Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 06 (part 3 of 3)
As I indicated to the Tribunal this morning, I wish to say that the Prosecution has no proof that such crimes were due to a German governmental order; but I believe that it is nevertheless interesting to advise the Tribunal of this last episode in the German undertakings against the University of Strasbourg, for the episode constitutes the sequel and, in a sense, the climax of the preceding incidents. We have seen, indeed, that German procedure began at first regularly and that after these regular procedures it reached the stage of recourse to the police. Brutality and violation accompanied this recourse.
I wish to advise you that this document which I have just read bears the Document Number RF-712 (bis).
I come now to the second part of this subject, which is the imposition of German standards. The leaders of the Reich began by organizing a specifically German administration. I already indicated a while ago the appointment of Gauleiter as heads of the civil administration. I continue on this point by producing as Document Number RF-713 the Ordinance of 28 August 1940, Official Gazette of the Reich, 1940, Page 22. The Ordinance is entitled: “Concerning the Introduction of the German Regime in Alsace.” I shall not read this Ordinance. I simply indicate that its object is to put into effect, from 1 October 1940 on, the German municipal regime of 30 January 1935.
The text and the organization show that the territories annexed were reorganized on the basis of German administrative concepts. At the head of each district (arrondissement) we no longer have a French subprefect but a Landkommissar, who has under his orders the different offices of Finance, Labor, School Inspection, Commerce, and Health. The large towns, the chief towns of arrondissements and even of cantons, were endowed with a Stadtkommissar instead of, and replacing, the mayors and elected counsellors, who had been eliminated. The judicial offices were attached to the court of appeals in Karlsruhe. The economic departments and, in particular, the chambers of commerce were run by the representatives of the chambers of commerce of Karlsruhe for Alsace and of Saarbrücken for Moselle.
After having germanized the forms of administrative activity, the Germans undertook to germanize the staffs. They nominated numerous German officials to posts of authority. They attempted, moreover, on a number of occasions, to make the officials who had remained in office sign declarations of loyalty to the Germans. These attempts, however, met with a refusal from the officials. They were therefore renewed on a number of occasions in different forms. We have recovered from the archives of the Gauleiter of Strasbourg 8 or 10 different formulas for these declarations of loyalty. I shall produce one of these for the Tribunal, by way of example.
This is Document Number RF-714. It is the formula for the new declaration which the officials are obliged to sign if they wish to retain their positions:
“Name and first name, grade and service, residence.
“I have been employed from —— 1940 to this date in the public service of the German administration in Alsace. During this period I have had, from my own observation as well as from the Party and the authorities, verbally and in writing, occasion to learn the obligations of a German official and the requirements which are exacted of him from a political and ideological point of view. I approve these obligations and these requirements without reservation and am resolved to be ruled by them in my personal and professional life. I affirm my adherence to the German people and to the National Socialist ideals of Adolf Hitler.”
Along with the administration, properly speaking, the Nazis set up in Alsace the parallel administration of the National Socialist Party, as well as that of the Arbeitsfront, which was the sole labor organization.
German currency legislation was introduced in Alsace on 19 October and in Lorraine on 25 October 1940. The Reichsmark became thenceforth the legal means of payment in the annexed territory. The German judicial organization was introduced by a series of successive measures leading up to the decree of 30 September 1941 concerning the simplification of the judicial organization in Alsace. I produce this ordinance as Document Number RF-715, without reading it.
In regard to the teaching system, the German authorities established a series of regulations and ordinances which were aimed at assuring the unification of the Alsatian school system with the German teaching system. I shall simply mention the dates of the principal texts, which we produce as documents, and which are of a public nature, since they were all published in the Official Gazette of the Reich in Alsace. Here are the main texts:
Document Number RF-717, regulation of 2 October 1940.
Document Number RF-718, ordinance of 24 March 1941 on elementary teaching in Alsace.
Document Number RF-719, ordinance of 21 April 1941 concerning the allocation of subsidies for education in Alsace.
Document Number RF-720, ordinance of 11 June 1941 on obligatory education in Alsace.
I now quote a series of measures ordering the introduction in Alsace and Lorraine of German civil law, German criminal law, and even procedure. I shall quote as the most important, under Document Number RF-721, the ordinance of 19 June 1941 concerning the application of the provisions of German legislation to Alsatians. I should like to read the first paragraph of Article 1 because it contains an interesting item:
“Article 1:
“1. The legal relationships of persons who acquired French citizenship under the Appendix to Articles 51 to 79 of the Versailles dictate and of those who derive their nationality from those persons, in particular in the domain of personal and family law, are governed by the legislation in force in the former Empire, in accordance with the law of the country of origin, insofar as this legislation applies to the country of origin.”
A similar ordinance was drawn up for Lorraine, Document Number RF-722, ordinance of 15 September 1941 concerning the application of German legislation to personal and family status in Lorraine. Official Bulletin of the Reich, Page 817.
I should like to quote, indicating the titles and references, the principal measures which have been introduced in penal matters:
Document Number RF-723, notice of 14 February 1941 relative to the penal dispositions declared applicable in Lorraine by virtue of Section 1 of the second ordinance concerning certain transitory measures in the domain of justice.
Document Number RF-724, ordinance of 29 October 1941 relative to the introduction into Alsace of the German legislation of penal procedure and of other penal laws.
Document Number RF-725, ordinance of 30 January 1942 relative to the introduction into Alsace of the German penal code and other penal laws.
I do not wish to read this text which is long, but I should like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to two features which show that the Germans introduced into Alsace the most extraordinary provisions of their penal law, conceived from the point of view of the National Socialist regime. The Tribunal will thus see, in this Document Number RF-725, Page 1 under Number 6 of the enumeration, that the law of 20 December 1934, repressing perfidious attacks directed against the State and the Party and protecting Party uniforms, was introduced into Alsace, as well as the ordinance of 25 November 1939, under Number 11 of the enumeration, completing the penal provisions relating to the protection of the military power of the German people.
As concerns public freedom, the Germans eliminated from the beginning the right of association; and they dissolved all existing associations. They intended to leave free room for the Nazi system, which was to be the only and obligatory association.
I shall quote in the same way a number of documents, with the titles of these public texts:
Document Number RF-726, regulation of 16 August 1940, dissolving the youth organizations in Alsace.
Document Number RF-727, regulation of 22 August 1940, setting up a supervising commission for associations in Lorraine.
Document Number RF-728, regulation of 3 September 1940, providing for the dissolution of teachers’ unions. I point out, in regard to this Document RF-728, that the last article provides an exception in favor of the organization called “Union of National Socialist Teachers.”
Document Number RF-729, regulation of 3 September 1940, providing for the dissolution of gymnastic societies and of sports associations in Alsace. I should like to read Article 4 of this Document RF-729:
“My Commissioner of Physical Culture will take, in regard to other gymnastic societies and sports associations in Alsace, all necessary provisions in view of their re-integration into the Reich’s National Socialist Union for Physical Culture.”
Following up these measures of Germanization, we now encounter two texts which are very characteristic and which I produce as Documents Numbers RF-730 and RF-731. Of Document Number RF-730 I read simply the title, which is significant: “Ordinance of 7 February 1942 Relative to the Creation of an Office of the Upper Rhine for Genealogical Research.” I shall likewise read the title of Document Number RF-731, “Regulation of 17 February 1942 Concerning the Creation of the Department of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism.”
I indicated a moment ago to the Tribunal that the Party had been established in Alsace and in Lorraine in a way that was parallel with the administration in Germany. I shall produce in this connection Document Number RF-732, which is a confidential note of the National Socialist Workers Party of the province of Baden dated Strasbourg, 5 March 1942. This document belongs likewise to the series found in the files of the Gauleitung of Strasbourg. It bears as a heading, “Gaudirektion—Auxiliary Bureau of Strasbourg.” If it please the Tribunal, I shall read the beginning of this document:
“Evaluation of recruiting possibilities of the Party, its subdivisions and related groups in Alsace.
“In the framework of the drive of 19 June organized for the recruiting of party members, the Kreisleiter in collaboration with the Ortsgruppenleiter have to investigate Alsatians above the age of 18, even if their membership is not yet to be obtained within this drive which may be”—the word “which” was omitted in the text—“considered for prospective membership of the Party, its sections, and affiliated organizations and which men between the age of 17 and 48 could be actively employed in the Party or in its subdivisions. In order to gain a numerical survey, these investigations should also comprise all persons already enrolled in the Party, in the Opferring”—this is the collecting organization of the Party—“in the sections, and affiliated organizations.
“The Kreisleiter may call upon the collaboration of the Kreisorganisationsleiter”—these are the organizing directors of the section—“and of the Kreispersonalamtsleiter”—the personnel information offices of the sections—“In spite of this work the 19 June drive for recruiting members should not suffer but must be carried on by all possible means and gain the goal set by the Gauleiter at the given date.
“The results of the screening of the population are to be compiled in five lists, namely: List 1a; List 1b; List 2a; List 2b; Control list.”
I shall skip over the following paragraphs, which are rather long and purely administrative, and I shall continue on Page 2 of the document, Paragraph 9:
“Since it is the aim of the National Socialist movement to embrace all Germans in a National Socialist organization in order to mould and direct them in compliance with the intentions of the Movement, 90 percent of the population will have to figure on Lists 1a and b and 2a and b, while on the Control List only those shall be named who, on account of racial inferiority or asocial or anti-German attitude are considered unworthy of belonging to an organization, are not deemed worthy of membership in Party organizations.”
I shall now enter upon the two most serious questions which are directly interconnected, questions which, on the one hand, concern nationality and, on the other hand, military recruiting.
The German policy in the matter of nationality reveals a certain hesitation, which is related to the German policy in regard to military recruiting. Indeed, the German leaders seem to have been swayed by two contradictory trends. One of these trends was that of bestowing the German nationality on a large number of people, in order to impose the corresponding obligation for military service. The other trend was that of conferring nationality only with discrimination. According to this viewpoint it was considered, first of all, that the possession of nationality was an honor and should to some extent constitute a reward when conferred on those who had not previously possessed it. On the other hand, nationality confers on its possessor a certain special quality. In spite of the abolition of all democracy, it gives that person a certain influence in the German community. It should, therefore, be granted only to persons who give guarantees in certain regards, notably that of loyalty; and we know that, from the German point of view, loyalty is not only a matter of mental attitude and choice but that it also applies to certain well-known physical elements, such as those of blood, race, and origin.
These are the two opposed trends in the German policy of conferring nationality. This is how they develop:
At first—and up to the month of August 1942—the Reich, not yet requiring soldiers as urgently as it did later, deferred the introduction of compulsory recruiting. Along with this they also deferred any action to impose German nationality on the population generally. During this earlier period the Nazis did not resort to compulsory recruiting but relied simply on voluntary recruiting which, however, they tried to render more effective by offering all kinds of inducements and exercising pressure in various ways.
I shall not go into details regarding these German procedures for voluntary recruitment. I should like simply to give, by way of example, the subject matter of Document Number RF-733. It is an appeal posted in Alsace on 15 January 1942 and constitutes one of the appendices of the governmental report, which was submitted previously under Document Number UK-72. In this document, I shall read simply the first sentence of the second paragraph:
“Alsatians: Since the beginning of the campaign in the East, hundreds of Alsatians have freely decided to march as volunteers, side by side with the men of the other German regions, against the enemy of civilization and European culture.”
For anyone who knows German propaganda and its technique of exaggeration, the term “hundreds” which is used in this document immediately betrays the failure of the Nazi recruiters. “Hundreds” may obviously be translated by “tens,” and it must be admitted that this was a very poor supply for the Wehrmacht.
During the period that I am speaking of the Nazis practiced, in regard to nationality, a policy similar to their policy in recruiting military forces, that is, a policy of selective nationalization. They appealed for volunteers for German nationality. It is desirable to quote in this regard an ordinance of 20 January 1942, a general ordinance of the Reich, not a special one for the annexed territories.
This ordinance in its first article increases the possibilities of naturalization, which until then had been extremely limited, in accordance with the Reich statute book. In Article 3 it gives the following provision: (This ordinance is not produced in the document book, for it is an ordinance of the German Reich and, therefore, a public document.)
“The Reich Minister of the Interior may, by means of a general regulation, grant German nationality to categories of foreigners established on a territory placed under the sovereign power of Germany or having their origin in such territory.”
In connection with this earlier period it is necessary to stress that natives of Alsace-Lorraine who did not become German citizens did not retain their French nationality. They are all considered as German subjects. They are qualified in the documents of the period as “members of the German community (Volksdeutsch),” and are consequently liable for German labor service. I submit Document Number RF-734 in this connection, “Regulation of 27 August 1942, on Compulsory Military Service and on Labor Service in Alsace.” I shall return to this document presently with regard to military service, but I would like to quote now the passages relative to service in the Hitler Youth, one of which bears an earlier date, the ordinance of 2 January 1942 for Alsace and ordinance of 4 August 1942 for Lorraine.
The German policy regarding nationality and military recruiting reaches its turning point in the month of August 1942. At this moment, on account of military difficulties and the need for extensive recruiting, the Germans instituted compulsory military service in Lorraine by an ordinance of 19 August 1942 and in Alsace by an ordinance of 25 August 1942. These two ordinances, relative to the introduction of compulsory military service, constitute Document Number RF-735, ordinance for Lorraine, and Document Number RF-736, ordinance for Alsace.
At the same time, the Germans promulgated an ordinance of 23 August 1942 on German nationality in Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg. This text is the subject of a circular issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior, which constitutes Document Number RF-737. These provisions are the following:
“Full rights of nationality are acquired by natives of Alsace and Lorraine and Luxembourgers of German origin:
“When they have been or will be called upon to serve in the armed forces of the Reich or in SS armed formations;
“when they are recognized as having acted as good Germans.”
As concerns the expression “of German origin,” which is used in these texts, this concerns Alsatians and Lorrainers who have become French either through the Treaty of Versailles or subsequently on condition of having previously been German nationals or having transferred their domicile from Alsace or Lorraine to the territory of the Reich after 1 September 1939; and, finally, children, grandchildren, and spouses of the preceding categories of persons are likewise considered as of German origin.
Lastly, it was anticipated that the Alsatians, Lorrainers, and Luxembourgers who did not acquire German nationality absolutely could obtain it provisionally.
I should like to mention, to complete this question of nationality, that an ordinance of 2 February 1943 gave details as to the German nationality laws applicable in Alsace, and that an ordinance of 2 November 1943 likewise conferred German nationality upon persons who had been in concentration camps during the war.
The German texts indicate that, on the one hand, German nationality was imposed upon a great number of persons; and, on the other hand, that Alsatians and Lorrainers who were French were forced to comply with the exorbitant and truly criminal requirements of military service in the German Army against their own country. These military obligations were constantly extended by the calling-up of successive classes, as far as the 1908 class.
These German exigencies provoked a solemn protest on the part of the French National Committee, which in London represented the Free French Government authority. I should like to read to the Tribunal the text of this protest, which is dated 16 September 1942, and which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-739. I shall read only the three paragraphs of the official protest, which constitute the beginning of this document of the Information Agency in London.
“After having proclaimed, in the course of the war, the annexation of Alsace and of Lorraine, banished and robbed a great number of the inhabitants, and enforced the most rigorous measures of Germanization, the Reich now constrains Alsatians and Lorrainers—declared German by the Reich—to serve in the German armies against their own compatriots and against the allies of France.
“The National Committee, defender of the integrity and of the unity of France and trustee of the principle of the rights of peoples, protests, in the face of the civilized world, against these new crimes committed in contempt of international conventions against the will of populations ardently attached to France. It proclaims inviolable the right of Alsatians and of Lorrainers to remain members of the French family.”
This protest could not have been unknown to the Germans, for it was read and commented on over the radio by the French National Commissioner of Justice, Professor René Cassin, on a number of occasions.
In regard to this solemn protest on the part of France, I shall allow myself to quote the justifications, if one may use this term, which were furnished in a speech by Gauleiter Wagner delivered in Colmar on 20 June 1943. This quotation is drawn from the Mühlhäuser Tageblatt of 21 June 1943. In view of its importance I shall not deal with it simply as a quotation, but I produce it as a document and submit it as Document Number RF-740. The clerk has been given this paper. I read the explanations of Gauleiter Wagner, as they are reproduced in this newspaper under the title “Alsace will not Stand Aloof”:
“The decisive event for Alsace in 1942 was therefore the introduction of compulsory military service. It cannot be my intention to justify legally a measure which strikes so deeply at the life of Alsace. There is no reason for this either. Every decision which the Greater Reich is taking, here is motivated and cannot be attacked as to its juridical and its de facto form.”
Naturally, the Alsatians and Lorrainers refused to accept the criminal orders of the German authorities, and they undertook to avoid these by every means. The Nazis then decided to compel them by means of merciless measures. The frontiers were strictly guarded, and the guards had orders to fire on the numerous recalcitrants who attempted to escape across the border. I should like to quote in this connection a sentence from a newspaper article, which appeared in the Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg of 28 August 1942. This is Document Number RF-741. This article deals with the death of one of these men who refused to serve in the German Army, and it concludes with the following sentence: “We insist most particularly on the fact that it is suicidal to attempt to cross the frontier illegally.”
Naturally, judicial penalties were applied with great severity and in a large number of cases. I do not consider that I should bring to the Tribunal all the instances of these cases, which would take too long; but I should like simply to insist on the principle that governed this form of repression.
I shall quote first of all a document which is entirely characteristic of the conception which the German administration had of justice and of the independence of judicial power. This is Document Number RF-742. It is a part of a series of documents discovered in the files of the Gauleitung. It is a teletype message dated Strasbourg, 8 June 1944, addressed by Gauleiter Wagner to the Chief of the Court of Appeals in Karlsruhe. I shall read Paragraph 2 of this document, which is on Page 1 of the same document:
“Especially in Alsace it is required that the sentences for refusal of military service should be intimidating. But upon those trying to evade military service, for fear of personal danger, this intimidating effect can be produced only by the death penalty, the more so, as an Alsatian bent upon escaping military service by emigration counts generally on an early victory of the enemy and, therefore, in case of conviction with punishment other than death, with a near cancellation of the penalty. The death penalty is, therefore, to be applied in all cases in which after 6 June 1944 an evasion of military service is attempted by illegal emigration, irrespectively of any other legal practice used in Germany proper.”
But I wish to indicate that the consideration of personal risk, even that of being killed at the frontier or condemned to death, was not sufficient to make the people of Alsace and Lorraine acknowledge the obligation for military service. Thus the Nazis decided to have recourse to the only threat which could be effective, the threat of reprisals against families. After 4 September 1942, there appeared in the Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg a notice entitled “Severe Sanctions Against Those Who Fail to Appear Before the Revision Council.” An extract from this notice constitutes Document Number RF-743. I shall read from it:
“In the case mentioned above it has been shown that parents have not given proof of authority in this regard. They have thus proved that they do not yet understand the requirements of the present time, which can tolerate in Alsace only reliable persons. The parents of the above-named young men will therefore shortly be deported to the Aleichem in order to re-acquire, in a National Socialist atmosphere, an attitude in conformity with the German spirit.”
Thus the deportation of families was decreed, not to punish a definite insubordination, but to punish failure to appear before the recruiting board.
In order to avoid repeated readings, I shall now present to the Tribunal, under the heading of Document Number RF-744, the ordinance of 1 October 1943, to check failure to perform military service (Official Bulletin of the Reich for 1943, Page 152). I shall read the first two articles:
“Article 1: The chief of the civil administration in Alsace may deny residence in Alsace to deserters and to persons who fail to fulfill their military obligations or those of the compulsory labor service, as well as to members of their families. This prohibition entails, for persons of German origin whom it may affect, transplantation to Reich territory by the Plenipotentiary for the Reich, Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality. Measures to be taken in regard to property, seizure, indemnity, et cetera, are prescribed in the ordinance of 2 February 1943, concerning property measures to be applied in the case of persons of German origin transferred from Alsace to Reich territory.
“Paragraph 2: Independently of the preceding measures, criminal proceedings may be instituted under the penal code for violation of the provisions of the penal laws.”
THE PRESIDENT: Exactly what did “souche allemande” mean? How far did it go?
M. FAURE: The term “souche allemande” applies, as indicated in connection with the preceding text, to the following categories of persons: In the first place, persons who were in Alsace and Lorraine before the Treaty of Versailles and who became French by the treaty; persons whose nationality before 1919 was German are considered as of German origin, as well as their children, their grandchildren, and their spouses. This affects the great majority of the population of the three departments.
I continue reading Paragraph 2 of the first article of Document Number RF-744.
“Independently of the foregoing measures, penal prosecutions may be brought for violation of the provisions of the penal laws.”
According to Article 52, Paragraph 2, of the Reich Penal Code, members of the family who bring proof of their genuine efforts to prevent or dissuade the fugitive from committing his act or avoiding the necessity of flight shall not be punishable.
These abominable measures, the obligation of denunciation, punishment inflicted upon families, permitted the German authorities to carry out the enlistment of Alsatians and Lorrainers, which for many of them had fatal consequences and which was for all of them a particularly tragic ordeal.
I must finally indicate, to conclude this part, that the Germans proceeded to the mobilization of women for war work. I produce a Document Number RF-745, the ordinance of 26 January 1942, completing the war organization of labor service for the young women of Lorraine.
Then we find an ordinance of 2 February 1943, Document Number RF-746, concerning the declaration of men and women for the accomplishment of tasks pertaining to national defense. (Official Bulletin of the Reich, 1943, Page 26.) This ordinance concerns Alsace.
The following Document, Number RF-747, deals with Lorraine. This is an ordinance of 8 February 1943 concerning the enrollment of men and women for tasks relating to the organization of labor. The Tribunal will note that the ordinance concerning Alsace used the expression “tasks of interest to national defense,” whereas the ordinance relative to Lorraine specifies simply “tasks concerning the organization of labor”; but in principle these are the same. Article 1 of this second ordinance, Document Number RF-747, refers to the ordinance of the General Delegate for the Organization of Labor, relative to the declaration of men and women for tasks of interest to national defense, et cetera. This is a question of making not only men, but also women, work for the German war effort. I shall read for the Tribunal an extract from a newspaper article which comments on this legislation and likewise on the measures which Gauleiter Wagner proposed to undertake in this connection. This constitutes Document Number RF-748, taken from the newspaper Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg, dated 23 February 1943.
“In his speech at Karlsruhe Gauleiter Robert Wagner stressed that measures of total mobilization would be applied to Alsace and that the authorities would abstain from any bureaucratic working method. The Alsatian labor offices have already invited the first category of young women liable for mobilization to fill out the enlistment form.
“In principle, all women who until the present have worked only at home, who have had to care only for their husbands, and who have no other relatives, shall work a full day. Many married men who until now had never offered to help their wives with the household work will be obliged to put their shoulder to the wheel. They will work in the household and do errands. With a little goodwill, everything will work out. Women who have received a professional education shall be put, if possible, to tasks that relate to their professions, on condition that they have an important bearing on the war effort. This prescription applies only to all feminine professions which imply care given to other persons.”
Here again a rather comical or clumsily worded presentation should not prevent one from perceiving the odious character of these measures, which obliged French women to work for the German war effort.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for ten minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
M. FAURE: Mr. Dodd would like to speak to the Tribunal concerning a question he wishes to put to the Tribunal.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I ask to be heard briefly to inform the Tribunal that the affiant Andreas Pfaffenberger, whom the Tribunal directed the Prosecution for the United States to locate, if possible, was located yesterday and he is here in Nuremberg today. He is available for the cross-examination which, if I remember correctly, was requested by Counsel for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: Was his affidavit read?
MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, it was.
THE PRESIDENT: It was read, and on the condition that he should be brought here for cross-examination?
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. He asked for him to be brought, if I recall it.
THE PRESIDENT: Does counsel for Kaltenbrunner wish to cross-examine him now—I mean, not this moment—does he still wish to cross-examine him?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I believe that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner does not need the testimony of this witness. However, I would have to take this question up with him once more, for up till today it was not certain that Pfaffenberger would be in court, and if he is to be cross-examined and to testify, I believe Kaltenbrunner would have to be present at the hearing.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems somewhat unfortunate that the witness should be brought here for cross-examination and that then you should be saying that you don’t want to cross-examine him after reading the affidavit. It seems to me that the reasonable thing to do would be to make up your mind whether you do, or do not, want to cross-examine him; and I should have thought that would have been done and he would have been brought here, if you want to cross-examine, and not brought here if you did not want to cross-examine. Anyway, as he has been brought here now, it seems to me that if you want to cross-examine him you must do so. Mr. Dodd, can he be kept here for some time?
MR. DODD: He can, Your Honor, except that he was in a concentration camp for 6 years; and we have to keep him here under certain security, and it is somewhat of a hardship on him to be kept too long. We would like not to keep him any longer than necessary. We located him with some difficulty with the help of the United States Forces.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In perhaps 2 or 3 days we might wish to cross-examine; perhaps two or three days.
THE PRESIDENT: I imagine that if after the affidavit had been read that you demanded to cross-examine him and that he has therefore been produced—well, in those circumstances it seems to me unreasonable that you should ask that he should now be kept for 2 or 3 days when he is produced. Mr. Dodd, would it be possible to keep him here until Monday?
MR. DODD: Yes, he can be kept here until Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: We will keep him here until Monday, and you can cross-examine as you wish, Dr. Kauffmann. You understand what I mean; when an affidavit has been put in and one of the Defense Counsel said that he wants to cross-examine, he ought to inform the Prosecution if, after reading and considering the affidavit, he finds that he does not want to cross-examine him; they ought to inform the Prosecution so as to avoid all the cost and trouble of bringing a witness from some distance off. Do you follow?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I will proceed with the cross-examination on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
M. FAURE: Mr. President, I would ask the Tribunal whether they would agree to hear the witness Emil Reuter at this point?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness, Emil Reuter, took the stand.]
What is your name?
EMIL REUTER (Witness): Reuter, Emil.
THE PRESIDENT: Emil Reuter, do you swear to speak without hate or fear, to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth?
[The witness repeated the oath in French.]
THE PRESIDENT: Raise the right hand and say, “I swear.”
REUTER: I swear.
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
M. FAURE: M. Reuter, you are a lawyer of the Luxembourg Bar?
REUTER: Yes.
M. FAURE: You are President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg?
REUTER: Yes.
M. FAURE: You had been exercising these functions at the time of the invasion of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by the German troops?
REUTER: Yes.
M. FAURE: Can you give us any indication on the fact that the Government of the Reich had, a few days before the invasion of Luxembourg, given to the Government of the Grand Duchy assurances of their peaceful intentions?
REUTER: In August 1939 the German Minister for Luxembourg gave to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country a statement according to which the German Reich, in the event of a European war, would respect the independence and neutrality of the country, provided that Luxembourg would not violate its own neutrality. A few days before the invasion, in May 1940, the Germans constructed pontoon bridges over half of the Moselle River which separates the two countries. An explanation from the German Minister in Luxembourg represented such construction of pontoon bridges as landing stages in the interest of navigation. In the general public opinion of the country, these installations were really of a military character.
M. FAURE: Can you tell us about the situation of public authorities in Luxembourg following the departure of Her Royal Highness, the Grand Duchess, and of her government?
REUTER: The continuity of administration in the country was assured by a government commission which possessed the necessary powers bestowed upon it by the competent constitutional authorities. There was, therefore, no lack of authority in the administration.
M. FAURE: Is it not true, however, that the Germans claimed, upon their arrival in that country, that the government had failed to carry out its functions; and, following the departure of the government, that there was no regular authority in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg?
