the digestive tract.”
Anticipating a little, I should like to report the results of the medico-legal autopsies performed on 112 corpses exhumed from Site Number 1 and of the external examination of approximately 500 bodies. In the first instance exhaustion was proved to have caused the death of 96 victims. In the second case, as stated in the findings—see Page 7—mentioned in Exhibit Number USSR-5(a), (Document Number USSR-5(a)):
“The statement that exhaustion was the fundamental cause of mortality in the prisoners’ camp was likewise proved by the results of the external examinations of some 500 corpses, when it was disclosed that the proportion of victims dead of acute exhaustion had approached 100 percent.”
A little further on, in the same report, in Subparagraph “d” of Paragraph 5, the experts, supported by numerous witnesses, state that the diet in the Slavuta “Grosslazarett” can be characterized as completely useless for human consumption. I quote, “Bread contained 64 percent sawdust; ‘Balanda soup’ was made of rotten potatoes with the addition of refuse, rat-droppings, et cetera.”
Such prisoners of war who had survived the tyranny of the Hitler hangmen and had lived to see the liberation of Slavuta declared—I quote an excerpt from Page 4 of Exhibit Number USSR-5, Page 153 of the document book:
“In the ‘Grosslazarett’ we periodically observed outbreaks of a mysterious disease of an unknown nature, referred to as ‘para-cholera’ by the German doctors. The appearance of ‘para-cholera’ was the result of barbarous experiments by the German doctors. These outbreaks would vanish as suddenly as they appeared. The mortality rate in ‘para-cholera’ rose to 60-80 percent. German physicians performed autopsies on the bodies of some of the victims, and no captured Russian medical officers were admitted to these autopsies.”
In conclusion, it is stated in Subparagraph 8 of the medico-legal expert report—Page 7 of Exhibit Number USSR-5(a), Page 159 of the document book—that:
“No objective circumstances can justify the conditions under which the prisoners of war were housed in the camp. All the more, since it has been revealed by thoroughgoing investigations that there were enormous food supplies in the German military depots at Slavuta and that both medical supplies and surgical bandages abounded in the military dispensaries.”
The “Grosslazarett” staff included a considerable number of medical personnel. Nevertheless, according to the statement of the government commission, sick and wounded officers and men of the Red Army did not receive even the most elementary medical attention. And how could there be any talk of medical attention when the entire object of the “Grosslazarett” was directly opposed to such assistance? The administration of the “Grosslazarett” not only strove to destroy the prisoners of war physically, but they also endeavored to fill the last days of the sick and wounded with suffering and anguish.
One part of the commission’s statement is entitled “Torture and shooting of Soviet prisoners of war.” I shall read into the Record a passage taken from this part. It is on Page 4, Exhibit Number USSR-5, Page 153 of the document book:
“Soviet prisoners of war in the ‘Grosslazarett’ were subjected to torture and torment, beaten up when food was distributed and again when setting out to work. Even the dying were not spared by the fascist murderers. The medico-legal examination of the exhumed corpses revealed, among a number of other bodies of prisoners of war, the body of a prisoner who, in his death agony, had been wounded in the groin with a knife. He had been thrown into his grave while still alive, with the knife sticking in the wound, and was then covered over with earth.
“One method of mass torture in the ‘Lazarett’ consisted in locking the sick and wounded in a detention cell—a room without heat and with a concrete floor. The prisoners in this cell were left without food for days on end, and many died there. In order to exhaust the ill and weak prisoners still further, the Hitlerites forced the sick and enfeebled patients to run round the ‘Lazarett’ building; those who could not run were flogged almost to death. There were many cases where the German guards murdered the prisoners just for fun.
“A former prisoner of war, Buchtichyuk, reported how the Germans threw the intestines of dead horses on the barbed wire surrounding the interior of the camp. When the prisoners, maddened with hunger, ran up to the barbed wire, the guards opened fire on them with submachine guns. The witness, Kirsanov, saw one prisoner of war bayonetted for picking up a potato tuber. A former prisoner of war, Shatalov, was an eyewitness to the shooting of a prisoner by his escort merely for trying to obtain a second helping of ‘Balanda soup.’
“In February 1942 Shatalov saw a sentry wound a prisoner who was searching the garbage heap for remnants of food left over from the kitchen of the German personnel; the wounded man was immediately brought to the pit, stripped, and executed.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 14 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FIFTY-NINTH DAY Thursday, 14 February 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make which concerns the defendants’ counsel. The Tribunal will sit in open session on Saturday morning from 10 o’clock to hear the application of the defendants’ counsel for an adjournment.
They will hear one counsel on either side, that is to say, one counsel for the Prosecution and one counsel for the Defense, for 15 minutes each, and after that open session the Tribunal will adjourn into closed session upon procedural matters.
COL. POKROVSKY: Yesterday, in the course of my representation, I referred to four photographs in our possession, two of which were submitted to the Tribunal there and then. These photographs have been made by the Germans and they show the prisoner-of-war camp at Uman. I must apologize that yesterday, for technical reasons, we were unable to produce the remaining two at the proper time. The first of these photographs shows the distribution of food to the prisoners; the second, hungry Soviet prisoners searching for and eating oil cakes intended as cattle food. I now submit the originals of these two photographs (Document Numbers USSR-358 and 359) as Exhibit Numbers USSR-358 and USSR-359.
An autopsy of the exhumed bodies, performed during the investigation of fascist crimes in the so-called “Lager,” Slavuta, confirms that:
“The headquarters command and the camp guards repeatedly resorted to refined forms of torture. Among the bodies exhumed on which autopsies were performed, the medico-legal examination established that the corpses of four prisoners of war, murdered with cold steel, had received bayonet wounds penetrating the cavity of the skull.”
You will find this passage, Your Honors, on Page 153 of the document book.
“The Hitlerites compelled sick and wounded prisoners, despite their extreme weakness and acute state of exhaustion, to carry out work which was entirely beyond their strength. The prisoners had to carry heavy burdens, were forced to shoulder the bodies of murdered Soviet citizens and carry them out of the camp. Exhausted prisoners who fell by the way were shot on the spot. The road to and from work, according to a report of the Roman Catholic priest at Slavuta, was marked, as by milestones, with small grave mounds.”
The fascist fanatics did not always have the patience to wait for the actual death of one or another prisoner of war, and they buried persons who were still alive. I quote from a document which I have previously submitted to the Tribunal. You will find this quotation once again on Page 153 of your document book:
“As a result of the discovery of a considerable quantity of grains of sand in the lower respiratory tracts of the corpses of four prisoners, grains which penetrated right down to the very smallest bronchial tube, and which could not have penetrated thus far unless propelled by the respiratory movements of persons smothered by sand, the medico-legal experts found that at the ‘Gross-Lazarett’ the guards of the commander had buried the Soviet citizens alive. This was done with the connivance of the German doctors.”
Prisoner-of-war Pankin, a former inmate of the “Gross-Lazarett,” knew of one case where, in February 1943, an unconscious patient was brought to the morgue. There he recovered consciousness, but when it was reported to the officer in charge of barracks that a live man had been taken to the morgue, he ordered him to be left there. The sick man was buried.
Some prisoners, spurred by the intolerable regime, ignored the immense risks attached to the venture and attempted to escape, either singly or in groups. Such martyrs who succeeded in getting out of the “hospital” hell sought refuge with the local population of Slavuta and the surrounding hamlets. The Hitlerite brutes mercilessly shot anybody who had rendered any kind of assistance to a fugitive.
The town of Slavuta lies in the Shepetov district. On 15 January 1942, the District Commissioner of Shepetov, Dr. Worbs, issued a special order to the effect that if those directly responsible for helping escaped prisoners were not found, 10 hostages would be shot in every case. Father Dhynkovsky reported that 26 peace-loving citizens were arrested and shot for helping prisoners of war flee.
A medical examination of the 525 prisoners liberated from the “Gross-Lazarett” revealed that 435 suffered from extreme exhaustion, 59 from complications following untended, infected wounds, and that 31 suffered from neuro-psychiatric disturbances.
The commission notes, and I quote—with the permission of the Tribunal—the last and the penultimate paragraphs of the left column, on Page 5 of our document. In your file this quotation is on Page 154 of the document book:
“During the 2 years of Slavuta’s occupation, the Hitlerites, with the connivance of the German doctors Borbe, Sturm, and other medical personnel in the ‘Gross-Lazarett,’ exterminated about 150,000 Red Army officers and men.”
The German fascist executioners, perfectly aware of the unbounded bestiality of their crimes, attempted to conceal by all possible means the traces of the atrocities committed. They especially endeavored to camouflage the burial sites of the Soviet prisoners of war. Thus, for instance, on the cross of Grave Number 623, only eight surnames of persons buried were indicated, whereas upon excavation 32 bodies were actually found in that grave. Such, too, was the case when Grave Number 624 was opened up. In other graves, layers of earth were placed between several rows of corpses. For instance, 10 bodies were found in Grave Number 625. When a layer of earth, 30 centimeters thick, had been removed, two further rows of corpses were found in the same grave; the same occurred at the excavation of Graves Number 627 and 628.
Numerous graves were camouflaged by flower-beds, trees, plants, paths, et cetera, but no disguise can ever hide the bloody crimes committed by the Hitlerite evildoers.
If I am not mistaken, there was a case when one of the participants in these trials, evidently forgetting where he was and under what circumstances, expressed a wish to follow the procedure laid down by German law. The Tribunal immediately made the necessary inquiries, and the intention of operating in accordance with the standards of German law was, of course, promptly rejected. At present I am fully able to submit to the Tribunal documents which, in my opinion, are of importance in our case, although they are compiled in complete accordance with the rules laid down by German law.
Among the numerous documents found in the police archives of the town of Zhitomir, Red Army troops seized a certain piece of correspondence. This is a police inquiry. The authors of this document could not foretell that it would be read into the record at a session of the International Tribunal for the punishment of the major war criminals. The documents constituting this correspondence were intended exclusively for the chiefs of police, and they were compiled in accordance with all the customary requirements of German law and of the police investigations of fascist Germany. From this point of view, those who would like to examine the documentation in question can be well satisfied.
