Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 12 (part 2 of 3)
GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his memoranda and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive Goerdeler or Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General Halder, and it was typical that during those critical days he could not get past the anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General Von Stülpnagel. Halder was not “at home,” and just said that he did not want to see Schacht. Thereupon we took a further step on that dramatic 25 August, the day on which Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the news reached us that Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht and I first got into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas, we went to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters in Zossen in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his presence. Schacht intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder that, in accordance with the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet must be consulted before waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder would be guilty of a breach of oath if, without the knowledge of the competent political authorities, they obeyed an order for war. That was roughly what Schacht intended to say to explain his step. When Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse, Thomas went to Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or...
DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal should know that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH.
GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a corner of the street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment when Hitler between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to withdraw his order to march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, influenced by the renewed intervention of Mussolini, suddenly withdrew the order to march which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal of an order to march was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler. Oster thought that never before in the history of warfare had a supreme commander withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous breakdown. And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved for 50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” And, unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all felt that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet frame of mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the decisive order to march, it came as a complete surprise for our group as well. Oster called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied me. We asked Canaris again whether he could not arrange another meeting with Brauchitsch and Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is too late now.” He had tears in his eyes and added, “That is the end of Germany.”
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that perhaps we had better deal with the war after lunch.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the war.
GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and Canaris without doing any direct service.
DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned? Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done?
GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator.
DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?
GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others.
DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your group?
GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was committing suicide in Germany.
DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you, Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt.
In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety. I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that now the moment...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter.
DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are...
THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?
DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be a victory, also a German victory...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?
DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?
DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter. In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland.
[Turning to the witness.] Please answer the question, Witness.
GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.
DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is, your group of conspirators?
GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the West by all means.
Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the neutrality of Holland and Belgium.
We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the expansion of the war.
Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late, that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake a revolt.
DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now...
Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your efforts?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.
DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a position to explain the cryptic words.
THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter.
DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its contents?
GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and written.
DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those cryptic words?
GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace.
DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?...
GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British Government. Again it was our aim solely to...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this only given from memory?
DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to us from Switzerland by this witness.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.”
GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do, while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as we had said previously we hoped to do.
These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.
DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.
GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939, General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil German government.
DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?
GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas. Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed.
DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now, since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these details about it?
DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above mentioned...
THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship.
[Turning to the witness.] You have already testified that the revolt which was planned for November did not occur because the western offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted upon?
GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner.
DR. DIX: Hoeppner?
GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt, Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the intermediaries.
DR. DIX: And how did the generals react?
GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.
DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period following.
GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent this evil.
DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group” you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk, along the same line in Switzerland?
GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941, and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr. McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to initiate negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the Tribunal of the article in the Basler Nachrichten, of which I presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later, when presenting documentary evidences.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?
GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts which we undertook to avert this catastrophe.
DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?
GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.
DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?
GISEVIUS: No, a little later.
DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, et cetera, as a revolt movement, that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more aim at an assassination?
GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators, be stricken from the record.
DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals deserted us” was not a statement of fact...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it. It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say, and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group of conspirators.”
DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.”
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. DIX: [Turning to the witness.] If I recall correctly, you were just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further?
GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.
DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that?
GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.
DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you meet Schacht after that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered whether he was also going to be arrested.
DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has already been read into the record and is probably contained in my document book.
[Turning to the witness.] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on 20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?
DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly approaching the end now.
GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events.
DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination?
GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.
DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question.
You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in itself?
GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify to this here.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to ask questions of the witness?
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member?
GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that organization in 1933.
HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner?
GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way.
HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force?
GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the legal way.
HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization?
GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from 1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time.
HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to protest against being taken over into the SA?
GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also in the Third Reich.
HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a step?
GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA. After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism.
HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very uneasy in their new surroundings.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, against the Church, and so forth?
GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.
HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against Peace?
GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only say no.
HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA men were also put into concentration camps?
GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least tortured, and put into concentration camps.
HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace?
GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped your notice.
GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness.
HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes?
GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no” again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly did not know of such things and were not trained for them.
HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these people certainly should be punished.
You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.
HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied.
HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in opposition to the SA?
GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo.
HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against the members of the SA, and possibly how many?
GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.
HERR BÖHM: Yes.
GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way.
HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire SA?
GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from the SA?
GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.
I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.
GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost.
Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side.
At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were deserted.”
DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special connection?
GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on 20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW.
DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?
GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.
DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.
GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the revolts against the Third Reich.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military revolt was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: What was that?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?
GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.”
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked” is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.
DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the other hand...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final question.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, can you tell me the names of those generals who participated on the 20th of July?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a conspiracy. The question...
THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that the question be permitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September 1939.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May 1940 is considered decisive.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be different in 1944?
DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of their official positions, and I do consider this point important.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July 1944?
GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben, General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.
DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously commander-in-chief of an armored army?
GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.
DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?
GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who, from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about this?
GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his acquaintance.
DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff participate in the 20th of July?
GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.
DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?
GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side. I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally could not initiate into their plans beforehand.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector?
GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he courageously called the attention of his superiors to the inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described.
THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this was my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of the witness?
[There was no response.]
Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, you will save a great deal of time.
The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for Frick and for Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a correct statement of your position?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police matters in Germany.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of the police in the reorganization, was it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police Commissioner, whatever it might be called.
GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo methods; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means of that kind?
GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht joined your group; is that not a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also known a large number of other members of the group for a long time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way; is that not correct?
GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner.
GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to be possible to remove Hitler legally.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or deal with the Gestapo, except the Army.
GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a period, in the SA?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right?
GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police, and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad masses of the people altogether.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing?
GISEVIUS: That was our conviction.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their assistance finally?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected with your group knew that the war was lost.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life, and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July 20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not?
GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that Hitler would never win this war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures, knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?
GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement, were you not?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at the head of the government and this group of men behind him?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have been a communist bomb?
GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever present; is that not true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact?
GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had stepped into Hitler’s place, would it?
GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that man even for an hour.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi government?
GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long for their sentences.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with the exception of Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Yes, every man.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi conspiracy. Is that a fact?
GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of persons?
GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to death of thousands of persons?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands of innocent people?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where they were tortured and beaten and killed?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of property?
GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of persons hostile to the State.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and against others?
GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or were driven from office?
GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion which has just been described.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in that organization and its knowledge of its program?
GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary members of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first year as being politically unreliable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set up the Gestapo, did it not?
THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo.
GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization who was not in sympathy with its program?
GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had educated and trained their own criminal officials.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo must have known the criminal program of that organization?
GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might have to expect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which you made when you were connected with the police administration and you mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us?
GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done.
A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.
Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed accordingly.
That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the whole story.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?
GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war, while a police officer on the Eastern Front.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated, with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm affair. Didn’t you so testify?
GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation, as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June, through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that purge?
GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which, at that time, was an enormous figure.
I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to the Ministry of the Interior.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who were killed in that purge?
GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name; instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.”
There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived which was important, and I have already described that we reported all these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about the Röhm purge?
GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing, I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other innocent men who were murdered.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from you; is that the fact?
GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons?
GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has experienced now with the SA.”
I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact that Frick should speak so openly to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his Ministry of Interior?
GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under his legal control, were they not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and Frick remained their superior.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you exchanged with the Defendant Frick?
GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him since.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. Gisevius?
GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United States, which has not yet been offered in evidence.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not?
GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could consider him my friend.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication here apparently from him.
GISEVIUS: Gürtner?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views. But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such.
Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote:
“My dear Reich Minister!
“Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.
“This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners:
“1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps.
“2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk.
“3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness or for sadistic motives.”
I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text:
“The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and infected wounds.”
I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important.
“In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, et cetera. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst.
“In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps.
“In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of hunger.
“These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.
“In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your capacity as departmental minister competent for the establishment of protective custody, and the camps for protective custody.”
And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this read.
Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that communication by Frick?
GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment. The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was assassinated in Prague, was there not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some improvement in this condition?
GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at least the cruelties might be lessened.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that.
GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day. More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument as the Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you informed about that?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich took care to conceal his crimes.
With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, were discussed.
I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after everything he had gone through.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in town?
GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group.
To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those luncheon conferences?
GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures in the concentration camps, were discussed?
GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I received the description only a few minutes later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing?
GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in these notes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would reach Neurath?
GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath.
GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934 Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the highway near Oranienburg.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that?
GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of?
GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However, no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the Anschluss in Austria?
GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler, was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or 4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands?
GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time. Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his activities as Ambassador at Ankara.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point?
THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with this witness?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY Friday, 26 April 1946
Morning Session
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal:
Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Göring in saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who Herbert Göring was in relation to the defendant?
GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant Göring. I had known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters, warned me already years ago about the disaster which would overtake Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Göring should get a position of even the smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with the many characteristics of the defendant which all of us had come to know in the meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples, even to the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had some idea what to expect of the defendant.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you were making these investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them. Is that true?
GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was as capable in economics as he was, could enter into such a close relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered because, on the other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first day and in a thousand small ways resisted the Nazis, and the German public took pleasure in many sharp and humorous remarks which he made about the Nazis. Great was my bewilderment, until I actually met the man Schacht. And then...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have great influence with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of responsibility and power?
GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many Germans hoped to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, since they heard that he undertook many steps in that direction. I remember his activity in the Ministry of Economics, where officials who were not Party members...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I am anxious to get along with this, if I may interrupt you.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to Dr. Schacht fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the Gestapo, did you not?
GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and it is obvious that I...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand you, that Hitler and Göring did not know about these things.
GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most only a part.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, when Göring pushed him out of the economics office, did he not?
GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be wrong. I believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for support from Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him from the Party and the Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed warnings about Göring until late 1936 or 1937?
GISEVIUS: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would be no doubt, would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the rearmament program until he was superseded by Göring with the Four Year Plan?
GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like that exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the leading man in German economy, not only for rearmament but for all questions of German economy; rearmament was just one of them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand it, you too believed during all this period that under German constitutional law no war could be declared except by authority of the Reich Cabinet. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view of the German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and carried out by Hitler, in your view.
GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the position you were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime. Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that movement was successful?
GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the first time. At that time, according to the information which I received, Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an overthrow, he would be ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would be ready for anything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime and Hitler.
As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, and at the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators from the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the foreground together with Beck as the leading candidate for the position of Reich Chancellor, so that after that time we need speak only of Goerdeler in that regard.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a position of real leadership and power in the Reich.
GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions in the Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a very close friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One was the Chief of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered General Olbricht; the second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the Chief of the Army Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he was also murdered—and finally there was the chief of the armament economy department, General Thomas, who escaped being murdered as though by a miracle. A close friendship, I might say, bound me to these men, and thus from these men I found out exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW and in all Army matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in representing the Army in the eyes of the German people.
It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. But I must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were to be transmitted to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris or one of the other gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent report to Hitler of his own accord. Keitel took it over, and what he did not like he did not transmit, or he gave these men the official order to abstain from making such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men, telling them that they were to limit themselves exclusively to their own specialized sectors, and that he would not protect them with respect to any political utterance which was critical of the Party and the Gestapo, of the persecution of the Jews, the murders in Russia, or the anti-Church campaign, and, as he said later, he would not hesitate to dismiss these gentlemen from the Wehrmacht and turn them over to the Gestapo. I have read the notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris made in his diary. I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to this from the conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with the Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. He put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered that a special insult.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath him. Is that not true?
GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did control and command the entire OKW underneath him?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own inclinations may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring around him which kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium and Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counterintelligence was to produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I ask that this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted. The second was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral Canaris and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning of these mass murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo were being made for these infamous actions. We received the documents, through Nebe and others. Keitel was informed as to this in detail, and here again he did not resist at the beginning; and he who did not stop the Gestapo at the beginning can not be surprised if in the end a millionfold injustice was the upshot.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your question, “Did not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as though it applied only to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all defendants, I think it ought to be cleared up.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true.
[Turning to the witness.] Each of the defendants who held ministerial positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler from that particular ministry, did he not?
GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must reply cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von Neurath cannot be included in this group, for it was obvious that Von Papen and Von Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the defendants, did not have the possibility, or much later no longer had the possibility, of having regular access to Hitler, for besides Von Neurath, Hitler already had his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus I can only say that a certain group, which is surely well known, composed the close circle of which I am speaking.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of the defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not, to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, and to Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you have testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer?
GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are missing. Take the Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call your attention to the strange influence which this defendant had and the position he had with regard to controlling access to Hitler. I believe my testimony shows that Schacht, on the other hand, did not control access to Hitler, but that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which got through to Hitler from his and other ministries. As far as the defendant Frick is concerned, I do not believe that he was necessarily in a position to control access to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick centers in the matter of responsibility.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the group that had access to Hitler?
GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time, and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to see that affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank were conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk put his surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in preparing reports which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the preparation of those reports?
GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered material about the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men at the front, officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to the scene, prepared reports, made photographs, and this material came then to both Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how can we bring this material to Keitel? It was generally known that officers, even highly placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris and the others come under the suspicion that they were dealing with politics; we employed the roundabout method of preparing so-called counterintelligence agents’ reports from foreign countries or from occupied countries; and with the pretext that different agents from all countries were here reporting about these outrages, or that agents traveling through or in foreign countries had found such infamous photographs we then submitted these reports to Field Marshal Keitel.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate in submitting those reports to Keitel?
GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and the gathering of this material would have been inconceivable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being submitted?
GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally he even had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was only concerned that someone else should take his place at such times, usually his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the representative, Chief of Staff for Canaris, was also in close association with Canaris. Keitel could not have wished for closer contact with reality and truth than through this connection with the Chief of his Wehrmacht Counterintelligence Service.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to Keitel came from the highest men in his own organization under himself?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you if they reported to him that there was a systematic program of murder of the insane going on.
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were completed in detail including the despairing reports of the directors of the lunatic asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we had great difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we actually put them through as reports of foreign doctors who had heard of these things with indignation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being carried out?
GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder factories later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities that were committed in Poland against the Poles?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities in Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so horrible that we were still able to report on single cases, and could add the names of the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was spared nothing of the terrible truth.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing Keitel also prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other occupied countries?
GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities in Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, on the basis of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as to what was at hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation of these orders, such as the order for the shooting of commissars and the Night and Fog Decree, was continued for weeks in the OKW, so that, as soon as the preparation of these orders was begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to present a petition to Keitel. But I would like to add that I do not doubt that other courageous men also presented a petition to Keitel in this connection. Since I belonged to a certain group, the impression might be created that only in this group were there persons who were interested in these problems, and I would be withholding vital information if I did not add that even in the High Command of the OKW and in the General Staff there were excellent men who did everything to reach Keitel through their separate channels, and that there were also brave men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the forced enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation or importation into Germany?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the displaced persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany today, are they not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to say that in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility the Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people should be free some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and those who made the reports at that time can understand what has now taken place.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the persecution of the churches in the occupied countries?
GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special example how we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in the guise of agents. They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, and brought back very detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf thought about the persecution of the churches in Norway and other countries. I can still see this report before me because Keitel also wrote one of his well-known National Socialist Party phrases on this document.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of information furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports coming in from the field under this plan?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions about the SA and the SS organizations. In your book, which you have been asked about, I think you have characterized the SA as a private army of the Nazi organization. Is that a correct characterization?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle for power the SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi Party, did it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in the SA, and it got pretty large, and there came a time when there was some danger it would get away from them; wasn’t there?
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his associates was a struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and Himmler and the Nazi crowd associated with them on one hand and Röhm and his associates on the other?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA organization, which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, didn’t it?
GISEVIUS: Yes, completely.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and more compact organization, came in to take its place as a private army, didn’t it?
GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during the period before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm purge. What part did the SA play in the battle for power, the seizure of power?
GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the Brown Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant role in the so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would undoubtedly never have come to power.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. Perhaps I can shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you say that:
“Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up for him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive, therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned the new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, beside every marching SA column—and where were there no parades in those days—a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians a crack on the head right and left if they failed to perform the correct gesture at least three steps ahead of the SA flag. And these Storm Troopers acted the same way in all things.”
Is that a correct account of their activities and influence?
GISEVIUS: I hope so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you?
GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I cannot criticize it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, did you not? You were in Germany at that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, with all the documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the day to day events, and you were there and we were not.
Now, let me make another question:
“The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. It teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings, shootings, and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild men of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much idealism, but at the same time the SA was the repository for political derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge there. The discontents, the disinherited, the desperados streamed to it wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, and particularly the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, more and more from the riffraff of a period of political and social decay.”
Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes, quite.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another question:
“The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. The SA confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. The SA put people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves permanent auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the principles of the so-called system period (Weimar Republic). The worst problem for the helpless authorities was that the SA never returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone who gets into their clutches!
“From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one. ‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency of a Standartenführer was measured by the number of arrests he had made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the effectiveness with which he ‘educated’”—in quotation marks, the quotation marks being yours—“‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the ‘fight’ went on, only the blows were now struck in the full enjoyment of power.”
Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term “Bunker,” and it is a slightly technical term with which some of us are not familiar. Will you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker system of the SA was?
GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with thick walls in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they were then beaten and in a large measure beaten to death. They were these private jails in which, during the first months, the leaders of the leftist parties and of the trade unions were systematically rendered harmless, which explains the phenomenon that the leftist groups did not act again for so long a time, for there, at the outset and most thoroughly, the entire leadership was done away with.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “‘taking away’ became the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” is in quotation marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” what it means?
GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives often for periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor victims had disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned home.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation in your book:
“Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of the National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of official sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new excess. It was the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration camps. The growth in brutality and insensibility of the general public, which toward the end of the revolution extended far beyond the domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable consequence of this first irresponsible attempt to give free rein to the Brown Shirts for their acts of violence.”
Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA?
GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions in Germany.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I understand you, after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned as the private army, and a more reliable and smaller and more compact private army was created under Himmler.
GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler long before this time now actually came into action. I do not doubt that Himmler and his closest circle for years had worked toward this very objective so that one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective guard), they could establish the terror system in Germany. But until 30 June the SS had been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse me, Röhm was also the chief of the SS. The road for Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief of evil, was only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much larger SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have existed in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous to that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its members with great care, did it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the qualifications for membership? What was necessary?
GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. Actually I always considered these questionnaires as a good subject for a humorous paper, and for that reason I am not in a position today to give you exact particulars, except that, if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing characteristics of men and women went so far as underarm perspiration. I recall that Heydrich and Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do police duty, decided only after a picture had been submitted to them of the future victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil commands. I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials in the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the ranks of the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these people so that, as far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that case, of course, they were turned down immediately. But it would be going too far afield to relate more about these dismal things in this courtroom.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS recruited only from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable Nazis?
GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first years of the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers and people in the country, felt drawn to the SS, because they believed Himmler’s assurance that the SS was to bring order to Germany and to be a counterbalance to the SA terror. In that way, to my knowledge, some people in the years before 1933, and even in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they hoped that here would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I believe it is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, a member was guilty or whether he remained decent.
But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified yesterday 1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS objectives. From then on—here I would like to take up your own expression—fanatical National Socialists, that is, “super” National Socialists, entered the SS.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your judgment as one who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the persons who entered it knew what its actual activities were?
GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders he had to expect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you in reference to yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. I know nothing further on that incident, in reference to the threat made. Is there anything that you wish to add about that incident in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, anything that has not been told about it?
GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not merely inform me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. That morning I arrived in the room of the attorneys, and I do not wish to state further particulars, but the atmosphere there was not exactly cordial to begin with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report something else. Dr. Stahmer approached, obviously very excited, and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate interview. Dr. Dix refused on the ground that he was talking to me. Dr. Stahmer said in a loud voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately and urgently. Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation that followed was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney Dr. Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer is carrying on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and after all this fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely was the demand of the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had half heard anyway. I would like to underline that if I had had the opportunity to tell the story first in my own way, I would have emphasized that I was under the impression that Dr. Stahmer had merely transmitted a statement, or rather what I would call a threat, by the Defendant Göring.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler came to power, will you state whether there was, as far as you could see, a systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi officials enriching themselves by reasons of their confiscation of property of Jews and others?
GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year and we kept lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, which of the generals and field marshals participated in this system. We planned to inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later date whether these donations had been put into a bank account or whether they had possibly used this money for their own personal interests.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal which of the defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the manner that you have indicated?
GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply since we repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht...
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more questions which I would like to put to you in reference to the war and the resistance movement of which you were a part.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question I should like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists of the ministers and generals who participated in this system of spoils. What was your source of information?
GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, from antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. But I did not finish the answer before. I said that I could answer the question as to which of the defendants had enriched himself only in the negative.
Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying that I personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part only in the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally had not enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any sense, therefore, that all the defendants, especially Defendants Von Papen or Von Neurath, to name only these two, had enriched themselves. I do not know. I wanted to say only that about Schacht we know, or rather I know, that he did not take part in that system.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils from confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to the generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property and money?
GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, especially in the years after the outbreak of the war, the top generals were systematically corrupted.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference to many of the ministers?
GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, whatever doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair Fritsch occurred, that event or series of events convinced even Schacht that Hitler was bent on aggressive warfare.
GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that now radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be stopped.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the minds of all of you men who were in the resistance movement, was there, that the attack on Poland of September 1939 was aggression on Hitler’s part?
GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting whatever wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the Corridor and Danzig had not been exhausted?
GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There was no will for peace.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, as I understand you, there was agreement that you wanted to obtain various modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you also wanted various economic betterments for Germany, just as other people wanted them. That was always agreed upon, was it not?
GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable balance could be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications of the Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of peaceful negotiations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group was chiefly, in reference to that matter, one of method.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand you, it was the position of your group that a war would result disastrously for Germany as well as for the rest of the world.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, given a little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means.
GISEVIUS: Absolutely.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference of opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against the regime in power in Germany carried out these proposals for Putsche and assassinations which you have described.
GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only thinking of the great dangers outside, but we also realized what dangers lay in such a system of terror. From the very beginning there was a group of people in Germany who still did not even think of the possibility of war, and nevertheless protested against injustice, the deprivation of liberty, and the fight against religion.
In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but if I may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very first moment on, among all classes of people, in all professional circles, and in all age groups, there were people who were ready to fight, to suffer, and to die for that idea.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as to what your motives and what your purposes in this resistance movement were with reference to the German people, and I shall ask you to state to the Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting the Government in power in your country.
GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a rich harvest among the members of the resistance movement, that it is only for that reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more worthy and able men could give this answer. Having said this, I feel that I can answer that, whether Jew or Christian, there were people in Germany who believed in the freedom of religion, in justice, and human dignity, not only for Germany but also, in their profound responsibility as Germans, for the higher concept of Europe and the world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed this resistance, as I understand it.
GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals had to carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death rather than confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few persons have enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a group.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated with you in this movement are dead?
GISEVIUS: Almost all of them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add to clarify your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius?
GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add in order that the Tribunal may understand your position in this, your feeling, your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand and appraise your own relation to this situation?
GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank you, Mr. Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify emphatically on behalf of the dead and the living.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination.
MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with Counsel for the Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant Frick should only be cross-examined by one prosecutor?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with the prosecutors to the effect that the examination of the Defendant Schacht and his witnesses will be carried out by the American Prosecution, but that, in the presence of additional questions during cross-examination, the prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could also join in the examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet Prosecution has several additional questions to ask the witness Gisevius, which are of great importance to the case, I ask permission to address these questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of particular importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual questions but the general nature of them.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part played by the Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions connected with the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Hitler regime, as well as a number of other important questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider whether the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine this witness in addition to the cross-examination which has already taken place.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents which were presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject of cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was provided that the following procedure for the cross-examination of the Defendants Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, and Funk was agreed; and that with reference to Frick the American Prosecution was to conduct the cross-examination of the defendant and his witness. The document was presented because of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time should not be taken up by the cross-examination by more than one prosecutor.
In addition to that document there was another document, which was only a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant Schacht it provided that the American delegation should conduct the principal cross-examination and the Soviet and the French delegations should consider whether either would wish to follow.
In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that the Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the witnesses of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively suggests that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the Soviet and the French might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal propose to allow the additional cross-examination in the present instance, and they are loath to lay down any hard and fast rule concerning cross-examination. They hope, however, that in the present instance, after the full cross-examination by the Prosecutor of the United States, the Soviet Prosecutor will make his cross-examination as short as possible. For the future, the Tribunal hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree among themselves that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination only will be sufficient, and that in any event the additional cross-examination will be made as brief as possible.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you to answer my questions as briefly as possible.
Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and the Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the second World War?
GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I left the Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually cannot say any more about conditions after that time than any other German, that is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of the German government machine and doubtlessly there, as in all other ministries, those preparations for war were made which administrations have to make in such cases.
DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has just stated that he could not say any more in answering that question than any other German could. I believe that, under these circumstances, the witness is not the right person to make any factual statements.
THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly what he said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The witness said so.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even function as a witness concerning these facts.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived of all possibility to put these questions to any German, but I am perfectly satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you know anything about the so-called “Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for Economy, and of a representative of the OKW. This Three Man College was entrusted with the preparation of all fundamental questions pertaining to the war.
GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities of the Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the Germans?
GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent important officials into the military administration, but it is not clear to me whether these officials, from that moment on, were subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior or the OKW.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to whether the machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of the Interior or at least with considerable help from this ministry?
GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help is concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories could take its officials only from the personnel department of the Ministry of the Interior.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by the Defendant Frick to the concentration camps?
GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the Interior I did not hear anything about that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that?
GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant Frick, although Minister of the Interior, would not be informed regarding the system of concentration camps established in Germany and of the violence and lawlessness practiced in the camps?
GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive information as to the fact that we were informed about everything.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested in the Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this connection?
GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the Interior received numberless calls for help from all over the country, and yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of Justice. Also I have referred...
THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question.
[Turning to the witness.] Are you acquainted with the secret law issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons and the old?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Frick towards the promulgation and enforcing of this law?
GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it.
THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, was it not? What is the law that you are putting? If it was in 1935, then this witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was promulgated in 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any more than anybody else.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I have received from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed to questions concerning the Defendant Schacht?
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, you were in close relations with the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have I understood you correctly?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted with the state and political activities of the Defendant Schacht?
GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the part played by the Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power?
GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know Schacht, and about which I cannot give any information.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it?
GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that without doubt he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting engineered by Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in February 1933?
GISEVIUS: No.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was created by the industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success of the Nazi Party at the elections. What do you know about this meeting?
GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I wrote that to my knowledge the largest amount for the election campaign in 1932 was given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a member of the Rhein-Hessian iron and steel industry group.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant Schacht on this occasion?
GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr district, and I also do not know whether he was there at that time. I emphasize again that I did not know him at all.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled Until the Bitter End, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably described the Defendant Schacht; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the Defendant Schacht; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes, yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant Schacht was in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed these opinions in a fairly open manner; is that true?
GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his suspicions were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of Hitler during the Fritsch crisis.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis?
GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch crisis was at the beginning of 1938.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime in Germany, could a situation arise where Hitler would not be informed as to these opposite views of Schacht which, according to you, existed at the end of 1937?
GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, under the then existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not informed as to this antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical towards the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. He often received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great deal, too. But he did not know how far that opposition went.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the Government of the Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler, right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, was fully aware of his critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy?
GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals disappear quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda could not take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case is not the only one in which Hitler tried to camouflage an open crisis.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from Hitler of 19 January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time was being relieved of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I should like to remind you of the contents of that letter in which Hitler writes to Schacht as follows:
“I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post of President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to thank you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you have repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany and to me personally, during long and arduous years. Above all else, your name will be connected forever with the first period of national rearmament. I am happy that you will now be able, as Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution of new tasks...”
THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the witness.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question to put to the witness in connection with this letter.
[Turning to the witness.] It would appear, from the contents of this letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How do you reconcile this divergence of opinion with your assertion that the Defendant Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s regime towards the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938?
GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed to consider any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. That man always said only that which seemed opportune to him at the moment to deceive the world or Germany. In this particular case Hitler intended to avoid the impression that Schacht’s resignation would cause a difficult economic crisis. But I am only saying now what Hitler could have had in his mind. Yesterday I described with what indignation Schacht received that letter. He considered it derision and debasement.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, to a letter from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a memorandum of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler:
“From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that the fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained if this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the financing of the armament program, despite the monetary and political difficulties involved. The justification of this consisted in the necessity, which far outweighed all other arguments, of manufacturing arms immediately, ex nihilo, often even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which would command respect.”
Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s attitude?
GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter from the year 1935, is that correct?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939.
GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said yesterday: that all these letters were very carefully written so that they could not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents of the letter made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a personal attack on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to convince the other conservative ministers, who were not so much against Hitler, about the actual situation and neutralize any opposition.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Anschluss?
GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the Fritsch crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why we were firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent case of camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no doubt that the German Army was to be diverted outwards...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if you knew what the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question at that time. You are not answering that question. Do you or do you not know?
GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because all of us saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in a legal way. There were differences of opinion with regard to this question in our group. Most of us hoped that the independence of Austria could be preserved. Especially from the German point of view, it was desirable that another independent German State should exist, if at any later time there should be a League of Nations or diplomatic negotiations. However, I cannot state under oath whether Schacht personally was of that opinion or whether he was for an outright annexation. He was certainly against the method.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech made by Schacht in Vienna, in March 1938:
“Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler has created a community of German will and thought, he supported it with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and thereby gave an outward form to this spiritual union of Germany and Austria.”
Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions of his opposition to the Hitler regime?
GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its entirety. I personally would not have said it, but I do not know whether pure judgment on my part here serves any purpose. Would it not be better to ask Schacht what he meant?
THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he goes into the witness box, if he does.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing in Switzerland? In which town?
GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland?
GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in Switzerland in 1943?
GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942?
GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland either in 1942 or 1943?
GISEVIUS: That is correct.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in Switzerland, did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 weeks or 8 weeks and until 1943...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit to Switzerland.
GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland by Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and then I saw him.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was published in the newspaper Basler Nachrichten, entitled “What Schacht Thinks.” Do you know anything about that article?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article?
GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have tried to find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the conversation.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me.
One last question: Did you know anything about a conference held at Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when the advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, in the case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did you hear anything about that conference?
GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any more, because there were proceedings against me, and I heard nothing about that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the witness?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination the American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of 14 May 1935 by the Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure which mentions a copy of a letter by an inspector of the Secret State Police. Witness, did I understand you correctly to say that you personally assisted in writing that letter?
GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, if a letter of a severe nature came from another ministry, for me to present it to my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick was also glad when he received a sharp letter, so that he could submit a matter in a general way and before the Cabinet. Thus I remember that the sending of that letter was discussed in advance with several gentlemen of the Ministry of Justice and with myself.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that the letter was a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror?
GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at that time a member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did not speak to my chief about that point.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the German text the following sentence—I quote:
“In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at regular intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the scalp.”
Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished for that?
GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding exception.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. That is in connection with the statement which you just made, that there was an atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of the attorneys due to the incident which has been mentioned. A number of colleagues are deeply shocked by that statement of yours, and these colleagues were glad that you described conditions in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether that statement you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel?
GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity to correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding which was created by my statement. I meant a different incident which occurred as I entered the counsel room, about which I do not want to speak any further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize the difficult task of the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize if in any way the impression was created or might be created that I had reproached the great majority of the Defense Counsel in the carrying out of their difficult task.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some questions to try and get clear what your various positions were and where you were at various times.
As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant was in the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil servant even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I received my first real position as an official in August of 1933 when I entered the Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position?
GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go?
GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is to say, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the year 1934 I also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in May of 1935 I was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior.
Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich Criminal Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium in Berlin. On the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief of Police, on 17 June 1936, I was finally dismissed from the police service.
I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, worked there in price control supervision, and, in the middle of 1937, I took an unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in economics. That vacation was canceled by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1939, and I was attached to the Government office in Potsdam near Berlin. There I had to do with road building...
THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid service and studied in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid vacation.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil service then, did you?
GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil service.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that?
GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October 1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences.
After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation. At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate General in Zürich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man, without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July.
After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and 20 July, were you returning to Germany from time to time?
GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation.
THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August to December 1933, what was your actual job or function?
GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial.
THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What was his position?
GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became an SS Gruppenführer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him, just like the Gestapo Chief Müller.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment at a quarter past 2.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But the form...” Would you please complete your answer now?
GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed to the Anschluss in this form.
DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave you permission to make use of this explanation at any time.
I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I think that is a most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there is anything the Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix should tell the witness what the witness should tell the Tribunal.
Now, I have no objection to the witness’ relating to the Tribunal anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object to the witness’ being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him he may tell the Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of clarifying it.
DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about Dr. Stahmer to Dr. Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness and myself; I consider it important that this remark of mine be related and testified to by the witness. It is an incident which he observed, and I prefer that the witness should confirm the fact that I explained this to him. I cannot see anything irregular about this procedure, and I ask for a decision by the Tribunal. Otherwise I should make the explanation myself, but I consider it better for the witness to say what I told him immediately after that incident.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly put the question to the witness.
DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer it at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question was, but the Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was there anything in connection with the incident which the witness has not already told us, which he wishes to say?
DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between the witness and myself.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday?
GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your colleague Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon me but that this undue pressure came rather from the Defendant Göring.
DR. DIX: I have no further questions.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine?
DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question...
THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you would take up, but the question of whether you ought to be allowed to put any question. Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time active in the intelligence service of a foreign power?
GISEVIUS: At no time.
DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to put to this witness in re-examination.
DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness, who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in the intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have an important bearing on the credibility of the witness.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In the first place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected to any attacks. In the second place, I respectfully submit that it does not militate against the credibility of the witness that he should have opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the attack upon the credibility of this witness, if there were one to be made—he is sworn on behalf of the defendants and is not the Prosecution’s witness—the attack is not timely, is not a proper attack, and the substance of it does not go to credibility.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the question.
DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your oath.
GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to remind me of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence service of a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, clean German cause.
DR. SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any power at war with Germany?
GISEVIUS: No.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: What do they stand for?
GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service.
DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization?
GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several members of this organization.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants’ counsel will remember that they have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine this witness already and have not...
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The person of Herr Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination by the American prosecutor. Therefore I could not ask questions before.
Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the American chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant Von Papen at any time protested. Of course, you modified this by pointing out that some written communication by Von Papen had not been addressed to the Ministry of the Interior.
In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether this assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. On Page 133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant Von Papen’s main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted in handing in protests and that he addressed these protests above all to Hindenburg and Göring.
GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or today. I have no official knowledge of any protest made by Von Papen to the competent police minister after 30 June 1934. I can say only that it would greatly have strengthened the position of the ministry of police if a protest of that nature, describing in detail the murder of Von Papen’s closest co-workers, had reached the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it is unlikely that this rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious death of Von Bose and Jung would have reached the public.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, especially considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively insignificant and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one should make such protests to higher authorities if it is possible to do so?
GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the position that they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, the dictator himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet.
It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that time had used the prescribed channels.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not dispute the fact that Von Papen made many protests to these higher authorities in respect to other questions as well?
GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general statements you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant Von Papen. This character sketch coincides with the one you gave in your book. In your book you pay special attention to certain details and draw your conclusions from them.
Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively small amount of space in your book and you probably had nothing to do with him in your official capacity, you must have had to base your statements on second-hand information. Since all these statements, as far as they refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I refer to them briefly.
First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the events of 30 June, Von Papen did not resign.
On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send in his resignation after the suppression of his Marburg speech, that negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler and Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen’s resignation immediately after the latter’s release on 3 July, when it was again tendered, but did not intend to make it public until a later date, in spite of Papen’s request to the contrary.
Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of this internal event?
GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known of internal events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a minister or vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain amount of publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say only that, whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he contrived with consummate skill to conceal from the German people the fact that he intended to resign—or had already resigned; and that is the point.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant Von Papen had had a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, when the press was forbidden to publish his speech at Marburg, which contained a frank statement of his opinions, and warning was given that persons found circulating it would be punished?
GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that a Vice Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be silenced in such a way. I believe that the 30th of June would not have involved such a heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice Chancellor Von Papen had given a manly “no”—a definite “no” at the proper time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the point which I raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned because the publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited.
Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part in the Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that the measures involved by 30 June were legal as emergency measures for the protection of the State. Is it known to you that Von Papen did not participate in this session, that he had just been released and went into the Chancellery while the session was in progress, that Hitler asked him to go from the session-room into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again tendered his resignation, which Hitler accepted, and that he left the Chancellery immediately afterwards, without participating in the session at all?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the witness to follow your questions, but they are so long and contain so many statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody else to follow them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von Papen did not attend the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question to the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the witness whether he knows whether he did participate or not? If that is the question you want to ask why do you not ask it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out whether the assertion to the contrary which appears in his book can also be explained by an error in information obtained from a third party.
GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, through the silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the public and by which I myself was misled.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that Von Papen, although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did not make a sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. Is it known to you that Von Papen did everything in his power to reach Hindenburg but was kept away from him and he did not reach Hindenburg’s estate at Neudeck until after the 30th of June, after Hindenburg’s death? Can the assertion to the contrary contained in your book be traced back to an error in information?
GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President of the Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that there were foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and even a large number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a German vice chancellor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he was a retired vice chancellor and had already been out of office for several weeks.
Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended the Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June were justified. Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that session in spite of Hitler’s summons to him to do so? Is it possible that you could have been informed incorrectly on that point, too?
GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is the Reichstag session.
GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
[Dr. Laternser approached the lectern.]
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense has had every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After the witness was examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, the Defense makes again an application to cross-examine the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is perfectly able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions of this sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he makes his application to cross-examine.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to say that we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings as much as possible, and the Prosecution would like the Defense to consider that the same way.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions to put to the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I assume that the Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him.
THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination of him.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question of the American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a Putsch against the then existing regime would have been possible only with the co-operation of the generals but that the many discussions which took place did not achieve this co-operation. I should like to ask you, Witness, to which generals you spoke personally about the existing plans for a Putsch on the part of your group?
THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general in the German Army; you are only concerned with those who are charged with being a criminal group.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, or with reference to them.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court’s permission to describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff circle so that he can answer my question.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether he had contact with any members of the General Staff who are charged with being a criminal group. You know who the generals are.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks to the witness and then put the question. Witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put?
DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question within the limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give the witness a brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually belonging to this group and then ask him with which of these persons he talked personally in order to win them over for the Putsch intended by his groups. Otherwise...
THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW is held to include the holders of certain appointments from February 1938 to May 1945. These appointments are as follows: The Commanders-in-Chief of the various branches of the Armed Forces...
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, are you, 130 of them?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short and otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said was, are you proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or officers?
DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain appointments; briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief during the period February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, with which generals of this group did you personally discuss the subject of Putsch plans, in order to obtain their co-operation in a Putsch, if such were made?
GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups?
DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the Wehrmacht, and General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches.
GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch.
DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in the affirmative and acted in the negative.
I spoke to Halder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer. At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have talked to other individuals falling within this category.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but to discuss Putsch plans with a high-ranking military leader is an event of some importance; if you had had a discussion of this kind with a field marshal you would surely remember it.
GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, Mr. Attorney. Field marshals were not such important people in the Third Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals were spoken to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this point is very important because it would exclude the assumption of a conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good answering me that a point is very important. What I asked you was, how is it relevant to show that these generals discussed a revolt against the regime? That, I am putting to you, is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the assumption of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it.
DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime in Germany is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the conspiracy to carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which has to do with a revolt against the regime in Germany is not relevant to the question which you have to deal with.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed precisely in connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high military leaders turned against the regime to such an extent that they discussed and even attempted a Putsch, there would be no question of conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper way of putting the question, which they understand you want to put, is to ask which of the generals were prepared to join in a revolt. You may put that question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the circle as a whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness how many of them he spoke to and how many of those declared themselves ready to act with him.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him—how many. Ask him how many.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked at the beginning.
THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, with how many generals of this group did you discuss the matter?
GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or several dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine. As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that, unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention of helping to overthrow the system.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to know. You spoke to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witzleben?
GISEVIUS: And Olbricht.
DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did speak to these three, then?
GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge.
DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch?
GISEVIUS: Yes, of course.
DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did Field Marshal Von Witzleben agree?
GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the only one who stuck to his word.
DR. LATERNSER: Then he did participate in this Putsch?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did I understand you correctly when you said yesterday that the Putsch of 20 July originated mainly with the Wehrmacht, that is, with the generals and the officers of the General Staff, and that they intended to keep down as far as possible the number of those taking part?
GISEVIUS: No, I did not make such an exact statement as that. Under a terror regime, only the military circles are in a position to carry out a Putsch; to this extent it is true to say that these few generals who participated were the mainstay of the Putsch. But on 20 July the main weight lay with the wide front of the civilians who for years had fought for the generals and were invariably disappointed by the generals. For this reason alone, because the generals had repeatedly broken their word, we decided this time that on 20 July we would wait until the generals had really taken action, in order not to raise the hopes or burden the conscience of many civilians all to no purpose. That is what I meant by limitation.
DR. LATERNSER: Then the only Putsch which was actually attempted was effected by generals and General Staff officers?
GISEVIUS: And civilians.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And the head of this group was, as you testified, Generaloberst Beck?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: And he also belonged to the group indicated under the name General Staff and OKW. Now, I have a further question: Do you know of relations between these military leaders and the Minister of Finance Popitz, who also had designs for a Putsch and is even said to have negotiated with Himmler for the purpose of doing away with Hitler; and do you know anything about that?
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is true. Popitz made great efforts to incite the generals to make a Putsch and to assassinate him. I regret that I did not mention his name at the right time. He too was one of those who, from 1938 or 1939 on, did their best to overthrow the regime.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you discuss that with Minister Popitz?
GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly.
DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you anything about the identity of the high military leaders he had contacted for this purpose?
GISEVIUS: Popitz was in contact with Beck in particular. He is certain to have been in contact with Witzleben; he was in touch with Halder and Brauchitsch. The list of his disappointments is no shorter than the list of disappointments which all the rest of us had.
DR. LATERNSER: Did he himself call it a disappointment?
GISEVIUS: Yes, he was bitterly disappointed. This bitter, everlasting disappointment was our one topic of conversation, and that was the difficulty confronting the civilians, Mr. Attorney.
DR. LATERNSER: There were no other possible ways of doing away with Hitler?
GISEVIUS: No. Since, through the fault of the generals, there was no other means of power, constitutional or otherwise, left in Germany, and the generals, who were the only armed power of the nation, took their orders from Hitler, it was impossible to organize opposition through any other circles. I may remind you that after 1938 every attempt made by the Leftists to organize a strike was punishable in the same way as mutiny in time of war, and I remind you of the hundreds of death sentences imposed on civilians under the war laws.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, a different subject. When...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that this matter has been fully covered and is really not relevant. You have already cross-examined this witness at some length before this, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear any further evidence on this subject in any further cross-examination.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just finished.
Witness, as regards the Fritsch crisis, when did you...
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had concluded?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am afraid I was misunderstood. I have concluded those questions referring to an intended Putsch and I should like to pass on to another point now and put a question on the Fritsch crisis.
THE PRESIDENT: What question?
DR. LATERNSER: As regards the Fritsch crisis I should like to ask the witness when he learned of the exact state of affairs and whether he transmitted his knowledge to high military leaders or caused that knowledge to be transmitted to them.
THE PRESIDENT: But the Fritsch crisis has nothing to do with the charges against the High Command. The charges against the High Command are crimes under the Charter, and the Fritsch crisis has nothing whatever to do with that.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw that question.
Witness, today in cross-examination...
THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to put to him now?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness now about some points which he made in reply to the American chief prosecutor’s questions. I believe that some clarification is necessary here.
THE PRESIDENT: The principle is not whether you think the clarification is necessary, but whether the Tribunal thinks it; and, therefore, the Tribunal wishes to know what points you wish to put to him.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed. In the course of his testimony today the witness mentioned the fact that he had in his possession documentary evidence of murders in Poland and Russia. I wanted to ask him who had prepared these reports and in particular whether he is acquainted with a very thorough and scientifically prepared report made by Blaskowitz, commander in Poland, and intended for transmission to his superiors. That would be an extremely important point. Generaloberst Blaskowitz is a member of the group which I represent. From the facts to be shown, it is clear that the members of this group have always taken a stand against cruelty, if such cases were reported to them through official channels. I must therefore establish whether these reports, the object of which was to prevent atrocities, are to be ascribed to the co-operation of generals belonging to the indicted group.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It seems to me, if I may suggest, Your Honors, that counsel is under the apprehension that he has here to deal with individual generals. We are dealing only with the group. If what counsel says about General Blaskowitz is true, that is a defense for him, and I am right to say that General Blaskowitz did defy this Nazi conspiracy. And if that fact is ever verified, he certainly should not be subject to penalties for the acts which he stood up against.
It seems to me that we are going into individual defenses here under a misapprehension that this is the occasion to try each and every one of the generals. We made no charge against them that they either did or did not have a Putsch or a Fritsch affair. The Fritsch affair is only referred to here as fixing the time when the Defendant Schacht became convinced that aggressive warfare was the purpose of the Nazi regime. The Putsch is only introduced because in his defense Schacht says he tried to induce a Putsch. It enters not at all into the case against the General Staff. And most of the General Staff who took any part in the Putsch were hanged and I cannot see how it could be any defense to those who remained and are under trial that a Putsch was or was not conducted. It seems that we are off the main track.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I would like to define my position with regard to this point. Unless I am permitted to ask questions about the attitude of the members of this group and in respect to such an important point, from which it is clear that they combated atrocities, it is impossible for me to make clear to the Tribunal the attitude typical of the high military leaders. It is absolutely necessary for me to follow up such points, especially since I have no other evidence material at my disposal; for I cannot consider a group criminal unless—for instance—the majority of its members actually committed crimes. I must be in a position to ask in this case what position Generaloberst Blaskowitz took in regard to the murders which took place in Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal considers that the questions that you have been putting, if relevant at all, are only extremely remotely relevant, and they cannot allow the cross-examination to continue for any length of time, or the time of the Tribunal would be wasted further. They think, and they rule, that you may put the question which they understand you desire to put in this form: The witness has spoken of reports which were received by the group of which he has spoken about atrocities in the East, and they think you may ask him who submitted those reports.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like you to answer this question: With whom did these reports of murders in Poland and Russia originate?
GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz during the first few months of the Polish campaign on the basis of information received by him and the military offices under him. Beyond that, as far as I know, such reports were compiled only by the group Canaris-Oster. But I should not care to assert that another report was not written by someone else somewhere.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst Blaskowitz submitted?
GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended...
THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general made does not tend to show that the group was either innocent or criminal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what the attitude of the group was.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one general is not evidence as to the criminality of the whole group.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? I asked about the aim of the report.
THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what was contained in that report is not admissible.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
Dr. Pannenbecker, that concludes your case, does it?
DR. PANNENBECKER: The case of the Defendant Frick is hereby concluded, except for the answers to the interrogatories which I have not yet received.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Counsel for the Defendant Streicher, Dr. Marx, go on.
DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): With the permission of the Tribunal, Mr. President, I now call the Defendant Julius Streicher to the witness box.
[The Defendant Streicher took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
JULIUS STREICHER (Defendant): Julius Streicher.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Witness, would you give the Tribunal first a short description of your career?
STREICHER: I should like to ask the Tribunal to let me make a brief statement in respect to my defense. Firstly...
THE PRESIDENT: You really ought to answer the questions that are put to you.
STREICHER: My Lord, my defense counsel cannot say what I must say now. I should like to ask permission—in short, my defense counsel has not conducted and was not in a position to conduct my defense in the way I wanted; and I should like to state this to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you understand that the Tribunal does not wish to have its time taken up with unnecessary matters. It has no objection to your stating what is material or to your reading it if necessary. It hopes that you will be as brief as possible.
STREICHER: I mention only facts, four facts.
Firstly, the Charter created for this International Military Tribunal guarantees the defendant the right to an unhampered and just defense.
Secondly, before the Trial began the defendants received a list containing the names of the attorneys from whom the defendant could choose his counsel. Since the Munich attorney whom I had selected for my defense could no longer be put at my disposal, I asked the Military Tribunal to put the Nuremberg attorney Dr. Marx at my disposal. That was done.
Thirdly, when I met my counsel for the first time, I told him he must expect, as my counsel, to be attacked before the public. Shortly afterwards, an attack was made by a Communist newspaper published in the Russian zone of Berlin. The International Tribunal was compelled to make a public statement repudiating the attack of that newspaper and assuring my counsel of the express protection of the Military Tribunal.
Fourthly, although the statement made by the International Military Tribunal left no doubt as to the fact that the Tribunal wished to see the defense of the defendants unhampered, a renewed attack occurred, this time by radio. The announcer said, “There are camouflaged Nazis and anti-Semites among the defendants’ counsel.” That these terroristic attacks were made with the intention of intimidating the defendants’ counsel is clear. These terror attacks might have contributed to the fact—that is my impression—that my own counsel had refused to submit to the Tribunal a large number of pieces of evidence which I considered important.
Fifthly, I wish to state that I have not been afforded the possibility of making an unhampered and just defense before this International Military Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that the Tribunal will see that everything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, bears upon the case or is relevant to your case or is in any way material in your case will be presented and that you will be given the fairest opportunity of making your defense.
STREICHER: I thank you. From my life...
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President; may I ask briefly to be permitted to state my position. May it please the Court, when I was asked to take over Herr Streicher’s defense, I naturally had grave misgivings. I have...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I do not think it is necessary, really, for you to make any personal explanation at this stage. It is very possible that the defendant may have different ideas about his own defense. I think we had better let him go on with his defense.
DR. MARX: Nevertheless, I should like to ask permission, Mr. President, just to mention the following point: As attorney and as defense counsel of a defendant I have to reserve for myself the right to decide how I shall conduct the defense. If the client is of the opinion that certain documents or books are relevant, and the attorney is of the opinion that they are not, then that is a difference of opinion between the counsel and his client.
If Herr Streicher is of the opinion that I am incapable or not in a position to conduct his defense, then he should ask for another defense counsel. I am aware that at this stage of the proceedings it would be very difficult for me to follow the matter to its logical conclusion and ask to be relieved of this task of defense. I am not terrorized by any journalist, but for a counsel to lose the confidence of his own client is quite another matter; and for that reason I feel bound to ask the Court to decide whether in these circumstances I am to continue to defend my client.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, Dr. Marx, that the explanation and the statement which you have just made is in accordance with the traditions of the legal profession and they think therefore that the case ought to proceed and that you should proceed with the case. Now, Defendant, will you go on?
STREICHER: About my life: I was born on 12 February 1885 in a small village in Bavaria Swabia. I was the youngest of nine children. My father was an elementary school teacher. I too became a teacher at an elementary school. In 1909, after I had taught for several years in my native district, I was called to the municipal school in Nuremberg. Here I had the opportunity of contact with the families of the working-class children in the suburbs and of observing social contrasts. This experience led to my decision in 1911 to go into politics. I became a member of the Democratic Party. As a young democratic speaker, I spoke at the Reichstag election in 1912. The car put at my disposal was paid for by the banking firm of Kohn. I stress this point because at that time I had occasion to associate a good deal with Jews, even in the Democratic Party. I must therefore have been fated to become later on a writer and speaker on racial politics.
The World War came and I, too, went into the army as a lance corporal in an infantry regiment. Then I became an officer in a machine-gun unit. I returned home with both Iron Crosses, with the Bavarian Order, and the rare Austrian Cross of Merit attached to the Ribbon for Gallantry. When I had returned home, I had no desire to go into politics again. I intended only to stay in private life and devote myself to my profession. Then I saw the blood-red posters of revolution in Germany and for the first time I joined the raging masses of that time. At a meeting, when the speaker had finished, I asked to be heard as an unknown person. An inner voice sent me onto the platform and I spoke. I joined in the debate and I spoke on recent happenings in Germany. In the November revolution of 1918 the Jews and their friends had seized the political power in Germany. Jews were in the Reich Cabinet and in all the provincial governments. In my native Bavaria the Minister President was a Polish Jew called Eisner-Kosmanowsky. The reaction among the middle classes in Germany manifested itself in the form of an organization known as Schutz und Trutzbund (Society for Protective and Offensive Action). Local branches of this organization were formed in all the large cities in Germany; and fate willed that after I had again spoken at a gathering, a man came up to me and asked me to come to the Kulturverein (Cultural Society) in the Golden Hall and hear what they had to say there.
In this way, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I became involved in what brings me here today. Destiny made of me what international propaganda thought it had made. I was called a bloodhound—a blood czar of Franconia; my honor was attacked, a criminal was paid 300 marks to swear in this very hall that he had seen me, as an officer in France during the war, rape a Madame Duquesne, a teacher’s wife in Atis, near Peronne. It was 2 years before someone betrayed him and the truth came out.
Gentlemen, the receipt for 300 marks was produced here in this court. With 300 marks they tried to deprive me of my honor.
I mention this case only because my case is a special case; and if it is to be judged with justice, then I must be allowed to make such a remark in passing. In this connection, I may say that it is no coincidence that the first question asked me by the Soviet Russian officer who interrogated me was whether I was a sex criminal.
Gentlemen, I told you how I was fated to be drawn into the Schutz und Trutzbund. I told you what conditions were like in Germany at the time, and it was therefore quite a natural development that I no longer visited the centers of revolution to join in debate. I felt myself impelled to call meetings of my own and so I spoke for perhaps 15 years almost every Friday before about 5,000 to 6,000 people. I admit quite frankly that I went on making speeches over a period of 20 years in the largest cities of Germany, sometimes at meetings on sport fields and on public squares, to audiences of 150,000 to 200,000 people. I did that for 20 years, and I state here that I was not paid by the Party. The Prosecution will never succeed, not even through a public appeal, in getting anybody into this room who could testify that I had ever been paid. I still had a small salary which continued after I was relieved of my position in 1924. Nonetheless, I remained the one and only unpaid Gauleiter in the Movement. It goes without saying that my writing supported myself and my assistants later on.
And so, Gentlemen, in the year 1921—I return now to that period—I went to Munich. I was curious because someone had said to me, “You must hear Adolf Hitler some time.” And now destiny again takes a hand. This tragedy can only be grasped by those whose vision is not limited to the material, but who can perceive those higher vibrations which even today have not had their full outcome.
I went to the Munich Bürgerbräukeller. Adolf Hitler was speaking there. I had only heard his name. I had never seen the man before. And there I sat, an unknown among unknowns. I saw this man shortly before midnight, after he had spoken for 3 hours, drenched in perspiration, radiant. My neighbor said he thought he saw a halo around his head; and I, Gentlemen, experienced something which transcended the commonplace. When he finished his speech, an inner voice bade me get up. I went to the platform. When Adolf Hitler came down, I approached him and told him my name.
The Prosecution has submitted a document to the Tribunal which recalls that moment. Adolf Hitler wrote in his book, Mein Kampf, that it must have cost me a great effort to hand over to him the movement which I had created in Nuremberg.
I mention this because the Prosecution thought that these things in Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf, should be submitted and used against me. Yes, I am proud of it; I forced myself to hand over to Hitler the movement which I had created in Franconia. This Franconian movement gave the movement which Adolf Hitler had created in Munich and southern Bavaria a bridge to northern Germany. That was my doing.
In 1923 I took part in the first National Socialist revolution or, rather, attempted revolution. It will go down in history as the Hitler Putsch. Adolf Hitler had asked me to come to Munich for it. I went to Munich and took part in the meeting in which Adolf Hitler came to a solemn agreement with representatives of the middle classes to go to northern Germany and put an end to the chaos.
I marched with them up to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I was arrested and, like Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and others, was taken to Landsberg on the Lech. After a few months I was put up as candidate for the Bavarian Parliament by the Völkischer Block and was elected in the year 1924.
In 1925 after the Movement had been permitted again and Adolf Hitler had been released from jail, I was made Gauleiter of Franconia. In 1933 I became a deputy to the Reichstag. In 1933 or 1934 the honorary title of SA Gruppenführer was bestowed on me.
In February 1940 I was given leave of absence. I lived for 5 years, until the end of the war, on my estate. At the end of April I went to southern Bavaria, to the Tyrol. I wanted to commit suicide. Then something happened which I do not care to relate. But I can say one thing: I said to friends, “I have proclaimed my views to the world for 20 years. I do not want to end my life by suicide. I will go my way whatever happens as a fanatic in the cause of truth until the very end, a fanatic in the cause of truth.”
I might mention here that I deliberately gave my fighting paper, Der Stürmer, the subtitle, A Weekly for the Fight for Truth. I was quite conscious that I could not be in possession of the entire truth, but I also know that 80 or 90 percent of what I proclaim with conviction was the truth.
DR. MARX: Witness, why were you dismissed from the teaching profession? Did you ever commit any punishable or immoral act?
STREICHER: Actually I have answered this question already. Everybody knows that I could not have been active publicly in this profession if I had committed a crime. That is not true. I was dismissed from my profession because the majority of the parties in the Bavarian Parliament in the fall of 1923, after the Hitler Putsch, demanded my dismissal. That, Gentlemen, was my crime of indecent behavior.
DR. MARX: You know that two charges are made against you. First, you are accused that you were a party to the conspiracy which had the aim of launching a war, or wars, of aggression generally, of breaking treaties and by so doing, or even at an earlier stage, of committing Crimes against Humanity.
Secondly, you are accused of Crimes against Humanity as such. I should like to ask various questions on the first point now. Did you ever have discussions with Adolf Hitler or other leading men of the State or the Party at which the question of a war of aggression was discussed?
STREICHER: I can answer that with “no” right away, but I should like to be permitted to make a short statement.
In 1921, as I have already said, I went to Munich; and before the public on the platform I handed over my movement to the Führer. I also wrote him a letter in this connection later. No other conference took place with Adolf Hitler or any other person. I returned to Nuremberg and went on making speeches. When the Party program was proclaimed I was not present. That announcement, too, was made in public; the conspiracy was so public that political opponents could make attempts at terrorization.
To sum up: At none of the secret meetings was any oath taken or anything agreed upon which the public could not have known. The program stood; it had been submitted to the Police; on the basis of the law governing organizations the Party, like other parties, was entered in the register of organizations. So that at that time there was no conspiracy.
DR. MARX: Witness, one of the most important points of the Party program was the demand, “Freedom from Versailles.” What were your ideas as to the possibility of some day getting rid of the Versailles Treaty?
STREICHER: I think I can state that very shortly. I believe the Tribunal has known this for some time. Of course you will sometimes find one traitor in a people—like the one who was sitting here today; and you will also find unlimited numbers of decent people. And after the last war these decent people themselves took up the slogan, “Freedom from Versailles.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I think I must object to this sort of procedure. This witness has no right to call another witness a traitor. He has not been asked any question to which that is a response, and I ask that the Tribunal admonish him in no uncertain terms and that he confine himself to answering the questions here and that we may have an orderly proceeding.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will observe that injunction.
STREICHER: I ask the Tribunal to excuse me. It was a slip of the tongue.
THE PRESIDENT: The observation that you apparently made I did not catch myself, but it was made with reference to a witness who has just given evidence here and you had no right at all to call him a traitor or to make any comment upon his evidence.
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, you will please refrain from making such remarks. Adolf Hitler always spoke on the anniversary days of the Party about a sworn fellowship. What do you say about that?
STREICHER: Sworn fellowship—that meant that he, Hitler, was of the conviction that his old supporters were one with him in thought, in heart, and in political loyalty—a sworn fellowship sharing the same views and united in their hearts.
DR. MARX: Would not that mean that a conspiracy existed?
STREICHER: Then he would have said we were a fellowship of conspirators.
DR. MARX: Was there any kind of close relationship between you and the other defendants which could be termed a conspiracy, and were you better acquainted or did you have especially close relations with any one of these defendants?
STREICHER: Inasmuch as they were old members of the Party we were one community of people with the same convictions. We met at Gauleiter meetings; or when one of us spoke in the other’s Gaustadt, we saw one another. But I had the honor of getting to know the Reich Ministers and the gentlemen from the Army only here. A political group therefore—an active group—certainly did not exist.
DR. MARX: In the early days of the Party what solution was foreseen for the Jewish problem?
STREICHER: Well, in the early days of the Party, the solution of the Jewish problem was never mentioned just as the question of solving the problem of the Versailles Treaty was never mentioned. You must remember the state of chaos that existed at that time in Germany. An Adolf Hitler who said to his members in 1933, “I shall start to promote a war,” would have been dubbed a fool. We had no arms in Germany. Our army of 100,000 men had only a few big guns left. The possibility of making or of prophesying war was out of the question, and to speak of a Jewish problem at a time when, I might say, the public made distinctions with respect to Jews only on the basis of religion, or to speak of the solution of this problem, would have been absurd. Before 1933, therefore, the solution of the Jewish problem was not a topic of discussion. I never heard Adolf Hitler mention it; and there is no one here of whom I could say I ever heard him say one word about it.
DR. MARX: It is assumed that you had particularly close relations with Adolf Hitler and that you had considerable influence on his decisions. I should like to ask you to describe your relations with Adolf Hitler and to clarify them.
STREICHER: Anyone who had occasion to make Adolf Hitler’s acquaintance knows that I am correct in saying that those who imagined they could pave a way to his personal friendship were entirely mistaken. Adolf Hitler was a little eccentric in every respect and I believe I can say that friendship between him and other men did not exist—a friendship that might have been described as intimate friendship. It was not easy to approach Adolf Hitler; and any one who wanted to approach him could do so only by performing some manly deed.
If you ask me now—I know what you mean by that question—I may say that before 1923 Adolf Hitler did not trust me. Although I had handed over my movement to him unreservedly, he sent Göring—who later became Marshal of the Reich—some time later to Nuremberg. Göring was then a young SA leader—I think he was an SA leader—and he came to investigate matters and to determine whether I or those who denounced me were in the right. I do not mean this as an accusation, but merely as a statement of fact. Soon after that he sent a second and then a third person—in short, he did not trust me before 1923.
Then came Munich and the Putsch. After midnight, when most of them had left him, I appeared before him and told him that the public must be told now when the next great day would come. He looked at me intently and said, “Will you do it?” I said, “I will do it.”
Maybe the Prosecution has the document before it. Then, after midnight, he wrote on a piece of paper, “Streicher will be responsible for the entire organization.” That was to be for the following day, 11 November; and on 11 November I publicly conducted the propaganda, until an hour before the march to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I returned and everything was in readiness. Our banner—which was to become a banner of blood—flew in front. I joined the second group and we marched into the city towards the Feldherrnhalle. When I saw rifle after rifle ranged before the Feldherrnhalle and knew that now there would be shooting, I marched up 10 paces in front of the banner and marched straight up to the rifles. Then came the massacre, and we were arrested.
I have almost finished.
At Landsberg—and this is the important part—Hitler declared to me and to the men who were in prison with him, that he would never forget this action of mine. Thus, because I took part in the march to the Feldherrnhalle and marched at the head of the procession, Adolf Hitler may have felt himself drawn to me more than to the others.
That was the friendship born of the deed.
DR. MARX: Have you finished?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: Were you consulted by Adolf Hitler on important matters?
STREICHER: I saw Adolf Hitler only at Gauleiter conferences; when he came to Nuremberg for meetings we had meals together, along with five, ten, or more people. I recall having been alone with him only once in the Brown House at Munich, after the completion of the Brown House; and our conversation was not a political one. All the conversations which I had with Adolf Hitler, whether in Nuremberg, Munich, or elsewhere, took place in the presence of Party circle members.
DR. MARX: Now I come to 1933. On 1 April 1933 a boycott day was decreed throughout the entire German Reich against the Jewish population. What can you tell us about that and what part did you play in it?
STREICHER: A few days before 1 April I was summoned to the Brown House in Munich. Adolf Hitler explained to me something that I already knew, namely, that a tremendous propaganda campaign against the new Germany was being carried on by the foreign press. Although he himself had only just become Chancellor, although Hindenburg was still at the head of the Reich, although Parliament existed, a tremendous campaign of hate against Germany had begun in the foreign press.
The Führer told me that even the Reich flag, the emblem of sovereignty, was being subjected to insults abroad and that we would have to tell world Jewry, “Thus far and no farther.” We would have to show them that we would not tolerate it any longer.
Then he told me that a boycott day was to be fixed for 1 April and that I was to organize it. Perhaps it would not be irrelevant to point out the following facts: Adolf Hitler thought that it might be a good thing to use my name in connection with this boycott day; that was not done in the end. So I undertook the organization of the boycott and issued a directive, which I believe is in the hands of the Court. There is no need for me to say much about it. I gave instructions that no attempts should be made on the lives of Jews, that one or more guards should be posted in front of all Jewish premises—that is to say, in front of every Jewish store—and that these guards should be responsible for seeing that no damage was done to property. In short, I organized the proceedings in a way which was perhaps not expected of me; and perhaps not expected by many members of the Party. I frankly admit that.
One thing is certain; except for minor incidents the boycott day passed off perfectly. I believe that there is not even one Jew who can contradict this. The boycott day was a disciplined proceeding and was not “anti” in the sense of an attack on something. It has a purely defensive connotation.
DR. MARX: Was a committee formed at the time consisting of prominent, that is, leading members of the Party and did that committee ever appear?
STREICHER: As to the committee, it was like the Secret Cabinet Council in Berlin, which never met. In fact, I believe that all the members of the Cabinet did not even see each other or get to know each other.
DR. MARX: The committee members?
STREICHER: The boycott committee, that was put in the newspapers in Berlin by Goebbels. That was a newspaper story. I spoke to Goebbels on the telephone once. He asked how things were going in Munich, where I was. I said that everything was going perfectly. Thus no conference ever took place; it was only done for effect, to make it appear a much bigger thing than it was.
DR. MARX: Witness, you made a mistake a few minutes ago, speaking of the Munich affair in 1923. You meant 9 November—or did you not—9 November 1923, and what did you say?
STREICHER: I do not remember.
DR. MARX: It should be 9 November 1923?
STREICHER: 9 November 1923.
DR. MARX: Yes. The so-called “Racial Law” was promulgated at the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935. Were you consulted about the planning and preparation of the draft of that law; and did you have any part in it, especially in its preparation?
STREICHER: Yes, I believe I had a part in it insofar as for years I have written that any further mixture of German blood with Jewish blood must be avoided. I have written such articles again and again; and in my articles I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the Jews should serve as an example to every race, for they created a racial law for themselves—the law of Moses, which says, “If you come into a foreign land you shall not take unto yourself foreign women.” And that, Gentlemen, is of tremendous importance in judging the Nuremberg Laws. These laws of the Jews were taken as a model for these laws. When, after centuries, the Jewish lawgiver Ezra discovered that notwithstanding many Jews had married non-Jewish women, these marriages were dissolved. That was the beginning of Jewry which, because it introduced these racial laws, has survived throughout the centuries, while all other races and civilizations have perished.
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, this is rather too much of a digression. I asked you whether you took part in planning and working out the draft of the law, or whether you yourself were not taken by surprise when these laws were promulgated.
STREICHER: I was quite honest in saying that I believe I have contributed indirectly to the making of these laws.
DR. MARX: But you were not consulted on the law itself?
STREICHER: No. I will make a statement, as follows:
At the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935, we were summoned to the hall without knowing what was going to happen—at least I myself had no knowledge of it—and the racial laws were proclaimed. It was only then that I heard of these laws; and I think that with the exception of Herr Hess, et cetera, this is true of most of the gentlemen in the dock who attended that Reich Party Day. The first we heard of these decrees was at the Reich Party Day. I did not collaborate directly. I may say frankly that I regarded it as a slight when I was not consulted in the making of these laws.
DR. MARX: It was thought that your assistance was not necessary?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: Were you of the opinion that the 1935 legislation represented the final solution of the Jewish question by the State?
STREICHER: With reservations, yes. I was convinced that if the Party program was carried out, the Jewish question would be solved. The Jews became German citizens in 1848. Their rights as citizens were taken from them by these laws. Sexual intercourse was prohibited. For me, this represented the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany. But I believed that another international solution would still be found, and that some day discussions would take place between the various states with regard to the demands made by Zionism. These demands aimed at a Jewish state.
DR. MARX: What can you tell us about the demonstrations against the Jewish population during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, and what part did you play in it?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, if you are going into that, it is now 5 o’clock; and I think we had better adjourn now until Monday morning.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 29 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH DAY Monday, 29 April 1946
Morning Session
DR. MARX: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Before continuing with questions to the Defendant Streicher, may I ask permission to make a statement?
On Friday afternoon, Herr Streicher referred to a case, namely, that press event which concerned me and my professional attitude. I thereupon took the opportunity to refer to this case in my statement as well, and I pointed out that at that time I had had to ask for the protection of the Tribunal against this damaging attack on my work and that this protection was given me very graciously. On that occasion and in that extemporary explanation I used the expression “newspaper writer.” I used it exclusively with reference to the particular journalist who had written the article in question in that Berlin newspaper regarding my person and my activity as a lawyer.
By no means did I express, or mean to express, a reference to the press in general. It was far from my intention in any way to attack the press, the group of press experts, and particularly not the members of the world press who are active here; nor did I wish to injure their professional honor.
The reason for this statement of mine is a statement made on the radio, according to which I, the attorney Marx, had attacked and disparaged the press in general. I am, of course, aware of the significance of the press. I know precisely what the press has to contribute and I should be the last person to fail to recognize fully the extremely difficult work and the responsible task of the press. May I, therefore, quite publicly before this Tribunal ask that this statement be accepted; and may I ask the gentlemen of the press to receive my statement in the spirit in which it is made, namely, that this was merely a special comment on that particular gentleman and not in any way on the entire press. That is what I wanted to say.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the Tribunal understood your statement the other day in the sense in which you have now explained it.
DR. MARX: Yes. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall then continue with my examination.
Witness, what aims did you pursue with your speeches and your articles in Der Stürmer?
STREICHER: The speeches and articles which I wrote were meant to inform the public on a question which appeared to me one of the most important questions. I did not intend to agitate or inflame but to enlighten.
DR. MARX: Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the Party came into power, were there any other publications in Germany which treated the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way?
STREICHER: Anti-Semitic publications have existed in Germany for centuries. A book I had, written by Dr. Martin Luther, was, for instance, confiscated. Dr. Martin Luther would very probably sit in my place in the defendants’ dock today, if this book had been taken into consideration by the Prosecution. In the book The Jews and Their Lies, Dr. Martin Luther writes that the Jews are a serpent’s brood and one should burn down their synagogues and destroy them...