REUTER: Yes, such declaration was made by the Ministers of the Reich in Luxembourg before a Parliamentary Commission.
M. FAURE: Do I understand correctly that these statements on the part of the German authorities did not in fact correspond to the truth inasmuch as you have told us that there did exist a higher organism for the administration of the country?
REUTER: This statement did not correspond to the reality. It was obviously aimed at usurping authority.
M. FAURE: M. Reuter, the Germans never proclaimed by law the annexation of Luxembourg. Do you consider that the measures adopted by the Germans in that country were equivalent to annexation?
REUTER: The measures that were taken by the Germans in the Grand Duchy were obviously equivalent to a de facto annexation of that country. Shortly after the invasion the leaders of the Reich in Luxembourg stated in public and official speeches that the annexation by law would occur at a time which would be freely selected by the Führer. The proof of this de facto annexation is shown in a clear manner by the whole series of ordinances which the Germans published in the Grand Duchy.
M. FAURE: The Germans organized an operation which was called a census in Luxembourg. In the form that was given the inhabitants of Luxembourg to effect the census, there was one question concerning the native or usual language and another question as to the racial background of the individual. Are you prepared to assert that in view of these two questions this census was considered as having the character of a plebiscite, a political character?
REUTER: From the menacing instructions published by the German authorities in connection with this census, the political purpose was obvious; therefore public opinion never envisaged this census except as a sort of attempt to achieve a plebiscite camouflaged as a census, a political operation destined to give a certain justification to the annexation which was to follow.
M. FAURE: The report of the Luxembourg Government does not give any indication of the statistical results of this census, specifically with regard to the political question of which I spoke a moment ago. Would you be kind enough to tell us why these statistical data are not to be found in any document?
REUTER: The complete statistical data have never been collected because after a partial examination of the first results the German authorities noted that only an infinitesimal fraction of the population had answered the two tricky questions in the German sense. The German authorities then preferred to stop the operation, and the forms distributed in the country for obtaining the answers were never collected.
M. FAURE: Do you remember the date of the census?
REUTER: This census must have taken place in 1942.
M. FAURE: After the census the Germans realized that there was no majority, and not even any considerable part of the population which was desirous of being incorporated into the German Reich. However, did they continue to apply their measures of annexation?
REUTER: Measures tending to Germanization and later to the annexation of the country were continued, and later on they were even reinforced by further new measures.
M. FAURE: Am I to understand, therefore, that during the application of these measures the Germans could not be ignorant of the fact that the Luxembourg population was opposed to them?
REUTER: There can be no doubt at all on this question.
M. FAURE: Can you tell us whether it is correct that the German authorities obliged members of the constabulary force and the police to take an oath of allegiance to the Chancellor of the Reich?
REUTER: Yes. This was forced upon the constabulary corps and the police with very serious threats and punishments. Recalcitrants were usually deported, if I remember rightly, to Sachsenhausen; and on the approach of the Russian Army all or a part of the recalcitrants who were in the camp were shot. There were about 150 of them.
M. FAURE: Can you tell us anything concerning the transfer—I believe the Germans call it “Umsiedlung”—of a certain number of inhabitants and families living in your country?
REUTER: The transplanting was ordered by the German authority of Luxembourg for elements which appeared to be unfit for assimilation or unworthy of, or undesirable for, residence on the frontiers of the Reich.
M. FAURE: Can you indicate the approximate number of people who were victims of this transplanting?
REUTER: There must have been about 7,000 people who were transplanted in this manner, because we found in Luxembourg a list mentioning between 2,800 and 2,900 homes or families.
M. FAURE: These indications are based on knowledge you received as President of the Chamber of Deputies?
REUTER: Not exactly, the list was found in Luxembourg; it is still deposited there and the Office of War Criminals took cognizance of it, like all the judicial authorities in Luxembourg.
M. FAURE: Can you state, M. Reuter, how the people who were transplanted were informed of this measure concerning them, and how much time they had to be ready?
REUTER: In general, the families to be transplanted were not given notice in advance, officially, at least. About 6 o’clock in the morning the Gestapo rang at the door, and they notified those who were selected to be ready for departure within 1 or 2 hours with a minimum of luggage. Then they were taken to the station and put on a train for the camp to which they were at first to be sent.
M. FAURE: Can you tell us whether these measures were applied to people whom you know personally?
REUTER: I know personally a very large number of people who were transplanted, among them members of my own family, a great number of colleagues of the Chamber of Deputies, many members of the Bar, many magistrates, and so forth.
M. FAURE: In addition to these transplantations, were there also deportations to concentration camps? This is another question.
REUTER: Yes, there were deportations to concentration camps which everyone knew about. The number of such deportations in the Grand Duchy may be approximately four thousand.
M. FAURE: M. Reuter, it has been established, through their ordinances, that the German authorities prescribed compulsory military service. I will not ask you, therefore, any question on this particular point. However, I would like to ask you whether you are able to state, approximately, the number of Luxembourg citizens who were enrolled in the German Army.
REUTER: The young people who were incorporated into the German Army by force belonged to 5 classes, beginning with the class of 1920. The number is about eleven thousand to twelve thousand, at least. A certain number of them, I think about one-third, succeeded in avoiding conscription and became refractory. Others later deserted the German Army and fled to other countries.
M. FAURE: Can you indicate the approximate number of Luxembourgers who died as a result of their forced enlistment?
REUTER: At the end of September 1944 we had 2,500 dead. Searches have continued and at present I think we have established the names of at least 3,000.
M. FAURE: The sanctions that had been provided to force the enlistment of the Luxembourgers, were they very severe?
REUTER: These sanctions were extremely severe. First of all, the young people who were refractory were pursued and hunted by the police and by the Gestapo. Then they were brought before various types of Tribunals, in Luxembourg, France, Belgium, or Germany. Their families were deported; the family fortune was generally confiscated. The penalties pronounced by the Tribunals against these young people were very severe. The death penalty was general, or else imprisonment, forced labor, or deportation to concentration camps. Some of them were released later on, but there were some who were shot as hostages after having been released.
M. FAURE: I would like to ask one last question. Do you think it is possible that the measures which constituted a de facto annexation of Luxembourg could have been unknown to the persons who belonged to the Reich Government, or to the German High Command?
REUTER: I believe that it is hardly possible that such a situation could have been unknown to the members of the Reich and the supreme military authority. My opinion is based on the following facts: First of all, our young people, when mobilized by force, frequently protested at the time of their arrival in Germany by invoking the fact that they were all of Luxembourg nationality, and that they were the victims of force, so that the military authorities must have been informed of the situation in the Grand Duchy.
In the second place, several Ministers of the Reich—among them, Thierack, Rust, and Ley—visited the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and could see for themselves the situation of the country and the reaction of the population; other high political personalities of the Reich, such as Bormann and Sauckel, also paid visits.
Finally there were German decrees and ordinances concerning the denationalization of certain categories of Luxembourg citizens. These ordinances bore the signature of the Minister of the Reich. The executive measures implementing these ordinances were published in the Official Gazette of the Reich Ministry of the Interior under the signature of the Minister of Interior Frick with the indication that these instructions were to be communicated to all the superior Reich authorities.
M. FAURE: I thank you. Those are all the questions I have to put to you.
[The American, British and Russian prosecutors had no questions.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any member of the defendants’ counsel who wishes to ask the witness any questions? [No response.] Then M. Faure the witness can retire.
M. FAURE: Mr. President, am I to understand that the witness will not have to remain any longer at the disposal of the Tribunal and he may return to his home?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
[The witness left the stand.]
M. FAURE: I had stopped my presentation at the end of the second part. That is to say, I have examined so far, in the first place, the elimination of the French regime and secondly, the imposition of German rules.
I now come to the third part, which gives measures for transplantation in Alsace-Lorraine. The German authorities applied in these annexed departments characteristic methods for the transport of populations. It so happens that, as the witness from Luxembourg was heard sooner than I had anticipated, the Tribunal is already informed of the aspect which these measures of transplantation assumed in the annexed territories.
The situation which I am about to describe with respect to Alsace and Lorraine is, indeed, analogous to the situation which existed with regard to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The principal purpose of the application of such methods by the Germans was to enable them to colonize by bringing German subjects into the country, who then seized the lands and property of the inhabitants who had been expelled.
A second advantage was the elimination of groups considered especially difficult to assimilate. I should like to quote in this connection—this will be Document Number RF-749—what Gauleiter Wagner stated in a speech given at Saverne, according to the Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg, of 15 December 1941.
“Today we must make up our mind. In the moment of our nation’s supreme struggle—a struggle in which you, too, must participate—I can only say to anyone who says ‘I am a Frenchman!’ ‘Get the hell out of here! In Germany there is room only for Germans.’”
From the beginning the Germans proceeded, firstly, to the expulsion of individuals or small groups, especially Jews and members of the teaching profession. Moreover, as is shown by a document which I have already cited this morning under Number RF-701 and which was the first general protest made by the French Delegation, under date of 3 September 1940, the Germans authorized the people of Alsace-Lorraine to return to their homes only if they acknowledged themselves to be of German origin. Now the Tribunal will understand that these restrictions upon the return of refugees were in themselves equivalent to expulsion. Mass expulsions began in September 1940. I now submit in this connection Document Number RF-750; it is again a note from the French Armistice Delegation taken from the files of the High Court of Justice. I shall now read this document, Paragraph 2:
“Since then it has been brought to the knowledge of the French Government that the German authorities are proceeding to mass expulsions of families in the three eastern departments. Every day French citizens, forced to abandon all their belongings on the spot, are driven into the unoccupied part of France in groups of 800 to 1,000 persons.”
It was only the 19th of September. On the 3rd of November the Germans undertook the systematic expulsion of the populations of the Moselle region. This operation was accomplished with extreme perfidy. The Germans, as a matter of fact, gave the Lorrainers of certain localities the choice of either going to eastern Germany or going to France. They gave them only a few hours to make up their minds. Moreover, they sought to promote the belief that such a choice was imposed upon the Lorrainers as a result of an agreement reached with the French authorities.
From the physical point of view, the transport of these people was effected under very difficult conditions. The Lorrainers were allowed to take away only a very small part of their personal belongings and a sum of 2,000 francs, plus 1,000 francs for the children. On 18 November, four trains filled with Lorrainers who had been torn away from their homes were headed for Lyons. The arrival in unoccupied France of these people who had been so sorely tried was for them, nevertheless, an opportunity for nobly manifesting their patriotic sentiments. With regard to the facts which I have presented I place before the Tribunal Document Number RF-751, which is a note of protest on the part of the French Delegation signed by General Doyen, dated 18 November 1940. I shall read excerpts of this Document Number RF-751, beginning with Paragraph 3 of Page 1:
“France is faced with an act of force which is in formal contradiction to the armistice convention as well as the assurance, recently given, of a desire for collaboration between the two countries. On the contrary, in Article 16, which the German commission had frequently invoked with specific regard to the departments of the East, the armistice convention stipulates the reinstallation of refugees in the regions in which they were domiciled. The creation of new refugees constitutes, therefore, a violation of the armistice convention. France is faced with an unjust act affecting peaceful populations against whom the Reich has nothing to reproach and who, settled for centuries on these territories, have made of them a particularly prosperous region.
“The unexpected decision of the German authorities is likewise an inhuman act. In the very middle of winter, without warning, families have to leave their homes, taking with them only a strict minimum of personal property and a sum of money absolutely insufficient to enable them to live even for a few weeks. Thousands of Frenchmen were thus suddenly hurled into misery without their country—already too heavily tried and surprised by the suddenness and amplitude of the measures adopted without its knowledge—being in a position to assure them, from one day to the next, a normal livelihood. This exodus and the conditions under which it is taking place cause most painful and sorrowful impressions throughout the French nation. The French people are particularly disturbed by the explanations given to the Lorrainers, according to which the French Government was reputed to be the source of their misfortune.
“It is that impression, in fact, which the poster in certain villages, where the population had to choose between leaving for eastern Germany or for Unoccupied France, was intended to convey.
“The poster is appended hereto, but we are not in possession of the text of this poster. That also encouraged the belief that these populations had themselves requested permission to leave following the appeals broadcast by the Bordeaux radio. Even if we admit that such appeals had been made by radio, it should be noted that the Bordeaux radio station is under German control. The good faith of the Lorrainers has been deceived as was shown by their reaction on arrival in the free zone.”
In spite of these protests, the expulsions continued. They reached a total of about 70,000 people, augmented by the deportation of Alsatians and Lorrainers to Eastern Germany and to Poland. These deportations were meant to create terror, and they particularly affected the families of men who had rightfully decided to refuse the German demand for forced labor and military service. (I am at present regarding the whole question of a French protest dated 3 September 1942; it is Document Number RF-752).
Since I do not wish to read to the Tribunal texts dealing with an identical subject I submit this document solely to show that this protest was made, and I believe that I can refrain from reading its content.
I shall refer, desiring to give only a short citation, to a document belonging to the American Prosecution. This document bears the Number R-114. It is a memorandum of the minutes of a meeting which took place between several officials of the SS concerning general directions in regard to the treatment of deported Alsatians.
It will be observed that this document has already been submitted by my American colleagues under Document Number R-114, Exhibit Number USA-314, the French Number RF-753. I merely wish to read one paragraph of that document, which may be interpreted as a supplement to this problem of deportation. I must say that these sentences have not been formally read in Court. The passage that I cite is on Page 2 of the document. At the end of that there is a paragraph which begins with the letter “d”:
“For further resettlement are destined:
“Members of the patois group. The Gauleiter would like to keep only those persons in the patois area who by their customs, language, and general attitude testify their adherence to Germany.
“Regarding the cases mentioned under a-d, it is to be noted that the racial problem is to be given foremost consideration, that is, in a way by which racially valuable persons shall be resettled in Germany proper, and the racially inferior in France.”
Finally, I should like to read to the Tribunal a few sentences from a newspaper article, which appeared in Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg, August 31, 1942—we are here dealing with a citation and not a document:
“On the 28th of August the families designated hereafter, of the Arrondissements of Mulhouse and Guebwiller, were deported to the Reich in order that they might recover a trustworthy German outlook in National Socialist surroundings. In several cases the persons involved did not conceal their hostility in that they stirred up sentiments of opposition, spoke French in public in a provocative manner, did not obey the ordinances concerning the education of youth, or in other ways showed a lack of loyalty.”
I would now like to indicate to the Tribunal that deportation or transportation entailed also the spoliation of property. This is not merely a fact; for the Germans it is a law. Indeed, there is an ordinance of 28 January 1943, which appeared in the Official Bulletin for 1943, Page 40, bearing the title, “Ordinance Concerning the Safeguarding of Property in Lorraine as a Result of Transplantation Measures.” I have placed this ordinance before you as Document Number RF-754. I would like to read Article One and the first paragraph of Article Two. I believe that the title itself is a sufficient indication of the contents:
“Article One. The safeguarding of property of people transplanted from Lorraine to the Greater German Reich or to territory placed under the sovereign power of Germany has been entrusted to the transfer services for Lorraine under the Chief of the Administration.
“Article Two. These services are authorized to put in effective safekeeping the property of the Lothringians who have been transplanted in order that such property may be administered, and—insofar as orders may have been given for this—exploited.”
This ordinance, therefore, still manifests some scruples of form. The intention is to “safeguard,” but we now know what the word “safeguard” means in Nazi terminology. We have already seen what safeguarding meant in the case of works of art and Jewish property. Even here, we have been specifically warned that the term “safeguard” carries with it the right of disposal or exploitation.
Other texts are even more specific or clear.
Here is Document Number RF-755. This is the ordinance of 6 November 1940 pertaining to the declaration of property in Lorraine belonging to the enemies of the people and of the Reich. And on the same subject I shall also submit to you Document Number RF-756, which is the regulation of 13 July 1940 applying to property in Alsace belonging to the enemies of the people and of the Reich. These two texts, one of which applies to Alsace and the other to Lorraine, permit the seizure and confiscation of properties designated as “enemy property.” Now, to realize the extent of the property covered by this term, I will read Document 756:
“Any objects and rights of any nature whatsoever, without regard to conditions of title, which are utilized for, or intended for use in, activities hostile to the people of Germany or the Reich will be considered as property belonging to the people and to the Reich.
“Such stipulation shall apply to the entire patrimony:
“(a) of all political parties, as well as of secondary or complementary organizations depending thereon;
“(b) of lodges and similar associations;
“(c) of Jews;
“(d) of Frenchmen who have acquired property in Alsace since 11 November 1918;
“(e) The Chief of the Administration Department and the Police will decide what patrimony in addition to the property mentioned above is likewise to be considered as property belonging to the enemies of the people and of the Reich. He will likewise decide on doubtful cases.”
We see, therefore, that in spite of the title, we are not dealing here with the measures of sequestration of enemy property taken in all countries within the scope of the laws of war. First of all, these are measures of definite confiscation; and in addition, they are applied to the property of numerous individuals who are in no wise subjects of enemy countries. We also see at this point the absolutely arbitrary power placed in the hands of the administration.
These texts are accompanied by many regulations; although the spoliations are particularly important in Alsace and in Lorraine, I shall not speak of them here in more detail, as the Prosecution has already dealt with the subject. I shall merely limit myself to the mentioning of two institutions special to Alsace and to Lorraine, that is, agricultural colonization, and industrial colonization.
In the first place, agricultural colonization is not a term that has been invented by the Prosecution; it is an expression which the Germans used. I submit in this connection, Document Number RF-757, which is the ordinance of 7 December 1940, “Pertaining to the New Regime of Settlement or Colonization in Lorraine.” I shall read the beginning of this Document Number RF-757:
“Real estate which has been vacated in Lorraine as a result of deportations will serve principally for the reconstitution of a German peasant class and for the requirements of internal colonization. In this connection and specifically in order to set us the required programs, I order, by virtue of the powers which have been conferred upon me by the Führer, the following:
“Article One. Real estate property of individuals deported from Lorraine shall be seized and confiscated for the benefit of the Chief of the Civil Administration.”
I will not cite the second paragraph of Article One, but I will cite Article Two:
“Agricultural properties or forest properties which are seized in consequence of the ordinance concerning enemy property of the people and the Reich in Lorraine are confiscated. Insofar as they are needed, they are included in the methodical organization of the region.”
Article Three:
“In addition to the cases provided for in Articles One and Two and according to the needs, other real estate property may be included in the programs for methodical reorganization if appropriate compensation is provided for.
“The Chief of the Civilian Administration and the services designated by him will decide upon the amount and nature of the compensation. Any recourse to the law on the part of the person involved is forbidden.”
Thus the Tribunal can see in a striking manner the processes and the methods pursued by the German authorities.
The first ordinance, cited earlier, spoke only of safeguarding the property of people who had been deported or displaced. A second ordinance now speaks of confiscations. It still refers only to the notion of enemies of the people and of the Reich.
The third ordinance is more complete, since it comprises confiscation prescriptions which are quite formal in their character, and which are no longer qualified as “safeguarding” property which has become vacant as the result of deportations.
This agricultural colonization of which I have spoken assumed a special importance in Lorraine. On the other hand, it is in Alsace that we find the greatest number of measures involving a veritable industrial colonization. These measures consisted in stripping the French industrial enterprises for the benefit of German firms. On this subject there are protests of the French Delegation to the Armistice Commission.
I submit as documents three of these protests, Documents Numbers RF-758, 759 and 760, which are notes under date of—respectively—27 April 1941, 9 May 1941, and 8 April 1943. I believe that it is preferable for me not to read these documents to the Tribunal and that I merely ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them, as proof of the existence of these protests, because I fear that such a reading would be a mere repetition to the Tribunal, to whom the matter of economic spoliation has already been explained in sufficient detail.
I shall say, finally, that the Germans carried their audacity to the point of demanding the seizure in Unoccupied France and the transportation to Alsace of assets belonging to French companies which were by this means stripped of their property and actually “colonized.” I am speaking of assets belonging to companies in the other zone of France, under the control of the regular shareholders of such companies.
I think it is worth while considering just one example of such procedure, contained in a very short document, which I submit to you under Document Number RF-761. This document appears in the Archives of the French Agencies of the Armistice Commission, to which it had been sent by the director of the company mentioned in the document. It is a paper which is partly written in German and partly translated into French—in the same document—and it is signed by the German Commissioner for a French enterprise called the Société Alsacienne et Lorraine d’Electricité. In Alsace this enterprise had been placed illegally under the administration of this commissioner, and the commissioner—as the document will show—had come to Paris to seize the remainder of the company’s assets. He drafted this document, which he signed and which he also made the president of the French company sign. This document is of interest as revealing the insolence of German procedure and also the Germans’ odd conception of law. I quote now:
“Today the undersigned has instructed me that in future I am strictly forbidden to take legal action with regard to the property of the former Société Alsacienne et Lorraine d’Electricité. If I should transgress this order in any way, I know that I shall be punished.
“Paris, 10 March 1941.
“Signed: Kucka.
“F. B. Kommissar.
“Signed: Garnier.”
Now this German economic colonization in the areas annexed was to serve as an experiment for the application of similar methods on a broader scale.
There will be submitted to the Tribunal, in this connection, a document concerning a colonization attempt in the French Department Ardennes. On this procedure of annexation by the Germans of Alsace and of Lorraine, many other items could be cited; and I could submit many more documents—even if I were to deal only with the circumstances and the documents which are useful from the point of view of our own Prosecution.
I want to limit myself in order to save the time of the Tribunal and to comply with the necessities of this Trial where so many items have to be discussed. Therefore I have limited myself to the submission of documents or to examples which are particularly characteristic. I believe that this documentation will enable the Tribunal to appraise the criminality of the German undertakings which I have brought to its attention—criminality which is particularly characteristic of military conscription, which is a criminal offence since it entails deaths. At the same time I believe the Tribunal can evaluate the grave sufferings that were imposed for five years on the populace of these French provinces, already so sorely tried, in the course of history.
I have submitted a few details which may have seemed ridiculous or facetious; but I did so because I thought it desirable that one should visualize the oppression exercised by the German Administration in all circumstances of life—even in private life—that general oppression characterized by the attempt to destroy and annihilate, and extended in a most complete manner over the departments and regions which were annexed.
I believe that the Tribunal will possibly prefer me to leave until tomorrow my comments with respect to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
I would like, moreover, to have the Tribunal’s assent concerning a question of testimony. I should like to put a witness on the stand, but it is only a little while ago that I gave the Tribunal a letter concerning this request. May I ask to be excused for not having done so earlier because there has been some uncertainty on this point.
If the Tribunal finds it convenient, I should like to have this witness here at tomorrow, Saturday morning’s session. I state that this witness would be Mr. Koos Vorrink, who is of Dutch nationality. I also wish to say, for the benefit of Defense, that the question I would like to submit to the witness will deal with certain items concerning Germanization in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to call him tomorrow?
M. FAURE: If that is convenient to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, call him tomorrow.
M. FAURE: If it please the Tribunal, his testimony could be taken after the recess tomorrow morning.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, I do not wish to prolong the proceedings; but I believe it will be in the interest of justice if I ask that the Dutch witness be heard, not tomorrow but Monday, on the assumption that Seyss-Inquart who is now ill may be expected back on that date.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, would it be equally convenient to you to call him on Monday?
M. FAURE: Mr. President, I do not desire to vex the Defense; but the witness might like to leave Nuremberg fairly promptly. Perhaps I might suggest that he be heard tomorrow and that after he has been heard, if Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart expresses his desire to cross-examine him, the witness could remain until Monday’s session.
If, on the other hand, after having heard the questions involved, the Counsel considers that there is no need for any cross-examination, then Seyss-Inquart’s absence would not matter. But I will naturally accept the decision of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: That seems a very reasonable suggestion.
DR. STEINBAUER: I am agreeable to the suggestion of the French Prosecutor.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 2 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FORTY-NINTH DAY Saturday, 2 February 1946
Morning Session
MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the Defendants Kaltenbrunner, Seyss-Inquart, and Streicher will be absent from this morning’s session due to illness.
M. FAURE: Gentlemen, I shall ask the Tribunal to be kind enough now to take the file which is entitled “Luxembourg.”
The Tribunal has already been informed of the essential elements of the situation concerning Luxembourg by the testimony of President Reuter, who was heard during yesterday’s session. I shall, therefore, be able to shorten my explanations about this file; but it is nevertheless indispensable that I submit some documents to the Tribunal.
The annexation of Luxembourg has quite a special character, in that it carried with it the total abolition of the sovereignty of this occupied country. It therefore concerns a case which corresponds to the hypothesis which we call “debellatio” in classic law, that is to say, the cessation of hostilities by the disappearance of the body of public law of one of the belligerents.
This total annexation of Luxembourg completes the proof that there was criminal premeditation on the part of the Reich against this State to which it was bound by diplomatic treaties, notably the Treaty of London of 11 May 1867, and the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation of 2 September 1929. And the Tribunal knows by the testimony of Mr. Reuter that these pledges were confirmed, first by a spontaneous diplomatic step taken on 26 August 1939 by M. Von Radowitz, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Germany, and afterwards by a re-assuring declaration a few days before the invasion, in circumstances which have already been explained to the Tribunal.
In view of the fact that Luxembourg—unlike Alsace and Lorraine, which were French departments—I say, in view of the fact that Luxembourg was a state, the Germans, in order to carry out this de facto annexation, had to issue special regulations concerning the suppression of public institutions; and this they did. Two ordinances of 23 August and 22 October 1940 announced, on the one hand, the ban on Luxembourg’s political parties; and, on the other, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the State Council. These two decrees are submitted as Documents RF-801 and RF-802. I request the Tribunal only to take judicial notice of these documents which are public texts.
Moreover, from 26 August 1940 on, a German decree had abolished the constitutional executive formula, according to which justice is rendered in the name of the sovereign. A formula, according to which justice is rendered in the name of the people, was substituted at that time for this executive formula. On 15 October 1941, the formula was again modified in a more obvious way and became “In the name of the German people.”
I shall now follow in my supplementary explanation the order of ideas which I adopted for Alsace and Lorraine; and naturally I shall dwell only on those circumstances peculiar to Luxembourg.
As in the case of Alsace and Lorraine, the Germans attempted to extirpate the national sentiment of Luxembourg and to render impossible all manifestations of the traditional culture of this country. Thus, the ordinances of 28 August 1940 and 23 October 1940 banned all associations of a cultural or educational nature.
As in Alsace and Lorraine, the Germans imposed Germanization of family and Christian names. This was the object of a decree of 31 January 1941, Document Number RF-803. I point out, in passing, that the wearing of a beret was also forbidden in Luxembourg, by a decree of 14 February 1941. At the same time they did away with national institutions, the Germans set up, according to their custom, their own administration and appointed a Gauleiter in the person of Gustav Simon, the former Gauleiter of Koblenz-Trier.
From the administrative point of view, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was administered as a Bezirk (district) of the Chief of the Civilian Administrative Service but by the German administrative services. As far as the Party was concerned—the National Socialist Party—it was officially joined to the Reich, as a dependency of the Mosel Gau.
I shall not dwell on the introduction of German civilian and penal legislation, which was introduced in the same way as in Alsace and Lorraine. Sufficient proof of this must be considered to have been given by the submission of the official report of the government of the Grand Duchy.
As regards nationality and conscription, we also notice a parallelism between the provisions which concern Luxembourg and those which concern other annexed countries.
On 30 August 1942, two ordinances were promulgated. It must be pointed out that these two ordinances, the one concerning nationality and the other military service, bear the same date. The ordinance concerning military service is submitted as Document Number RF-804 and the one concerning nationality is submitted as Document Number RF-805. The legislation concerning nationality includes, moreover, a provision which is peculiar to Luxembourg, although it is in conformity with the general spirit of German legislation concerning nationality in annexed countries.