At the same time this correspondence is useful to us. So much has been said in the comparatively small number of pages that I should have to analyze the documentation section by section in order that you could appreciate it fully and from every angle. I submit this correspondence to you both in the German photostats and in the Russian translation. I repeat—this is a police inquiry. The document is submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-311 (Document Number USSR-311); and we have, in accordance with the wishes of the Tribunal, asked for the original copy which we may possibly receive from Moscow this very day.
On 24 December 1942, 78 prisoners of war from the Berditchev section of the Educational Labor Camp were to be subjected to “special treatment.” All the 78 prisoners were Soviet citizens. There is, in the correspondence, a report addressed to the authorities by SS Obersturmführer Kuntze, of 27 December 1942. You will find it on Page 170 of your document book. At the end of the first paragraph there is one sentence which, for greater clarity, has been marked with a red pencil. It says:
“There is no proof that these prisoners of war had ever participated in any communistic activities during the time of the Soviet regime.”
Kuntze’s next sentence fully elucidates the question of how and why these prisoners of war entered the Educational Labor Camp. He states:
“It seems that the Wehrmacht had, at the time, placed these prisoners of war at the disposal of our local authorities for special treatment. . . .”
We became convinced that they had been directed to this camp by the military authorities. The specialist—in this case undoubtedly Obersturmführer Kuntze—states that they were sent here especially to be subjected to the treatment of the “special regime.”
In an attempt to shorten, if ever so slightly, this very abundant documentation which forms the correspondence, I shall tell you, in my own words, that the 78 people in question were all that remained of a far larger group. Sturmscharführer SS Fritz Knop reports—Page 163 of your document book:
“. . . some of the prisoners at that time were transported in a truck, to some place in the neighborhood and unloaded. Later on further unloadings of prisoners of war were suspended, following objections raised by the Army.”
A little later I shall be more explicit when dealing with the nature of these transfers and the objections raised by the Army. Please permit me now to pass over to a brief summary of the gist of the matter. It appears to me more useful to describe it in the words of one of the documents. I quote:
“Commander of the Security Police and SD in Zhitomir; Berditchev, 24 December 1942.
“When summoned to appear, SS Sturmscharführer and Chief Secretary of the Kripo, Fritz Knop, complied. He was born on 18 February 1897, at Neuklinz, in the district of Köslin. Fritz Knop testified as follows:
“‘As from the middle of August 1 was head of the Berditchev field office of the commander of the Security Police and SD in the town of Zhitomir. On 23 December 1942 the Deputy Commander, Hauptsturmführer of the SS Kallbach, inspected the local office and also the Educational Labor Camp which was supervised by my office. In this Educational Labor Camp, as from the end of October or the beginning of November, there were 78 former prisoners of war who had been dismissed from the permanent camp (Stalag) in Zhitomir as being unfit for work. A considerable number of prisoners of war had, in the past, been handed over and placed at the disposal of the Commander of the Security Police and SD.”
I think there is no necessity to explain in detail that the transfer of the prisoners of war and the placing of them at the disposal of the Security Police had been provided for by special directives of the SS and the SD, especially referring to persons condemned to physical extermination. I quote further, on the same page of your document book, 163:
“In Zhitomir a few of them, who up to a certain point were fit for work, had been set aside. The remaining 78 persons were transferred to the local Educational Labor Camp.”
I omit two more extracts.
“The 78 prisoners of war in the local camp were, one and all, severely wounded men. Some had lost both legs; others both arms; others again had lost one or the other of their limbs. Only a few of them had all their arms and legs, although they were so mutilated by other kinds of wounds that they were totally unfit for work. The latter had to nurse the former.
“At the time he was inspecting the Educational Labor Camp on 23 December 1942, SS Hauptsturmführer Kallbach issued an order to the effect that the surviving 68 or 70 prisoners of war, the others having died in the meantime, should this very day be subjected to ‘special treatment.’ For this purpose he assigned a motor truck, driven by SS man Schäfer from the command division, who arrived here today at 1130 hours. I entrusted the preparations for the execution early this morning to my colleagues in the local administration, SS Unterscharführer Paal, SS Rottenführer Hesselbach, and SS Sturmmann Vollprecht.”
I shall, with your permission, omit a further part of the quotation which, in any case, already figures in your files. I think I may safely do so in order to save time. It is a description of the technical preparations for the execution. One passage, however, does appear to me to be of interest; and I quote:
“Usually the execution of the Jews was carried out in the precincts of the labor camp which could not be seen from the outside. For this particular execution I issued orders to choose a site outside on a terrain behind the permanent camp. Concerning the three above-mentioned persons whom I entrusted with the shooting of the prisoners of war, I knew that they had, in Kiev, participated in the mass executions of many thousands of persons and that they had before, that is during my time of service, been entrusted by the local administration with the shooting of many hundreds of victims.”
I should like to invite your attention to another instance which again shows the meaning which the Hitlerites usually attached to the words “execution” and “treatment by special regime.” Here, in one sentence alone, the words “mass execution” and “shooting” are definitely used as synonymous terms, while a little higher up it is made quite clear to us what “transporting by trucks to some place in the neighborhood” and “treatment by special regime” mean. Unquestionably, these four terms have an identical significance.
After this digression I continue my quotation. Having made a few more omissions from the passage already printed in your document book, I proceed to the following paragraph, your Page 165, if only to maintain the sense of the statement:
“They were armed with a German submachine gun, a Russian automatic rifle, an 0.8 pistol, and a carbine. I would point out that I had intended to give these three persons, as an assistant, SS Hauptscharführer Wenzel, but SS Sturmmann Vollprecht declined, remarking that three men were perfectly able to execute this order.
“Concerning the indictment: It never entered my head, to ensure the smooth procedure of an ordinary execution, to send a larger detachment, since the execution ground was hidden from public view and the captives were. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT These words “Concerning the indictment,” are they in the original document?
COL. POKROVSKY: It is the text of the explanation of the evidence which the signatory of the document handed to his police chief. I, with the permission of the Tribunal, shall quote the original German documents of the inquiry. The persons responsible for carrying out the execution were accused of provoking, by their indiscretion and carelessness, that which they called an “incident” and they produced an explanation of the cause of this indictment.
“Concerning the charge: It never entered my head, to ensure the smooth procedure of an ordinary execution, to send a larger detachment, since the execution ground was hidden from public view and the captives were unable to escape by reason of their physical infirmities.
“At about 1500 hours I received a telephone call from the camp to the effect that one of the co-workers in my department, in charge of this special task, had been wounded and that one man had run away. I promptly sent SS Hauptscharführer Wenzel and SS Oberscharführer Fritsch to the execution ground in a horse cart. Some time later I received another telephone call from the camp, informing me that the co-workers of my department had been killed.”
I think it useless to read into the record details of a purely technical nature. I shall omit at this point a considerable part of those references which I had previously intended to quote, and I shall proceed to that part of Knop’s evidence which he had handed to his police chief. You will find the passage in question on Page 166:
“I wish to point out that the incident I have described took place during the second execution. It had been preceded by the shooting of approximately twenty prisoners of war which had passed without any incident at all. As soon as I returned, I informed the command headquarters at Zhitomir accordingly.
“I cannot give any further evidence. I declare that my evidence is absolutely true and I am aware that any false evidence on my part would result in punishment and in exclusion from the SS.
“Signed: Fritz Knop, SS Sturmscharführer; certified: Kuntze, SS Obersturmführer.”
Next to be interrogated was the executioner. We have at our disposal a document on this subject. You will find the extract in question on Page 166 of your document book. I quote the minutes of the inquiry:
“SS Rottenführer of the Waffen-SS, Hesselbach, Friederich, born 24 January 1909 in Freudingen, district of Wittgenstein (Westphalia), was then summoned and testified as follows:
“‘I have been informed concerning the subject of the forthcoming interrogation. It has been pointed out to me that any false statements on my part will result in punishment and expulsion from the SS.’”
After this routine part of the investigation—where he was warned of the penalties awaiting him—Hesselbach gave the following testimony on the matter:
“Yesterday evening I was told by SS Unterscharführer Paal that I would have to take part in the execution of prisoners of war. Later on I received a corresponding order from Hauptscharführer Wenzel, in the presence of SS Sturmscharführer Knop. This morning, at 0800 hours, SS Hauptscharführer Berger, SS Unterscharführer Paal, SS Sturmmann Vollprecht, and myself, drove in a truck lent us by the tannery and driven by a Ukrainian driver, to a place situated approximately one and a half kilometers behind the camp, in order to dig a pit, with eight inmates of our prison.”
Later he describes the digging of the pit. I think that we can skip that part. Then they returned.
“At the entrance to the camp, Vollprecht, acting on Paal’s instructions, left the car. By these instructions Paal intended not to betray our intentions to the prisoners by the presence of a large number of SS men. Therefore, only I, Paal, and a few militia men loaded the prisoners onto the truck. On Paal’s order, the whole first group consisted almost exclusively of the prisoners who had lost their legs.”
I omit a few extracts which are of no interest to the Tribunal and I quote from Page 6 of the Russian translation, the underlined passages, printed on Page 168 of your document book:
“After having executed the first three prisoners I suddenly heard shouting beyond the pit. Since the fourth prisoner was already next in line, I shot him on the spot, and looking up, I noticed a terrific disturbance near the truck. A moment before already I had heard some shots being fired and I now saw the prisoners running away in all directions. I cannot give any precise particulars as to what actually happened near the truck, since I was about 40 to 50 meters away from the place and everything was very confusing. I can only say that I saw two of my comrades lying on the ground, and two prisoners shooting at me and the driver with the firearms they had seized. When I realized what was happening, I fired the four remaining cartridges in my magazine at the prisoners shooting at us, put in a new clip, and suddenly noticed that a bullet had struck the ground near me. I had the feeling that I had been hit, but realized later that I was wrong. I now ascribe this sensation to nervous shock. Anyway, I was shooting at the fugitives with the cartridges from my second clip, though I cannot tell whether I hit any of them.”
I would inform you that the last part of Hesselbach’s testimony deals with the subject of organizing the search for the scattered cripples, a search which yielded no results.
