LXXXIII. REVENUE COLLECTION, OR FORCE BILL
The President in his message on the South Carolina proceedings had recommended to Congress the revival of some acts, heretofore in force, to enable him to execute the laws in that State; and the Senate's committee on the Judiciary had reported a bill accordingly early in the session. It was immediately assailed by several members as violent and unconstitutional, tending to civil war, and denounced as "the bloody bill"--"the force bill," &c. Mr. Wilkins of Pennsylvania, the reporter of the bill, vindicated it from this injurious character, showed that it was made out of previous laws, and contained nothing novel but the harmless contingent authority to remove the office of the customs from one building to another in the case of need. He said:
"The Judiciary Committee, in framing it, had been particularly anxious not to introduce any novel principle--any which could not be found on the statute book. The only novel one which the bill presented was one of a very simple nature. It was that which authorized the President, under the particular circumstances which were specified in the bill, to remove the custom-house. This was the only novel principle, and care was taken that in providing for such removal no authority was given to use force.
"The committee were apprehensive that some collision might take place after the 1st of February, either between the conflicting parties of the citizens of South Carolina, or between the officers of the federal government and the citizens. And to remove, as far as possible, all chance of such collision, provision was made that the collector might, at the moment of imminent danger, remove the custom-house to a place of security; or, to use a plain phrase, put it out of harm's way. He admitted the importance of this bill; but he viewed its importance as arising not out of the provisions of the bill itself, but out of the state of affairs in South Carolina, to which the bill had reference. In this view, it was of paramount importance.
"It had become necessary to legislate on this subject; whether it was necessary to pass the bill or not, he would not say; but legislation, in reference to South Carolina, previous to the 1st of February, had become necessary. Something must be done; and it behooves the government to adopt every measure of precaution, to prevent those awful consequences which all must foresee as necessarily resulting from the position which South Carolina has thought proper to assume.
"Here nullification is declaimed, on one hand, unless we abolish our revenue system. We consenting to do this, they remain quiet. But if we go a hair's breadth towards enforcing that system, they present secession. We have secession on one hand, and nullification on the other. The senator from South Carolina admitted the other day that no such thing as constitutional secession could exist. Then civil war, disunion, and anarchy must accompany secession. No one denies the right of revolution. That is a natural, indefeasible, inherent right--a right which we have exercised and held out, by our example, to the civilized world. Who denies it? Then we have revolution by force, not constitutional secession. That violence must come by secession is certain. Another law passed by the legislature of South Carolina, is entitled a bill to provide for the safety of the people of South Carolina. It advises them to put on their armor. It puts them in military array; and for what purpose but for the use of force? The provisions of these laws are infinitely worse than those of the feudal system, so far as they apply to the citizens of Carolina. But with its operations on their own citizens he had nothing to do. Resistance was just as inevitable as the arrival of the day on the calendar. In addition to these documents, what did rumor say--rumor, which often falsifies, but sometimes utters truth. If we judge by newspaper and other reports, more men were now ready to take up arms in Carolina, than there were during the revolutionary struggle. The whole State was at this moment in arms, and its citizens are ready to be embattled the moment any attempt was made to enforce the revenue laws. The city of Charleston wore the appearance of a military depot."
The Bill was opposed with a vehemence rarely witnessed, and every effort made to render it odious to the people, and even to extend the odium to the President, and to all persons instrumental in bringing it forward, or urging it through. Mr. Tyler of Virginia, was one of its warmest opposers, and in the course of an elaborate speech, said:
"In the course of the examination I have made into this subject, I have been led to analyze certain doctrines which have gone out to the world over the signature of the President. I know that my language may be seized on by those who are disposed to carp at my course and to misrepresent me. Since I have held a place on this floor, I have not courted the smiles of the Executive; but whenever he had done any act in violation of the constitutional rights of the citizen, or trenching on the rights of the Senate, I have been found in opposition to him. When he appointed corps of editors to office, I thought it was my duty to oppose his course. When he appointed a minister to a foreign court without the sanction of the law, I also went against him, because, on my conscience, I believed that the act was wrong. Such was my course, acting, as I did, under a sense of the duty I owed to my constituents; and I will now say, I care not how loudly the trumpet may be sounded, nor how low the priests may bend their knees before the object of their idolatry, I will be at the side of the President, crying in his ear, 'Remember, Philip, thou art mortal!'
"I object to the first section, because it confers on the President the power of closing old ports of entry and establishing new ones. It has been rightly said by the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Bibb] that this was a prominent cause which led to the Revolution. The Boston port bill, which removed the custom-house from Boston to Salem, first roused the people to resistance. To guard against this very abuse, the constitution had confided to Congress the power to regulate commerce; the establishment of ports of entry formed a material part of this power, and one which required legislative enactment. Now I deny that Congress can deputize its legislative powers. If it may one, it may all; and thus, a majority here can, at their pleasure, change the very character of the government. The President might come to be invested with authority to make all laws which his discretion might dictate. It is vain to tell me (said Mr. T.) that I imagine a case which will never exist. I tell you, sir, that power is cumulative, and that patronage begets power. The reasoning is unanswerable. If you can part with your power in one instance, you may in another and another. You may confer upon the President the right to declare war; and this very provision may fairly be considered as investing him with authority to make war at his mere will and pleasure on cities, towns, and villages. The prosperity of a city depends on the position of its custom-house and port of entry. Take the case of Norfolk, Richmond, and Fredericksburg, in my own State; who doubts but that to remove the custom-house from Norfolk to Old Point Comfort, of Richmond to the mouth of Chickahominy, or of Fredericksburg to Tappahannock or Urbanna, would utterly annihilate those towns? I have no tongue to express my sense of the probable injustice of the measure. Sir, it involves the innocent with the guilty. Take the case of Charleston; what if ninety-nine merchants were ready and willing to comply with your revenue laws, and that but one man could be found to resist them; would you run the hazard of destroying the ninety-nine in order to punish one? Trade is a delicate subject to touch; once divert it out of its regular channels, and nothing is more difficult than to restore it. This measure may involve the actual property of every man, woman, and child in that city; and this, too, when you have a redundancy of millions in your treasury, and when no interest can sustain injury by awaiting the actual occurrence of a case of resistance to your laws, before you would have an opportunity to legislate.
"He is further empowered to employ the land and naval forces, to put down all 'aiders and abettors.' How far will this authority extend? Suppose the legislature of South Carolina should happen to be in session: I will not blink the question, suppose the legislature to be in session at the time of any disturbance, passing laws in furtherance of the ordinance which has been adopted by the convention of that State; might they not be considered by the President as aiders and abettors? The President might not, perhaps, march at the head of his troops, with a flourish of drums and trumpets, and with bayonets fixed, into the state-house yard, at Columbia; but, if he did so, he would find a precedent for it in English history.
"There was no ambiguity about this measure. The prophecy had already gone forth; the President has said that the laws will be obstructed. The President had not only foretold the coming difficulties, but he has also assembled an army. The city of Charleston, if report spoke true, was now a beleagured city; the cannon of Fort Pinckney are pointing at it; and although they are now quietly sleeping, they are ready to open their thunders whenever the voice of authority shall give the command. And shall these terrors be let loose because some one man may refuse to pay some small modicum of revenue, which Congress, the day after it came into the treasury, might vote in satisfaction of some unfounded claim? Shall we set so small a value upon the lives of the people? Let us at least wait to see the course of measures. We can never be too tardy in commencing the work of blood.
"If the majority shall pass this bill, they must do it on their own responsibility; I will have no part in it. When gentlemen recount the blessings of union; when they dwell upon the past, and sketch out, in bright perspective, the future, they awaken in my breast all the pride of an American; my pulse beats responsive to theirs, and I regard union, next to freedom, as the greatest of blessings. Yes, sir, 'the federal Union must be preserved.' But how? Will you seek to preserve it by force? Will you appease the angry spirit of discord by an oblation of blood? Suppose that the proud and haughty spirit of South Carolina shall not bend to your high edicts in token of fealty; that you make war upon her, hang her Governor, her legislators, and judges, as traitors, and reduce her to the condition of a conquered province--have you preserved the Union? This Union consists of twenty-four States; would you have preserved the Union by striking out one of the States--one of the old thirteen? Gentlemen had boasted of the flag of our country, with its thirteen stars. When the light of one of these stars shall have been extinguished, will the flag wave over us, under which our fathers fought? If we are to go on striking out star after star, what will finally remain but a central and a burning sun, blighting and destroying every germ of liberty? The flag which I wish to wave over me, is that which floated in triumph at Saratoga and Yorktown. It bore upon it thirteen States, of which South Carolina was one. Sir, there is a great difference between preserving Union and preserving government; the Union may be annihilated, yet government preserved; but, under such a government, no man ought to desire to live."
Mr. Webster, one of the committee which reported the bill, justly rebuked all this vituperation, and justified the bill, both for the equity of its provisions, and the necessity for enacting them. He said:
"The President, charged by the constitution with the duty of executing the laws, has sent us a message, alleging that powerful combinations are forming to resist their execution; that the existing laws are not sufficient to meet the crisis; and recommending sundry enactments as necessary for the occasion. The message being referred to the Judiciary Committee, that committee has reported a bill in compliance with the President's recommendation. It has not gone beyond the message. Every thing in the bill, every single provision, which is now complained of, is in the message. Yet the whole war is raised against the bill, and against the committee, as if the committee had originated the whole matter. Gentlemen get up and address us, as if they were arguing against some measure of a factious opposition. They look the same way, sir, and speak with the same vehemence, as they used to do when they raised their patriotic voices against what they called a 'coalition.'
"Now, sir, let it be known, once for all, that this is an administration measure; that it is the President's own measure; and I pray gentlemen to have the goodness, if they call it hard names, and talk loudly against its friends, not to overlook its source. Let them attack it, if they choose to attack it, in its origin.
"Let it be known, also, that a majority of the committee reporting the bill are friends and supporters of the administration; and that it is maintained in this house by those who are among his steadfast friends, of long standing.
"It is, sir, as I have already said, the President's own measure. Let those who oppose it, oppose it as such. Let them fairly acknowledge its origin, and meet it accordingly.
"The honorable member from Kentucky, who spoke first against the bill, said he found in it another Jersey prison-ship; let him state, then, that the President has sent a message to Congress, recommending a renewal of the sufferings and horrors of the Jersey prison-ship. He says, too, that the bill snuffs of the alien and sedition law. But the bill is fragrant of no flower except the same which perfumes the message. Let him, then, say, if he thinks so, that General Jackson advises a revival of the principles of the alien and sedition laws.
"The honorable member from Virginia [Mr. Tyler], finds out a resemblance between this bill and the Boston port bill. Sir, if one of these be imitated from the other, the imitation is the President's. The bill makes the President, he says, sole judge of the constitution. Does he mean to say that the President has recommended a measure which is to make him sole judge of the constitution? The bill, he declares, sacrifices every thing to arbitrary power--he will lend no aid to its passage--he would rather 'be a dog, and bay the moon, than such a Roman.' He did not say 'the old Roman.' Yet the gentleman well knows, that if any thing is sacrificed to arbitrary power, the sacrifice has been demanded by the 'old Roman,' as he and others have called him; by the President whom he has supported, so often and so ably, for the chief magistracy of the country. He says, too, that one of the sections is an English Botany Bay law, except that it is much worse. This section, sir, whatever it may be, is just what the President's message recommended. Similar observations are applicable to the remarks of both the honorable gentlemen from North Carolina. It is not necessary to particularize those remarks. They were in the same strain.
"Therefore, sir, let it be understood, let it be known, that the war which these gentlemen choose to wage, is waged against the measures of the administration, against the President of their own choice. The controversy has arisen between him and them, and, in its progress, they will probably come to a distinct understanding.
"Mr. President, I am not to be understood as admitting that these charges against the bill are just, or that they would be just if made against the message. On the contrary, I think them wholly unjust. No one of them, in my opinion, can be made good. I think the bill, or some similar measure, had become indispensable, and that the President could not do otherwise than to recommend it to the consideration of Congress. He was not at liberty to look on and be silent, while dangers threatened the Union, which existing laws were not competent, in his judgment, to avert.
"Mr. President, I take this occasion to say, that I support this measure, as an independent member of the Senate, in the discharge of the dictates of my own conscience. I am no man's leader; and, on the other hand, I follow no lead, but that of public duty, and the star of the constitution. I believe the country is in considerable danger; I believe an unlawful combination threatens the integrity of the Union. I believe the crisis calls for a mild, temperate, forbearing, but inflexibly firm execution of the laws. And, under this conviction, I give a hearty support to the administration, in all measures which I deem to be fair, just, and necessary. And in supporting these measures, I mean to take my fair share of responsibility, to support them frankly and fairly, without reflections on the past, and without mixing other topics in their discussion.
"Mr. President, I think I understand the sentiment of the country on this subject. I think public opinion sets with an irresistible force in favor of the Union, in favor of the measures recommended by the President, and against the new doctrines which threaten the dissolution of the Union. I think the people of the United States demand of us, who are intrusted with the government, to maintain that government; to be just, and fear not; to make all and suitable provisions for the execution of the laws, and to sustain the Union and the constitution against whatsoever may endanger them. For one, I obey this public voice; I comply with this demand of the people. I support the administration in measures which I believe to be necessary; and, while pursuing this course, I look unhesitatingly, and with the utmost confidence, for the approbation of the country."
The support which Mr. Webster gave to all the President's measures in relation to South Carolina, and his exposure of the doctrine of nullification, being the first to detect and denounce that heresy, made him extremely obnoxious to Mr. Calhoun, and his friends; and must have been the main cause of his exclusion from the confidence of Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun in the concoction of their bill, called a compromise. His motives as well as his actions were attacked, and he was accused of subserviency to the President for the sake of future favor. At the same time all the support which he gave to these measures was the regular result of the principles which he laid down in his first speeches against nullification in the debate with Mr. Hayne, and he could not have done less without being derelict to his own principles then avowed. It was a proud era in his life, supporting with transcendent ability the cause of the constitution and of the country, in the person of a chief magistrate to whom he was politically opposed bursting the bonds of party at the call of duty, and displaying a patriotism worthy of admiration and imitation. General Jackson felt the debt of gratitude and admiration which he owed him; the country, without distinction of party, felt the same; and the universality of the feeling was one of the grateful instances of popular applause and justice when great talents are seen exerting themselves for the good of the country. He was the colossal figure on the political stage during that eventful time; and his labors, splendid in their day, survive for the benefit of distant posterity.
LXXXIV. MR. CALHOUN'S NULLIFICATION RESOLUTIONS
Simultaneously with the commencement of the discussions on the South Carolina proceedings, was the introduction in the Senate of a set of resolutions by Mr. Calhoun, entitled by him, "Resolutions on the powers of the government;" but all involving the doctrine of nullification; and the debate upon them deriving its point and character from the discussion of that doctrine. The following were the resolutions:
"Resolved, That the people of the several States composing these United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each State acceded as a separate sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification; and that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a union between the States ratifying the same.
"Resolved, That the people of the several States, thus united by the constitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating a general government to carry into effect the objects for which they were formed, delegated to that government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving at the same time, each State to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own separate government; and that whenever the general government assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized, and are of no effect; and that the same government is not made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well as of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.
"Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United States, taken collectively as individualss, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle of the social compact, and as such are now formed into one nation or people, or that they have ever been so united in any one stage of their political existence; that the people of the several States composing the Union have not, as members thereof, retained their sovereignty; that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred to the general government; that they have parted with the right of punishing treason through their respective State governments; and that they have not the right of judging in the last resort as to the extent of the powers reserved, and, of consequence, of those delegated; are not only without foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts, and the dearest deductions of reason; and that all exercise of power on the part of the general government, or any of its departments, claiming authority from so erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconstitutional, must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the States, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself."
To which Mr. Grundy offered a counter set, as follows:
"1. Resolved, That by the constitution of the United States, certain powers are delegated to the general government, and those not delegated, or prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
"2. Resolved, That one of the powers expressly granted by the constitution to the general government, and prohibited to the States, is that of laying duties on imports.
"3. Resolved, That the power to lay imposts is by the constitution wholly transferred from the State authorities to the general government, without any reservation of power or right on the part of the State.
"4. Resolved, That the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832 are exercises of the constitutional power possessed by the Congress of the United States, whatever various opinions may exist as to their policy and justice.
"5. Resolved, That an attempt on the part of a State to annul an act of Congress passed upon any subject exclusively confided by the constitution to Congress, is an encroachment on the rights of the general government.
"6. Resolved, That attempts to obstruct or prevent the execution of the several acts of Congress imposing duties on imports, whether by ordinances of conventions or legislative enactments, are not warranted by the constitution and are dangerous to the political institutions of the country."
It was in the discussion of these resolutions, and the kindred subjects of the "force bill" and the "revenue collection bill," that Mr. Calhoun first publicly revealed the source from which he obtained the seminal idea of nullification as a remedy in a government. The Virginia resolutions of '98-'99, were the assumed source of the power itself as applicable to our federal and State governments; but the essential idea of nullification as a peaceful and lawful mode of arresting a measure of the general government by the action of one of the States, was derived from the veto power of the tribunes of the people in the Roman government. I had often heard him talk of that tribunitian power, and celebrate it as the perfection of good government--as being for the benefit of the weaker part, and operating negatively to prevent oppression, and not positively to do injustice--but I never saw him carry that idea into a public speech but once, and that was on the discussion of his resolutions of this session; for though actually delivered while the "force bill" was before the Senate, yet all his doctrinal argument on that bill was the amplification of his nullification resolutions. On that occasion he traced the Roman tribunitian power, and considered it a cure for all the disorders to which the Roman state had been subject, and the cause to which all her subsequent greatness was to be attributed. This remarkable speech was delivered February 15th, 1833, and after depicting a government of the majority--a majority unchecked by a right in the minority of staying their measures--to be unmitigated despotism, he then proceeded to argue in favor of the excellence of the veto and the secession power; and thus delivered himself:
"He might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of which the Roman furnished the most familiar and striking. It was a well-known fact, that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins, to the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into a state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, he might add, corruption. How did this happen? The explanation will throw important light on the subject under consideration. The community was divided into two parts, the patricians and the plebeians, with the powers of the state principally in the hands of the former, without adequate check to protect the rights of the latter. The result was as might be expected. The patricians converted the powers of the government into the means of making money, to enrich themselves and their dependants. They, in a word, had their American system, growing out of the peculiar character of the government and condition of the country. This requires explanation. At that period, according to the laws of nations, when one nation conquered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors; and, according to the Roman law the lands thus acquired were divided into parts, one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the other assigned to the use of the treasury, of which the patricians had the distribution and administration. The patricians abused their power, by withholding from the people that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by converting to their own use that which ought to have gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the entire spoils of victory, and they had thus the most powerful motive to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverishment and oppression of the people. After resisting the abuse of power, by all peaceable means, and the oppression becoming intolerable, the people at last withdrew from the city; they, in a word, seceded; and, to induce them to reunite, the patricians conceded to the plebeians, as the means of protecting their separate interests, the very power which he contended is necessary to protect the rights of the States, but which is now represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted to the people the right of choosing three tribunes from among themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should have the right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even against their execution; a power which those who take a shallow insight into human nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the state, if not utterly impracticable. Yet, so far from that being the effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory followed her steps till she had established an almost universal dominion.
"How can a result so contrary to all anticipation be explained? The explanation appeared to him to be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring consent of both the patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependent on the other, and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, each was compelled to consult the good will of the other, and to elevate to office not simply those who might have the confidence of the order to which he belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that men possessing those qualities which would naturally command confidence, moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriotism, were elevated to office; and these, by the weight of their authority and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders, furnishes the real explanation of the power of the Roman state, and of that extraordinary wisdom, moderation, and firmness, which in so remarkable a degree characterized her public men. He might illustrate the truth of the position which he had laid down, by a reference to the history of all free states, ancient and modern, distinguished for their power and patriotism; and conclusively show not only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under some form, by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the community was made necessary in the action of government, but also that the virtue, patriotism, and strength of the state were in direct proportion to the strength of the means of securing such assent. In estimating the operation of this principle in our system, which depends, as he had stated, on the right of interposition on the part of the State, we must not omit to take into consideration the amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement of the system be corrected, by the concurring assent of three-fourths of the States; and thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any derangement occasioned by the executive action of a State. In fact, the power of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal against the usurpations of the general government, the joint agent of all the States, to the States themselves, to be decided, under the amending power, affirmatively, in favor of the government, by the voice of three-fourths of the States, as the highest power known under the system.
"Mr. C. said that he knew the difficulty, in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle for which he contended, though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience of free nations. He knew that the governments of the several States would be cited as an argument against the conclusion to which he had arrived, and which, for the most part, were constructed on the principle of the absolute majority; but, in his opinion, a satisfactory answer could be given; that the objects of expenditure which fell within the sphere of a State government were few and inconsiderable; so that, be their action ever so irregular, it could occasion but little derangement. If, instead of being members of this great confederacy, they formed distinct communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses necessary for their defence, the laws which he had laid down as necessarily controlling the action of a State, where the will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which he had referred were perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of the Union, whose governments had a powerful central action, and which already showed a strong tendency to that moneyed action which is the invariable forerunner of corruption and convulsions.
"But to return to the general government; we have now sufficient experience to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in this action is between Southern and other sections. The latter, having a decided majority, must habitually be possessed of the powers of the government, both in this and in the other House; and, being governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to the human breast, they must become the advocates of the power of government, and in the same degree opposed to the limitations; while the other and weaker section is as necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. In one word, the one section is the natural guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved; and the struggle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that on the opposite side will be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such he considered the present; a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor, productions, and situation, has at stake all that can be dear to freemen. Should they be able to maintain in their full vigor their reserved rights, liberty and prosperity will be their portion; but if they yield, and permit the stronger interest to consolidate within itself all the powers of the government, then will its fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom they have expelled, or of their slaves. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers, so far from repining that his lot and that of those whom he represented is cast on the side of the latter, he rejoiced that such is the fact; for though we participate in but few of the advantages of the government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor did he repine that the duty, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence of the reserved powers against, apparently, such fearful odds, had been assigned to them. To discharge successfully this high duty requires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual; and, should you perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny, if we yield to the steady encroachment of power, the severest and most debasing calamity and corruption will overspread the land. Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be for ever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this government, which will be reserved for those only who have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen Asylum."
In this extract from that remarkable speech, the first one in which Mr. Calhoun defended nullification and secession in the Senate, and in which every word bears the impress of intense thought, there is distinctly to be seen his opinion of the defects of our duplicate form of government (State and federal), and of the remedy for those defects. I say, in our form of government; for his speech had a practical application to ourselves, and was a defence, or justification of the actual measures of the State he represented. And this defect was, the unchecked authority of a majority; and the remedy was, an authority in the minority to check that majority, and to secede. This clearly was an absolute condemnation of the fundamental principle upon which the administration of the federal constitution, and of the State constitutions rested. But he did not limit himself to the benefits of the veto and of secession, as shown in Roman history; he had recourse to the Jewish for the same purpose--and found it--not in a veto in each of the twelve tribes, but in the right of secession; and found it, not in the minority, but the majority, in the reign of Jeroboam, when ten tribes seceded. That example is thus introduced:
"Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, was the most striking. Their government, at first, was a mere confederation, without any central power, till a military chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without, however, merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes. This was the commencement of that central action among that peculiar people, which, in three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is impossible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event without being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separation, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the establishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of taxation, which, under king Solomon, was greatly increased, to defray the expense of rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent reign. Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences--discontent and complaint, which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succession of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a reduction of the taxes; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties--a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under consideration, and, after consulting the old men (the counsellors of '98), who advised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers. He hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make the reduction; and the secession of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house of David."
This example also had a practical application, and a squint at the Virginia resolutions of '98-'99, and at the military chieftain then at the head of our government, with a broad intimation of what was to happen if the taxes were not reduced; and that happened to be secession. And all this, and the elaborate speech from which it is taken, and many others of the same character at the same time, was delivered at a time when the elections had decided for a reduction of the taxes--when a bill in the House was under consideration for that purpose--and when his own "compromise" bill was in a state of concoction, and advanced to a stage to assure its final passing. Strong must have been Mr. Calhoun's desire for his favorite remedy, when he could contend for it under such circumstances--under circumstances which showed that it could not be wanted for the purpose which he then avowed. Satisfied of the excellence, and even necessity in our system, of this remedy, the next question was to create it, or to find it; create it, by an amendment to the constitution; or find it already existing there; and this latter was done by a new reading of the famous Virginia resolutions of '98-'99. The right in any State to arrest an act of Congress, and to stay it until three fourths of the States ordered it to proceed, and with a right forcibly to resist if any attempt was made in the mean time to enforce it, with the correlative right of secession and permanent separation, were all found by him in these resolutions--the third especially, which was read, and commented upon for the purpose. Mr. Rives, of Virginia, repulsed that interpretation of the act of his State, and showed that an appeal to public opinion was all that was intended; and quoted the message of Governor Monroe to show that the judgment of the federal court, under one of the acts declared to be unconstitutional, was carried into effect in the capital of Virginia with the order and tranquillity of any other judgment. He said:
"But, sir, the proceedings of my State, on another occasion of far higher importance, have been so frequently referred to, in the course of this debate, as an example to justify the present proceedings of South Carolina, that I may be excused for saying something of them. What, then, was the conduct of Virginia, in the memorable era of '98 and '99? She solemnly protested against the alien and sedition acts, as 'palpable and alarming infractions of the constitution;' she communicated that protest to the other States of the Union, and earnestly appealed to them to unite with her in a like declaration, that this deliberate and solemn expression of the opinion of the States, as parties to the constitutional compact, should have its proper effect on the councils of the nation, in procuring a revision and repeal of the obnoxious acts. This was 'the head and front of her offending'--no more. The whole object of the proceedings was, by the peaceful force of public opinion, embodied through the organ of the State legislatures, to obtain a repeal of the laws in question, not to oppose or arrest their execution, while they remained unrepealed. That this was the true spirit and real purpose of the proceeding, is abundantly manifested by the whole of the able debate which took place in the legislature of the State, on the occasion. All the speakers, who advocated the resolutions which were finally adopted, distinctly placed them on that legitimate, constitutional ground. I need only refer to the emphatic declaration of John Taylor, of Caroline, the distinguished mover and able champion of the resolutions. He said 'the appeal was to public opinion; if that is against us, we must yield.' The same sentiment was avowed and maintained by every friend of the resolutions, throughout the debate.
"But, sir, the real intentions and policy of Virginia were proved, not by declarations and speeches merely, but by facts. If there ever was a law odious to a whole people, by its daring violation of the fundamental guaranties of public liberty, the freedom of speech and freedom of the press, it was the sedition law to the people of Virginia. Yet, amid all this indignant dissatisfaction, after the solemn protest of the legislature, in '98, and the renewal of that protest, in '99, this most odious and arbitrary law was peaceably carried into execution, in the capital of the State, by the prosecution and punishment of Callender, who was fined and imprisoned for daring to canvass the conduct of our public men (as Lyon and Cooper had been elsewhere), and was still actually imprisoned, when the legislature assembled, in December, 1800. Notwithstanding the excited sensibility of the public mind, no popular tumult, no legislative interference, disturbed, in any manner, the full and peaceable execution of the law. The Senate will excuse me, I trust, for calling their attention to a most forcible commentary on the true character of the Virginia proceedings of '98 and '99 (as illustrated in this transaction), which was contained in the official communication of Mr. Monroe, then Governor of the State, to the legislature, at its assembling, in December, 1800. After referring to the distribution which had been ordered to be made among the people, of Mr. Madison's celebrated report, of '99, he says 'In connection with this subject, it is proper to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law, one of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect, in this commonwealth, by the decision of a federal court. I notice this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil submission, on the part of the people, as could have been shown by them, on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary, constitutional and popular acts of the government.'"
Mr. Webster, in denying the derivation of nullification and secession from the constitution, said:
"The constitution does not provide for events which must be preceded by its own destruction. Secession, therefore, since it must bring these consequences with it, is revolutionary. And nullification is equally revolutionary. What is revolution? Why, sir, that is revolution which overturns, or controls, or successfully resists the existing public authority; that which arrests the exercise of the supreme power; that which introduces a new paramount authority into the rule of the state. Now, sir, this is the precise object of nullification. It attempts to supersede the supreme legislative authority. It arrests the arm of the Executive Magistrate. It interrupts the exercise of the accustomed judicial power. Under the name of an ordinance, it declares null and void, within the State, all the revenue laws of the United States. Is not this revolutionary? Sir, so soon as this ordinance shall be carried into effect, a revolution will have commenced in South Carolina. She will have thrown off the authority to which her citizens have, heretofore, been subject. She will have declared her own opinions and her own will to be above the laws, and above the power of those who are intrusted with their administration. If she makes good these declarations, she is revolutionized. As to her, it is as distinctly a change of the supreme power as the American Revolution, of 1776. That revolution did not subvert government, in all its forms. It did not subvert local laws and municipal administrations. It only threw off the dominion of a power claiming to be superior, and to have a right, in many important respects, to exercise legislative authority. Thinking this authority to have been usurped or abused, the American colonies, now the United States, bade it defiance, and freed themselves from it, by means of a revolution. But that revolution left them with their own municipal laws still, and the forms of local government. If Carolina now shall effectually resist the laws of Congress--if she shall be her own judge, take her remedy into her own hands, obey the laws of the Union when she pleases, and disobey them when she pleases--she will relieve herself from a paramount power, as distinctly as did the American colonies, in 1776. In other words, she will achieve, as to herself, a revolution."
The speaker then proceeded to show what nullification was, as reduced to practice in the ordinance, and other proceedings of South Carolina; and said:
"But, sir, while practical nullification in South Carolina would be, as to herself, actual and distinct revolution, its necessary tendency must also be to spread revolution, and to break up the constitution, as to all the other States. It strikes a deadly blow at the vital principle of the whole Union. To allow State resistance to the laws of Congress to be rightful and proper, to admit nullification in some States, and yet not expect to see a dismemberment of the entire government, appears to me the wildest illusion and the most extravagant folly. The gentleman seems not conscious of the direction or the rapidity of his own course. The current of his opinions sweeps him along, he knows not whither. To begin with nullification, with the avowed intent, nevertheless, not to proceed to secession, dismemberment, and general revolution, is as if one were to take the plunge of Niagara, and cry out that he would stop half-way down. In the one case, as in the other, the rash adventurer must go to the bottom of the dark abyss below, were it not that that abyss has no discovered bottom.