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is not my question, I am asking you to answer my question in accordance with the way I put it. Please answer now with “yes” or “no,” whether there were...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to interpose an objection to this method of answering unresponsively and with speeches here. We are utterly unable in this procedure to make objections when answers are not responsive to questions. We have already got into this case, through Streicher’s volunteered speeches, an attack on the United States which will take considerable evidence to answer if we are to answer it. It seems to me very improper that a witness should do anything but make a responsive answer to a question, so that we may keep these proceedings from getting into issues that have nothing to do with them. It will not help this Tribunal, in deciding Streicher’s guilt or innocence, to go into questions which he has raised here against us—matters that are perfectly capable of explanation, if we take time to do it.
It seems to me that this witness should be admonished, and admonished so that he will understand it, if that is possible, that he is to answer questions and stop, so that we can know and object in time to orations on irrelevant subjects.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, will you try, when you put the questions to the witness, to stop him if he is not answering the questions you put to him?
DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. I was just in the process...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Streicher, you understand, you have heard what has been said and you will understand that the Tribunal cannot put up with your long speeches which are not answers to questions which we put to you.
DR. MARX: I will now repeat the question and I want you to answer the question first with “yes” or “no” and then to add a brief explanation regarding the question.
Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the Party came into power, were there other publications in Germany which dealt with the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way?
STREICHER: Yes, even before the coming to power there were in every Gau weekly journals that were anti-Semitic and one daily paper called the Völkischer Beobachter in Munich. Apart from that, there were a number of periodicals which were not working directly for the Party. There was also anti-Semitic literature. After the seizure of power, the daily press was co-ordinated, and now the Party found itself in control of some 3,000 daily papers, numerous weekly journals, and all type of periodicals; and orders were given by the Führer that every newspaper should provide enlightening articles on the Jewish question. The anti-Semitic enlightenment was, therefore, after the seizure of power, carried out on a very large scale in the daily press as well as in the weekly journals, periodicals, and books. Consequently, Der Stürmer did not stand alone in its enlightening activity. But I want to state quite openly that I make the claim of having treated the question in the most popular way.
DR. MARX: Were the directives necessary for this issued by a central office, say, for instance, by the National Socialist press service?
STREICHER: Yes. The Propaganda Ministry in Berlin had a National Socialist press service. In this service, in every issue, there were a number of enlightening articles on the Jewish question. During the war the Führer personally gave the order that the press, far more than previously, should publish enlightening articles on the Jewish question.
DR. MARX: The Prosecution accuse you of having contributed indirectly to mass murders by incitation, and according to the minutes of 10 January 1946, the following charge has been made against you: No government in the world could have undertaken a policy of mass extermination, as it was done here, without having behind it a nation which agreed to it; and you are supposed to have brought that about. What have you to say to this?
STREICHER: To that I have the following to say: Incitation means to bring a person into condition of excitement which causes him to perform an irresponsible act. Did the contents of Der Stürmer incite, this is the question? Briefly stated, the question must be answered, “What did Der Stürmer write?” Several volumes of Der Stürmer are available here, but one would have to look at all the issues of 20 years in order to answer that question exhaustively. During those 20 years I published enlightening articles dealing with the race, dealing with what the Jews themselves write in the Old Testament, in their history, what they write in the Talmud. I printed excerpts from Jewish historical works, works for instance, written by a Professor Dr. Graetz and by a Jewish scholar, Gutnot.
In Der Stürmer no editorial appeared written by me or written by anyone of my main co-workers in which I did not include quotations from the ancient history of the Jews, from the Old Testament or from Jewish historical works of recent times.
It is important, and I must emphasize that I pointed out in all articles, that prominent Jews, leading authors themselves, admitted that which during 20 years as author and public speaker I publicly proclaimed.
Allow me to add that it is my conviction that the contents of Der Stürmer as such were not incitation. During the whole 20 years I never wrote in this connection, “Burn Jewish houses down; beat them to death.” Never once did such an incitement appear in Der Stürmer.
Now comes the question: Is there any proof to be furnished that any deed was done from the time Der Stürmer first appeared, a deed of which one can say that it was the result of an incitement? As a deed due to an incitement I might mention a pogrom. That is a spontaneous deed when sections of the people suddenly rise up and kill other people. During the 20 years no pogrom took place in Germany, during the 20 years, as far as I know, no Jew was killed. No murder took place, of which one could have said, “This is the result of an incitement which was caused by anti-Semitic authors or public speakers.”
Gentlemen, we are in Nuremberg. In the past there was a saying that nowhere were the Jews in Germany so safe and so unmolested as in Nuremberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, is not this becoming a rather lengthy speech?
DR. MARX: Streicher, you have explained this now sufficiently, so that one can form an opinion—you mean, “I have not incited in such a way that any spontaneous action carried out against the Jews by any group of people or by the masses resulted”?
STREICHER: May I make a remark in this connection? Here we are concerned with the most serious, the most decisive accusation raised against me by the Prosecution, and here I ask the Tribunal to permit me to defend myself against it objectively. Is it not of tremendous significance if I can establish that in Nuremberg, of all places, no murder took place, no single murder and no pogrom either? That is a fact.
THE PRESIDENT: You have already said it. I have just written down, before I intervened, saying that no Jews have been killed not only in Nuremberg but anywhere else as a result of your incitement.
DR. MARX: Witness, we shall make reference to these demonstrations of 9 and 10 November 1938 later.
STREICHER: Yes, but may I continue? The Indictment accuses me of having indirectly contributed by incitation to mass murders, and I ask to be allowed to make a statement on this: Something has been ascertained today about which I myself did not know. I learned of the will left behind by the Führer, and I assume that a few moments before his death the Führer told the world the truth in that will. In it he says that mass killings were carried out by his order; that the mass killings were a reprisal.
Thus it is demonstrated that I, myself, cannot have been a participant in the incredible events which occurred here.
DR. MARX: Finished?
STREICHER: Yes. You said that the Indictment accuses me in saying that these mass killings could never have taken place if behind the Government and behind the leaders of the State there had not been an informed people.
Gentlemen, first of all, the question, “Did the German people really know what was happening during the years of the war?” We know today...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is a matter of argument and not a matter upon which you can give evidence. You can say what you knew.
STREICHER: I was a part of that nation during the war. During the war I lived alone in the country. For 5 years I never left my farm. I was watched by the Gestapo. From 1939 on I have been forbidden by the Führer to speak.
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we will certainly come to that later. I have interrogated you now on this question, and I will proceed with my questions. The other will come later.
STREICHER: But I wish to state that I had no opportunity—that is why I said this—to learn what was actually going on.
I first heard of the mass murders and mass killings at Mondorf when I was in prison. But I am stating here that if I had been told that 2 or 3 million people had been killed, then I would not have believed it. I would not have believed that it was technically possible to kill so many people; and on the basis of the entire attitude and psychology of the Führer, as I knew it, I would not have believed that mass killings, to the extent to which they have taken place, could have taken place. Finished.
DR. MARX: The Prosecution also raise the charge against you that it was the task of the educators of the nation to educate the people to murder and to poison them with hatred, that you had devoted yourself particularly to these tasks. What do you want to answer to this charge?
STREICHER: That is an allegation. We educated no murderers. The contents of the articles which I wrote could not have educated murderers. No murders took place, and that is proof that we did not educate murderers. What happened during the war—well, I certainly did not educate the Führer. The Führer issued the order on his own initiative.
DR. MARX: I now continue. The Prosecution further assert that the Himmler-Kaltenbrunner groups and other SS leaders would have had no one to carry out their orders to kill, if you had not made that propaganda and if you had not conducted the education of the German people along these lines. Will you make a statement on that?
STREICHER: I do not believe that the National Socialists mentioned read Der Stürmer every week. I do not believe that those who received the order from the Führer to carry out killings or to pass on the order to kill, were led to do this by my periodical. Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf, existed, and the content of that book was the authority, the spiritual authority; nor do I believe that the persons mentioned read that book and carried out the order on the strength of it. Based on my knowledge of what went on in the Movement, I am convinced that if the Führer gave an order everyone acted upon it; and I state here quite openly that maybe fate has been kind to me. If the Führer had ordered me to do such things, I would not have been able to kill; but perhaps today I would face some indictment which it has not been possible to lodge against me. Perhaps because fate has taken a hand in this. But the conditions were thus, that the Führer had such a power of hypnotic suggestion that the entire people believed in him; his way was so unusual that, if one knows this fact, one can understand why everyone who received an order acted. And thus I want to reject as untrue and incorrect what was here thought fit to assert against me.
DR. MARX: What do you know about the general attitude of Adolf Hitler to the Jewish question? And when did Hitler first become hostile to the Jews, according to your knowledge?
STREICHER: Even before Adolf Hitler became publicly known at all I had occupied myself journalistically with anti-Semitic articles. However, on the strength of his book, Mein Kampf, I first learned about the historic connections of the Jewish problem. Adolf Hitler wrote his book in the prison in Landsberg. Anyone who knows this book will know that Hitler many years back, either by study of anti-Semitic literature or through other experiences, must have developed this knowledge in himself in order then to be able to write that book in prison in so short a time. In other words, in his book Adolf Hitler stated to the world public that he was anti-Semitic and that he knew the Jewish problem through and through. He himself often said to me personally...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the book Mein Kampf is in evidence, and it speaks for itself.
STREICHER: I will now answer your question, not with reference to the book. You asked me whether Adolf Hitler had discussed the Jewish problem with me. The answer is “yes.” Adolf Hitler always discussed the Jewish problem in connection with Bolshevism. It is perhaps of importance in answering that question to ask whether Adolf Hitler wanted a war with Russia. Did he know long in advance that a war would come, or not? When he was with us Adolf Hitler spoke of Stalin as a man whom he honored as a man of action, but that he was actually surrounded by Jewish leaders, and that Bolshevism...
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is going too far again. The question which I put was quite exact, and I am asking you not to go so far afield. You have heard the Tribunal object to it, and in the interest of not delaying the proceedings you must not go into so many details. You must not make speeches.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I believe that some time ago Mr. Justice Jackson remarked, quite justly, quite reasonably, that the Defendant Streicher became so intoxicated by his own speeches that he did not answer the questions put to him or the charges made against him. I therefore invite the attention of the Tribunal to this fact and suggest that the defendant abstain from making lengthy speeches and merely give brief replies to the charges brought against him.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on, Dr. Marx, and try to keep the witness to an answer to the questions which you have no doubt prepared.
DR. MARX: Very well, Mr. President.
STREICHER: May I, please, as a defendant, say a few words, here? The question was...
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] No, you may not. You will answer the questions, please.
DR. MARX: Next question. Is there reason for the assumption that Hitler, when he decided to have the Jews in Europe killed in masses, was subject to any influence, or what is to be considered the motive for that dreadful decision?
STREICHER: The Führer could not be influenced. As I know the Führer, if somebody had gone to him and said that Jews should be killed, then he would have turned him down. And if, during the war, somebody had gone to him and said, “I have learned that you are giving the order that mass killings are to be carried out,” then he would have turned that man down too. I therefore answer your question by saying that the Führer could not be influenced.
DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that the decision in this matter was made entirely on his own initiative.
STREICHER: I have already said that that becomes clear from his will.
DR. MARX: In August 1938 the main synagogue in Nuremberg was demolished. Was this done on your orders?
STREICHER: Yes. In my Gau there were approximately 15 synagogues, in Nuremberg one main synagogue, a somewhat smaller one, and I think several other prayer rooms. The main synagogue stood in the outskirts of the medieval Reichsstadt. Even before 1933, during the so-called period of struggle, when we still had the other government, I stated publicly during a meeting that it was a disgrace that there should be placed in the Old City such an oriental monstrosity of a building. After the seizure of power I told the Lord Mayor that he should have the synagogue torn down, and at the same time the planetarium. I might point out that after the World War, in the middle of the park grounds laid out for the recreation of the citizens, a planetarium had been built, an ugly brick building. I gave the order to tear down that building and said that the main synagogue, too, should be razed. If it had been my intention to deprive the Jews of their synagogue as a church or if I had wanted to give a general signal, then I would have given the order, after the seizure of power, that every synagogue in my Gau should be torn down. Then I would likewise have had all the synagogues in Nuremberg torn down. But it is a fact that in the spring of 1938 only the main synagogue was torn down; the synagogue in the Essenweinstrasse, in the new city, remained untouched. That the order was then given in November of that year to set fire to the synagogues, that is no fault of mine.
DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that you did not order the tearing down of this building for anti-Semitic reasons but because it did not conform to the architectural style of the city?
STREICHER: For reasons of city architecture. I wanted to submit a picture to the Tribunal on this, but I have not received any.
DR. MARX: Yes, we have a picture.
STREICHER: But you cannot see the synagogue in it. I do not know whether the Tribunal want to see the picture. The picture actually shows only the old houses, but the front of the synagogue facing the Hans-Sachs-Platz is not visible. I do not know whether I may submit the picture to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, the photograph can be put in. Let us see the photograph.
DR. MARX: In that case, I will submit it to the Tribunal as evidence and I am asking you to accept it accordingly.
THE PRESIDENT: What will it be, exhibit what?
DR. MARX: I cannot say at the moment, Mr. President. I shall take the liberty of stating the number later and for the moment I confine myself to submitting it. I could not present it any earlier because I had not come into possession of this picture. It was only in the last days...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. MARX: In your measure in connection with the main synagogue did you rely on any statements of art experts?
STREICHER: I had frequent opportunities to discuss the subject with architects. Every architect said that there must have been a city council which had no feeling whatsoever for city architecture, that it was impossible to explain it.
These statements were not in any way directed against the synagogue as a Jewish church, but rather against such a building in this part of the city. Strangers, too, whom I guided—for on Party rally days I used to accompany British and American people across the Hans-Sachs-Platz—and I remember only one case where when I said “Do you not notice anything?” that the person did not. But all other strangers said “How could that building get there in the midst of these medieval buildings?” I could also have submitted a book, written in 1877, which is in the prison library, where a Professor Berneis, who was famous, wrote at that time to the author, Uhde, in Switzerland, that he had now seen the Sachs Platz...
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is enough now. In other words, you have indicated that you believed you could rely on the judgment of architects who seemed to you to be authorities?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: At the time when the synagogue was demolished, did you make a speech?
STREICHER: Yes, but I want to point out that the Prosecution have submitted an article, a report from the Tageszeitung, that was written by a simple young man. I want to state that this article does not contain a true representation of the statements which I made.
DR. MARX: I now come to the demonstrations on the night of 9 to 10 November 1938. What can you say concerning those demonstrations and what role did you play in that connection? Were those demonstrations initiated by the population?
STREICHER: Every year the Gauleiter and SA and SS leaders met the Führer in Munich on the occasion of the historic day of 9 November. We sat down to dinner in the old Town Hall, and it was customary for the Führer to make a short speech after the dinner. On 9 November 1938, I did not feel very well. I participated in the dinner and then I left; I drove back to Nuremberg and went to bed. Toward midnight I was awakened. My chauffeur told me that the SA leader Von Obernitz wanted to talk to the Gauleiter. I received him and he said the following: “Gauleiter, you had left already when the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, took the floor and said”—I can now repeat it only approximately—“said, ‘Legation Counsellor Vom Rath has been murdered in Paris. That is now the second murder abroad of a prominent National Socialist. This murder is not the murder by the Jew, Grünspan; this is rather the execution of a deed which has been desired by all Jewry. Something should now be done.’” I do not know now whether Goebbels said the Führer had ordered it; I remember only that Von Obernitz told me that Goebbels had stated the synagogues were to be set on fire; and I cannot now remember exactly, but I think he told me that the windows of Jewish business houses were to be smashed and that houses were to be demolished.
Then I said to Obernitz—for I was surprised—“Obernitz, I think it is wrong that synagogues be set on fire, and at this moment I think it is wrong that Jewish business houses be demolished; I think these demonstrations are wrong. If people are let loose during the night, deeds can be perpetrated for which one cannot be responsible.” I said to Obernitz that I considered the setting on fire of synagogues particularly wrong because abroad and even among the German people the opinion might arise that National Socialism had now started the fight against religion. Obernitz replied, “I have the order.” I said, “Obernitz, I will not assume any responsibility here.” Obernitz left and the action took place. What I have said under oath here I have previously stated in several interrogations; and my chauffeur will confirm it, for he was witness to this night’s conversation, and shortly afterwards when he went to bed told his wife what he had heard up there in my bedroom.
DR. MARX: Have you finished?
STREICHER: Yes, but you asked another question...
DR. MARX: Yes, whether it was a spontaneous act of force initiated by the masses of the people?
STREICHER: Yes. In the National Socialist press there appeared after this action an article to the same effect, which stated that a spontaneous demonstration of the people had revenged the murder of Herr Vom Rath. It had therefore been deliberately ordered from Berlin that there should be a public statement to the effect that the demonstration of 1938 was spontaneous. That this was not the case I was also able to learn in Nuremberg; and it is remarkable that the indignation at what had happened during those demonstrations expressed itself even here in Nuremberg, even among the Party members.
The Prosecution have submitted an article which is a report on a speech which I made on 10 November; and that is a remarkable piece of evidence of the fact that the people were against this action. I was forced, because of the atmosphere which prevailed in Nuremberg, to make a public speech and say that one should not have so much sympathy for the Jews. Such was the affair of November 1938.
Perhaps it might also be important for you to ask me how I, of all people, happened to oppose the idea of these demonstrations.
DR. MARX: I thought you had explained that already. Very well. Who gave the order then for the burning down of the synagogue still standing on Essenweinstrasse?
STREICHER: I do not know who gave the order; I believe it was SA leader Von Obernitz. I do not know the details.
DR. MARX: A further question: Did you yourself express publicly your disapproval of these brutalities?
STREICHER: Yes. In a small circle of leading Party members I said what I have always said, what I have always said publicly: I stated that this was wrong. I talked to lawyers during a meeting—I do not know whether my defense counsel himself was there—I believe it was as early as November 1938 that I stated, to the Nuremberg lawyers at a meeting, that what had happened here during that action, was wrong; that it was wrong as regards the people and as regards foreign countries. I said then that anyone who knew the Jewish question as I knew it would understand why I considered that demonstration a mistake. I do not know whether this was reported to the Führer at that time, but after November 1938 I was never again called to the Hotel Deutscher Hof when the Führer came to Nuremberg. Whether this was the reason I do not know, but at any rate I did criticize these demonstrations publicly.
DR. MARX: It is assumed by the Prosecution that in 1938 a more severe treatment of the Jews was introduced. Is that true, and what is the explanation?
STREICHER: Yes. In 1938 the Jewish question entered a new phase; that is shown, indeed, by the demonstration. I myself can only say in this connection that there was no preliminary conference on this subject. I assume that the Führer, impulsive as he was and acting on the spur of the moment, got around probably only on 9 November to saying to Dr. Goebbels, “Tell the organizations that the synagogues must be burned down.” As I said, I myself did not attend such a meeting; and I do not know what happened to bring about this acceleration.
DR. MARX: On 12 November 1938 the decree was published according to which the Jews were to be eliminated from the economic life of the country. Was there a connection between the orders for the demonstrations of 9 November and that further decree of 12 November 1938, and would that decree be due to the same reason?
STREICHER: Well, here I can say only that I am convinced that there was a connection. The order, rather the decrees, which were to have such an extensive effect in the economic field, came from Berlin. We did not have any conference. I do not remember any Gauleiter meetings in which that was discussed. I do not know of any. That happened just as everything happened; we were not previously informed.
DR. MARX: How was it that not you, but the Codefendant Rosenberg, was given the task of attending to this matter?
STREICHER: Rosenberg was the spiritual trustee of the Movement, but he was not given this particular task nor the task of the demonstration nor that of economic matters.
DR. MARX: No, we are talking of different points. Rosenberg was the one given the task by the Leaders of the State of taking care, as it was called, of racial-political and other enlightenment tasks; and you were not. How can that be explained? How can it be explained that you were not chosen?
STREICHER: Rosenberg, as he himself said, had met the Führer very early and was anyway, because of his knowledge, intellectually suited to take over this task. I devoted myself more to popular enlightenment.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, he has told us that he wasn’t given the task. Unless he had some communication with Rosenberg he can’t tell us anything more about it except that he wasn’t given the task. All the rest is mere comment and argument.
DR. MARX: Yes.
[Turning to the defendant.] I now put the next question to you: Was an order issued during the year 1939 forbidding you to make speeches?
STREICHER: Yes. In the autumn of 1939 my enemies went so far that the Führer, without my being asked beforehand, issued a written order through Party Member Hess forbidding me to make speeches. The threat of immediate arrest was made should I act against this order.
DR. MARX: Is it also correct that in 1938 an effort was evidently made to stop further publication of Der Stürmer, I mean in government circles?
STREICHER: Such intentions existed quite often, and also at that time. Perhaps I might refer to two other documents in this connection in order to save time.
The Prosecution have submitted copies of a letter from Himmler and Baldur von Schirach. Here I can give quite a simple explanation right now. At that time, in 1939, there were intentions of prohibiting Der Stürmer. Bormann had even issued some such order. Then the Chief Editor of Der Stürmer wrote to prominent members of the Party, asking them to state their opinion about Der Stürmer. And thereupon letters were also received from Himmler and Von Schirach. Altogether, I think about 15 letters were received from prominent members of the Movement; they were merely kind replies to an inquiry.
DR. MARX: That is sufficient. Is it true that at the outbreak of the war you were not made Armed Forces District Commissioner (Wehrkreis-Kommissar) in your own Gau?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: How can that be explained?
STREICHER: Well, maybe that is not so important; that is how conditions were at the time. There were certain personal feelings, et cetera; it is of no significance. At any rate, I did not become Armed Forces District Commissioner.
DR. MARX: The Prosecution have stated that after 1 September 1939 the persecution of the Jews increased more and more. What was that due to?
STREICHER: That question only the Führer could answer; I cannot.
DR. MARX: But do you not think this had something to do with the outbreak of war?
STREICHER: The Führer always said so in public, yes.
DR. MARX: A proceeding was instituted against you before the Supreme Party Court. How did that happen? What was the development and the result of that trial?
STREICHER: I am grateful that I have an opportunity to state quite briefly before the International Military Tribunal something which I have had to keep silent about up to now because of a Führer order. I myself had instituted proceedings against myself before the Supreme Party Court in order to defend myself against people who were denouncing me. I was being accused...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant talking about some order which Hitler gave that he was not to be allowed to speak or is he talking about something else?
You remember, Dr. Marx, that certain allegations were struck out of the record. If he is talking about those, it seems to me that we have got nothing whatever to do with it. Am I right in recollecting that something was struck out of the record?
DR. MARX: Yes it was, Mr. President, but only certain things from the Göring report were struck out, only the one passage which concerned the affair with the three young persons; but everything else was retained by the Prosecution. The Defense, therefore, must be able to take a stand in regard to these points, if the Prosecution do not say that they are dropping the entire Göring report; and in that connection this proceeding before the Supreme Party Court also plays a part. He can make a brief statement about it.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. MARX: Witness, be brief.
STREICHER: Yes. It is important then that I instituted proceedings against myself; about 10 points were involved which had been raised against me, among them a matter referring to some shares. An affidavit exists from the Göring report which states that I had been found guilty. May I state here that the trial was never completed and no sentence was passed.
That is the answer to the question which you have put to me.
DR. MARX: The matter referring to shares, does that have something to do with the shares of the Mars works?
STREICHER: We will come to it later. It was not the main point.
DR. MARX: And then you were ordered to remain permanently at the Pleikershof? Were you under the guard of the Gestapo there, and was there also a check-up as far as visitors were concerned?
STREICHER: It is not correct that I was ordered to stay at the Pleikershof. What is true is that I retired voluntarily with the intention of never again being active in the Movement. It is correct that the Gestapo watched me, and every visitor was called to the police station and interrogated as to his conversations he had had. That is a fact.
DR. MARX: During your stay at the Pleikershof did you have any connections or correspondence with any leading personalities of the Party or State?
STREICHER: No. As far as prominent persons of the Movement and of the State are concerned, I had no correspondence whatsoever with them; that is why the Prosecution could hardly find any letters. I never stated in letters my opinion on the Jewish problem or on other matters. I shall have to state then, in order to answer your question exactly, that I had no correspondence with prominent persons of the Party and the State.
DR. MARX: After the outbreak of the war, were you informed of or consulted in any way on any measures intended against the Jews?
STREICHER: No.
DR. MARX: What were your relations to Himmler? Did you know him at all closely? Did you ever speak to him about measures against the Jews or did he talk about intended mass executions of the Jews?
STREICHER: I knew Himmler just as I knew the SA leaders, or other SS leaders. I knew him from common meetings, Gauleiter conferences, et cetera. I did not have a single political discussion with Himmler, except in society when he may have touched on this or that, in the presence of others. The last time I saw Himmler was in Nuremberg when he spoke to the officers in their mess. When that was I cannot say exactly but I think it was shortly before the war. I never had a talk with him on the Jewish question. He himself was, of course, well informed on this question. He had an organ of his own called the Schwarze Korps. And what his inner attitude toward me was is something that I did not discover until my stay on the farm. There were denunciations against me which reached him. It was stated that I was being too humane with the French prisoners. Shortly after that I received a letter in which he reproached me and made serious representations against me. I gave no answer at all. Without having made any previous inquiries with me as to whether these denunciations were true, he made a serious charge against me; and I state quite openly that it was actually my feeling at the time that I might possibly lose my liberty through arrest. These were my relations with Himmler.
DR. MARX: That is enough.
During this Trial you have heard mentioned the names of a great number of Higher SS and Police Leaders who played a leading part in the Jewish persecutions, as for instance, Heydrich, Eichmann, Ohlendorf, and so on. Were there any connections between you and one of these Higher SS and Police Leaders?
STREICHER: I heard the names you have mentioned for the first time during an interrogation here. I did not know these men; they may well have seen me, but there was never a discussion involving me and the senior SS or SA leaders. Furthermore, I never was in any of Himmler’s offices in Berlin, or any Ministry in Berlin. Thus, no conference ever took place.
DR. MARX: The Prosecution have drawn the conclusion from numerous articles in Der Stürmer, that as early as 1942 and 1943 you must have had knowledge of the mass executions of Jews which had taken place.
What statement can you make on this, and when, and in what way, did you hear of the mass executions of Jews which took place in the East?
STREICHER: I had subscribed to the Jewish weekly that appeared in Switzerland. Sometimes in that weekly there were intimations that something was not quite in order; and I think it was at the end of 1943 or 1944—I believe 1944—that an article appeared in the Jewish weekly, in which it said that in the East—I think it was said in Poland—Jews were disappearing in masses. I then made reference to this in an article which perhaps will be presented to me later. But I state quite frankly that the Jewish weekly in Switzerland did not represent for me an authoritative source, that I did not believe everything in it. This article did not quote figures; it did not talk about mass executions, but only about disappearances.
DR. MARX: Have you finished?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: Did you make proposals in Der Stürmer for the solution of the Jewish question, during the war?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: And in what sense?
STREICHER: As I said yesterday, I represented the point of view that the Jewish question could be solved only internationally, since there were Jews in all countries. For that reason we published articles in my weekly journal referring to the Zionist demand for the creation of a Jewish state, such as had also been provided for or indicated in the Balfour Declaration. There were therefore two possibilities for a solution, a preliminary solution within the countries through appropriate laws; and then the creation of a Jewish state.
During the war, I think it was in 1941 or 1942, we had written another article—we were subject to the Berlin censorship—and the censorship office sent back the proof submitted with the remark that the article must not be published in which we had proposed Madagascar as the place for the establishment of a Jewish state. The political relations with France were given as the reason why that article should not be published.
DR. MARX: If you had expected that question to be solved by mass executions, would you then too have written this article?
STREICHER: At that time, at any rate, it would still have been nonsensical to publish it.
DR. MARX: Did it not make you uneasy to deal with the Jewish question in a biased way, in a way which left completely out of sight those qualities of the Jews which can be described as great?
STREICHER: I did not understand this question fully, perhaps I did not hear it correctly.
DR. MARX: You can be accused of treating, in a biased way, only those qualities of the Jews that appear disadvantageous to you, whereas the other qualities of the Jewish people you ignored. What is your explanation?
STREICHER: I think that this question is really superfluous here. It is perfectly natural that I, as an anti-Semitic person and as I saw the Jewish question, was in no way interested in that. Perhaps I did not see the good traits which you or some others see in the Jews. That is possible. But at any rate I was not interested in investigating as to what particular good qualities might be recognized here.
DR. MARX: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: This would seem a good time to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. MARX: Did you visit concentration camps?
STREICHER: Yes. I visited the Dachau Concentration Camp.
DR. MARX: When was that?
STREICHER: I believe the first time was when all the Gauleiter were called together. I believe 1935, I do not know definitely, 1934 or 1935, I do not know.
DR. MARX: At what intervals did you then visit this camp? It is said that you were in Dachau every 4 weeks.
STREICHER: Altogether I was at Dachau four times.
DR. MARX: It is asserted that after each of your visits in Dachau, Jews disappeared there.
STREICHER: I do not know whether Jews disappeared.
DR. MARX: What caused you to visit the Dachau Camp repeatedly?
STREICHER: I went to the Dachau Camp to visit Social Democratic and Communist functionaries from my Gau who were in prison there to have them introduced to me. I picked out—I do not know how many hundreds of them there were—but every time I was in Dachau I picked out 10 or 20 of those of whom it had been ascertained by the Police that they had no criminal record; I had them picked out from among the inmates, and at Christmas every year I had them brought in buses to Nuremberg to the Hotel Deutscher Hof, where I brought them together with their wives and children and had dinner with them.
I should like to ask the Tribunal, for the benefit of the Nuremberg public, to permit me to make a very short statement as to why I took these Communists out. Party proceedings were initiated against me because I did this. There were rumors which were not true. May I make a very short statement as to why I did it?
DR. MARX: I should like to ask the Tribunal to approve this, Mr. President, so that the reasons why the defendant did this may be ascertained.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as long as it is brief.
DR. MARX: Be brief.
STREICHER: When I walked through the streets of Nuremberg children approached me and said, “My father is in Dachau.” Women came to me and asked to get their husbands back. I knew many of these officials from the time when I spoke at revolutionary meetings, and I could vouch for these people. I know of only one case where I was wrong in the selection of those people. All the others behaved impeccably. They kept the word which they had given me. Thus, perhaps my Party comrades, who sit here in the dock, see now that I did not want to harm my country but that I wanted to do, and did do, something humanely good.
DR. MARX: Now I come to the picture books which appeared in Der Stürmer publishing house. You know that two picture books were published, one with the title, Trust No Fox in the Field, and the other one with the title, The Poisonous Toadstool. Do you assume responsibility for these picture books?
STREICHER: Yes. May I say, by way of summary, that I assume responsibility for everything which was written by my assistants or which came into my publishing house.
DR. MARX: Who was the author of these picture books?
STREICHER: The book Trust No Fox in the Field and No Jew Under His Oath was done and illustrated by a young woman artist, and she also wrote the text. The title which appears on the picture book is from Dr. Martin Luther.
The second picture book was done by the Editor-in-Chief of Der Stürmer, who was a former schoolteacher. Two criminal cases in Nuremberg, which were tried here in this courtroom, as far as I know, were the occasion for my publishing these two books. There was a manufacturer, Louis Schloss, a Jew, who with young Nuremberg girls some of them still innocent, had...
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we do not want to hear that now. My question was only as to who was the author of these picture books and whether you assumed the responsibility for them?
STREICHER: It is important for the Tribunal, in fact, right for them to know how it came about that all of a sudden two picture books for young people appeared in my publishing house. I am making this statement absolutely objectively. I am speaking here of legal cases. There are gentlemen here, who are witnesses, who were here in this court and were present during the proceedings. Only thus can one understand why these books were published. They were the answer to deeds that had occurred.
DR. MARX: Yes, but we are concerned here only with the accusation made against you, that thereby you exerted an influence on the minds of young people which was not beneficial and which could be considered designed to have a poisonous effect.
STREICHER: And I should like to prove by my statement that we wanted to protect youth because things had, in fact, occurred.
DR. MARX: Yes, but young persons could hardly understand the Schloss case, or any such case, could they?
STREICHER: It was a matter of public discussion in Nuremberg and beyond that all over Germany.
DR. MARX: As far as I am concerned, this question is answered, Mr. President.
STREICHER: But not for me as defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: You told us that the books were published to answer things which had occurred here. That is sufficient.
DR. MARX: Witness, another serious accusation made by the Prosecution against you is that a special issue concerning ritual murders was published in the publishing house of Der Stürmer and appeared in one number of Der Stürmer. How did this special issue come about and what was the cause for it? Were you the author of that special issue?
STREICHER: No.
DR. MARX: Who was the author?
STREICHER: My collaborator, the Editor-in-Chief at that time, Karl Holz, who is now dead. But I assume the responsibility.
DR. MARX: Is it not true that even during the twenties you dealt with that question in Der Stürmer?
STREICHER: Yes, and in public speeches.
DR. MARX: Yes, in public speeches. Why did you now in 1935 stir up again this doubtlessly very grave matter?
STREICHER: I should like to ask my counsel to express no judgment as to what I have written; to question me, but not to express judgment. The Prosecution are going to do that.
You have asked me how this issue came about. I will explain very briefly...
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. I have to protest against the fact that Herr Streicher here, in the course of his interrogation by me, thinks he can criticize the manner in which I put my questions. Therefore, I ask the Court to give a decision on this, since otherwise I am not in a position to ask my questions at all.
THE PRESIDENT: You have already stated your position and the Tribunal has given you full support in your position. Will you please continue?
And let me tell you this, Defendant, that if you are insolent either to your counsel or to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will not be able to continue the hearing of your case at this moment. You will kindly treat your counsel and the Tribunal with due courtesy.
STREICHER: May I ask to say something about this?
THE PRESIDENT: No. Answer the question, please.
DR. MARX: I will go on now with my questioning.
The Prosecution accuse you, in connection with this ritual murder affair, of having treated the matter without documentary proof, by referring to a story from the Middle Ages. What, in brief, was your source?
STREICHER: The sources were given in that issue. Nothing was written without the sources being given at the same time. There was reference made to a book written in Greek by a former Rabbi who had been converted to Christianity. There was reference made to a publication of a high clergymen of Milan, a book which has appeared in Germany for the last 50 years. Not even under the democratic government did Jews raise objections to that book. That ritual murder issue refers to court files which are located in Rome, it refers to files which are in Court. There are pictures in it which show that in 23 cases the Church itself has dealt with this question. The Church has canonized 23 non-Jews killed by ritual murder. Pictures of sculptures, that is, of stone monuments were shown as illustrations; everywhere the source was pointed out; even a case in England was mentioned, and one in Kiev, Russia. But in this connection I should like to say, as I said to a Jewish officer here, that we never wanted to assert that all Jewry was ready now to commit ritual murders. But it is a fact that within Jewry there exists a sect which engaged in these murders, and has done so up until the present. I have asked my counsel to submit to the Court a file from Pisek in Czechoslovakia, very recent proceedings. A court of appeal has confirmed a case of ritual murder. Thus, in conclusion I must say...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this statement, Your Honor. After his counsel has refused to submit it, he insists on stating here the contents of a court record. Now this is not an orderly way to make charges against the Jewish people. Streicher says he is asking counsel to submit. His counsel apparently has refused, whereupon he starts to give evidence of what he knows, in any case, is a resumé of the matters which his counsel has declined to submit here. It seems to me that, having appointed counsel to conduct his case, he has shown repeatedly that he is not willing to conduct his case in an orderly manner and he ought to be returned to his cell and any further statements that he wishes to make to this Court transmitted through his counsel in writing. This is entirely unfair and in contempt of Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I think you had better continue.