Finally, I would like to quote a few excerpts from the last document in the correspondence. This is a report of SS Obersturmführer Kuntze. It concludes with the statement that the funeral of the SS men killed took place at 1400 hours at the Police and SS Heroes’ Cemetery in Hegewalde. It seems to me that this detail is of a certain interest. I shall now quote the opening part of the above-mentioned report. I shall omit the first report already appearing in your document book, in order to shorten the time taken by my work. He reports that 78 people were supposed to have been killed after the inspection of the camp by Kallbach. Because of their inability to work, these prisoners of war were a burden to the camp.
“For this reason, SS Hauptsturmführer Kallbach ordered the execution of the former prisoners of war, and that on 24 December. Neither in the local nor in the regional offices could anybody discover why the former commandant had taken charge of these crippled prisoners and sent them to the Educational Labor Camp. In this case there did not exist any data whatsoever concerning communistic activities of the prisoners in question during the entire period of the Soviet regime. Evidently the military authorities have, in their own time, placed these prisoners at the disposal of the local branch in order to submit them to the ‘special regime,’ since owing to their physical condition, they could not be made to work.
“So SS Hauptsturmführer Kallbach ordered the execution for 24 December. On 24 December at about 1700 hours, the head of the Berditchev regional office, SS Sturmscharführer Knop, telephoned that during the execution of the ‘special regime’ operation, the two officials of the branch, SS Unterscharführer Paal and SS Sturmmann Vollprecht, were assaulted by the prisoners and killed with their own firearms.”
I shall now omit a considerable part of SS Obersturmführer Kuntze’s idle talk and shall quote only three more paragraphs. You will find them on Pages 172 and 173:
“Thus, of the 28 prisoners, 4 were shot in the pit and 2 while trying to escape; the remaining 22 managed to get away.
“The efforts to recapture the fugitives, promptly undertaken by SS Rottenführer Hesselbach with the help of the guards from the neighboring camp, were expedient though unsuccessful. The head of the Berditchev Department ordered an immediate search for the fugitives and instructed all the police and military agencies to this effect. However, the names of the fugitives are unknown and this fact alone would render the search more difficult. The records merely contained the names of all the prisoners subjected to the ’special regime’ and it was therefore necessary to declare as escapees even those who had already been shot.
“On 25 December, on the same spot, a ‘special regime’ execution of the 20 surviving prisoners of war was carried out under my direction. As I feared that the fugitives might already have established contact with some partisan unit, I again had the camp send a detachment of 20 men, armed with light submachine guns and carbines, in order to guard the surrounding territory. The execution went off without any trouble.”
It is enough to imagine these 20 unfortunate men, without arms, without legs, being escorted to their death by a strong contingent of SS men and soldiers, soldiers armed with submachine guns. I continue:
“As a measure of reprisal I ordered the military police to check up on all released prisoners of war in the adjoining regions to ascertain their political activities during the entire period of Soviet rule, so as to arrest and submit to the ‘special regime’ 20 activists and members of the Communist Party.”
To conclude the presentation of the evidence pertaining to this monstrous crime of the Hitlerites, I should like to invite the Tribunal’s attention to certain facts.
I would, first of all, like to refer to the “objections raised by the Army,” reported by the member of the SS, Knop. Knop said—you will find the passage quoted on Page 163:
“In the future all evacuations of prisoners of war will be suspended due to objections raised by the Army. I do not wish my words to be misunderstood. The Army did not so much object to such evacuations, rather it expressed the wish that the prisoners of war, once they had been released and sent elsewhere, should be given some kind of shelter.”
It is not difficult to guess what “shelter” he was referring to. It was the “shelter” provided when, in the words of Knop, they were “transported in a truck to a place in the neighborhood.”
The second fact which, to me, appears of importance, is the scale of the outrages committed. Referring to the executioners, Paal, Hesselbach, and Vollprecht, Knop writes:
“With reference to the three above-mentioned persons whom I entrusted with the shooting of prisoners of war, I knew that they had, in Kiev, participated in the mass executions of many thousands of persons and that they had already before, that is, during my period of service, been entrusted by the local administration with the shooting of many hundreds of victims.”
In reference to Hesselbach, I should like to note two not very important but extremely characteristic traits. The first is his terminology. Here are his words:
“After having executed the first three prisoners I suddenly heard shouting beyond the pit; since the fourth prisoner was already next in line, I shot him on the spot.”
Any bandit, any habitual murderer would, naturally, use such language in speaking of the destruction of a human being. For the fascist executioners the murder of a soldier who had honestly fought for his country and become an invalid, the brief expression “shot on the spot” is good enough; when occupied in killing, the executioners do not even consider it necessary to find out whom they really are murdering. Thanks to this, shame and confusion cover the police. They order a search both for those who had escaped and for those who were shot.
Secondly, the very sound of a bullet passing nearby gives him a sensation of being wounded, and people of this type are then called “heroes” by their superiors.
It would be an omission on my part not to emphasize the exceptional brutality displayed by Kuntze—this typical representative of the SS. Twenty persons captured at random, captured anyhow, without any fault on their part, must be murdered. What for? Only because 22 armless and legless invalids had succeeded in escaping from death.
The Tribunal, of course, is quite aware of the fact that by all the laws of God and man these 22 invalids should not have perished by the hand of the executioner, but should have been placed under the protection of the German Government as prisoners of war.
The confession of Kuntze, concerning the motives for which the military authorities directed invalids to the camp for treatment by “special regime,” is of particular value. He frankly states that the cause of it was their physical condition which had rendered them unfit for any kind of work. In this connection I submit a series of documents to the Tribunal. They show that only from the angle of possibility of obtaining slaves were the representatives of the German Command and the German authorities occasionally interested in the prisoners of war. You have in your possession a circular of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to the effect that Soviet prisoners of war should be branded and that this branding would not be considered as a medical measure. I am submitting to you another equally shameful document. It bears the following identifying marks: Az. 2,24.82h, Commander of Camps for Prisoners of War, Number 3142/42; Berlin-Schöneberg; 20.7.1942; 51, Badensche Strasse. This document is Exhibit Number USSR-343 (Document Number USSR-343). I shall not read it into the record. It resembles identically those which I have already read into the record. But it is characteristic of the extent to which the Hitlerite conspirators had abandoned the thesis that “a state can do everything which is necessary to hold prisoners of war in their own safekeeping, but it cannot do anything more.”
A regime based on hard labor, on an unending stream of insult and torture, drove Soviet people to manifestations of stark despair, such as attacks on camp guards who were armed to the teeth. We know of such truly heroic deeds. Testimonies of eyewitnesses are in our hands. I am submitting to you, as Exhibit Number USSR-314 (Document Number USSR-314), the personally written testimony of the witness, Lampe—you interrogated him a few days ago in this court—together with the testimony of the witness, Ribol—our Exhibit Number USSR-315 (Document Number USSR-315). I shall read out such passages of the testimony as appear on Page 348 of your document book. These witnesses reported that in the beginning of February 1945, in the extermination camp of Mauthausen, 800 Red Army prisoners of war who were interned there, had broken out of the fascist hell after first disarming the guards and piercing the electrified barbed wire. Lampe testifies how brutally the SS treated those whom they were able to recapture. I am quoting a few lines:
“All those who returned to the camp were savagely tortured and then shot. I myself saw the escaped prisoners, who were being brought back to Block Number 20.”—I wish to interpolate that Block 20 was the death block.—“They were beaten and the head of one of them was badly bleeding. They were followed by 10 SS men, among whom were three or four officers. They carried whips and were laughing loudly, giving the impression of pleasurably anticipating the tortures they were going to inflict upon the three unfortunate prisoners. The courage of the insurgents and the cruelty of the repression have left an undying impression on all the internees of Mauthausen.”
The fascist conspirators behaved with equal hatred toward all Soviet citizens. If any altercations ever arose among them, they would only be in connection with the methods of destruction to be inflicted on their victims. Some strove to kill off the prisoners immediately; others deemed it wiser to exploit their prisoners’ blood and strength in the mills, factories, military workshops, and in the construction of military undertakings.
Any long war is responsible for labor shortage in industry and agriculture. Fascist Germany solved this problem by importing white male and female slaves. The greatest number of them were prisoners of war. They were sent to heavy labor where masses perished from exhaustion, overwork, hunger, and savage treatment by the guards.
I submit to the Tribunal Document Number 744-PS, and quote the following three paragraphs:
“To carry out the augmented iron-steel industry program, the Führer ordered on 7 July that a sufficient coal supply be guaranteed and that prisoners of war be utilized for this purpose.”
I am omitting several sentence from the documents dealing with the technicalities of this question and quote Point 2 of this directive:
“2. All Soviet prisoners of war, captured since 5 July 1943, are to be sent to the OKW camps and from there directly, or by way of labor exchange, put at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, for use in the coal mining industry.”
The fourth point is of special interest. It contains a definite directive on how to convert all men between the ages of 16 and 55 into prisoners of war. I quote Point 4:
“4. All male prisoners between the ages of 16 and 55, captured in battles with the partisans in the operational area of the Army, of the eastern commissariats, of the Government General, and of the Balkans, are to be regarded in the future as prisoners of war. The same applies to men in newly conquered districts of the East. They must be sent to the prisoner-of-war camps and then to work in Germany.”
The second document, Number 744-PS, issued by the Chief of the OKW on 8 July 1943, duplicates this directive. The document is signed by Keitel. There is a postscript to the text of the document which was signed by Keitel. It is addressed to all the higher authorities of the SS and is signed by Himmler. The text has already been read into the record on 20 December 1945; I shall therefore refer only to the contents. It concerns the transportation of children, old people, and of young women. Himmler indicates how and by what methods they should be sent to Germany through Sauckel’s organization. In this case, too, Himmler, Keitel, and Sauckel act in perfect agreement, almost as a single entity.
I consider Exhibit Number USSR-354 (Document Number USSR-354) to be of primary importance. It is a report on the prison camp in Minsk. The report was compiled in Rosenberg’s office on 10 July 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been put in already?