"Nullification, if successful, arrests the power of the law, absolves citizens from their duty, subverts the foundation both of protection and obedience, dispenses with oaths and obligations of allegiance, and elevates another authority to supreme command. Is not this revolution? And it raises to supreme command four-and-twenty distinct powers, each professing to be under a general government, and yet each setting its laws at defiance at pleasure. Is not this anarchy, as well as revolution? Sir, the constitution of the United States was received as a whole, and for the whole country. If it cannot stand altogether, it cannot stand in parts; and, if the laws cannot be executed every where, they cannot long be executed any where. The gentleman very well knows that all duties and imposts must be uniform throughout the country. He knows that we cannot have one rule or one law for South Carolina, and another for other States. He must see, therefore, and does see--every man sees--that the only alternative is a repeal of the laws throughout the whole Union, or their execution in Carolina as well as elsewhere. And this repeal is demanded, because a single State interposes her veto, and threatens resistance! The result of the gentleman's opinions, or rather the very text of his doctrine, is, that no act of Congress can bind all the States, the constitutionality of which is not admitted by all; or, in other words, that no single State is bound, against its own dissent, by a law of imposts. This was precisely the evil experienced under the old confederation, and for remedy of which this constitution was adopted. The leading object in establishing this government, an object forced on the country by the condition of the times, and the absolute necessity of the law, was to give to Congress power to lay and collect imposts without the consent of particular States. The revolutionary debt remained unpaid; the national treasury was bankrupt; the country was destitute of credit; Congress issued its requisitions on the States, and the States neglected them; there was no power of coercion but war; Congress could not lay imposts, or other taxes, by its own authority; the whole general government, therefore, was little more than a name. The articles of confederation, as to purposes of revenue and finance, were nearly a dead letter. The country sought to escape from this condition, at once feeble and disgraceful, by constituting a government which should have power of itself to lay duties and taxes, and to pay the public debt, and provide for the general welfare; and to lay these duties and taxes in all the States, without asking the consent of the State governments. This was the very power on which the new constitution was to depend for all its ability to do good; and, without it, it can be no government, now or at any time. Yet, sir, it is precisely against this power, so absolutely indispensable to the very being of the government, that South Carolina directs her ordinance. She attacks the government in its authority to raise revenue, the very mainspring of the whole system; and, if she succeed, every movement of that system must inevitably cease. It is of no avail that she declares that she does not resist the law as a revenue law, but as a law for protecting manufactures. It is a revenue law; it is the very law by force of which the revenue is collected; if it be arrested in any State, the revenue ceases in that State; it is, in a word, the sole reliance of the government for the means of maintaining itself and performing its duties."
Mr. Webster condensed into four brief and pointed propositions his opinion of the nature of our federal government, as being a UNION in contradistinction to a LEAGUE, and as acting upon INDIVIDUALS in contradistinction to STATES, and as being, in these features discriminated from the old confederation.
"1. That the constitution of the United States is not a league, confederacy, or compact, between the people of the several States in their sovereign capacities; but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating direct relations between itself and individuals.
"2. That no State authority has power to dissolve these relations; that nothing can dissolve them but revolution; and that, consequently, there can be no such thing as secession without revolution.
"3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of the constitution of the United States, acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it, and treaties; and that, in cases not capable of assuming the character of a suit in law or equity, Congress must judge of, and finally interpret, this supreme law, so often as it has occasion to pass acts of legislation; and, in cases capable of assuming, and actually assuming, the character of a suit, the Supreme Court of the United States is the final interpreter.
"4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify an act of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her limits, on the ground that, in her opinion, such law is unconstitutional, is a direct usurpation on the just powers of the general government, and on the equal rights of other States; a plain violation of the constitution, and a proceeding essentially revolutionary in its character and tendency."
Mr. Webster concluded his speech, an elaborate and able one, in which he appeared in the high character of patriot still more than that of orator, in which he intimated that some other cause, besides the alleged one, must be at the bottom of this desire for secession. He was explicit that the world could hardly believe in such a reason, and that we ourselves who hear and see all that is said and done, could not believe it. He concluded thus:
"Sir, the world will scarcely believe that this whole controversy, and all the desperate measures which its support requires, have no other foundation than a difference of opinion, upon a provision of the constitution, between a majority of the people of South Carolina, on one side, and a vast majority of the whole people of the United States on the other. It will not credit the fact, it will not admit the possibility, that, in an enlightened age, in a free, popular republic, under a government where the people govern, as they must always govern, under such systems, by majorities, at a time of unprecedented happiness, without practical oppression, without evils, such as may not only be pretended, but felt and experienced; evils not slight or temporary, but deep, permanent, and intolerable; a single State should rush into conflict with all the rest, attempt to put down the power of the Union by her own laws, and to support those laws by her military power, and thus break up and destroy the world's last hope. And well the world may be incredulous. We, who hear and see it, can ourselves hardly yet believe it. Even after all that had preceded it, this ordinance struck the country with amazement. It was incredible and inconceivable, that South Carolina should thus plunge headlong into resistance to the laws, on a matter of opinion, and on a question in which the preponderance of opinion, both of the present day and of all past time, was so overwhelmingly against her. The ordinance declares that Congress has exceeded its just power, by laying duties on imports, intended for the protection of manufactures. This is the opinion of South Carolina; and on the strength of that opinion she nullifies the laws. Yet has the rest of the country no right to its opinions also? Is one State to sit sole arbitress? She maintains that those laws are plain, deliberate, and palpable violations of the constitution; that she has a sovereign right to decide this matter; and, that, having so decided, she is authorized to resist their execution, by her own sovereign power; and she declares that she will resist it, though such resistance should shatter the Union into atoms."
Mr. Davis, of Massachusetts, had been still more explicit, in the expression of the belief already given (in the extract from his speech contained in this work), that the discontent in South Carolina had a root deeper than that of the tariff; and General Jackson intimated the same thing in his message to the two Houses on the South Carolina proceedings, and in which he alluded to the ambitious and personal feelings which might be involved in them. Certainly it was absolutely incomprehensible that this doctrine of nullification and secession, prefigured in the Roman secession to the sacred mount, and the Jewish disruption of the twelve tribes, should be thus enforced, and impressed, for that cause of the tariff alone; when, to say nothing of the intention of the President, the Congress and the country to reduce it, Mr. Calhoun himself had provided for its reduction, satisfactorily to himself, in the act called a "compromise;" to which he was a full contracting party. It was impossible to believe in the soleness of that reason, in the presence of circumstances which annulled it; and Mr. Calhoun himself, in a part of his speech which had been quoted, seemed to reveal a glimpse of two others--slavery, about which there was at that time no agitation--and the presidency, to which patriotic Southern men could not be elected. The glimpse exhibited of the first of these causes, was in this sentence: "The contest (between the North and the South) will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such he considered the present; a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor, productions and situation, has at stake all that is dear to freemen." Here is a distinct declaration that there was then a contest between the two sections of the Union, and that that contest was between power and liberty, in which the freedom and the slave property of the South were at stake. This declaration at the time attracted but little attention, there being then no sign of a slavery agitation; but to close observers it was an ominous revelation of something to come, and an apparent laying an anchor to windward for a new agitation on a new subject, after the tariff was done with. The second intimation which he gave out, and which referred to the exclusion of the patriotic men of the South from the presidency was in this sentence: "Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be forever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this government, which will be reserved for those only who have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen asylum." This was bitter; and while revealing his own feelings at the prospect of his own failure for the presidency (which from the brightness of the noon-day sun was dimming down to the obscurity of dark night), was, at the same time, unjust, and contradicted by all history, previous and subsequent, of our national elections; and by his own history in connection with them. The North had supported Southern men for President--a long succession of them--and even twice concurred in dropping a Northern President at the end of a single term, and taking a Southern in his place. He himself had had signal proofs of good will from the North in his two elections to the vice-presidency; in which he had been better supported in the North than in the South, getting the whole party vote in the former while losing part of it in the latter. It was evident then, that the protective tariff was not the sole, or the main cause of the South Carolina discontent; that nullification and secession were to continue, though their ostensible cause ceased; that resistance was to continue on a new ground, upon the same principle, until a new and impossible point was attained. This was declared by Mr. Calhoun in his place, on the day of the passage of the "compromise" bill, and on hearing that the "force bill" had finally passed the House of Representatives. He then stood up, and spoke thus:
"He had said, that as far as this subject was concerned, he believed that peace and harmony would follow. But there is another connected with it, which had passed this House, and which had just been reported as having passed the other, which would prevent the return of quiet. He considered the measure to which he referred as a virtual repeal of the constitution; and, in fact, worse than a positive and direct repeal; as it would leave the majority without any shackles on its power, while the minority, hoping to shelter itself under its protection, and having still some respect left for the instrument, would be trammelled without being protected by its provisions. It would be idle to attempt to disguise that the bill will be a practical assertion of one theory of the constitution against another--the theory advocated by the supporters of the bill, that ours is a consolidated government, in which the States have no rights, and in which, in fact, they bear the same relation to the whole community as the counties do to the States; and against that view of the constitution which considers it as a compact formed by the States as separate communities, and binding between the States, and not between the individual citizens. No man of candor, who admitted that our constitution is a compact, and was formed and is binding in the manner he had just stated, but must acknowledge that this bill utterly overthrows and prostrates the constitution; and that it leaves the government under the control of the will of an absolute majority.
"If the measure be acquiesced in, it will be the termination of that long controversy which began in the convention, and which has been continued under various fortunes until the present day. But it ought not--it will not--it cannot be acquiesced in--unless the South is dead to the sense of her liberty, and blind to those dangers which surround and menace them; she never will cease resistance until the act is erased from the statute book. To suppose that the entire power of the Union may be placed in the hands of this government, and that all the various interests in this widely extended country may be safely placed under the will of an unchecked majority, is the extreme of folly and madness. The result would be inevitable, that power would be exclusively centered in the dominant interest north of this river, and that all the south of it would be held as subjected provinces, to be controlled for the exclusive benefit of the stronger section. Such a state of things could not endure; and the constitution and liberty of the country would fall in the contest, if permitted to continue.
"He trusted that that would not be the case, but that the advocates of liberty every where, as well in the North as in the South; that those who maintained the doctrines of '98, and the sovereignties of the States; that the republican party throughout the country would rally against this attempt to establish, by law, doctrines which must subvert the principles on which free institutions could be maintained."
Here was a new departure, upon a new point, as violent as the former complaint, looking to the same remedy, and unfounded and impossible. This force bill, which was a repeal of the constitution, in the eyes of Mr. Calhoun, was a mere revival of formerly existing statutes, and could have no operation, if resistance to the tariff laws ceased. Yet, nullification and secession were to proceed until it was erased from the statute book; and all the morbid views of the constitution, and of the Virginia resolutions of '98 and '99, were to hold their places in Mr. Calhoun's imagination, and dominate his conduct in all his political action, until this statute was erased. But it is due to many of his friends and followers, to say that, while concurring in his complaints against the federal government, and in his remedies, they dissented from his source of derivation of these remedies. He found them in the constitution, shown to be there by the '98-'99 Virginia resolutions; the manly sense of McDuffie, and some others, rejected that sophistry, and found their justification wholly in the revolutionary right of self-defence from intolerable oppression.
LXXXV. SECRET HISTORY OF THE "COMPROMISE" OF 1833
Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Clay were early, and long, rival aspirants for the Presidency, and antagonistic leaders in opposite political systems; and the coalition between them in 1833 was only a hollow truce (embittered by the humiliations to which Mr. Calhoun was subjected in the protective features of the "compromise") and only kept alive for a few years by their mutual interest with respect to General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren. A rupture was foreseen by every observer; and in a few years it took place, and in open Senate, and in a way to give the key to the secret motives which led to that compromise. It became a question between them which had the upper hand of the other--in their own language--which was master of the other--on that occasion. Mr. Calhoun declared that he had Mr. Clay down--had him on his back--was his master. Mr. Clay retorted: He my master! I would not own him for the meanest of my slaves. Of course, there were calls to order about that time; but the question of mastery, and the causes which produced the passage of the act, were still points of contestation between them, and came up for altercation in other forms. Mr. Calhoun claimed a controling influence for the military attitude of South Carolina, and its intimidating effect upon the federal government. Mr. Clay ridiculed this idea of intimidation, and said the little boys that muster in the streets with their tiny wooden swords, had as well pretend to terrify the grand army of Bonaparte: and afterwards said he would tell how it happened, which was thus: His friend from Delaware (Mr. John M. Clayton), said to him one day--these South Carolinians act very badly, but they are good fellows, and it is a pity to let Jackson hang them. This was after Mr. Clay had brought in his bill, and while it lingered without the least apparent chance of passing--paralyzed by the vehement opposition of the manufacturers: and he urged Mr. Clay to take a new move with his bill--to get it referred to a committee--and by them got into a shape in which it could pass. Mr. Clay did so--had the reference made--and a committee appointed suitable for the measure--some of strong will, and earnest for the bill, and some of gentle temperament, inclined to easy measures on hard occasions. They were: Messrs. Clay, Calhoun, Clayton, Dallas, Grundy, Rives.
This was the movement, and the inducing cause on one side: now for the cause on the other. Mr. Letcher, a representative from Kentucky, was the first to conceive an idea of some compromise to release South Carolina from her position; and communicated it to Mr. Clay; who received it at first coolly and doubtfully. Afterwards, beginning to entertain the idea, he mentioned it to Mr. Webster, who repulsed it entirely, saying--"It would be yielding great principles to faction; and that the time had come to test the strength of the constitution and the government." After that he was no more consulted. Mr. Clay drew up his bill, and sent it to Mr. Calhoun through Mr. Letcher--he and Mr. Calhoun not being on speaking terms. He objected decidedly to parts of the bill; and said, if Mr. Clay knew his reasons, he certainly would yield the objectionable parts. Mr. Letcher undertook to arrange an interview;--which was effected--to take place in Mr. Clay's room. The meeting was cold, distant and civil. Mr. Clay rose, bowed to his visitor, and asked him to take a seat. Mr. Letcher, to relieve the embarrassment, immediately opened the business of the interview: which ended without results. Mr. Clay remained inflexible, saying that if he gave up the parts of the bill objected to, it could not be passed; and that it would be better to give it up at once. In the mean time Mr. Letcher had seen the President, and sounded him on the subject of a compromise: the President answered, he would have no negotiation, and would execute the laws. This was told by Mr. Letcher to Mr. McDuffie, to go to Mr. Calhoun. Soon after, Mr. Letcher found himself required to make a direct communication to Mr. Calhoun. Mr. Josiah S. Johnson, senator from Louisiana, came to his room in the night, after he had gone to bed--and informed him of what he had just learnt:--which was, that General Jackson would admit of no further delay, and was determined to take at once a decided course with Mr. Calhoun (an arrest and trial for high treason being understood). Mr. Johnson deemed it of the utmost moment that Mr. Calhoun should be instantly warned of his danger; and urged Mr. Letcher to go and apprise him. He went--found Mr. Calhoun in bed--was admitted to him--informed him. "He was evidently disturbed." Mr. Letcher and Mr. Clay were in constant communication with Mr. Clayton.