DR. MARX: I should like to say that that closes this affair. The essential thing is whether one can say that he treated the case without documentary proof. The Defense is not interested in the affair at all; and, according to my recollection, I even suggested to one of the gentlemen of the Prosecution that this affair perhaps be left out altogether, because it is really so gruesome and so horrible that it is better not to treat it. But the defendant only wanted to say that it was only on the basis of various pieces of evidence that he dealt with the case, and I believe that is sufficient; that should close the matter.
Now, Herr Streicher, you fall again and again into the mistake of going too far in your explanations and of discussing things which can be considered propaganda on your part. I should like to ask you now for the last time to stick to the questions and leave out everything else. It is in your own interest. You are accused of having carried on various activities in your Gau, which were Crimes Against Humanity, of having mistreated people who lived in your Gau. Thus you are accused of having sought out a political prisoner, a certain Steinruck, in his cell and of having beaten him. Is that correct?
STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: Was Steinruck a Jew?
STREICHER: No.
DR. MARX: For what reason did you do that?
STREICHER: Steinruck, in a public place, in the presence of many witnesses, had made derogatory statements about the Führer, libelous statements. He was at police headquarters. I had spoken to the Police President about it and told him that I should like to look at that Steinruck once. I went with my adjutant—the Göring report says that a Party member, Holz, was there too, but that is not correct—I went with my adjutant to police headquarters. The same Police President, who later denounced me to Reich Marshal Göring, took me to Steinruck’s cell. We went into the cell; I stated here that I had come with the intention of talking to him, talking to him reasonably. We talked to him. But he behaved so cowardly that it became necessary at the moment that he be chastised. I do not mind stating here that I am sorry about that case, that I regret it as a slip.
DR. MARX: Then it is asserted that in August 1938 you beat up an editor, Burger. Is that correct?
STREICHER: No, that is not correct. If I had beaten him up, then I would say so here. But I believe that my adjutant and somebody else had an argument with him.
DR. MARX: What about the incident in the Künstlerhaus in Munich?
STREICHER: I went to Munich to the Inn Künstlerstätte, or something like that. I was received by the manager. Then a young man came up to me, drunk and quarrelsome, and shouted at me. The manager protested and ordered him out of the place. But the drunken young fellow came back again and again and then my chauffeur grabbed him and my son helped. They took him into a room and beat him up and then the proprietor of the inn thanked me for having rid him of the drunkard.
And now I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to state very briefly my position on one case which I believe the Prosecution also have dropped, where I was accused of sadistic tendencies...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you know perfectly well that that incident has been stricken from the record and is not, therefore, mentioned against you, so that it is quite unnecessary to go into it. The Tribunal cannot hear you on it.
DR. MARX: Witness, from the so-called Göring report I should like to submit to you some points which have been presented by the Prosecution.
You know that after the action of November 1938, in the district of Franconia, Aryanization of Jewish property was undertaken to the utmost extent. Would you like to make a statement about that?
STREICHER: Here in the Göring report is a reference to a statement of the deceased Party member, Holz. In that statement it is pointed out that Holz came to see me after that action, that he made a report about the action and likewise declared the action to be wrong; he said furthermore that now that this had happened, he considered it necessary to go further and Aryanize the property. The Göring report states that I then told Holz that could not be done and that I opposed it. Then it states further that Holz said to me that he still thought it would be right if one were to do it. We could then get out of it the means for the establishment of a Gau school. Holz also states that I said something like: “Well, Holz, if you believe you can do it, then go ahead and do it.”
I want to state here that what Party member Holz said is true. I was opposed at first; and then, acting on a sudden impulse, which I cannot understand today, I said, “Well, if you can do it, then go ahead and do it.” I want to state that at that time when I said it, I did not believe at all that it was to be done or would be done; but it was done. The Reich Marshal, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, later stated his position on it in Berlin, sharply rejecting it. Only at that time did I find out exactly how Holz accomplished this Aryanization. I had a talk with him, got into a serious dispute; and our friendly relations were broken off at that time. Holz volunteered in an armored unit, went to the front, and resigned as deputy. I returned from Berlin to Nuremberg, and later there appeared in Nuremberg a Police Inspector sent by the Reich Marshal in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan. He reported to me and asked me if I would agree to an investigation of the whole matter, and I stated that I would welcome the investigation. Then the investigation took place. The Aryanization was repealed, and it was established that Holz personally had not gotten any material advantage from it. Aryanization was then taken over by the State, repealed, and taken over.
I state frankly that in that affair I am at least guilty of negligence.
DR. MARX: Did you know that the amounts paid in the Aryanization of houses or real estate represented only about 20 percent, or even less, of the actual value?
STREICHER: Holz had not come to see me for weeks. He had carried on the Aryanization in the Labor Front Office with the expert there. Not until later, in Berlin during the meeting which the Reich Marshal held, did I learn of the real facts; and thus the dispute and the break between Holz and me came about, because I had to disapprove the manner in which the Aryanization had been handled.
DR. MARX: You are further accused of having had shares in the Mars Works at Nuremberg acquired at an extraordinarily low price, for purposes of enriching yourself and, in the course of this acquisition, of having exerted an undue pressure on the owner of the shares?
STREICHER: It says in the Göring report, literally, that I had instructed and in another place that I had given the order that the Mars shares be acquired for me. I state here that I neither instructed nor ordered anyone to acquire the Mars shares. The whole thing was like this. The director of my publishing house, who had power of attorney because I, personally, never in all the years bothered with financial or business matters, could do what he wanted. One day he came to see me with my adjutant. I do not recollect now whether the adjutant or the director of my publishing house was the one who spoke first. I was told the following: An attorney had called and said that the Mars shares were being offered for sale at an advantageous price. The director of my publishing house asked me whether I agreed. I stated that never in my life had I owned any shares, that I had never bothered about financial matters in my publishing house. If he thought that the stock should be bought, then he could do it. The shares were bought. It was the most serious breach of confidence ever committed against me by any Party comrade or employee. After a short time it turned out; that is, I was informed how these shares had been acquired. I found out that the owner had been threatened. When I found out under what conditions this stock purchase had been made, I gave the order at once to return the stock. In the Göring report it is noted that this return took place. Among the confiscated files of my publishing house there is an official statement about this affair which shows that these shares were returned.
In this connection perhaps I may be permitted to say that my publishing house was located until the end of the war in a rented house. At the time of the Aryanization I was approached with the plan that an Aryanized house be acquired for my publishing firm. I refused that. I state here in conclusion that I have in my possession no Jewish property.
When those demonstrations occurred in 1938, jewels had been brought into the Gau house. These pieces of jewelry were turned over to the police. A man who was bearer of the honorary Party emblem was convicted and sentenced to 6 years penal servitude because he had given his sweetheart a ring and another piece of jewelry dating from that time. But I may add one thing: The guilt of this bearer of the Party emblem rests perhaps with those who gave the order: “Go into the Jewish houses.” That man, as far as I knew him, had always been personally decent. Because of that order, he got into a position in which he committed a crime.
I have finished what I wanted to say.
DR. MARX: Is it not true the allegations, made by the chief of the publishing firm Fink before the Party Court and also even before that, at a police interrogation, were different, in the main points, from your present statements?
STREICHER: The whole thing was that Fink, the publishing house manager, was called to police headquarters and interrogated. The police Chief was interested in the hearing since for many years he had been a friend of mine and of my family. Fink returned from the interrogation completely upset. He paced up and down in front of me and shouted, “I was threatened, I have made statements which are not true. I am blackguard. I am a criminal.” A witness of that incident was my chauffeur. I calmed him down and told him, “I was called in for a hearing once, too. I was even imprisoned once. I will give you opportunity...”
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into such detail in this matter?
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Perhaps this is necessary, because in this very report reference is made to the testimony of Fink; and an attempt is made to prove with this that the explanation made by the Defendant Streicher is wrong, that he gave the order to purchase this stock, possibly under pressure, and that he approved of it, whereas he counters that he knew neither that these shares were to be bought at such a low price nor that blackmail was to be used.
If this is taken for granted, then, of course, we can close the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what he has already said. He has said that quite clearly, has he not? I was only suggesting that it was not necessary to go into such detail in the matter.
DR. MARX: Witness, it may be of some importance to state what the development of Der Stürmer has been since 1933, as far as circulation is concerned. Give us a short statement on the circulation of Der Stürmer, and then I shall put another question to you.
STREICHER: Der Stürmer appeared in 1923 in octavo format, and in the beginning it had a circulation of 2,000 to 3,000 copies. In the course of time the circulation increased to 10,000. At that time Der Stürmer circulated—until 1933 really—only in Nuremberg, in my Gau, perhaps also in Southern Bavaria. The publisher was a bookseller and he worked first with one man, then with two. This is proof that the circulation was really small.
In 1933—but I say this with certain reservations because it may be that the publisher did not always tell me the correct circulation figures and I had no written contract with him—I say with reservations, that in 1933 the circulation was 25,000 copies.
In 1935 the publisher died; and at that time it was, I believe, 40,000. Then an expert took over the publishing house and organized it to cover all of Germany. The circulation increased then to 100,000, and went up as high as 600,000. It fluctuated, decreased, and then dropped during the war; I cannot say exactly but I believe it was about 150,000 to 200,000.
DR. MARX: You said that that new man organized the circulation to cover all of Germany. Was the Party machinery utilized in this, and were not industries and other offices—the German Labor Front, for instance—utilized in order to increase the circulation forcibly?
STREICHER: Well, the attitude of the Party was made manifest in a letter, which was sent to all Gaue, signed by Bormann. There it was expressly pointed out that Der Stürmer was not a Party organ and had nothing to do with the Party. Thereupon several Gauleiter saw this an occasion for ordering that Der Stürmer should not appear in their Gaue any more. Now it is clear that within the organizations there were Party members who, because of idealism or for other reasons, worked to increase the distribution of Der Stürmer. However, I myself, neither in writing nor orally, ever issued any order to any Party organization to support Der Stürmer.
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, even, before 1933 you came in contact with the courts on various occasions, both because of your articles and because of your attitude as evidenced in Der Stürmer. Would you give us a short statement as to how often that occurred and what consequences it had for you?
STREICHER: How often? I cannot answer that exactly now, but it was very often. I was frequently given a court summons. You ask me about the consequences. I was many times in prison, but I can say proudly that in the sentences it repeatedly stated “an incorruptible fanatic for the truth.”
That was the consequence of my activity as a speaker and writer, but perhaps it is important to add the following: I never was arraigned because of criminal charges, but only because of my anti-Semitic activity, and the charge was brought by an organization of citizens of the Jewish faith. The chairman filed charges repeatedly when we made a slip in speaking and thus exposed ourselves to prosecution on the basis of the laws and regulations existing at that time. But perhaps I may also point out here that the Jewish Justizrat, Dr. Süssheim, the Prosecuting Attorney, stated before the court here in this courtroom, “Your Honors, he is our inexorable enemy, but he is a fanatic for the truth. He is convinced of what he does; he is honest about it.”
THE PRESIDENT: What years were they that you were repeatedly in jail?
STREICHER: That was, of course, before 1933. The first time I went to Landsberg, to prison, because I had taken part in the Hitler Putsch. Then I was sentenced to three and a half months in prison in Nuremberg, where I am now. Then I got three months...
THE PRESIDENT: You needn’t bother with the details.
STREICHER: That is to say, before 1933 I was repeatedly given prison sentences or fined.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, the Göring report also mentions the fact that the Defendant Streicher was personally interested in various Jewish plants, allegedly in order to get some capital out of them. However, I am of the opinion that it is not essential to deal with these points. The same applies to the fact that the house on Lake of Constance was sold, and to whom. I do not know whether the defendant should make any statements about this here. In my opinion there is no cause to ask him any questions concerning that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you could leave that and see whether it is taken up in cross-examination. If it is, then you may re-examine him.
DR. MARX: Yes, certainly.
Mr. President, this concludes my questions to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the defendant?
[There was no response.]
The Prosecution?
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): If the Tribunal pleases.
When you handed over your Party to Hitler in 1922, did you know his policy and what was to become the policy of the Nazi Party?
STREICHER: The policy? First I should like to say, “no.” At that time one could not speak of things which could not exist even as thoughts. The policy then was to create a new faith for the German people, that is, a faith which would deny the chaos and disorder and which would bring about a return to order.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that, within a short course of time, you knew the policy, the policy according to the Party program and according to Mein Kampf?
STREICHER: I did not need a Party program. I admit frankly that I never read it in its entirety. At that time programs were not important, but mass meetings...
THE PRESIDENT: That’s not an answer to the question. The question was whether, a short time after 1922, you knew the policy as indicated in the Party program and in Mein Kampf.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You knew, did you not, that the policy included the Anschluss with Austria? Can you answer that “yes” or “no”?
STREICHER: No. There was never any talk about Austria. I do not remember that the Führer ever spoke about the fact that Austria should be annexed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only want you to answer my question. My question was: Did you know that the Führer’s policy was the annexation of Austria to Germany? I understand your answer to be “no.” Is that correct?
STREICHER: That he intended it? No, that I did not know.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that he intended to take over Czechoslovakia or at least the Sudetenland?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that from the beginning in Mein Kampf his ultimate objective was Lebensraum?
STREICHER: What I read in Mein Kampf is marked in red. The book has been confiscated. I only read that. I read only what concerns the Jewish question; I did not read anything else. However, that we had the objective of acquiring Lebensraum for our people, that goes without saying. I personally also had set myself the objective of contributing in some way to providing a future for the surplus children.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. May I take it that during the years 1922 and 1923, as editor and owner of Der Stürmer, and as a Gauleiter from 1925, you did everything you could to put the Nazi Party into power?
STREICHER: Yes; that is to be taken as a matter of course.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And after 1933 did you continuously support and issue propaganda on behalf of the Nazi Party’s policy?
STREICHER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Not only in respect to the Jewish question, but to the foreign policy as well?
STREICHER: No, that is not correct. In Der Stürmer there is not a single article to be found which dealt with foreign policy. I devoted myself exclusively...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is quite enough. I am not going to occupy very much time with this matter. But I would ask you to look at Document Number D-802.
My Lord, this is a new exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: Which will be what?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Exhibit Number GB-327.
My Lord, I am sorry, but the document seems to be missing for the moment. Perhaps I might read the extract.
[Turning to the defendant.] Let me just read to you an extract from an article which you wrote in Der Stürmer of March 1938, immediately after the Anschluss with Austria. I want you to tell me whether or not you are advocating the Nazi policy in regard to Austria.
“Our Lord is making provision that the power of the Jews may not extend to heaven itself. What was only a dream up to a few days ago has now become reality. The brother nation of Austria has returned home to the Reich.”
And then, a few lines farther down:
“We are entering into glorious times, a Greater Germany without Jews.”
Do you say that you are not there issuing propaganda on behalf of the Nazi policy?
STREICHER: I did not indulge in propaganda politics, for Austria was already annexed. I just welcomed the fact. I did not need to make any more propaganda about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Perhaps you’ll tell me what you mean by the “Greater Germany” that you are approaching. What Greater Germany are you approaching in March 1938, a Germany greater than it was after the Anschluss with Austria?
STREICHER: A Greater Germany, a living area in which all Germans, German-speaking people, people of German blood, can live together.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand that you are advocating Lebensraum, greater space, not yet owned by Germany?
STREICHER: Not at first, no. At first it was merely a question of Austria and Germany. The Austrians are Germans and, therefore, belong to a Greater Germany.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t argue with you. I will just ask you once more, what do you mean by the “Greater Germany” that you are approaching in March of 1938?
STREICHER: I have already explained, a Germany where all those can live and work together who speak German and have German blood.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Document Number D-818, which will become Exhibit Number GB-328. Perhaps I can carry on. In November of 1938, after Munich, did you yourself personally send a telegram to Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten-German Party?
STREICHER: If it says so here, then it is true. I do not recall it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me refresh your recollection as to what you said, “Without your courageous preparatory work the great task would not have succeeded.”
Are you there advocating and issuing propaganda in support of the policy of the Nazi Government?
STREICHER: I have to ask you again, would you please repeat your question?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am asking you whether or not that telegram, which you sent to Konrad Henlein and reprinted in your newspaper under a picture of that gentleman—I am asking you whether or not that was propaganda in support of the Nazi policy, Nazi foreign policy?
STREICHER: I have to say the same to this as I said before. That was a telegram of greeting, of thanks. I did not have to make propaganda any more because the Munich Agreement had already taken place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put it to you and I’ll leave it. I’ll put it to you that throughout the years from 1933 until 1944 or 1945 you were in fact doing everything you could to support the policy of the Government, both domestically and in regard to its foreign affairs.
STREICHER: As far as possible within my field of activity, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to turn now to the question of the Jews. May I remind you of the speech that you made on 1 April 1933, that is to say, the day of the boycott.
My Lord, this will be found in the original document book, Document Number M-33. It was not actually put in before. It now becomes Exhibit Number GB-329. It is in the document book on Page 15, in the original document book which the Tribunal have.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, I give you the document book. If you want to see the original, you may do so in every case. [The document book was submitted to the defendant.]
“For 14 years we have been crying to the German nation, ‘German people, learn to recognize your true enemy,’ and 14 years ago the German Philistines listened and then declared that we preached religious hatred. Today German people have awakened; even all over the world there is talk of the eternal Jews. Never since the beginning of the world and the creation of man has there been a nation which dared to fight against the nation of blood-suckers and extortioners who, for a thousand years, have spread all over the world.”
And then I go down to the last line of the next paragraph:
“It was left to our Movement to expose the eternal Jew as a mass murderer.”
Is it right that for 14 years you had been repeating in Germany, “German people, learn to recognize your true enemy”?
STREICHER: I state first of all that what you have given me here has nothing to do with that. You have given me an article...
THE PRESIDENT: You are asked a question. You are asked whether it is true that for 14 years you had been repeating, to Germany, “Learn to recognize your true enemy.” Is that true?
STREICHER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And in doing so, is it true that you had been preaching religious hatred?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at...
STREICHER: May I be permitted to make a statement concerning this answer? In my weekly, Der Stürmer, I repeatedly stated that for me the Jews are not a religious group but a race, a people.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you think to call them “blood-suckers,” “a nation of blood-suckers and extortioners”—do you think that’s preaching hatred?
STREICHER: I beg your pardon. I have not understood you?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may call them a race or a nation, whichever you like, now; but you were saying, on 1 April 1933, that they were a “nation of blood-suckers and extortioners.” Do you call that preaching hatred?
STREICHER: That is a statement, the expression of a conviction which can be proved on the basis of historical facts.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Understand me. I did not ask you whether it was a fact or not. I am asking whether you called it preaching hatred. Your answer is “yes” or “no.”
STREICHER: No, it is not preaching hatred; it is just a statement of facts.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look two pages further on in that last document, M-33, and do you see the fourth paragraph from the end of the extract? That is Page 17 of the document book: “As long as I stand at the head of the struggle, this struggle will be conducted so honestly that the eternal Jew will derive no joy from it.”
STREICHER: That I wrote; that was right.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you were, were you not, one of those who did stand and continue to stand at the head of that struggle?
STREICHER: Did I stand at the head? I am too modest a man for that. But I do claim to have declared my conviction and my knowledge clearly and unmistakably.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why did you say that so long as you were at the head of it, the Jew would derive no joy from it?
STREICHER: Because I considered myself a man whom destiny had placed in a position to enlighten people on the Jewish question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And “enlightenment”—is that another word for persecution? Do you mean by “enlightenment,” “persecution”?
STREICHER: I did not understand that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word “persecution”? Is that why the Jew was to have no joy from it, from your enlightenment?
STREICHER: I ask to have the question repeated.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can show it to you and we will repeat the question as loud as you want it. Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word “persecution”? Do you hear that?
STREICHER: I hear “enlightenment” and “production.” I mean by “enlightenment” telling another person something which he does not yet know.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We won’t go on with that. You know, do you not, that starting with the boycott which you led yourself in 1933, the Jews thereafter were, during the course of the years, deprived of the right to vote, deprived of holding any public office, excluded from the professions; demonstrations were conducted against them in 1938, they were fined a billion marks after that, they were forced to wear a yellow star, they had their own separate seats to sit on, and they had their houses and their businesses taken away from them. Do you call that “enlightenment”?
STREICHER: That has nothing to do with what I wrote, nothing to do with it. I did not issue the orders. I did not make the laws. I was not asked when laws were prepared. I had nothing to do with these laws and orders.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But as those laws and orders were passed you were applauding them, and you were going on abusing the Jews and asking for more and more orders to be passed; isn’t that a fact?
STREICHER: I ask to have put to me which law I applauded.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you told the Tribunal yesterday, did you not, that you were responsible, you thought, for the Nuremberg Decrees, which you had been advocating for years before they came into force; isn’t that a fact?
STREICHER: The Nuremberg Decrees? I did not make them. I was not asked beforehand, and I did not sign them either. But I state here that these laws are the same laws which the Jewish people have as their own. It is the greatest and most important act of legislation which a modern nation has at any time made for its protection.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the time to break off.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I wonder if the Tribunal would be good enough to consider setting aside a half hour some time for the discussion of the documents of the Defendant Von Schirach. We are ready to clear up outstanding points at any time that is suitable to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [Turning to the defendant.] Now, I just want to ask you a few questions as to the part you played in the various actions against the Jews between 1933 and 1939.
Will you look at Document M-6, which is at Page 20 in the document book that you have before you, Page 22 in the document book that the Tribunal have in English. It is Page 20 in the German document book; M-6, which is already Exhibit Number GB-170.
Now, I just want to refer to what you said about the Nuremberg Decrees. You told us this morning that you thought when they had been passed that that was already the final solution of the Jewish question. Will you look at the paragraph beginning in the center of the page, “However, to those who believe...”:
“However, to those who believe that the Jewish question has been finally solved and the matter thus settled for Germany by the Nuremberg Decrees, be it said that the battle continues—world Jewry itself is seeing to that anyhow—and we shall only get through this battle victoriously if every member of the German people knows that his very existence is at stake. The work of enlightenment carried on by the Party seems to me to be more necessary than ever today, even though many Party members seem to think that these matters are no longer real or urgent.”
STREICHER: Yes, I wrote that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “the battle continues,” if you have already solved the Jewish problem by the issuance of the Nuremberg Decrees?
STREICHER: I have already stated today that the solution of the Jewish problem was regarded by me as having to be solved, first of all, within the country and then in conjunction with other nations. Thus “the battle continues” means that in the International Anti-Semitic Union, which I had formed and which had representatives from all countries in it, the question was discussed as to what could be done from an international point of view to terminate the Jewish problem.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are we, therefore, to take it that everything that you said and wrote after 1936 was in connection with an international problem and had nothing to do with the Jews in Germany as such?
STREICHER: Yes, mainly international, of course.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just refer you to half way through the next paragraph, “Der Stürmer’s 15 years’ work of enlightenment has already led an army of those who know, millions strong, to National Socialism.” Is that so?
STREICHER: That is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, you were telling the Tribunal this morning that up to 1933, and indeed afterwards, you said the circulation of your paper was only very small. Is it true, in fact, that your 15 years’ work had led an army, millions strong, to National Socialism?
STREICHER: I have said today that the moment the press was politically co-ordinated, 3,000 daily newspapers were committed to the purpose of enlightenment about the Jewish problem. There were 3,000 daily papers in addition to Der Stürmer.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I don’t think you need go on. Let me just finish reading through that paragraph:
“The continued work of Der Stürmer will help to insure that down to the last man every German will, with heart and hand, join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the head of the serpent Pan-Judah.”
Wait one moment, let me ask my question. There is nothing there about an international problem. You are addressing yourself to the German people, are you not?
STREICHER: In that article? Yes. And if that article was read abroad, then also to countries abroad, but as to the remark about crushing the serpent’s head, that is a biblical expression.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you now let us discuss for a moment the breaking up of the synagogue in Nuremberg, which you have told about, on the 10th of August of 1938. Will you look at Page 41 of the book that you have in front of you, Page 42 of the English document book that the Tribunal has.
Now we have heard your explanation of that breaking up of the synagogue. The Fränkische Tageszeitung at the 11th of August states this, “In Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished. Julius Streicher himself inaugurated this work by a speech lasting more than an hour and a half.” Were you talking to the inhabitants of Nuremberg upon the architectural value of their city for an hour and a half on the 10th of August 1938?
STREICHER: I no longer know in detail what I said, but I refer to what you have remarked and what you find important. There was a branch of the Propaganda Ministry in Nuremberg. The young Regierungsrat had press conferences with the editors every day, and at that time he told the editors during a press conference that Streicher would speak and that the synagogue was being demolished and that this was to be kept secret.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I asked you, were you talking for that hour and a half on the architectural beauties of Nuremberg and not against the Jews? Is that what you are telling us?
STREICHER: That, too, of course.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At the press conference to which you referred—you no doubt have seen the document; it is Page 40 of the Tribunal’s document book—do you remember that it was arranged that the show should be staged in a big way, the show of pulling down the synagogue? What was the object of arranging the demonstration to demolish that synagogue in such a big way?
STREICHER: I was merely the speaker. What you are intimating here, that was done by the representative of the Ministry of Propaganda; but I would not object to it if you decided to assume, let me put it like that, that I would naturally have been in favor of making a big show if I had been asked.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just ask you now a word about the demonstrations which followed that in November of that year—My Lord, I refer to Page 43 of the document book; 42 of the German—as I understand it, you tell us that you disapproved of those demonstrations that took place and they took place without your knowledge or previous knowledge. Is that correct, “yes” or “no”?
STREICHER: Yes, it is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I just want to remind you of what you said on the following day, the 10th of November. This is an account of what happened:
“In Nuremberg and Fürth there were demonstrations by the crowd against the Jewish gang of murderers. These lasted until the early hours of the morning.”
I now pass to the end of that paragraph:
“After midnight the excitement of the public had reached its peak and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nuremberg and Fürth and burned those two Jewish buildings where the murder of Germans had been preached.”
This is now what you say—it is on Page 44 of the document book, My Lord:
“From the cradle on, the Jew is not taught as we are: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ or ‘If you are smitten on the left cheek offer then your right one.’ No. He is told ‘With the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He is even taught that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act pleasing to God. For 20 years we have been writing about this in Der Stürmer. For 20 years we have been preaching it throughout the world, and we have made millions recognize the truth.”
Does that sound as though you had disapproved of the demonstrations that had taken place the night before?
STREICHER: First of all I must state that the report, part of which you read, appeared in a daily paper. Thus I am not to be held responsible for this. If someone wrote that part of the populace rose up against the gang of murderers then that is in keeping with the order from the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin; outwardly that action was described as a spontaneous demonstration of the populace...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That does not answer my question. Does that passage that I have read sound as though you had disapproved of the demonstrations that had taken place the night before? Does it or does it not?
STREICHER: I was against that demonstration.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just let me read on:
“But we know that we have in our midst people who take pity on the Jews, people who are not worthy of living in this town, who are not worthy of belonging to this people, of whom you are a proud part.”
Why should it have been necessary for people to have had pity on the Jews, if you were not—you and the Nazi Party—persecuting them?
STREICHER: I have already pointed out today that I was forced, after this demonstration had taken place, to make a public comment and say that one should not have so much pity. I wanted to prove thereby that this was not a spontaneous action by the people; in other words, the matter does not speak against me; it speaks for me. The people, as I myself, were opposed to the demonstration and I found that I had cause to—should I say—get public opinion to the point where one might possibly not regard that action as something too severe.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, why, if you were opposed to it and if the people were opposed to it, should it have been your duty to try and convert them so that they should be in favor of that kind of thing? Why were you opposed to it and why should you try to turn them against the Jew?
STREICHER: I do not understand what you mean.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand you to say that you were opposed to these demonstrations and that the people also were opposed to the demonstrations; that, therefore, it was your duty to try to stir them up and make them in favor of the demonstrations after they had happened. Why should it have been your duty to do that?
STREICHER: Today one can perhaps say that this or that was my duty, but one must consider what those times were—the confusion that existed—that to make a quick decision, as one might have to in this courtroom, was quite impossible. What happened has happened. I was against it and the public too. What was written about it otherwise was done so for tactical reasons.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Were you in favor of the Aryanization of Jewish houses and businesses? Were you in favor of that or did you disapprove of that issue?
STREICHER: I have answered that question today in great detail, in connection with a statement of Party comrade Holz. I have stated and I repeat that my deputy came to me...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just stop for a moment, I don’t want a speech. I asked you a question which you could answer “yes” or “no.” Did you approve or disapprove of the system of Aryanization of Jewish businesses and houses?
STREICHER: One cannot answer that quickly with “yes” or “no.” I have made it clear today, and you must allow me to explain it so that there is not any misunderstanding. My Party comrade...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to allow you to repeat it. I will go on if you are not prepared to answer that question. The Tribunal have heard it and I pass on.
STREICHER: I certainly want to answer it. After my Party comrades...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant...
STREICHER: After the Party comrades came...
THE PRESIDENT: You have refused to answer the question properly, a question to which you can give either an affirmative or a negative answer. Did you approve or did you not approve? You can give an answer to that and then you can give any explanation afterwards.
STREICHER: I personally was not for Aryanization. When Holz repeated that, giving as a reason that the houses had been pretty badly damaged, et cetera, that we might get material for a Gau (district) building, I said “All right, if you can do it, go ahead.” I already stated today that this was carelessness on my part.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There were in fact a very great number of Jewish businesses and houses Aryanized in Nuremberg and Franconia, were there not?
STREICHER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you just look at a new exhibit, Document Number D-835, which becomes Exhibit GB-330. That is a list—it is an original document—it is a list of Jewish property in Nuremberg and Fürth which was Aryanized. Have you seen that list or anything like it before?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you can take it from me, that that list contains the addresses of some 800 properties in Nuremberg and Fürth which have been taken from the Jews and handed over to Aryans. Would you agree that that would be at least 800 houses in your city here that were Aryanized?
STREICHER: I do not know about it in detail; but I must establish something: I do not know—is that the official document? I have already stated today that my Party comrade Holz started Aryanizing. That was rescinded by Berlin. Then came the Aryanization carried out by the State. I could not have had any influence here, either, so that this was none of my business. This Aryanization, the expropriation of Jewish property, was ordered by Berlin.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you mentioned this morning that you were a subscriber to a weekly newspaper called the Israelitisches Wochenblatt; is that correct?
STREICHER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When did you start subscribing to that newspaper?
STREICHER: What did you say?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At what date did you start subscribing to that newspaper?
STREICHER: I do not know.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I have no doubt you can tell the Tribunal approximately. Have you always, since 1933, been a subscriber of that newspaper?
STREICHER: Well, I do not think I could have read every issue, since I traveled a great deal.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were, as I think it is stated in this application of your wife to give evidence, a regular reader of it, were you not?
STREICHER: My friends, the editors, and I used to share in the reading of this paper.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that between yourself and your editors—I don’t say every copy was read—but it was regularly read from 1933 onwards; is that fair?
STREICHER: You cannot say “read regularly.”
LT. COL, GRIFFITH-JONES: A large number of the copies that you subscribed for, which came weekly to you, were they read by yourself or by your editors?
STREICHER: Certainly.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to turn to something else for a moment. I want to make myself perfectly clear to you.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, I should like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the document which has just been presented, “Confiscated Property and Real Estate,” has the heading “Aryanization Department for Real Estate, Nuremberg.” That cannot mean anything except that this document comes from the official department which was later set up for the confiscation of such real estate. But by no means can this be a document to prove that we are concerned here with the real estate Aryanized by Holz, subsequent to 9 November.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I accept that that may be so.
DR. MARX: I should like to ask, therefore, that the appropriate correction be made.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If I was mistaken in saying that those properties had been Aryanized, I would be right then, would I not, in saying that that list of properties was prepared by the Aryanization Department in Nuremberg for the purpose of Aryanizing them in the future? Would that be a fair statement to make?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t pursue that matter any further.
I want to make myself quite clear to you in what I am suggesting. I am suggesting that from 1939 onwards you set out to incite the German people to murder and to accept the fact of the murder of the Jewish race. Do you understand that?
STREICHER: That is not true.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No doubt you will say it isn’t true. I just wanted you to be quite clear on what my suggestion is going to be.
I want you to look now at a bundle, which will be given to you, of extracts from Der Stürmer. You can see the originals which are in Court if you desire to do so, but it will save time if we use the document books there.
Now, will you look at Page 3-A. For convenience, the pages in this bundle are all marked “A” to distinguish them from the numbers in the original document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in evidence?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: None of them are in evidence at the moment. Perhaps the most convenient way would be for me to put the actual documents in evidence together at the end, unless the Tribunal or the defendant desire to see any copies of them. I will give them numbers as I go along.
Will you look at Page 3-A of that bundle, Document Number D-809, which becomes Exhibit Number GB-331:
“The Jewish problem is not yet solved, nor will it be solved when one day the last Jew will have left Germany. Only when world Jewry has been annihilated, will it have been solved.”
Is that what you were working for when you say you were working for the international solution to this problem, an annihilation of world Jewry?
STREICHER: If that is how you understand “annihilation.” That was written by my chief editor at the time. He says that the Jewish problem will not yet be solved when the last Jew will have left Germany. And when he suddenly says that only when world Jewry has been annihilated will it be solved, then he certainly may have meant that the power of world Jewry should be annihilated. But my Party comrade Holz did not think of mass killing or the possibility of mass killing.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The German word used there is “vernichtet,” is it not? Look at your copy. “Vernichtet” that means “to annihilate.”
STREICHER: Today, when you look back, you could interpret it like that, but not at that time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we won’t waste time because we have quite a number to look through. Will you look on to the next page. That was in January you were writing that. In April 1939, Document D-810, Exhibit GB-332, I refer only to the last two lines. This is an article again by your editor: “Then perhaps their graves will proclaim that this murderous and criminal people has, after all, met its deserved fate.”
What do you mean by “graves” there? Do you mean excluding them from the business of the world?
STREICHER: This is the first time that I have seen this article. That is the statement of opinion of a man who was probably looking ahead and making a play on words; but as far as I knew him, and as far as we discussed the Jewish problem, there was no question of mass extermination; we did not even think of it. Maybe it was his wish—I do not know—but anyway, that is the way it happened to be written.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Just turn over, will you now, to May 1939, Document Number D-811, Exhibit Number GB-333. I quote the last six lines: “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia.”
This, of course, was before the Russian invasion.
“There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia, a punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them that every murderer and criminal must expect, death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be utterly exterminated. Then the world will see that the end of the Jews is also the end of Bolshevism.”
STREICHER: Who wrote that article?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is published in your Stürmer. We can find out, if necessary. It is not written by you, but it is published in your Der Stürmer; and you have told the Tribunal that you accept responsibility for everything that was written in that newspaper.
STREICHER: All right, I assume responsibility; but I want to state that, here too, this is the private opinion of a man who in May 1939 could not have thought that ex nihilo—for we had no soldiers—a “March to Russia” could be started. This is a theoretic and very strongly-worded expression of opinion of that anti-Semitic person.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: All I ask you about that is: Is that not advocating the murder of Jews, that article; if it is not, what is it advocating?
STREICHER: The whole article would have to be read so that I could tell what motives existed for writing something like that. I therefore ask you to make public the whole article. Then one can form a proper judgment.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we’ll go on. We won’t waste time unless you really want to see the whole article.