COL. POKROVSKY: This document has not yet been read into the record. Permit me, Your Honor, to read a few excerpts. I quote Page 183:
“The prison camp in Minsk, covering a space about the size of the Wilhelmsplatz, accommodates about one hundred thousand prisoners of war and forty thousand civilian prisoners. The prisoners, crowded together in this small space, can hardly move, and are therefore forced to relieve nature at the very place where they happen to be. The camp is guarded by a detail of soldiers on active duty, of company strength. Due to the small strength of the guard detail, the watch over the camp can only be accomplished by the application of brute force.”
I omit a paragraph and turn to the page which continues the original idea:
“The only possible language for a small guard, which remains on duty both day and night without being relieved, is the firearm, of which ruthless use is made.”
Next, the authors of this document complain about the impossibility of carrying out the selection of prisoners according to physical and racial classification for various forms of hard labor:
“On the second day this selection of civilian prisoners was forbidden to the O.T., referring to an order of General Field Marshal Kluge, according to which he alone had the right to release civilian prisoners.”
I shall read into the record two documents demonstrating how the Hitlerites, in their hatred of the Soviet people, considered the regime of bestial cruelty and systematic insults which they had set up for the Soviet prisoners of war as being too mild, and demanded that it be made still more severe.
On 29 January 1943 an order was issued on the “Rights of Self-Defense against the Prisoners of War,” under the signature of the Chief of the OKH. This order bears the number 3868/42, and is registered by the United States Delegation as Document Number 696-PS. We submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-355, since it has not been read into the record. I shall read a few short extracts from this document. You will find the passage quoted on Page 185 of your document book. It starts as follows:
“The military organizations and the organizations of the National Socialist Party have, on numerous occasions, raised the question of the treatment of the prisoners of war, and they are of the opinion that the punishments provided for by the 1929 Agreement (H. Dv. 38/2) are inadequate.”
This document explains that the previous agreement regarding the treatment of all prisoners of war, with the exception of Soviet nationals, remains in force. The Order Number 389/42-S issued by the OKW Section for Prisoners-of-War Affairs, determines the treatment of the latter. This order was issued on 24 March 1942.
The second document is the circular of the Nazi Party bureau, submitted as Order Number 12/43-S. This circular, signed by Bormann, was issued by the chief of the Party bureau, at the Führer’s main headquarters on 12 February 1943. The circular was sent out by the Reichsführer to the Gauleiter and to the commanding officers of military units. It speaks of Secret Order Number 3868/42-S of the Chief of the General Staff. It is therefore proved once more, and proved beyond any manner of doubt, that the leaders of the Nazi Party and the military command bear equal responsibility for the atrocities perpetrated on the Soviet prisoners of war.
The Navy regulations regarding prisoners of war remain in force for all but Soviet prisoners, and where the Soviet prisoners were concerned the “regulations of the OKW” which I have already mentioned, “remain in force.”
Thus, absolute criminal agreement between the Party leaders and the OKW can be considered as existing as I already have shown to the Tribunal. I stress the circumstance and I would remind you that all this happened in the country whose representative had declared as far back as 1902:
“The only purpose in capturing prisoners of war is to prevent their further participation in the war. Although prisoners of war lose their freedom, they do not lose their rights. In other words, captivity is not an act of mercy on the part of the conqueror. It is the right of the disarmed soldier.”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have had that document read to us more than once.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not rereading it. I am merely recalling its contents.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must give the Tribunal credit for some recollection. As I say, that document has been read more than once before.
COL. POKROVSKY: We have at our disposal an official note signed by Lammers. This document is registered under Document Number 073-PS. We submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-361—it has not yet been read into the record. The document states—you will find this excerpt on Page 191 of your document book:
“1. Prisoners of war are foreigners. Influencing them is the task . . . of foreign propaganda and therefore the task of the Foreign Office.”
I omit a few sentences.
“Excepted from this ruling are the Soviet prisoners who are placed under the control of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Territories of the East because the Geneva Convention is not valid for them and because they have a special political status.”
In this connection, I wish to submit to you as Exhibit Number USSR-356 (Document Number USSR-356), another German document. It consists of notes composed at the headquarters of the Foreign Counterintelligence Office on the 15 November 1941 for the “OKW Chief of Staff.” I shall read into the record a few extracts, of which you will find the opening lines on Page 192 of your document book:
“The Geneva Convention regarding prisoners of war is not valid between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Therefore, the only rules in force are the principles of general international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, which since the 18th century have so developed that war captivity represented neither revenge nor punishment, but a security measure, the sole object of which was to prevent prisoners from further participating in the war. This principle developed in connection with the prevalent opinion that, from a military standpoint, the killing or wounding of prisoners was inadmissible. In addition, it is to the interest of each belligerent to be assured against ill-treatment of its soldiers in case of their capture. Appendix I states the directives, based on different premises as can be seen at the beginning of this paragraph, concerning the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.”
To save time I shall omit several sentences and shall read the end of the paragraph into the record:
“. . . and, in addition, eliminated much which from past experience was considered not only as useful from a military viewpoint but as indispensable to the maintenance of discipline and high striking power.
“The orders are drawn up in very general terms. But, if we bear in mind the ruling basic tendency, then the ‘measures’ permitted by these orders are bound to result in wanton and unpunished murder, even though officially the law of violence has been abolished.
“This is obvious from the directive regarding the use of weapons against recalcitrance. The guards and their commanding officers, who often do not understand the language of the prisoner of war, will not be able to know whether the prisoners’ disobedience was due to recalcitrance or to a misunderstanding of the orders. The principle that use of weapons against Soviet prisoners of war is, as a rule, justified absolves the guards from any duty of making reflections about their actions.”
Omitting two paragraphs not directly relating to this matter, I quote as follows:
“The organization of camp police equipped with clubs, whips, and similar weapons, even in camps where all labor is done by the prisoners, is against military rule and tradition. In addition the military authorities thus give into other hands the means for applying punishment without providing adequate control as to how these means are employed.”
I wish to quote one more sentence taken from Paragraph 5 of these notes—you will find it on Page 194:
“Appendix 2 contains a translation of the Russian decree regarding prisoners of war which is in accord with the basic principles of international law as well as with the rules of the Geneva Convention.”
I shall refrain from quoting the rest of the document as it is of little interest. This document is signed by the Chief of the Foreign Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris. It includes directives containing instructions relating to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, dwelling in detail on such sections which Canaris considered as violations of the basic principles of international law and of the Geneva Convention.
I should like to supplement this document with a few excerpts from the minutes of the interrogation by Dr. Wengler, a former counsellor of the Foreign Counterintelligence Service of the OKW. This document is submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-129 (Document Number USSR-129). Wengler was questioned by me on 19 December 1945, and his testimony is important for purposes of evaluating the line of conduct both of the OKW and Keitel himself.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I ask that the document, Exhibit Number USSR-129, which the Russian Prosecutor intends to read, should not be read, but that the witness mentioned in this document, Dr. Wengler, be called personally to testify in Court, if the Soviet Prosecution is willing.
This document, USSR-129, is a record of an interrogation of Dr. Wengler, who was active in Counterintelligence Service in the OKW. It is a question of determining whether the nonapplication of the Geneva Convention as regards Russia is due to the fault of the German Government, the OKW, and the Defendant Keitel. I do not need to state that the clarification of this question is of the utmost significance in judging the responsible persons, not only because of the Counts in the Indictment, but because of the terrible guilt in face of the German people, if the testimony given by this witness should be true. The witness was interrogated in Nuremberg on 19 December 1945. Whether he is still here or in Berlin—he gave his address at the time of the inquiry—I cannot say. But I do believe that the basic decisions of the Tribunal concerning the interpretation of Article 21 of the Charter will justify my request in this respect since, firstly, the summoning of the witness from Berlin does not entail great difficulties, secondly we are concerned with a question of such tremendous significance, even in this setting, that the personal testimony and interrogation by this Tribunal should not be replaced by the mere lecture of the minutes of an inquiry.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you anything you wish to say in answer to that objection?
COL. POKROVSKY: With your permission I should like first of all, in order to clarify the matter, to ask where the witness actually is at the present moment? He is not in Nuremberg. He was brought here especially for this interrogation under the greatest technical difficulties. The interrogation was conducted according to all the rules of our judicial proceedings, so that this document could be submitted to the Tribunal and accepted as evidence, if the Tribunal so judges, according to Article 19 of the Charter.
All the problems concerning this subject, which were of interest to the Soviet Prosecution, are already sufficiently clear from the Document Number USSR-129, which we submit to you, and I see no possibility of having this witness brought here in the near future. Maybe the representatives of the Defense Counsel imagine that it is very easy to produce him, but I do not see any technical possibility of bringing him here a second time. And I repeat that, if the Tribunal does not consider it feasible to accept this document in the suitable manner in which we have formulated it, then we would even agree to refrain from submitting it as evidence and to replace it by other evidence—even though we believe it to be incorrect. But we consider it easier than to bring the witness here a second time. That is all I have to say in reply to this request.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that you could not bring the witness here, and that as you could not bring him here you would not press the introduction of the document?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I put it differently. I said that we insist that this document be admitted, since the Tribunal has the right, according to Article 19 of the Charter, to accept this document as evidence. But if we were to choose between two possibilities, either by adding this evidence to the record or by summoning the witness a second time, the technical obstacles which prevent us from so doing would compel us, by preference, to accept the exclusion of this document from the record, in order to avoid any repetition of the difficulties already experienced. We consider that the document is quite correctly compiled, in accordance with all the rules of the Charter, and that the Tribunal should receive it as evidence according to Article 19 of the Charter.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know first of all, why is it difficult or impossible to bring the witness to Nuremberg in the same way that he was brought to Nuremberg in December 1945; and secondly, has Dr. Nelte and have the other defendants’ counsel got full copies in German of the document?
COL. POKROVSKY: Dr. Wengler was interrogated in his native German tongue. The original of his record, of his interrogation, has been submitted to the Tribunal in an adequate number of copies, which are at the disposal of the Defense Counsel.