After the committee had been appointed, Mr. Clayton assembled the manufacturers, for without their consent nothing could be done; and in the meeting with them it was resolved to pass the bill, provided the Southern senators, including the nullifiers, should vote both for the amendments which should be proposed, and for the passage of the bill itself--the amendments being the same afterwards offered in the Senate by Mr. Clay, and especially the home valuation feature. When these amendments, thus agreed upon by the friends of the tariff, were proposed in the committee, they were voted down; and not being able to agree upon any thing, the bill was carried back to the senate without alteration. But Mr. Clayton did not give up. Moved by a feeling of concern for those who were in peril, and for the state of the country, and for the safety of the protective system of which he was the decided advocate, he determined to have the same amendments, so agreed upon by the friends of the tariff and rejected by the committee, offered in the Senate; and, to help Mr. Clay with the manufacturers, he put them into his hands to be so offered--notifying Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Clay that unless the amendments were adopted, and that by the Southern vote, every nullifier inclusively, that the bill should not pass--that he himself would move to lay it on the table. His reasons for making the nullification vote a sine qua non both on the amendments and on the bill, and for them all, separately and collectively, was to cut them off from pleading their unconstitutionality after they were passed; and to make the authors of disturbance and armed resistance, after resistance, parties upon the record to the measures, and every part of the measures, which were to pacify them. Unless these leaders were thus bound, he looked upon any pacification as a hollow truce, to be succeeded by some new disturbance in a short time; and therefore he was peremptory with both Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun, denouncing the sacrifice of the bill if his terms were not complied with; and letting them know that he had friends enough bound to his support. They wished to know the names of the senators who were to stand by him in this extreme course--which he refused to give; no doubt restrained by an injunction of secrecy, there being many men of gentle temperaments who are unwilling to commit themselves to a measure until they see its issue, that the eclat of success may consecrate what the gloom of defeat would damn. Being inexorable in his claims, Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun agreed to the amendments, and all voted for them, one by one, as Mr. Clay offered them, until it came to the last--that revolting measure of the home valuation. As soon as it was proposed, Mr. Calhoun and his friends met it with violent opposition, declaring it to be unconstitutional, and an insurmountable obstacle to their votes for the bill if put into it. It was then late in the day, and the last day but one of the session, and Mr. Clayton found himself in the predicament which required the execution of his threat. He executed it, and moved to lay it on the table, with the declaration that it was to lie there. Mr. Clay went to him and besought him to withdraw the motion; but in vain. He remained inflexible; and the bill then appeared to be dead. In this extremity, the Calhoun wing retired to the colonnade behind the Vice-President's chair, and held a brief consultation among themselves: and presently Mr. Bibb, of Kentucky, came out, and went to Mr. Clayton and asked him to withdraw his motion to give him time to consider the amendment. Seeing this sign of yielding, Mr. Clayton withdrew his motion--to be renewed if the amendment was not voted for. A friend of the parties immediately moved an adjournment, which was carried; and that night's reflections brought them to the conclusion that the amendment must be passed; but still with the belief, that, there being enough to pass it without him, Mr. Calhoun should be spared the humiliation of appearing on the record in its favor. This was told to Mr. Clayton, who declared it to be impossible--that Mr. Calhoun's vote was indispensable, as nothing would be considered secured by the passage of the bill unless his vote appeared for every amendment separately, and for the whole bill collectively. When the Senate met, and the bill was taken up, it was still unknown what he would do; but his friends fell in, one after the other, yielding their objections upon different grounds, and giving their assent to this most flagrant instance (and that a new one), of that protective legislation, against which they were then raising troops in South Carolina! and limiting a day, and that a short one, on which she was to be, ipso facto, a seceder from the Union. Mr. Calhoun remained to the last, and only rose when the vote was ready to be taken, and prefaced a few remarks with the very notable declaration that he had then to "determine" which way he would vote. He then declared in favor of the amendment, but upon conditions which he desired the reporters to note; and which being futile in themselves, only showed the desperation of his condition, and the state of impossibility to which he was reduced. Several senators let him know immediately the futility of his conditions; and without saying more, he voted on ayes and noes for the amendment; and afterwards for the whole bill. And this concluding scene appears quite correctly reported in the authentic debates. And thus the question of mastery in this famous "compromise," mooted in the Senate by Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun as a problem between themselves, is shown by the inside view of this bit of history, to belong to neither of them, but to Mr. John M. Clayton, under the instrumentality of Gen. Jackson, who, in the presidential election, had unhorsed Mr. Clay and all his systems; and, in his determination to execute the laws upon Mr. Calhoun, had left him without remedy, except in the resource of this "compromise." Upon the outside history of this measure which I have compiled, like a chronicler, from the documentary materials, Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Clay appear as master spirits, appeasing the storm which they had raised; on the inside view they appear as subaltern agents dominated by the necessities of their condition, and providing for themselves instead of their country--Mr. Clay, in saving the protective policy, and preserving the support of the manufacturers; and Mr. Calhoun, in saving himself from the perils of his condition: and both, in leaving themselves at liberty to act together in future against General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren.
LXXXVI. COMPROMISE LEGISLATION; AND THE ACT, SO CALLED, OF 1833
This is a species of legislation which wears a misnomer--which has no foundation in the constitution--and which generally begets more mischief than it assumes to prevent; and which, nevertheless, is very popular--the name, though fictitious, being generally accepted for the reality. There are compromises in the constitution, founded upon what gives them validity, namely, mutual consent; and they are sacred. All compromises are agreements, made voluntarily by independent parties--not imposed by one upon another. They may be made by compact--not by votes. The majority cannot subject the minority to its will, except in the present decision--cannot bind future Congresses--cannot claim any sanctity for their acts beyond that which grows out of the circumstances in which they originate, and which address themselves to the moral sense of their successors, and to reasons of justice or policy which should exempt an act from the inherent fate of all legislation. The act of 1820, called the Missouri Compromise, is one of the most respectable and intelligible of this species of legislation. It composed a national controversy, and upon a consideration. It divided a great province, and about equally, between slaveholding and non-slaveholding States. It admitted a State into the Union; and that State accepted that admission upon the condition of fidelity to that compromise. And being founded in the material operation of a line drawn upon the earth under an astronomical law, subject to no change and open to all observation, visible and tangible, it became an object susceptible of certainty, both in its breach and in its observance. That act is entitled to respect, especially from the party which imposed it upon the other; and has been respected; for it has remained inviolate for thirty years--neither side attempting to break or abolish it--each having the advantage of it--and receiving all the while, like the first magna charta, many confirmations from successive Congresses, and from State legislatures.
The act of 1833, called a "compromise," was a breach of all the rules, and all the principles of legislation--concocted out of doors, managed by politicians dominated by an outside interest--kept a secret--passed by a majority pledged to its support, and pledged against any amendment except from its managers;--and issuing from the conjunction of rival politicians who had lately, and long, been in the most violent state of legislative as well as political antagonism. It comprised every title necessary to stamp a vicious and reprehensible act--bad in the matter--foul in the manner--full of abuse--and carried through upon the terrors of some, the interests of others, the political calculations of many, and the dupery of more; and all upon a plea which was an outrage upon representative government--upon the actual government--and upon the people of the States. That plea was, that the elections (presidential and congressional), had decided the fate of the protective system--had condemned it--had sentenced it to death--and charged a new Congress with the execution of the sentence; and, therefore, that it should be taken out of the hands of that new Congress, withdrawn from it before it met--and laid away for nine years and a half under the sanction of a, so called, compromise--intangible to the people--safe in its existence during all that time; and trusting to the chapter of accidents, and the skill of management, for its complete restoration at the end of the term. This was an outrage upon popular representation--an estoppel upon the popular will--the arrest of a judgment which the people had given--the usurpation of the rights of ensuing Congresses. It was the conception of some rival politicians who had lately distracted the country by their contention, and now undertook to compose it by their conjunction; and having failed in the game of agitation, threw it up for the game of pacification; and, in this new character, undertook to settle and regulate the affairs of their country for a term only half a year less than the duration of the siege of Troy; and long enough to cover two presidential elections. This was a bold pretension. Rome had existed above five hundred years, and citizens had become masters of armies, and the people humbled to the cry of panem et circenses--bread and the circus--before two or three rivals could go together in a corner, and arrange the affairs of the republic for five years: now this was done among us for double that time, and in the forty-fourth year of our age, and by citizens neither of whom had headed, though one had raised, an army. And now how could this be effected, and in a country so vast and intelligent? I answer: The inside view which I have given of the transaction explains it. It was an operation upon the best, as well as upon the worst feelings of our nature--upon the patriotic alarms of many, the political calculations of others, the interested schemes of more, and the proclivity of multitudes to be deceived. Some political rivals finding tariff no longer available for political elevation, either in its attack or defence; and, from a ladder to climb on, become a stumbling-block to fall over, and a pit to fall into, agree to lay it aside for the term of two presidential elections; upon the pretext of quieting the country which they had been disturbing; but in reality to get the crippled hobby out of the way, and act in concert against an old foe in power, and a new adversary, lately supposed to have been killed off, but now appearing high in the political firmament, and verging to its zenith. That new adversary was Mr. Van Buren, just elected Vice-President, and in the line of old precedents for the presidency; and the main object to be able to work against him, and for themselves, with preservation to the tariff, and extrication of Mr. Calhoun. The masses were alarmed at the cry of civil war, concerted and spread for the purpose of alarm; and therefore ready to hail any scheme of deliverance from that calamity. The manufacturers saw their advantage in saving their high protecting duties from immediate reduction. The friends of Mr. Clay believed that the title of pacificator, which he was to earn, would win for him a return of the glory of the Missouri compromise. Mr. Calhoun's friends saw, for him, in any arrangement, a release from his untenable and perilous position. Members of gentle temperaments in both Houses, saw relief in middle courses, and felt safety in the very word "compromise," no matter how fictitious and fallacious. The friends of Mr. Van Buren saw his advantage at getting the tariff out of his way also; and General Jackson felt a positive relief in being spared the dire necessity of enforcing the laws by the sword and by criminal prosecutions. All these parties united to pass the act; and after it was passed, to praise it; and so it passed easily, and was ushered into life in the midst of thundering applause. Only a few of the well-known senators voted against it--Mr. Webster, Mr. Dickerson, General Samuel Smith, Mr. Benton.
My objections to this bill, and its mode of being passed, were deep and abiding, and went far beyond its own obnoxious provisions, and all the transient and temporary considerations connected with it. As a friend to popular representative government, I could not see, without insurmountable repugnance, two citizens set themselves up for a power in the State, and undertake to regulate, by their private agreement (to be invested with the forms of law), the public affairs for years to come. I admit no man to stand for a power in our country, and to assume to be able to save the Union. Its safety does not depend upon the bargains of any two men. Its safety is in its own constitution--in its laws--and in the affections of the people; and all that is wanted in public men is to administer the constitution in its integrity, and to enforce the laws without fear or affection. A compromise made with a State in arms, is a capitulation to that State; and in this light, Mr. Calhoun constantly presented the act of 1833 and if it had emanated from the government, he would have been right in his fact, and in his inductions; and all discontented States would have been justified, so far as successful precedent was concerned, in all future interpositions of its fiat to arrest the action of the federal government. But it did not emanate from the government. It (the government) was proceeding wisely, justly, constitutionally in settling with South Carolina, by removing the cause of her real grievance, and by enforcing the laws against their violators. It (the constituted government) was proceeding regularly in this way, with a prospect of a successful issue at the actual session, and a certainty of it at the next one, when the whole subject was taken out of its hands by an arrangement between a few members. The injury was great then, and of permanent evil example. It remitted the government to the condition of the old confederation, acting upon sovereignties instead of individuals. It violated the feature of our Union which discriminated it from all confederacies which ever existed, and which was wisely and patriotically put into the constitution to save it from the fate which had attended all confederacies, ancient and modern. All these previous confederacies in their general, or collective capacity, acted upon communities, and met organized resistance as often as they decreed any thing disagreeable to one of its strong members. This opposition could only be subdued by force; and the application of force has always brought on civil war; which has ended in the destruction of the confederacy. The framers of our constitutional Union knew all this, and had seen the danger of it in history, and felt the danger of it in our confederation; and therefore established a UNION instead of a LEAGUE--to be sovereign and independent within its sphere, acting upon persons through its own laws and courts, instead of acting on communities through persuasion or force. It was the crowning wisdom of the new constitution; and the effect of this compromise legislation, was to destroy that great feature of our Union--to bring the general and State governments into conflict--and to substitute a sovereign State for an offending individual as often as a State chose to make the cause of that individual her own. A State cannot commit treason, but a citizen can, and that against the laws of the United States; and so, if a citizen commits treason against the United States he may (if this interposition be admitted), be shielded by a State. Our whole frame of government is unhinged when the federal government shifts from its foundation, and goes to acting upon States instead of individuals and, therefore, the "compromise," as it was called, with South Carolina in 1833 was in violation of the great Union principle of our government--remitting it to the imbecility of the old confederation, giving inducement of the Nashville convention of the present year (1850); and which has only to be followed up to see the States of this Union, like those of the Mexican republic, issuing their pronunciamientos at every discontent; and bringing the general government to a fight, or a capitulation, as often as they please.
I omit all consideration of the minor vices of the act--great and flagrant in themselves, but subordinate in comparison to the mischiefs done to the frame of our government. At any other time these vices of matter, and manner, would have been crushing to a bill. No bill containing a tithe of the vices, crowded into this one, could ever have got through Congress before. The overthrow of the old revenue principle, that duties were to be levied on luxuries, and not on necessaries--substitution of universal ad valorems to the exclusion of all specific duties--the substitution of the home for the foreign valuation--the abolition of all discrimination upon articles in the imposition of duties--the preposterous stipulation against protection, while giving protection, and even in new and unheard of forms; all these were flagrant vices of the bill, no one of which could ever have been carried through in a bill before; and which perished in this one before they arrived at their period of operation. The year 1842 was to have been the jubilee of all these inventions, and set them all off in their career of usefulness; but that year saw all these fine anticipations fail! saw the high protective policy re-established, more burthensome than ever: but of this hereafter. Then the vices in the passage of the bill, being a political, not a legislative action--dominated by an outside interest of manufacturers--and openly carried in the Senate by a douceur to some men, not in "Kendal Green," but Kendal cotton. Yet it was received by the country as a deliverance, and the ostensible authors of it greeted as public benefactors; and their work declared by legislatures to be sacred and inviolable, and every citizen doomed to political outlawry that did not give in his adhesion, and bind himself to the perpetuity of the act. I was one of those who refused this adhesion--who continued to speak of the act as I thought--and who, in a few years, saw it sink into neglect and oblivion--die without the solace of pity or sorrow--and go into the grave without mourners or witnesses, or a stone to mark the place of its interment.
Chapter LXXXVII
VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF '98-'99--DISABUSED OF THEIR SOUTH CAROLINA INTERPRETATION--1. UPON THEIR OWN WORDS--2. UPON CONTEMPORANEOUS INTERPRETATION.