My Lord, if I perhaps might be allowed to put these documents in evidence. As Your Lordship will see, this bundle is a bundle of extracts from Der Stürmer.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to make the following statements: A number of extracts from Der Stürmer have been mentioned here which have been put before me for the first time. Some of them are articles which have not been written by the defendant personally. Some are signed by Hiemer, and some by Holz, who was particularly radical in his manner of writing, and passages are being quoted which are perhaps taken out of context.
I must ask, therefore, that I be afforded the opportunity of going over these extracts together with the Defendant Streicher. Otherwise, he might come to the conclusion that his defense is being made too difficult for him and that it is being made impossible for him to prepare himself appropriately.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you will have an opportunity of checking up on these various extracts, and then you will be able to introduce, if necessary, any passages which explain the extracts. That is a matter which has been explained to defendants’ counsel over and over again.
Colonel Griffith-Jones, are there not certain of these extracts which are written or signed by the defendant?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, with Your Lordship’s permission I will refer to some of them, but so that I should not have to refer to all of them, I was going to suggest that perhaps I might put them in and, if it is necessary, let the Tribunal know afterwards the numbers of them to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put the whole bundle in evidence and will not refer to all of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you can give us the exhibit numbers later.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is suitable to the convenience of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, the Tribunal will see by looking at this bundle, from the first page—which I think is 3-A—to Page 25-A, that there are various extracts which have been written either by yourself or by members of your staff between January 1939 and January 1941.
Do I understand you to say now, to have said in your evidence, that you never knew that Jews were being exterminated in thousands and millions in the Eastern territories? Did you never know that?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: As I understood your evidence about the Israelitisches Wochenblatt this morning you said this, as I have written it down:
“Sometimes that journal contained hints that everything was not in order. Later in 1943 an article appeared stating that masses of Jews were disappearing but the article did not quote any figures and did not mention anything about murders.”
Are you really saying that those copies of the Israelitisches Wochenblatt, which you and your editors were reading, contained nothing except for a hint of disappearance with no mention of figures or murder? Is that what you are telling this Tribunal?
STREICHER: Yes, I stick to that, certainly.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want you, if you will, to take this bundle and keep it in front of you. It is a bundle of extracts from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt from July 1941 until the end of the war. The Tribunal will be able to see what a fanatic for the truth really tells.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
My Lord, this bundle, for convenience again, is marked “B.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Will you look at the first page? That is an article on the 11th of July 1941. “Some 40,000 Jews died in Poland during the last years. The hospitals are overfull.”
Now, you need not turn over for the moment, Defendant. We will turn the pages soon enough.
Did you happen to read that sentence in the issue of the 11th of July 1941?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 3, 3-B? In November 1941: “Very bad news comes from the Ukraine. Thousands of Jewish dead are being mourned, among whom are many of the Galician Jews who were expelled from Hungary.”
Did you read that?
STREICHER: That might be possible. It says “thousands,” thousands are being mourned. That is no proof that millions were killed. There are no details as to how they came to their end.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is the explanation you want us to accept we will leave it.
Just go on again to the next page, will you? The 12th of December 1941, a month later:
“According to news which has arrived from several sources, thousands of Jews—one even speaks of many thousands—are said to have been executed in Odessa”—and so on.—“Similar reports reach us from Kiev and other Russian cities.”
Did you read that?
STREICHER: I do not know; and if I had read it then it would not change a thing. That is no proof.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you have told the Tribunal, you know, that there was nothing except hints of disappearance. Doesn’t it show that you were not telling the truth when you read these extracts?
STREICHER: In that case may I say the following? When the war started we no longer received the Israelitisches Wochenblatt. During the later years one could only get the Israelitisches Wochenblatt through the Police. We got that paper, toward the end, into Germany by smuggling. On one occasion we asked the Police to provide us with foreign newspapers and this weekly, and we were told that it was not possible. But we nevertheless got it. What I mean to say by this is that I did not read every one of those issues. The issues which I did read were confiscated on my farm. Whatever is underlined has been read by me or it was read by my editor in chief. I cannot, therefore, guarantee that I read every article.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I appreciate that and that is why we have quite a number of them. You see, we have an extract for practically every week or month over the course of 3 years.
I would just like you to turn to Page 30-A of the “A” bundle. I just want you to see what you were writing after having heard, or after having read, or anyway after those copies of the Israelitisches Wochenblatt had been published. This is a leading article by yourself.
“If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only one way open—the extermination of that people whose father is the devil.”
And is the word that you use for extermination there “Ausrottung,” rooting out, extirpation?
STREICHER: First of all, I would like to ask whether this issue is known to my defense counsel, and if the translation is correct?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It does not matter. He has copies of all this and he will be able to protect your interests. We are now just testing the truth of the evidence that you have given.
Can you tell me, is that “extermination”? Does that mean murder of Jews? What else can it mean?
STREICHER: It depends on the whole context. In that case I want you to read the whole article.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, if there is anything in the rest of the article which can be helpful to you, your counsel will have an opportunity to see the article and be able to put it before the Tribunal. I can assure you that the remainder of your articles, as a general rule, do not assist your case.
STREICHER: When that article appeared, mass killing had already taken place a long time ago.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Well now, we will not go through this at any length.
If you will look at your “B” bundle, your bundle of extracts from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt...
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should draw his attention to the date on Page 30-A.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.
[Turning to the defendant.] The 25th of December 1941.
If you will glance at “B” bundle you will see a number of extracts going from Page A to Page 21. Now, I would like you to glance at Page 24 of that “B” bundle.
STREICHER: Page 24?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, Page 24. This is an article which appeared in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt on the 27th of November 1942. I just wondered whether you read this:
“At the Zionist Congress of Switzerland the representative of the ‘Jewish Agency’ in Geneva... gave a report on European Jewry.... The number of victims goes into millions. If the present conditions continue and the German program is carried out, it is to be reckoned that, instead of 6 or 7 million Jews in Europe only 2 million will still be left.”
Then there are the three last lines of the extract:
“The Jews who were there had mostly been deported to the notorious unknown destination further to the East. At the end of this winter the number of victims will be 4 million.”
Is that what you call a hint of disappearance of Jews from the East?
STREICHER: I cannot recollect that I have ever read that but I do want to say that if I had read it I would not have believed it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, let us just turn to the “A” bundle again and look at the article that you wrote on the 17th of December 1942. It is Page 34-A. This is an article which is initialed “STR” so I presume it was written by you.
“The London newspaper, The Times, of the 16th of September 1942 published a...”
STREICHER: I have not got it yet.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Page 34-A.
STREICHER: Just a minute.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Find it for him. It is headed: “Eye for Eye, Tooth for Tooth.”
“The London newspaper, The Times, of 16 September 1942 published a resolution which had been unanimously passed by the Board of Deputies of British Jews. This resolution expresses the grief and horror of the Anglo-Jewish Community at the unspeakable atrocities committed by Germany and her allies and vassals against the Jews of Europe which had only one aim, to exterminate the whole Jewish population of Europe in cold blood.”
Now, you must have read of that in The Times because you say so.
STREICHER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
“Strange how the Jews of the Anglo-Jewish Community suddenly begin to prick up their ears. When the second World War began the Führer of the German nation warned the Jewish warmongers against plunging the world into a blood bath again. Since then the German Führer has warned and prophesied again and again that the second World War, instigated by world Jewry, must necessarily lead to the destruction of Jewry. In his last speech too, the Führer again referred to his prophecies.”
Did you write that?
STREICHER: Yes, this is merely a quotation. It refers to a forecast from the Führer, of which nobody could possibly tell what it really meant.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well.
If you had not even read that or the Israelitisches Wochenblatt, did you ever hear of the declaration of the United Nations which was made on the 17th of December 1942?
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
Do you remember hearing of that? You appear to have been reading The Times; you appear to have been reading some copies of the Israelitisches Wochenblatt. Maybe you heard of this declaration which was published in London, Washington, and Moscow at the same time with the assent and support of all Allied nations and dominions. I will just read it to you and see if you remember it:
“The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslav Governments and also the French National Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler’s often repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.
“From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to Eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invaders are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation, or are deliberately massacred in mass executions.
“The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and children.
“The above-mentioned Governments and the French National Committee condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny. They reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those responsible for the crimes shall not escape retribution, and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.”
Did you never hear of this declaration?
STREICHER: I do not know, but if I should have heard of it, then I would have to say the following:
After the seizure of power the foreign press published so many atrocity stories, which turned out to be rumors, that I would have had no reason to believe anything like this; nor is there any mention here that millions of Jews were killed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you see, it isn’t altogether uncorroborated. You say you had no reason to believe it; but your Israelitisches Wochenblatt, which you were subscribing to, was saying exactly the same thing.
Would you look at Page 26-B of the “B” bundle? That is the declaration of the United Nations of the 17th of December. Just see what the Israelitisches Wochenblatt says on the 18th. And there I quote the second paragraph:
“At that time the Polish Government in London gave the number of Jews executed as 700,000. The Berlin radio hereupon declared that these reports were untrue, but admitted that in Poland ‘Jews’ had had to be executed because they carried out acts of sabotage.”
Then the last paragraph quoted:
“‘Up to the end of September 1942,’ writes the Daily Telegraph, ‘2 million Jews have lost their lives in Germany and in the countries occupied by the Axis, and it is to be feared that the number of victims will be doubled by the end of this year.’”
Did you happen to read that article?
STREICHER: I cannot remember having read it, but I would not have believed it if I had.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, there is another article in that same paper on the 23rd of December, in the same terms; another on the 30th of December; and another on the 8th of January. Look at what it says on the 8th of January:
“The Polish Government in London has issued a new declaration which states that all the information received agrees that a third of the 3 million odd Jews have lost their lives.”
Did you read that?
STREICHER: I do not know, but I have to repeat, I would not have believed it.
LT. COL GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, just let’s see just what you were writing on the 28th of January. Look at 35-A of your own bundle; 35-A. Now just see what your Chief Editor, the witness you are going to call, I understand, Hiemer—see what he has got to say first of all:
“But the ghetto too, which has today been re-established in nearly all European countries, is only an interim solution, for mankind once awakened will not merely solve the ghetto question but the Jewish question in its totality. A time will come when the present demands, of the Jews will be fulfilled. The ghetto will have disappeared—and with it Jewry.”
What is he referring to, if he isn’t referring to the mass killing, murder, of the Jewish race?
STREICHER: That was a statement of his opinion, his conviction. That conviction must be understood in the same way as something which a Jewish author wrote in his book in America. Erich Kauffmann wrote that German men capable of fathering children should be sterilized, and in that manner the German people should be exterminated. It was at the same time that Hiemer wrote his article, and I want to say that the very severe tone in Der Stürmer at that time was due to that book from America.
The interrogating officers know—and so does my counsel—that I have repeatedly pointed out that I wanted that book to be produced. It was in the Völkischer Beobachter.
If in America an author called Erich Kauffmann can publicly demand that all men in Germany capable of fathering children should be sterilized, for the purpose of exterminating the German people, then I say, eye for eye and tooth for tooth. This is a theoretical literary matter.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I am sure we have heard your explanation. Let’s see what you have to say about your own article on the same date. I quote from the middle of the next paragraph:
“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand that the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of German National Socialism.”
What did you mean by that? Perhaps I should have quoted a little earlier, going back to the beginning:
“When, with the outbreak of the second World War, world Jewry again began to manifest themselves as warmongers, Adolf Hitler announced to the world from the platform of the German Reichstag that the World War conjured up by world Jewry would result in the self-destruction of Jewry. This prophecy was the first big warning. It was met with derision from the Jews, as were all the subsequent warnings.”
And then you go on to say:
“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand that the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of German National Socialism.”
What did you mean by that?
STREICHER: Pardon me?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “World Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of National Socialism”? How did you mean that National Socialism was finding the fulfillment of Jewry’s destiny?
STREICHER: National Socialism could not fulfill the fate, that is to say, find the solution, since the Führer intervened with the hand of destiny. That was not a solution.
During an interrogation I pointed out that I who personally wanted a total solution, was, right from the beginning, against trying to solve the Jewish problem by means of pogroms. If I said that the destiny of Jewry was to be fulfilled by National Socialism, then I wanted to say that through National Socialism the world would gain the knowledge and the realization that the Jewish problem must be solved internationally.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let’s just go on.
“That which the Führer of the German people announced to the world as a prophecy at the beginning of this second World War is now being fulfilled with unrelenting inevitability. World Jewry, which wanted to reap big dividends from the blood of the warring nations, is rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation.”
And again you use the word “Ausrottung.”
Does that mean just as it sounds, as though the fulfillment that you were aiming at was warning the world about Jewry? What do you mean by it? “Rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation”—Ausrottung. What did you mean by it?
STREICHER: This is a warning. The Führer made a prophecy; nobody could interpret that prophecy properly. The prophecy was not quoted only in this article, but in 10 others. Again and again we referred to these prophecies, the first of which had been made in 1929. Today we know what the Führer wanted to say; at that time we did not. And I confess quite openly that with this quotation we wanted to warn world Jewry: “Against their threat, this threat.”
So as to defend myself I might mention in this connection that the author, Dr. Emil Ludwig Kohn, who had left Germany and emigrated to France, had written in the paper Le Fanal, in 1934, “Hitler does not want war, but he is being forced into it. Britain has the last word.” Thus...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We are not discussing war now. We are discussing the extermination, the mass murder of Jews, by the National Socialists. That is what we are discussing. Let me read on:
“When Adolf Hitler stepped before the German people 20 years ago to submit to them the National Socialist demands which pointed the way into the future, he also made the promise which was to have the gravest repercussions; that of freeing the world from its Jewish tormentors. How wonderful it is to know that this great man and leader is following up this promise with practical action. It will be the greatest deed in the history of mankind.”
Do you say that you are not putting forward propaganda for the policy of mass extermination which the Nazi Government had set out to do?
STREICHER: We too had freedom of the press like democratic countries. Every author knew of the forecast, which perhaps later on turned out to be a fact, and could write about it. That is what I did.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well.
STREICHER: But for my defense, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to be allowed to say that wars too can be mass murder, with their bombs, et cetera. And if it is proved that someone says that we are forcing Hitler into war, then I can certainly say that a man who knows that Hitler is being forced into war is a mass murderer.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal I am going to interrupt you again because we are not discussing whether or not Hitler was forced into war. We will leave that now.
Just let us go on and see if you are really speaking the truth in saying that while you are writing these articles you are not perfectly well aware of what was happening in the Eastern territories.
We got as far as January 1943. I would like you to just look at one or two more of the Israelitisches Wochenblatt and see if you remember reading any of these. Will you look at Page 30-B the 26th of February, in your “B” bundle?
“Exchange reports from the Polish Government circles in London that Warsaw, Lvov, Lodz and other cities have been ‘liquidated,’ and that nobody from the ghettos remained alive. The last investigations have ascertained that only about 650,000 Jews remain out of 2,800,000.”
Listen to me. Did you read that? Do you remember it?
STREICHER: I do not know. For months, perhaps half a year, we did not get an issue, but if I had read it, I would not have believed that either.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you believe Hitler? If you will turn over the page to 31-B, did you believe Hitler? According to the last two lines quoted in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt of the 5th of March 1943: “Hitler, in his proclamation of 24 February, again proclaimed the extermination of the Jews in Europe as his goal.”
Did you believe your own beloved Führer when he was saying the same things as the Israelitisches Wochenblatt, the United Nations, and The Times newspaper in London?
STREICHER: No, I declare that whoever got to know the Führer’s deepest emotions and his soul, as I have personally, and then later had to learn from his testament that he, in full possession of his faculties, consciously gave the order for mass extermination, is confronted with a riddle. I state here...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We really don’t want another long speech about the Führer. Just turn over the page and look at what is being said on the 26th of March:
“The report of the Polish Government on the measures against the Jewish population is published in full in the English press. A passage reads, ‘In the town of Vilna 50,000 Jews were murdered, in Rovno 14,000; in Lvov half of the total Jewish population.’
“Many details are also given about the use of poison gas, as at Chelm, of electricity in Belzec, of the deportations from Warsaw, the surrounding of blocks of houses, and of the attacks with machine guns.”
Did you read that one?
STREICHER: I do not know. However, that shootings must have occurred, of course, where Jews committed sabotage, et cetera, is self-evident. During a war that is considered as a matter of course. However, the figures which are quoted here were just simply not believable.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I understand you to say that now, but what I do not understand is what you meant when you said this morning that the Israelitisches Wochenblatt made no mention of murders and gave no figures. You didn’t say that the figures were unbelievable; you told this Tribunal, on your oath, that the newspaper contained nothing except the hints of disappearance, with no mention of figures. What did you mean by that?
STREICHER: I have said the truth under oath, but it is possible that one might not remember everything. During an interrogation some time back I stated, based on memory, that an issue must exist which mentions the disappearance of Jews, and so on. It is in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt, and I thought I said that it was in 1943 and it is true. If one article after the other is put before me—well, even if I had seen it, how can I remember it? But that I, under oath, should have deliberately told you an untruth, that is, at any rate, not so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will deal with the article you mention in 1943 in one moment; but just before we do that, just see if you believe your own staff. Turn, will you, to 38-A, M-139. Now, on the 6th of May it so happens just after those last three extracts from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt we have looked at, within 2 or 3 months, 1 or 2 months afterwards your newspaper is publishing this article. It is headed “Children of the Devil.”
“Der Stürmer paid a visit to the ghettos in the East. Der Stürmer sent its photographic reporter to various ghettos in the East; a member of Der Stürmer’s staff is well acquainted with the Jews. Nothing can surprise him easily. But what our contributor saw in these ghettos was a unique experience for him. He wrote, ‘What my eyes and my Leica camera saw here convinced me that the Jews are not human beings but children of the devil and the spawn of crime.... It is hard to see how it was possible that this scum of humanity was for centuries looked upon as God’s chosen people by the non-Jews. ... This satanic race really has no right to exist.’”
Now, you have heard of what was happening in the ghettos in the East during 1942 and 1943? Are you really telling this Tribunal that your photographer went with his camera to those ghettos and found out nothing about the mass murder of Jews?
STREICHER: Yes, otherwise he would have reported to us about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Warsaw ghetto, you remember, exterminated, wiped out in April 1943. Your photographer must have been around just about that time, if you were writing this on the 6th of May, if he had just returned. Did you think he could have been there looking at ghettos for Der Stürmer, for Julius Streicher, the Jew-baiter, and have discovered nothing of what was happening in the ghetto in Warsaw and elsewhere?
STREICHER: I can only remember that immediately after the end of the Polish campaign a Viennese reporter went over there, made films and made reports, in 1942. I would like to ask—is there a name, a signature there, to show by whom it was written? One thing I know is that the ghetto was destroyed; I read it in a summary, an illustrated report which I think originated in the Ministry of Propaganda. But as to the destruction of the ghetto during an uprising—well, I consider that legal; from my point of view it was right. But mass murders in the ghetto in Warsaw are something I never heard of.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just let’s look at the article to which you referred a moment ago. Will you look at 44-A of the document book?
My Lord, this is the same as was included at Page 53 in the original document book; it was Document Number 1965-PS, Exhibit Number GB-176, but there is slightly more of the extract quoted at Page 44-A.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, I just want you to examine for the last time whether or not you are speaking the truth in telling the Tribunal that you did not know what was happening. You quote in that article from the Swiss newspaper, the Israelitisches Wochenblatt, of the 27th August 1943—you will see that date, My Lord, in the middle of the first paragraph—I start now from that line in the middle:
“The Swiss Jewish newspaper goes on to say, ‘The Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England and of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have disappeared, so to speak. The Jewish reservoir of the East that was able to counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West no longer exists.’”
That is the end of your quotation from the newspaper, and you go on to say:
“This is not a Jewish lie; it is really true that the Jews have, ‘so to speak,’ disappeared from Europe and that the ‘Jewish reservoir of the East’ from which the Jewish pestilence spread for centuries among the European nations has ceased to exist. If the Swiss newspaper wishes to affirm that the Jews did not expect this kind of development when they plunged the nations into the second World War, this is to be believed; but already at the beginning of the war the Führer of the German Nation prophesied the events that have taken place. He said that the second World War would swallow those who had conjured it.”
Now, are you really saying that when that article was written you did not know how to interpret the word “disappearance,” the disappearance of the Jews from the East? Are you really telling the Tribunal that?
STREICHER: Yes, the word “disappear” after all does not mean extermination en masse. This deals with a quotation from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt and is a repeated quotation of what the Führer had prophesied.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, would you look at the article from which you quote there, which you will find at Page 36-B; and I would like you to follow it, and we will read the two together. Now, the particular paragraph which I want to read in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt is that quotation which I have just read to you and you will find the same quotation.
My Lord, it starts at the end of the eighth but last line, “The Jews were” or rather “The Jews of Europe...” Have you got them in front of you, Defendant?
STREICHER: I shall listen to you.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It would be better, I think, if you followed it. I want to help you as much as possible. Page 44-A and 36-B. I will read slowly first of all from your Stürmer again:
“The Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England and of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have, so to speak, disappeared...”
and you will see that you then go on in the quotation and say:
“...the Jewish reservoir of the East which was able to counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West no longer exists.”
Now, would you look at the original article:
“The Jews of Europe”—this is 36-B—“the Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England and of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have, so to speak, disappeared.”
Now—there you go on, “The Jewish reservoir of the East”—the original goes on—“three million dead, the same number outlawed; many thousands, all over the world, mentally and physically broken.”
Are you telling this Tribunal now that on the 27th of August, or when you read that article of the 27th of August, you didn’t know that Jews were being murdered in the East and that you had not read of those things in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt?
STREICHER: Whether I had read it or not, I would not have believed it, that 3 million Jews had been killed. That is something I would not have believed, and that is why I left it out, at any rate. Anyhow, the German censorship would not have allowed the spreading of something which is not credible.
THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t read the last part of the line, did you?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [Repeating.] “...were mentally and physically broken. That is the result of the new order.” I am very much obliged to you.
[Turning to the defendant.] “That is the result,” you say, “of the ‘new order’ in Europe...”
You say you didn’t believe it. Is that what you say now, that you must have read it—must you not?
STREICHER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you just didn’t believe it; is that right?
STREICHER: No, I did not believe it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Even if you didn’t believe it, when you were reading this newspaper more or less regularly, when your cameraman had been to the ghettos in the East, did you think it right to go on, week after week, in your newspaper crying for the extermination, murder, of the Jews?
STREICHER: That is not correct. It is not true that murder was demanded week after week. And I repeat again, the sharpening of our tone was the answer to the voice from America that called for our mass murder in Germany—eye for eye, tooth for tooth. If a Jew, Erich Kauffmann, demands mass murders in Germany, then perhaps I, as an author, can say that the Jews too should be exterminated. That is a literary matter. But the mass murders had taken place a long time before without our having known about them; and I state here that if I had known what had in fact happened in the East, then I would not have used these quotations at all.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, Defendant, you must have known then, must you not, after reading that article, after sending your cameraman, after the United Nations published their declaration, after Hitler’s prophecies had been made again and again in his proclamations, after you said his prophecy had been fulfilled? You really say you didn’t know?
STREICHER: The cameraman is at your disposal. He is in Vienna, and I ask to have him brought here. And I state that this cameraman reported nothing, and could not have reported anything, about mass murders.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, and in the interest of clarification of the facts, I should like to point out the following: The Prosecutor, Sir Griffith-Jones, has mentioned a document, Page 38-A from Der Stürmer of 6 May 1943. That seems to be an error, because we are dealing here with Der Stürmer of 6 March 1943.
That date is of the greatest importance because if the photographer of Der Stürmer published a report of 6 March in Der Stürmer, then he must have been at the ghetto in Warsaw before 6 March 1943. Presumably...
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say 6 March? The document I have before me has 6 May.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There has been a mistake, I am afraid, in the German that Dr. Marx has. I have the original before me, which is 6 May 1943.
DR. MARX: Excuse me. At the present moment I cannot recall when the destruction of the ghetto of Warsaw took place. That was Document 1061-PS.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I cannot remember for the moment the number of the document, but the date was, I think from memory, from the 1st to the 23rd of April.
DR. MARX: Then, of course, my remark is without foundation. Please excuse me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now we had just dealt with the Israelitisches Wochenblatt issue for 27 August, the copy that you quoted from. I just refer you to one more copy of that newspaper. Would you look at Page 37-B, which is an issue of 10 September 1943:
“Statistics presented by the Convening Committee showed that 5 millions out of the 8.5 million Jews of Europe had died or been deported ... About 3 million Jews had lost their lives through forced labor and deportation.”
Did you read that one?
STREICHER: I do not know, and again I would not have believed it. To this day I do not believe that 5 million were killed. I consider it technically impossible that that could have happened. I do not believe it. I have not received proof of that up until now.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is quite clear that there were plenty of figures for you, quoted in this Israelitisches Wochenblatt over the period that we are discussing. Plenty of figures, it now turns out, doesn’t it?
STREICHER: Pardon?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will go on. Now, I just want to put one or two further articles of your own to you. You remember what I am suggesting, that you are inciting the German people to murder. We know now that at least you had read one article in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt where murder is mentioned. I just want to see what you go on to publish in your own paper after that date.
Would you look at Page 47-A. This is an article by yourself on 6 January 1944. This is after you had been living on your estate for some time.
“After the National Socialist uprising in Germany, a development began in Europe, too, from which one can expect that it will free this continent for all time of the Jewish disintegrator and exploiter of nations; and, over and above this, that the German example will, after a victorious termination of the second World War, bring about the destruction of the Jewish world tormentor on the other continents as well.”
What example was the German nation setting to the other nations of the world? What example do you mean there?
STREICHER: This article corroborates what I have been saying all along. I spoke of an international solution of the Jewish question. I was convinced that if Germany had won this war or had been victorious over Bolshevism, then the world would have agreed that an understanding should be reached with the other nations for an international solution of the Jewish question. If I wrote here about destruction, it is not to be understood as destruction by mass killing; as I have said, that is an expression; I have to point out that I do not believe that Erich Kauffmann really wanted to kill the German people by sterilization, but he wrote it, and we sometimes wrote in the same manner, echoing the sounds that we heard in the other camp.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have not yet told us what is this international solution that you are advocating by talking about extermination; if it is not murder, what is it? What is the solution?
STREICHER: I have already said that I founded the Anti-Semitic Union, and through this Anti-Semitic Union we wanted to create movements among the nations which should, above and beyond governments, act in such a way that an international possibility would be created, such as has been represented today here in this Trial—thus, I conceived it, to form an international congress center which would solve the Jewish question by the creation of a Jewish state and thereby destroy the power of the Jews within the nations.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is your answer—that you were advocating a Jewish state? Is that all that this comes to? Is it simply that you were advocating a Jewish national home? Is that what you have been talking about in all these extracts that we have read? Is that the solution which you are advocating?
STREICHER: Well, I do not know what you want with that question. Of course, that is the solution.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Let us just go on now. Turn to Page 48-A now, will you? This is 24 January 1944, “Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal, and he who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the same fate—annihilation, death.”
Are you still advocating a national Jewish home?
STREICHER: Yes, that has nothing to do with the big political plan. If you take every statement by a writer, every statement from a daily newspaper, as an example, and want to prove a political aim by it, then you miss the point. You have to distinguish between a newspaper article and a great political aim.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us just turn now to the next page, 2 March 1944, “Eternal night must come over the born criminal race of Jews so that eternal day may bless awakening non-Jewish mankind.”
Were they going to have eternal night in their national Jewish state? Is that what you wanted?
STREICHER: That is an anti-Semitic play of words. Again it has nothing to do with the great political aim.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It may be an anti-Semitic play of words, but the only meaning it can have is murder. Is that not true?
STREICHER: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you turn to the next page, 25 May 1944; and I remind you that these are all after you must have read of the murder in Israelitisches Wochenblatt. I quote the second paragraph:
“How can we overcome this danger and restore humanity to health? Just as the individual human being is able to defend himself against contagious diseases only if he proclaims war against the cause of the disease, the germ, so the world can be restored to health only when the most terrible germ of all times, the Jew, has been removed. It is of no avail to battle against the outward symptoms of the world disease without rendering the morbific agents innocuous. The disease will break out again sooner or later. The cause and the carrier of the disease, the germ, will see to that. But if the nations are to be restored to health and are to remain healthy in the future, then the germ of the Jewish world plague must be destroyed, root and branch.”
Is that what you mean? Are you saying there when you say “must be destroyed root and branch”—did you mean to say “ought to be given a Jewish national state”?
STREICHER: Yes, it is a far cry from such a statement in an article to the act, or to the will, to commit mass murder.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Turn over to the 10th of August. “When it loses this struggle, Judaism will be ruined, then the Jew will be extinguished. Then will Judaism be annihilated down to the last man.”
Are we to read from these words: Provide the Jews with a Jewish national state?
STREICHER: That is a vision of the future. I would like to call it an expression of a prophetic vision. But it is not incitement to kill 5 million Jews. That is an opinion, a matter, of belief, of conviction.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is the prophetic vision of what you wanted, is it not—of what you have been advocating now for the last 4 years—the beginning of the war? Isn’t that what it is?
STREICHER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you today what I may have been thinking years ago at a certain moment when writing an article. But still I admit that when I saw lying before me on the table declarations from the Jewish front, many declarations saying, “the German nation has to be destroyed; bomb the cities, do not spare women, children, or old men”—if one has declarations like these in front of one, it is possible that things will come from one’s pen such as I have often written.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You know, do you not, now, even if you do not believe the full figures, that millions of Jews have been murdered since the beginning of the war? Do you know that? You have heard the evidence, have you not?
STREICHER: I believe it...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know whether you had heard that evidence. You can answer “yes” or “no,” and I presume it will be “yes.”
STREICHER: Yes, I have to say, evidence for me is only the testament of the Führer. There he states that the mass executions took place upon his orders. That I believe. Now I believe it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have been possible to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in 1921? Do you think the German people would have stood for it? Do you think it would have been possible under any regime in 1921 to have carried out the murder of 6 million men, women, and children of the Jewish race?
STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the knowledge of the people—no, it would not have been possible. The prosecutor himself has said here that since 1937 the Party had full control over the people. Now even if the people had known this, according to the opinion of the Prosecution, they could not have done anything against that dictatorship because of that control. But the people did not know it. That is my belief, my conviction, and my knowledge.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate people in that way only after some 20 years of incitement and propaganda by you and other Nazis? Is that what made that possible?
STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was enlightened, and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed against the other side as an answer. It was enlightenment, not incitement. And if we want to keep our place before history I have to state again and again that the German people did not want any killings, whether individually or en masse.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to let you go into another history about the German people. I am going to remind you of what you have said...
STREICHER: Adolf Hitler...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am going to remind you of what you said yesterday. I read from the transcript: You speak of a Jewish question at the time—that is 1923—“I would like to say that the public distinguished Jews only by their religion; to speak about a Jewish problem then would have been nonsense.”
Was that because there was no Jewish problem then, and that the Jewish problem had only been created by you and the Nazi regime?
STREICHER: It was my aim, and I reached that goal in part: If the laws which in the future should make impossible sexual intercourse between different races, that is to say if that should become law—then it would make the public realize that to be a Jew is not a point of religion but of people and race. I helped to create that basis. But mass killings were not the result of the enlightenment, or as the Prosecution say, incitement. Mass killings were the last acts of will of a great man of history who was probably desperate because he saw that he would not win.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might be allowed to just sort out the exhibits and then mention to the Tribunal their numbers. If the Tribunal would agree, those that I have put in evidence, which are the other parts of the bundle other than I have actually quoted from—perhaps I could put them all in as one number and hand the exhibits in to the clerk, if that would be the convenient course.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. If they are in one bundle and you are going to give one number to a number of documents, it had better be in one bundle, had it not?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you want to re-examine?
DR. MARX: I do not consider it necessary any more.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. Dr. Marx, will you continue the defendant’s case?
DR. MARX: I call now, with the permission of the Court, the witness Fritz Herrwerth.
[The witness Herrwerth took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
FRITZ HERRWERTH (Witness): Fritz Herrwerth.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?
HERRWERTH: Since the Party Rally in 1934.
DR. MARX: When did you enter his service and in what capacity?
HERRWERTH: I was employed on 15 October 1934, in Nuremberg, not in the personal service of Herr Streicher himself, but in the municipal motor pool. However, I worked for the then Gauleiter Streicher.
DR. MARX: When did you leave that service?
HERRWERTH: In August 1943.
DR. MARX: For what reason?
HERRWERTH: It was a personal dispute, and mainly due to my fault.
DR. MARX: Did you have any other tasks to carry out for Herr Streicher?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: And which?
HERRWERTH: Well, whatever came up. I also did agricultural work at the end.
DR. MARX: Thus you were very often with Streicher?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: And therefore you knew about the most important incidents during that period?
HERRWERTH: Yes. I do not know, however, what you call important incidents. There were things that I do not know about, that is, at least I assume that.
DR. MARX: I will ask you later in detail.
HERRWERTH: Yes, if you please.
DR. MARX: The Defendant Streicher is accused of having caused acts of violence against the Jews and of having participated in these acts. Do you know of any such case?
HERRWERTH: Not a single one.
DR. MARX: Will you please wait until the end of my question, and then I shall say “end of question.” On 9 November 1938, did you drive Streicher back to Nuremberg from Munich, and when? End of question.
HERRWERTH: It was on 9 November, yes. I do not know the time exactly. At that time Streicher left Munich a bit earlier, and it may have been about—I do not know for sure—9 o’clock perhaps.
DR. MARX: Did Streicher know already during that ride back that something was to be done that night against the Jewish population?
HERRWERTH: No, he knew nothing about that.
DR. MARX: Then, during the night of 9 November, did you witness a conversation between Streicher and the SA Leader, Von Obernitz?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: Where did that conversation take place?
HERRWERTH: In order to answer that question, I have to explain a little further. When Herr Streicher went to bed, I was usually with him or the house superintendent. On that evening Herr Streicher went to bed earlier than usual. I do not know the reason. And that concluded my work for the day. I went from Herr Streicher to the Casino of the Gauleitung. That was in the cellar of the Gauleitung building on Schlageterstrasse. I played cards there. And then the former SA Obergruppenführer, Von Obernitz, came and called me, as was customary, by the name of Fritz and told me he had to speak to Herr Streicher very urgently; and I answered him that Herr Streicher had already gone to bed. Then he said, “Then I must rouse him,” and he told me he would assume the responsibility; it was an important affair. Herr Von Obernitz went to Herr Streicher’s apartment in my car. Herr Streicher’s bedroom is above my apartment. I had the keys and of course I could get in at any time.
On the way to the apartment at night I noticed that many SA men were in the streets. I asked Herr Von Obernitz the reason for that. He told me that that night something was going to happen; the Jewish homes were to be destroyed. He did not say anything further to me.
I accompanied Herr Von Obernitz all the way to the bed of Herr Streicher. Herr Von Obernitz then reported to Streicher about what was happening that night. I cannot recall the details very well any more, but I believe that he said that that night the Jewish homes were to be destroyed. Herr Streicher was, if I may say so, surprised. He had not known anything about it. He said literally to Herr Von Obernitz, and I remember that very clearly, “That is wrong. One does not solve the Jewish question that way. Do what you have been ordered. I shall have no part in it. If anything should occur so that you need me, then you may come for me.” I can also mention that thereupon Herr Von Obernitz said that Hitler had declared that the SA should be allowed to have a fling as retribution for what had occurred in Paris in connection with Herr Vorn Rath. Streicher stayed in bed and did not go out during that night.