As regards the technical difficulties, I cannot, at present, undertake to give the Tribunal a precise description of all the technical difficulties reported to me by my collaborators, since I can no longer remember them. But I do know that, when they were working on this matter, establishing the existence of the witness, searching for him, bringing him here, they—my collaborators—declared that they could do this once but that they would not be able to do it a second time. Consequently, Dr. Wengler, a free agent, was here in Nuremberg, not for 1 day, but for many days, precisely for the time needed adequately to clear up all the questions which were of interest to us and to interrogate him, since we foresaw the impossibility of summoning him a second time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the deponent, the witness, was brought from when he was brought to Nuremberg.
COL. POKROVSKY: From Berlin. He was brought the last time from Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Then is he now in Berlin?
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not undertake to answer this question now without making further inquiries. He is not interned.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Nelte, do you want to say anything?
DR. NELTE: I should just like to refer to the last page of the minutes, where the address is given: Dr. Wilhelm Wengler, Berlin-Hermsdorf, Ringstrasse Number 32. We are simply concerned with the question: Which technical difficulties are involved to bring this witness from Berlin to Nuremberg a second time? Of course, I do not know whether the witness is in Berlin, but I assume that he is there.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the deposition to be put in evidence, should the Soviet Prosecutor decide to do so. If the document is put in evidence, the Tribunal will desire that the Prosecutor should secure the attendance of the deponent as a witness for cross-examination. If the Prosecution is unable to secure the attendance of the deponent as a witness, then the Tribunal will itself attempt to secure the attendance of the deponent as a witness, for cross-examination.
COL. POKROVSKY: I can report to the Tribunal that I attempted to employ the time spent by the Tribunal in deliberating this problem in discovering if we could bring this witness back again and that I did not receive a conclusive reply from my organization. According to the wish of the Tribunal, I shall omit the topic of his cross-examination and shall only refer to it again if I am informed by my collaborators that we can once more bring the witness before the Tribunal. This would seem to me in accordance with the wishes of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I am not quite sure that you appreciated quite what I said. What I said was that you are at liberty to put in the document now, if you wish to do so. That is one thing. But, if you do so, you must attempt to secure the attendance of the witness, and should you fail to do so, the Tribunal will attempt to secure the attendance of the witness; but the document will still be in evidence and will not be struck out, although, of course, it will be open to the criticism that it is only a deposition or an affidavit and that the witness has not been produced for cross-examination and therefore the weight that attaches to the testimony will not be so great as it would be if the witness had been produced for cross-examination.
Is that clear?
COL. POKROVSKY: Wengler was interrogated by me. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I fear I used inaccurately the word “affidavit.” It is only an interrogation. It is not made upon oath and that, of course, will be taken into consideration. But the point is that you can put in the document now if you decide to do so. That is a matter for your discretion. If you do so, you must attempt to secure the attendance of the witness for cross-examination. If you are unable to get him, then the Tribunal will attempt to get him here for cross-examination.
COL. POKROVSKY: When reporting to the Tribunal on the measures we had adopted, I started from the point of view that the Tribunal desired that each witness, whose testimony had been read into the record, could, if necessary, be summoned to appear before the Tribunal for a supplementary cross-examination. That is why I have already attempted to find out whether we can call up this witness now, and since I have not yet received any definite answer from our organization, I wish to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the possibility that we will simply abstain from mentioning these minutes now, as we only need them for the confirmation of one point, already confirmed by a document which has just been presented to the Tribunal. This is the report signed by Canaris. What is the meaning of Wengler’s interrogation? The meaning of Wengler’s interrogation is that it shows that the OKW knew of the treatment meted out to the Soviet prisoners. Canaris said the same.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must decide, Colonel Pokrovsky, whether you wish to put in the document or not. If you wish to put in the document, you may do so, but I do not think it is right for you to state the contents of the document and at the same time not to put it in. If you wish to put it in, then you must try to secure the attendance of the witness, and if you cannot secure the attendance, the Tribunal will try to secure it.
COL. POKROVSKY: I consider that Wengler’s testimony is not important enough for us to pay so very much attention to it. If we can find this witness, we shall examine him at a later date.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of the documents read into the record, and also in view of the protest of the German prisoners of war in Camp 78, which shows how humanely the Soviet authorities treated German military prisoners of the German Army, the sentence from Appendix I of Operations Order Number 14 of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, concerning the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, is nothing less than a brazen insult. This sentence can be found on Page 7 of the document submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-3 (Document Number USSR-3). You will find it on Page 204 of your document book:
“Thus the Bolshevik soldier has lost his right to be treated as an honest soldier and in accordance with the rules of the Geneva Convention.”
I beg the Tribunal to recollect that the following directive, dated 7 November 1941, appears in Appendix II of Order Number 11 of the General Staff of the OKW. I quote from Exhibit Number USSR-3, extracts from which appear on Page 233 of your document book—last paragraph in the right column.
“The work of the Special Squad, by license of the rear area commander (officer in charge of prisoner-of-war affairs of the district) must be done in such a way that the selecting and sorting out is practically unnoticeable. Executions must be carried out without delay, and at sufficient distance from the camp and from habitations to keep them secret from the other prisoners and the population.”
These are the transfers of prisoners “to some place in the neighborhood” that Kuntze, the expert executioner, had in mind when he reported to his chiefs on the incidents which occurred during the execution of the 28 crippled prisoners of war.
Among the documents submitted to the Tribunal by the Soviet Delegation are data regarding the shooting, on 7 April 1945, at the Seelhorst Cemetery in Hanover, of 150 Soviet prisoners of war and civilians. We submit this data as Exhibit Number USSR-112 (Document Number USSR-112). You will find the data in question on Page 207 of your document book. They have been placed at our disposal by the American investigation authorities. They consist of a number of testimonies, including that of Peter Palnikov, a Red Army officer who had fortuitously escaped the execution. You will find the minutes to which I refer on the same page, 207 of your document book. We also have the testimonies of other members of the local population who had been questioned under oath by the American investigation authorities. Their evidence is corroborated by medical reports on bodies exhumed from the graves at Seelhorst Cemetery. In addition, we submit duly certified photographs.
I shall not read all these documents into the record but shall merely point out that the 167 corpses thus exhumed were specially noted in the concluding report of the commission, as enabling the commission to judge, from their appearance, of the “pronounced degree of insufficient nourishment.”
This circumstance must be stressed so that the Tribunal may have a perfectly clear picture of the food situation prevalent among Soviet prisoners of war in the various camps. Regardless of the territory in which the camp was located, all Soviet prisoners of war were exposed to a regime of hunger with the same sustained and systematic cruelty.
While I am thus reporting on the Hitlerian atrocities perpetrated on the prisoners, I find that we now have at our disposal several court verdicts pronounced on the fascist criminals who committed their crimes in the temporarily occupied territories. In accordance with Article 21 of the Charter, I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-87 (Document Number USSR-87) the verdict of a district military tribunal. You will find the entire verdict on Page 214 up to Page 221. It was pronounced in Smolensk, on 19 December 1945. The Tribunal inflicted penalties varying from 12 years hard labor to death by hanging, on 10 Hitlerites directly guilty of the numerous crimes committed in the city and region of Smolensk.
I shall not quote the document, but shall merely mention that on Pages 4, 5, and 6 of the verdict, in passages marked in your copies—these pages, that is, 4, 5, and 6 of the verdict, are to be found in your document book on Pages 218, 219, and 222—information is contained how, as a result of pseudo-scientific experiments on prisoners of war by persons who, to the undying shame of German medicine, were known in Germany as professors and doctors, tortured and murdered the prisoners by blood poisoning. The sentence presents further evidence that, as a result of savage ill-treatment by the German escort conveying Soviet prisoners of war, some 10,000 exhausted, half-dead captives perished between Vyasma and Smolensk.
It is precisely this passage, this information, which you will find in Subparagraph 3 of the verdict. It appears on Page 218 of your document book. The verdict reflects the systematic mass shooting of prisoners of war in Camp 126, in the city of Smolensk—“in Transit Camp 126 South”—during the transfer of the prisoners to the camp and to the hospital. The verdict particularly emphasizes the fact that prisoners of war, too exhausted to work, were shot.
I should now like to turn to the brutalities committed by the Hitlerites towards members of the Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Yugoslavian Armies. We find, in the Indictment, that one of the most important criminal acts for which the major war criminals are responsible was the mass execution of Polish prisoners of war, shot in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk by the German fascist invaders.
I submit to the Tribunal, as a proof of this crime, official documents of the special commission for the establishment and the investigation of the circumstances which attended the executions. The commission acted in accordance with a directive of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union. In addition to members of the Extraordinary State Commission—namely Academicians Burdenko, Alexis Tolstoy, and the Metropolitan Nicolas—this commission was composed of the President of the Pan-Slavonia Committee, Lieutenant General Gundorov; the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Kolesnikov; of the People’s Commissar for Education in the R.S.S.F.R., Academician Potemkin; the Supreme Chief of the Medical Department of the Red Army, General Smirnov; and the Chairman of the District Executive Committee of Smolensk, Melnikov. The commission also included several of the best known medico-legal experts.
It would take too long to read into the record that precise and detailed document which I now submit to you as Exhibit Number USSR-54 (Document Number USSR-54), which is a result of the investigation. I shall read into the record only a few comparatively short excerpts. On Page 2 of the document, which is Page 223 in your document book, we read—this passage is marked in your file:
“According to the estimates of medico-legal experts, the total number of bodies amounts to over 11,000. The medico-legal experts carried out a thorough examination of the bodies exhumed, and of the documents and material evidence found on the bodies and in the graves. During the exhumation and examination of the corpses, the commission questioned many witnesses among the local inhabitants. Their testimony permitted the determination of the exact time and circumstances of the crimes committed by the German invaders.”
I believe that I need not quote everything that the Extraordinary Commission ascertained during its investigation about the crimes of the Germans. I only read into the record the general conclusions, which summarize the work of the commission. You will find the lines read into the record on Page 43 of Exhibit Number USSR-54 if you turn to the original document, or on Page 264 of your document book:
“General conclusions:
“On perusal of all the material at the disposal of the special commission, that is, the depositions of over 100 witnesses questioned, the data of the medico-legal experts, the documents and the material evidence and belongings taken from the graves in Katyn Forest, we can arrive at the following definite conclusions:
“1. The Polish prisoners of war imprisoned in the three camps west of Smolensk and engaged in railway construction before the war, remained there after the occupation of Smolensk by the Germans, right up to September 1941.