The debate in the Senate, in 1830, on Mr. Foot's resolutions, has been regarded as the dawn of those ideas which, three years later, under the name of "nullification," but with the character and bearing the seeds of disorganization and civil war, agitated and endangered the Union. In that debate, Mr. Hayne, as heretofore stated, quoted the third clause of the Virginia resolutions of 1798, as the extent of the doctrines he intended to avow. Though Mr. Webster, at the time, gave a different and more portentous interpretation to Mr. Hayne's course of argument, I did not believe that Mr. Hayne purposed to use those resolutions to any other effect than that intended by their authors and adopters; and they, I well knew, never supposed any right in a State of the Union, of its own motion, to annul an act of Congress, or resist its operation. Soon after the discussion of 1830, however, nullification assumed its name, with a clear annunciation of its purpose, namely, to maintain an inherent right in a State to annul the acts of the federal government, and resist their operation, in any case in which the State might judge an act of Congress to exceed the limits of the constitution. And to support this disorganizing doctrine, the resolutions of 1798, were boldly and perseveringly appealed to, and attempted to be wrested from their real intent. Nor is this effort yet abandoned; nor can we expect it to be whilst nullification still exists, either avowed or covert. The illustrious authorship of the Resolutions of 1798; the character and reputation of the legislators who adopted them; their general acceptance by the republican party, the influence they exercised, not only on questions of the day, but on the fate of parties, and in shaping the government itself, all combine to give them importance, and a high place in public esteem; and would go far to persuade the country that nullification was right, if they were nullification. In connection, therefore, with the period and events in which nullification had its rise, the necessity is imposed of an examination into the scope and objects of those resolutions; and the same reasons that have made, and make, the partisans of nullification so urgent to identify their fallacies with the resolutions, must make every patriot solicitous for the vindication of them and their author and adopters from any such affinity.
Fortunately, the material is at hand, and abundant. The resolutions are vindicated on their text alone; and contemporaneous authentic interpretation, and the reiterated, earnest--even indignant--disclaimers of the illustrious author himself, utterly repudiate the intent that nullification attempts to impute to them. I propose, therefore, to treat them in these three aspects:
I. Vindicated on their text.
The clause of the resolutions, chiefly relied on as countenancing nullification, is the third resolution of the series, and is as follows:
"That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the States, who are the parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them."
The right and duty of interposition is certainly here claimed for the States, in case of a "deliberate, palpable, and dangerous assumption of powers, by the federal government;" but, looking alone to the words of the text, it is an unreasonable inference, that forcible or nullifying interposition is meant. The word does not import resistance, but rather the contrary; and can only be understood in a hostile sense, when the connection in which it is used necessarily implies force. Such is not the case in this resolution; and no one has a right to suppose that, if its authors had intended to assert a principle of such transcendent importance, as that the States were severally possessed of the right to annul an act of Congress, and resist its execution, they would not have used words to declare that meaning explicitly, or, that they would intimate covertly a doctrine they dared not avow.
The constitution itself suggests several modes of interposition, competent for either the States or the people. It provides for the election (by a mixed system, popular and State), at brief intervals, of all the functionaries of the federal government; and hence, the interposition of the will of the States and people to effect a change of rulers; hence, of policy. It provides that freedom of speech and the press, shall not be abridged, which is equivalent to a provision that those powerful means be perpetually interposed to affect the public conscience and sentiment--to counsel and alarm the public servants; to influence public policy--to restrain and remedy government abuses. It recognizes the right, and provides that it shall not be abridged, of the people "to assemble and petition the government for the redress of grievances;" hence, contemplating that there may be grievances on the part of the government, and suggesting a means of meeting and overcoming them. Finally, it provides that, on the application of a designated proportion of the States, Congress shall cause a convention to be called, to provide, in the constitution itself, should it be judged necessary, additional securities to the States and the people, and additional restraints on the government.
To act on the sentiments of the country then; to bring to their aid the potent engines of the press and public harangues; to move the people to petition and remonstrance against the obnoxious measures; to draw the attention of other States to the abuses complained of, and to the latitudinous construction the federal authorities were giving to their powers; and thus bring those States, in like manner, to act on their senators and representatives, and on the public voice, so as to produce an immediate remedy, or to co-operate in calling a convention to provide further securities--one or both; these alone are the modes of "interposition" the Virginia resolutions of 1798 contemplated; all they professed; all they attempted; all that the resolutions, or their history, warrant to be imputed to them. These modes of interposition are all consistent with peace and order; with obedience to the laws, and respect to the lawful authorities; the very means, as was well argued by the supporters of the resolutions, to prevent civil strife, insubordination, or revolution; in all respects, the antipodes of nullification.
To enlarge somewhat on the force of the words of the resolutions: The right and duty of "the States" to interpose, certainly does not mean the right of "a State" to nullify and set at nought. The States--less than the whole number--have a right to interpose, secured, as already shown, in the constitution; and this, not only persuasively, but peremptorily; to compel the action they may desire; and it is demonstrable, that it was this constitutional provision that the Virginia legislature had in mind, as a last resort. The resolutions do not speak any where of the right of a State; but use the plural number, States. Virginia exercises the right that pertains to a State--all the right that, in the premises, she pretends to--in passing the resolutions, declaring her views, and inviting the like action of her co-States. Instead, therefore, of the resolutions being identical with nullification, the two doctrines are not merely hostile, but exactly opposites; the sum of the Virginia doctrine being, that it belongs to a State to take, as Virginia does in this instance, the initiative in impeaching any objectionable action of the federal government, and to ask her co-States to co-operate in procuring the repeal of a law, a change of policy, or an amendment of the constitution--according as one or the other, or all, may be required to remedy the evil complained of; whereas, nullification claims, that a single State may, of its own motion, nullify any act of the federal government it objects to, and stay its operation, until three fourths of all the States come to the aid of the national authority, and re-enact the nullified measure. One submits to the law, till a majority repeal it, or a convention provides a constitutional remedy for it; the other undertakes to annul the law, and suspend its operation, so long as three fourths of the States are not brought into active co-operation to declare it valid. The resolutions maintain the government in all its functions, only seeking to call into use the particular function of repeal or amendment: nullification would stop the functions of government, and arrest laws indefinitely; and is incapable of being brought to actual experiment, in a single instance, without a subversion of authority, or civil war. To this essential, radical, antagonistic degree do the Virginia resolutions and the doctrine of nullification differ, one from the other; and thus unjustly are the Virginia republicans, of 1798, accused of planting the seeds of dissolution--a "deadly poison," as Mr. Madison, himself, emphatically calls the doctrine of nullification--in the institutions they had so labored to construct.
II. Upon their contemporaneous interpretation.
The contemporaneous construction of the resolutions is found in the debates on their adoption; in the responses to them of other State legislatures; and in the confirmatory report prepared by the same author, and adopted by the Virginia general assembly, in January, 1800; and by the conduct of the State, in the case of Callender. And it is remarkable (when we consider the uses to which the resolutions have subsequently been turned), that, while the friends of the resolutions nowhere claim more than a declaratory right for the legislature, and deny all idea of force or resistance, their adversaries, in the heat of debate, nor the States which manifested the utmost bitterness in their responses, have not attributed to the resolutions any doctrine like that of nullification. Both in the debates and in the State responses, the opponents of the resolutions denounce them as inflamatory, and "tending" to produce insubordination, and whatever other evil could then be thought of, concerning them; but no one attributes to them the absurdity of claiming for the State a right to arrest, of its own motion, the operation of the acts of Congress.
The principal speakers, in the Virginia legislature, in opposition to the resolutions, were: Mr. George Keith Taylor, Mr. Magill, Mr. Brooke, Mr. Cowan, Gen. Henry Lee, and Mr. Cureton. Nearly the whole debate turned, not on the abstract propriety or expediency of such resolutions, on the question whether the acts of Congress, which were specially complained of, were, in fact, unconstitutional. It was admitted, indeed, by Gen. Lee, who spoke elaborately and argumentatively against the resolutions, that, if the acts were unconstitutional, it was "proper to interfere;" but the extreme notions of the powers of the federal government that then prevailed in the federal party, led them to contend that those powers extended to the acts in question, though, at this day, they are universally acknowledged to be out of the pale of federal legislation. Beyond the discussion of this point, and one or two others not pertinent to the present matter, the speakers dwelt only on the supposed "tendency" of such declarations to excite the people to insubordination and non-submission to the law.
Mr. George K. Taylor complained at the commencement of his speech, that the resolutions "contained a declaration, not of opinion, but of fact;" and he apprehended that "the consequences of pursuing the advice of the resolutions would be insurrection, confusion, and anarchy;" but the legal effect and character that he attributed to the resolutions, is shown in his concluding sentence, as follows:
"The members of that Congress which had passed those laws, had been, so far as he could understand, since generally re-elected; therefore he thought the people of the United States had decided in favor of their constitutionality, and that such an attempt as they were then making to induce Congress to repeal the laws would be nugatory."
Mr. Brooke thought resolutions "declaring laws which had been made by the government of the United States to be unconstitutional, null and void," were "dangerous and improper;" that they had a "tendency to inflame the public mind;" to lessen the confidence that ought to subsist between the representatives of the people in the general government and their constituents; and to "sap the very foundations of the government, by producing resistance to its laws." But that he did not apprehend the resolutions to be, or to intend, any thing beyond an expression of sentiment, is evident from his further declaration, that he was opposed to the resolutions, and equally opposed to any modification of them, that should be "intended as an expression of the general sentiment on the subject, because he conceived it to be an improper mode by which to express the wishes of the people of the State on the subject."
General Lee thought the alien and sedition laws "not unconstitutional;" but if they were unconstitutional he "admitted the right of interposition on the part of the general assembly." But he thought these resolutions showed "indecorum and hostility," and were "not the likeliest way to obtain a repeal of the laws." He "suspected," in fact, that "the repeal of the laws was not the leading point in view," but that they "covered" the objects of "promotion of disunion and separation of the States." The resolutions "struck him as recommending resistance. They declared the laws null and void. Our citizens thus thinking would disobey the laws." His plan would be, if he thought the laws unconstitutional, to let the people petition, or that the legislature come forward at once, "with a proposition for amending the doubtful parts of the constitution;" or with a "respectful or friendly memorial, urging Congress to repeal the laws." But he "admitted" the only right which the resolutions assert for the State, namely, the right "to interpose." The remarks of the other opponents to the resolutions were to the same effect.
On behalf of the resolutions, the principal speakers were, Mr. John Taylor, of Caroline, who had introduced them, Mr. Ruffin, Mr. Mercer, Mr. Pope, Mr. Foushee, Mr. Daniel, Mr. Peter Johnston, Mr. Giles, Mr. James Barbour.
They obviated the objection of the speakers on the other side, that the resolutions "contained a declaration, not of opinion, but of fact," by striking out the words which, in the original draft, declared the acts in question to be "null, void, and of no force or effect;" so as to make it manifest, as the advocates of the resolutions maintained, that they intended nothing beyond an expression of sentiment. They obviated another objection which appeared in the original draft, which asserted the States alone to be the parties to the constitution, by striking out the word "alone." They thoroughly and successfully combated both the "suspicion" that they hid any ulterior object of dissension or disunion, and the "apprehension" that the resolutions would encourage insubordination among the people. They acceded to and affirmed, that their object was to obtain a repeal of the offensive measures, that the resolutions might ultimately lead to a convention for amending the constitution, and that they were intended both to express and to affect public opinion; but nothing more.
Says Mr. Taylor, of Caroline:
"If Congress should, as was certainly possible, legislate unconstitutionally, it was evident that in theory they have done wrong, and it only remained to consider whether the constitution is so defective as to have established limitations and reservations, without the means of enforcing them, in a mode by which they could be made practically useful. Suppose a clashing of opinion should exist between Congress and the States, respecting the true limits of their constitutional territories, it was easy to see, that if the right of decision had been vested in either party, that party, deciding in the spirit of party, would inevitably have swallowed up the other. The constitution must not only have foreseen the possibility of such a clashing, but also the consequence of a preference on either side as to its construction. And out of this foresight most have arisen the fifth article, by which two thirds of Congress may call upon the States for an explanation of any such controversy as the present; and thus correct an erroneous construction of its own acts by a minority of the States, whilst two thirds of the States are also allowed to compel Congress to call a convention, in case so many should think an amendment necessary for the purpose of checking the unconstitutional acts of that body.... Congress is the creature of the States and the people; but neither the States nor the people are the creatures of Congress. It would be eminently absurd, that the creature should exclusively construe the instrument of its own existence; and therefore this construction was reserved indiscriminately to one or the other of those powers, of which Congress was the joint work; namely, to the people whenever a convention was resorted to, or to the States whenever the operation should be carried on by three fourths."
"Mr. Taylor then proceeded to apply these observations to the threats of war, and the apprehension of civil commotion, 'towards which the resolutions were said to have a tendency.' Are the republicans, said he, possessed of fleets and armies? If not, to what could they appeal for defence and support? To nothing, except public opinion. If that should be against them, they must yield; if for them, did gentlemen mean to say, that public will should be assailed by force?... And against a State which was pursuing the only possible and ordinary mode of ascertaining the opinion of two thirds of the States, by declaring its own and asking theirs?"
"He observed that the resolutions had been objected to, as couched in language too strong and offensive; whilst it had also been said on the same side, that if the laws were unconstitutional, the people ought to fly to arms and resist them. To this he replied that he was not surprised to hear the enemies of the resolutions recommending measures which were either feeble or rash. Timidity only served to invite a repetition of injury, whilst an unconstitutional resort to arms would not only justly exasperate all good men, but invite those who differed from the friends of the resolutions to the same appeal, and produce a civil war. Hence, those who wished to preserve the peace, as well as the constitution, had rejected both alternatives, and chosen the middle way. They had uttered what they conceived to be truth, and they had pursued a system which was only an appeal to public opinion; because that appeal was warranted by the constitution and by principle."
Mr. Mercer, in reply to Mr. G. K. Taylor, said:
"The gentleman from Prince George had told the committee that the resolutions were calculated to rouse the people to resistance, to excite the people of Virginia against the federal government. Mr. Mercer did not see how such consequences could result from their adoption. They contained nothing more than the sentiment which the people in many parts of the State had expressed, and which had been conveyed to the legislature in their memorials and resolutions then lying on the table. He would venture to say that an attention to the resolutions from the committee would prove that the qualities attempted to be attached to them by the gentleman could not be found."
"The right of the State government to interfere in the manner proposed by the resolutions, Mr. Mercer contended was clear to his mind.... The State believed some of its rights had been invaded by the late acts of the general government, and proposed a remedy whereby to obtain a repeal of them. The plan contained in the resolutions appeared to Mr. Mercer the most advisable. Force was not thought of by any one.... The States were equally concerned, as their rights had been equally invaded; and nothing seemed more likely to produce a temper in Congress for a repeal."
"The object (of the friends of the resolutions), in addressing the States, is to obtain a similar declaration of opinion, with respect to several late acts of the general government, ... and thereby to obtain a repeal."
Mr. Barbour, likewise, in reply to Mr. G. K. Taylor, said:
"The gentleman from Prince George had remarked that those resolutions invited the people to insurrection and to arms; but, if he could conceive that the consequences foretold would grow out of the measure, he would become its bitterest enemy."... The resolutions were "addressed, not to the people but to the sister States; praying, in a pacific way, their co-operation, in arresting the tendency and effect of unconstitutional laws.
"For his part, he was for using no violence. It was the peculiar blessing of the American people to have redress within their reach, by constitutional and peaceful means."
On the same point, Mr. Daniel spoke as follows:
"If the other States think, with this, that the laws are unconstitutional, the laws will be repealed, and the constitutional question will be settled by this declaration of a majority of the States."... "If, on the contrary, a sufficient majority of the States should declare their opinion, that the constitution gave Congress authority to pass these laws, the constitutional question would still be settled; but an attempt might be made so to amend the constitution as to take from Congress this authority."