The Germans had created in Luxembourg various organizations of the Nazi type, of which the main one was the Volksdeutsche Bewegung (German nationalist movement); and here is the special circumstance which I wish to point out. The ordinance of 30 August 1942 concerning nationality grants German nationality to persons who gave their adherence to this association, the Volksdeutsche Bewegung. But this nationality could be revoked. This is shown in the last paragraph of title 1 of this ordinance, Document Number RF-805. In fact, this conferring of nationality in this special case was valid provisionally for 2 years only.
At the same time that the Nazis were establishing conscription, they made it obligatory for all young Luxembourgers to serve in the premilitary formations of the Hitler Youth. This is laid down in an ordinance of 25 August 1942 concerning the Hitler Youth camps, which is Document Number RF-806.
Just as in Alsace and Lorraine, compulsory labor was imposed in Luxembourg, not only for men but also for women and for work of military concern. These provisions are found chiefly in three ordinances: the ordinance of 23 May 1941, the ordinance of 10 February 1943, and the ordinance of 12 February 1943. These last two ordinances are introduced as Documents RF-807 and RF-808.
I should now like to cite another circumstance, which is peculiar to Luxembourg and of which proof is found in the official report of the Luxembourg Government already submitted to the Tribunal. According to this report, Page 4, Paragraphs 7 to 8, it is stipulated—the quotation is very short and I did put the whole of the Luxembourg report in my document book; I shall cite only one sentence which bears the reference I have given:
“By ordinance, which appeared in the Official Gazette for Luxembourg, 1942, Page 232, part of the Luxembourg population was forced to join the formations of a corps called Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst (Security and Emergency Service), a premilitary formation which had to do military drills. Part of it was sent forcibly to Germany to carry out very dangerous tasks at the time of the air attacks of the Allied forces.”
The Nazis made a special effort to bring about the nazification of Luxembourg; and for this country they thought out a special method, the basic point of which was the language element. They developed the official thesis that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg belonged to the German language group. By means of propaganda they spread the idea that the dialect spoken in Luxembourg was a Franconian dialect of the Moselle and constituted a variant of the High German. Having developed this theory, they took a census of the population, as mentioned yesterday by the witness who gave evidence before the Tribunal. I especially mention that this census took place on 10 October 1941. I wished to have the witness speak on this point because no information on the result of the census was furnished in the government report; and the Tribunal knows now the reason why the German authorities immediately stopped the census as soon as they discovered that the number of persons answering in the way they desired was ridiculously small.
After this failure the Germans considered that the Luxembourg dialect was no longer their political friend and in a circular dated 13 January 1942, which I submit as Document Number RF-809, they forbade the civil servants to use this dialect in conversations with the public or on the telephone. This was very inconvenient to a great many people.
The nazification campaign was carried out also by the creation of groups with the same end in view. I have already said that the most important of these groups was the Volksdeutsche Bewegung and I shall merely supplement this by citing a sentence from the Luxembourg report, namely:
“Membership in the Volksdeutsche Bewegung was the condition sine qua non on which civil servants were allowed to keep their positions, private employees their positions, professional people—such as lawyers, doctors, et cetera—to exercise their profession, industrialists to run their factories, and everybody to earn his livelihood. Failure to comply meant dismissal, expulsion from the country, and the deportation of whole families.”
The penalties imposed on the Luxembourgers who refused these solicitations were accompanied by a formula which shows very well the Nazi mentality and which I shall read to the Tribunal from the text of the government report. It is a very short quotation.
“Because of their attitude these persons do not offer the guarantee that they will fulfill, in an exemplary manner at all times and without any reservation, during and outside their professional activity, the duties which have their foundation in the establishment of the civil administration in Luxembourg and in the pro-German attitude.”
The Nazis also sought to develop in Luxembourg the SA formation.
THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this report? Has this governmental report been deposited?
M. FAURE: The report of the Luxembourg Government was submitted to the Tribunal by my colleague, M. Dubost.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
M. FAURE: As I am making only very short quotations from it I did not put it in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure, it would help me if you would give me the page of the dossier, when you are citing a document which is not in the document book.
M. FAURE: The Nazis also used all kinds of constraint to obtain members for their SA formation as well as for the motorized group of the SA which is known under the initials NSKK.
I would like now to point out to the Tribunal that a special effort was directed towards the youth, because the Nazis thought it would be easier to get young people—and I may say, even children—to accept their precepts and doctrines.
I think I may submit to the Tribunal Document Number RF-810, which is a circular dated 22 May 1941, addressed to the principals of high schools. This is a very short document and I ask your permission to read it.
“By order of the Gauleiter, all teachers are bound to buy the book of the Führer, Mein Kampf, before 1 June 1941. By September 1941 every member of the teaching profession must make a declaration on his honor that he has read this work.”
The Germans thought that the compulsory reading of Mein Kampf—they allowed three months to assimilate this important work—might convince the teachers, who in turn would teach it to their pupils in the prescribed spirit.
I have here another document, Number RF-811, which I should like to read to the Tribunal, because it is not long and is also very characteristic. It is an extract from a collection of circulars addressed to the pupils of the Athenaeum:
“Luxembourg, 16 June 1941:
“1. All pupils must stand up when the teacher enters to begin the lesson and when leaving the classroom at the end of the lesson.
“2. The German salute will be given in the following manner: a) Raise the outstretched right arm to shoulder level, b) Shout: ‘Heil Hitler.’
“3. The pupils must return the same salute which the teachers use at the beginning and end of the lessons.
“4. I also expect all pupils to give the German salute in the street, especially to those gentlemen known to be enthusiastic partisans of the German salute.”
These German methods reached their culminating point with the imposition of the oath of allegiance to Hitler, which oath was imposed upon the gendarmes and the police. I refer here to the testimony of M. Reuter, who made the terrible statement that those who refused to do so were deported and afterwards most of them were shot. I also submit as proof of this the government report which gives the same information, on Page 12.
Naturally, as in the other annexed territories, the Luxembourgers did not yield to these German methods; and there also endeavors were made to break the resistance by terror. I must mention a quite special regulation, the ordinance of 2 June 1941. This will be Document Number RF-812, which has as title “Ordinance on the Putting into Force in Luxembourg of the Law of 10 February 1936 Concerning the Gestapo.” This title suffices to show the subject.
The Gestapo established in Luxembourg special tribunals, a special summary court known as Standgericht, and SS tribunals. These jurisdictions, if we can use the term jurisdiction, passed many sentences for political reasons. A detailed list of these convictions is appended to the government report. One tribunal, the Standgericht of which I spoke just now, passed 16 death sentences and sentenced 384 people to penalties involving loss of their liberty. But this tribunal was not the only one, and the report states—and the witnesses also confirmed it—that about 500 were condemned to death in this country, which is a considerable number, because the population is not very large.
I think I should likewise mention, in connection with the Germanization, the measures concerning deportation already known to the Tribunal through the testimony of M. Reuter. These measures concerning deportation were applied systematically to the intellectual elite of the country, to the clergy, and to persons who had served in the army. This proves that it was deliberately intended to do away with the social, intellectual, and moral structure of this country.
To the Luxembourg report is appended a list of names of deportees, including officers, magistrates, men who took part in politics in the Grand Duchy, writers, economic leaders, and in particular—I shall give only one figure which is striking—the Germans expelled or deported 75 clergymen, which, with regard to a population as small as that of Luxembourg, shows clearly the will to abolish completely the right to worship. The official report also states that the property of religious orders was confiscated, and most of the places of worship were either destroyed or desecrated.
Just a word about agricultural colonization: An organization called “Für Deutsches Volkstum und Siedelung” (For the Settlement of Racial Germans) was entrusted with the liquidation of the property of Luxembourg deportees for the benefit of southern Tyroleans who were settled in the Grand Duchy. Also, industrial and economic colonization: Here we find the same methods, the same spoliations, and therefore I do not want to go over this ground again. The Tribunal already knows the way in which this was carried out. But I should like to give one example concerning Luxembourg because when dealing with points, even general points, I think the best method is to give a documentary example, and also because, from this document that I am going to cite, I think it is possible to draw some important conclusions from the point of view of the Prosecution.
The document which I am going to cite concerns many cases where the German authorities compelled private citizens and firms to transfer their assets and the control of their businesses to Germans. That was called colonization, and consisted in putting German nationals into the businesses with large assets and economic functions. The Reich Minister of Economy himself devised these illicit methods by which it was intended to plunder private citizens and to germanize the economy of the country. The document that I am going to read to the Tribunal bears the Document Number 813. It is offered as a document by the Luxembourg Government, and it is an original document with the signature, bearing the heading “The Reich Minister of Economy,” Berlin, 5 January 1942. This letter with the heading “The Minister of Reich Economy” is signed “By order: Dr. Saager.” He is a subordinate who is acting regularly, administratively, by order of his minister. It is Number RF-813, the last but one. This letter is marked “Secret.” It concerns the “Accumulateurs Tudor, S. A., Bruxelles,” and is addressed to the battery factory in the hands of Mr. Von Holtzendorff of Berlin, Askanischer Platz 3. The Tribunal will understand that the Minister of Economy is writing to the German firm which is going to benefit by the pressure to be exercised on the Luxembourg firm.
“Referring to our repeated conversations I confirm that in the interest of the Reich it would be considered very desirable if your company would obtain a participation in the stock of the Tudor Batteries. The interest of the Reich is based in no small degree on economic requirements of national defense.
“In order to obtain a majority the stock owned by M. Léon Laval, formerly in Luxembourg and now in Bad Mergentheim, would have to be considered first. This concerns not only the shares which M. Laval possesses personally, but also the 3,000 shares deposited with Sogeco.”
I now come to a very important paragraph:
“I therefore request that the necessary negotiations be started immediately. I would point out that, first of all, you will have to apply to the Gestapo for the authorization of the State Police to negotiate with M. Laval, and then request them to give their agreement to the transfer of these shares to your company in case M. Laval should be willing to cede them.
“I have already informed the Gestapo of the matter. If the result of your negotiations should make it necessary I am prepared to point out once again to the Gestapo how urgent your mission is.”
Now I should like to read to the Tribunal the sequel to this, Document Number RF-814, which shows a further stage of the maneuver by which the Reich Minister of Economy, in conjunction with the Gestapo, sought to plunder a private citizen. This is a letter addressed to a private citizen, who was going to be compelled to sell his shares, Dr. Engineer Léon Laval, and we are going to see who writes to him. Here is the text of this letter, which is dated Luxembourg, 14 January 1942, and which bears the heading of the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD in Luxembourg:
“On 19 January 1942 and the following days you must remain at your residence to be at the disposal of the representative of the Accumulatoren-Fabrik, A.G., Berlin, Director Von Holtzendorff.”
The Tribunal will recognize the name of Von Holtzendorff, who was the recipient of the letter from the Reich Minister of Economy in the previous document. I continue the quotation:
“Mr. Von Holtzendorff, who is in possession of a special authorization from the Redchssicherheitshauptamt, will discuss business matters with you. Heil Hitler! Signed, Hartmann.”
The Tribunal will understand, I am sure, that if I have read these two documents, it is not because I think it very important in the scope of this Trial that the Tudor battery firm was despoiled, an illicit act which was to their prejudice; but I want especially, and I think it is very important in the Trial, to emphasize—and I shall do it each time when the document gives me the opportunity—the co-ordination which existed between the different German services of which these defendants here were the leaders. Certain persons are sometimes inclined to believe that all the German crimes must be imputed to the Gestapo, and it is true that the Gestapo was a characteristic criminal organization; but the Gestapo did not function all by itself. The Gestapo acted on the order of, and in conjunction with, the civil administrations and with the military command. We heard yesterday, in connection with the pontificals of the Bishopric of Strasbourg and also in connection with the University of Strasbourg, of the scheme which allowed the civil minister or his representative to have recourse to the police agents for the enforcement of orders. We also noted this fact when reading these documents which dealt with economic matters.
I now conclude the first chapter of my brief. I should like to mention that the work on the documentation and the preparation of this chapter was carried out with the aid of my assistant, M. Albert Lentin.
I should like now to hand to the Tribunal the first part of the second chapter, concerning the seizure of sovereignty. This first part includes general ideas which I think I should expound to the Tribunal before supporting them by documents. Consequently, the Tribunal will have before them a file entitled “Exposé” for which there is no corresponding document book.
The Germans occupied the territories of five powers, without counting Luxembourg which was annexed and of which I spoke just now. Of these five countries, three kept governmental authority. These are Denmark, Norway, and France, but even in these three countries the cases are entirely different. The government of Denmark was a legitimate government; the government of France was a de facto government, which at the beginning exercised real authority over unoccupied territories; the government of Norway was also a de facto government, typical example of a puppet government. The two other powers, Belgium and Holland, retained no governmental authority but only administrative authorities, of which the highest were the general secretariats of the ministerial departments.
In view of these situations, the Germans, as I said previously, varied their methods of domination. On the other hand, they did not establish a specific form of government corresponding to the internal organization of each country; therefore looking at it as a whole, it would seem at first sight to be somewhat complex. The usurpation of sovereignty by the occupying power assumed three different forms. We are speaking here of the external procedure.
First form: Direct exercise of power to legislate or issue regulations. By this we mean the exercise of power above and beyond the limited power to issue regulations accorded by international law to occupation armies.
Second form: The indirect exercise of power to legislate or issue regulations through local authorities. This was also done in two ways: 1. By injunction, pure and simple, which is the case when the local authorities are the administrative authorities. 2. By pressure, which is the case when the local authorities are authorities of a governmental character, either de facto or de jure. It should be noted, moreover, that the pressure is sometimes such that it bears a complete resemblance to an injunction, pure and simple. We also understand such pressure to include recourse to the complicity of traitors.
Third form: The third form is purely and simply that of assault and battery. We do not mean physical force used in individual cases, for this does not concern us here: but physical force used as a result of the order of a competent occupation authority, which consequently entails the responsibility of a superior.
If we now consider the question of determining who or what the instruments of usurpation were, we observe that these instruments fall into five categories:
In the first place, we have the Reich Commissioner, who was appointed in Norway and Holland only, that is to say, in the one case in a country which retained governmental authority at least in appearance and for a certain length of time, and in the other, in a country which retained administrative authority only.
In the second place, we have the military administration. In all countries the military authorities exercised powers absolutely disproportionate to those which belonged to them lawfully.
I must note here that only these two instruments, the Reich Commissioner and the military authority, were able to carry out usurpation by issuing direct legislative or regulatory decrees. In each of the two powers where there was a Reich Commissioner, the powers conferred were naturally shared by the Reich Commissioner and the military authority.
A third instrument of usurpation took the form of diplomatic administration responsible to the Foreign Office. Diplomatic representations existed only in countries which had governmental authorities and where there was no Reich Commissioner. We refer to Denmark and France.
These diplomatic representatives of the Reich, unlike the Reich Commissioner and the military occupation authority, did not have power—illicit but formal power—to legislate or issue regulations. However, this does not mean that their role in the usurpation of sovereignty is a secondary one. On the contrary, it is an important one. Their principal activity consisted, naturally, in bringing pressure to bear on local authorities to whom they were accredited.
I should like to bring out two points here. It might be thought from a logical point of view, that in an occupied country such as France, the intervention by the occupying power in the administration of the local authorities would be the exclusive competence of the diplomatic representatives. That is not the case. The military authority also intervened on frequent occasions through direct contact with the French authorities. In their turn, the diplomatic representatives did not limit themselves to the powers conferred by their functions. One of the characteristics of the Nazi method is this exceeding of powers conferred. It is, moreover, when one thinks of it, a necessary result of the Nazi enterprise.
In view of the fact that the usurpation of sovereignty in a country which is militarily occupied is an illegal and abnormal thing, it does not come within the normal competency of the categories of public functions as understood by civilized nations. Thus the diplomats, as well as the military authorities, exceeded their powers; and there was also an overlapping of functions. The diplomats and the military authorities dealt with the same things. We see this in regard to propaganda, for instance; and in regard to the persecution of the Jews. Generally speaking, the military authority acted in a more obvious way; the diplomatic administration preferred to act in domains where publicity could be evaded. There was a constant liaison between them on all questions concerning the occupied country.
The fourth instrument of usurpation was the police administration. The German police was installed in all occupied countries, often under several distinct administrations, according to the principles which were presented to the Tribunal when the American Prosecution revealed the inner workings of the immense, complex, and terrible police organism of the Nazis. Neither did the police have limited or exclusive functions. They acted in close and constant liaison with the other instruments we have defined.
The fifth instrument which we must mention consisted of the local branches of the National Socialist Party and the similarly inspired organizations which sought to organize nationals in the occupied country. These organizations served as auxiliaries to the German authorities; and in a specific case, that of Norway, they provided the foundation of a so-called government.
I have thought fit to outline this picture, as it seems to me that the Prosecution may draw from it an interesting conclusion in regard to the points I have already touched on in my statement on Luxembourg.
We have seen, in effect, that the German line of policy for the usurping of sovereignty was carried out by means of various organs which were associated with this action. In the occupied countries—and we must not forget that this usurpation provided the method for the commission of crimes—this usurpation was not the exclusive work of an official, or of an ambassador, or of a military commander. In countries which had a Reich Commissioner there also existed a military administration. A country placed under the sole regulating authority of the Army also had diplomatic agents. In all countries there were police authorities.
In all these occupied countries, as a result of the occupation and the usurpation of sovereignty, there were systematic abuses and crimes. Many of them are already known to the Tribunal. Others have still to be mentioned.
From what I have just said, we see that the responsibility for these abuses does not exist only with one or the other of these administrations which we have mentioned, it exists with all of them. It may be true that in Belgium, for instance, there was no diplomatic representation; but there was such representation in France and in Denmark. It therefore follows that the Department of Foreign Affairs and its head could not help being aware of the conditions under the occupation which, as far as the principal features are concerned, were similar in the different countries.
Moreover, as I have just said, these coexisting administrations had no fixed division of functions. Even if this division of functions had existed, it must be pointed out that the responsibility and the complicity of each in the action of the others would have been sufficiently proved by their knowledge and their approval—which was at least implicit with regard to this action. But even this division did not exist, and we shall show that all were associated and accomplices in a common action.
Now, this very fact involves a more far reaching consequence. The association and complicity of these various departments involves all the leaders and all the organizations here accused in a general responsibility. I shall explain this point by giving an example. If, for instance, all the abuses and all the crimes had been committed only by the Army without a single interference, perhaps it would be possible for one important person, or organization, having no military functions, to claim that it had no knowledge of these abuses and of these crimes. Even in this case I think this claim would be difficult to uphold, because the vast scope of the enterprises which we denounce made it impossible for anyone who exercised a higher authority not to know of these things. However, since several administrations are jointly responsible, it necessarily follows that the other authorities are also responsible, because the question at this point is no longer the question whether one administration is involved, or even three, but all the administrations; it involves the consubstantial element of all the authorities of the State.
I shall speak later of the order concerning the deportation of the Jews; and I shall show that this order was the result of a common action of the military administration, the diplomatic administration, and the Security Police, in the case of France. It follows that in the first place the Chief of the High Command, in the second place, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the third place, the Chief of the Security Police and Reich Security Service—these three persons—were all necessarily informed and necessarily approved this action, for it is clear that their offices did not keep them in ignorance of such plans concerning important affairs and that, moreover, decisions were agreed upon on the same level in the three different administrations.
Therefore these three persons are responsible and guilty. But is it possible that, by an extraordinary chance, among the persons who directed the affairs of the Reich, as ministers or as persons holding equivalent offices, these three persons turned out to be criminals and the only ones to be criminals and that they had conspired among themselves to hide from the others their criminal actions? This idea is manifestly absurd. In view of the interpenetration of all the executive departments in a modern state, all the leaders of the Reich were necessarily aware of and agreed with the usurpation of sovereignty in the occupied countries, as well as the criminal abuses resulting therefrom.
In this chapter I shall go on to speak first of Denmark, which is a special case. Then I shall speak of the civil administration which existed in Norway and in Holland, and finally I shall speak of the military administration which was the regime in Belgium and in France.
I think it would be a suitable time now for the Tribunal to have a recess; or if the Tribunal prefers, I can continue my brief.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
M. FAURE: After the recess I should like to call the witness of whom I spoke to the Tribunal yesterday. I should like to mention one fact, however. Yesterday the lawyer for Seyss-Inquart requested that he be allowed to cross-examine this witness on Monday. Senator Vorrink, who is my witness, is absolutely obliged to leave Nuremberg this evening. I think, therefore, that the lawyer for Seyss-Inquart might cross-examine him today. In any case I should like to notify him of the modification of the request which I made yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible, if the counsel for Seyss-Inquart wants to cross-examine the witness, for the witness to be brought back at some other date?
M. FAURE: My witness can of course be brought back at another date, if it should be necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I meant. Let him go this evening in accordance with arrangements that he has made, and then at some date convenient to him he could be brought back if the defendant’s counsel wants to cross-examine him.
[A recess was taken.]
M. FAURE: Mr. President, may I ask the permission of the Tribunal to call the witness, Jacobus Vorrink.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, have him called.
M. FAURE: This witness speaks Dutch as his native tongue. Since the interpreting system does not include this language, I propose that he speak in the German language, which he knows well.
[The witness, Jacobus Vorrink, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
JACOBUS VORRINK (Witness): Vorrink.
THE PRESIDENT: Your Christian name, your first name?
VORRINK: Jacobus.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you swear to speak without hate or fear, to say the truth, all the truth, and only the truth? Will you raise your right hand and say, “I swear”?
VORRINK: I swear.
M. FAURE: Sit down, Mr. Vorrink. You are a Dutch Senator?
VORRINK: Yes, Sir.
M. FAURE: You are President of the Socialist Party of the Netherlands?
VORRINK: Yes, Sir.
M. FAURE: You exercised these functions in 1940 at the time of the invasion of the Netherlands, by the Germans?
VORRINK: Yes.
M. FAURE: I should like to ask you to give a few explanations on the following situation: There existed in the Netherlands, before the invasion, a National Socialist Party. I should like you to state what the situation was, after the invasion by the Germans and during the occupation, with regard to the various political parties in the Netherlands, and more particularly the National Socialist Party, and what were the activities of this Party in liaison with the German occupation?
VORRINK: I should prefer to speak in the Dutch language. I am sorry I do not know French and English well enough to use these languages—but in order not to delay the proceedings, I shall make my declarations in German. This is the only reason why I am using the German language.
The political situation in Holland after the invasion by the Germans was that first and foremost the German Army wanted to maintain public order in Holland. But the real Nazis immediately came with the Wehrmacht and tried to direct and organize public life in Holland according to their concepts. There were among the Germans three main categories. In the first place, there were those who believed in the “blood and soil” (Blut und Boden) theory. They wanted to win over the whole of the Dutch people to their National Socialist concepts. I must say that, in certain respects, this was our misfortune because these people, on the basis of their “blood and soil” theory, loved us too much and when that love was not reciprocated it turned to hate.
The second category consisted of the politically informed; and these people knew perfectly well that the Dutch National Socialists in Holland were only a very small and much hated group. At the elections of 1935 they received only 8 percent of the votes, and 2 years later this percentage had been reduced by one-half. These people were tactlessness itself. For instance, when the ruins of Rotterdam were still smoking, they saw fit to make a demonstration at which the leader of the Dutch National Socialists, Mussert, dedicated to Göring a new bell as a thank offering for what he had done for Holland. Fortunately, it did not prevent him from being defeated.
In the third place there were the so-called intriguers, those who wanted to destroy the national unity of Holland and who, first of all, tried through Seyss-Inquart to gain the favor of the Dutch people by flattery. In the same way as Seyss-Inquart, they always stressed that the two peoples were kindred races and should therefore work together, while behind the scenes they played off one Nazi group against the other.
In Holland at that time there existed the Dutch National Socialist Workers’ Party, the Dutch National Socialist Front, and the so-called National Front. All these three movements had their contacts with certain German organizations. The Germans first tried to find out whether it was possible to use these groups for their purposes. Slowly, however, they recognized that it was not possible to work with these groups; and so they decided to adopt the National Socialist movement only. These National Socialists gradually occupied the key positions in the Dutch administration. They were appointed general secretaries for internal administration, they became commissioners of the provinces, mayors, et cetera.
I should like to mention in this connection that at that time there were not enough people qualified to become mayors, so that short courses of instruction were arranged which performed the record feat of turning out Dutch mayors in 3 weeks. You can imagine what kind of mayors they were.
Furthermore, they became administrators in nazified organizations and commercial undertakings, which gave them certain power in Holland; and they behaved like cowardly Nazi lackeys.
Mr. Rost von Tonningen, for instance, used millions of Dutch guilders to finance the war against Russia in order to fight against Bolshevism as he called it. Finally, in December 1942, Seyss-Inquart declared the Nazi Party to be the representative of the political life of Holland. If it had not been so tragic, one might have laughed at it. Mussert was then appointed as the Leader of Holland. I must add that the Nazi Party had only a shadow existence from the political point of view, with the single but important exception that these people had occasionally the opportunity to deal with matters of personnel. I should also add that sometimes they turned the heads of young Dutchmen and persuaded several thousands of them to enter the SS formations; and during the last years it became even worse. Then they even went so far as to put young boys into the SS without their parents’ consent. They even forced minors from correctional institutions into the SS. Sometimes—I know of cases myself—young boys who for certain reasons were at loggerheads with their parents, were taken into the SS. To realize the harm done you must, as I have sometimes done, go and speak to these children who are now in camps in Holland. You will then see what a monstrous crime has been committed against these young people.
M. FAURE: Am I to understand that all these methods employed by the Germans were intended to achieve the nazification of Holland and that if there were, as you have indicated, several varying tendencies among the Germans, these tendencies differed only as to the means to be employed and not in regard to the purpose of Germanization?
VORRINK: The actual nazification of Holland extended to practically all spheres of our national life. They tried in every domain to introduce the Leadership Principle. I would like to point out, for instance, that contrary to our expectations, they did not ban the Socialist Trade Unions but just tried to employ them. They merely sent a Nazi commissioner who told the people, “The era of democracy is past, just go on working under the leadership of the commissioner and you can still help the workers. It is not necessary to change anything.” They even tried that with the Dutch political parties.
As President of the Socialist Democratic Workers’ Party of Holland, I had a long conversation with Rost von Tonningen, who personally told me that it was a pity that the good cultural work done to educate the workers should cease. We both wanted socialism and all we had to do was to work together calmly. I denied that at the time of that conversation. I told him that for us democracy was not a question of opportunism but a part of our ideology and that we were not prepared to betray our convictions and our principles.
They tried to keep the workers in their organizations; but slowly the workers, thousands and tens of thousands of them, left their organizations. When finally the National Labor Front was created, with the Catholic and Christian Trade Unions, there certainly was an organization but no longer any members.
M. FAURE: Can you state with accuracy whether in your country persecutions against the Jews were started?
VORRINK: One of the worst chapters of our sufferings in Holland was the persecution of the Jews. You may know that we in Holland, and especially in Amsterdam, had a strong Jewish minority. These Jews took a very active part in the public and cultural life of Holland, and one can say there was no anti-Semitism in Holland.
When the Germans first came to Holland, they promised us that they would not harm the Jews at all. Nevertheless, even in the first weeks there was a wave of suicides. In the following months the measures against the Jews started. The professors in the universities were forced to resign. The president of the highest court in Holland was dismissed. Then the Jews had to present themselves for registration, and then came the time when the Jews were deported in great numbers.