“2. In the autumn of 1941, in Katyn Forest, the German occupational authorities carried out mass shootings of the Polish prisoners of war from the above-mentioned camps.
“3. Mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war in Katyn Forest were carried out by German military organizations disguised under the specific name, ‘Staff 537, Engineer Construction Battalion,’ commanded by Oberleutnant Arnes and his colleagues, Oberleutnant Rex and Leutnant Hott.
“4. In connection with the deterioration, for Germany, of the general military and political machinery at the beginning of 1943, the German occupational authorities, with a view to provoking incidents, undertook a whole series of measures to ascribe their own misdeeds to organizations of the Soviet authorities, in order to make mischief between the Russians and the Poles.
“5. For these purposes:
“a. The German fascist invaders, by persuasion, attempts at bribery, threats, and by barbarous tortures, endeavored to find ‘witnesses’ among the Soviet citizens from whom they obtained false testimony, alleging that the Polish prisoners of war had been shot by organizations of the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940.
“b. The German occupational authorities, in the spring of 1943, brought from other places the bodies of Polish prisoners of war whom they had shot, and laid them in the turned up graves of Katyn Forest with the dual purpose of covering up the traces of their own atrocities and of increasing the numbers of ‘victims of Bolshevist atrocities’ in Katyn Forest,
“c. While preparing their provocative measures, the German occupational authorities employed up to 500 Russian prisoners of war for the task of digging up the graves in Katyn Forest. Once the graves had been dug, the Russian prisoners of war were shot by the Germans in order to destroy thus all proof and material evidence on the matter.
“6. The date of the legal and medical examination determined, without any shadow of doubt:
“a. That the time of shooting was autumn 1941.
“b. The application by the German executioners, when shooting Polish prisoners of war, of the identical method—a pistol shot in the nape of the neck—as used by them in the mass murders of the Soviet citizens in other towns, especially in Orel, Voronetz, Krasnodar and in Smolensk itself.”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now recess.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
COL. POKROVSKY: Point 7 of the general conclusions of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union, on which I reported in the preceding session, states:
“The conclusions reached, after studying the affidavits and medico-legal examinations concerning the shooting of Polish military prisoners of war by Germans in the autumn of 1941, fully confirmed the material evidence and documents discovered in the Katyn graves.
“8. By shooting the Polish prisoners of war in Katyn Forest, the German fascist invaders consistently realized their policy for the physical extermination of the Slav peoples.”
Here follow the signatures of all the members of the Commission.
The Katyn massacres did not exhaust the Hitler crimes against the soldiers of the Polish Army. In the report of the Polish Government, submitted by me to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-93 (Document Number USSR-93), we find a series of proofs confirming the breach by the Hitlerite conspirators of the elementary rules of international law governing the customs and laws of war; on Page 36 of this report by the Polish Government—it is on Page 285 of your document book—we find, as an outstanding part of the material collected, the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and their extermination. It is said in the report—and I quote:
“As and when the Polish officers and other ranks returned from German prisoner-of-war camps, we learn further details concerning conditions prevailing in the German camps. All these details undeniably prove the existence of a line of policy, instructions, and orders concerning the Polish prisoners of war. Ill-treatment, hardship, and inhuman conditions were of common occurrence. Murders and grievous bodily injuries were frequently encountered. A few examples confirmed by witnesses under oath are submitted later on.”
I take the liberty of reading into the record some of the examples quoted in the Polish report. As a first example, I shall quote the description of an incident which occurred in a temporary prisoner-of-war camp in the city of Belsk. This material figures on Page 285 of your document book:
“On 10 October 1939 the camp commandant assembled all the prisoners and ordered those who had joined the Polish Army as volunteers to raise their hands. Three prisoners obeyed his order. They were immediately led out of the rank and placed at a distance of 25 meters from a detachment of German soldiers armed with machine guns. The commandant gave the order to open fire. He then spoke to the remaining prisoners and told them that the three volunteers had been shot as an example to the others.”
In this case we are not faced with the simple murder of three unarmed soldiers of the Polish Army. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel, you forgive my interrupting you, but you remember that I have interrupted all the other prosecutors to point out to them that one opening speech had been made on behalf of their delegation, and that really their function was to present the documents.
Now, you have just presented a document which states that three volunteers were shot. I think that any comment upon that is really unnecessary.
COL. POKROVSKY: I now proceed to the quotation of the second excerpt on Page 37, Subparagraph d—Page 226 of your document book:
“In the autumn of 1939 Camp (Stalag) VIII-S was established in Kounau, near Sagan on the River Bober, a tributary of the Oder. Depositions from this camp read as follows:
“The camp in Kounau was an open space surrounded by barbed wire, with large tents, each holding 180 or 200 persons. In spite of very cold weather (the temperature was below 25 degrees centigrade) there was, in December 1939, no heating appliance whatsoever in the camp. Consequently, some of the internees suffered from frozen hands, feet, and ears. Since the prisoners had no blankets and since their uniforms were too worn out to protect them from the cold, disease broke out, while malnutrition resulted in extreme debility. Moreover, the guards constantly ill-treated the prisoners. They were beaten on the slightest pretext. Two men were especially noted for their brutality, Lieutenant Schinke and Sergeant Major Grau. They hit the prisoners in the face and beat them, broke their ribs and arms, and gouged out their eyes. Such inhuman treatment resulted in several cases of suicide and insanity among the soldiers.”
I think we can now pass on at once to the general conclusions and to read into the Record to this end Subparagraph g on Page 39—Page 287 of the document book:
“The above-mentioned treatment of Polish prisoners of war by individuals as well as by the German military authorities, flagrantly violated the articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929, Articles 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 29, 30, 50, and 54. The convention in question had been ratified by Germany on 21 February 1934.”
Soldiers of the Yugoslav Army, captured by the German troops, were subjected to unbridled ill-treatment by the fascist invaders. Ill-treatment, torture, and torment, together with mass executions were introduced as a part of the system. Here, too, the Hitler criminals were perfectly aware of what they were doing. To whitewash themselves, if only a little, in the eyes of the world, they referred in all documents concerning the destruction of Yugoslav prisoners of war, to the officers and men of the Yugoslav Army as “bandits.”
The second paragraph from the bottom of Page 23 of the official Yugoslav report with regard to the above matter reads as follows—I quote Page 23 of Document Number USSR-305. This quotation begins on Page 326 of your document book:
“. . . everywhere where the Germans used the so-called actions against ‘bands and bandits’ as a pretext for the annihilation of the civilian population (women, children, and old people), units of the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation and partisan units had actually been involved. . . .
“Being under military command and wearing recognizable military emblems and insignia, they conducted an armed struggle against the fascist occupational forces and, moreover, they were fully recognized by all the Allies. Besides, we will see later on that on some of its documents, the German Command itself unmistakably recognized this fact; but in its attitude towards the Yugoslav warriors it continued unrestrainedly to violate the principles of the international laws of war.”
As an additional confirmation of the report, the form of which is in accordance with the requirements of Article 21 of the Charter concerning the admissibility of evidence, I also submit to the Tribunal Document Number USSR-305. This is an excerpt from the report by the Yugoslav State Commission concerning the determination of crimes committed by the occupational forces and their accomplices. The State Commission reports that there is at its disposal a secret report by Lieutenant General Hoesslin, the officer in command of the 188th Mountain Infantry Reserve Division, numbered 9070/44. The report is of great importance because of the following considerations which I will explain to the Tribunal in the terms of Document Number USSR-305. I quote:
“Although the report refers to our divisions, brigades, and artillery battalions under their proper names and proper numbers—in cases of military engagements—all our army is called in this report by the general name of ‘bandits,’ and for the very simple reason that by so doing they are attempting to divest us of the rights of belligerents, they themselves assuming the right to shoot prisoners of war, to kill the wounded, and to have a pretext for employing repressive measures against the peaceful non-combatant population, allegedly because of their assistance to the ‘bandits.’ Lieutenant General Hoesslin admits that the combat group of Colonel Christel after ‘a night engagement with weak bandit forces’—these are the precise words of the report—‘burnt down Laskovitz, Lazna, and Cepovan, and destroyed a hospital.’
“In General Hoesslin’s report it is further stated that the division, together with the 3rd Brandenburg Regiment and other German army and police units, participated in ‘a free-for-all manhunt for bandits in the neighborhood of Klana’ (Operation Ernst). . . .”
I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number USSR-132 (Document Number USSR-132), Page 363 of your document book. This represents an excerpt from the directives issued by Major General Kübler concerning the conduct of troops in action, an extract which was certified by the Yugoslav State Commission. I read these excerpts into the Record:
“Secret; 118th Jäger Division; Abt Ic; Br. B. No. 1418/43 secret; Div. Hqs., 12. 5. 1943.
“Directives for the Conduct of Troops in Action.
“2. Prisoners:
“Anyone having participated openly in the fight against the German Armed Forces and having been taken prisoner is to be shot after interrogation.”
I further submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number USSR-304 (Document Number USSR-304). This number has been given to the excerpt from Memorandum Number 6 of the Yugoslav State Commission for the determination of the crimes committed by the occupational forces and by their accomplices. In the last paragraph of Exhibit Number USSR-304—Page 2 of the Russian text—is stated as follows—your Page 365 of the document book:
“On 3 May 1945 the Germans brought from one of the partisan hospitals 35 manacled patients and hospital orderlies. Ten of the patients who were unable to walk were stood against the wall and shot. Their bodies were piled in a heap, covered with wood and set on fire.”
As Exhibit Number USSR-307 (Document Number USSR-307) I submit another extract from statement Number 6 of the same State Commission. This statement is found on Page 85 to 115 of the first book entitled “Memoranda on Crimes Committed by the Occupation Forces and their Accomplices.” I shall now proceed to quote a part of this extract:
“On 5 June 1944 Hitler’s criminals captured two soldiers of the Yugoslav Liberation Army and the Slovene Partisan Detachments. They brought them to Razori, where they cut off their noses and ears with bayonets, gouged out their eyes and then asked them if they could see their Comrade Tito. Thereupon they assembled the peasants and beheaded the two victims in their presence. . . . They then placed both the heads on a table.”