And, finally, Mr. Taylor of Caroline, in closing the debate, and in explanation of his former remarks in respect to calling a convention, said:
"He would explain, in a few words, what he had before said. That the plan proposed by the resolutions would not eventuate in war, but might in a convention. He did not admit, or contemplate, that a convention would be called. He only said, that if Congress, upon being addressed to have these laws repealed, should persist, they might, by a concurrence of three fourths of the States, be compelled to call a convention."
It is seen, then, by these extracts, that the opposers of the resolutions did not charge upon them, nor their supporters in any manner contend for, any principle like that of nullification; that, on the contrary, the supporters of the resolutions, so far from the absurd proposition that each State could, for itself, annul the acts of Congress, and to that extent stop the operation of the federal government, they did not recognize that power in a majority of the States, nor even in all the States together, by any extra-constitutional combination or process, or to annul a law otherwise than through the prescribed forms of legislative repeal, or constitutional amendment.
The resolutions were, however, vigorously assailed by the federal party throughout the Union, especially in the responses of several of the States; and at the ensuing session of the Virginia legislature, those State responses were sent to a committee, who made an elaborate examination of the resolutions, and of the objections that had been made to them, concluding by a justification of them in all particulars, and reiterating their declarations. This report was adopted by the general assembly and is a part of the contemporaneous and authentic interpretation of the resolutions. The report says:
"A declaration that proceedings of the federal government are not warranted by the constitution, is a novelty neither among the citizens, nor among the legislatures of the States.
"Nor can the declarations of either, whether affirming or denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions thereon, be deemed, in any point of view, an assumption of the office of judge. The declarations, in such cases, are expressions of opinion, unaccompanied by any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection. The expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into immediate effect by force."
Again: "In the example given by the State, of declaring the alien and sedition acts to be unconstitutional, and of communicating the declaration to other States, no trace of improper means has appeared. And if the other States had concurred in making a like declaration, supported too, by the numerous applications flowing immediately from the people, it can scarcely be doubted, that these simple means would have been as sufficient, as they are unexceptionable.
"It is no less certain that other means might have been employed, which are strictly within the limits of the constitution. The legislatures of the States might have made a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain a rescinding of the two offensive acts; or they might have represented to their respective senators in Congress their wish, that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a convention for the same object.
"These several means, though not equally eligible in themselves, nor probably to the States, were all constitutionally open for consideration. And if the general assembly, after declaring the two acts to be unconstitutional, the first and most obvious proceeding on the subject, did not undertake to point out to the other States a choice among the farther measures that might become necessary and proper, the resource will not be misconstrued by liberal minds into any culpable imputation."
These extracts are valuable, not only for their positive testimony that the Resolution of 1798, nor their authors, had ever contemplated such a doctrine as Nullification; but also for their precise definition and enumeration of the powers which, in the premises, were really claimed for the States, by the State-Rights Republicans of that day. They are all distinctly laid down:
1. By a solemn declaration of opinion, calculated to operate on the public sentiment, and to induce the co-operation of other States in like declarations.
2. To make a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain a repeal of the acts complained of.
3. To represent to their respective senators their wish that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the constitution.
4. By the concurrence of two-thirds of the States to cause Congress to call a convention for the same object.
These are the entire list of the remedial powers suspected, by the Resolutions of 1798, and their author and adopters, to exist in the States with reference to federal enactments. Their variant character from the peremptory arrest of acts of Congress proposed by nullification, is well illustrated in the comparison made in the report between expressions of opinion like those of the resolutions, and the compulsory operation of a judicial process. Supposing, says the report, "that it belongs to the judiciary of the United States, and not the State legislatures, to declare the meaning of the federal constitution," yet the declarations either of a State, or the people, "whether affirming or denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions thereon," cannot "be deemed in any point of view an assumption of the office of the judge;" because, "the declarations in such cases are expressions of opinions unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection;"--whereas, "the expositions of the judiciary are carried into immediate effect by force."
The Republicans who adopted the Resolutions of 1798, never contemplated carrying their expositions into effect by force; never contemplated imparting to them the character of decisions, or decrees, or the legal determination of a question; or of arresting by means of them the operation of the acts they condemned. The worst the enemies of the resolutions undertook to say of them, was that they were intemperate, and might mislead the people into disobedience of the laws. This was successfully combated; but had it been true--had the authors of the resolutions even intended any thing so base, it would still have been nothing comparable to the crime of State nullification; of placing the State itself in hostile array to the federal government. Insubordination of individuals may usually be overcome by ordinary judicial process, or by the posse of the county where it occurs; or even if so extensive as to require the peace-officers to be aided by the military, it is still but a matter of police, and in our country cannot endanger the existence of the government. But the array of a State of the Union against the federal authority, is war--a war between powers--both sovereign in their respective spheres--and that could only terminate in the destruction of the one, or the subjugation and abasement of the other.
But neither the one or the other of these crimes was contemplated by the authors of the Resolutions of 1798. The remedies they claimed a right to exercise are all pointed out in the constitution itself; capable of application without disturbing the processes of the law, or suggesting an idea of insubordination; remedies capable of saving the liberties of the people and the rights of the States, and bringing back the federal government to its constitutional track, without a jar or a check to its machinery; remedies felt to be sufficient, and by crowning experience soon proven to be so. It is due to the memory of those men and those times that their acts should no longer be misconstrued to cover a doctrine synonymous with disorganization and civil war. The conduct both of the government, and the people, on the occasion of these resolutions, show how far they were from any nullifying or insubordinate intention; and this furnishes us with another convincing proof of the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions. So far (as Mr. Madison justly says,)[6] was the State of Virginia from countenancing the nullifying doctrine, that the occasion was viewed as a proper one for exemplifying its devotion to public order, and acquiescence in laws which it deemed unconstitutional, while those laws were not repealed. The language of the Governor of the State (Mr. James Monroe), in a letter to Mr. Madison, in May and June of 1800, will attest the principles and feelings which dictated the course pursued on the occasion, and whether the people understood the resolutions in any inflammatory or vicious sense.
[6] Selections from the correspondence of Madison, p. 399.
On the 15th May, 1800, Governor Monroe writes to Mr. Madison as follows:
"Besides, I think there is cause to suspect the sedition law will be carried into effect in this State at the approaching federal court, and I ought to be there (Richmond) to aid in preventing trouble.... I think it possible an idea may be entertained of opposition, and by means whereof the fair prospect of the republican party may be overcast. But in this they are deceived, as certain characters in Richmond and some neighboring counties are already warned of their danger, so that an attempt to excite a hot-water insurrection will fail."
And on the 4th of June, 1800, he wrote again, as follows:
"The conduct of the people on this occasion was exemplary, and does them the highest honor. They seemed aware that the crisis demanded of them a proof of their respect for law and order, and resolved to show they were equal to it. I am satisfied a different conduct was expected from them, for every thing that could was done to provoke it. It only remains that this business be closed on the part of the people, as it has been so far acted; that the judge, after finishing his career, go off in peace, without experiencing the slightest insult from any one; and that this will be the case I have no doubt."
Governor Monroe was correct in the supposition that the sedition law would be carried into effect, at the approaching session of the federal court, and he was also right in the anticipation that the people would know how to distinguish between the exercise of means to procure the repeal of an act, and the exercise of violence to stop its operation. The act was enforced; was "carried into effect" in their midst, and a fellow-citizen incarcerated under its odious provisions, without a suggestion of official or other interference. Thus we have the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions exemplified and set at rest, by the most powerful of arguments: by the impressive fact, that when the public indignation was at its height, subsequent to the resolutions of 1798, and subsequent to the report of '99, and when both had been universally disseminated and read, and they had had, with the debates upon them, their entire influence on the public mind; that at that moment, the act of Congress against which the resolutions were chiefly aimed, and the indignation of the community chiefly kindled, was then and there carried into execution, and that in a form--the unjust deprivation of a citizen of his liberty--the most obnoxious to a free people, and the most likely to rouse their opposition; yet quietly and peaceably done, by the simple, ordinary process of the federal court. This fact, so creditable to the people of Virginia, is thus noted in the annual message of Governor Monroe, to the general assembly, at their next meeting, December, 1800:
"In connection with this subject [of the resolutions] it is proper to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law, one of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect in this commonwealth by the decision of a federal court. I notice this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil submission on the part of the people, as could have been shown by them on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary, constitutional and popular acts of the government."
Governor Monroe then adds his official and personal testimony to the proper intent and character of the proceedings of '98, '9, as follows:
"The general assembly and the good people of this commonwealth have acquitted themselves to their own consciences, and to their brethren in America, in support of a cause which they deem a national one, by the stand which they made, and the sentiments they expressed of these acts of the general government; but they have looked for a change in that respect, to a change in the public opinion, which ought to be free; not to measures of violence, discord and disunion, which they abhor."
Chapter LXXXVIII
VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798:--DISABUSED OF NULLIFICATION, BY THEIR AUTHOR.
Vindicated upon their words, and upon contemporaneous interpretation, another vindication, superfluous in point of proof, but due to those whose work has been perverted, awaits these resolutions, derived from the words of their author (after seeing their perversion); and to absolve himself and his associates from the criminal absurdity attributed to them.
The contemporary opponents of the Resolutions of 1798 said all the evil of them, and represented them in every odious light, that persevering, keen and enlightened opposition could discover or imagine. Their defenders successfully repelled the charges then made against them; but could not vindicate them from intending the modern doctrine of Nullification, because that doctrine had not then been invented, and the ingenuity of their adversaries did not conceive of that ground of attack. Their venerable author, however--the illustrious MADISON[7]--was still alive, when this new perversion of his resolutions had been invented, and when they were quoted to sustain doctrines synonymous with disorganization and disunion. He was still alive, in retirement on his farm. His modesty and sense of propriety hindered him from carrying the prestige and influence of his name into the politics of the day; but his vigorous mind still watched with anxious and patriotic interest the current of public affairs, and recoiled with instinctive horror both from the doctrine and attempted practice of Nullification, and the attempted connection of his name and acts with the origination of it. He held aloof from the public contest; but his sentiments were no secret. His private correspondence, embracing in its range distinguished men of all sections of the Union and of all parties, was full of the subject, from the commencement of the Nullification excitement down to the time of his death: sometimes at length, and argumentatively; sometimes with a brief indignant disclaimer; always earnestly and unequivocally. Some of these letters, although private, were published during Mr. Madison's lifetime, especially an elaborate one to Mr. Edward Everett; and many of the remainder have recently been put into print, through the liberality of a patriotic citizen of Washington (Mr. J. Maguire), but only for private distribution, and hence not accessible to the public. They are a complete storehouse of material, not only for the vindication of Madison and his compeers, from the doctrine of Nullification, but of argument and reasons against Nullification and every kindred suggestion.
[7] Mr. Madison did not introduce the Resolutions into the Virginia legislature. He was not a member of that body in 1798. The resolutions were reported by John Taylor, of Caroline. Mr. Madison, however, was always reputed to be their author, and in a letter to Mr. James Robertson, written in March, 1831, he distinctly avows it. He was both the author and reporter of the Report and Resolution of 1799-1800.
From the letter to Mr. Everett, published in the North American Review, shortly after it was written (August, 1830), the following extracts are taken:
"It (the constitution of the United States) was formed by the States, that is, by the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed consequently by the same authority which formed the State constitutions.
"Being thus derived from the same source as the constitutions of the States, it has, within each State, the same authority as the constitution of the State, and is as much a constitution in the strict sense of the term within its prescribed sphere, as the constitutions of the States are within their respective spheres; but with this obvious and essential difference, that being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the constitution of a State may be at its individual will."
"Nor is the government of the United States, created by the constitution, less a government in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the governments created by the constitutions of the States are, within their several spheres. It is like them organized into legislative, executive and judiciary departments. It operates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them, it has at command a physical force for executing the powers committed to it.
"Between these different constitutional governments, the one operating in all the States, the others operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction."
"That to have left a final decision, in such cases, to each of the States, could not fail to make the constitution and laws of the United States different in different States, was obvious, and not less obvious that this diversity of independent decisions, must altogether distract the government of the Union, and speedily put an end to the Union itself."
"To have made the decision under the authority of the individual States, co-ordinate in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would unavoidably produce collisions incompatible with the peace of society."
"To have referred every clashing decision, under the two authorities, for a final decision, to the States as parties to the constitution, would be attended with delays, with inconveniences and expenses, amounting to a prohibition of the expedient."
"To have trusted to 'negotiation' for adjusting disputes between the government of the United States and the State governments, as between independent and separate sovereignties, would have lost sight altogether of a constitution and government of the Union, and opened a direct road, from a failure of that resort, to the ultima ratio, between nations wholly independent of, and alien to each other.... Although the issue of negotiation might sometimes avoid this extremity, how often would it happen among so many States, that an unaccommodating spirit in some would render that resource unavailing?"
After thus stating, with other powerful reasons, why all those fanciful and impracticable theories were rejected in the constitution, the letter proceeds to show what the constitution does adopt and rely on, "as a security of the rights and powers of the States," namely:
"1. The responsibility of the senators and representatives in the legislature of the United States to the legislatures and people of the States; 2. The responsibility of the President to the people of the United States; and, 3. The liability of the executive and judicial functionaries of the United States to impeachment by the representatives of the people of the States in one branch of the legislature of the United States, and trial by the representatives of the States, in the other branch."
And then, in order to mark how complete these provisions are for the security of the States, shows that while the States thus hold the functionaries of the United States to these several responsibilities, the State functionaries, on the other hand, in their appointment and responsibility, are "altogether independent of the agency or authority of the United States."
Of the doctrine of nullification, "the expedient lately advanced," the letter says:
"The distinguished names and high authorities which appear to have asserted and given a practical scope to this doctrine, entitle it to a respect which it might be difficult otherwise to feel for it."
"The resolutions of Virginia, as vindicated in the report on them, will be found entitled to an exposition, showing a consistency in their parts, and an inconsistency of the whole with the doctrine under consideration."
"That the legislature could not have intended to sanction any such doctrine is to be inferred from the debates in the House of Delegates. The tenor of the debates, which were ably conducted, discloses no reference whatever to a constitutional right in an individual State to arrest by force a law of the United States."
"If any further light on the subject could be needed, a very strong one is reflected in the answers to the resolutions, by the States which protested against them.... Had the resolutions been regarded as avowing and maintaining a right, in an individual State, to arrest by force the execution of a law of the United States, it must be presumed that it would have been a conspicuous object of their denunciation."
In a letter to Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, May 31, 1830, Mr. Madison says:
"I received yesterday yours of the 26th. Having never concealed my opinions of the nullifying doctrines of South Carolina, I did not regard the allusion to it in the Whig, especially as the manner of the allusion showed that I did not obtrude it.... I have latterly been drawn into a correspondence with an advocate of the doctrine, which led me to a review of it to some extent, and particularly to a vindication of the proceedings of Virginia in 1798, '99, against the misuse made of them. That you may see the views I have taken of the aberrations of South Carolina, I enclose you an extract."
And in a letter to Mr. Daniel Webster, written a few days previously, he uses nearly the same language; as also in a letter in February, 1830, to Mr. Trist.
To Mr. James Robertson, March 27, 1831, Mr. Madison writes as follows:
"The veil which was originally over the draft of the resolutions offered in 1798 to the Virginia Assembly having been long since removed, I may say, in answer to your inquiries, that it was penned by me."