DR. MARX: Did Herr Von Obernitz mention anything about the fact that the synagogues were to be set on fire?
HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes. But, as far as I remember, Herr Streicher refused to do that, too, because the synagogue, as far as I know, was burned down by the regular fire department, and upon orders from Herr Von Obernitz.
DR. MARX: How do you know that?
HERRWERTH: I was there.
DR. MARX: Did you watch it?
HERRWERTH: Yes. I was at the synagogue during the night.
DR. MARX: And how could one assume that the regular fire department started the fire?
HERRWERTH: How that could be assumed I do not know, but I saw it. The regular fire department started the fire.
DR. MARX: Were you there in time to see how the fire was started or did you arrive when the building was already on fire?
HERRWERTH: The building was not yet on fire, but the fire department was there already.
DR. MARX: Is that right?
HERRWERTH: I can say nothing else.
DR. MARX: Did Herr Streicher at that time mention anything about the fact that he was afraid of a new wave of excitement on the part of the world press if the synagogue was burned? Did he say that that is why he refused to do it?
HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes, but I could not say definitely; but, if I remember correctly, they spoke about that.
DR. MARX: Did Obernitz say from whom he had received the order?
HERRWERTH: He only repeated what Hitler had said—the SA should be allowed to have a fling.
DR. MARX: Is it correct that you, Witness, told your wife during the same night about that conversation between Obernitz and Streicher?
HERRWERTH: I believe I did not speak about the conversation; but when I walked down from the second floor to the ground floor through my apartment, I told my wife that I would probably be a little late because that night that action was going to be started; I told her briefly what was happening but nothing about the conversation.
DR. MARX: Then, later you were at the Pleikershof when Streicher had been forced to retire there or had retired?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: Do you remember an incident where the future Frau Streicher spoke about the incidents at Magdeburg which had occurred there the same night?
HERRWERTH: No, I know nothing of that.
DR. MARX: Did you not tell the then Frau Merkel that she should not talk about these incidents because Streicher always got very excited about them?
HERRWERTH: I can recall that Herr Streicher once said that he had been right in his opinion, for, not long after that night he received information—I do not know through whom—that, for instance, the glass for the window panes had to be bought from Holland again. Herr Streicher said then that that was the first confirmation of the correctness of the opinion he had expressed at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, just one moment.
Sir David, would it be convenient to you and the counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach if we discussed the question about the documents at 0930 tomorrow morning?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will find out. Yes, counsel for Von Schirach says that he thinks it is all right.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, 0930 tomorrow morning.
DR. MARX: What observations did you make during your stay at Pleikershof about the attitude of Streicher with regard to the Jewish question? What was that about the Israelitisches Wochenblatt?
HERRWERTH: Well, what do you want to know about the Israelitisches Wochenblatt? Herr Streicher received it.
DR. MARX: Did he receive it regularly?
HERRWERTH: Yes, I believe I can say that quite certainly. I always saw large bundles of newspapers of the Israelitisches Wochenblatt. They came continuously.
DR. MARX: Herr Streicher said that during the first years of the war he had great difficulty in getting that paper and the Police did not release it easily.
HERRWERTH: Yes, that can very well be. For I do not know, after all, of what year they were. I just saw them and it is difficult for me to tell now of what date these papers were.
DR. MARX: Yes, you said there were always large bundles of them.
HERRWERTH: Yes, on and off, but there were other newspapers too. Swiss newspapers were there, the Israelitisches Wochenblatt, and so on. There were always so many newspapers lying about and among them I saw here and there the Israelitisches Wochenblatt. I mean to say that it would not be possible for me to say how many there were.
DR. MARX: All right. Did Streicher speak at times about his knowledge of happenings in the East or of happenings in concentration camps in the East?
HERRWERTH: Well. Herr Streicher did not know anything at all about it. Thus he could not say anything about it. At least that is my conviction.
DR. MARX: Did you, then, ever speak to him about it?
HERRWERTH: Not that I know of; I did not know anything about it myself.
DR. MARX: Did you ever receive knowledge of a letter in which Streicher was reproached by Reichsführer SS Himmler because he treated the French prisoners too well? Did you understand me?
HERRWERTH: Yes, I understood, but I have to think about it. I know quite well that Herr Streicher once mentioned something about the treatment of prisoners. I know that the Frenchmen were treated very well, but whether the cause for that was a letter from Himmler I do not know.
DR. MARX: No, no. The cause for the good treatment, you mean?
HERRWERTH: No, the cause for Herr Streicher’s speaking about it. Herr Streicher spoke about reproaches against the good treatment of the Frenchmen; but I do not know whether the fact that he spoke about it was due to a letter from Himmler. But I do not believe that there was a single Frenchman who could complain in any way about the treatment.
DR. MARX: You were no longer present when the Frenchmen left?
HERRWERTH: No.
DR. MARX: Do you know about an incident when the publisher Fink came into the garden of Streicher’s home and admitted having lied to the police in an affair concerning shares?
HERRWERTH: The question must be put in detail, Mr. Attorney, for I do not know all about it, only part of it. I know that the then Director Fink stood in tears before Streicher, that he wailed, that he accused himself, saying that he was a rascal and a traitor. But why, I do not know. For Herr Streicher then walked farther into the garden with him, and I only saw that Herr Fink wept, and again heard how he accused himself.
DR. MARX: Do you know that Streicher at certain intervals brought people from the SPD and the KPD (Social Democratic Party and Communist Party) from the Dachau Concentration Camp?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: How many do you suppose there were?
HERRWERTH: I do not know. It was every year around Christmas time. I estimate that there were about 100 to 150 men every year. They came from Dachau. Herr Streicher had dinner prepared for them in a separate room, in the Hotel Deutscher Hof, and I believe that used to be the family reunion—that is to say, the prisoners rejoined the members of their family. Streicher also saw to it that released prisoners found work, and he intervened personally for them.
DR. MARX: Did he also get work for one or another of these released persons?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: What do you know about that?
HERRWERTH: I remember that three men, I believe, came into the Mars motorcycle factory. Herr Streicher at that time told the plenipotentiary of the German Labor Front to find positions for these people, as far as I remember.
DR. MARX: What was the attitude of Streicher when he found out that members of the Party had acquired cars and villas of Jewish property at very low prices?
HERRWERTH: I can still remember when Herr Streicher returned from Berlin. I do not know how much Herr Streicher knew at that time about these purchases; but at any rate, when Herr Streicher returned from Berlin where Herr Göring had expressed his views about these low-priced purchases of buildings, Herr Streicher, just arrived at the Nuremberg railroad station, said—and I heard it myself—that these purchases had to be nullified at once.
Besides, I know only about one case where a Party member had to do with the purchase of a house. I do not know whether there were more of them.
DR. MARX: Do you know whether Streicher was under surveillance by the Gestapo while on his farm and that there was a prohibition against visiting him there?
HERRWERTH: In answering the first question, I cannot say for sure that Criminal Police agents were there. I cannot affirm categorically that Herr Streicher was once under observation, but it could be safely assumed. I know of a woman who even stated that she had been photographed in the forest when she came from the railroad station to the farm. And what was the second question?
DR. MARX: Whether people were prohibited from visiting him.
HERRWERTH: Yes. I met various members of the Party within the city and whomever I asked said to me, “Impossible to get out there, impossible to get out there.” And if I asked who had issued the prohibition, then no one would talk about it; but as one heard it here and there, this prohibition was said to have been issued by the Deputy of the Führer, Herr Hess.
DR. MARX: Do you know anything about the fact that Streicher, when he found out that acts of violence against Jews or other political adversaries were intended, stopped them immediately?
HERRWERTH: Yes. At least, on the basis of his statements. He always said that that was wrong.
DR. MARX: Do you know of any case where he took measures against somebody who had been a party to such acts of violence? If you do not know it, say you do not know.
HERRWERTH: Very well, at this moment I cannot recall any case.
DR. MARX: Do you know anything about that affair concerning the Mars Works shares? What do you know about it?
HERRWERTH: Yes. I know about that case through statements made by Streicher at that time. I was not a witness to these events myself, but Herr Streicher once related to me what had happened. Shall I describe it briefly?
DR. MARX: Yes, but very condensed, please.
HERRWERTH: Streicher was in a Turkish bath at the time when the Director Fink and his adjutant, König, came and offered to sell the shares to Herr Streicher. Herr Streicher said, “What kind of shares are they?” The answer was, “They are shares of the Mars Works.” He said, “How many?” The answer was “100,000 marks’ worth.” Then Streicher said, “What do the shares cost?” He was told “5,000 marks.” Herr Streicher asked, “Why are these shares so cheap?” Finally Herr Fink said, I believe, “Because they are Jewish shares.”
Whoever knows Herr Streicher as I do, knows that Herr Streicher has never taken anything from a Jew. He protested very emphatically against the fact that such an offer had been made to him at all.
That seemed to settle the matter for the time being, and then suddenly the then Gauleiter Herr Streicher had the thought that with that money he could possibly construct the third Gau building. He mentioned that to the gentlemen as they left, and they decided to buy the shares. Herr Streicher forbade them to use Party money. Then both did not know what to do. Herr Streicher said he would advance these 5,000 marks.
That settled the case, but I had another experience later. It was about one and a half years after that trial that Streicher had had in Munich, when he was dismissed. At that time the wife of NSKK Obergruppenführer Zühlen came to me and asked whether I already knew that the criminal police was again in Nuremberg concerning the Streicher case. I said “no” to Frau Zühlen and added, “If they want to find out something why do they not come out to the farm to Herr Streicher himself? He will give them all the necessary information.”
After about 2 to 3 weeks, I met the Director of Der Stürmer, Fischer, successor to Herr Fink. He told me—but I would like to mention first that the shares, together with the 5,000 marks, were confiscated from Herr Streicher. The then Director Fischer told me that on that same day he had received a phone call from the trustee association, and that the trustee association had reported to Director Fischer that they had transferred to the account of Der Stürmer the 5,000 marks which Streicher at that time had advanced for the purchase of the shares.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you not think he is going into rather too much detail about this?
DR. MARX: Yes.
HERRWERTH: Yes, I will make it shorter.
The man from the trustee association said that the 5,000 marks were released because the innocence of Streicher had been proved in this matter.
DR. MARX: You witnessed the Supreme Party Court session at that time?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: What did Herr Fink say at that time? Did he not accuse himself again of having made false statements?
HERRWERTH: I was not present when Herr Fink was questioned.
DR. MARX: Very well. Then I would like to ask you, were you present when the incident in Munich occurred at the Künstlerhaus Inn—with the man who accosted Streicher?
HERRWERTH: Yes.
DR. MARX: Can you give us a description of how that incident occurred?
HERRWERTH: Well, Herr Streicher left the inn after dinner. I cannot remember the exact words any more, but I am going to try to describe it as well as possible. Herr Streicher left the inn, and as he went out that man approached Herr Streicher in a—may I say—improper manner. Streicher continued on his way and was silent at first. He asked the people around him, myself also, whether we knew that man. Nobody knew him.
Then Herr Streicher sent his son, Lothar, back into the room again to speak to the man and to ask him what the reason was for such behavior. Lothar Streicher came out and said that the man had behaved in just the same manner again.
DR. MARX: Will you please be more brief? You should only tell us how that incident occurred and what caused you and also Herr Streicher to use violence against the man.
HERRWERTH: You mean his behavior?
DR. MARX: Yes. What happened then?
HERRWERTH: Herr Streicher asked the landlord for a room, and in that room Streicher spoke to the man personally. There again the man made offensive remarks, and then it came to blows, first with Lothar Streicher. Now, as it happened, he was a strong man, and of course all of us helped to get him down.
DR. MARX: All right.
I am through with the questioning of this witness, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions? Do any of the Prosecution Counsel wish to cross-examine? Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. MARX: Then I should like to call the witness Wurzbacher, if he is available. Is he not? I do not know which one of the witnesses is still in the witness room. Is there anyone? Wurzbacher? Hiemer?
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Frau Streicher is available.
THE PRESIDENT: Is not the witness Wurzbacher here?
MARSHAL: I will see, Sir. He was not here a while ago. He was not called for.
THE PRESIDENT: What other witnesses have you got, Dr. Marx?
DR. MARX: The wife of the defendant could be called as a witness now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let her be called then.
MARSHAL: The witness Strobel is available now.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx wants to call Frau Streicher.
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. If it is rather difficult to call Frau Streicher, then the witness...
[The witness Frau Streicher took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name?
FRAU ADELE STREICHER (Witness): Adele Streicher, born Tappe.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Your maiden name is Tappe and you were born in Magdeburg?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: Were you a member of the NSDAP or of the Frauenschaft?
FRAU STREICHER: No.
DR. MARX: When did you become Herr Streicher’s secretary and for how long were you in that job?
FRAU STREICHER: On 7 June 1940, I became Julius Streicher’s secretary and I remained in that job until the end of the war.
DR. MARX: And during that period, you were continuously on his farm?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I was always with him.
DR. MARX: Were you also in charge of all the correspondence for Herr Streicher?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: What did that correspondence mainly consist of?
FRAU STREICHER: Mainly letters to his sons and to relatives.
DR. MARX: What were Streicher’s activities during that period of 5 years?
FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher did mainly physical work; that is, agriculture and gardening, and from time to time he wrote articles for Der Stürmer.
DR. MARX: During these 5 years did he leave the farm at all or was he ever absent from the farm for any length of time?
FRAU STREICHER: During the first few years of his stay there Julius Streicher did not leave the farm at all; later, once in a while, he would pay a visit in the neighborhood. His longest absence did not comprise an entire day and never a single night.
DR. MARX: Did you know that it was prohibited for prominent Party members to visit Herr Streicher?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes, there was such a prohibition.
DR. MARX: How did you know that?
FRAU STREICHER: From conversations. Then, too, I myself remember, when Dr. Goebbels visited the farm, that Julius Streicher said to him, “Doctor, you dare to come here? Do you not know that it is prohibited by the Party chiefs to visit me?”
DR. MARX: When did the visits of Dr. Ley and Dr. Goebbels occur?
FRAU STREICHER: Dr. Ley came to the farm on 7 May 1944. The visit of Dr. Goebbels occurred on 4 June 1944.
DR. MARX: Would you please describe the character of these visits and what was the subject of the conversations?
FRAU STREICHER: Both visits were of a rather unofficial character. Dr. Ley wanted mainly to know how Julius Streicher was doing, personally. No political questions were raised. Ley said only, “Streicher, the Führer is waiting for you.”
DR. MARX: And what did Streicher say to that?
FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher answered that he had become accustomed to his solitude, that he was happy as a farmer, and that Ley should tell the Führer that he, Streicher, wanted nothing more. At the visit of Dr. Goebbels the subject of the conversation dealt mainly with Julius Streicher’s dismissal from his office as Gauleiter, and Dr. Goebbels was of the opinion that Julius Streicher should return into the circle of old Party members; but he gave him the same answer, “Tell the Führer I wish for nothing.”
DR. MARX: Were you always present during these conversations?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: Was not the Jewish question a subject of these conversations?
FRAU STREICHER: No, they never spoke about the Jewish question.
DR. MARX: Did they not speak about the happenings in the Eastern territories, or in the concentration camps?
FRAU STREICHER: No, that never came up any more.
DR. MARX: Did not Streicher speak to you about the articles he intended to write for Der Stürmer, and did he not also speak about what he considered to be the solution of the Jewish problem?
FRAU STREICHER: From all conversations with Julius Streicher I could see with certainty that he never thought of the solution of the Jewish question in terms of violence, but hoped for the emigration of Jews from Europe and their settlement in territories outside Europe.
DR. MARX: Was Herr Streicher in correspondence with leading personalities of the Party or of the State?
FRAU STREICHER: No, neither personally nor by correspondence was there any such connection.
DR. MARX: I will now mention several names, of whom I want you to tell me whether they had any connection with him: Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann, or other leading men of the Police or the SS or the Gestapo.
FRAU STREICHER: No, I know nothing of any of these men. With the exception of one letter from Herr Himmler there was never any mail.
DR. MARX: What was the reason for that letter?
FRAU STREICHER: In that letter Herr Himmler complained about the fact that the French prisoners of war who were employed on our Pleikershof farm were treated too well.
DR. MARX: How was the treatment of the prisoners of war and the foreign civilian workers on the farm?
FRAU STREICHER: On the Pleikershof eight French prisoners of war, one Polish girl, and one Slovene girl were employed. They were all treated very well and very humanely. Each service for which Julius Streicher asked, each piece of work for which he asked personally, was especially rewarded with tobacco, pastry, fruit, or even money. Such cordial relations developed with some of the Frenchmen during the years that they were there that they assured us, with tears in their eyes at their departure, that they would visit Julius Streicher after the war with their families.
DR. MARX: Did Streicher not finally receive credible information about these mass executions in the East?
FRAU STREICHER: I believe he found out about it through Swiss newspapers in 1944. We were never informed about it officially.
DR. MARX: But it is asserted that he already had knowledge before that.
FRAU STREICHER: No.
DR. MARX: You do not know anything about it?
FRAU STREICHER: I only know about the Swiss newspapers.
DR. MARX: Very well. You once brought up the subject, in a conversation, that in Magdeburg, from the 9 to 10 November 1938, you witnessed the demonstration against the Jews and that you were revolted by it. Is that true?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I spoke about it and said that I was shocked at this action. Julius Streicher got very excited during that conversation and said, “Such nonsense occurred in Nuremberg also. That is not anti-Semitism; that is just great stupidity.”
DR. MARX: Is it correct that Herr Streicher was hardly interested in the financial affairs of the publishing firm and left these things to the manager?
FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher never bothered about financial affairs at all, neither in the house nor in the firm. Again and again the gentlemen of the firm were disappointed when they wanted to report about annual balances or the like and Julius Streicher would tell them, “Do not worry me with your business matters. There are other things besides that are more important than money.”
DR. MARX: How did he take care of the household expenses, then?
FRAU STREICHER: I received 1,000 marks every month from the firm. That provided for the household, presents, and so on.
DR. MARX: Do you know that he is supposed to have acquired shares through illegal pressure against a Jewish banker?
FRAU STREICHER: That is completely out of the question. I consider it quite impossible that Julius Streicher acquired shares that way. I believe that he does not even know what a share looks like.
DR. MARX: Did he not tell you anything about it?
FRAU STREICHER: I only heard that he never received shares.
DR. MARX: How did it come about that you and the defendant were married as late as April 1945?
Did you understand the question?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes. Julius Streicher wanted to take part in the fighting in Nuremberg. I wanted to accompany him, so he married me before we left. We wanted to die together.
DR. MARX: Then you left the Pleikershof with him, and where did you go from there?
FRAU STREICHER: First we wanted to go to Nuremberg, and that was refused for fear of difficulties with the authorities. So we drove in the direction of Munich. In Munich we were told to continue in the direction of Passau. From Passau they sent us to Berchtesgaden; from Berchtesgaden they sent us to Kitzbühel.
DR. MARX: How did it happen that the original intention to die together was not followed up? What caused him to change his mind?
FRAU STREICHER: The cause for that was a conversation with three young soldiers.
DR. MARX: And what was that? I will be through right away, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should go into that, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: Well, then. I will forego the question. Only one more question: Is it correct that Streicher gave the managers of his publishing firm a written power of attorney which meant that they could dispose of the money as they saw fit?
FRAU STREICHER: Yes, Julius Streicher gave the power of attorney to whoever happened to be the manager of the firm, and thereby gave him his full confidence without any restrictions.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
Does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire, and the Court will adjourn until 0930 tomorrow morning.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 30 April 1946 at 0930 hours.]
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH DAY Tuesday, 30 April 1946
Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to deal with these questions?
MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, I am prepared to do so. Shall I proceed to take up those documents about which we have some difficulty?
THE PRESIDENT: If you will, yes.
MR. DODD: Altogether, there are some 118 documents submitted on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach. As a result of our conversations we have agreed on all but—I believe the number is twelve.
The first group, Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 109, 124, and 133, are all excerpts from a book entitled, Look, the Heart of Europe, written by a man named Stanley McClatchie. They are excerpts referring to the Hitler Youth organization, and we do object to them on the ground that they are all irrelevant and immaterial here. They describe Hitler Youth meetings at homes and Hitler health programs and Hitler athletic competitions and Hitler Youth Land Service and that sort of thing. There are general descriptions by Mr. McClatchie of some activities of the Hitler Youth organization. They are all, I say, from that same book—none of them written by the defendant himself. They were published in 1937.
Then, Document Number 118 (a) is a letter. It is unsigned, except that it is typewritten. It is by Colin Ross and his wife and it appears to be a suicide note setting forth the reasons why Ross and his wife intended to commit suicide. We have been unable to determine its probative value and do not see any probative value in it, insofar as the issues concerning this defendant are concerned. He apparently was acquainted with the Defendant Von Schirach and that is the claim, I assume, of counsel for Von Schirach, that it sheds some light of some kind on Von Schirach’s attitude. But it is not clear to us.
The third document is Number 121. This is a quotation from the United States Army newspaper, The Stars and Stripes, issue of the 21st of February 1946. It is about the training of young people in Yugoslavia at the present time. With respect to this we also say that we believe it to be immaterial here and not relevant and not bearing on the issues concerning this defendant as charged in the Indictment.
Those three—the first group and the two, 118 and 121, are the only documents concerning which we have any controversy.
THE PRESIDENT: Eleven.
MR. DODD: I am sorry. I said twelve.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): Mr. President, the first group of documents to which the Prosecution has objected are from a book by an American, McClatchie.
This American, as he himself writes in the book, is of Scottish descent, and in the year 1936—that was the year of the Olympic Games—visited Germany; he was able to see for himself the conditions in Germany and the development of the German people during the first years of the Hitler regime, and here he describes the impressions he received.
Normally, I would not attach any special value to this book, if it were not for the fact that the preface shows that the book was written on suggestion of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach.
The defendant, as he will explain in the course of his own examination, began very early to build up a pleasant and friendly relationship especially with the United States, and this book by McClatchie is one of the many means which the Defendant Von Schirach used for that purpose. The author himself admits in the preface of his book that he obtained a large part of the material for the book from the Defendant Von Schirach. This fact lends to the book an importance, with respect to its relevancy for the purposes of this Trial in the defense of Von Schirach, entirely different from what it would have been had it been written quite independently of Von Schirach. That is, we have to evaluate the statements and descriptions in this book more or less as though they were statements of the Defendant Von Schirach himself. This is the main reason why I have submitted the book with the request that I be permitted to quote in evidence some short passages, particularly those referring to the Youth Leadership. The rest of the book, which is also interesting but has no direct connection with the Youth Leadership of the Defendant Von Schirach, have not mentioned; I refer only to a few short extracts which shed light exclusively on the activity and the aims of the Defendant Von Schirach; and, besides, they are intended to show you, Gentlemen, what impression even a foreigner gained of this activity, although naturally he had come to Germany with a certain prejudice which had to be overcome by his personal impressions.
That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to the first group, which the prosecutor listed individually from Numbers 30 to 133.
The second group consists of Number 118(a) of the Document Book Schirach, and that is a letter of farewell which the explorer, Dr. Colin Ross, left behind.
If the prosecutor objects that the letter bears no signature, the fact, in my opinion, is not particularly important. What we have submitted is the original copy of that last letter, and this original copy was found among the papers of Dr. Colin Ross.
Now, the Prosecution ask: What has that farewell letter by Dr. Colin Ross to do with the charges against Schirach? I ask the Tribunal to recall that the name of Dr. Colin Ross has been mentioned here repeatedly. He is the explorer—I believe an American by birth but I am not certain at the moment. He is the man who for many years was not only a close friend of Schirach’s but one whom the Defendant Von Schirach used again and again in order to prevent the outbreak of a war with the United States, and later, to terminate the war and to bring about peace with the United States. When the evidence is presented, these points will be clarified in detail, I believe. I now submit the last letter of Dr. Colin Ross...
THE PRESIDENT: When was it dated?
DR. SAUTER: One moment please. The date is 30 April 1945. I consider the letter—it is only one page long—important for the reason that in it a man, at a moment before he committed suicide with his wife because he was desperate about the future of Germany, at this moment—in the face of death, he again confirmed the fact that he, together with the Defendant Von Schirach, continuously endeavored to maintain peace particularly with the United States. I believe, Gentlemen, that such a man...
THE PRESIDENT: Where was he at the time when, as I understand you to say, he committed suicide?
DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach...
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, the man who wrote the letter.
DR. SAUTER: One moment, please. The Defendant Von Schirach had a small house in Upper Bavaria in Urfeld on the Walchensee, and in that house Colin Ross lived at the time with his wife, and it was here in Schirach’s house that he committed suicide.
The letter is only one page, and it would not cause any considerable delay in the proceedings if it were read.
Then, Gentlemen, the third group to which the Prosecution objects again consists of one number only—a comparatively short article from The Stars and Stripes, Number 121. That edition of which I shall submit the original in evidence is of 21 February 1946, that is, of this year. It explains in detail how the education of youth in Yugoslavia has now been reorganized by Marshal Tito, and the Defendant Von Schirach attaches particular value to this document because it proves that in Yugoslavia a definitely military education of youth has been decided upon this very year. The Defendant Von Schirach therefore desires to make a comparison between the kind of education which he promoted and the Yugoslav education of youth which has been adopted only this year, and which goes very much further than the program of the Defendant Von Schirach did at any time.
That is all.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I make just one or two short observations? I realize that ordinarily the Tribunal does not want to hear from counsel twice, but there are two matters I feel I should clear up.
First of all, this book, Look, the Heart of Europe, which may have been written by this man McClatchie, who, counsel says, is an American of Scotch ancestry—I think it is important that the Tribunal know that it was published in Germany. I am sure that counsel did not mean to imply that it was an American publication because, other than having been written by this man, it was published over here after he attended the Olympic Games in 1936.
THE PRESIDENT: And in the German language, I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, and the German title was Sieh: Das Herz Europas. Then with respect to the Colin Ross note. I think it is important to observe that no one knows whether Ross committed suicide or not—at least insofar as the Allied countries are concerned. His body has never been found and only this note which counsel says was found among his effects.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make another remark concerning the first group? This book by McClatchie was published by a German publisher. The efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach made the publication possible. That again speaks for the fact that Von Schirach in furthering the publication had a certain purpose in view. That purpose was to bring about enlightenment between America and Germany and to smooth over the difficulties which he was afraid could one day lead to war. The book by McClatchie appeared not only in German, but also in the English language, and it was sold in large numbers in England and in the United States. Of course, it also appeared in German and the German language edition was sold in Germany.
That, I believe, is all I wish to say at this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell the Tribunal what these other documents are that Mr. Dodd has not objected to? Because we understand that there are 160 documents which he has not objected to. What are they all about, and how long are they?
DR. SAUTER: They are short. I have submitted only one Document Book. That is, I have limited myself to the absolute necessities, Gentlemen.
THE PRESIDENT: Of how many pages?
DR. SAUTER: Altogether, 134 pages. Of course, some cover only one-half or one-third of a page, since the majority are relatively short quotations. It was necessary for me to submit these excerpts, because I can produce evidence of the activities of the Defendant Von Schirach as Reich Youth Leader only by showing the Tribunal just what the Defendant Von Schirach told the youth of the German nation, what his teachings were, what his directives to his subordinate leaders were. And in order to do so, I must submit, as I believe the Prosecution realizes, a short report covering the entire period during which Von Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, so as to show that the opinions and theories of the Defendant Von Schirach during the last year of his activity as Reich Youth Leader were exactly the same as those during his first year. He is one of the few men within the Party who did not, in the course of the years, allow themselves to become violent, he did not go to extremes as did most of the others; and that is what I want to show by these comparatively short excerpts.
I believe that is all at the moment.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have the supplementary applications for witnesses, have you not?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You’d better deal with those, had you not?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, one of them, I understand, is a person who made an affidavit which has been used by the Prosecution.
DR. SAUTER: I believe that is the witness Uiberreither.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it is the other one, is it not? Who are the two?
DR. SAUTER: One is, I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Marsalek.
DR. SAUTER: No, not Marsalek, but Uiberreither. Marsalek, Mr. President,...
THE PRESIDENT: I have your application before me for Marsalek. You do not want Marsalek?
DR. SAUTER: No, that must be an error.
THE PRESIDENT: Dated the 15th of April 1946. Anyhow, you do not want him?
DR. SAUTER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you only want one, do you?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And that is Uiberreither?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution any objection to him?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, we have not, Your Honor. That affidavit I believe, was introduced by us in connection with the Kaltenbrunner case, an affidavit by Uiberreither.
THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Dr. Sauter. We will consider your application in respect of documents and the witness. We will consider your application, and we will now proceed with the case of Streicher.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to make a motion to the case of Streicher. I desire to move that Streicher’s testimony found on Pages 8495, and 8496 of April 26th be expunged from the Record, and on Page 8549 of yesterday’s testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you wish to say anything about that?
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I did not completely understand the motions made by the Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Justice Jackson, because at that moment I was busy with something else. As far as I understood, he dealt with the deletion.
THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you what the motion was. The motion was that passages on Pages 8494, 8495, and 8496, and on Page 8549 be expunged from the record.
DR. MARX: I understand. I would like to say, from the point of view of the Defense, that I agree that these passages be expunged from the record, because I am of the opinion that they are in no way relevant for the defense of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: The passages to which Mr. Justice Jackson has drawn our attention are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, highly improper statements made by the Defendant Streicher. They are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, entirely irrelevant, and they have been admitted by counsel for the Defendant Streicher to be entirely irrelevant, and they will, therefore, be expunged from the record.
And now, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: May I now, with the permission of the Tribunal, continue with the examination of witnesses? I now call the witness Friedrich Strobel to the stand.
[The witness Strobel took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
FRIEDRICH STROBEL (Witness): Friedrich Strobel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Witness, on 3 December 1938 were you at a meeting of the Jurists’ association (Rechtswahrerbund) in Nuremberg?
STROBEL: Yes.
DR. MARX: During that meeting the Defendant Streicher is supposed to have spoken; is that correct?
STROBEL: Yes.
DR. MARX: Would you please tell us what the Defendant Streicher stated on that occasion concerning the demonstrations of 9 November 1938?
STROBEL: He said, “I should not have carried out this action in this way. In such a manner it is impossible to fight a power like World Jewry.” Then he added, “What has been done cannot be undone,” and some more phrases of that kind.
DR. MARX: Is it correct that at that time you were surprised that Streicher in public objected against that action, which had been ordered by the highest authorities?
STROBEL: Yes. Streicher frequently spoke against measures and directives of the Government when he was of a different opinion, as on this occasion. I had the impression that apparently he had been passed over; for in his speech there was a certain malicious undertone to the effect that the matter was having unfavorable aftereffects. I wondered at the time whether Streicher really had a lucid interval and realized how harmful that anti-Jewish action was, or whether merely his vanity was wounded, or whether he felt that a too quick and radical an extermination of the Jews would put an end also to his own importance.
DR. MARX: Witness, these are opinions which you are stating and not facts; I did not ask you about that.
STROBEL: Well, that was my impression.
DR. MARX: All right, I ask you now: On 9 and 10 November 1938 were you present in Nuremberg?
STROBEL: Yes, I believe so. I do not remember exactly, but I believe it was on the night of 8 to 9 November 1938 that that action was carried out. It was on 7 November that Herr Vom Rath was shot, and on the 8th he died, and the night after these things occurred.
THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t argue about whether it was the 8th or the 9th. It doesn’t matter, does it?
DR. MARX: The question which I want to put to you now is: After that night during which the demonstrations against the Jewish population took place, what observations did you make on the following morning and later, about the attitude of the population in Nuremberg toward these demonstrations?
STROBEL: I was informed about that action by the personnel in my office. Thereupon I walked into the city and looked around in the streets. People were standing in front of the damaged stores. I had the impression that the vast majority of the population was benumbed and speechless. People shook their heads, looked at each other, muttered something, and then walked away. But, generally, I had the impression that people could not speak aloud, and later I heard that those who had objected to these things were treated rather badly, when they were overheard by informers.
DR. MARX: But the general impression was, was it not, that the population definitely disapproved of that action, and that general indignation was recognizable though not loudly expressed?
STROBEL: Yes. The Russian radio at the time hit the nail on the head by saying, “Let it be said to the credit of the German people that they had no part in the events and that they were sleeping.”
In fact most people heard of the events of the night only on the following morning.
THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the Defendant Streicher?
DR. MARX: Well, the Defendant Streicher has been accused of openly approving this action in his speech on 10 November. The Defendant Streicher also maintains in his defense that it was an action ordered by the top authorities and not a spontaneous demonstration of the people.
THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a number of people in Nuremberg, or even the whole of the people of Nuremberg, disapproved of it wouldn’t show that Streicher disapproved of it.
DR. MARX: Yes, but he maintains that there could have been no question of an incitement, since the action had been ordered and directed from the top, whereas, in the case of an incitement, the action would have been started by the people themselves. That was his conclusion.
STROBEL: May I state my opinion about that? The action was definitely not started by the people themselves, because even the majority of the SA men who took part in it did so against their will. It was an order from above; it was an organized affair. The assertion of Dr. Goebbels that the German people had risen spontaneously was an intentional incrimination of the German people.
DR. MARX: I have no more questions to ask of this witness, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask him any questions?
[There was no response.]
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
[There was no response.]
Then the witness can retire.
DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Ernst Hiemer.
MARSHAL: There is no witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Is he not there?
MARSHAL: We have no witness there.
THE PRESIDENT: He says, Dr. Marx, that he is not there, and that there are no witnesses there.
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. The witness Hiemer is in the prison here, and I talked to him personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you inform the prison authorities yesterday that you were going to call him?
DR. MARX: I spoke to the Marshal on Monday and asked that Hiemer be brought up on Tuesday, as far as I can recall. There must be a misunderstanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you got any other witnesses besides Hiemer?
DR. MARX: Yes, the witness Wurzbacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is he? Where is Wurzbacher?
DR. MARX: Wurzbacher is also here in prison.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, while he is being brought, can you take up the time in dealing with your documents?
DR. MARX: Yes. We can do that.
MARSHAL: They will be here in about 5 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, before coming to the question of the documents, I should like to point out the following: During the session yesterday afternoon the Prosecution submitted several documents which were new to me, and I have not yet had an opportunity of stating my position with regard to them. Nor have I yet had a chance of speaking to the Defendant Streicher about them. From the point of view of the Defense, I consider it necessary to explain my position with regard to these very important documents; and I believe that I must now examine all the articles of Der Stürmer to see whether Streicher used in some way or other the various pieces of information from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt; for his defense is, “I did not believe what I read there.” If he did not use these items of information in any of his articles, then his answer is, to a certain extent, corroborated. Therefore I have to review the matter...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. In one particular article it was demonstrated yesterday in cross-examination, as I understood it, that he had used an article from the Jewish paper.
DR. MARX: Yes. I know that article. It is one of 4 November 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Marx, what exactly are you applying for now? What is your motion?
DR. MARX: My motion is that the Tribunal permit me to supplement my document book so as to be able to state my position with regard to yesterday’s presentation of documents by the Prosecution by submitting counter documents of my own. My presentation of documents would be incomplete if I had no chance of replying to these new documents submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Marx; the Tribunal grants your motion provided you make it in the ordinary way, in writing, referring to any passages which you contend throw light on the passages which have been put in by the Prosecution.
DR. MARX: Yes. May I now begin to discuss the individual documents? Document Number Streicher-1 shows that the newspaper Der Stürmer, according to the decision of the Führer, was not an official Party organ and was not even entitled to carry the state insignia while all other press organs displayed the insignia conspicuously. That is evidence that the paper Der Stürmer was a private publication of the Defendant Streicher.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you are going to offer these documents in evidence and give them exhibit numbers, are you not?