In accordance with their usual practice of photographing the bodies of their victims, the fascists then took photographs, and, as is further stated in the extract quoted by me:
“Later, in the course of the fighting, the photographs were found on a fallen German. From this it can be seen that they confirm the above described incident at Razori.”
These pictures will be submitted to the Tribunal together with other Yugoslav photographic evidence.
Under Document USSR-65(a) I submit to the Tribunal an announcement signed by the Commander of the SS and police detachments of the 18th Military District, SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of Police, Rösener. I shall now proceed to read into the Record a part of this announcement. You will thus be able to see that the warriors of the Yugoslav Armed Forces who were taken prisoner were either hanged or shot. This document is on Page 367 of your document book, “In connection with the various clashes between police detachments and Yugoslav units. . . .”
I skip several sentences of this document concerning a description of the encounters between detachments of Polish and Yugoslav units.
“Eighteen bandits were recently killed in action and a considerable number taken prisoner.
“The following bandits, who were among the prisoners, were publicly hanged at Stein on 30 June 1942. . . .”
This statement is followed by the names of eight Yugoslav soldiers between the ages of 21 and 40 years. I will not read this list into the Record.
On Page 36 of our Exhibit Number USSR-36 (Document Number USSR-36)—your Page 339—the first paragraph from the bottom reads, “We can find the identical evidence in a collection of official notes on the staff conferences of Gauleiter Uiberreiter.” Thus, for example, it is stated in the minutes of the conference held on 23 March 1942, “Fifteen bandits were executed in Maribor today.” I omit some sentences from the minutes of the conference held on 27 July 1942, “Many bandits have been shot recently.”
The minutes of the conference of 21 December 1941 contain a passage:
“Since the bandits started their activities in July 1941, 164 bandits have been shot by the uniformed police and 1,043 by special procedure (Sonderverfahren).”
The minutes of 25 January 1943 state:
“The number of guerilla troops liquidated on 8 January 1942 by the Security Police and the uniformed branch is 86, including wounded and prisoners, 77 of whom were killed.”
Such notes can be found in almost every one of the minutes of these conferences held by Uiberreiter.
A certain number of prisoners of war who had escaped immediate annihilation were moved into special camps where they were gradually killed off by hunger and by exhausting heavy labor. I will now read into the Record the last paragraph on Page 37 of the report of the Yugoslav Government, which was previously mentioned by me and offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-36. It is on Page 340 of the document book:
“One such camp was established in 1942 at Boten, near Rognan. Nearly 1,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war were brought into this camp; and in the course of a few months all of them, to the last man, died of illness, hunger, physical torture, or execution by shooting. They were forced every day to do the very hardest work on a road and some dams. Their working hours lasted from dawn until 1800 hours, under the worst possible climatic conditions in this far northern part of Norway. During their work the prisoners were beaten incessantly and in the camp, itself, were exposed to terrible ill-treatment.
“Thus, for example, in August 1942 the prisoners were ordered by the German staff of the camp to have all their hair removed from their armpits and around their genitals, as otherwise they would be shot. Not one prisoner received a razor from the Germans, though the Germans knew well that they had none. The prisoners spent the whole of the night plucking out their hair with their hands and assisting one another. However, in the morning the guards killed four prisoners and wounded three by rifle fire.
“On 26 November 1943, German soldiers, in the middle of the night, broke into the hospital and dragged out into the courtyard 80 sick prisoners; after they had been forced to strip in the bitter cold, they were all shot. On 26 January 1943, 50 more prisoners died in torment from the beatings received. Throughout the winter many prisoners were killed in the following manner: They would be buried up to their waist in the snow, and water poured over them, so that they formed statues of ice. It was established that 880 Yugoslav prisoners of war were killed in the above-mentioned camp in various ways.”
Further, on Page 38, Exhibit Number USSR-36 (Document Number USSR-36), information is contained of the shooting of Yugoslav prisoners of war in the camp at Bajsfjord, Norway. After 10 July 1942, when an epidemic of spotted fever broke out in the camp and spread to six others, the Germans found no other way of fighting this epidemic than by shooting all the patients. This was done on 17 July 1942. On the same page, 38, there is a reference to a Norwegian report of 22 January 1942, compiled on a basis of statements made by Norwegian guards of this camp who had fled. It is stated in this report that of 900 Yugoslav prisoners of war, 320 were shot, while the remainder, with a view to isolating them, were transferred to another camp, Bjerfjel. I will read into the Record Page 38 of Exhibit Number USSR-36, beginning with the fifth paragraph from the bottom, Page 341 of your document book:
“When an epidemic of spotted fever broke out in the new camp, an average of 12 men a day were shot in the course of the following 5 to 6 weeks. By the end of August 1942 only 350 of these prisoners were returned to Bajsfjord, where German SS troops continued to exterminate them. In the end only 200 men remained alive and were transferred to camp Osen.”
I will now skip two paragraphs and pass to the last paragraph of the same report:
“On 22 June 1943 a transport containing 900 Yugoslav prisoners arrived in Norway. Most of them were intellectuals, workers and peasants, and prisoners from the ranks of the former Yugoslav Army or else captured partisans or men seized as so-called ‘politically suspicious elements.’ Some of them—about 400—were placed in the still unfinished camp at Korgen, while the other group of about 500 was sent 10 to 20 kilometers further on to Osen. The commandant of both camps, from June 1942 until the end of March 1943, was the SS Sturmbannführer Dolps. . . .
“Men were constantly dying of hunger. Forty-five were placed in a hut which normally accommodated six men only. . . . There was no medicine. . . . They worked under most difficult conditions on road building, in the bitter cold, without clothing and caps, in the wind and rain, 12 hours a day.
“The prisoners in the camp at Osen used to sleep in their shirts without any underpants, without any cover whatsoever, on the bare boards. Dolps personally visited the huts and carried out inspections. The prisoners who were caught sleeping in their underpants were killed on the spot by Dolps with his submachine gun. In the same manner he killed all those who appeared on parade, which he reviewed personally, in soiled underwear. . . . By the end of 1942 only 90 still remained alive of the first group of 400 in Korgen. Out of about 500 prisoners who were taken to the camp of Osen by the end of June 1942, there were, in March 1943, only 30 men left alive.”
I will read into the record an excerpt from Page 39, Exhibit Number USSR-36 beginning with the third paragraph from the bottom, Page 342 of your document book:
“Besides this terrible treatment of the captured soldiers of the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation and the Partisan Detachments, the Germans also treated prisoners of war from the ranks of the old Yugoslav Army in complete contravention of international law and contrary to the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 1929. In April 1941, immediately after the occupation of the Yugoslav territory, the Germans drove into captivity in Germany about 300,000 noncommissioned officers and men. The Yugoslav State Commission has at its disposal much evidence of the unlawful ill-treatment of these prisoners. We shall give here a few examples only.
“On 14 July 1943 in the officers’ SS camp at Osnabrück, 740 captured Yugoslav officers were separated from the remainder and placed in a special penitentiary camp called Camp D. Here they were all crowded together in four huts; all contact with the rest of the camp was prohibited. The treatment of these officers directly contravened the provisions of the Geneva Convention even more so than the treatment of the other prisoners. In this penitentiary camp were placed all those whom the Germans considered as supporters of the National-Liberation movement and against whom they very frequently applied measures of mass punishments.
“The Germans gambled with the lives of the prisoners and frequently shot them from sheer caprice. Thus, for instance, at the aforesaid camp at Osnabrück, on 11 January 1942, a German guard fired at a group of prisoners, severely wounding Captain Peter Nozinic. On 22 July 1942 a guard fired on a group of officers. On 2 September 1942, a guard fired on the Yugoslav lieutenant, Vladislav Vajs, who was incapacitated by a wound he had received some time before. On 22 September 1942, a guard from the prison tower again fired on a group of officers. On 18 December 1942 the guard fired on a group of officers because, from their huts, they were watching some English prisoners passing by. On 20 February 1943 a guard fired on an officer merely because this officer was smoking. On 11 March 1943 a guard opened fire on the doors of a hut and killed General Dimitri Pavlovic. On 21 June 1943 a guard fired at the Yugoslav lieutenant colonel, Branko Popanic. On 26 April 1944 a German noncommissioned officer, Richards, fired on Lieutenant Vladislav Gaider, who subsequently died of his wounds.
“On 26 June 1944 the German captain, Kuntze, fired on two Yugoslav officers, severely wounding Lieutenant Djorjevic.
“All these shootings were carried out without any serious reasons or pretext and only as a result of brutal orders issued by the German camp commandants, who threatened that firearms would be used even in the case of the most insignificant offenses.
“All these incidents occurred in one single camp. But this was the treatment applied in all the remaining camps for Yugoslav officers and soldiers—captives in the hands of the Germans.”
A certain incident is described in the Czechoslovak Government report which I should like to mention here. Its importance lies not in the fact that it throws a new light on the methods employed in fascist crimes but that it took place at the time when the Hitlerites clearly realized that their days were numbered. This incident is described in Appendix 4 to the Czechoslovak Government’s report, and I shall describe it briefly and in my own words.
There was an airfield at Gavlichkov Brod at which various military installations were located, while the former lunatic asylum was used as an SS hospital. When the question arose regarding the formalities for the surrender of the German military units at the airfield—in 1945—Staff Captain Sula with one of his fellow officers as official representative of the Czechoslovak Army took himself to the airfield. Neither of them ever came back. Later the airfield and the hospital were occupied by the Czech national units and an investigation was carried out. It showed that the negotiators, together with six other persons who had previously disappeared at Gavlichkov Brod, were taken by the Germans to the SS hospital where they were subjected to cruel tortures. In the case of Captain Sula the Germans cut out his tongue, gouged out his eyes, and cut his chest open. The others suffered similar treatment. Most of them had been castrated. I am in possession of photographic evidence in support of this fact which I am submitting to the Tribunal.