I am proud to say that the Dutch population did not suffer this without protesting. The Dutch students went on strike when their Jewish professors were driven out, and the workers of Amsterdam went on strike for several days when the persecution of the Jews started. But one has to have seen this with one’s own eyes, as I have, to know what a barbaric system this National Socialism was.
The Green Police sealed off whole sections of cities, went into houses, even went on the roofs, and drove out young and old and took them off in their trucks. No difference was made between young and old. We have seen old women of over 70, who were lying ill at home and had no other desire than to be allowed to die quietly in their own home, put on stretchers and carried out of their home, to be sent to Westernborg and from there to Germany, where they died.
I myself remember very well how a mother, when she was dragged from her home, gave her baby to a stranger, who was not a Jewess, and asked her to look after her child. At this moment there are still hundreds of families in Holland where these small Jewish children are being looked after and brought up as their own.
M. FAURE: Can you state whether, apart from these measures against the Jews, the Germans concerned themselves with other confessions?
VORRINK: From the beginning the Germans always tried to get the churches into their power. All the churches, the Catholic as well as the Protestant, protested whenever the Germans violated human rights. The churches protested against the arbitrary arrest of persons, against the mass deportation of our workers, and the church never failed to testify for the Jews.
Of course, the church dignitaries, the priests and pastors, had to suffer for that; and hundreds of our pastors and priests were taken to concentration camps, and of the 20 parsons and priests whom I knew in the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen, only one has returned to Holland.
M. FAURE: Can you state what measures were adopted with regard, for example, to culture, propaganda, and teaching?
VORRINK: What incensed us most in Holland was not so much our military defeat. We were a small people, and I can say that during those 5 days we fought as well as we could. Perhaps it would have been possible to maintain a correct attitude with the occupation forces, if it hadn’t been for the Nazis’ determination to dominate us, not only in a military sense, but also to break our spirit and to crush us morally. Therefore, they never lost an opportunity of encroaching on our cultural life in their efforts to nazify us.
In regard to the press, for instance, they forced us to publish in our press editorials which were written by Germans and to print them on the front page in order to create the impression that the editor in chief of the paper had written them. One can even say that these measures were the starting point for the very extensive underground press in Holland, because we wouldn’t allow the Germans to lie to us systematically. We had to have a press which told us the truth.
Also in regard to the radio, it was soon forbidden to listen to foreign stations; and they dealt out exceedingly harsh punishment to people who defied this ban; and there were a great many people in Holland who listened to the foreign radio, especially the BBC. And we in Holland were always glad to hear the British radio which never hesitated to give the people, in extenso, all the affecting speeches of Hitler and Göring, while we were not allowed to listen to Churchill’s speeches. In those moments we were deeply conscious of the reasons why we had built up our resistance, and we also knew why our Allied friends strove with all their might to deliver the world from the Nazi tyranny.
It was the same in the field of the arts. Quite a number of guilds for painters, musicians, and writers were forced to organize themselves. An author could not even publish a book without submitting it to some Nazi illiterate.
They also encroached on school life and tried to influence elementary education; for instance, in the text books for children of 6 to 12 years they ordered that whole sentences should be struck out. A sentence like the following, “When the Queen visited them the people cheered.” In the schools and public buildings they organized real hunts for pictures of our Royal Family.
M. FAURE: I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: You have finished your examination, have you?
M. FAURE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko?
GENERAL RUDENKO: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the British or American prosecutors any questions? [There was no response.] Does any member of the defendants’ counsel wish now to cross-examine?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in order to avoid the witness having to make the long trip from Holland a second time, I should like to cross-examine him today, although my client is absent.
Witness, when Seyss-Inquart took over the government in Holland under the decree of 18 May 1940, was the Queen or were members of the Dutch Government still on Dutch territory?
VORRINK: No, they were no longer on Dutch territory.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the government of Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner, leave in office the functionaries of the former government?
VORRINK: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that of the nine General Secretaries appointed by the former Royal Government and still in office only one was dismissed?
VORRINK: Well, it is possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you further know that of the 11 Commissioners of the Provinces only four were dismissed from the government for political reasons?
VORRINK: I do not know the exact number but that is possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know how many mayors were appointed by the Royal Government and in particular is it correct that there were more than one-half still in office in 1944?
VORRINK: Yes, I believe so.
DR. STEINBAUER: You have not answered fully the question which was asked you by the prosecutor. He asked you how many political parties there were in parliament at the time of the invasion. Which were those parties?
VORRINK: The Catholic Party, two Protestant Christian parties, two liberal parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and some minor parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: I shall now talk about two subjects mentioned by you—schools and churches. Is it correct that the Dutch school system, throughout the Seyss-Inquart regime, was under the direction of a Dutchman, Van Hann?
VORRINK: It was under a Dutchman during the whole time, but we do not consider him as a Dutchman. He is today in prison because he betrayed his country.
DR. STEINBAUER: But he was not a German?
VORRINK: He was a Dutch traitor.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it correct that Seyss-Inquart showed great interest in the Dutch school system?
VORRINK: I cannot remember that.
DR. STEINBAUER: For instance, Seyss-Inquart added an eighth class to the elementary school?
VORRINK: That is not correct.
DR. STEINBAUER: And that in this way adolescents did not have to enter the labor services until later?
VORRINK: Correct.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he show an interest in a long standing wish of the Dutch concerning the spelling of the Dutch language and did he not appoint a special committee to investigate the matter?
VORRINK: In this connection he did take some interest in a thing about which he knew nothing; he got his information from the wrong people.
DR. STEINBAUER: But he did make an effort.
VORRINK: Yes, but in the wrong direction.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it correct that he endeavored to increase the number of teachers?
VORRINK: No, certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: That, in particular, he employed junior teachers and reduced expenses thereby?
VORRINK: He did that because he wanted to influence the Dutch youth.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know, for instance, that as a result of protests, Seyss-Inquart rescinded measures that had been taken against the School of Commerce in Rotterdam?
VORRINK: Will you repeat the question? I did not understand it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that Seyss-Inquart, as a result of protests, took steps to see that the School of Commerce in Rotterdam was not interfered with?
VORRINK: I do not know.
DR. STEINBAUER: As far as the churches are concerned, apart from deportation, as you say for political reasons, were the Catholics and Protestants ever prevented from practicing their religion?
VORRINK: The Germans interfered very much with the right to worship. They put spies in the churches to listen to the sermons with the idea of possibly denouncing the pastors.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, but that has happened in other countries too. Please, tell me, could the priest or the parson still continue to preach according to his conscience?
VORRINK: No, certainly not according to his conscience.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that during the whole of the occupation the prayer for the Queen was allowed in churches of all denominations?
VORRINK: It was certainly not allowed. Several ministers were arrested for that very reason.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that Seyss-Inquart prevented 27 convents from being confiscated for German refugees? Is it correct?
VORRINK: I know nothing about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: But perhaps you may know that he prevented the destruction of the synagogues in Rotterdam and in The Hague. The police wanted to destroy them, and he prevented them from doing it. Do you know anything about that?
VORRINK: I do not know whether he wanted to prevent it; but in any case, the synagogues were destroyed; and those who destroyed them went unpunished and later took part in the worst persecution of the Jews.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, do you know that out of the Catholic and Protestant Dutch clergymen deported to Germany, Seyss-Inquart succeeded in getting two-thirds sent back to their country?
VORRINK: I do not know.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that he prevented the departure of valuable cultural treasures, especially libraries, which were already prepared for transportation from Holland to the Reich?
VORRINK: I do not know whether he used his personal influence in that respect; I only know that enormous quantities of our art treasures and books were taken away by the Germans, and in any case he was then powerless to prevent it.
DR. STEINBAUER: You said also that the radio was prohibited because it stimulated the organization of resistance. As a leader, would you have allowed a radio speaking against you?
VORRINK: I would by all means allow the radio. I am of the opinion that there can be no human dignity if people are not allowed to form their opinions by hearing reasons for and against.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was Mussert given the task of forming a government, or was that not done because Seyss-Inquart objected?
VORRINK: I really do not know what happened behind the scenes, but perhaps you may be right that Seyss-Inquart was no friend of Mussert. While in prison I was taken out of my cell one night and asked to write an article on the National Socialist movement in Holland, and I was requested to give my own personal opinion about Mussert. When I answered, ‘Why should I do this? You know what I think of Mussert and of all the Nazis,’ they said: ‘You cannot make it bad enough.’ I took this to be one of the many machinations of the Nazi cliques which fought against each other.
DR. STEINBAUER: I thank you. I have no further questions.
HERR BABEL: Witness, you spoke of Dutch youngsters who had entered the SS. Could you tell me approximately what the total number was?
VORRINK: I would say a few thousand.
HERR BABEL: In your opinion how many of those entered the ranks voluntarily and how many were forced?
VORRINK: I cannot give you an exact figure; but I am of the opinion that if minors entered such organizations without the consent of their parents, they did not do it voluntarily. They could not judge the consequences of their actions.
HERR BABEL: I did not ask that question. I asked you how many, in your opinion, joined the SS voluntarily and how many were forced. Will you answer this question and no other?
VORRINK: I have already said that I cannot give you the exact number.
HERR BABEL: Well, an approximate figure.
VORRINK: I should say several hundred were forced.
HERR BABEL: Good, and you gave the total number as several thousand.
VORRINK: They were youngsters who for some reason or another left their homes, and they were taken by the Green Police or the Security Police and pressed into the SS. I myself have come across quite a few cases of this in Dutch concentration camps. As an old leader in the Youth Movement I was able to speak to these youngsters and got them to tell me about their life.
HERR BABEL: You say “pressed”? What do you mean by “pressed”?
VORRINK: That means that they were threatened with imprisonment if they were not willing to join the SS.
HERR BABEL: You heard that yourself?
VORRINK: Yes.
HERR BABEL: You further said that thousands of workmen left their organizations. I think you said tens of thousands. Did they do so voluntarily, or what was the reason for this?
VORRINK: The reasons were that the workmen refused to be in a nazified trade union and to submit to the Leadership Principle. They wanted to be in their old trade unions where they could have a say in the running of their organizations.
HERR BABEL: The resignations, therefore, were voluntary?
VORRINK: Yes.
HERR BABEL: In regard to the Jewish question you said that at first nothing happened to the Jews, but that nevertheless there was a wave of suicides. Why? What was the reason for those suicides when it had been said, “nothing will happen to you.”
VORRINK: These Jews were the most sensible ones. We in Holland did not live on an island, and we knew all that had happened between 1933 and 1940 in Germany. We knew that in Germany the Jews had been persecuted to death, and I personally still have in my possession quite a few sworn statements of German Jews who had emigrated, who kept us hourly informed of how they had been tortured and martyred by the SS during the period before the war. That of course was known to the Dutch Jews, and in my opinion in that respect they were more sensible since they knew they would suffer the same fate.
HERR BABEL: You put it in such a way as to make it sound as if there were a large number of suicides. Was that so, or were there a few individual cases?
VORRINK: This happened to about 30 or 50 people, but in Holland; where we value life very highly, that is quite a large number.
HERR BABEL: Now, you used the word “Nazi illiterate.” Quite apart from, I would say, your not very friendly attitude towards us Germans, have you any justification for saying this? Have you met a single German who was illiterate?
VORRINK: I am rather surprised at this question. By an “illiterate Nazi” I meant a man who talks about things about which he has no knowledge, and the people who judged an author’s work were people who had been set to read through the book to find out whether a Jew appeared in it and was presented as a good and humane character. According to the Nazi concepts, such a book could not be published. I would add that I have used the word “Nazi illiterate” from the days when there were found in the German cities, in the country of Goethe and Schiller, great piles of burned books, books that we had read and admired in Holland.
HERR BABEL: I understand you to mean that you can bring no positive facts which might justify this derogatory word “Nazi illiterate.”
Thank you.
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): I have just one question, Witness. You just said that young people who did not enter the SS were threatened with prison. Do I understand you to say that they would be given prison sentences for an offense committed previously or that they would be imprisoned only because they did not enter the SS?
VORRINK: They would be given a prison sentence, of course, because they had been threatened. Whether they would have put them in prison, I do not know, but it was a threat. It was one of the usual methods of the Nazis to say “We want you to do this or that, and if you do not we will put you in prison.” There were so many instances of this sort that one could have no illusions about it.
DR. PANNENBECKER: But it is correct in this case that these were youngsters who had run away from home because of differences with their parents?
VORRINK: Those are cases which I know of personally.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? [There was no response.] M. Faure, do you wish to ask any questions?
M. FAURE: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, the witness can leave.
[The witness left the stand.]
M. FAURE: I shall ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take the brief and the document book, bearing the title “Denmark.”
The Tribunal knows that Denmark was invaded on 9 April 1940 in violation, as in other cases, of treaties, and particularly, of a treaty which was not very old, since it was the Non-Aggression Treaty which had been concluded on 31 May 1939.
Inasmuch as Denmark was not in a position to offer armed resistance to this invasion, the Germans sought to establish and maintain the fiction according to which that country was not an occupied country. Therefore they did not set up a civil administration with powers to issue regulations as they were to do in the case of Belgium and Holland.
On the other hand, there was a military command, inasmuch as troops were garrisoned there. But this military command, contrary to what happened in the other occupied countries, did not exercise any official authority by issuing ordinances or general regulations.
In spite of this fiction, the Germans did commit in this country which they pretended they were not occupying, usurpations of sovereignty. These usurpations were all the more blatant, inasmuch as they had no juridical justification whatsoever, even from the Nazi point of view.
During the first period, which extended to the middle of 1943, German usurpations were discreet and camouflaged. There were two reasons for this. The first was that one had to take into account international public opinion, inasmuch as Denmark was not officially occupied. The second reason was that the Germans had conceived the plan to germanize the country from within by developing National Socialist political propaganda there.
I think it should be noted, very briefly, that this Germanization from within had already begun before the war. It is set forth in detail and in a most interesting manner in a part of the official report of the Danish Government, which I place before the Tribunal as Document Number RF-901.
This Document Number RF-901 comprises the whole of the green dossier which the Tribunal has before it. There are several sections. The subject of which I am now speaking is to be found in the first document of this bundle. This first document starts with the heading “Memorandum.”
This document shows that even before the war the Germans had organized an information service which was supplemented by a clever espionage service. In particular they had established a branch of the National Socialist Party, into which Germans living in Denmark were recruited. The idea was first of all to form a party made up of Germans and we shall shortly see how this National Socialist Party was afterwards called the Danish Party.
This branch of the German Party was called NSDAP, Ausland-Organisation, Landeskreis Danemark (Foreign Section, Regional District Denmark). It acted in co-ordination with other institutions; particularly, the Deutsche Akademie, the Danish-German Chamber of Commerce, and the Nordische Gesellschaft (Nordic Association).
A German organization in Hamburg called the Deutsche Fichtebund, which was directly under the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, undertook a systematic propaganda campaign in order to gain favorable Danish public opinion.
In this connection I should like to quote a passage of the document which is worthy of note from the point of view of German premeditation and of the methods employed. This passage is in the first document which I have just mentioned and which is called “Memorandum”—on Page 6 of this first document. I shall skip the first sentence of this paragraph.
I would point out to the Tribunal, in case it should be more convenient for them because of the length of the document, that these quotations are to be found in the exposé:
“This information agency, which functioned in Hamburg with no less than eight different addresses, gave in one of its publications the following details about itself. It was established in January 1914 in memory of the German philosopher, Fichte, and was to be looked upon as a ‘union for world truth.’ The objects were: (1) The promotion of mutual understanding by the free publication of information on the new Germany. (2) The protection of culture and civilization by the propagation of truth concerning the destructive forces in the world.”
I skip one sentence and continue:
“This German propaganda had for its essential purpose the creation in Denmark of a nation-wide sentiment favorable to Germany and hostile to England, but it could also represent an attempt to prepare the ground for the introduction into Denmark of a Nazi system of government by collecting surreptitiously all manifestations of discontent in Denmark against the democratic regime in order to use such data as documentary proof in the event of a liberation action in the future. Thus, in January 1940, the propaganda was no longer content merely with attacking England and her methods of conducting the war, or the Jews and their mentality; but it proceeded to make serious attacks on the mentality of the government and the Danish Parliament.”
Finally, in this connection the Danish report mentions a very revealing incident:
“At the end of February 1940, the Danish police seized from a German subject, a document entitled, ‘Project for Propaganda in Denmark.’”
In saying this, I am summarizing the first paragraph of Page 7 of this report. This document contains a characteristic sentence. It is the last sentence in that paragraph, in German, and is in quotation marks with a French translation in parenthesis:
“It should be possible for the Legation and its collaborators to control the daily press.”
Germany did not limit herself to the use of her own subjects as agents inside the country and for carrying out propaganda, but the Nazis also inspired the organization of Danish political groups which were affiliated with the Nazi Party.
This campaign first of all found favorable ground in southern Jutland, where there was a German minority. The Germans thus were able to promote the organization of a group called Schleswig’sche Kameradschaft, or SK, which exactly corresponds to the German SA. The members of this group received military training. Likewise a group called Deutsche Jugendschaft Nordschleswig had been organized on the pattern of the Hitler Jugend.
I want to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that I am now summarizing the statements in the Danish report in order to avoid reading in full. These statements are developed in detail in the following chapters of the report and what I have just said is on Page 7.
This German infiltration had been completed by social institutions such as the Wohlfahrtsdienst founded in 1929 at Tinglev, and the Deutsche Selbsthilfe, founded in 1935, and also by economic organizations, the model of which was Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang, which by very clever and secret financing on the part of the Reich, had succeeded in taking over important agricultural properties.
The movement formed in southern Jutland then tried to spread to the whole of Denmark. Thus, there existed, even before the war, a National Socialist Party of Denmark, whose leader was Fritz Clausen. We read in the governmental report, Pages 6 and 7:
“With regard to the relations of the Party with Germany prior to the occupation it can be said that Fritz Clausen, himself, as well as the members of the Party, were assiduous participants at the Party Days held in Nuremberg and at the Congress of Streicher at Erfurt and that, in any event, Fritz Clausen personally was in very close relation with the German Foreign Office.
“This propagation of Nazism in Denmark, starting in southern Jutland and spreading to the rest of the country, is illustrated by the fact that the Nazi newspaper, called Das Vaterland, which at first was published in Jutland, was transferred in October 1939 to Copenhagen, where it was published from then on as a morning daily.”
Such, then, was the situation when the occupation started. As I have indicated, the Germans did not establish a formal occupation authority; and it follows that the two principal agents for the usurpation of sovereignty in Denmark were diplomatic representation, on the one hand, and the Danish Nazi Party on the other.
The German Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark was at first Von Renthe-Fink, and from October 1942, Dr. Best.
Cases of diplomatic infringement on Danish sovereignty were numerous; and the demands, made at first in a discreet manner, became more and more sweeping. I shall quote, for example, a document which is contained in the government report. This document is a memorandum submitted by the Reich Plenipotentiary on 12 April 1941.
May I point out to the Tribunal that this text is to be found in Book Number 3 of the report submitted. This third book is entitled, “Second Memorandum,” or rather, it is a continuation of this third book and there is a sheet entitled “Annex One.” I am now quoting:
“The German Reich Plenipotentiary has received instructions to demand from the Royal Government of Denmark:
“First: A formal declaration as to whether His Majesty, the King of Denmark, to whom M. De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark now refers, or any other member of the Royal Danish Government had, prior to its publication, any knowledge of the treaty concluded between M. De Kauffmann and the American Government.
“Second: The immediate putting into effect of the recall of M. De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark, by His Majesty, the King of Denmark.
“Third: The delivery without delay to the American Chargé d’Affaires in Copenhagen of a note disavowing M. De Kauffmann, communicating the fact that he is being recalled, and stating that the treaty thus concluded is not binding upon the Danish Government, and formulating the most energetic protest against the American procedure.
“Fourth: A communication to be published in the press, according to which the Danish Royal Government clearly states that M. De Kauffmann acted against the will of His Majesty, the King, and of the Danish Royal Government and without their authorization; that he has been recalled, and that the Danish Government considers the treaty thus concluded as not binding upon it and has formulated the most energetic protests against the American procedure.
“Fifth: The promulgation of a law according to which the loss of nationality and the confiscation of property may be pronounced against any Danish subject who has been guilty of grave offenses abroad against the interests of Denmark, or against the provisions laid down by the Danish Government.
“Sixth: M. De Kauffmann is to be brought to trial for the crime of high treason, by virtue of Article 98 of the penal code, and of Article 3, Section 3, of the law of 18 January 1941, and to lose his nationality in conformity with a law to be promulgated, as mentioned under Paragraph 5.”
I believe that this very characteristic example shows how the sovereignty of the legitimate Danish Government was violated by the Germans. They gave orders in the sphere of international relations, although liberty in this sphere constitutes the essential attribute of the sovereignty and the independence of the State. They even go so far, as the Tribunal has seen in the last two paragraphs, as to demand that a law be passed in accordance with their wishes and that a prosecution for high treason be made in conformity with such law, on the supposition that it will be promulgated at their instance.
To conclude the subject, I should like to read a passage from the Danish Government report which appears in the second supplementary memorandum on Page 4, the third book in the green file:
“In the month of October there occurred a sudden crisis. The Germans claimed that His Majesty, the King, had offended Hitler by giving too short a reply to a telegram which the latter had sent to him. The Germans reacted abruptly and with extreme violence. The German Minister in Copenhagen was immediately recalled. The Danish Minister in Berlin was then recalled to Denmark. Minister Von Renthe-Fink was replaced by Dr. Best, who arrived in the country with the title of Plenipotentiary of the German Reich and who brought with him sweeping demands on the part of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Ribbentrop, including a demand for a change in the Danish Government and the admission of National Socialists into the Government. These demands were refused by Denmark and, the government having dragged out the matter, they were finally abandoned by Dr. Best.”
THE PRESIDENT: This may be a convenient time to break off.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
FIFTIETH DAY Monday, 4 February 1946
Morning Session
MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this morning’s session on account of illness.
M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd would like to give some explanations.
MR. DODD: May it please the Court, with reference to the prospective witness Pfaffenberger, over the weekend it occurred to us, after talking with him, that perhaps if Defense Counsel had an opportunity to talk to him we might save some time for the Court. Accordingly we made this Witness available to Dr. Kauffmann for conversation and interview; he has talked with him as long as he has pleased, and has notified us that in view of this conversation he does not care to cross-examine him, and as well other Counsel for the Defense have no desire to cross-examine him.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness Pfaffenberger can be released?
MR. DODD: That is what we would like to do, at the order of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. FAURE: Gentlemen, during the last session I reached the end of the first period of the German occupation of Denmark. In connection with that first period I should like still to mention a circumstance which is established by the Danish report, Document Number RF-901, second memorandum, Page 4. I quote:
“When the German aggression against Russia took place on 22 June 1941”—that is the third book of the report—“one of the most serious encroachments was made on the political liberties which the Germans had promised to respect. They forcibly obliged the government to intern the Communists, the total number of which was 300.”
The explanations which I gave in the previous session related to the improper interference on the part of the first instrument of German usurpation, the diplomatic representation.
The second instrument of German interference was, as might be expected, the local National Socialist Party of Fritz Clausen, about which I spoke previously. The Germans hoped that in the favorable circumstances of the occupation, and thanks to the support they would bring to it, this party might develop enormously. But their calculations were completely wrong. In effect, in March 1943 elections took place in Denmark; and these elections resulted in the total defeat of the Nazi Party. This party obtained only a proportion which represented 2.5 percent of the votes, and it obtained only 3 seats out of 149 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. I point out to the Tribunal that in some copies of my brief there is a printing mistake and that 25 percent is indicated instead of 2.5 percent, which is the correct figure and which shows what very little success the Clausen party had at the elections.
The conduct of the Germans in Denmark showed a notable change in the period following the month of August 1943. The first reason for this change was clearly the failure of the plan which consisted in seizing power in a legal manner, thanks to the aid of the Clausen party. On the other hand, about the same time, the Germans were equally disappointed in another direction. They had sought, as has been shown in my brief on economic questions, to mobilize Danish economy for the benefit of their war effort. But the Danish population, which had refused political nazification, did not wish to lend itself to economic nazification either. And so the Danish industries and the Danish workmen offered passive resistance, and by a legitimate reaction against the irregular undertakings of the occupying power they organized a sabotage program. There were strikes accompanied by various incidents. Faced with this double failure, the Germans decided to modify their tactics.
In this connection we read in the government report, Page 6 of the second memorandum, the following sentence:
“As a result of these events, the Plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Dr. Best, was on 24 August 1943, called to Berlin, from whence he returned with claims in the nature of an ultimatum addressed to the Danish Government.”
I should now like to submit the text of this ultimatum, which is also to be found in the official Danish report. This is Appendix Number 2 of this report. The ultimatum is dated Copenhagen, 28 August 1943. At the end of the first three books there are several loose sheets which are the appendices. I now come to the second appendix—on Saturday I read the first appendix—which is the second sheet and it has also been copied in my brief:
“Claims of the Reich Government:
“The Danish Government must immediately declare the entire country in a state of military emergency.
“The state of military emergency must include the following measures:
“1. Prohibition of public gatherings of more than five persons.
“2. Prohibition of all strikes and of any aid given to strikers.
“3. Prohibition of all meetings in closed premises or in the open air; prohibition to be in the streets between 2030 hours and 0530 hours; closing of restaurants at 1930 hours. By 1 September 1943 all firearms and explosives to be handed over.
“4. Prohibition to hamper in any way whatsoever Danish nationals because of their collaboration or the collaboration of their relatives with the German authorities, or because of their relations with the Germans.
“5. Establishment of a press censorship with German collaboration.
“6. Establishment of courts-martial to judge acts contravening the measures taken to maintain order and security.
“Infringement of the measures mentioned above will be punished by the most severe penalties which can be imposed in conformity with the law in force concerning the power of the Government to take measures to maintain calm, order, and security. The death penalty must be introduced without delay for acts of sabotage and for any aid given in committing these acts, for attacks against the German forces, for possession after 1 September 1943 of firearms and explosives.
“The Reich Government expects to receive today before. 1600 hours the acceptance by the Danish Government of the above-mentioned demands.”
The Danish Government, mindful of its dignity, courageously refused to yield to that ultimatum, although it found itself under the material constraint of the military occupation. Direct encroachments upon the sovereignty then started. The Germans themselves took the measures which they had not succeeded in getting the national government to accept. They declared a state of military emergency; they took hostages; they attacked without warning, which is contrary to the laws of war; and at a time when—let me recall it—a state of war did not exist, they attacked the Danish Army and Navy and disarmed and imprisoned their forces. They pronounced death sentences and deported a certain number of persons considered to be Communists and whose internment, as I pointed out, they had previously required. From 29 August 1943, the King, the Government, and the Parliament ceased to exercise their functions. The administration continued under the direction of high officials who in urgent cases took measures called, “Emergency Laws.” During this same period there existed three German authorities in Denmark:
First, the Plenipotentiary, who was still Dr. Best; second, the military authority under the orders of General Hannecken, replaced subsequently by General Lindemann; and third, the German police.
Indeed, the German police were installed in Denmark a few days after the crisis of which I have just spoken to you. The SS Standartenführer, Colonel Dr. Mildner, arrived in September as Chief of the German Security; and on 1 November there arrived in Denmark as the Supreme Chief of the Police, the Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Police, Günther Pancke, of whom I shall have occasion to speak again. General of Police Günther Pancke had under his authority Dr. Mildner, whose name I mentioned at first and who was replaced on 5 January 1944 by SS Standartenführer Bovensiepen.