DR. MARX: I consider these documents as submitted; I have discussed the subject with the Prosecution, and the Prosecution had no objections.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, there is a written transcript being taken down, and unless you offer each document in evidence and say that will be exhibit number so-and-so, it does not get into the transcript. If you like you can do it in a group and say, “I offer in evidence such and such documents as Exhibits 1 to 100,” or whatever number you wish.
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The book I have before me does contain certain exhibit numbers; for instance, Page 1 to 4 appears to be Exhibit Number Streicher-1 and Page 5 is Exhibit Number Streicher-5; Page 6 is Exhibit Number Streicher-6; Page 7 is Exhibit Number Streicher-7.
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that Page 4 is Exhibit Number Streicher-1; is it?
DR. MARX: The pagination made here is completely different from the one I made and consequently it is now arranged altogether differently.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let us get on. You only have to tell us what documents you are offering in evidence and under what exhibit numbers. Dr. Marx, you can do it later if you want to.
DR. MARX: I further submit Exhibit Number Streicher-5, an excerpt from an editorial of Der Stürmer of July 1938. Number 28. This article, which was not written by the Defendant Streicher but by Karl Holz, is worded in very sharp language and says that vengeance will break loose one day and all Jewry will be exterminated. But the salient point here—the article seems to have been provoked by a letter which was sent from Nuremberg to New York, and which stated that Germany in the case of war, would be destroyed from the air. And so this article also falls under the claim which the defendant made yesterday, namely that his sharp language was always caused by some preceding action from another side. That is Document Number Streicher-5 and I ask permission to submit it as an exhibit under that number.
Then I submit as Document Number Streicher-6, an excerpt from Number 40 of Der Stürmer of October 1938. I think I can dispense with comment on it because my argument can be seen from the document itself; or is it necessary to speak about it?
THE PRESIDENT: No, you need not speak about them; just put them in.
DR. MARX: I submit as Document Number Streicher-7, an excerpt from the Völkischer Beobachter of 25 February 1942, in answer to Document M-31 of the trial brief against the defendant.
Then I submit Document Number Streicher-8, an excerpt from the Völkischer Beobachter of 8 February 1939, Page 2.
Then as Document Number Streicher-9, an excerpt from the political testament of Adolf Hitler, dated 29 April 1945.
As Document Number Streicher-10, an excerpt from Der Stürmer, February 1935, Number 8, Page 4.
As Document Number Streicher-11, an excerpt from Der Stürmer of September 1935, Number 38.
I am giving the next page the Document Number Streicher-12. That is an excerpt from Der Stürmer, of September 1935, Number 38, Page 9.
Document Number Streicher-13 is an excerpt from Der Stürmer, of January 1938. Number 1.
Document Number Streicher-14, an excerpt from Der Stürmer of May 1938, Number 20.
As Document Number Streicher-15, an excerpt from Der Stürmer of 5 November 1943, Number 45.
As Document Number Streicher-16, of the Defense, a document submitted by the Prosecution under number 759-PS.
As Document Number Streicher-17, speeches made by Himmler in April 1943, on 4 October 1943, and 23 September 1943 at Posen and Kharkov.
As Document Number Streicher-18, a photostat of the special issue of Der Stürmer of May 1939, Number 20.
I ask to have these documents admitted. I have limited myself to the utmost.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the witnesses ready yet? Perhaps we might as well adjourn for 10 minutes now.
[A recess was taken.]
[The witness Ernst Hiemer took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
ERNST HIEMER (Witness): Ernst Hiemer.
DR. MARX: May I just interrupt for a minute, Mr. President. First of all I would like to state that I am by no means holding the Marshal responsible for the mistake. The matter was as follows: The mistake in requesting the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: It is quite all right, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: I consider it my duty to state here that the Marshal is not responsible for the mistake about the bringing in of the witness. One of my assistants spoke yesterday with a gentleman...
THE PRESIDENT: We quite understand, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit Documents Number Streicher 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 up to 18. I do not know whether it is clear now. The numbers are 1 and 5, and from 6 through 18. Lacking are 2, 3, and 4, which were dropped. All other exhibit numbers are contained therein, Numbers 1 and from 5 through 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You include 19, don’t you?
DR. MARX: No, Numbers 19 and 20 are not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I beg your pardon. I think I must have been wrong. I have taken down 19, but you haven’t got 19, have you?
DR. MARX: Number 18 is my last one, Your Honor, and I ask to have that included in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: And now you are going to go on with the witnesses?
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
ERNST HIEMER: Ernst Hiemer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Since when have you known Herr Streicher, how did you get into contact with him, and what position did you have on Der Stürmer?
HIEMER: At the end of 1934 I was introduced to the then Gauleiter Julius Streicher in the Deutscher Hof in Nuremberg. Streicher gave me the assignment of working for his public health journal, Die Deutsche Volksgesundheit. In 1935 I also wrote reports for Der Stürmer. Streicher then had me transferred to the editorial staff of Der Stürmer.
Eventually, under Streicher’s direction and the direction of other staff members of Der Stürmer, I did editorial work as a co-editor. The responsible editor of Der Stürmer was Karl Holz, Streicher’s deputy, but the leading spirit of the paper was Streicher himself. In the year 1938 instructions came from Berlin to the effect that Holz was permitted to contribute to Der Stürmer, but in his capacity as state official—he was the Deputy Gauleiter—he was no longer to be mentioned in the editions of Der Stürmer. Thereupon, on instruction from Streicher, my name was entered in Der Stürmer as responsible editor. The overall direction of the paper and all authority connected therewith remained in Streicher’s hands, and Streicher retained this position until the collapse.
DR. MARX: What was the main idea of Der Stürmer’s policy? What was the Leitmotiv?
HIEMER: Streicher wanted by means of Der Stürmer, in the simplest and most popular language, to convey to every man and every woman of the German nation knowledge about the Jews. Streicher wanted the entire German people to realize that the Jew was a stranger among them.
DR. MARX: Herr Hiemer, I do not want to know that. I want you to tell me whether Herr Streicher, let us say, wished to advocate emigration or whether he followed a different train of thought. Long expositions on the Jewish problem are not required.
HIEMER: Streicher was of the opinion that in Germany the Jewish question should be solved by emigration. He repeatedly criticized the leadership of the Reich because the emigration of Jews was not being carried through in the manner desired by Streicher. When the war came, Streicher asserted that the Jewish problem would no longer have had any significance for a Germany at war if in accordance with his idea it had been solved by complete emigration of the Jews during the preceding time of peace.
DR. MARX: Is it correct that the Palestine and Madagascar problem was discussed in the journal?
HIEMER: Yes. Streicher stated his opinion in word as well as in writing, that Palestine and Madagascar would be suitable localities for absorbing the Jews living in Germany. However, he did not follow up this thought, since not Germany but only England and France could dispose of Palestine and Madagascar.
DR. MARX: What do you think about the influence exerted by Streicher and Der Stürmer since 1933? Is it not true that since 1933 its influence among the German people was much in decline?
HIEMER: Yes, that is correct. In many circles it was known that the influence of Streicher and of his paper on the movement did decrease. After 1933 Streicher had many conflicts with other Party leaders, and he made many enemies. Particularly from the year 1937, Streicher was pushed more and more into the background. Within the Party the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem, under the leadership of Rosenberg, dealt with the theory of the Jewish problem, and actual authority over the Jews belonged, as is well known, exclusively to Himmler.
When finally in the year 1940 Streicher was relieved of his post as Gauleiter, he was completely isolated. From then on he lived on his farm and worked there as a farmer; he wrote articles only for Der Stürmer.
DR. MARX: What was the circulation of Der Stürmer from 1933? Can you give us figures? Of course, only after the date when you joined the paper.
HIEMER: This question of the circulation could, of course, be answered best by the publication manager, who was concerned with it. However, I remember approximate figures. Der Stürmer was in 1933 a very small paper; but by the year 1935 its circulation increased to about 800,000. After that, however, there was a sharp decline.
Of course, during the war Der Stürmer had a smaller circulation. I cannot give you any exact figures and during the last months the circulation of the paper was, of course, extremely small. On the average, I might say that Der Stürmer had a circulation of perhaps half a million. Of course, there were special issues which had a much larger circulation.
As I said, only the publisher could authenticate these figures.
DR. MARX: What can be the reason for the increase in the year 1935?
HIEMER: It is very difficult for me to answer that question.
DR. MARX: Wasn’t it because Party authorities—because subscriptions were made compulsory in factories and other places?
HIEMER: You are putting questions to me which really only a publisher can answer. I myself cannot answer the question with assurance, and therefore must remain silent; my testimony would not be reliable.
DR. MARX: Of course, if you don’t know, you are free to say, “My knowledge on this point is not sufficient.” Did Herr Streicher know of the happenings in the East, especially in the concentration camps, and what did he personally tell you about these things?
HIEMER: Streicher himself never told me that he knew about the happenings in the concentration camps. On the contrary, Streicher said he learned of these things only in 1944 through the Swiss press. Streicher received the Swiss newspapers regularly, in particular the Israelitisches Wochenblatt of Switzerland, and in 1944 this journal published rather detailed descriptions about what was going on in the concentration camps.
Streicher at first refused to credit these reports in the Swiss press and called them premeditated lies. He declared that these reports were being printed merely for the purpose of undermining the prestige of the German people abroad. It is true Streicher soon changed his opinion. He began to doubt that his opinion was right and finally he believed that the occurrences in concentration camps, as pictured in the Swiss press, did after all correspond to the facts. Streicher said that Himmler was the only man who could have authorized such crimes.
DR. MARX: You said that Streicher soon changed his opinion. What does that mean?
HIEMER: In the beginning he had decidedly said that these reports could not be true. Then he became uncertain and said that perhaps they might be true. I had the impression that either the detailed manner of the reports in the Swiss press had convinced Streicher that these things had actually occurred or that Streicher, from one source or another, either through personal contact or through letters, had received knowledge that these happenings were actually taking place in the concentration camps. To that I ascribe his change of view.
DR. MARX: And when was that, approximately?
HIEMER: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the middle of 1944.
DR. MARX: What attitude did he take when he was finally convinced? Did he express satisfaction at the fact that so many people had been killed?
HIEMER: No. Streicher definitely deprecated what was done in the concentration camps. It did happen that Streicher, in anger—if he had been especially upset by political events—often or at times, asserted that Jews, as an enemy of the German people, should be exterminated. However, Streicher talked in that way only in the first phase of excitement. When he was calmed, he always opposed the extermination of the Jews.
DR. MARX: But repeatedly in articles of Der Stürmer there is talk of the extermination of the Jews?
HIEMER: Yes. It is a fact that in reports of Der Stürmer the extermination of Jewry is spoken about. However, on the other hand, Streicher again and again opposed the murder of the Jews, and I am quite convinced that Streicher and Der Stürmer had nothing whatever to do with the happenings in concentration camps. I do not believe it.
For it is known now that these crimes in the concentration camps were committed on the instructions of individual leading men; that is, on official orders, and it is my firm conviction that neither Streicher nor Der Stürmer had anything to do with them.
DR. MARX: How were the articles which you wrote prepared? Did you receive directives for the articles from Streicher and then merely edit them, or were you the real author?
HIEMER: Streicher was the founder and the publisher of Der Stürmer. But he was in fact also the chief editor, and all his colleagues, no matter whether it was his deputy, Holz, or others—all of them had to submit their articles to Streicher before they were printed. Streicher then ordered changes if the need arose; he also gave the editors assignments for articles, that is, he told them with what arguments these articles were to be drawn up; and Streicher knew of all the articles which appeared in Der Stürmer. In fact, he was the responsible head, the editor of Der Stürmer. All others were his assistants. He himself was, as he often said with pride, one and the same with Der Stürmer. “Streicher and Der Stürmer are one and the same.” That was his maxim.
DR. MARX: That, of course, he admits; he says that he assumes the responsibility.
What can you tell us about the so-called pornographic library?
HIEMER: Der Stürmer was in possession of a large archive. This archive consisted of many thousands of German and foreign-language books, documents, edicts, and so forth. These books were either put at the disposal of the Stürmer archive by friends of Der Stürmer, or they came from Jewish apartments. The police put books which were found in Jewish houses at the disposal of Rosenberg’s Institute for the Study of the Jewish problem for research purposes. Whatever remained in the Jewish dwellings in Nuremberg was turned over to the Stürmer archive. Among these books there were also numerous which dealt with sexual knowledge, books by Magnus Hirschfeld, Bloch, and some which were simply pornographic. These, then, consisted both of books which had been sent in by friends of the Stürmer, and books which had been found in Jewish dwellings.
These books were kept in a special section of the Stürmer archive under lock and key, and the public did not have access to them. This literature was no personal pornographic library of Streicher, but formed a part of Der Stürmer’s archive. Streicher never read these books. They were to be reviewed after the war in the course of the reconstruction. All those which were not of direct Jewish origin were to be removed, but as I said, Streicher did not read these books.
DR. MARX: Where were these books kept? Were they in the publishing house, or how is it that a part...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, there is no charge here with respect to this particular sort of books.
DR. MARX: This is my last question. I just wanted to clarify this matter, since it played an important part in the public mind. I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any questions from the other Defense Counsel?
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): I have one question only.
[Turning to the witness.] Did Rosenberg have any connections with the editorial staff of Der Stürmer?
HIEMER: To my knowledge, his connections were almost non-existent. I knew personally only Dr. Ballensiefen, who worked with Rosenberg. I also knew Dr. Pohl personally, but no relations existed between the Der Stürmer and the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem for the purposes of co-operation.
DR. THOMA: Did Ballensiefen and Pohl have connections with Der Stürmer?
HIEMER: Pohl had personal connections with me. He was a student of Hebrew and had made translations of the Talmud; he had also published the Talmudgeist. Through that I got to know him. Ballensiefen also had no personal connection with Der Stürmer.
DR. THOMA: Does this mean that Pohl did have personal connections...
HIEMER: Only with me, not with Der Stürmer.
DR. THOMA: ...or was he sent by Rosenberg in this matter?
HIEMER: No.
DR. THOMA: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have only one matter to ask you about. Do I understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become convinced that the reports in the Swiss newspaper, Israelitisches Wochenblatt, were true?
HIEMER: I did not understand you. Will you please repeat the question?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become convinced of the truth of the reports he was reading in the Swiss newspaper about concentration camps?
HIEMER: Yes, I had the impression that Streicher in the middle of 1944...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted an answer “yes” or “no.” That is quite sufficient.
Let me just read to you three lines of an article which was published in Der Stürmer on the 14th of September 1944.
HIEMER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
“Bolshevism cannot be vanquished; it must be destroyed. The same is true of Judaism; it cannot be vanquished, disarmed, or rendered powerless; it must be exterminated.”
That is Page 2.
Then the word that you use or is cited for exterminated is ausgerottet, which I understand means completely wiped out. Why was that article appearing in Der Stürmer in September 1944, when it was known by the owner of Der Stürmer what was going on in concentration camps in the East? What was the purpose of that article?
HIEMER: I personally did not write this article. I believe that Streicher wrote it, therefore I myself am not able to judge the intention of the article. But I do maintain that Streicher made statements opposing the murders in the concentration camps, and that he did not want the murder of Jewry.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I will leave that.
My Lord, in the interest of time I do not propose to cross-examine this witness any further. Perhaps I might be allowed to draw the Tribunal’s attention to those articles contained in your bundle, which are articles actually written by this witness. There are about seven of them. Page 3A, 35A, 38A, 40A, 49A, 50A and 51A, that is, covering a period from January 1939 up to August 1944.
And, My Lord, the other matter that I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to was that this witness was the author of the disgusting children’s book which I presented to the Tribunal in putting the individual case against Streicher.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?
[There was no response.]
Dr. Marx, do you wish to re-examine? You heard what counsel said about the various articles written by this witness. You wish to re-examine or not? Have you any questions you wish to ask the witness?
DR. MARX: Yes, please.
Herr Hiemer, perhaps you did not quite understand the question a moment ago. Please tell us again just when Herr Streicher received knowledge, and when he told you that he was convinced of or believed in these mass murders.
HIEMER: It is my opinion and conviction that it was in the middle of 1944.
DR. MARX: But there had been statements to that effect in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt for a number of years prior to that date.
HIEMER: Yes; at that time Streicher did not believe these things. His change of view took place only in the year 1944 and I remember it was not before the middle of the year.
DR. MARX: I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call the witness Philipp Wurzbacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness Wurzbacher took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
PHILIPP WURZBACHER (Witness): Philipp Wurzbacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Witness, you were an SA Leader in Nuremberg?
WURZBACHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: From when?
WURZBACHER: From 1928.
DR. MARX: And what position did you have?
WURZBACHER: At that time I was an SA Standartenführer and had risen from the lowest ranks.
DR. MARX: Witness, please speak more slowly and pause as frequently as possible, as your testimony has to be interpreted into several languages.
How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?
WURZBACHER: I have known him from meetings, since 1923; personally, from the time of my activity as an SA Leader in the year 1928.
DR. MARX: Were you regularly present at the meetings at which Streicher spoke?
WURZBACHER: I cannot say that I was present regularly, but I attended very frequently.
DR. MARX: Did Streicher in his speeches advocate the use of violence against the Jewish population, or did he predict it?
WURZBACHER: At no meeting did I hear suggestions that violence should be used against the Jewish population. Nor did I ever hear Streicher suggest or announce that he had any such intentions in mind.
DR. MARX: Did an act of violence against the Jewish population, originating from and carried out by the people themselves, take place in Nuremberg or the Gau Franconia at any time in the period from 1920 to 1933?
WURZBACHER: No, I cannot remember any incident of that type.
DR. MARX: Did the SA undertake any such action or was anything like that ordered?
WURZBACHER: The SA never undertook anything like that at that time. On the contrary, the SA had instructions, unequivocal instructions, to refrain from such acts of violence. Severe punishment would have resulted for anyone who did anything like that, or for an SA Leader who gave such orders. Besides, as I have already emphasized, there was never any suggestion or any order to that effect.
DR. MARX: What do you say to the events on the night of the 9 to 10 November 1938?
WURZBACHER: I was not in Nuremberg during the events from the 9 to 10 November 1938. At that time I was in Bad Ems on account of chronic laryngitis. I can only say what I know from stories which I heard afterwards.
DR. MARX: Did you talk with Obergruppenführer Obernitz?
WURZBACHER: Yes.
DR. MARX: About these events?
WURZBACHER: Yes, I talked with SA Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz in a brief conversation, when I reported my return. We spoke only a few words, since Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz was called away so that in the course of the conversation I could not return to the subject. I remember that Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz declared at the time that as far as he was concerned the matter had been put in order. That was the sense of what he said.
DR. MARX: Was there within the SA a uniform opinion, or were there, even in the circles of the SA, men who disapproved of these incredible occurrences?
WURZBACHER: Opinions were, as far as I could determine upon my return—I believe it was on 23 or 24 November—very much divided. A part of the SA was in favor, the other opposed what had happened, but at all events, the majority in general considered it to be wrong and condemned what had been done.
DR. MARX: Was there an increase, I mean, an increase of brutality in these circles after 1933 on account of the growing numbers of the SA?
WURZBACHER: It goes without saying that after the accession to power, when many doubtful elements joined, the situation was completely different from what it had been before. Up to that time, as a responsible Leader, one knew almost every member individually, but now with the tremendous influx of new men, a general survey of the new situation had first to be made. But I believe I may say that an increase of brutality did not occur. Perhaps some undesirable elements which, in the name of the SA, did this or that, had slipped in but in general I cannot say that an overall increase of brutality took place.
DR. MARX: Did you conclude that Der Stürmer exerted an influence in the SA with the result that an anti-Semitic tendency made itself felt among the men under your command? Did you not read a different publication, Der SA Mann?
WURZBACHER: Der Stürmer had a very divided reception, I might say, especially among the people in Nuremberg and in particular in the SA. There were large numbers in the SA who, if they did not exactly reject Der Stürmer, were in fact not interested because of the tedious repetitions contained in it, and for this reason the paper was of no importance to them. Moreover, it was natural that members of the SA read their own paper, Der SA Mann, first.
DR. MARX: When you attended a meeting in which Streicher spoke, what impression did you gain of the objectives which he pursued in his speech with regard to the solution of the Jewish problem?
WURZBACHER: The objectives which were stated by Streicher were, I should say, unequivocal and clear. He pursued the policy that the strong elements of the Jewish people which occupied positions in the German economy and above all in public life and public offices should be removed and that necessarily, expulsion or emigration should be considered.
DR. MARX: Did you participate in the boycott on 1 April 1933 in any way?
WURZBACHER: Yes, I participated in the boycott. At that time I had instructions from my Gruppenführer to see to it that this boycott should be kept within the limits of order and propriety, and that in this way the success of the boycott would be assured. I instructed the Sturmführer under my command to assign to each department store a guard of two SA men who were to see to it that nothing happened and everything took its course in an orderly and unobjectionable fashion.
DR. MARX: Were there not instructions from Streicher also?
WURZBACHER: Yes. The instructions which I received from my Gruppenführer had been issued by Gauleiter Streicher.
DR. MARX: Were attacks on Jews not to be prevented by all means?
WURZBACHER: That was so not only in this one case, but in all cases. It was repeatedly pointed out that we were to refrain from attacks or unauthorized acts of violence or other hostile acts against the Jewish people or Jewish individuals, especially in Nuremberg, and that it was strictly prohibited...
DR. MARX: What was Streicher’s reaction when he heard that nevertheless such acts of violence had been perpetrated by individuals?
WURZBACHER: I can cite one example in which violence was used. I believe it was a small scuffle, at any rate, something had happened, but I do not recall the details of the case. In any event, he called us very sharply to account, and we SA leaders were severely reprimanded and rebuked.
DR. MARX: And what did he say? Did he make a general statement?
WURZBACHER: If I may give the essence of it, he said that he would not tolerate that human beings be beaten or molested in any way in his Gau, and for the SA leaders he had rather drastic expressions such as ruffians or similar names—I do not recall them exactly.
DR. MARX: But he was called the Bloody Czar of Franconia. How is that to be explained?
WURZBACHER: Perhaps it was his manner, the way he behaved at times. Sometimes he could be very harsh and outspoken. At any rate I can only say that during my activity I did not experience anything or hear anything suggesting that he was a “bloody czar.”
DR. MARX: Do you know what his attitude was toward concentration camps? Did he visit Dachau? If so, how often, and what did he do about it?
WURZBACHER: I cannot give you any information on that point. I know just one thing and that is that he said repeatedly that people who had been taken to Dachau should be freed as soon as possible if there was no criminal or other charge against them. I also know of several cases of release very soon after the arrest of the people or their removal to a concentration camp. For example the teacher Matt, who was an old adversary of his in the Town Hall of Nuremberg, was released after a very short time—I believe three or four months. Another man, a certain Defender, who had been active primarily in labor unions, was also released after a very short period of time. If I remember correctly, it was about the year 1935 or perhaps the beginning of 1936—I do not know exactly—when the last inmates left the camp at Dachau and were greeted with music upon their return.
DR. MARX: Was it not held against him that he freed so many members of the left-wing parties from Dachau?
WURZBACHER: It was said here and there by members of the SA that the Gauleiter’s action could hardly be justified, that he took too light a view of these things and so on, but we also pointed out that after all the Gauleiter bore the responsibility and that he ought to know just what he had to do in this or that case.
DR. MARX: Do you know that Himmler told Streicher of his displeasure at these releases and said that disciplinary action would be taken against him if he continued with them? If you know nothing about this matter, please say: “No.”
WURZBACHER: No.
DR. MARX: Then I have concluded my questioning of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel wish to ask questions?
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude your case, Dr. Marx?
DR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we go on with Dr. Schacht’s case next.
DR. DIX: I begin my presentation of evidence with the calling of Dr. Schacht as a witness, and I ask Your Lordship to permit Dr. Schacht to enter the witness box.
[The Defendant Schacht took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): Hjalmar Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
You may sit down.
DR. DIX: Please tell the Tribunal briefly about your descent?
SCHACHT: The families of both my parents have lived for centuries in Schleswig-Holstein, which until 1864 belonged to Denmark. My parents were both born as Danish citizens. After the annexation by Germany my father emigrated to the United States, where three of his older brothers had already emigrated, and he became an American citizen. My two brothers, who were older than I, were born there. Later my mother’s health prompted my father’s return to Germany.
I was educated in Hamburg. I studied at universities in Germany and in Paris, and after receiving my doctor’s degree I was active for 2 years in economic organizations. Then I began my banking career, and for 13 years I was at the Dresdner Bank, one of the large so-called “D” banks. I then took over the management of a bank of my own, which was later merged with one of the “D” banks, and in 1923 I abandoned my private career and went into public service as Commissioner for German Currency (Reichswährungskommissar). Soon afterwards I became President of the Reichsbank, and I held that office until 1930, when I resigned.
DR. DIX: Why did you resign as President of the Reichsbank at that time?
SCHACHT: In two essential points there were differences of opinion between the Government and me; one was the internal finance policy of the Government. With the terrible catastrophe of the lost war and the Dictate of Versailles behind us, it was necessary in my opinion to use thrifty and modest methods in German politics. The democratic and socialist governments of that period could not see that point, but carried on an irresponsible financial policy, especially by incurring debts which in particular were contracted to a very large extent abroad. It was quite clear that Germany, already heavily burdened with reparation payments, was under no circumstances in a position to build up as much foreign currency as was necessary for the payment of these debts. We were not even able to pay the reparations from our own economy.
Therefore I objected to the contraction of these debts in which the various governments of that period indulged, and to which they also encouraged communities and private companies. I objected to this financial policy and continually, abroad and at home, warned against such a policy of incurring foreign debts. The foreign bankers did not listen nor did the German Government. It was during that period that if in Berlin one passed the Adlon Hotel, Unter Den Linden, one could not be sure that a financial agent would not emerge and ask whether one did not need a loan.
Later I was strongly opposed by these same people, when Germany was forced to discontinue making payments of her debts. But I wish to state here that I have always and on every occasion been against such a policy of debts. That was the one reason. The other reason was in the field of foreign policy. I had not only contributed my part toward the creation of the Young Plan but in 1929 I also assisted in the setting up of the Young Committee; the so-called Young Plan had resulted in a number of improvements for Germany, which the German Government was now sacrificing step by step during the subsequent negotiations at The Hague. Thus the financial and economic condition of the nation again deteriorated. I revolted against this, and for both these reasons I resigned my office as Reichsbankpräsident in protest, in March 1930.
DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this connection, may I call your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-6 of my Document Book. If the Tribunal agrees, I should like, in order to shorten the presentation of documents during the examination of the witness, to call your attention to those documents which have a direct connection with the questions with which the witness is dealing. I believe that this arrangement will be agreeable to the Tribunal since it will shorten the presentation of documents. It is Document Number Schacht-6, on Page 12 of the German copy of my document book and on Page 8 of the English copy, Your Lordship, Exhibit Number Schacht-6. That is a record of the statements made by Dr. Schacht during the session of the subcommittee for monetary and credit matters on 21 October 1926. I believe it is not necessary for me to read these statements. They refer to the foreign debts which Dr. Schacht has just mentioned, and contain the same thoughts which Dr. Schacht has just expressed before the Tribunal, and are proof that these thoughts are not views ex post facto. Therefore, without reading it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the whole of this document.
I shall return to my examination.
[Turning to the witness.] You had resigned your office as President of the Reichsbank. What did you do then?
SCHACHT: I went to the small estate which I owned in the country and lived there as a private citizen. Then in 1930 I made a trip to the United States. I departed shortly or immediately after the Reichstag elections of September 1930 and went to New York via London. There I lectured for about two months on questions which were presented to me by American friends.
DR. DIX: When did you first get in touch with the National Socialist ideology, with the Party, and with Hitler personally, and when, in particular, did you read the Party program and Hitler’s Mein Kampf?
SCHACHT: With the exception of a single occasion I have never in my life concerned myself with Party politics. Even at the age of 26 I was offered a sure electoral district in the Reichstag, which I did not accept, since I have never been interested in Party politics. My interest always lay in the field of economics and financial policy but, of course, for public affairs I always had a general interest, arising from a concern for the future of my country and my people.
Therefore, in 1919, I participated in the foundation of the Democratic Party.
May I say a few words here about my background and spiritual upbringing? My father, throughout his life, adhered to democratic ideals. He was a Freemason. He was a cosmopolitan. I had, and I still have, numerous relatives on my mother’s side in Denmark and on my father’s side in the United States, and to this day I am on friendly terms with them. I grew up among these ideas and I have never departed from these basic conceptions of Freemasonry and democracy and humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals. Later I always remained in very close contact with foreign countries. I traveled much, and with the exception of Ireland and Finland there is no country in Europe which I have not visited. I know Asia down to India, Ceylon, and Burma. I went to North America frequently, and just before the Second World War broke out I intended to travel to South America.
I want to emphasize this in order to show that I was never interested in Party politics. Nevertheless, when in the elections of September 1930 Hitler’s party suddenly and surprisingly obtained 108 seats, I began to take an interest in the phenomenon; and on board ship going to the United States I read Mein Kampf and, of course, also the Party program. When I arrived on the other side the first question was what was my opinion about Hitler and the Party, because naturally everyone was talking about this event in Germany. In my first publication at that time—it was an interview—I uttered an unequivocal warning and said, “If you people abroad do not change your policy towards Germany, then you will soon have very many more adherents of Hitler in Germany than there are now.” Throughout that period of 2 months I spoke about 50 times in public meetings, and I always met with understanding in the question of reparations, the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, and the economic difficulties of Germany, and I returned with the impression that the whole American attitude, the attitude of the American people toward us, was indeed rather friendly. Not on my initiative but by coincidence, I got in touch with the adherents of the National Socialist Party. A friend of mine, a bank director, invited me at the beginning of December 1930 to dine with him at his house and to meet Hermann Göring there. I did so and gained no really definite impression from Göring’s statements and conduct. He was in every respect reserved, modest, and well-mannered, and he invited me to his house in order to meet Hitler. At the beginning of January my wife and I dined with Göring and his wife one evening at their home, and on that occasion, Fritz Thyssen was also invited. It had been planned that Hitler should come also and talk with us. I say again now that Göring’s apartment was extremely modestly and simply styled. We had a plain pea soup and bacon and particularly Göring’s first wife made an excellent impression. After supper Hitler appeared, and the ensuing conversation was conducted in such a way that, let us say, 5 percent of it was contributed by us, and 95 percent by Hitler. What he said concerned national questions, in which he agreed absolutely with us. No extravagant demands were stated, but on the other hand the national necessities of Germany were definitely emphasized. In social questions Hitler expressed a number of good ideas; he was especially intent on avoiding class struggle and on eliminating strikes, lock-outs, and wage disputes by decisive intervention of the State in labor relations and the direction of economic affairs. There was no demand for abolishing private enterprise, but merely for influence in its conduct. It seemed to us these ideas were quite reasonable and acceptable. Aside from that, he revealed practically no knowledge in the field of economy and financial policy, though on that evening he did not claim to know anything about these subjects. He merely asked that we as representatives of economy should have understanding for his ideas and give him factual advice. That was the purpose of that evening.
DR. DIX: I shall refer to this first conversation with Adolf Hitler later, but I should like to return now to the question I have put before concerning your attitude to the Party program and the ideology developed in the book, Mein Kampf. I am stressing this because, as you have heard, the gentlemen of the Prosecution are of the opinion that certain parts of the Party program as such and also parts of the book, Mein Kampf, are of a criminal character, and that their criminal character was recognizable immediately upon their publication. Therefore I should like to ask you to explain in detail your attitude at the time, and possibly also your attitude today, toward the Party program and the ideology of National Socialism as it appears in the book Mein Kampf.
SCHACHT: From the proceedings in this Court so far I have not gained the impression that the opinion of the Prosecution concerning the criminal character of the Party program is a uniform one. I am unable to see in the Party program as such any sign of criminal intentions.
Federation of all Germans, which always plays a great role, is always claimed only on the basis of the right for self-determination. A position for Germany in foreign politics is demanded as constituting equality of the German nation with the other nations; that this involved the abolition of the discriminations which were imposed upon the German people by the Versailles Treaty is quite clear.
Land and soil was demanded for the nutrition of our people and the settlement of our excess population. I cannot see any crime in that, because after land and soil was expressly added in brackets the word “colonies.” I have always considered that as a demand for colonies, which I myself supported a long time before National Socialism came into existence. Rather strange and, in my opinion, going somewhat beyond the limits were the points concerning the exclusion of Jews from civil rights, but on the other hand it was reassuring that the Jews were to be under the protection of the Aliens’ Law, that is, subject to the same laws which applied to foreigners in Germany. I would have wished and always demanded that this legal protection should under all circumstances be given to the Jews. Unfortunately they were not given that protection. For the rest it was emphasized that all citizens should have equal rights and duties.
Promotion of popular education was stressed as being beneficial, and also gymnastics and sports were demanded for the improvement of public health. The fight against deliberate political lies was demanded, which Goebbels afterwards conducted very energetically. And, above all, demand was made for the freedom of all religious denominations and for the principle of positive Christianity.
That is, in essence, the content of the National Socialist Party program, and I cannot see anything criminal in it. It would, indeed, have been quite peculiar if, had this been a criminal Party program, the world had maintained continuous political and cultural contact with Germany for two decades, and with the National Socialists for one decade.
As far as the book, Mein Kampf, is concerned, my judgment has always been the same from the very beginning as it is today. It is a book written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a man who was strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, half educated man, which to me Hitler has always been. In the book Mein Kampf and in part also in the Party program there was one point which worried me a great deal, and that was the absolute lack of understanding for all economic problems. The Party program contained a few slogans, such as “Community interests come before private interests,” and so on, and then the “breaking up of subjection to financial interests” and similar phrases which could not possibly signify anything sensible. The same held true for Mein Kampf, which is of no interest from the point of view of economic policy and consequently had no interest for me.
On the other hand, as regards foreign policy Mein Kampf contained, in my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it always toyed with the idea that within the continent of Europe the living space for Germany ought to be extended. And if nevertheless I did co-operate later on with a National Socialist Reich Chancellor, then it was for the very simple reason that expansion of the German space toward the East was in the book made specifically dependent upon the approval of the British Government. Therefore, to me, believing that I knew British policy very well, this seemed Utopian and there was no danger of my taking these theoretical extravagances of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It was clear to me that every territorial change on European territory attempted by force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be approved by the other nations.
Besides that, Mein Kampf had a number of very silly and verbose statements but, on the other hand, it had many a reasonable idea, too; I want to point out that I liked two things especially: first, that anyone who differs with the government in political matters is obliged to state his opinion to the government; and secondly, that, though the democratic or rather parliamentary government ought to be replaced by a Führer government, nevertheless the Führer could only remain if he was sure of the approval of the entire people, in other words, that a Führer also depended on plebiscites of a democratic nature.
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have now described the impression which you gained from your first conversation with Adolf Hitler, as well as from a study of the Party program and Mein Kampf. Did you believe that you would be able to work with Adolf Hitler and what practical conclusions did you derive from that first conversation with Hitler?