"With respect to the terms following the term 'unconstitutional,' viz., 'not law, but null, void, and of no force or effect,' which were stricken out of the seventh resolution, my memory cannot say positively whether they were or were not in the original draft, and no copy of it appears to have been retained. On the presumption that they were in the draft as it went from me, I am confident that they must have been regarded only as giving accumulated emphasis to the declaration, that the alien and sedition acts had, in the opinion of the assembly, violated the constitution of the United States, and not that the addition of them could annul the acts or sanction a resistance of them. The resolution was expressly declaratory, and, proceeding from the legislature only, which was not even a party to the constitution, could be declaratory of opinion only."
To Joseph C. Cabell, Sept. 16, 1831:
"I congratulate you on the event which restores you to the public councils, where your services will be valuable, particularly in defending the constitution and Union against the false doctrines which assail them. That of nullification seems to be generally abandoned in Virginia, by those who had most leaning towards it. But it still flourishes in the hot-bed where it sprung up."
"I know not whence the idea could proceed that I concurred in the doctrine, that although a State could not nullify a law of the Union, it had a right to secede from the Union. Both spring from the same poisonous root."
To Mr. N. P. Trist, December, 1831:
"I cannot see the advantage of this perseverance of South Carolina in claiming the authority of the Virginia proceedings in 1798, '99, as asserting a right in a single State to nullify an act of the United States. Where, indeed, is the fairness of attempting to palm on Virginia an intention which is contradicted by such a variety of contradictory proofs; which has at no intervening period, received the slightest countenance from her, and which with one voice she now disclaims?"
"To view the doctrine in its true character, it must be recollected that it asserts a right in a single State to stop the execution of a federal law, until a convention of the States could be brought about by a process requiring an uncertain time; and, finally, in the convention, when formed, a vote of seven States, if in favor of the veto, to give it a prevalence over the vast majority of seventeen States. For this preposterous and anarchical pretension there is not a shadow of countenance in the constitution; and well that there is not, for it is certain that, with such a deadly poison in it, no constitution could be sure of lasting a year."
To Mr. C. E. Haynes, August 26, 1832:
"In the very crippled and feeble state of my health, I cannot undertake an extended answer to your inquiries, nor should I suppose it necessary if you have seen my letter to Mr. Everett, in August, 1830, in which the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, were explained, and the novel doctrine of nullification adverted to.
"The distinction is obvious between such interpositions on the part of the States against unjustifiable acts of the federal government as are within the provisions and forms of the constitution. These provisions and forms certainly do not embrace the nullifying process proclaimed in South Carolina, which begins with a single State, and ends with the ascendency of a minority of States over a majority; of seven over seventeen; a federal law, during the process, being arrested within the nullifying State; and, if a revenue law, frustrated through all the States."
To Mr. Trist, December 23, 1832:
"If one State can, at will, withdraw from the others, the others can, at will, withdraw from her, and turn her nolentem volentem out of the Union. Until of late, there is not a State that would have abhorred such a doctrine more than South Carolina, or more dreaded an application of it to herself. The same may be said of the doctrine of nullification which she now preaches as the only faith by which the Union can be saved."
In a letter to Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, December 28, 1832:
"It is not probable that (in the adoption of the resolutions of 1798), such an idea as the South Carolina nullification had ever entered the thoughts of a single member, or even that of a citizen of South Carolina herself."
To Andrew Stevenson, February 4, 1833:
"I have received your communication of the 29th ultimo, and have read it with much pleasure. It presents the doctrine of nullification and secession in lights that must confound, if failing to convince their patrons. You have done well in rescuing the proceedings of Virginia in 1798-'99, from the many misconstructions and misapplications of them."
"Of late, attempts are observed to shelter the heresy of secession under the case of expatriation, from which it essentially differs. The expatriating party removes only his person and his movable property, and does not incommode those whom he leaves. A seceding State mutilates the domain, and disturbs the whole system from which it separates itself. Pushed to the extent in which the right is sometimes asserted, it might break into fragments every single community."
To Mr. Stevenson, February 10, 1833, in reference to the South Carolina nullifying ordinance:
"I consider a successful resistance to the laws as now attempted, if not immediately mortal to the Union, as at least a mortal wound to it."
To "a Friend of the Union and State rights," 1833:
"It is not usual to answer communications without proper names to them. But the ability and motives disclosed in the essays induce me to say, in compliance with the wish expressed, that I do not consider the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, as countenancing the doctrine that a State may, at will, secede from its constitutional compact with the other States."
To Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, April 1, 1833:
"The attempt to prove me a nullifier, by a misconstruction of the resolutions of 1798-'99, though so often and so lately corrected, was, I observe, renewed some days ago in the 'Richmond Whig,' by an inference from an erasure in the House of Delegates from one of those resolutions, of the words 'are null, void and of no effect,' which followed the word 'unconstitutional.' These words, though synonymous with 'unconstitutional,' were alleged by the critic to mean nullification; and being, of course, ascribed to me, I was, of course, a nullifier. It seems not to have occurred, that if the insertion of the words could convict me of being a nullifier, the erasure of them (unanimous, I believe), by the legislature, was the strongest of protests against the doctrine.... The vote, in that case seems not to have engaged the attention due to it. It not merely deprives South Carolina of the authority of Virginia, on which she has relied and exulted so much in support of her cause, but turns that authority pointedly against her."
From a memorandum "On Nullification," written in 1835-'36:
"Although the legislature of Virginia declared, at a late session, almost unanimously, that South Carolina was not supported in her doctrine of nullification by the resolutions of 1798, it appears that those resolutions are still appealed to as expressly or constructively favoring the doctrine."
"And what is the text in the proceedings of Virginia which this spurious doctrine of nullification claims for its patronage? It is found in the third of the resolutions of 1798."
"Now is there any thing here from which a 'single' State can infer a right to arrest or annul an act of the general government, which it may deem unconstitutional? So far from it, that the obvious and proper inference precludes such a right."
"In a word, the nullifying claims, if reduced to practice, instead of being the conservative principle of the constitution, would necessarily, and it may be said, obviously, be a deadly poison."
"The true question, therefore, is, whether there be a 'constitutional' right in a single State to nullify a law of the United States? We have seen the absurdity of such a claim, in its naked and suicidal form. Let us turn to it, as modified by South Carolina, into a right in every State to resist within itself the execution of a federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional, and to demand a convention of the States to decide the question of constitutionality, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent unless three fourths of the States concur in overruling the annulment.
"Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results would be the same as those proceeding from an unqualified nullification, and the result of a convention might be that seven out of twenty-four States might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the United States whatever, and give to the constitution, constructively, any shape they pleased, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen.[8] Every feature of the constitution might thus be successively changed; and after a scene of unexampled confusion and distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not, as a whole, be agreed to by a single party."
[8] The above was written when the number of the States was twenty-four. Now, when there are thirty-one States, the proportion would be eight to twenty-three! that is, that a single State nullifying, the nullification would hold good till a convention were called, and then if the nullifying State could procure seven others to join, the nullification would become absolute--the eight States overruling the twenty-three.
To this graphic picture of the disorders which even the first stages of nullification would necessarily produce, drawn when the graphic limner was in the eighty-sixth and last year of his life, the following warning pages, written only a few months earlier, may be properly appended:
"What more dangerous than nullification, or more evident than the progress it continues to make, either in its original shape or in the disguises it assumes? Nullification has the effect of putting powder under the constitution and Union, and a match in the hand of every party to blow them up, at pleasure. And for its progress, hearken to the tone in which it is now preached; cast your eyes on its increasing minorities in most of the Southern States, without a decrease in any one of them. Look at Virginia herself, and read in the gazettes, and in the proceedings of popular meetings, the figure which the anarchical principle now makes, in contrast with the scouting reception given to it but a short time ago.
"It is not probable that this offspring of the discontents of South Carolina will ever approach success in a majority of the States. But a susceptibility of the contagion in the Southern States is visible; and the danger not to be concealed, that the sympathy arising from known causes, and the inculcated impression of a permanent incompatibility of interests between the South and the North, may put it in the power of popular leaders, aspiring to the highest stations, to unite the South, on some critical occasion, in a course that will end in creating a new theatre of great though inferior extent. In pursuing this course, the first and most obvious step is nullification, the next, secession, and the last, a farewell separation. How near has this course been lately exemplified! and the danger of its recurrence, in the same or some other quarter, may be increased by an increase of restless aspirants, and by the increasing impracticability of retaining in the Union a large and cemented section against its will. It may, indeed, happen, that a return of danger from abroad, or a revived apprehension of danger at home, may aid in binding the States in one political system, or that the geographical and commercial ligatures may have that effect, or that the present discord of interests between the North and the South may give way to a less diversity in the application of labor, or to the mutual advantage of a safe and constant interchange of the different products of labor in different sections. All this may happen, and with the exception of foreign hostility, hoped for. But, in the mean time, local prejudices and ambitious leaders may be but too successful in finding or creating occasions for the nullifying experiment of breaking a more beautiful China vase[9] than the British empire ever was, into parts which a miracle only could reunite."
[9] See Franklin's letter to Lord Howe, in 1776.
Incidentally, Mr. Madison, in these letters, vindicates also his compeers, Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Monroe. In the letter to Mr. Cabell, of May 31, 1830, he says:
"You will see, in vol. iii., page 429, of Mr. Jefferson's Correspondence, a letter to W. C. Nicholas, proving that he had nothing to do with the Kentucky resolutions, of 1799, in which the word 'nullification' is found. The resolutions of that State, in 1798, which were drawn by him, and have been republished with the proceedings of Virginia, do not contain this or any equivalent word."
In the letter to Mr. Trist, of December, 1831, after developing at some length the inconsistencies and fatuity of the "nullification prerogative," Mr. Madison says:
"Yet this has boldly sought a sanction, under the name of Mr. Jefferson, because, in his letter to Mr. Cartwright, he held out a convention of the States as, with us, a peaceful remedy, in cases to be decided in Europe by intestine wars. Who can believe that Mr. Jefferson referred to a convention summoned at the pleasure of a single State, with an interregnum during its deliberations; and, above all, with a rule of decision subjecting nearly three fourths to one fourth? No man's creed was more opposed to such an inversion of the republican order of things."
In a letter to Mr. Townsend of South Carolina, December 18, 1831:
"You ask 'whether Mr. Jefferson was really the author of the Kentucky resolutions, of 1799;' [in which the word 'nullify' is used, though not in the sense of South Carolina nullification.] The inference that he was not is as conclusive as it is obvious, from his letter to Col. Wilson Cary Nicholas, of September 5, 1799, in which he expressly declines, for reasons stated, preparing any thing for the legislature of that year.
"That he (Mr. Jefferson) ever asserted a right in a single State to arrest the execution of an act of Congress--the arrest to be valid and permanent, unless reversed by three fourths of the States--is countenanced by nothing known to have been said or done by him. In his letter to Major Cartwright, he refers to a convention as a peaceable remedy for conflicting claims of power in our compound government; but, whether he alluded to a convention as prescribed by the constitution, or brought about by any other mode, his respect for the will of majorities, as the vital principle of republican government, makes it certain that he could not have meant a convention in which a minority of seven States was to prevail over seventeen, either in amending or expounding the constitution."
In the letter (before quoted) to Mr. Trist, December 23, 1832:
"It is remarkable how closely the nullifiers, who make the name of Mr. Jefferson the pedestal for their colossal heresy, shut their eyes and lips whenever his authority is ever so clearly and emphatically against them. You have noticed what he says in his letters to Monroe and Carrington, pages 43 and 302, vol. ii., with respect to the powers of the old Congress to coerce delinquent States, and his reasons for preferring for the purpose a naval to a military force; and, moreover, that it was not necessary to find a right to coerce in the federal articles, that being inherent in the nature of a compact."
In another letter to Mr. Trist, dated August 25, 1834:
"The letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Jefferson, of which you inclose an extract, is important. I have one from Mr. Monroe, on the same occasion, more in detail, and not less emphatic in its anti-nullifying language."
In the notes "On Nullification," written in 1835-'6:
"The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the United States, and institute a process which is to terminate in the ascendency of a minority over a large majority. And this new-fangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of republicanism, and whose own words declare, that 'acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it.' Well may the friends of Mr. Jefferson disclaim any sanction to it, or to any constitutional right of nullification from his opinions."
In a paper drawn by Mr. Madison, in September, 1829, when his anxieties began first to be disturbed by the portentous approach of the nullification doctrine, he concludes with this earnest admonition, appropriate to the time when it was written, and not less so to the present time, and to posterity:
"In all the views that may be taken of questions between the State governments and the general government, the awful consequences of a final rupture and dissolution of the Union should never for a moment be lost sight of. Such a prospect must be deprecated--must be shuddered at by every friend of his country, to liberty, to the happiness of man. For, in the event of a dissolution of the Union, an impossibility of ever renewing it is brought home to every mind by the difficulties encountered in establishing it. The propensity of all communities to divide, when not pressed into a unity by external dangers, is a truth well understood. There is no instance of a people inhabiting even a small island, if remote from foreign danger, and sometimes in spite of that pressure, who are not divided into alien, rival, hostile tribes. The happy union of these States is a wonder; their constitution a miracle; their example the hope of liberty throughout the world. Wo to the ambition that would meditate the destruction of either."
These extracts, voluminous as they are, are far from exhausting the abundant material which these admirable writings of Mr. Madison contain, on the topic of nullification. They come to us, for our admonition and guidance, with the solemnity of a voice from the grave; and I leave them, without comment, to be pondered in the hearts of his countrymen. Notwithstanding the advanced age and growing bodily infirmities of Mr. Madison, at the time when these letters were written, his mind was never more vigorous nor more luminous. Every generous mind must sympathize with him, in this necessity, in which he felt himself in his extreme age, and when done, not only with the public affairs of the country, but nearly done with all the affairs of the world, to defend himself and associates from the attempt to fasten upon him and them, in spite of his denials, a criminal and anarchical design--wicked in itself, and subversive of the government which he had labored so hard to found, and utterly destructive to that particular feature considered the crowning merit of the constitution; and which wise men and patriotic had specially devised to save our Union from the fate of all leagues. We sympathize with him in such a necessity. We should feel for any man, in the most ordinary case, to whose words a criminal intention should be imputed in defiance of his disclaimers; but, in the case of Mr. Madison--a man so modest, so pure, so just--of such dignity and gravity, both for his age, his personal qualities, and the exalted offices which he had held; and in a case which went to civil war, and to the destruction of a government of which he was one of the most faithful and zealous founders--in such a case, an attempt to force upon such a man a meaning which he disavows, becomes not only outrageous and odious, but criminal and impious. And if, after the authentic disclaimers which he has made in his advanced age, and which are now published, any one continues to attribute this heresy to him, such a person must be viewed by the public as having a mind that has lost its balance! or, as having a heart void of social duty, and fatally bent on a crime, the guilt of which must be thrown upon the tenants of the tomb--speechless, but not helpless! for, every just man must feel their cause his own! and rush to a defence which public duty, private honor, patriotism, filial affection, and gratitude to benefactors impose on every man (born wheresoever he may have been) that enjoys the blessings of the government which their labors gave us.
Chapter LXXXIX
THE AUTHOR'S OWN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF OUR GOVERNMENT, AS BEING A UNION IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO A LEAGUE: PRESENTED IN A SUBSEQUENT SPEECH ON MISSOURI RESOLUTIONS.