The Tribunal will find in the Danish Government’s report, on which I base this information, a chart showing the German officials in Denmark. This chart is to be found in the second memorandum, Page 2. It is interesting, although we are not concerned here with individual cases, insofar as it shows the organization of the German network in this country. During the whole period which I am speaking about now, of the three German authorities already mentioned, the police played the most important role and was the principal organ of usurpation of sovereignty by the Germans. For that reason we might consider that while Norway and Holland represent cases of civil administration and Belgium and France represent cases of military administration, Denmark represents the typical case of police administration. At the same time we must never forget that these different types of administration in all these occupied countries were always interdependent. The seizure of authority by the German police in Denmark during the period from September 1943 until the liberation was responsible for an extraordinary number of crimes. Unlike other administrations, the police did not act under legal or statutory regulations, but it interfered very effectually in the life of the country by the exercise of orderly and systematic de facto law. I shall have the opportunity of treating certain aspects of this police administration in the fourth section of my brief. For the moment, within the scope of my subject, I should like simply to cite the facts which constitute direct and general violation of sovereignty. In this connection, I believe that it is indispensable that I inform the Tribunal of a quite exceptional event which took place on 19 September 1944. At that date the Germans suppressed the police—I mean the national police of Denmark—and totally abolished this same institution which is naturally indispensable and essential in all states.
I am going to read on this point what the government report says, second memorandum, that is to say, still the third book of the file, Page 29. I shall begin in the middle of the paragraph, after the first sentence. The extract is to be found in my brief. I quote:
“The fact that the Germans had not succeeded in exerting any influence among the Danish police or among their leaders or in the ranks, was partly the reason why the German military authorities at the end of the summer of 1944 began to fear the police. Pancke explained that General Hannecken himself was afraid that the police, numbering 8,000 to 10,000 well-trained men, might fall upon the Germans in the event of an invasion. In September 1944, believing that an invasion of Denmark was probable, Pancke and Hannecken planned the disarming of the police and the deportation of a part of it. Pancke submitted the plan to Himmler, who consented to it in writing, adding in the letter that the plan had been approved by Hitler. He had moreover discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner. The operation was carried out by Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner and Müller of the RSHA, and the regular troops aided this operation with the consent of General Hannecken.
“At 11 o’clock in the morning of 19 September 1944 the Germans caused a false air-raid alarm to be given. Immediately afterwards, the police soldiers forcibly entered the police headquarters in Copenhagen as well as the police stations in the city. Some policemen were killed. They acted in the same way throughout the whole country. Most of the policemen on duty were captured. In Copenhagen and in the large cities of the country the prisoners were taken to Germany in ships, which Kaltenbrunner had sent for this purpose, or in box cars. As has already been said before, the treatment to which they were subjected in German concentration camps was horrible beyond description. In the small country towns the policemen were freed.
“At the same time Pancke decreed what he called a state of police emergency. The exact meaning of this expression has never been explained, and even the Germans do not seem to have understood what it meant. In practice, the result was that all police activities, ordinary as well as judicial, were suspended. Maintenance of order and public security was left to the inhabitants themselves.
“During the last 6 months of the occupation, the Danish nation found itself in the unheard-of situation, unknown in other civilized countries, of being deprived of its police force and the possibility to maintain order and public security. This state of affairs might have ended in complete chaos if the respect for the law and the discipline of the population, strengthened by the indignation at this act of violence, had not warded off the most serious consequences.”
Despite the bearing of the Danish population, the absence of the police during these last 6 months of the occupation naturally resulted in a recrudescence of all forms of criminality. You can get an idea of this if you consider—and that detail will suffice—that the premiums of insurance companies had to be raised to 480 percent—it says so in the report—whereas previously they were limited to half of the normal rate. We are justified in considering that the crimes committed under these conditions involved the responsibility of the German authorities who could not fail to foresee and who accepted this state of affairs. We see here further proof of the total indifference of the Germans to the consequences arising from decisions taken by them to suit their ends at the time.
Finally, I should like to conclude this section on Denmark by quoting to the Tribunal a passage from a document which I shall present as Exhibit Number RF-902. This document belongs to the American documentation under the Number 705-PS, but it has not yet been submitted, and I should like to read an extract, one quotation, which seems to me to be interesting. This is a report drawn up in Berlin on 12 January 1943, and concerns a meeting of the SS Committee of the Research Institute for Germanic Regions (Ausschuss der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für den Germanischen Raum). At this meeting there were present 14 personages of the SS. This report contains a special paragraph which concerns Denmark. Other paragraphs of the same document are of interest in connection with the section which will follow this. Therefore, in order to avoid having to refer to this document twice, I shall read the whole of the passages which I should like to submit as evidence. I start on Page 3 of the document, towards the end of the page.
“Norway. In Norway the Minister Fuglesang meanwhile has become the successor to the Minister Lunde, who has been killed in an accident. Despite the promises made by Quisling’s party, Norway may not be expected to furnish an important quota.
“Denmark. In Denmark the situation is extremely encouraging on account of the taking over of power by SS Gruppenführer Dr. Best. We may be convinced that the SS Gruppenführer Dr. Best will furnish a classical example of the ethnical policy of the Reich. The relations with the Party Leader Clausen have recently become difficult. Clausen agreed only to the project for the establishment of a Front Combatant Corps as a preliminary to the Germanic Schutzstaffel in Denmark, on the condition that members of this corps will be barred from membership to the Party. Negotiations about this urgently needed central organization of front combatants are going on. The monopoly of the Party is untenable; all rejuvenating elements must be mobilized although Clausen personally has to stand in the foreground but without his clique.
“Netherlands. In the Netherlands Mussert has in the meantime been proclaimed Führer of the Dutch people by the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart. This measure has produced an extremely disquieting effect in other Germanic countries, particularly in Flanders. The decisive role again falls to the General Commissioner whose principle of exploiting Mussert and then dropping him cannot be accepted under a Germanic Reich policy as approved by the SS.
“Flanders: In Flanders the development of the VNV (the Flemish National Movement) continues to be unfavorable. Even the shrewd policy of the new leader of the VNV, Dr. Elias, can no longer deceive us about this. Besides, he once expressed the opinion that Germany was prepared to make concessions in ethnological policy only when she was in bad straits.”
This information is quite characteristic. In the first place, it is firmly established that the Germanic regions should include Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Flanders. Naturally I speak only of the western countries. In the second place, we clearly see how the Germans used the Nazi-inspired local parties as an instrument for the usurpation of sovereignty. In the third place, we see it is quite true that the German diplomatic agents were also instruments for this policy of usurpation and completely exceeded their normal functions. In the fourth place, the document confirms the interdependence which existed between the different agents of German interference, which we stressed a short time ago and on which we cannot lay too much emphasis. The case of Dr. Best is a good example. Dr. Best was a minister with plenipotentiary powers; therefore, he was a diplomatic agent. We have seen that this same Dr. Best was previously an agent of the military administration in France, and we see by this document that besides his being a Plenipotentiary Minister he is a General in the SS, and in this capacity, so the document states, he seized power in Denmark. The information contained in the document concerning Norway and the Netherlands is a transition for the following part of this section, and I ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled, “Norway and the Netherlands.”
The institution of Reich Commissioner was applied in Norway and in the Netherlands, and in these two countries only; it constitutes a definite concept in the general plan of Germanization, in which these two countries occupy parallel positions. In both cases the establishment of the civil administration followed hard upon the military occupation of the country. The military men, therefore, did not have to take over the administration, and during the few days which preceded the appointment of the Reich Commissioner, they confined themselves to measures concerning order.
In Norway the decree of 24 April 1940 appointed Terboven as Reich Commissioner. This decree is signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendants Keitel and Frick. In Holland the decree of 18 May 1940 appointed the Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissioner. This decree is signed by the same persons as the preceding decree, and it bears in addition the signatures of Göring and Ribbentrop.
The decrees appointing the Reich-Commissioners also defined their functions as well as the division of the functions between the civil commissioner and the military authorities. I am not submitting these two decrees as documents since they are direct acts of German legislation. The decree concerning Norway provides in its first article:
“The Reich Commissioner has the task of safeguarding the interests of the Reich, and of exercising supreme power in the civil domain.”—The decree adds—“The Reich Commissioner is directly under me and receives from me directives and instructions.”
As far as the division of functions is concerned, I give the text of Article 4, “The Commander of the German troops in Norway exercises the rights of military sovereignty. His orders are carried out in the civil domain by the Reich Commissioner.”
This decree was published in the Official Gazette of German Decrees for 1940, Number 1. The same instructions are given in a similar decree of 18 May 1940 concerning the Netherlands. The establishment of Reich-Commissioners was accompanied at the beginning by some pronouncement intended to reassure the population. Terboven proclaimed that he intended to limit, as much as possible, the inconveniences and costs of the occupation. This is in a proclamation of 25 April 1940 which is in the Official Gazette, Page 2.
Likewise, after his appointment, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart addressed an appeal to the Dutch people. This is to be found in the Official Gazette for Holland for 1940, Page 2, and in it he expressed himself as follows—he starts off with a categorical phrase:
“I shall take all measures, including those of a legislative nature, which will be necessary for carrying out this mandate”—and he says also—“it is my will that the laws in force up to now shall remain in force and that the Dutch authorities shall be associated with the carrying out of government affairs and that the independence of justice be maintained.”
But these promises were not kept. It is evident that the Reich Commissioner was to become in Norway and in Holland the principal instrument for the usurpation of sovereignty. He was to act, however, in close relation with a second instrument of usurpation, the National Socialist organization in the country. This collaboration of the local Nazi Party with the German authority, represented by the Reich Commissioner, took perceptibly different forms in each of the two countries under consideration. Thus, the exercise of power by the Reich Commissioner presents in itself differences between Norway and Holland which were more apparent than real.
In both countries the local National Socialist Party existed before the war. It grew and was inspired by the German Nazi Party and had its place in the general plan of war preparations and the plan for Germanization. I should like to give some information concerning Norway.
The National Socialist Party was called “Nasjonal Samling.” It had as leader the famous Quisling. It was a perfect imitation of the German Nazi Party. I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-920, the text of the oath of fidelity subscribed to by members of this Nasjonal Samling Party. I quote:
“My pledge of allegiance: I promise on my honor:
“1. Unflinching allegiance and loyalty towards the National Socialist movement, its idea, and its Führer.”—This is the third page of the Document RF-920.
“2. To stand up energetically and fearlessly for the cause, always to offer reliability and loyal discipline at my work, and to do all I can in order to acquire the knowledge and abilities which my work for the Movement demands.
“3. To the best of my abilities to live in compliance with the National Socialist concept and to show solidarity, understanding, and good comradeship to all my companions.
“4. To obey any orders given by the Führer or by his appointed officials insofar as such orders are not in disagreement or do not violate the directions of the Führer.
“5. Never to reveal to unauthorized persons details of NS methods of work or anything detrimental to the Movement.
“6. At all times to make the utmost effort to contribute to the progress of the Movement, and to the achievement of its purpose, and to play the part in the fighting organization which I have undertaken to do under promise of fidelity, quite conscious that I should be guilty of an unworthy and vile act if I broke this promise.
“7. If circumstances should make it impossible for me to continue as a member of the fighting organization, I promise to withdraw in a loyal manner. I shall remain bound by the vow of secrecy which I made and I shall do nothing to harm the Movement.
“Our aim. The aim of the Nasjonal Samling is: A new state, a Norwegian and Nordic fellowship within the world community, organically constructed on the basis of work, with a strong and stable administration, a combination of common and private weal.”
This party therefore conforms completely to the Leadership Principle and while it shows a Norwegian facade, it is nothing but a facade. In fact on the very day of the invasion the Nazis imposed the establishment of an alleged Norwegian Government, presided over by Quisling. At that time the Norwegian Supreme Court appointed a board of officials who were to be invested, under the title of Administrative Council, with powers of higher administration. This Administrative Council constituted therefore, in the exceptional circumstances in which it was set up, a qualified authority for representing the legitimate sovereignty, at least in a conservative way. It functioned only for a short time. By September the Nazis found that it was not possible for them to obtain the participation or even passive acceptance of the Administrative Council and of the administrators. They themselves then appointed 13 commissioners, of whom 10 were selected among the members of the Quisling party. Quisling himself did not exercise any nominal function, but he remained the Führer of his party.
Finally, a third period began on 1 February 1942. At that date Quisling returned to power as Minister President, and the commissioners themselves assumed the title of ministers. This situation lasted until the liberation of Norway. Thus, except for a few months in 1940, the Germans completely usurped all sovereignty in Norway. This sovereignty was divided between their direct agent, the Reich Commissioner, and their indirect agents, first called State Councillors and then the Quisling Government, but always an emanation of National Socialism.
There is no doubt whatever that the independence of these organizations vis-à-vis the German authorities was absolutely nil. The fact that the second organization was called a government did not mean a strengthening of its autonomous authority. These were merely differences of form, the nature of which I shall point out to the Tribunal. I submit, in this connection, two documents, Documents RF-921 and RF-922. By comparing these two documents you will see that what I have just affirmed is correct. These two documents are instructions addressed by the Reich Commissioner to his offices concerned with legislative procedure.
Document Number RF-921 is dated 10 October 1940; that is the very beginning of the period of the State Councillors. I quote an extract from this document, “All the decrees of the State Councillors must be submitted to the Reich Commissioner before publication.” This is to be found in the second paragraph. It is the only point which I should like to bring out in this document. Therefore all the decrees of the higher Norwegian administration were under the control of the Reich Commissioner.
The second document, Document Number RF-922, is dated 8 April 1942. It relates to the period shortly after the establishment of the second Quisling Government. I start at the second sentence of this document:
“In view of the formation of the National Norwegian Government on 1 February 1942 the Reich Commissioner has decided that from now on this form of agreement”—a prior agreement in writing—“is no longer required. Nevertheless, this modification of formal legislative procedure does not mean that the Norwegian Government may proclaim laws and decrees without the knowledge of the competent department of the Reich Commissioner. His Excellency, the Reich Commissioner, expects every department chief to acquaint himself, by close contact with the competent Norwegian departments, with all legislative measures which are in preparation, and to find out in each case whether these measures concern German interests, and to assure himself, if necessary, that German interests will be taken into consideration.”
Thus, in the one case, there is a formal control with written authorization. In the other case there is a control by information among the different departments, but the principle is the same. The establishment of local authority under one form or under another form was merely a means of finding out the best way of deceiving public opinion. When the Germans put Quisling into the background, it was because they thought the State Councillors, being less well-known, might more easily deceive the public. When they returned Quisling, it was because the first maneuver had obviously failed and because they thought that perhaps the official establishment of an authority qualified as governmental would give the impression that the sovereignty of the country had not been abolished. One might, however, wonder what was the reason for these artifices and why the Nazis used them, instead of purely and simply annexing the country. There is a very important reason for that. It operates for Norway and it will operate for the Netherlands. The Nazis always preferred to maintain the fiction of an independent state and to gain a definite hold from within by using and developing the local Party. It is with this end in view that they granted the Party in Norway advantages of prestige; and if they did not act in an identical manner in Holland, their general conduct was, however, imbued with the same spirit.
This policy of the Germans in Norway is perfectly illustrated by the Norwegian law, or so-called Norwegian law, of 12 March 1942, (Norwegian Official Gazette, 1942, Page 215, which I offer in evidence as Document Number RF-923). I quote:
“Law concerning the Party and the State, 12 March 1942, Number 2.
“Paragraph 1. In Norway the Nasjonal Samling is the fundamental party of the State and closely linked with the State.
“Paragraph 2. The organization of the Party, its activity, and the duties of its members are laid down by the Führer of the Nasjonal Samling.
“Oslo, 12 March 1942”—signed—“Quisling, Minister President.”
On the other hand, the Nazis organized on a large scale the system of the duplication of functions which existed among the higher authorities. In fact, it is the transposition of the German system, which shows a constant parallelism between the state administration and the party organizations. Everywhere German Nazis were installed to second and supervise the Norwegian Nazis who had been put in official positions.
As this point is interesting from the point of view of seizure of sovereignty and of action taken in the administration, I think I may submit two documents, which are Documents RF-924 and RF-925. These are extracts of judicial interrogations by the Norwegian Court of two high German officials of the Reich Commission at Oslo. Document Number RF-924 refers to the interrogation of Georg Wilhelm Müller, interrogation dated 5 January 1946. Wilhelm Müller was the Ministerial Director in the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The information which he gives concerns more particularly the functioning of the propaganda service, but similar methods were used in a general way, as this statement admits. I quote Document RF-924:
“Question: ‘In 1941 nobody in your country thought that military difficulties would arise. At that time they certainly tried to mold the Norwegian people along Nationalist Socialist lines?’
“Answer: ‘They did this until the very end.’
“Question: ‘Which were the practical measures for achieving this National Socialist molding?’
“Answer: ‘They supported the NS Samling as far as possible; and they did it, in the first place, by strengthening the Party organization considerably.’”
I may point out that this translation into French is not first rate; it is, however, comprehensible.
“Question: ‘In what way was it strengthened?’
“Answer: ‘In each Fylke’—or province—‘picked German National Socialists were assigned to aid the Norwegian National Socialists.’
“Question: ‘Were there other practical measures?’
“Answer: ‘That was done in all domains, even in the field of propaganda, by the Einsatzstab propagandists placed at their disposal. This was also done in Oslo at the central offices of the NS Samling.’
“Question: ‘How did these propagandists work?’
“Answer: ‘They worked closely with similar Norwegian propagandists and made suggestions to them. Grebe did this by virtue of his double capacity as Chief of Propaganda in the Reichskommissariat and Chief of the Landesgruppe.’
“Question: ‘How was this done?’
“Answer: ‘These consultations and conferences were even arranged for the very top of the Party hierarchy. There was a man who was specially appointed for this; first Wegeler, then Neumann, then Schnurbusch, who had the task of strengthening National Socialist ideas within the NS Samling.’
“Question: ‘In the Einsatzstab there were experts from the different branches whose task it was to contact Norwegians and give them useful advice. In what domains?’
“Answer: ‘There were organizers, and above all instructors for the Hird, leaders of the SA and SS. Until he, himself, became leader of the Einsatzstab, we had at the head a press man, a propagandist, Herr Schnurbusch, an accountant, an expert on social welfare questions in the same way as in the NSV in Germany.’”
The Tribunal will notice in this document the name of Schnurbusch, as being that of the leader of the Einsatzstab, and of the organism for liaison with, and penetration into, the local Party. I am now going to quote an extract from the interrogation of Schnurbusch, which is found in Document Number RF-925.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting these documents in?
M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say, for the purposes of the shorthand note, that you offer them in evidence?
M. FAURE: Will you excuse me? I should like to point out that I submit as evidence Document Number RF-925 as well as Document Number RF-924 of which I spoke just now.
This is from the interrogation of Heinrich Schnurbusch, leader of the liaison service in the Reich Commission on 8 January 1946 in Oslo:
“Question: ‘How did the German departments try to achieve this National Socialist conversion?’
I wish to point out to the Tribunal that I have passed over the first three questions as they are not of much interest.
“Answer: ‘We sought to strengthen this movement by the means which we were accustomed to apply in Germany for leading the masses. The Nasjonal Samling benefited by having at their disposal all the means of news service and propaganda. But we soon saw that the object could not be achieved. After 25 September 1940 the public mood in Norway changed suddenly when some State Councillors were appointed as NS State Councillors, for Quisling’s action in the days of April 1940 was considered treason by the Norwegian people.’
“Question: ‘In what way did you assist materially the NS Samling in this propaganda? In what way did you counsel the NS Samling?’
“Answer: ‘During the time I was in office, when a propaganda drive was made, it was always brought into line with the propaganda which the Germans made in Norway.’
“Question: ‘Did you issue any directives for the NS Samling?’
“Answer: ‘No. In my time the NS Samling worked independently in this respect, and partly even contrary to our advice. The NS Samling took the view that it understood better the Norwegian mentality, but it made many mistakes.’
“Question: ‘Was financial support given?’
“Answer: ‘Certainly, financial help was given, but I don’t know the exact amount.’”
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn for 10 minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
M. FAURE: I should like first of all to point out to the Tribunal that, with its permission, I shall examine this afternoon the Witness Van der Essen concerning whom a formal request has already been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure.
M. FAURE: This witness can then be called at the beginning of the afternoon session.
The observations which I have just presented had to do with Norway.
In the Netherlands, unlike what happened in Norway, the Nazis did not utilize the local Party as an official instrument of government. The governmental authority was completely in the hands of the Reich Commissioner who set up a sort of ministry, including four German General Commissioners, respectively competent for government and justice, public security, finance, and economic affairs, and special affairs. This organization was created by a decree of 3 June 1940 (Official Gazette for Holland, 1940, Number 5). I point out that, as the Dutch Official Gazette has already been submitted in evidence to the Tribunal, I shall not again submit each of these texts, which are a part of it. I shall, therefore, simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them and to consider them as proved.
The holders of the posts of General Commissioners were appointed by the decree of 5 June 1940.
The local authorities were represented at the higher level only by the Secretaries General of the Ministries, who were entirely under the authority of the Reich Commissioner and of the General Commissioners.
The decree of 29 May 1940, which is in the Dutch Official Gazette, 1940, Page 8, lays down in its first article:
“The Reich Commissioner will exercise the powers invested until now in the King and the Government. . . .”
And in Article 3:
“The Secretaries General of the Dutch ministries are responsible to the Reich Commissioner.”
If the Nazi Party did not constitute the Government, it nevertheless received the official blessing.
I shall quote to the Tribunal in this connection the decree of 30 January 1943, which likewise is in the Dutch Official Gazette, 1943, Page 63. I read the following passage:
“The representative of the political will of the Dutch people is the National Socialist movement of the Netherlands. I have, therefore, decreed that all the German offices under my orders, of the administration and those of the National Socialist movement, shall maintain close contact with the leader of the Movement in order to assure the co-ordination of the tasks in carrying out important administrative measures and particularly for all matters concerning personnel.”
The Tribunal knows already, for it is common knowledge, and insofar as it might be necessary through the witness who has already been heard, how outrageously untrue it was to claim that the Dutch National Socialist Party represented the political will of the people of this country.
Having commented on these two forms of utilization of the local party as agents of sovereignty, I should now like to point out to the Tribunal the main features of these usurpations which were committed by the Germans.
A first line of action is exemplified by the attempt to induce the occupied countries to participate in the war or, at the very least, to initiate recruitment for the German Army. In Norway the Nazis created the “SS Norge,” a formation which later was called the “Germanske SS Norge.” I submit as evidence Document Number RF-926, which is the decree of 21 July 1942, concerning the “Germanske SS Norge,” and I quote Paragraph 2 of this decree, which is a Quisling decree.
“2. ‘The Germanske SS Norge’ is a National Socialist order of soldiers which shall consist of men of Nordic blood and ideas. It is an independent subdivision of the Nasjonal Samling, directly under the NS Foerer (NS Leader) and responsible to him. It is, at the same time, a section of the ‘Stor-Germanske SS’”—the SS of Greater Germany—“and shall help to lead the Germanic peoples towards a new future and create the basis of a Germanic fellowship.”
We see again, by this example, that the interventions of the so-called Norwegian Government are perfectly obvious methods of Germanization. In order to facilitate the recruiting into this legion, the German or Norwegian Nazis did not hesitate to upset the civil legislation and to abolish the abiding principles of family rights by making a law which exempted minors from having to obtain the consent of their parents. This is a law of 1 February 1941, Norwegian Official Gazette, 1941, Page 153, which I submit in evidence as Document Number RF-927.
In the Netherlands the Germans were obliged to upset even more the national legislation in order to permit military recruitment. As they did not create a factitious government and as the legitimate government was still at war with the Reich, the volunteers came under Articles 101 and the following articles of the Dutch penal code, which punished those enlisted in the army of a foreign power at war with the Netherlands and likewise those who give aid to the enemy.
By reason of the de facto occupation of the country there was little chance of these penalties being effectively applied, but it is very curious and very revealing that the Reich Commissioner issued a decree of 25 July 1941, Dutch Official Gazette, 1941, Number 135. This decree states that the taking of Dutchmen for service in the German Army, the Waffen SS, or the Legion of Netherlands Volunteers does not bring them under the provisions of the penal texts mentioned above, and this decree is declared retroactive to 10 May 1940. It is therefore very convenient, when one commits a criminal act according to the general code, to be able to modify the law to suppress the crime in question.
Another decree of 25 July 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 548, stipulates that enrollment in the German Army will no longer involve loss of Dutch nationality.
Finally, a decree of 8 August 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 622, declares that the acquisition of German nationality no longer entails the loss of Dutch nationality except in cases of express renunciation. Although this last text seems to bring out a point of detail, it may be regarded as an initial attempt to create later a double Dutch and German nationality, which will fit into the general procedures for the advancement of the whole plan of Germanization.
In regard to these measures for military recruitment, I should like to state precisely the attitude of the Prosecution as a result of the examination and cross-examination of the witness, Vorrink, who was heard on Saturday. The Prosecution does not consider that the criminal character of this military recruitment is established only by the fact of having recruited persons by force or by pressure upon their will. This pressure and this constraint are an aggravating and characteristic aspect but not a necessary aspect of the criminal action which we reprehend. The fact of having recruited persons, even on a voluntary basis, in the occupied countries for service in the German Army, is considered by us as a crime. This crime is moreover punishable under the internal legislation of all these countries, whose legislation covers such acts as those committed in these countries, in accordance with the rules of law in matters of legislative competence.
It is even relatively of small importance, except for knowing all the details, whether the recruiting of traitors was favored or not by particular pressure according to the situation in which these traitors found themselves.
I should like also to indicate in a more general way, that the Prosecution does not consider that the recruiting of traitors, either for service in the Army or in other activities, is for the Nazi leaders an extenuating circumstance or an exonerating one. On the contrary, it is one of the characteristics of their criminal activity; and the responsibility of the traitors in no way exempts them from responsibility. On the contrary, we hold against them this corruption which they attempted to spread in the occupied countries by appealing to those elements of weak morality which may be found in the population of a country and by instilling in the mind of each person the thought of possible immoral and criminal activity against his country.
This was a first line of action for German usurpation: namely, the enrollment of troops.
A second general line of action is identified with the whole of the measures designed to abolish civil liberties and to set up the Leadership Principle. I shall quote some of these measures by way of example.
In Norway, suppression of political parties, German decree of 25 September 1940, which is in the Official Gazette for 1940, Page 19; a decree forbidding all activity in favor of the legitimate dynasty, decree of 7 October 1940, in the Official Gazette for 1940, Page 10; the guarantees under the statutory rules for officials were suppressed, they could be transferred or dismissed for political reasons, German decree of 4 October 1940, Page 24. Finally, a Norwegian law of 18 September 1943, setting up a characteristic institution, that of departmental chief representing the Party, and responsible to the Minister President and to no other authority of the State (Document Number RF-928). He exercised in the department the supreme political control over all public authorities of the department.
All professions came under the system of compulsory membership with application of the Leadership Principle.
In Holland we likewise observe the suppression of elected bodies, decree of 11 August 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 637, which confirms the decree of 21 June 1940, Official Gazette for 1940, Page 54; the dissolution of political parties, decree of 4 July 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 583; creation of the Labor Front, decree of 30 April 1942, Official Gazette for 1942, Page 211; setting up of the Peasant Corporation, decree of 22 October 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 838.
I have given only a few examples of this principle; and to conclude I shall quote a decree of 12 August 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 34, which created a special judicial competence for all offenses and infringements committed against political peace and against political interests, or committed for political motives. In fact, the justices of the peace charged with exercising these oppressive powers were always chosen from among the members of the Nazi Party.