SCHACHT: To work with Adolf Hitler was out of the question for me personally, since I was a private citizen and not interested in Party politics and consequently after that conversation I did nothing at all to create for myself any personal relations with the Hitler circles. I simply went back to my farm and I continued to live there as a private citizen. So personally, for myself I did not draw any conclusions but I drew another conclusion. I have already said that naturally I had the future of my country at heart. After that conversation I repeatedly emphasized to Reich Chancellor Brüning and implored him when forming and heading the Cabinet to include the National Socialists in it, because I believed that only in this way the tremendous impetus, the tremendous propagandistic fervor which I had noticed in Hitler, could be caught and harnessed—by putting the National Socialists to practical government work. One should not leave them in the opposition where they could only become more dangerous, but one should take them into the government and see what they could achieve and whether they would not acquire polish within the government. That was the suggestion and the very urgent request I made to Brüning, and I might say that according to my impression Hitler would at that time have been quite ready to do that. Brüning could under no circumstances be won over to such a policy and in consequence was later crushed.
DR. DIX: Let us stop for a moment and deal with the Party. The Indictment states that you were a Party member. Now, Göring has already said that Hitler conferred the Golden Party Emblem only as a sort of decoration. Do you have anything new to add to that statement made by Göring?
SCHACHT: I do not know whether it has been mentioned here; the Golden Party Emblem was in January 1937 given to all Ministers and also to all military personalities in the Cabinet. The latter could not become Party members at all; therefore the award of the Party emblem did not entail membership. As to the rest I think Göring has testified from the witness stand. I might mention one more thing. If I had been a Party member, then doubtlessly when I was ousted from my position as Minister without Portfolio in January 1943, the Party Court would have gone into action, since a case of insubordination to Hitler would have been evident. I was never before the Party Court and even when on the occasion of my dismissal the return of the Golden Party Emblem was demanded from me, I was not told that I was being dismissed from the Party, since I was not in the Party. I was only told “return the Golden Emblem of the Party which was conferred upon you,” and I promptly complied.
I believe I could not add anything else to the statements already made.
DR. DIX: Then the Indictment is wrong in this point?
SCHACHT: Yes; in this point it is absolutely wrong.
DR. DIX: Why did you not become a Party member?
SCHACHT: Excuse me, but I was opposed to quite a number of points of the National Socialist ideology. I do not believe that it would have been compatible with my entirely democratic attitude to change over to a different Party program, and one which, not in its wording but through its execution by the Party had certainly not—in the course of time—gained any more favor with me.
DR. DIX: Therefore, you did not become a Party member for reasons of principle?
SCHACHT: Yes, for reasons of principle.
DR. DIX: Now, a biography of you was published by one Dr. Reuther in 1937. There, also, it is correctly stated that you were not a Party member; but the biographer gives different, more tactical reasons for your refusing to join the Party; and he mentions the possibility of being more influential from outside the Party and so on. Maybe it is advisable, since the biography has been referred to in the course of the proceedings, that you shortly state your views on this point?
SCHACHT: I believe that at the time Hitler had the impression that I could be useful to him outside of the Party and it may be that Dr. Reuther got knowledge of this. But I would rather not be made responsible for the writings of Dr. Reuther, and in particular I should like to object to the fact that the Prosecutor who presented the brief against me described this book by Dr. Reuther as an official publication. Of course this book is the private work of a journalist for whom I have respect but who certainly states his own opinions and ideas.
DR. DIX: Did you speak in public on behalf of Hitler before the July elections in 1932?
SCHACHT: Before the July elections of 1932, which brought that tremendous success for Hitler, I was never active either publicly or privately on behalf of Hitler, except once, perhaps, or twice—I remember now, it happened once—Hitler sent a Party member to me who had plans on economic, financial, or currency policies; Hitler may have told him that he should consult me as to whether or not these plans could be put into practice. I might tell the story briefly: It was Gauleiter Röwer of Oldenburg. In Oldenburg the Nazis had already come to power before 1932 and he was the Minister President there. He wanted to introduce an Oldenburg currency of its own, a consequence of which would have been that Saxony would have introduced its own Saxon currency, Württemberg would have introduced its own currency, and Baden would have had its own currency, and so on. I ridiculed the whole thing at the time and sent a telegram to Hitler, saying that the economic needs of the German Reich could not be cured by such miracles. If I disregard this case, which might have constituted some sort of private connection, then I may say that neither privately nor publicly, neither in speeches nor in writing, have I at all been concerned with Hitler or his Party and in no way have I recommended the Party.
DR. DIX: Did you vote National Socialist in July 1932?
SCHACHT: No, I would not think of it.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution now lists a number of points by which it wants to prove that you were an adherent of the National Socialist ideology. I am going to name them one by one, and I ask you to state your view on each of them. First, that you were an opponent of the Treaty of Versailles. Would you like to say something about that?
SCHACHT: It surprised me indeed to hear that reproach from an American Prosecutor. The lieutenant who spoke is perhaps too young to have experienced it himself, but he should know it from his education; at any rate, for all of us who have lived through that time, it was one of the outstanding events that the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the United States, and, if I am not wrong, rejected with the resounding approval of the entire American people.
The reasons prompting that action were also my reasons for rejecting the Treaty: it stood in contradiction to the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which had been solemnly agreed upon, and in the field of economics it contained absurdities which certainly could not work out to the advantage of world economy. But I certainly would not accuse the American people of having been adherents of the Nazi ideology, because they rejected the Treaty.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution also assert that you had already been for a long time a German National Socialist, not merely a German patriot, but a German nationalist and expansionist. Would you like to state your position in that respect?
SCHACHT: You, yourself, by emphasizing the word “patriot” have recognized that one must be clear on just what a nationalist is. I have always been proud to belong to a nation which for more than a thousand years has been one of the leading civilized nations of the world. I was proud to belong to a nation which has given to the world men like Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven, to mention only a few. I have always interpreted nationalism as the desire of a nation to be an example to other nations, and to maintain a leading position in the field of spiritual and cultural achievement through high moral standards and intellectual attainment.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, it seems to me that we are getting very far from the relevant charges in this case, and particularly if they are going to be preceded by a statement of the Prosecution’s position.
We have no charge against Dr. Schacht because he opposed the Treaty of Versailles; we concede it was the right of any German citizen to do that by any means short of war. Nor do we object to his being a patriotic German by any means short of war. The only purpose has been to find out what his attitude in those matters was in connection with the charge that he prepared and precipitated war.
To deal with philosophical matters separately from the war charge seems to me entirely irrelevant, and I assure the Tribunal we have no purpose in charging that it is a crime to oppose the Treaty of Versailles. Many Americans did that. It is no crime to be a German patriot. The crime is the one defined in the Indictment, and it seems to me we are a long way off from that here, and wasting time.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: I was eager and glad to hear what Justice Jackson just said, but I must quote from Wallenstein, “Before dinner we heard another version.” There was no doubt—and once, because I thought I had misunderstood, I even asked again—that the criminal character of the Party program, the criminal character of the contents of Mein Kampf—reproachable in itself and, to say the least, indicative of crimes committed later—the willful opposition to the Treaty of Versailles—and further the accusation of having been an expansionist and nationalist, all these things have repeatedly in the course of the proceedings here been held against Dr. Schacht in order to strengthen the foundation of the charges made against him.
If Mr. Justice Jackson now with gratifying frankness states, “We do not at all blame Schacht for opposing the Treaty of Versailles; we do not assert that he was more than a patriot, that is to say, a nationalist in the sense described before, and we do not maintain either that these our statements are circumstantial evidence for his later co-operation, his financial co-operation, in the rearmament program, which in turn is proof indicative of his intent to assist in waging a war of aggression”—if that is now stated unequivocally by the Prosecution, then we can dispense with a great many questions which I intended to put in the course of my examination of the witness; I would then gladly leave the whole subject of Schacht’s expansionism and nationalism. We have not yet mentioned expansionism; Mr. Justice Jackson has not mentioned it either. I do not believe, however, that the Prosecution will withdraw the accusation of expansionism, that is the expansion of German living space in Europe. I am not sure of this but we shall certainly hear about it. As I said, if these accusations which have been made are withdrawn, then I can dispense with these questions and my client need not answer them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course, I made no such statement as Dr. Dix has assumed. My statement was clearly made in the opening and clearly is now, that he had a perfect right to be against the Treaty of Versailles and to be a German nationalist and to follow those aims by all means short of war. I do not want to have put in my mouth the very extensive statements made by Dr. Dix.
My statement was made clear in the opening, and these matters as to the Versailles Treaty and nationalism and Lebensraum, as political and philosophical matters, are not for the Court to determine. We are not going to ask you to say whether the Treaty of Versailles was a just document or not. It was a document. They had a right to do what they could to get away from it by all means short of war.
The charge against Dr. Schacht is that he prepared, knowingly, to accomplish those things by means of aggressive warfare. That is the nub of the case against him.
DR. DIX: Then on this point there is...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think the case for the Prosecution has been clear from the outset, that all these matters are only relied upon when they were entered into with the intention of making war.
DR. DIX: Very true. I need not put these questions if the Prosecution no longer uses these accusations as circumstantial evidence for his intent to wage a war of aggression, but Mr. Justice Jackson has not yet made a statement to that effect. But there seems to be no doubt—and I do not believe that I misunderstood the Prosecution—that in order to prove Dr. Schacht’s intention to wage a war of aggression, the Prosecution did refer to Schacht’s opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, to his nationalism and expansionism that is, extension of Lebensraum. We do not want to make academic or theoretical statements about the ideas of Lebensraum and nationalism, but as long as these ideas, which the Prosecution concedes he is justified in holding, as long as these characteristics are considered to be in part proof of his intent, my client must have the opportunity of telling the Tribunal just what he meant by Lebensraum if he ever spoke of it, which I do not yet know. But I think, nevertheless, that there is still a matter not quite clear between Mr. Justice Jackson and me, and that I do not quite agree either with what was said by Your Lordship...
THE PRESIDENT: What you were asking him about was his views on nationalism. That is what you were asking him about, his views upon nationalism, and that seems to be a waste of time.
DR. DIX: I put to him that he was accused of being a nationalist and an expansionist, and that the Prosecution therefrom drew the conclusion that he planned an aggressive war by financing armament; now he has to show, of course, that...
THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out is that the Prosecution have never said that he simply held the views of a nationalist and of an expansionist, but that he held those views and intended to go to war in order to enforce them.
DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, but it is held that these opinions were proof—one proof among others—that he had the intention of waging aggressive war; that they therefore constitute what we jurists should call circumstantial evidence for his intent, to wage war, and as long as this argument—it is no longer a charge maintained by Justice Jackson but it is an argument of the Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue about it. He agrees that he did hold these views. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to go into the fact. The Prosecution say he held the views; he agrees that he held the views. The only question is whether he held them with the innocent intention of achieving them by peaceful methods, or whether he had the alleged criminal intention of achieving them by war.
DR. DIX: I only wish to say one more thing to that. Expansionism has not yet been discussed. Should Dr. Schacht have had expansionist tendencies, then Mr. Justice Jackson certainly would not say that he has no objection. Therefore...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think that you may ask him questions about the expansionists, his ideas of what expansionists were, what he meant by expansion, but for the rest it seems to me you are simply proving exactly the same as the Prosecution have proved.
DR. DIX: I fully agree. Dr. Schacht, were you...
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]
Afternoon Session
DR. DIX: I believe, Dr. Schacht, that both of us will have to speak a little more slowly and pause between question and answer.
Now, please reply to the accusation by the Prosecution that you were an expansionist. Please define your position.
SCHACHT: Never in my life have I demanded even a foot of space that did not belong to Germany, nor would I ever entertain such an idea.
I am of the opinion that neither is it national to try to dominate and govern foreign peoples, nor is appropriation of foreign territory a politically just action.
These are two questions with which we are much concerned at present.
I might perhaps add, in order to clarify my position, just what I understand by nationalism, and just why I was against each and every form of expansionism. Just one sentence will suffice, a sentence from a speech which I made in August of 1935. On that occasion I said, and I quote:
“We want to express the belief that self-respect requires respect for others, and the upholding of our national individuality must not mean disparagement of the individuality of others; by respecting the acts of others we respect our own action; and a battle of economic competition can be won in the end only through example and achievement and not through methods of violence or craft.”
DR. DIX: According to the opinion of the Prosecution, in the year 1936 you made a public threat of war, on which occasion you are alleged to have said that the spirit of Versailles was instrumental in keeping alive war mania. I am referring to Document EC-415, a document to which the Prosecution has referred.
SCHACHT: I never understood, in the course of this proceeding, how there could be a threat of war in this quotation. The quotation concludes with the words—and I must quote in English because I just have the English words before me:
“The spirit of Versailles is perpetuated in the fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.”
The conclusion says that the German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning. It seems to be a matter of course that hereby expression is given to the fact that I am warning others from persisting in war mania. I am not warning ourselves, but the entire world, to avoid perpetuating the spirit of Versailles.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution further accuses you in this connection that you publicly approved the idea of Lebensraum, for the German people. In this special connection reference was made to the speech you made at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, in which you said: “Germany has too limited Lebensraum for her population.”
SCHACHT: This speech of 9 December 1936 was a speech which was solely concerned with a restoration of the colonial rights of Germany. I have never demanded any Lebensraum for Germany other than colonial space. And in this instance, again, I am surprised that just the American Prosecutor should accuse me on my efforts in this direction, because in the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which regrettably were not adhered to later on, the colonial interests of the Germans are taken into consideration. In consequence, I said, again and again: “If you want peace in Europe, give Germany an economic outlet into which Germany can develop and from which she can satisfy her needs. Otherwise Germany will be a center of unrest and a problem for Europe.”
I would like to quote one sentence only from the speech I made:
“Peace in Europe, together with the peace of the entire world, is dependent upon whether or not the densely populated areas of Central Europe will have the means of existence.”
I emphasized this viewpoint again and again, but at no time did I connect these views with the idea of an armed conflict.
I would like to quote another sentence from this same speech:
“I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of Germany which were separated from her”—and I am speaking of the losses suffered by Germany—“in order that we might draw the conclusion of warlike intentions; my entire position and my work are marshaled to the objective of bringing about peace in Europe through peaceful and sensible considerations and measures.”
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers and the exhibit numbers of those two speeches?
DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, but I will try to get them and submit them in writing. The last is the speech at Frankfurt, and the others...
THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know in writing, will you?
DR. DIX: Yes, indeed.
SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two other sentences from my article which was published in Foreign Affairs, the well-known American magazine, in the year 1937. I have the German translation before me, which says, in the introduction, and I quote:
“I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify the situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is for Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, but still surely and simply a question of economic existence.”
Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans were in constant accord with this view. I have a statement made by the collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who made the well-known distinction between the “haves” and “have nots,” and who was especially influential in advocating consideration for German colonial interests. Perhaps I can dispense with the quotation.
DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit USA-630. This document is concerned with the conversation which you had with the American Ambassador Davies, and in which you are accused of having indirectly threatened a breach of peace.
SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly said that Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no means of livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central Europe, and I believe conditions at present show how absolutely right I was—just what an impossibility it is to feed these masses of people within Europe. And beyond that I had a keen interest in diverting Hitler’s quite misguided ideas from Eastern Europe and therefore was constantly at pains to direct his attention to the colonial problem so that I could turn his thought from the mad ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in 1932, shortly before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in which for the first time I approached him on these facts and particularly told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an expansion in the East.
Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I spoke about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer of 1936 I had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave me the mission, which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris to discuss with the French Government the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the question of colonies for Germany. This actually happened in the summer of 1936. And for the satisfaction of myself and all other friends of peace, I might say that the Government of Léon Blum, which was in office at the time, showed gratifying appreciation of this solution for Europe’s food and economic problems, and for their part stated that they were ready to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps returning one or two colonies to Germany. Léon Blum then undertook, in agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a discussion of this problem within the British Government. That actually did take place, but the British Government hesitated for months before they finally could decide on any position in this matter and so the discussion dragged on up to the initial months of the Spanish civil war and was eclipsed and supplanted by the problems of the Spanish civil war, so that a continuation of the discussion on this colonial problem never came about.
At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador to Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, I was rather irritated by the slowness with which the British Government was meeting these suggestions, and consequently I came forth with a request for understanding and support and told Ambassador Davies about this whole matter. I tried constantly and repeatedly to gain the understanding support of representatives of the American Government. I tried again and again to advise these gentlemen about domestic conditions and developments within Germany, to tell them as much as was possible and compatible with German interests and to keep them informed. That applies to Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when he was in Berlin, and so on.
This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the document which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, and which is taken from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote about his mission in Moscow, and we will perhaps come back to this book later.
As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote just one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since I have only the English book at my disposal.
“Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could be developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present desperation into future hope.”
DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an important part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. According to this affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if Germany could not get colonies through negotiations she would take them. Please define your position as to this statement.
SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed by a tyrant to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply, “Just give me one word said by this man, and I will hang him thereby.” I believe, My Lord Justices, that in this courtroom there is not a single person who at one time or another in his life has not said a rather unfortunate word. And how much easier is it when he is speaking in a foreign language of which he is not completely master.
Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and this discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done according to the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that even had he tried to put down the exact words he could not guarantee that each and every word has been said. But if I did say these words, then it seems only that I said we Germans must have colonies and we shall have them. Whether I said, “We shall take them,” or “We shall get them,” that, of course, it is impossible for me to say with certainty today after a period of 10 years.
The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, “We will take them,” a little colorless in effect and therefore I believe he just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation of the charges that I had said, “We will take these colonies by force,” and on a second occasion he even said, “We will take these colonies by force of arms.” But “force” or “force of arms” are not mentioned in the whole of Fuller’s affidavit. And if I had used that word or even used it only by implication, Mr. Fuller would have had to say with reason: “So you want to take colonies by force; how do you expect to do that?” It would have been utter nonsense to assert that Germany would ever have been able to take overseas colonies by force. She lacked—and always will lack—domination of the seas, which is necessary for this.
Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and in his conversation he immediately continued—and I quote:
“You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw materials could not be obtained, owing to German lack of foreign exchange. Would stabilization help you?”
Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I wanted to take colonies by force—something which I never said and which is contrary to my views, as I have already stated—he immediately goes on to foreign exchange and to stabilization.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested in the conquest of neighboring territory in Europe.
SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous mistake of the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was accused as follows, and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges here, referred to the fact—I quote the prosecutor:
“On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on reparation payments, Schacht said, ‘Germany in general can pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to Germany.’”
This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the verbatim record of the interrogation, I answered:
“It may be that I said such a thing.”
Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had made 10 to 15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember that in connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made a remark, and since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted this record to me it would be an accurate stenographic record, for that reason I did not dispute this remark which I had allegedly made and said that it might be that I said something to that effect. The Prosecution takes a “maybe” and out of that reconstructed the following sentence:
“This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was correct.”
This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, “It may be that I said something to that effect,” but I did not say that this statement that was submitted to me was correct.
Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting hold of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of reparation payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I luckily put down the text of my statement about the matter we are dealing with now. I have the exact text, and I would like to say that this book has been submitted in evidence, and from this text appears what I said verbatim:
“Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, it is especially important that import of foodstuffs has been decreased”—I beg your pardon—“that import will be decreased.”—I am sorry again. I cannot read this—“that the import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact be overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories in the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and that a large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian has been separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic welfare of this territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily and the Reich Government must support and subsidize it. Constantly, therefore, suitable measures should be taken to eliminate these injurious conditions, which are hindering considerably Germany’s ability to pay.”
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44.
SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the statement submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can we draw the conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a return of these areas. What I demanded was that the separation of these areas be taken into consideration when Germany’s ability to pay and the payments were determined. When the prosecutor in his speech added: “I would like to point out that this is the same area over which the war started in September 1939,” I believe it is an insinuation which characterizes the prosecutor, rather than me, against whom it was intended.
DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the indirect evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are charged, the Prosecution includes your wish—your alleged wish—for the Anschluss of Austria. Will you please take your position as to this accusation?
SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria inevitable and, in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, it was welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of Austria would not be for Germany so much an aggrandizement as a liability. I always knew. But the wish of the Austrian people to belong, to be incorporated into Germany—I took that wish as my own and said that if here there are six and a half million people who spontaneously in 1919 and later in innumerable demonstrations expressed their wish of being incorporated into the brotherhood of Greater Germany, that was an event to which no German could be opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with gladness. In that sense I always favored and respected the wish of Austria to belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as external political conditions permitted it.
DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you are still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging behind a little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly.
What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany?
SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, I never thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a European problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which had five and a half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks and about three and a half million Germans, the German element had no means of expression. But just because the Czechoslovakian problem was not a purely German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech problem, I sought a solution of this problem in such a way and wished it to be in such a way that Czechoslovakia should constitute a federated state, similar perhaps to Switzerland, divided into three different, culturally separate, but politically unified areas, which would be a guarantee for the unity of a German-Czech-Slovak state.
DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of war; by that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical considerations are concerned?
SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating things to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles throughout my entire life I was a pacifist.
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful life you have certainly considered the fundamental and profound differences between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and militarism in its various degenerate forms. What did you mean by the latter and what was your attitude toward it, that is, militarism?
SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country’s defense in case of war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense I was always in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a soldier I consider to be full of deprivations and characterized by willingness and readiness to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a war the soldier has to give up his life—that is the duty of every citizen of military age—but because his whole aim and aspiration must be directed to the end that never must the craft which he has learned be exercised. A soldier, a career officer, who is not intrinsically a pacifist, has really in my opinion missed his calling. Consequently, I was always an opponent of every military digression and excess. I was always against militarism, but I consider that soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the highest calling which a citizen can pursue.
DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul General of the United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of his various affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told him, and repeatedly told him, about Nazi intents of aggression. Will you please state your position in that regard?
SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I never made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith nor to anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. Messersmith, which were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, I would like to make a further statement.
Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and numerous private conversations with me, and I would like to state here now that, according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George Messersmith perhaps two or three times in my entire life. Mr. George Messersmith represents himself as having had numerous contacts and many private conversations with me, and he asserts further that his official capacity brought him in contact with me as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of Economics.
I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my office. Mr. George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions and proceeds to characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, egotistic, vain, two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give an equally comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. But I must definitely dispute his trustworthiness.
And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general remark by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, Document 2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: “When the Nazi Party took over Germany, it represented only a small part of the German population.”
Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over Germany it occupied about forty percent of all Reichstag seats. That percentage Mr. Messersmith calls a small part of the German population. If diplomatic reports are everywhere as reliable as in this instance, it is small wonder that nations do not understand each other.
I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, that his duty brought him in contact with me as Minister of Economics. In his affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith says, and I quote: “During the wave of terrorist activity in May and June of 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna.” In August of 1934 I became Minister of Economics, whereas, on the other hand, Mr. Messersmith, already in May of 1934, assumed his official duties in Vienna; but this does not prevent Mr. Messersmith from asserting that his official duties brought him in frequent contact with me as Minister of Economics. I believe this will suffice to gauge the capacity of Mr. Messersmith’s memory correctly.
DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly referred to the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, which was published on the basis of his private notes by his children after his death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. The Prosecution quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that Mr. Dodd, too, considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that you were a friend of Mr. Dodd’s, a fact which is shown in his diary. Can you tell me how the two facts can be reconciled?
SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was one of the most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright character, a man of unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was a professor of history, undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied at German universities. I believe that he would turn in his grave if he could know that the notes which he put down casually in his diary were put together by his two children without commentary and printed without investigation.
Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made dealing with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in his steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him appear averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make himself understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a position to view opinions of others in the right light. Many things that were told him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light.
On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence I would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. Here he says: “I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps”—the British Ambassador at that time—“about the accumulated evidence of Germany’s intense war activities.” This statement dates from the autumn of 1934 and I believe no one is able to say that in the autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a war activity on the part of Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression “war” undoubtedly in the place of “armament”; he says “Krieg” instead of “Aufrüstung.” In that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words.
And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in making the Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign Office asked him once to bring a secretary who would take notes of discussions with representatives of the Foreign Office, so that misunderstandings could be avoided.
I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are apt to be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have already said about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked about war intentions.
DR. DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably disposed towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly attitude to you?
SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with Henderson...
DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later.
SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. Dodd was entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. I saw a sign of his friendship in that shortly before his departure from Berlin in December of 1937 he visited me at my home, and this incident is also dealt with in his diary, and I would like to quote just one sentence: “I went to Dr. Schacht’s house in Dahlem. I wished especially to see Schacht, whose life is said to be in danger.”
In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on my life on the part of National Socialists, and considered it important enough and a reason for coming to my home personally in order to warn me.
A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be seen from the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning to America. At that time he again called on me and told me urgently that I should go to America with him, or as soon after him as possible, that I should change my residence to America, and that I would find a pleasant welcome there. I believe he would never have said that to me had he not felt a certain degree of friendship for me.
DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can hardly be assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done you these good services if he had considered you a warmonger and friend of the Nazis, and especially—and I would like to say this to the High Tribunal—if one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the few accredited diplomats in Berlin who very obviously had no sympathy of any sort for the regime in power, in fact he was wholly and fully opposed to it.
I intentionally say “the few diplomats” and, Dr. Schacht, I would like you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will remember that those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler’s regime politically and socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent grand seigneur Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the true-hearted and great Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of these diplomats were recalled by their Governments. How is it that an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd did such open services of friendship to someone whom he considered a friend of the Nazis? Do you agree with my opinion?
SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this kind of sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. It seems to me that the witness has been allowed to say everything that Mr. Dodd has ever written and to put in his mind what he thinks Dodd meant. He has allowed him to go to great lengths characterizing all American representatives, but it seems to me that this is utterly off the track and improper for this witness to give a characterization of him in comparison with other ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.
There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, we are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We are accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems great reluctance to get to and deal with.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass from this part of it, pass on from these documents.
DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely far from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here our opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the other hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against the defendant in this proceeding, the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put questions and put them shortly, it would be much better, and we should get on much faster.
DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. I only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with part of the evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up the reliability of Dodd’s Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my document book; German text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. Here we are concerned with the correspondence between the publisher of Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile Henderson, which deals with several misstatements in the diary. I will dispense with the rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson—there are five folio pages—and will cite just a few sentences.
On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes:
“Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of Hitler...”
and so on and so forth.
Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph:
“And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded, about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and other countries.”
And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last paragraph, it says:
“Nor could I possibly have said that ‘Germany must dominate the Danube-Balkan zone.’”
And on the next page, second paragraph:
“The remark attributed to me that England and Germany ‘must control the world’ is pure balderdash and hardly fits in with the preceding sentence about the United States.”
Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following page, but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I request the High Tribunal to take official notice of this document in its entirety, and I would like to submit it as such.
[Turning to the defendant.] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard to a danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your life?
SCHACHT: At that time—and I only heard about this in January after Mr. Dodd told me—I was informed that the SS was planning an attack on my person. The intent was, as the technical expression then had it, “to remove” me. Something like that must have been in the air; otherwise, a foreign ambassador and the circles close to me would not have known about it.
DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy rejected the use of arms in bringing about equality of German rights and means of livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a practical way to further your policy of peaceful agreement with foreign countries, for example, when you were President of the bank?
SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was primarily based on the principle of working with the banks in foreign countries as harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy of mutual assistance and support.
Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with the directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding for German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by way of co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems which had arisen in Central Europe. The word “co-operation” (Zusammenarbeit) was the leitmotif of our circle.
DR. DIX: To turn from the directors of the banks, what about your foreign creditors?
SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start I was in disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had profited from German loans in foreign countries for I was against Germany’s being involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand very firmly on this point.
Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted actually did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, these self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact that the interest on their money was no longer being transferred to them. Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but among serious bankers and large banking institutions which were interested in constant and regulated business with Germany, I believe I made no enemies, because all measures which I later had to take in order to protect the German currency and to maintain Germany’s foreign trade, all these measures I always discussed jointly with the representatives of foreign creditors. Approximately every six months we met, and I always gave them a detailed account of German conditions. They were permitted to look into the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate the officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I told them everything in the most frank and open manner. So that I may say that I worked in a fair and friendly way also with these men.
DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect foreign trade, export, credit, and so forth?
SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now taken place it is today even clearer than before that Germany cannot and could not live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance of export trade must be the basis for the future existence of the German nation. Consequently, I did everything in order to maintain German foreign trade. I can cite a few specific examples to supplement the general principles. I tried, for example, to do business with China in order that we might export to China. I was ready to give China credit and did. I hailed the fact that the Soviet Union kept up an extensive flow of trade with us, and I always advocated expanding and stabilizing this foreign trade in the case of Russia as well as China. About the ability and readiness to pay and the promptness of payment of the opposite parties I never had any doubts.
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support of the allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not surely need details.
DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition is of great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary and in opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was hostile to the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by open friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy of understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler carried on a peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, such as the war of propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in my opinion, this point is very important for Schacht’s fundamental attitude—on one side war and on the other understanding. This is of absolute relevance.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is for the Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, then the details might become material in re-examination.
DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now I shall turn to an entirely new phase of questioning.
Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct basic opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to Document Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit, of Schniewind, the banker and Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, Page 114, of the English translation, and I would like to quote a short paragraph on Page 112 of the German text, which confirms Dr. Schacht’s remarks. Schniewind, who was a high official in the Ministry of Economics, says here:
“My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries to Russia, and thus I was in position to know that Schacht considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through much effort, he obtained Hitler’s permission to send extensive supplies, especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained the impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries because, while instrumental in giving employment, they did not benefit rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public occasions pointed out with satisfaction that trade shipments to Russia were proceeding promptly and smoothly.”
There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, Your Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted to reply shortly to Your Lordship’s remarks of a few minutes ago. The defendant must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very difficult defense. The Prosecution very simply argued: “You helped to finance rearmament and this rearmament in the final analysis ended in war and not only a war but a war of aggression; therefore, you as a defendant are either a conspirator or an accomplice, and that is a war crime.”
As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be open to the defendant, first—and we shall deal with that later—to point out that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire for aggressive war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually indicate the exact opposite, namely, his desire for concord and peace; and for these fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not to cut me short in this evidence but rather to give me the time to carry it through in detail. This explains my desire to set forth Schacht’s policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy in which he was in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring it forth in its entirety, and also my wish to show that he worked for agreement on all levels—with directors of banks and credit furnishers—that is, he advocated a policy of give and take rather than one of unilateral terrorizing and strife.
Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plane on which I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and delicate field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more difficult. Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will most likely dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that you show me some consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it time for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the Tribunal has shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly have a recess.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the Leadership Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a blank check, the danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? You have heard that Sir David considers the Leadership Principle in itself to be criminal.
SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal or not, opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we look back through Roman history we see that from time to time in dire periods of distress a leader was selected to whom everyone else was subordinate. And if I read Failure of a Mission by Henderson there, too, I find sentences in which he says:
“People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and even extremely beneficial for a nation.”
Another passage from the same book says:
“Dictatorships are not always evil.”
In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Führer, how much confidence one has in a Führer, and for how long a time. Of course, it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the leadership of a country without giving the nation from time to time an opportunity of saying whether it still wants to keep him as Führer or not. The election of Hitler as Führer was in itself no political mistake; in my opinion one could have introduced quite a number of precautionary limitations with a view to averting the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say that that was not done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one was entitled to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a plebiscite, a new expression of the will of the people would take place by which the Führer could have been corrected, because a leader who cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger very well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say one more thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce the idea of a Führer as a lasting principle into politics. That of course is utter nonsense, and I took the opportunity—I always took such opportunity whenever it was possible—of expressing my dissenting opinions publicly. I took the opportunity in an address to the Academy of German Law, of which not only Nazis but lawyers of all groups were members, and in that speech I lectured about the Leadership Principle in economics. And I expressed myself ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my wont, and said that it was not necessary to have a leader in every stocking factory, that in fact, this principle was not a principle at all, but an exceptional rule which had to be handled very carefully.
DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion of that address. What did you think about the ideology of the master race (Herrenvolk)?
SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent to speak of a “chosen people,” or of “God’s own country,” or of things like that. As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith I believe in Christian charity, which bids me extend love to all men without regard to race or faith. I would like to mention also that the silly talk about the master race, which some Party leaders made their own, was held up to constant ridicule by the German public. That was not surprising, because most of the leaders of the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the Nordic race. And in that connection, when these things were discussed among the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as “Der Schrumpfgermane”—the shrivelled Teuton.
Only one thing—I have to say this to be just—did most of the leaders of the Party have in common with the old Teutons—and that was drinking; excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi ideology.
DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist Weltanschauung?
SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of all those moral principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment on all aspects of life. Therefore it is a matter of course that a Weltanschauung cannot take root in the tangible world, but must rise above it; it is something metaphysical, that is to say, it is based on faith, on religion. A Weltanschauung which is not rooted in religion is in my opinion no Weltanschauung at all. Consequently I reject the National Socialist Weltanschauung which was not rooted in religion.
DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated that there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish question. Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this topic, because the trial brief by its very words takes from you what in the Jewish question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial brief accuses you repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance of anti-Semitism is integral.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence after this flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction with this witness’ testimony. It is not true that we make no charges against Dr. Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that we say that he was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi program which involved a wholesale extermination of the Jews, and he was for that reason attacked from time to time. It is further conceded that he gave aid and comfort to individual Jews, but we do charge that he believed the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and that he aided and participated in their persecution. And I do not like to have our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel by silence.
DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your clarifying statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I put in questions to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point out...
THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is a problem, and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, because it still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the opportune time I can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it would be right to bring it up how.
As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I would like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in our final speeches.
I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether Dr. Schacht is accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, not only the crime of conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, but also the typical crimes against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of the Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were presented, are at variance. I wanted to take the liberty of pointing out the contradictory passages and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough to state conclusively at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused also on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution will limit itself to Counts One and Two:
“Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to the planning and preparation of aggressive war and his participation in the conspiracy for aggressive war.”
Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in Appendix A of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are limited to Counts One and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment we find the following:
“...accuse as guilty...of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes....”
And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant Hjalmar Schacht.
On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read:
“On the basis of the facts previously stated, the defendants”—that is, all the defendants—“are guilty.”
That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four. It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment:
“All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945, War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories occupied by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas.”
On Page 46 it reads:
“During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany”
—and so forth.
Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht to Counts One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt that he is also accused of Crimes against Humanity.
I think it would be helpful—it need not be done immediately, but I wanted as a precaution to express it now—if at the proper time the Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply to Schacht.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one moment to answer that, and I think the cross-examination—the examination should not proceed under any misapprehension.
At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One.
Count One, as the statement of the offense, states:
“The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace in that the defendants planned, prepared, and initiated wars of aggression... In the development and course of the Common Plan it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon, and carried out ruthless war...”
And that included also Crimes against Humanity.
Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was not in the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is answerable for every offense committed by any of the defendants or their co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with this outfit with which he became associated.
That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination on the assumption that every charge is a charge against Schacht up to the time that he openly, and on record so that somebody knew it, became separated from the company with which he chose to travel.
DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. First, I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it admits that Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during my examination...
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind as to what time it was, the time at which he openly broke.
Are you not able to hear?
DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the evidence.
DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well then, please do not make any statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on the Jewish question.
SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, in 1933, a New York banker, the late James Meier, announced his intention to visit me. I went to Hitler at that time and told him, “Mr. James Meier, one of the most respected New York bankers and a great benefactor of his old home country, Germany, will come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner in his honor. I assume that you have no objection.” He immediately said, in a very definite and pronounced manner, “Herr Schacht, you can do everything.” I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep in contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually took place.
I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish question was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a definite position on the Jewish question—and wherever possible, publicly—I have always looked for that opportunity.