My presentation has lasted several hours. But surely, neither time nor any word of living human speech will ever suffice to describe even a thousandth part of the sufferings borne by the soldiers of my fatherland and of the other democratic countries who had the misfortune of falling into the hands of the fascist executioners.
I have only been able to show the Tribunal, in a very condensed form, the manner in which the monstrous fascist directives regarding the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and their mass extermination were carried out, an ill-treatment before which the horrors of the Middle Ages pale.
We shall here attempt, if only quite briefly, to fill in the gaps. In tens of thousands the witnesses will pass before your eyes. They have been called before the Tribunal to testify in this case. I cannot summon them by name, no oath will you ever administer to them and yet their evidence will never be denied—for the dead do not lie. Most of the films pertaining to German atrocities which will be presented by the Soviet Prosecution pertain to crimes against prisoners of war. The silent testimony of the helpless prisoners burned alive in hospitals, of prisoners mutilated beyond all recognition, of prisoners tortured and starved to death will, I am certain, be far more eloquent than any word of mine.
Blood drips from the hands of the accused—the blood of the victims of Rostov and Kharkov, the martyrs of Auschwitz and all the extermination camps created by the Hitlerites. Treacherously the enemy attacked our country. The people rose in arms to defend their mother country, her freedom, and her independence, the honor and lives of their families. They joined the ranks of the fighting men. They fell into the hands of the enemy. Now see how the enemy dishonored them when they stood helpless and unarmed.
So may these major criminals, who bear the main responsibility for the evil deeds of the fascists, be forced to answer to the martyrs to the full extent of the law of international justice for the indescribable atrocities which you will see with your own eyes, and for the many other crimes which will forever remain unknown.
Allow me to present to the Tribunal Chief Counsellor L. N. Smirnov, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R., who will submit to the Tribunal the documentation pertaining to the crimes committed against the civilian population of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Your Honors, my problem today consists of presenting to you the written documents and other judicial evidence testifying to the very grievous crimes committed by the Hitlerian conspirators against the peaceful population in the territories of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia when under temporary occupation.
The number of such depositions at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution is unusually great. Suffice it to say that in the reports of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union for the determination and investigation of the atrocities of the German fascist invaders and the accomplices, there are 54,784 reports of the crimes by the Hitlerian criminals, directed against the peaceful citizens of the Soviet Union.
But even these documents do not, by a long way, cover all the crimes perpetrated by these war criminals against the peaceful population. The Soviet Prosecution asserts and I submit to the Tribunal evidence to this effect, that along the entire length of the far-flung front, from the Barents to the Black Sea, and throughout the entire depths of the infiltration of the German hordes into my mother country, wherever the German soldier or the men of the SS set foot, crimes of unspeakable cruelty were committed and the victims of these crimes were the women, the children, and the old.
The crimes of the German fascist criminals became apparent as and when the Red Army units moved west. The reports on these Hitlerite crimes against the peaceful population were made by officers of the advance units of the Red Army, by local authorities, and public organizations.
The Soviet people did not, in the first moment, learn of the crimes of the German fascist invaders from circulars of the German Command, from the notices posted up by the Reich leaders, or from the directives issued by the SS Obergruppenführers both in incoming and outgoing bulletins of the competent German chancelleries, although such documents were captured in very large quantities by the advance units of the Red Army and are currently in the possession of the Soviet Prosecution. Far different were the sources of their information. Returning to their native haunts the soldiers of the Army of Liberation saw the many villages, towns, and cities which had been reduced to so much wasteland.
At the foot of the communal graves where rest the bodies of the Soviet people murdered by “typical German methods”—I shall, later on, present to the Tribunal evidence of these methods and of the regularity of their application—at the foot of the gallows where the feet of the adolescents danced on the air, at the ovens of the gigantic crematories where the murdered internees from the extermination camps were burned, at the sight of the dead women and girls, victims of some sadistic whim of the fascist bandits, at the sight of children, who had been torn in half—by all this evidence did the Soviet people recognize the mighty chain of crime extending, as the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. so aptly said, “from the ministerial armchair to the hands of the executioner.”
All these monstrous crimes had a definite system of their own. There was uniformity in the murder methods: One and the same system prevailed in the construction of the gas chambers, in the mass production of the round tins containing the poisonous substances “Cyclone A” or “Cyclone B,” the ovens of the crematories are all built on the same typical lines, and one was the plan extending over all the camps of destruction. There was uniformity in the construction of the evil-smelling death machines, which the Germans referred to as “gaswagen” but which our people called the “soul destroyers”; and there was the same technical elaboration in the construction of mobile mills for grinding human bones. All this indicates one sole and evil will uniting all the individual assassins and executioners.
It became obvious that German thermotechnicians and chemists, architects, toxicologists, mechanics, and physicians were engaged in this rationalization of mass murder on instructions received from Hitler’s government and from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. It was also evident that the “death factories” brought into existence an entire series of auxiliary industries.
But the unity of this will-to-evil was not only apparent there, where a special technique had been evolved to serve the purpose of very evil murder. The unity of this will-to-evil was also apparent from the similarity of the methods employed by the murderers, from the uniformity of type in the murder technique evolved as well as from the fact that, in cases where no special technique was employed, use was made of ordinary weapons of the German Armed Forces.
From the evidence which I shall submit later on you will see that the sites where the Germans buried their victims were opened up by Soviet legal doctors in the north and south of the country. These sites were separated from each other by thousands of kilometers, and it is quite evident that the crimes were perpetrated by perfectly different people; but the methods employed were absolutely identical. The wounds were invariably inflicted on the same parts of the body. And identical, too, were the preparations for camouflaging the gigantic graves as antitank ditches and trenches. Everywhere the unarmed and defenseless people, on their arrival at the execution ground, were ordered, in practically the same terms, to undress and lie face downwards in previously prepared pits. As soon as the first batch was shot, whether in the swamps of Bielorussia or the foothills of the Caucasus, the row was covered with quicklime and the second batch of unarmed and defenseless people, of people about to die, were again ordered by the murderers to undress and lie down on that corrosive, blood-soaked mass which covered the first batch of victims.
This is testified to not only by the uniformity of instructions and orders received from high commands. So similar were the methods employed that it became clear that execution squads were being trained in special schools which had systematized beforehand and provided for every eventuality, from the order to undress prior to the shooting right down to the shooting proper. These assumptions, based on an analysis of assembled facts, were later confirmed by documents captured by the Red Army and by the testimony of prisoners of war.
From the very first months of the war it became clear to the Soviet Government that the innumerable crimes of the German fascist aggressors against the peaceful citizens of my mother country represented, not the excesses of undisciplined military units or the isolated crimes of individual officers and soldiers, but that they represented a system prepared in advance, not merely sanctioned by the criminal Hitler Government, but consciously planned and encouraged by this government.
I submit to the Tribunal in evidence according to Article 21 of the Charter, one of the official notes of V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the U.S.S.R., dated as early as 6 January 1942. This document is registered as Exhibit Number USSR-51 (Document Number USSR-51). It is on the first page of your document book, beginning at the third paragraph after the heading:
“As and when the Red Army, in the course of its continued and victorious counter-offensive, liberated numerous cities and rural committees which had, for a certain time, been in the hands of the German invader, an incredible picture emerged more clearly with every passing day—a picture of the looting which took place in every community, of general devastation, of revolting acts of rape, ill-treatment, and mass murder—all committed against peaceful citizens by the fascist German occupational forces during their advance, during the occupation, and during their withdrawal. The great amount of documentary material which the Soviet Government has at its disposal witnesses to the plundering and despoiling of the population, accompanied by bestial acts of violence and mass murders, carried out in all territories which came under the heels of the German invaders. Unquestionable facts prove that the regimes of robbery and of bloody terror inflicted on the peaceful population of the occupied villages and cities did not consist of certain excesses of individual undisciplined military units or individual German officers and soldiers. Rather does it point to a definite system, planned far in advance and encouraged by the German Government and the German Army Command, a system which intentionally unleashed within their army the lowest animal instincts among the officers and men.
“Every step of the German fascist army and its allies in the invaded Soviet territories of the Ukraine and Moldavia, of Bielorussia and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, in the Karelian-Finnish lands, in the Russian zones and regions, led to annihilation and to the destruction of priceless material and cultural treasures—the property of the nation; for the civilian population it led to the loss of hard-won property, slave labor, famine, and bloody massacre before whose horror the most savage crimes in history have paled.
“The Soviet Government and its organizations record all these infamous crimes of the Hitler army for which the indignant Soviet people justifiably demand and will obtain retribution.
“The Soviet Government considers it a duty to bring to the notice of all civilized humanity, of honest men all the world over, its declaration concerning the monstrous crimes perpetrated against the peaceful people of all occupied territories of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite armies.”
I now proceed to read into the record Paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of the concluding statement of this note. Your Honors will find the place in question on the reverse side of Page 4 of the document quoted, Paragraph 5, Column 1 of the text:
“The Hitlerite Government in Germany which had so treacherously attacked the Soviet Union pays no heed, in warfare, to any standards of international law or to any of the moral requirements. It wages war primarily against the peaceful and unarmed populations, against women, children, and old men, thereby revealing its own essential vileness. This government of robbers, which only recognizes violence and rapine, must be crushed by the all-powerful strength of the freedom-loving peoples, in whose ranks the Soviet nation will carry out its mighty task of liberation to the end.
“In bringing all the atrocities committed by the German invaders to the knowledge of all the governments with which the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations, the Soviet Government announces that it holds Germany’s criminal Hitlerite Government responsible for all the inhuman and rapacious acts perpetrated by the German Armed Forces.
“At the same time the Government of the Soviet Union declares with unshakable conviction that the Soviet Union’s fight for liberation is a fight for the rights and liberty not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union, but also for the rights and liberty of all freedom-loving peoples of the world and that this war can only end with the complete destruction of the Hitler armies and with complete victory over the Hitler tyranny.”
The large quantity of the materials and facts which I have to submit to the Tribunal renders necessary the adherence to a very strict systematization of the materials in question.
Evidence will be submitted to the Tribunal successively.