Finally a third line of action in this campaign of usurpation can be defined as a systematic campaign against the elite of the country and against its spiritual life. In fact it is always in this sphere that the Nazis met with the greatest resistance to their designs. They attacked the universities and teaching establishments.
In Holland a decree of 25 July 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 559, gives the administration the right to close arbitrarily all private institutions. In the Netherlands the University of Leyden was closed on 11 November 1941.
By a decree of the Reich Commissioner of 10 May 1943, Official Gazette for 1943, Page 127, the students were forced to sign a declaration of loyalty drawn up in the following terms:
“The undersigned, ——, hereby solemnly declares on his word of honor that he will conscientiously conform to the laws, decrees, and other dispositions in force in Dutch occupied territory and will abstain from any act directed against the German Reich, the German Army, or the Dutch authorities, or engage in any activity which might imperil public order in the higher teaching institutions in view of the present circumstances and danger.”
In Norway rigorous measures were taken against the University of Oslo. I offer in evidence Document Number RF-933. I point out to the Tribunal that this is not in strict order and that Document Number RF-933 is the last in the document book.
This Document Number RF-933 is an article in the Deutsche Zeitung of 1 December 1943, reproduced in a Norwegian newspaper. It is entitled, “A Cleaning-Up Measure Necessary in Oslo; Purge in the Student World.” I shall read only a few paragraphs of this article. I begin with the second paragraph:
“The students of the University of Oslo”—will the Tribunal excuse me. I shall read also the first paragraph:
“By order of the Reich Commissioner Terboven, the SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Rediess made the following announcement to the students in the lecture room of the University of Oslo on Tuesday afternoon:
“The students of the University of Oslo have attempted to offer resistance to the German Army of occupation and to the Norwegian Government recognized by the Reich, since the occupation of Norway, that is, since 1940.”
I shall end the quotation here, and continue at Paragraph 5:
“In order to protect the interests of the occupying power and to assure maintenance of peace and order within this country, rigorous measures are indispensable. Therefore, by order of the Reich Commissioner, I have to make known to you the following:
“1. The students of the University of Oslo will be transferred to a special camp in Germany.
“2. The women students will be dismissed from the University and must return by the quickest means to their original place of residence, where they will immediately report to the police. Until further notice they are forbidden to leave these places without permission from the police.”
I break off the quotation here and continue at the last paragraph but one, on the second page of this Document Number RF-933:
“You ought to be thankful to the Reich Commissioner that other much more Draconian measures are not being applied. Moreover, thanks to this measure, most of you have been saved from forfeiting your life and wealth in the future.”
As concerns religious life, the Germans multiplied their harassing methods. By way of example, I offer in evidence Document Number RF-929, which I shall read:
“Oslo, 28 May 1941: To the Commanders of the Sipo and the SD in Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim, Tromosoe. Subject: Surveillance of Religious Services during the Whitsuntide Feasts. Incidents: none.
“It is requested that you watch the religious services and send in a report here on the result.
“BDS”—commander—“of the Sipo and the SD. Oslo. Signature: (illegible) SS Hauptsturmführer.”
Now here is the report following this order to watch the church services. I offer this report in evidence as Document Number RF-930. I shall read this document, which is very short.
“Trondheim, 5 June 1941.
“The surveillance of religious services during the Whitsuntide Feasts showed no new essential points. Domprobst Fjellbu adheres to his provocative preaching, but so cleverly that he is able to excuse every phrase as applied to religious subjects and void of any political meaning.”
The rest of the letter is partly burned.
Finally I should like, in order not to dwell on this matter too long, to quote two examples which show, on the one hand, the constant immorality of the German methods and, on the other hand, the justified protests to which they gave rise on the part of the most qualified authorities. The first example concerns the Netherlands.
The Dutch magistrates were roused to righteous indignation by the German practice of arbitrary detentions in concentration camps. They found the opportunity of making known their disapproval in a manner which came within the normal exercise of their juridical functions. Thus, in connection with a particular case, the Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden rendered a decision of which I wish to read an extract to the Tribunal. This is submitted as Document Number RF-931. I shall read to you an extract from this document:
“Whereas the Court cannot declare itself in agreement in the matter of the penalty inflicted upon the accused by the Chief Judge and his presentation of motives, the Court is of the opinion that this penalty should be determined as follows:
“Whereas as regards the penalty to be inflicted:
“The Court desires to take into account the fact that for some time various penalties of detention inflicted by the Dutch Judge upon delinquents of masculine sex, contrary to legal principles and contrary to the intention of the Legislator and of the Judge, have been executed, or are being executed in camps in a manner which aggravates the penalty to a degree such as it was impossible for the Judge to foresee or even to suppose when determining the degree of the punishment.
“Whereas the Court, taking into account the possibility of this manner of executing the penalty to be inflicted at present, will abstain, for conscience sake, from condemning the suspect to a period of detention in conformity, in this case, with the gravity of the offense committed by the defendant, because the latter would be exposed to the possibility of an execution of the penalty as indicated here above.
“Whereas the Court, on the strength of this consideration, will confine itself to condemning the suspect to a penalty of detention to be determined hereafter, after deducting the time spent by him in preventive detention, and the duration of which is such that the penalty at the moment of the pronouncing of the penalty will have almost entirely expired during the period of preventive detention.”
This example is especially interesting, because I now have to indicate that as a result of this decision of the Court of Appeal, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart dismissed the President of the Court by a decree of the 9th of April 1943, which is likewise submitted in evidence under the same document number, RF-931. These two documents constitute a whole.
“By virtue of paragraph 3 of my decree,”—et cetera—“I dismiss from his office as Counsellor of the Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden, such dismissal to take effect immediately, Doctor of Law F.F. Viehoff.”—Signed—“Seyss-Inquart.”
The second example which I give in conclusion will now be taken from Norway. It is a solemn protest made by the Norwegian bishops. The special occasion which called forth this protest is the following: The Minister for Police had issued a decree, dated 13 December 1940, by which he arrogated to himself the right to suppress the obligation of professional secrecy for priests and provided that priests who refused to break the secrecy of the confession would be subjected to imprisonment by his orders.
On 15 January 1941, the Norwegian bishops addressed themselves to the Ministry of Public Education and Religious Affairs, and handed to it a memorandum. In this memorandum they made known their protests against this extraordinary demand by the police and at the same time they protested against other abuses; violent acts committed by Nazi organizations, and illegal acts in judicial matters. This protest of the Norwegian bishops is transcribed in a pastoral letter addressed to their parishes in February 1941. I submit it as Document Number RF-932. I should like to quote an extract from this document on Page 9, top of the page:
“The decree of the Ministry of Police, dated 13 December 1940, just published, gravely affects the mission of the priests. According to this decree, the obligation of professional secrecy for priests and ministers may be suppressed by the Ministry of Police.
“Our obligation to maintain professional secrecy is not only established by law, but has always been a fundamental condition for the work of the Church and of the priests in the exercise of their care of souls and in receiving the confession of persons in distress. It is an unalterable condition for the work of the Church, that a person may have absolute and unlimited confidence in the priest who is unreservedly bound by his obligation to keep professional secrecy, as it has been formulated in the Norwegian legislation and in the regulations of the Church at all times and in all Christian countries.
“To abolish this Magna Charta of the conscience is to strike at the very heart of the work of the Church, which is all the more serious because Paragraph 5 of the decree stipulates that the Ministry of Police may imprison the priest in question, in order to force a statement without the case having been submitted to a tribunal.”
Yet all this was happening during the first year of the occupation. Already the highest spiritual authorities of Norway found themselves in the position of having not only to protest against a particularly intolerable act, but also to enunciate a judgment upon the whole of the methods of the occupation, which judgment appears on Page 16 of the pastoral letter, and which I shall read to the Tribunal (last paragraph):
“For this reason the bishops of the Church have placed before the Ministry some of the acts and official proclamations about the government of society during these latter times, acts and proclamations which the Church finds in contradiction with the Commandments of God and which give the impression of revolutionary conditions prevailing in the country, instead of a state of occupation by which the laws are upheld as long as they are not directly incompatible with this state of occupation.”
This is a very correct juridical analysis; and now, if it please the Tribunal, I should also like to read a last sentence which preceded this, on Page 16:
“When the public authority of society permits violence and injustice and exercises pressure over souls, then the Church becomes the guardian of consciences. A human soul is of more importance than the whole world.”
I shall now ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled “Belgium.” I point out immediately to the Tribunal that this file does not include any document book. This statement, which deals with very general facts, will be supported as being evidence by the report of the Belgian Government, which has already been submitted by my colleagues under Document Number RF-394. The section which I now take up is a general section concerning military administration in two cases, in Belgium and France; and I shall begin with the file concerning Belgium.
In Belgium the usurpations of national sovereignty by the occupying power are imputable to the military command which committed them either by direct decrees or by injunctions to the Belgian administrative authorities who in this case were the Secretaries General of the Ministries.
Concerning the setting up of this apparatus of usurpation I shall read out to the Tribunal two paragraphs of the Belgian report, Chapter 4, concerning Germanization and nazification, Page 3, Paragraph 3:
“The legal government of Belgium, having withdrawn to France, then to London, it was the Secretaries General of the Ministries, that is to say, the highest officials in the hierarchic order, who, by virtue of Article 5 of the law of 10 May 1940, exercised within the framework of their professional activity and in cases of urgency, all the powers of the highest authority.”
In other words, these high officials, animated, at least during the first months of the occupation, by the desire to keep the occupying authorities as far removed as possible from the administration of the country, took upon themselves governmental and administrative powers. At the order of the Germans this administrative power after a time became a real legislative power.
This regime of the Secretaries General pleased the Germans who adopted it. In appointing to these posts Belgians paid by them they could introduce into Belgium under the appearance of legality absolutely radical reforms, which would make of this country a National Socialist vassal state.
It is interesting to note at this point that in order to strengthen their hold on the public life through the local authorities, the Germans did not hesitate by a decree of 14 May 1942, which is referred to in the official report, to suppress the jurisdictional control of the legality of the orders of the Secretaries General, which was a violation of Article 107 of the Belgian Constitution. The Belgian report states in the following paragraphs where the responsibility lies in this matter of breaches of public order, and I shall quote here the actual terms of this report on Page 4, Paragraph 3:
“In conclusion, whether the transformation of the legal institutions be the consequence of German decrees or that of orders emanating from the Secretaries General makes no difference. It is the Germans who bear the responsibility for these, the Secretaries General being in relation to them only faithful agents for carrying out their instructions.”
I think that it will likewise be interesting to read the three following paragraphs of the report, for they reveal characteristic facts as to German methods in their seizure of sovereignty.
“If it is necessary to furnish a new argument to support this thesis further, it is sufficient to recall that the occupying power employed all means to introduce into the structure which was to be transformed, from top to bottom, devoted National Socialist agents. This was really the work of termites.
“The decree of 7 March 1941, under the pretext of bringing younger men into the administration, provided for the removal of a great number of officials. They would naturally be replaced by Germanophiles.
“Finally, the Germans set up at the head of the Ministry of the Interior one of their most devoted agents, who arrogated to himself, as we shall see subsequently, the right to designate aldermen, permanent deputies, burgomasters, et cetera, and used his rights to proceed to certain appointments of district commissioners, for instance, by putting into office tools of the enemy.”
The Belgian report then analyzes in a remarkably clear manner the violations by the Germans of Belgian public order, classifying these under two headings. The first is entitled “Modifications Made in the Original Constitutional Structure.”
Under this heading we find particular mention of the decree of 18 July 1940, which immediately abolished all public activity; then a series of decrees by which the Germans suppressed the election of aldermen and decided that these aldermen would henceforth be designated by the central authority. This meant the overthrow of the traditional democratic order of communal administrations.
In the same way the Germans, in violation of Article 3 of the Belgian Constitution, ordered by the decree of 26 January 1943 the absorption of numerous communes into great urban areas.
The report then mentions here the fiscal exemptions granted in violation of the Constitution, to persons engaged in the service of the German Army or the Waffen SS. We find here a fresh example of the German criminal and general methods of military recruitment in the occupied countries.
The second heading of the report reads: “Introduction into Belgian Public Life of New Institutions Inspired by National Socialism and the Idea of the State.” Such institutions were, in fact, created by the German authorities. The most remarkable are the National Agricultural and Food Corporation and the Central Merchandise Offices. The report analyzes the characteristics of these institutions and proves that they aimed at destroying traditional liberties. They were organs of totalitarian inspiration in which the Leadership Principle was applied, as we have seen was the case in similar institutions in the Netherlands.
I should like now to read the brief but revealing conclusion of the Belgian report on Germanization. We think that it has been sufficiently established by the preceding statement that the Belgian Constitution and laws were deliberately violated by the German occupying power, and this with the purpose, not of assuring its own security, which is obvious, but with the skillfully premeditated intention of making of Belgium a National Socialist State and, consequently, capable of being annexed, seeing that two nationalist states that are neighbors must necessarily exclude each other, the stronger absorbing the weaker.
This policy was carried out in violation of international laws and customs, of the Declaration of Brussels of 1874, and of the Hague Regulations of 1899.
I shall not give detailed indications concerning other applications of this usurpation in connection with Belgium, because many indications have been furnished to the Tribunal already, notably in the economic statement and likewise in M. Dubost’s presentation. And, moreover, as the regime in Belgium was closely bound up with the regime in France, the indications which I shall give in the two other sections of my brief will relate particularly to these two countries.
However, before concluding the presentation which I am now making, I should like to mention the abuses committed by the Germans against the universities of Belgium. We find here again the same phenomenon of hostility—very understandable of course—on the part of the doctrinaires and Nazi leaders against the centers of culture; and this hostility showed itself especially with regard to the four great Belgian universities, which have such a fine tradition of spiritual life. I must point out to the Tribunal that the observations which I intend to present on this point have been taken from the appendices to the Belgian report of which I read some extracts. I must point out that these appendices have not been submitted as documents, although they are attached to one of these originals, which marks their authenticity. I shall have these appendices translated and submitted later and I shall ask the Tribunal, therefore, to consider the indications which I shall give it as affirmations, the proof of which will be furnished, on the one hand, by the deposit of documents and, on the other hand, by oral evidence, since I have called a witness on the subject of these questions. If this method satisfies the Tribunal, and I beg to be excused for the fact that the appendices have not been actually presented with the document, I shall continue my statement on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, what are the appendices to which you are referring?
M. FAURE: They are documents which are in the appendix of the Belgian report. They are as follows:
The subject matter of this report is to be found in the Belgian report itself, which has already been submitted. On the other hand, another copy of the same section has been established as the original with a series of appendices. For this reason the appendices were not translated and submitted at the same time as the main report, of which this was only a part. They are appended notes which trace events that occurred in university life. But, as I indicated to the Tribunal, I propose to prove these points by the hearing of a witness. I thought, therefore, that I could make a statement which would constitute an affirmation of the Prosecution and on which I would produce oral evidence. On the other hand, I shall submit the appendices as soon as they have been translated into German, which has not yet been done.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal is satisfied with the course which you propose, M. Faure.
M. FAURE: I shall mention first that in the University of Ghent the Germans undertook special propaganda among the students, with a view to germanizing these young generations. They utilized for this purpose an organization called “Genter Studenten Verband,” but their efforts to develop this organization did not achieve the success they had hoped. They set up in this university and in others a real espionage system under the cover of an ingenious formula, namely, that of “invited professors,” German professors who were supposed to have been invited and who were observers and spies.
The report of one of these invited professors has been found in Belgium. This report shows the procedure adopted as well as the complete failure of the German efforts to exert influence.
In all the universities, the Germans made arrests and deported professors and students, and this action was resorted to particularly when the students refused—and rightly so—to obey the German illegal orders which compelled them to enter the labor service.
As regards the University of Brussels, it should be pointed out that this university had been, from the beginning, provided with a German Commissioner, and that 14 professors had been irregularly dismissed. Later, the University of Brussels was obliged to discontinue the courses, and this as a result of a characteristic incident:
On the occasion of the vacancy of three chairs at the university, the Germans refused to accept the nomination of the candidates proposed in the usual way, and decided that they would appoint professors whose views suited them. This clearly shows the generally applied German method of interfering in everything and putting into office everywhere agents under their influence.
On 22 November 1941 the German military administration notified the President of the University of this decision. Therefore, the university decided to go on a sort of strike and, in spite of all the efforts of the Germans, this strike of the University of Brussels lasted until the liberation.
On this question of the Belgian universities, I should like now to read something to the Tribunal. This concerns the University of Louvain. Before reading this, I must indicate to the Tribunal the circumstances.
The Germans had in this university, as in the others, imposed upon the students compulsory labor. This we already know. But what I am going to read has to do with an additional requirement which is altogether shocking.
The Germans wished to oblige the Rector of the University, Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, to give them a complete list with the addresses of those students who were liable to compulsory service and who evaded it. They wished, therefore, to impose upon the rector an act whereby he would become an informer and this under threat of very severe penalties. The Cardinal Archbishop of Malines intervened on this occasion and on 4 June 1943 addressed a letter to General Von Falkenbausen, Military Commander in Belgium. I should like to read this letter to the Tribunal. This letter is to be found in a book which I have here and which is published in Belgium, entitled “Cardinal Van Roey and the German Occupation in Belgium.” I do not submit this letter as a document. I ask the Tribunal to consider it as a quotation from a publication. This is what Cardinal Archbishop of Malines writes:
“By an oral communication, of which I have asked in vain for the confirmation in writing, the Chief of the Military Administration Reeder has informed me that in case Monseigneur the Rector of the Catholic University of Louvain should persist in refusing to furnish the list with the addresses of the first year students, the occupying authority will take the following measures:
“Close down the university; forbid the students to enroll in another university; subject all the students to forced labor in Germany and, should they evade this measure, take reprisals against their families.
“This communication is all the more surprising, as a few days previously, following a note addressed to your Excellency by Monseigneur the Rector, the latter received from the Kreiskommandant of Louvain a notification that the academic authority would have no further trouble with regard to the lists. It is true that the Chief of Military Administration Reeder informed me that this answer was due to a misunderstanding.
“As President of the Board of the University of Louvain, I have informed the Belgian bishops, who make up this board, of the serious nature of the communication which I have received; and I have the duty to inform you, in the name of all the bishops, that it is impossible for us to advise Monseigneur the Rector to hand over the lists of his students, and that we approve the passive attitude which he has observed up to now. To furnish the lists would, in effect, imply positive co-operation in measures which the Belgian bishops have condemned in the pastoral letter of 15 March 1943 as being contrary to international law, to natural rights, and to Christian morality.
“If the University of Louvain were subjected to sanctions because it refuses this co-operation, we consider that it would be punished for carrying out its duty and that however hard and painful the difficulties it would have to undergo temporarily, its honor at least would not be sullied. We believe, with the famous Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, that honor is above everything—‘Nihil praeferandum honestati.’
“Moreover, Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the fact that the Catholic University of Louvain is a dependency of the Holy See. Canonically established by the Papacy, it is under the authority and the control of the Roman Congregation of Seminaries and Universities and it is the Holy See which approved the appointment of Monseigneur Van Wayenberg as Rector Magnifique of the University. If the measures announced were to be carried out, it would constitute a violent attack on the rights of the Holy See. Consequently His Holiness the Pope will be informed of the extreme dangers which threaten our Catholic University.”
I shall end here the quotation of the letter, but I must point out to the Tribunal that in spite of this protest and any considerations of simple practical interest, which the Germans might have had in maintaining correct attitude in this matter, the Rector Magnifique was arrested on 5 June 1943, and was condemned by the German military court to 18 months imprisonment.
Having recalled the painful facts which the Tribunal has just heard, I should like to observe that they might almost give us the impression that such an event as the arrest and sentence of a prelate, rector of a university, for a wrongful reason was, since there were no tragic consequences, of relatively secondary importance. But I think we should not subordinate our intellectual judgment to the direct test of our sensibility, now grown so accustomed to horrors; and if we reflect upon it, we consider that such an outrage is in itself very characteristic, and the fact that such treatment should have been considered by the Germans as the expression of justice, that is truly characteristic of the plan of Germanization with its repercussions on the world.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this afternoon’s session on account of illness.
M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to call the witness, Van der Essen.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness, Van der Essen, took the stand.]
M. FAURE: What is your name?
VAN DER ESSEN (Witness): Van der Essen.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you swear to speak without hate or fear, to say the truth, all the truth, and only the truth?
Raise your right hand and say “I swear.”
VAN DER ESSEN: I swear.
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down, if you wish.
M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, you are a professor of history in the Faculty of Letters at the University of Louvain?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes.
M. FAURE: You are the General Secretary of the University of Louvain?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes.
M. FAURE: You have stayed in Belgium during the whole period of the occupation?
VAN DER ESSEN: To the end; from the end of July 1940 I never left Belgium.
M. FAURE: Can you give information on the destruction of the Library of Louvain?
VAN DER ESSEN: It will be remembered that in 1914 this library, which was certainly one of the best university libraries in Europe, containing many early printed books, manuscripts and books of the 16th and 17th centuries, was systematically destroyed by means of incendiary material by the German soldiers of the 9th Reserve Corps, commanded by General Von Ston. This time, in 1940, the same thing happened again. This library was systematically destroyed by the German Army; and in order that you may understand, I must first say that the fire began, according to all the witnesses, during the night from the 16th to the 17th of May 1940 at about 1:30 in the morning. It was on the 17th at dawn that the English Army made the necessary withdrawal maneuver to leave the Q. W. line of defense. On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that the first German troops entered on the morning of the 17th, only about 8 o’clock. This interval between the departure of the British troops, on the one hand, and the arrival of the Germans on the other, enabled the latter to make it appear as if the library had been systematically destroyed by the British troops. I must here categorically give the lie to such a version. The library of the University of Louvain was systematically destroyed by German gun fire.
Two batteries were posted, one in the village of Corbek, and the other in the village of Lovengule. These two batteries on each side systematically directed their fire on the library and on nothing but the library. The best proof of this is that all the shells fell on the library; only one house near the library received a chance hit. The tower was hit 11 times, 4 times by the battery which fired from Lovengule, and 7 times by the battery which fired from Corbek.
At the moment when the Lovengule battery was about to begin firing the officer who commanded it asked an inhabitant of the village to accompany him into the field; when they arrived at a place from where they could see the tower of the library, the officer asked, “Is that the tower of the university Library?” The reply was “Yes.” The officer insisted, “Are you sure?” “Yes,” replied the peasant, “I see it every day, as you see it now.”
Five minutes later the shelling began, and immediately a column of smoke arose quite near the tower. So there can be no doubt that this bombardment was systematic and aimed only at the library. On the other hand, it is also certain that a squadron of 43 airplanes flew over the library and dropped bombs on the monument.
M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, you are a member of the official Belgian Commission for War Crimes?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes.
M. FAURE: In this capacity you investigated the events of which you speak?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed.
M. FAURE: The information which you have given the Tribunal, then, is the result of an inquiry which you made and evidence by witnesses which you heard yourself?
VAN DER ESSEN: What I have just stated here is most certainly the result of the official inquiry made by the Belgian War Crimes Commission, assisted by several witnesses heard under oath.
M. FAURE: Can you give information on the attempt at nazification of Belgium by the Germans, and especially the attempt to undermine the normal and constitutional organization of the public authorities.
VAN DER ESSEN: Certainly. First, I think it is interesting to point out that the Germans violated one of the fundamental principles of the Belgian Constitution and institutions, which consisted of the separation of powers, that is to say, separation of judicial powers, of executive powers, and legislative powers; because in the numerous organizations of the New Order, which they themselves created either by decree or by suggesting the creation of these organizations to their collaborators, they never made a distinction between legislative and executive powers. Also, in these organizations freedom of speech for the defense was never, or very little, respected. But what is much more important is that they attacked an organization which goes far back in our history, which dates back to the Middle Ages; I mean the communal autonomy which safeguards us and safeguards the people against any too dangerous interference on the part of the central authority. This is what happened in this domain: It would be sufficient to read, or to have read for a short time, the present day Belgian newspapers, to observe that the burgomasters, that is to say the chiefs of the communes, the aldermen of the principal Belgian towns, such as Brussels, Ghent, Liège, Charleroi, and also of many towns of secondary importance—all these aldermen and burgomasters are either in prison or about to appear before courts-martial.
That shows sufficiently, I think, that these burgomasters and these aldermen are not those who were appointed by the King and by the Belgian Government before 1940, but all of them were people who were imposed by the enemy by means of groups of collaborators, VNV or “Rexists.”
It is of capital importance to establish that fact, because the burgomaster, as soon as he was directly responsible to the central authority—in other words, as soon as the Leadership Principle was applied—could interfere in all kinds of ways in the administrative, political, and social life. The burgomaster appointed the aldermen; the aldermen appointed the communal officials and employees, and the moment the burgomaster belonged to that Party and was appointed by that Party, he appointed as communal officials members of the Party who could refuse ration cards to refractory people, or order the police to give, for instance, the list of Communists, or of those suspected of being Communists; in short, they could interfere in almost any way they wished, and by every possible means, in the communal life of Belgium.
If we examine the big towns and the small towns, we can say that everywhere there was truly a veritable network of espionage and interference following the events or acts of which I have just informed you.
M. FAURE: It is true, then, to say that this meddling by the Germans with the administration of the communes constituted a seizure of Belgian national sovereignty?
VAN DER ESSEN: Certainly, since it made the fundamental principle of the Belgian constitution disappear, that is to say, the sovereignty that belongs to the nation and more especially to the Communal Council which appointed aldermen and burgomasters. From then on it was impossible for them to make themselves heard in the normal way, so that the sovereignty of the Belgian people was directly attacked by the fact itself.
M. FAURE: Since you are a professor of higher education, can you give us information concerning the interference in education?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, sir, certainly.
First, there was interference in the domain of elementary and secondary education through the General Secretary of Public Education, on whom the Germans exercised pressure. A commission was set up which was entrusted with the task of purging the text books. It was forbidden to use text books which mentioned what the Germans did in Belgium during the 1914-18 war; this chapter was absolutely forbidden. The booksellers and publishing houses could still sell these books, but only on the condition that the bookseller or library should tear out this chapter. As for new books which had to be reprinted or republished, this commission indicated exactly which ones should be cancelled or removed. That was serious and alarming interference with primary and secondary education.
As regards higher education, the interference was unleashed, so to speak, from the very beginning of the occupation; and first of all, for motives which I need not explain here but which are well known, in the free University of Brussels.
The Germans first imposed on the University of Brussels a German Commissioner, who thus had in his hands the whole organization of the university and even controlled it, as far as I know, from the point of view of accountancy. Moreover they imposed exchange professors. But serious difficulties began the day when, in Brussels as elsewhere, they required that they should be informed of all projects of new appointments and all new appointments of professors, in the same way as the assignment of lecture courses and other subjects taught in the university. The result was that in Brussels, by virtue of this right which they had arrogated, they wished to impose three professors, of whom two were obviously not acceptable to any Belgian worthy of the name. There was one, notably, who, having been a member of the Council of Flanders during the occupation of 1914-18, had been condemned to death by the justice of this country and whom they wanted to impose as a professor in the University of Brussels in 1940. Under these conditions the university refused to accept this professor, and this was considered by the occupying authorities as sabotage.
As a penalty, the President of the Board of the University, the principal members of the board, the deans of the principal faculties, and a few other professors, who were especially well known as being anti-Fascists, were arrested and imprisoned in the prison of Witte with the aggravating circumstance that they were considered as hostages and that, if any act whatsoever of sabotage or resistance occurred, they, being hostages, could be shot.
As far as the other universities were concerned, as I have just said here, they wished to impose exchange professors. There were none at Louvain because we refused categorically to receive them, the more so as it appeared that these exchange professors were not, primarily, scholars who had come to communicate the result of their researches and their scientific work, but a great many of them were observers for the occupying authorities.
M. FAURE: In this connection, is it true that the Belgian authorities discovered the report made by one of these so-called “invited” professors?
VAN DER ESSEN: That is indeed the case. The Belgian authorities got hold of a report by Professor Von Mackensen, who was sent as an exchange professor to the University of Ghent. In this report—drawn up with infinite care and which is extraordinarily interesting to read because of the personal and psychological observations which it contains concerning the various members of the faculty of Ghent—in this report we see that everyone was observed and followed day by day, that his tendencies were labeled, that a note was made as to whether he was for or against the system of the occupying power, or whether he had any relations with students who were N.P. or Rexists. The slightest movements and actions of all the professors were carefully noted; and I add, with great care and precision. It was almost a scientific piece . . .
M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, I described this morning to the Tribunal various incidents which occurred in the University of Louvain, of which you were the General Secretary. Therefore I should like you to tell the Tribunal briefly the actual facts connected with these incidents, especially, those connected with the imprisonment of the Rector Monseigneur Van Wayenberg.
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed, sir. Serious difficulties began in the University of Louvain after the appearance of the decree of compulsory labor of 6 March 1943, by which students of the university were forced to accept compulsory labor. I would add, not in Reich territory, but in Belgium. But this action, which was held out to the university students as a sort of privilege, was entirely inacceptable to Belgian patriots for the simple reason that, if the university students accepted to go and work in the Belgian factories, they automatically expelled workmen, who were then sent to Germany as the students took their place.
That was the first reason why they did not wish to work for the enemy; the second was because, from a social point of view, they wanted to show solidarity with the workers, who suffered very much because the students had refused. At least two-thirds of the students of Louvain refused to do compulsory work. They became refractory, the classes became empty, they hid themselves as best they could, and several went into the Maquis.
The German authorities, when they saw the way things were going, demanded that the list of students be given to them, with their addresses, so that they could arrest them in their homes or, if they couldn’t find them, they could arrest a brother, or sister, or father, or any member of the family in their place. This was the principle of collective responsibility which was applied here the same as in all other cases.
After having used gentle means, they resorted to blackmail and ended up by adopting really brutal measures. They renewed the raids, they dismissed Dr. Tschacke and Dr. Kalische, I think, and many others. They ordered searches to be made in the university offices to lay their hands on the list of students; but as this list was carefully hidden, they had to go away empty-handed. It was then that they decided to arrest the Rector of the University, Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, who had hidden the lists in a place known only to him. He declared that he alone knew the place so as not to endanger his colleagues and the members of the faculty.
One morning in June two members of the Secret Police from Brussels, accompanied by Military Police, came to the Hall. They arrested the rector in his office and transferred him to the prison of Saint-Gilles in Brussels, where he was imprisoned. Shortly afterwards he appeared before a German tribunal which condemned him to 18 months imprisonment for sabotage. To tell the truth, he was in jail for only 6 months, because the doctor of Saint-Gilles saw that the rector’s health was beginning to fail and it would be dangerous to keep him longer if one wished to avoid a serious incident, also because of the many petitions by all sorts of authorities. Thus the rector was freed. However, he was forbidden to set foot on the territory of Louvain; and they enjoined the university to appoint, immediately, another rector. This was refused.
M. FAURE: Very well. Is it true to say that the German authorities persecuted, more systematically, persons who belonged to the intellectual elite?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, there can be no doubt as to this. I might give, as examples, the following facts:
When hostages were taken it was nearly always university professors, doctors, lawyers, men of letters, who were taken as hostages and sent to escort military trains. At the time when the resistance was carrying out acts of sabotage to railways and blowing up trains, university professors from Ghent, Liège and Brussels, whom I know, were taken and put in the first coach after the locomotive so that, if an explosion took place, they could not miss being killed. I know of a typical case, which will show you that it was not exactly a pleasure trip. Two professors of Liège, who were in a train of this kind, witnessed the following scene: The locomotive passed over the explosive. The coach in which they were, by an extraordinary chance, also went over it; and it was the second coach containing the German guards which blew up, so that all the German guards were killed.
On the other hand, several professors and intellectuals were deported to that sinister camp of Breendonck, about which you know, some for acts of resistance, others for entirely unknown reasons; others were deported to Germany. Professors from Louvain were sent to Buchenwald, to Dora, to Neuengamme, to Gross-Rosen, and perhaps to other places too. I must add that it was not only professors from Louvain who were deported, but also intellectuals who played an important role in the life of the country. I can give you immediate proof. At Louvain, on the occasion of the reopening ceremony of the university this year, as Secretary General of the University, I read out the list of those who had died during the war. This list included 348 names, if I remember rightly. Perhaps some thirty of these names were those of soldiers who died during the Battles of the Scheldt and the Lys in 1940, all the others were victims of the Gestapo, or had died in camps in Germany, especially in the camps of Gross-Rosen and Neuengamme.
Moreover, it is certain that the Germans hated particularly the intellectuals because, from time to time, they organized a synchronized campaign in the press to give prominence to the fact that the great majority of intellectuals refused categorically to rally to the New Order and refused to understand the necessity for the struggle against bolshevism. These articles always concluded by stressing the necessity of taking measures against them. I remember well certain newspaper articles which simply proposed to send these intellectuals to concentration camps. There can be no doubt therefore that the intellectuals were deliberately selected.
M. FAURE: I shall ask you no questions on anything relating to deportations or to camps, because all that is already well known to the Tribunal. I shall ask you, when replying to the following question, not to mention deportation.
Now, my question concerns the whole of the atrocities which were committed by the Germans in Belgium and, especially, at the time of the December 1944 offensive by the German armies. Can you give information concerning these atrocities?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I can give you exact and detailed information, if necessary, on the crimes and atrocities committed during the offensive of Von Rundstedt in the Ardennes, because as a member of the War Crimes Commission I went there to make an inquiry, and I questioned witnesses and survivors of these massacres; and I know perfectly well, from personal knowledge, what happened.
During the Von Rundstedt offensive in the Ardennes they committed crimes which were truly abominable in 31 localities of the Ardennes, crimes committed against men, women, and children. These crimes were committed, on the one hand, as it happened elsewhere and as it happens in all wars, by individual soldiers, so I shall let that pass; but what I particularly want to stress are the crimes committed by whole units who received formal instructions, as well as crimes committed by known organizations; if I remember rightly, I think they were called Kommandos zur besonderen Verwendung, that is to say, commandos with special tasks which operated unchecked not only in the Belgian Ardennes but which also committed the same kind of crimes, carried out in the same way, in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
As regards the first, the crimes committed by whole units, I should like merely to give one very typical example, in order not to take up the time of the Tribunal. It happened at Stavelot, where about 140 persons—the number varies, let us say between 137 and 140—first it was 137, then they discovered some more bodies—about 140 persons, of whom 36 were women and 22 were children, of which the oldest was 14 years and the youngest 4 years, were savagely slaughtered by German units belonging to SS tank divisions, one the Hohenstaufen Division, the other the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division. This is what the divisions did. We have full information about this from the testimony of a soldier who took part in it. He was arrested by the Belgian Security Police. He deserted during the Von Rundstedt campaign, dressed himself as a civilian, and then worked as a laborer on an Ardennes farm. One day as he was working stripped to the waist, he was seen by Belgian gendarmes, who saw by the tattooing on his body that he was an SS man. He was immediately arrested and interrogated.
This is the method used by the soldiers of the Hohenstaufen Division. There was a line of tanks, some were Königstiger (Royal Tigers), followed and preceded by Schützenpanzer. At a certain moment the Obersturmführer of this group stopped his men and delivered them a little speech telling them that all civilians whom they encountered should be killed. They then went back to their tanks, and as the tanks advanced along the road, the Obersturmführer would point to a house. Then the soldiers entered it with machine guns in their hands. If they found people in the kitchen, they killed them in the kitchen; if they found them sheltering in the cellar, they machine-gunned them in the cellar; if they found them on the road, they killed them on the road. Not only the Hohenstaufen Division, but also the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division, and others acted in this manner on formal orders according to which all civilians were to be killed. And what was the reason for this measure? Precisely because, during the retreat in September, it was mainly in that part of the Ardennes that the resistance went into action and quite a number of German soldiers were killed during that retreat. It was therefore to revenge this defeat, to avenge themselves for the action of the resistance, that orders were given that all civilians should be killed without mercy during the offensive launched in this region.
As far as the other method is concerned, this is still more important from the point of view of responsibility, for it concerns persons commanding troops of the Sicherheitspolizei, that is to say, of the Security Police, who in most villages they came to immediately set about questioning the people as to those who had taken part in the resistance, about the secret army, where these people lived, whether they were still there or whether they had fled. In short, they had special typed questionnaires with 27 questions, always the same, which were put to everyone in the villages to which they came.
Here again I shall proceed as I did in the first case. In order not to take up too much of the Tribunal’s time, I shall simply give the example of Bande, in the Arrondissement of Marche. At Bande one of these SD detachments, the officers of which said they were sent especially by Himmler to execute members of the resistance, seized all men between 17 and 32 years of age. After having questioned them thoroughly and after sorting them out in a quite arbitrary manner—they didn’t keep any people belonging to the resistance, for most of them had never taken part in it; there were only four who were members of the resistance—they led them away along the road from Marche to Basteuil with their hands raised behind their heads. When they reached a ruined house, which had been burned down in September, the officer who commanded the detachment posted himself at the entrance of the house, a Feldwebel joined him and put his hand on the shoulder of the last man of the third row who was making his way towards the entrance to the house; and there the officer, armed with a machine gun, killed a prisoner with a bullet in the neck. Then this same officer executed in this manner the 34 young men who had been kept back.
Not content with killing them, he kicked the bodies into the cellar; and then fired a volley of machine gun bullets to make sure that they were dead.
M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, you are a historian; you have taught scholars; therefore you are accustomed to submitting the sources of history to criticism. Can you say that your inquiry leaves no doubt in your mind, that these atrocities reveal that there was an over-all plan and that instructions were certainly given by superior officers?
VAN DER ESSEN: I think that I can affirm it, I am quite convinced that there was an over-all plan.
M. FAURE: I would like to ask you a last question: I think I understood that you yourself were never arrested or particularly worried by the Germans. I would like to know if you consider that a free man, against whom the German administration or police have nothing in particular, could during the Nazi occupation lead a life in accordance with the conception a free man has of his dignity?
VAN DER ESSEN: Well, you see me here before you, I weigh 67 kilos, my height is 1 meter 67 centimeters. According to my colleagues in the Faculty of Medicine that is quite normal. Before the 10th of May 1940, before the airplanes of the Luftwaffe suddenly came without any declaration of war and spread death and desolation in Belgium, I weighed 82 kilos. This difference is incontestably the result of the occupation. But I don’t want to dwell on personal considerations or enter into details of a general nature or of a theoretical or philosophical nature. I should like simply to give you an account—it will not take more than 2 minutes—of the ordinary day of an average Belgian during the occupation.
I take a day in the winter of 1943: At 6 o’clock in the morning there is a ring at the door. One’s first thought—indeed we all had this thought—was that it was the Gestapo. It wasn’t the Gestapo. It was a city policeman who had come to tell me that there was a light in my office and that in view of the necessities of the occupation I must be careful about this in the future. But there was the nervous shock.
At 7:30 the postman arrives bringing me my letters; he tells the maid that he wishes to see me personally. I go downstairs and the man says to me, “You know, Professor, I am a member of the secret army and I know what is going on. The Germans intend to arrest today at 10 o’clock all the former soldiers of the Belgian Army who are in this region. Your son must disappear immediately.” I hurry upstairs and wake up my son. I make him prepare his kit and send him to the right place. At 10 o’clock I take the tram for Brussels. A few kilometers out of Louvain the tram stops. A military police patrol makes us get down and lines us up—irrespective of our social status or position—in front of a wall, with our arms raised and facing the wall. We are thoroughly searched, and having found neither arms nor compromising papers of any kind, we are allowed to go back into the tram. A few kilometers farther on the tram is stopped by a crowd which prevents the tram from going on. I see several women weeping, there are cries and wailings. I make inquiries and am told that their men folk living in the village had refused to do compulsory labor and were to have been arrested that night by the Security Police. Now they are taking away the old father of 82 and a young girl of 16 and holding them responsible for the disappearance of the young men.
I arrive in Brussels to attend a meeting of the academy. The first thing the president says to me is:
“Have you heard what has happened? Two of our colleagues were arrested yesterday in the street. Their families were in a terrible state. Nobody knows where they are.”
I go home in the evening and we are stopped on the way three times, once to search for terrorists, who are said to have fled, the other times to see if our papers are in order. At last I get home without anything serious having happened to me.
I might say here that only at 9 o’clock in the evening can we give a sigh of relief, when we turn the knob of our radio set and listen to that reassuring voice which we hear every evening, the voice of Fighting France: “Today is the 189th day of the struggle of the French people for their liberation,” or the voice of Victor Delabley, that noble figure of the Belgian radio in London, who always finished up by saying, “Courage, we will get them yet, the Boches!” That was the only thing that enabled us to breathe and go to sleep at night.
That was an average day, a normal day of an average Belgian during the German occupation. And you can well understand that we could hardly call that time the reign of happiness and felicity that we were promised when the German troops invaded Belgium on 10 May 1940.
M. FAURE: Excuse me, M. Van der Essen. The only satisfaction that you had was to listen to the London radio; this was punished by a severe penalty, if you were caught, I suppose?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, it meant imprisonment.
M. FAURE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you finished, M. Faure?
M. FAURE: No more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko? The American and British prosecutors?
[Each indicated that he had no question.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR. EXNER: You have been speaking about the university library at Louvain. I should like to ask something: Were you yourself in Louvain when the two batteries were firing at the library, and at the library only, in 1940?
VAN DER ESSEN: I was not in Louvain, but I should say this: Louvain was in the K. O. line, that is in the very front line; and the population of Louvain was obliged by the British military authorities to evacuate the town on the 14th so that nearly all the inhabitants of Louvain had left at the time when these events took place and only paralytics and sick persons, who could not be transported and who had hidden in their cellars, were left; but what I said concerning these batteries, I know from the interrogation of the two witnesses who were on the spot just outside Louvain. The library was not set on fire from within, but shelled from without. And these witnesses of whom I speak lived in these two villages outside the town where the batteries were located.
DR. EXNER: Were there any Belgian or British troops still left in the town?
VAN DER ESSEN: The Belgian troops were no longer there. They had been replaced by the British troops when the British had taken over the sector and at the time when the library was seen to be on fire. The first flames were seen in the night of the 16th to the 17th at 1:30 in the morning. The British troops had left. There remained only a few tanks which were operating a withdrawal movement. These fired an occasional shot to give the impression that the sector was still occupied by the British Army.
DR. EXNER: So there were still British troops in the town when the bombardment started?
VAN DER ESSEN: There were no longer any British troops; there were merely a few tanks on the hills outside Louvain in the direction of Brussels, a few tanks which, as I said, were carrying out necessary maneuvers for withdrawal.
I would have liked to add a few words and to say to the very honorable Counsel for the Defense that, according to the testimony of persons who were in the library—the ushers and the janitors—not a single British soldier ever set foot in the library buildings.
DR. EXNER: That is not surprising. At the time the German batteries were firing were there still British batteries or Belgian batteries firing?
VAN DER ESSEN: No.
DR. EXNER: So all was quiet in the town of Louvain; the troops had left; the enemy was not there yet, and the batteries didn’t fire?
VAN DER ESSEN: That was the rather paradoxical situation in Louvain; there was a moment when the British had left and the Germans had not yet arrived; and there remained only the few ill persons, the few paralytics who could not be moved and who were left behind in cellars. A few other persons remained too: the Chief of the Fire Service and Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, the Rector of the University, who had brought the dead and the dying from Brussels to Louvain in the firemen’s car and made the journey several times. There was also my colleague, Professor Kennog, a member of the Faculty of Medicine who had taken over the direction of the city.
DR. EXNER: Do you know where these German batteries were located?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed. One was located at Corbek and the other at Lovengule, one on the west side and one on the north side. The only shell hits on the tower of the library were four hits from the east side and seven from the north side. If there had still been British or Belgian batteries, the shells would have come from the opposite side.
DR. EXNER: Can you tell me anything about the caliber of these batteries?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, we saved the shells and at present they are in the Library of Louvain, or rather in what serves as a library for the university. There are four shells and two or three fragments of shells.
DR. EXNER: And do you know the name of the peasant who was supposed to have been asked by a German officer whether that was really the University of Louvain? Do you know the peasant personally?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed, his name is M. Vigneron.
DR. EXNER: Do you know the peasant yourself? Do you know him?
VAN DER ESSEN: I do not know him personally. It was the librarian of the university who had a conversation with him and who induced the War Crimes Commission to interrogate this peasant.
DR. EXNER: You are a member of that commission yourself?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, I am ready to declare that I took no direct part in the inquiry concerning the Library of Louvain, just as Monseigneur the Rector and the librarian took no active part in the inquiry concerning the Library of Louvain. It was made by an officer of the judicial delegation who acted alone and quite independently upon the order of the Prosecutor of Louvain, and we kept entirely out of the matter.
DR. EXNER: Have you seen the official files of this commission?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, certainly.
DR. EXNER: I am surprised they weren’t brought here. Tell me, why did the director of the library or the person who was directly concerned not go, after the occupation of the town, to the mayor or to the commander of the town?
VAN DER ESSEN: I don’t think I understand the question very well.
DR. EXNER: When the German Army came, a town commander was appointed. Why didn’t the mayor of the town, or the Director of the University Library go to the town commander and tell him about these things?
VAN DER ESSEN: Why didn’t he tell him about these things—for the very simple reason that at that time everything was in complete disorder and there was hardly anybody left in the town, and on the other hand as soon as the German Army arrived, it systematically closed the entrance gate of the library so that the Belgians could not make any inquiry. Then two German inquiry commissions came upon the scene. The first worked on 26 May 1940 with an expert, Professor Kellermann of the School of Technology in Aachen, accompanied by a Party man in a brown shirt. They examined what was left and they summoned before them as witnesses the Rector of the University and the Librarian. From the very beginning of the inquiry they wished to force the rector and the librarian to declare and admit that it was the British who had set fire to the library. And as a proof, this expert showed shell cases saying, “Here, sniff this, it smells of gasoline and shows that chemicals were used to set fire to the library.” Whereupon the Rector and the Librarian of the University said to him, “Where did you find this shell case, Mr. Expert?” “In such and such a place.” “When we went by that place,” said the rector, “it wasn’t there.” It had been placed there by the German expert. And I will add, if you will permit me, because this is of considerable importance, that a second inquiry commission came in August 1940, presided over by a very distinguished man, District Court of Appeal Judge Von Neuss. He was accompanied this time by the expert who had directed the inquiry into the firing of the Reichstag. This commission again examined everything, and before the rector and another witness, Krebs, from the Benedictine Abbey of Mont-César, they simply laughed at the conclusions of the first commission, and said they were ridiculous.
DR. EXNER: You have said that the library building had towers. Do you know whether there were artillery observers in these towers?
VAN DER ESSEN: You ask whether there were artillery observers? All I can say is that the rector had always opposed this from the beginning, and he certainly would have opposed any attempt of this kind, knowing that the presence of artillery observers in the tower would obviously provide the enemy with a reason to fire on the library. The rector knew this and he always said to me, “We must be extremely careful to see that British soldiers or others who might take the sector do not go up in the tower.” I know from the statements of the janitor that no Englishman, no British soldier, went into the tower. That is absolutely certain. As for Belgians, I must confess that I cannot answer your question, as I don’t know.
DR. EXNER: It would not be so very amazing, would it, if the university library had been hit by German artillery. After all, it has happened that the libraries of the Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, Munich, Breslau, Cologne, et cetera, have been hit. The only question is whether this was done deliberately, and here it occurs to me that the peasant . . .
VAN DER ESSEN: The peasant . . .
DR. EXNER: I would like to ask you: Was there any mention in these inquiries as to the motive which might have induced the German Army to make this an objective?
VAN DER ESSEN: All the evidence seems to indicate, and this was the conclusion arrived at by the commission, that the motive—I will not say the main motive, because there is no certainty in this sort of thing—that the motive which is very probable, almost certain, for the destruction of the library was the German Army’s desire to do away with a monument which commemorates the Treaty of Versailles. On the library building there was a virgin wearing a helmet crushing under her foot a dragon which symbolized the enemy. Certain conversations of German officers gave the very clear impression that the reason why they wished to set fire systematically to this building was their desire to get rid of a testimony of the defeat in the other war, and above all, a reminder of the Treaty of Versailles. I may add that this is not the first time that the Germans have destroyed the University of Louvain.
DR. EXNER: You believe that the commander of that battery knew that?
VAN DER ESSEN: There is very interesting testimony which I should like to submit to the honorable Counsel for the Defense. On the day when the batteries were installed, the two batteries which I mentioned, I spoke to a tax collector, a civil servant, who lived in a villa on the road to Roosweek, a few kilometers from Louvain. That afternoon some German high-ranking officers came to his house to ask for hospitality. These officers had with them a truck with all the necessary radio apparatus for sending wireless orders to the German artillery to fire. These officers installed themselves in his house, and dinner was naturally served to them, and they invited him to sit with them. After hesitating a moment, he accepted, and during the meal there was a violent discussion. The officers said, “These Belgian swine”—excuse my using this expression, but they used it—“at any rate they did put that inscription on the library.” They were referring to the famous inscription “Furore Teutonica” which in fact was never on the library; but all the German officers were absolutely convinced that this inscription “Furore teutonica diruta, dono americano restituta” (destroyed by German fury, restored by American generosity) was on the building, whereas, in fact, it never has been there. However, I am quite willing to admit that in Germany they might have believed that it was there; and the very fact that there should have been a discussion among the officers in command of these two batteries, seems to prove that if they directed the fire onto the library, it was in order to destroy this monument. It was probable that they wanted to get rid of a monument which, according to their idea, bore an inscription which was insulting to the German Army and the German people. That is the testimony which I can give to the honorable Counsel for the Defense. I give it as it is.
DR. EXNER: You mean that the captain who commanded this battery knew about that inscription! I don’t believe it.
VAN DER ESSEN: Certainly.
DR. EXNER: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, you have said that 43 airplanes flew over the library and dropped bombs on it. As you told us yourself, in reply to Professor Exner’s question, you were not in the town at the time; where did you get that information?
VAN DER ESSEN: As I have already said, it is not my testimony which I am giving here, because for my part I have none; but it is the testimony of the lawyer, Davids, who had a country house at Kesseloo.
This lawyer went out in the morning to look at the sky. He had a considerable number of refugees in his home, among them women and children, and as airplanes were continually overhead he had gone out in the morning to see what was going on. He saw this squadron of airplanes which he counted—remember he was an old soldier himself—and there were 43 which were flying in the direction of the library; and when they arrived over the library, exactly over the gable at the farthest point from the house of the witness, they dropped a bomb, and he saw smoke immediately arise from the roof of the library. That is the testimony on which I base the statement I just made.
DR. STAHMER: So it was just one bomb that hit the library?
VAN DER ESSEN: We must distinguish here, sir, between artillery fire and bombs which are dropped by planes. From a technical point of view, it seems absolutely certain that a bomb from a plane hit the library, because the roof has metal covering and this metal roofing is quite level, except in one part where it caves in. We consulted technicians, who told us that a metallic surface would never have sunk in to such an extent if it had been hit by artillery fire and could only have been caused by a bomb from a plane.
DR. STAHMER: How many bombs in all were dropped by airplanes?
VAN DER ESSEN: As the witness was at a height dominating the Louvain area from where he could see the library on the plain, it was impossible for him to count exactly the bombs which these planes dropped. He only saw the bombs fall. Then he saw the smoke which arose from the roof of the library. That’s all I have to say concerning this point.
DR. STAHMER: How many bomb hits were counted in the city?
VAN DER ESSEN: On this point I can give you no information, but I know that some airplanes passed over the library quarters in a straight line going north to south. These bombs, at that time, in May 1940, damaged, but not very seriously, the Higher Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of Pharmacy, and a few other university buildings; also a certain number of private houses.
DR. STAHMER: When were the bombs dropped, before the artillery fire or afterwards?
VAN DER ESSEN: The bombs were dropped before and afterwards. There were some air raids. I myself was present during a terrible air-raid on the afternoon of 10 May 1940 by a squadron of seven planes. I am not a military technician, but I saw with my own eyes the planes which dive-bombed the Tirlemont Bridge. The result of this bombing was that a considerable number of houses were destroyed and 208 persons killed on the spot, on the afternoon of 10 May 1940.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine?
HERR BABEL: Witness, when did you last see the university building; that is, before the attack?
VAN DER ESSEN: Before the fire? I saw it on 11 May 1940.
HERR BABEL: That is to say, before the attack?
VAN DER ESSEN: Before the attack.
HERR BABEL: Was it damaged at that time, and to what extent?
VAN DER ESSEN: On 11 May absolutely nothing had happened to the library. It was intact. Until the night of the 16th to 17th of May, when I left, there was absolutely no damage.
HERR BABEL: Apart from the hits on the tower, did you notice any other traces of artillery fire on the building?
VAN DER ESSEN: On the building I don’t think so. There were only traces of artillery fire . . .
HERR BABEL: From the fact that only the tower had been hit, couldn’t it be thought that the tower and not the building was the target?
VAN DER ESSEN: When I said that the tower was struck, I meant only the traces that could be seen on the walls, on the balcony of the first story, and on the dial of the clock. Apart from that, nothing could be seen on the building for the simple reason that the building had been completely burned out inside and nothing could be seen on the charred walls. But it is absolutely certain that either a bomb from a plane or an artillery shell—I personally think it was the latter—hit the building on the north side, after the fire. The trace of shell fire can be seen very visibly. It is just here that the fire began. Witnesses who saw the fire of the Abbey of Mont César. . . .
HERR BABEL: After the fire, when did you see the building for the first time?
VAN DER ESSEN: After the fire, in July 1940.
HERR BABEL: That is, much later?
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, but still in the same condition. Nothing had been done to it. It was still as it was originally.
HERR BABEL: Do you know whether, while the building was burning, an attempt was made to stop the fire and save the building?
VAN DER ESSEN: It is absolutely certain that attempts were made to stop the fire. The Rector of the University, Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, told me himself and has stated that he sent for the firemen, but the firemen had gone. Only the chief and two members of the fire brigade were left, and all the water mains at that time were broken as a result of the bombardment. There was no water supply for several days.
HERR BABEL: Did German troops take part in these attempts to save the building?
VAN DER ESSEN: No, they were not there yet.
HERR BABEL: How do you know that? You weren’t there.
VAN DER ESSEN: But the Rector of the University did not leave the town of Louvain. The rector was there and so was the librarian.
HERR BABEL: Did you speak to the rector on this question, as to whether German troops took part in the attempt to save the building?
VAN DER ESSEN: I spoke to the rector and to the librarian. In my capacity as General Secretary of the University I discussed with the rector all general questions concerning the university. We discussed this point especially, and he told me categorically that no soldier of the German Army tried to fight the fire.
HERR BABEL: You also have spoken about the resistance movement. Do you know whether the civilian population was called upon to resist the German troops?
VAN DER ESSEN: Where? In the Ardennes?
HERR BABEL: In Belgium?
VAN DER ESSEN: In Belgium the resistance was mainly composed of the secret army, which was a military organization with responsible and recognized commanders, and wore a distinctive badge so that they could not be confused with simple francs-tireurs.
HERR BABEL: Do you know how many German soldiers fell victims to the resistance movement?
VAN DER ESSEN: How German soldiers fell victims to this resistance? I know very well because everywhere in the Ardennes the resistance went into action, and legally, with chiefs at their head, carrying arms openly, and with distinctive badges. They openly attacked the German troops from the front.
HERR BABEL: That was not my question. I asked you if you knew roughly how many German soldiers became victims of that resistance movement?
VAN DER ESSEN: I don’t understand what is implied by the question of the honorable Counsel for the Defense.
HERR BABEL: That is not for you to judge, it is for the Tribunal.
VAN DER ESSEN: Does the honorable Counsel for the Defense mean the events of the Ardennes which I alluded to a while ago, or does he speak in a quite general sense?
HERR BABEL: The witness in his statements had himself brought up the question of the resistance movement, and that is why I asked whether the witness knows . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, the witness has already answered the question by saying that he cannot say how many Germans were killed by the resistance movement.
HERR BABEL: But he can say whether a certain number of Germans did fall victims to the resistance.
VAN DER ESSEN: There were real battles.
HERR BABEL: The witness will also be able to confirm that the members of the resistance are today considered heroes in Belgium. From what we have read in the papers and from what has been brought up here, these people who were active in the resistance movement are now considered heroes. At least I could draw that conclusion.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please continue your examination.
HERR BABEL: Witness, you have said, if I understood you correctly, that you lost 15 kilograms weight.
VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed.
HERR BABEL: What conclusion did you draw from that fact? I could not quite understand what you said.
VAN DER ESSEN: I simply meant to say that I lost these 15 kilos as a result of the mental suffering which we underwent during the occupation, and it was an answer to a question of M. Faure on whether I considered this occupation compatible with the dignity of a free man. I wanted to answer “no,” giving the proof that as a result of this occupation we suffered much anguish, and I think the loss of weight is sufficient proof of this.
HERR BABEL: During the war, I also, without having been ill, lost 35 kilos. What conclusion could be drawn from that, in your opinion?
[Laughter.]
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Babel, we are not interested in your experiences.
HERR BABEL: Thank you, Sir. That was my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Counsel wish to ask any questions? [There was no response.] M. Faure?
M. FAURE: I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
M. FAURE: I ask the Tribunal kindly to take the presentation file and the document book constituting the end of the section on the seizure of sovereignty, which bears the title “France.”
France, like Belgium, was placed under the regime of the military occupation administration. There was, moreover, in France a diplomatic representation. Finally, it must be noted that the police administration always played an important role there. It became increasingly important and was extended, particularly during the period which followed the appointment of General Oberg in 1942.
As regards this last part of my section on the seizure of sovereignty, I should like to limit myself to mentioning a few special features of these usurpations in France and certain original methods employed by the Germans in this country, for this question has already been extensively dealt with, and will be further dealt with by me under the heading of consequences of German activities in France.
I wish to draw the attention of the Tribunal to four considerations. First, the German authorities in France, at the very beginning, got hold of a special key to sovereignty. I speak of the splitting up of the country into five different zones. This splitting up of the country by the Germans compensated to a certain extent for the special situation which the existence of unoccupied French territories created for them.
I have already indicated that the Armistice Convention of 22 June, which has already been deposited with the Tribunal, provided for the establishment of a line of demarcation between the occupied zone and the so-called unoccupied zone. It might have been thought at that time that this demarcation between the occupied and the unoccupied zone was chiefly drawn to meet the necessity of military movements in the occupied zone. It might also have been concluded that the separation of the zones would be manifested only through the exercise in the occupied zone of the ordinary rights of an armed force occupation. I have already had occasion to quote to the Tribunal a document, the testimony of M. Léon Noël, which contained the verbal assurances given in this respect by General Keitel and by General Jodl, who are now the defendants before you bearing these names.
Now, in fact, this demarcation of zones was interpreted and applied with extreme rigor and in a manner that was wholly unforeseen. We have already seen the far reaching consequences of this from the point of view of the economic life of the country. There were also serious consequences from the point of view of local administration, which was continually hampered in its tasks, and from the point of view of the life of the population, which could move from one part of French territory to another only with great difficulty. In this way the Germans acquired a first means of pressure on the French authorities. This means of pressure was all the more effective as it could be used at any time and was very elastic. At times the Germans could relax the rules of separation of the zones, at others they could apply them with the greatest severity.
By way of example, I quote an extract from a document, which I present in evidence under the Document Number RF-1051.
This document is a letter of 20 December 1941 addressed by Schleier of the German Embassy to the French Delegate De Brinon, a letter concerning passes to German civilians wishing to enter the unoccupied zone. The French authorities of the de facto government had protested against the fact that the Germans obliged the French authorities to allow any person provided with German passes to enter the unoccupied zone where they could take on any kind of work, particularly spying, as one may imagine.
The letter which I quote is in answer to this French protest, and I wish to mention only the last paragraph which is the second paragraph on page 2 of this Document Number 1051.
“In case the French Government should create difficulties concerning requests for passes presented with the German approval, it will no longer be possible to exercise that same generosity as shown hitherto when granting passes to French nationals.”
But what I have just said is only a first point concerning the division of the country. This first division had as basis an instrument which was the Armistice Convention, although this basis was exceeded and was contestable. On the other hand, the other divisions which I am going to mention were simply imposed by the Germans without warning of any kind, and without the enunciation of any plausible pretext.
I must recall that a first supplementary division was that which separated the annexed Departments of the Haut-Rhin, the Bas-Rhin, and the Moselle from the rest of France; and in this connection I have already proved that they had been really annexed.
A second division affected the Departments of Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. These departments were in fact attached to the German Military Administration of Belgium. This fact is shown by the headings of the German Military Command decrees, which are submitted to the Tribunal in the Belgian Official Gazette. Not only did this separation exist from the point of view of the German Military Command Administration, but it also existed from the point of view of the French Administration. This last mentioned administration was not excluded in the departments under consideration, but its communications with the central services were extremely difficult.
As I do not wish to develop this point at length, I should like simply to quote a document which will serve as an example, and which I submit as Document Number RF-1052. This is a letter from the military commander under the date of 17 September 1941, which communicates his refusal to re-establish telegraphic and telephonic communications with the rest of France. I quote the single sentence of this letter:
“Upon decision of the High Command of the Army it is so far not yet possible to concede the application for granting direct telegraphic service between the Vichy Government and the two departments of the North.”
A third division consisted in the creation within the unoccupied zone of a so-called forbidden zone. The conception of this forbidden zone certainly corresponded to the future projects of the Germans as to the annexation of larger portions of France. In this connection I produced documents at the beginning of my presentation. This forbidden zone did not have any special rules of administration, but special authorization was required to enter or to leave it. The return to this zone of persons who had left it in order to seek refuge in other regions was possible only in stages, and with great difficulty. Administrative relations, the same as economic relations between the forbidden zone and the other zones were constantly hampered. This fact is well known. Nevertheless, I wish to quote a document also as an example, and I submit this document, Number RF-1053. It is a letter from the military commander, dated 22 November 1941, addressed to the French Delegation. I shall simply summarize this document by saying that the German Command agreed to allow a minister of the de facto government to go into the occupied zone, but refused to allow him to go into the forbidden zone.
In order that the Tribunal may realize the situation of these five zones which I have just mentioned, I have attached to the document book a map of France indicating these separations. This map of France was numbered RF-1054, but I think it is not necessary for me to produce it as a document properly speaking. It is intended to enable the Tribunal to follow this extreme partitioning by looking, first at the annexed departments, and then at Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, the boundaries of these departments being indicated on the map, then at the forbidden unoccupied zone, which is indicated by a first line; and, finally, the line of demarcation with the unoccupied zone. This is, by the way, a reproduction of the map which was published and sold in Paris during the occupation by Publishers Girard and Barère.
To conclude this question of the division I should like to remind the Tribunal that on 11 November 1942 the German Army forces invaded the so-called unoccupied zone. The German authorities declared at that time that they did not intend to establish a military occupation of this zone, and that there would simply be what was called a zone of operations.
The German authorities did not respect this juridical conception that they had thought out any more than they had respected the rules of the law of the occupation; and the proof of this violation of law in the so-called operational zone has already been brought in a number of circumstances and will be brought again later in the final parts of this presentation.
Apart from this division, the inconveniences of which can well be imagined for a country which is not very extensive and whose life is highly centralized, I shall mention the second seizure of sovereignty, which consisted in the control by the Germans of the legislative acts of the French de facto government.
Naturally, the German military administration, in conformity with its doctrine, constantly exercised by its own decrees, a real legislative power in regard to the French. On the other hand—and it is this fact which I am dealing with now—in respect to the French power the sovereignty of which the Germans pretended still to recognize, they exercised a veritable legislative censorship. I shall produce several documents by way of example and proof of this fact.
The first, which I submit as Document Number RF-1055, is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces in France to the French Delegate General; the letter is dated 29 December 1941. We see that the signature on this letter is that of Dr. Best, of whom I spoke this morning in connection with Denmark, where he went subsequently and where he was given both diplomatic and police functions. I think it is not necessary for me to read the text of this letter. I shall read simply the heading: “Subject: Bill Concerning the French Budget of 1942, and the New French Finance Law.”
The German authorities considered that they had the power to take part in the drawing up of the French de facto government’s budget, although this bore no relation to the necessities of their military occupation. Not only did the Germans check the contents of the laws prepared by the de facto government, but they made peremptory suggestions. I shall not quote any document on this point at the moment, as I shall be producing two: One in connection with propaganda and the other in connection with the regime imposed upon the Jews.
The third seizure of sovereignty which the Germans exercised consisted in their intervention in the appointment and assignment of officials. According to the method which I have already followed, I submit, on this question, documents by way of example. First I submit a document which will be Document Number RF-1056, a letter of 23 September 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief Von Stülpnagel to De Brinon. This letter puts forth various considerations, which it is not necessary to read, on the sabotage of harvests and the difficulties of food supplies. I read the last paragraph of Document RF-1056.
“I must, therefore, peremptorily demand a speedy and unified direction of the measures necessary for assuring the food supplies for the population. A possibility of achieving this aim I can see only by uniting both ministries in the hands of one single and energetic expert.”
It was, therefore, a case of interference on the very plane of the composition of a ministry, of an authority supposedly governmental. As regards the control of appointments, I produce Document Number RF-1057, which is a letter from the Military Command of 29 November 1941. I shall simply summarize this document by indicating that the German authorities objected to the appointment of the President of the Liaison Committee for the Manufacture of Beet Sugar. You see, therefore, how little this has to do with military necessities.
I next produce Document Number RF-1058, which is likewise a letter from the Military Command. It is brief and I shall read it by way of example:
“I beg you to take the necessary measures in order that the Subprefect of St. Quentin, M. Planacassagne, be relieved of his functions and replaced as soon as possible by a competent official. M. Planacassagne is not capable of carrying out his duties.”
I shall now quote a text of a more general scope. I produce Document Number RF-1059, which is a secret circular of 10 May 1942, addressed by the Military Command Administrative Staff to all the chief town majors. Here again we find the signature of Dr. Best.
“Control of French policy as regards personnel in the occupied territories.
“The remodelling of the French Government presents certain possibilities for exercising a positive influence on French police in the occupied territories as regards personnel. I, therefore, ask you to designate those French officials, who, from the German point of view, appear particularly usable and whose names could be submitted to the French Government when the question of appointing holders for important posts arises.”
Thus we see in the process of formation this general network of German control and German usurpation. I now produce Document Number RF-1060. This document is an interrogation of Otto Abetz, who had the function of German ambassador in France. This interrogation took place on 17 November 1945 before the Commissioners Berge and Saulas at the General Information Bureau in Paris. This document confirms German interferences in French administration and likewise gives details about the duplications of these controls by the military commander and the Gestapo. I quote:
“The Military Commander in France, basing himself on the various conventions of international law”—this is Otto Abetz who is speaking and it is not necessary to say that we in no way accept his conception of international law—“considered himself responsible and supreme judge for the maintenance of order and public security in the occupied zone. This being so, he claimed the right to give his approval for the appointment or the retaining of all French officials nominated to occupy posts in the occupied zone. As regards officials residing in the free zone who were obliged by reason of their functions to exercise them subsequently in the occupied zone, the Military Commander also stressed the necessity for his approval of their nomination. In practice the Military Commander made use of the right thus claimed only when the officials were nominated and solely in the sense of a right to veto, that is to say, he did not intervene in the choice of officials to be nominated and contented himself with making observations on certain names proposed. These observations were based on information which the Military Commander received from his regional and local commanders, from his various administrative and economic departments in Paris, and from the police and the Gestapo, which at that time were still under the authority of the Military Commander.
“From 11 November 1942 on, this state of things changed because of the occupation of the free zone. The German military authorities settled in this zone demanded that they should give their opinion in regard to the nomination of officials in all cases where the security of the German Army might be affected. The Gestapo for its part acquired in the two zones a de facto independence with regard to the regional and local military chiefs and with regard to the Military Commander. It claimed the right to intervene in connection with any appointment which might affect the carrying out of their police tasks.
“Having been recalled to Germany from November 1942 to December 1943, I did not myself witness the conflicts which resulted from this state of things and which could not fail to compromise in the highest degree the so-called sovereignty of the Vichy Government. When I returned to France the situation was considerably worse because the Gestapo claimed, in the occupied as well as in the unoccupied zone, the right to make the nomination of prefects subject to its consent. It even went so far as to propose itself the officials to be nominated by the French Government. Seconded by me, the Military Commander took up again the struggle against these abusive demands and succeeded in part in restoring the situation to what it was before November 1942 . . . .”
The document which I have just read constitutes a transition to the fourth consideration which I should like to submit to the Tribunal. In putting this consideration I should like to stress the juxtaposition and the collaboration of the various agents of usurpation, that is to say, the military command, the embassy, and the police. As regards the latter I shall deal at greater length with its role in the last part of my brief.
With regard to the setting up of the German Embassy in France, I produce before the Tribunal Exhibit Number RF-1061. This document was in my file as a judicial translation of a judicial document in the file concerning Otto Abetz in Paris. On the other hand, it is also contained in the American documentation and bears the Document Number 3614-PS. It has not, however, as yet been submitted to the Tribunal. It deals with the official appointment of Otto Abetz as ambassador. I should like to read this Document RF-1061.
“Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 August 1940.
“In answer to a question of the General Quartermaster, addressed to the High Command of the Armed Forces and transmitted by the latter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Führer had appointed Abetz, up to now minister, as ambassador and upon my report has decreed the following:
“I. Ambassador Abetz has the following functions in France:
“1. To advise the military agencies on political matters.
“2. To maintain permanent contact with the Vichy Government and its representatives in the occupied zone.
“3. To influence the important political personalities in the occupied zone and in the unoccupied zone in a way favorable to our intentions.
“4. To guide from the political point of view the press, the radio, and the propaganda in the occupied zone and to influence the responsive elements engaged in the molding of public opinion in the unoccupied zone.
“5. To take care of the German, French, and Belgian citizens returning from internment camps.
“6. To advise the secret military police and the Gestapo on the seizure of politically important documents.
“7. To seize and secure all public art treasures and private art treasures, and particularly art treasures belonging to Jews, on the basis of special instructions relating thereto.
“II. The Führer has expressly ordered that only Ambassador Abetz shall be responsible for all political questions in Occupied and Unoccupied France. Insofar as military interests are involved by his duties, Ambassador Abetz shall act only in agreement with the Military Command in France.
“III. Ambassador Abetz will be attached to the Military Commander in France as his delegate. His domicile shall continue to be in Paris as hitherto. He will receive from me instructions for the accomplishment of his tasks and will be responsible solely to me. I shall greatly appreciate it if the High Command of the Armed Forces (the OKW) will give the necessary orders to the military agencies concerned as quickly as possible.
“Signed: Ribbentrop.”
This document shows the close collaboration that existed between the military administration and the administration of foreign affairs, a collaboration which, as I have already said on several occasions, is one of the determining elements for establishing responsibility in this Trial, a collaboration of which I shall later on give examples of a criminal character.
I now wish to mention to the Tribunal that I eliminate the production of the next document which was numbered RF-1062. Although I am personally certain of the value of this document which comes from a French judicial file, I have not the original German text. This being so, the translation might create difficulties, and it is naturally essential that each document produced should present incontestable guarantees. I shall therefore pass directly to the last document, which I wish to put in and which I submit as Document Number RF-1063. This is a detail, if I may call it such, concerning this problem of the collaboration of the German administrations, but sometimes formal documents concerning details may present some interest. It is a note taken from the German archives in Paris, a note dated 5 November 1943, which gives the distribution of the numbering of the files in the German Embassy. I shall read simply the first three lines of this note: “In accordance with the method adopted by the military administration in France, the files are divided into 10 chief groups.” There follows the enumeration of these methods and groups used for the classification of the files. I wish simply to point out that under their system of close collaboration the German Embassy, a civil service department of the foreign office, and the Military Command had adopted filing systems under which all records and all files could be kept in the same way.
I have now concluded my second section which was devoted to the general examination of this seizure of sovereignty in the occupied territories, and I should like to point out that these files have been established with the collaboration of my assistant, M. Monneray, a collaboration which also included the whole brief which I present to the Tribunal.
I shall now ask the Tribunal to take the files relative to Section 3, devoted to the ideological Germanization, and to propaganda.
When I had occasion to speak to the Tribunal about forced labor and economic pillage I said that the Germans had taken all available manpower, goods, and raw materials from the occupied countries. They drained these countries of their reserves. The Germans acted in exactly the same manner with regard to the intellectual and moral resources. They wished to seize and eliminate the spiritual reserves. This expression “spiritual reserves,” which is extremely significant, was not invented by the Prosecution. I have borrowed it from the Germans themselves. I have quoted to the Tribunal another extract from a work which was submitted as a document under Number RF-5 of the French documentation. This was a book published in Berlin by the Nazi Party. The author was Dr. Friedrich Didier. This work has a preface by the Defendant Sauckel and is entitled Working For Europe. The quotation which I should like to make appears in the document book under 1100, which is simply the order of sequence, as the book itself has already been presented and submitted. The book includes a chapter entitled “Ideological Guidance and Social Assistance.” The author is concerned with the ideological guidance of the foreign workers who were taken away by millions to the Reich by force. This preoccupation with the ideological guidance of such an important element of the population of the occupied countries is already remarkable in itself; but it is, on the other hand, quite evident that this preoccupation is general with regard to all the inhabitants of the occupied countries, and the author in this case has simply confined himself to his subject. I have chosen this quotation to begin my section because its wording seemed to me to be particularly felicitous to enable us to get an idea of the German plans in regard to propaganda.
Page 69 of the book that has been put in evidence reads:
“The problem of ideological guidance of the foreign worker is not as simple as in the case of the German fellow worker. In employing foreigners far more importance must be paid to the removal of psychological reservations. The foreigner must get accustomed to unfamiliar surroundings. His ideological scruples must be dispersed, if he has any. The mental attitude of the nationals of former enemy states must be just as effectively refuted as the consequences of foreign ideologies.”
In the occupied countries the Germans undertook to eliminate the mental reserves and to expurgate the ideology of each man in order to substitute for them the Nazi conception. Such was the object of the propaganda. This propaganda had already been introduced in Germany and it was carried on there unceasingly. We have seen from the article just quoted that there was also a preoccupation with the ideological guidance of the German worker, although the problem was considered there to be more simple. When we speak today of Nazi propaganda we are often tempted to underestimate the importance of this propaganda. There are grounds for underestimating it, but they are false grounds. On the one hand, when we consider the works and the themes of propaganda, we are often struck by their crudeness, their obviously mendacious character, their intellectual or artistic poverty. But we must not forget that the Nazi propaganda utilized all means, the most crude as well as the more subtle and often skillful methods. From another point of view the crudest affirmations are those that carry most weight with some simple minds.
Finally, we must not forget that if the Germans had won the war, these writings, these films, which we find ridiculous, would have constituted in the future our principal and soon our sole spiritual food.
Another remark that is often heard is that German propaganda achieved only very poor results. Indeed, these results are quite insignificant, especially if one takes into account the means which this propaganda had at its disposal. The enslaved peoples did not listen to the news and to the exhortations of the Germans. They threw themselves into the resistance. But here again we must consider that the war continued, that the broadcasts from the countries which had remained free gave out magnificent counter propaganda, and that finally the Germans after a time suffered military reverses.
If events had been different perhaps this propaganda would, in the long run, have brought about an acquiescence on the part of the more important elements of the populations which would have been worse than the oppression itself. It is fortunate that only a very small minority in the different countries were corrupted by the Nazi propaganda, but however small this minority may have been, it is for us a cause for sadness and of just complaint.
The slogans of Nazi propaganda appear to us less childish and less ridiculous when we consider the few wretches who, influenced by it, enrolled in a legion or in the Waffen SS to fight against their countries and against humanity. By their death in this dishonorable combat or after their condemnation some of these men have expiated their crimes. But Nazi propaganda is responsible for the death of each one of them and for each one of these crimes.
Finally, we are not sure that we know today exactly the real effect of Nazi propaganda. We are not sure that we are able to measure all the harm which it has done to us. The nations count their visible wounds, but propaganda is a poison which dissolves in the mental organism and leaves traces that cannot be discerned. There are still men in the world who, because of the propaganda to which they have been subjected, believe, perhaps obscurely, that they have the right to despise or to eliminate another man because he is a Jew or because he is a Communist. The men who believe this still remain accomplices and, at the same time, are victims of Nazism.
One of my colleagues has shown that while the physical health of the occupied peoples was severely undermined, their moral health appears more robust; but it must still be anxiously watched for a certain time in the future.
For these reasons, the French Prosecution has considered that there was room in this accusation for the section on spiritual Germanization and propaganda. This propaganda is a criminal enterprise in itself. It is an onslaught against the spiritual condition, according to the definition of M. de Menthon, but it is also a means and an aggravating circumstance of the whole of the criminal methods of the Nazis, since it prepared their success and since it was to maintain their success. It was considered by the Germans themselves, as numerous quotations show, as one of the most reliable weapons of total war. It is more particularly a means and an aspect of the Germanization which we are studying at this moment. I should add that German propaganda has been constantly developed for many years and over considerable areas. It assumed very diverse forms. We have therefore only to define some of its principal features and to quote merely a few characteristic documents, chiefly from the point of view of the responsibility of certain persons or of certain organizations.
Over a long period of time the Reich had developed official propaganda services in a ministerial department created as early as 1933 under the name of Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, with Goebbels at the head and the Defendant Fritzsche performing important functions. But this ministry and its department were not the only ones responsible for questions of propaganda. We shall show that the responsibility of the Minister and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is equally involved. We shall likewise show that the Party took an active part in propaganda.
Finally, I mention here that in the occupied countries the military commands constituted organs of propaganda and were very active. This fact must be added to all those which show that the German military command exercised powers wholly different from what are normally considered to be military powers. By this abnormal extension of their activities, apart from the crimes committed within the framework of their direct competence, the military chiefs and the High Command have furnished justification for the allegation of joint responsibility.
The German propaganda always presents two complementary aspects, a negative aspect and a positive aspect: A negative or, in a sense, a destructive aspect, that of forbidding or of limiting certain liberties, certain intellectual possibilities which existed before; a positive aspect, that of creating documents or instruments of propaganda, of spreading this propaganda, of imposing it on the eyes, on the ears, and on the mind. An authority has already said that there are two different voices: The voice that refuses truth and the voice that tells lies. This duality of restrictive propaganda and of constructive propaganda exists in the different realms of the expression of thought.
I shall mention now, in my first paragraph, the measures taken by the Germans as regards meetings and associations. The German authorities have always taken measures to suppress the right of assembly and association in the occupied countries. We are here concerned both with the question of political rights and of thought. In France, a decree of 21 August 1940, which appeared in the Official Gazette of German Decrees of 16 September 1940, forbade any meeting or association without the authorization of the German military administration.
It must not be thought that the Germans utilized their powers in this matter only in regard to associations and groups which were hostile to them, or even those whose object was political. They were anxious to avoid any spreading of an intellectual or moral influence which would not be directly subordinated to them. In this connection I present to the Tribunal, merely by way of example, Document Number RF-1101, which is a letter from the Military Commander dated 13 December 1941, addressed to the General Delegate of the French Government. This deals with the youth groups. Even with regard to associations or groups which should have a general public character, the German authorities gave their authorization only on condition that they would be able to exercise not only their control over these organizations, but a real influence by means of these organizations.
I shall read the first paragraph of this Document Number RF-1101.
“The General Secretariat of Youth has informed us by letter of 11 November 1941 of its intention to establish so-called social youth centers whose aim shall be to give to youth a civic education and to safeguard it from the moral degeneracy which threatens it. The creation of these social youth centers, as well the establishment of youth camps, must be sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces in France. Before being able to make a final decision as to the creation of these social centers, it appears indispensable that greater details should be furnished, particularly about the persons responsible for these centers in the various communes, the points of view which will prevail when selecting the leaders of these centers, the principal categories of youth to be recruited and detailed plans for the intended instruction and education of these young people.”
I shall now produce Document Number RF-1102. This document is a note, dealing with . . .
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] M. Faure, could you tell us how long you think you will be on this subject of propaganda?
M. FAURE: I expect to speak for about two hours, or two and a half hours.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the program after you have done with this subject of propaganda?
M. FAURE: Mr. President, as I indicated at the beginning of my presentation, it includes four sections. The propaganda section, about which I am speaking now, constitutes Section 3. The fourth section is devoted to the administrative organization of the criminal action. It corresponds, more exactly, to the second heading under Count Four of the Indictment relative to the persecution of the Jews in the occupied countries of the West. After this section I shall have completed my presentation. Does the Tribunal likewise Pg571 wish me to indicate what will follow in the program of the French Prosecution?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we would like to know.
M. FAURE: M. Mounier will deal with the analytical brief and the recapitulation of the individual accusations of the Prosecution. Then I think M. Gerthoffer is to speak rather briefly about the pillage of art treasures which has not been dealt with; it appears now that it would be suitable to deal with it within the framework of the presentation.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn now.
M. FAURE: Mr. President, I should like to ask the Tribunal if it is convenient for it to see tomorrow, in the course of my propaganda section, a few projections on the screen of documents which relate to this chapter.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so. Certainly.
HERR BABEL: Regarding the questions which I asked the witness, there is something I did not understand. I did not want, in any case, to speak about the resistance or about its methods which were animated by patriotism. I did not want to judge, or even think anything derogatory about it. I wanted only to prove that deeds which are said to have been committed by the German troops were in many cases caused by the attitude of the civilian population and that actions against Germans which were contrary to international law have not been judged in the same way as lapses laid to the charge of members of the German Wehrmacht. I am of the opinion that the Indictment of the organizations . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, will you forgive me for a moment. You concluded your cross-examination some time ago, and the Tribunal doesn’t desire . . .
HERR BABEL: Yes, Mr. President, but I thought that by this statement I could clarify it for the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t need any clarification at all. We quite understand the point of your cross-examination and we shall hear you when the time comes, very fully in all probability, in support of the arguments which you desire to present.
HERR BABEL: I did so because I thought that you . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You must give the Tribunal credit for understanding your cross-examination. We really cannot continue to have interruptions of this sort. We have some twenty defendants and some twenty counsels, and if they are all going to get up in the way that you do and make protests, we shall never get to the end of this Trial.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 5 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, ‘Defense’ versus ‘Defence’. Unlike prior Blue Series volumes I and II, all French, German and eastern European names and terms include accents and umlauts: hence Führer and Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 6), by Various.]