I do not discuss these resolutions at this time. That discussion is no part of my present object. I speak of the pledge which they contain, and call it a mistake; and say, that whatever may be the wishes or the opinions of the people of Missouri on the subject of the extension or non-extention of slavery to the Territories, they have no idea of resisting any act of Congress on the subject. They abide the law, when it comes, be it what it may, subject to the decision of the ballot-box and the judiciary.
I concur with the people of Missouri in this view of their duty, and believe it to be the only course consistent with the terms and intention of our constitution, and the only one which can save this Union from the fate of all the confederacies which have successively appeared and disappeared in the history of nations. Anarchy among the members, and not tyranny in the head, has been the rock on which all such confederacies have split. The authors of our present form of government knew the danger of this rock, and they endeavored to provide against it. They formed a Union--not a league--a federal legislature to act upon persons, not upon States; and they provided peaceful remedies for all the questions which could arise between the people and the government. They provided a federal judiciary to execute the federal laws when found to be constitutional; and popular elections to repeal them when found to be bad. They formed a government in which the law and the popular will, and not the sword, was to decide questions; and they looked upon the first resort to the sword for the decision of such questions as the death of the Union.
The old confederation was a league, with a legislature acting upon sovereignties, without power to enforce its decrees, and without union except at the will of the parties. It was powerless for government, and a rope of sand for union. It was to escape from that helpless and tottering government that the present constitution was formed; and no less than ten numbers of the federalist--from the tenth to the twentieth--were devoted to this defect of the old system, and the necessity of the new one. I will read some extracts from these numbers--the joint product of Hamilton and Madison--to show the difference between the league which we abandoned and the Union which we formed--the dangers of the former and the benefits of the latter--that it may be seen that the resolutions of the general assembly of Missouri, if carried out to their conclusions, carry back this Union to the league of the confederation--make it a rope of sand, and the sword the arbiter between the federal head and its members.
Mr. B. then read as follows:
"The great and radical vice, in the structure of the existing confederation, is in the principle of legislation for States or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contra-distinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it prevades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction, or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways--by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the coercion of the magistracy, or by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident there is no process of a court by which their observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it."
Of the certain destruction of the Union when the sword is once drawn between the members of a Union and their head, they speak thus:
"When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States, against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union."
Of the advantage and facility of the working of the federal system, and its peaceful, efficient, and harmonious operation--if the federal laws are made to operate upon citizens, and not upon States--they speak in these terms:
"But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the intervention of the State legislatures; if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of unconstitutional power. They would be obliged to act, and in such manner as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its own defence, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of justice, and of the body of the people. If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional and void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as the natural guardians of the constitution, would throw their weight into the national scale, and give it a decided preponderance in the contest."
Of the ruinous effects of these civil wars among the members of a republican confederacy, and their disastrous influence upon the cause of civil liberty itself throughout the world, they thus speak:
"It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of disgust and horror at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept continually vibrating between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. From the disorders which disfigure the annals of those republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans."
And again they say:
"It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislation; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice."
After reading these extracts, Mr. B. said: It was to get rid of the evils of the old confederation that the present Union was formed; and, having formed it, they who formed it undertook to make it perpetual, and for that purpose had recourse to all the sanctions held sacred among men--commands, prohibitions, oaths. The States were forbid to form compacts or agreements with each other; the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, were declared to be the supreme law of the land; and all authorities, State and federal, legislative, executive, and judicial, were to be sworn to support it. The resolutions which have been read contradict all this; and the General Assembly mistook their own powers as much as they mistook the sentiments of the people of Missouri when they adopted them.
XC. PUBLIC LANDS:--DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS
Mr. Clay renewed, at this session, 1832-'33, the bill which he had brought in the session before, and which had passed the Senate, to divide the net proceeds of the sales of public lands among the States, to be applied to such purposes as the legislatures of the respective States should think proper. His principal arguments, in favor of the bill, were: first, the aid which the distribution would give to the States, in developing their resources and promoting their prosperity; secondly, the advantage to the federal government, in settling the question of the mode of disposing of the public lands. He explained his bill, which, at first, contained a specification of the objects to which the States should apply the dividends they received, which was struck out, in the progress of the bill, and stated its provisions to be:
"To set apart, for the benefit of the new States, twelve and a half per cent., out of the aggregate proceeds, in addition to the five per cent., which was now allowed to them by compact, before any division took place among the States generally. It was thus proposed to assign, in the first place, seventeen and a half per cent. to the new States, and then to divide the whole of the residue among the twenty-four States. And, in order to do away any inequality among the new States, grants are specifically made by the bill to those who had not received, heretofore, as much lands as the rest of the new States, from the general government, so as to put all the new States on an equal footing. This twelve and a half per cent., to the new States, to be at their disposal, for either education or internal improvement, and the residue to be at the disposition of the States, subject to no other limitation than this: that it shall be at their option to apply the amount received either to the purposes of education, or the colonization of free people of color, or for internal improvements, or in debts which may have been contracted for internal improvements. And, with respect to the duration of this scheme of distribution proposed by the bill, it is limited to five years, unless hostilities shall occur between the United States and any foreign power; in which event, the proceeds are to be applied to the carrying on such war, with vigor and effect, against any common enemy with whom we may be brought in contact. After the conclusion of peace, and after the discharge of the debt created by any such war, the aggregate funds to return to that peaceful destination to which it was the intention of the bill that they should now be directed, that is, to the improvement of the moral and physical condition of the country, and the promotion of the public happiness and prosperity."
He then spoke of the advantages of settling the question of the manner of disposing of the public lands, and said:
"The first remark which seemed to him to be called for, in reference to this subject, was as to the expediency, he would say the necessity, of its immediate settlement. On this point, he was happy to believe that there was a unanimous concurrence of opinion in that body. However they might differ as to the terms on which the distribution of these lands should be made, they all agreed that it was a question which ought to be promptly and finally, he hoped amicably, adjusted. No time more favorable than the present moment could be selected for the settlement of this question. The last session was much less favorable for the accomplishment of this object; and the reasons were sufficiently obvious, without any waste of time in their specification. If the question were not now settled, but if it were to be made the subject of an annual discussion, mixing itself up with all the measures of legislation, it would be felt in its influence upon all, would produce great dissensions both in and out of the House, and affect extensively all the great and important objects which might be before that body. They had had, in the several States, some experience on that subject; and, without going into any details on the subject, he would merely state that it was known, that, for a long period, the small amount of the public domain possessed by some of the States, in comparison with the quantity possessed by the general government, had been a cause of great agitation in the public mind, and had greatly influenced the course of legislation. Persons coming from the quarter of the State in which the public land was situated, united in sympathy and interest, constituted always a body who acted together, to promote their common object, either by donations to settlers, or reduction in the price of the public lands, or the relief of those who are debtors for the public domain; and were always ready, as men always will be, to second all those measures which look towards the accomplishment of the main object which they have in view. So, if this question were not now settled, it would be a source of inexpressible difficulty hereafter, influencing all the great interests of the country, in Congress, affecting great events without, and perhaps adding another to those unhappy causes of division, which unfortunately exist at this moment."
In his arguments in support of his bill, Mr. Clay looked to the lands as a source of revenue to the States or the federal government, from their sale, and not from their settlement and cultivation, and the revenue to be derived from the wealth and population to which their settlement would give rise; and, concluding with an encomium on his bill under the aspect of revenue from sales, he said:
"He could not conceive a more happy disposition of the proceeds of the public lands, than that which was provided by this bill. It was supposed that five years would be neither too long nor too short a period for a fair experiment. In case a war should break out, we may withdraw from its peaceful destination a sum of from two and a half to three and a half millions of dollars per annum, and apply it to a vigorous prosecution of the war--a sum which would pay the interest on sixty millions of dollars, which might be required to sustain the war, and a sum which is constantly and progressively increasing. It proposes, now that the general government has no use for the money, now that the surplus treasure is really a source of vexatious embarrassment to us, and gives rise to a succession of projects, to supply for a short time a fund to the States which want our assistance, to advance to them that which we do not want, and which they will apply to great beneficial national purposes; and, should war take place, to divert it to the vigorous support of the war; and, when it ceases, to apply it again to its peaceful purposes. And thus we may grow, from time to time, with a fund which will endure for centuries, and which will augment with the growth of the nation, aiding the States in seasons of peace, and sustaining the general government in periods of war."
Mr. Calhoun deprecated this distribution of the land money as being dangerous in itself and unconstitutional, and as leading to the distribution of other revenue--in which he was prophetic. He said:
"He could not yield his assent to the mode which this bill proposed to settle the agitated question of the public lands. In addition to several objections of a minor character, he had an insuperable objection to the leading principle of the bill, which proposed to distribute the proceeds of the lands among the States. He believed it to be both dangerous and unconstitutional. He could not assent to the principle, that Congress had a right to denationalize the public funds. He agreed that the objection was not so decided in case of the proceeds of lands, as in that of revenue collected from taxes or duties. The senator from Ohio had adduced evidence from the deed of cession, which certainly countenanced the idea that the proceeds of the lands might be subject to the distribution proposed in the bill; but he was far from being satisfied that the argument was solid or conclusive. If the principle of distribution could be confined to the proceeds of the lands, he would acknowledge that his objection to the principle would be weakened.
"He dreaded the force of precedent, and he foresaw that the time would come when the example of the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands would be urged as a reason for distributing the revenue derived from other sources. Nor would the argument be devoid of plausibility. If we, of the Atlantic States, insist that the revenue of the West, derived from lands, should be equally distributed among all the States, we must not be surprised if the interior States should, in like manner, insist to distribute the proceeds of the customs, the great source of revenue in the Atlantic States. Should such a movement be successful, it must be obvious to every one, who is the least acquainted with the workings of the human heart, and the nature of government, that nothing would more certainly endanger the existence of the Union. The revenue is the power of the State, and to distribute its revenue is to dissolve its power into its original elements."
Attempts were made to postpone the bill to the next session, which failed; and it passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 20.
YEAS.--Messrs. Bell, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson, Dudley, Ewing, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Holmes, Johnston, Knight, Poindexter, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles, Seymour, Silsbee, Sprague, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Wilkins--24.
NAYS.--Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buckner, Calhoun, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Rives, Robinson, Smith, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright--20.
The bill went to the House and received amendments, which did not obtain the concurrence of the Senate until midnight of the first of March, which, being the short session, was within twenty-four hours of the constitutional termination of the Congress, which was limited to the 3d--which falling this year on Sunday, the Congress would adjourn at midnight of the 2nd. Further efforts were made to postpone it, and upon the ground that, in a bill of that magnitude and novelty, the President was entitled to the full ten days for the consideration of it which the constitution allowed him, and he would have but half a day; for if passed that night it could only reach him in the forenoon of the next day--leaving him but half a day for his consideration of the measure, where the constitution allowed him ten; and that half day engrossed with all crowded business of an expiring session. The next evening, the President attended, as usual, in a room adjoining the Senate chamber, to be at hand to sign bills and make nominations. It was some hours in the night when the President sent for me, and withdrawing into the recess of a window, told me that he had a veto message ready on the land bill, but doubted about sending it in, lest there should not be a full Senate; and intimated his apprehension that Mr. Calhoun and some of his friends might be absent, and endanger the bill: and wished to consult me upon that point. I told him I would go and reconnoitre the chamber, and adjacent rooms; did so--found that Mr. Calhoun and his immediate friends were absent--returned and informed him, when he said he would keep the bill until the next session, and then return it with a fully considered message--his present one being brief, and not such as to show his views fully. I told him I thought he ought to do so--that such a measure ought not to be passed in the last hours of a session, in a thin Senate, and upon an imperfect view of his objections; and that the public good required it to be held up. It was so; and during the long vacation of nine months which intervened before the next session, the opposition presses and orators kept the country filled with denunciations of the enormity of his conduct in "pocketing" the hill--as if it had been a case of "flat burglary," instead of being the exercise of a constitutional right, rendered most just and proper under the extraordinary circumstances which had attended the passage, and intended return of the bill. At the commencement of the ensuing session he returned the bill, with his well-considered objections, in an ample message, which, after going over a full history of the derivation of the lands, came to the following conclusions:
"1. That one of the fundamental principles, on which the confederation of the United States was originally based, was, that the waste lands of the West, within their limits, should be the common property of the United States.
"2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the States which claimed them, and the cessions were accepted, on the express condition that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other purpose whatsoever.
"3. That, in execution of these solemn compacts, the Congress of the United States did, under the confederation, proceed to sell these lands, and put the avails into the common treasury; and, under the new constitution, did repeatedly pledge them for the payment of the public debt of the United States, by which pledge each State was expected to profit in proportion to the general charge to be made upon it for that object.
"These are the first principles of this whole subject, which, I think, cannot be contested by any one who examines the proceedings of the revolutionary Congress, the sessions of the several States, and the acts of Congress, under the new constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed upon the mind, let us proceed to examine how far the objects of the cessions have been completed, and see whether those compacts are not still obligatory upon the United States.
"The debt, for which these lands were pledged by Congress, may be considered as paid, and they are consequently released from that lien. But that pledge formed no part of the compacts with the States, or of the conditions upon which the cessions were made. It was a contract between new parties--between the United States and their creditors. Upon payment of the debt, the compacts remain in full force, and the obligation of the United States to dispose of the lands for the common benefit, is neither destroyed nor impaired. As they cannot now be executed in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is, in what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of for the common benefit of the several States, 'according to their respective and usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure?' The cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, in express terms, and all the rest impliedly, not only provide thus specifically the proportion, according to which each State shall profit by the proceeds of the land sales, but they proceed to declare that they shall be 'faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.' This is the fundamental law of the land, at this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union itself was erected.
"In the practice of the government, the proceeds of the public lands have not been set apart as a separate fund for the payment of the public debt, but have been, and are now, paid into the treasury, where they constitute a part of the aggregate of revenue, upon which the government draws, as well for its current expenditures as for payment of the public debt. In this manner, they have heretofore, and do now, lessen the general charge upon the people of the several States, in the exact proportions stipulated in the compacts.
"These general charges have been composed, not only of the public debt and the usual expenditures attending the civil and military administrations of the government, but of the amounts paid to the States, with which these compacts were formed; the amounts paid the Indians for their right of possession; the amounts paid for the purchase of Louisiana and Florida; and the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks, &c., employed in preparing for market, and selling, the western domain. From the origin of the land system, down to the 30th September, 1832, the amount expended for all these purposes has been about $49,701,280 and the amount received from the sales, deducting payments on account of roads, &c., about $38,386,624. The revenue arising from the public lands, therefore, has not been sufficient to meet the general charges on the treasury, which have grown out of them, by about $11,314,656. Yet, in having been applied to lessen those charges, the conditions of the compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State has profited according to its usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure. The annual proceeds of land sales have increased, and the charges have diminished; so that, at a reduced price, those lands would now defray all current charges growing out of them, and save the treasury from further advances on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore, would be accomplished, as fully as it has hitherto been, by reducing the price, and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the proceeds into the treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in which the objects of the original compact can be attained, it may be considered, for all practical purposes, that it is one of their requirements.
"The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every one of the compacts by which the United States became possessed of their western domain, and treats the subject as if they never had existence, and as if the United States were the original and unconditional owners of all the public lands. The first section directs--
"'That, from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there shall be allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, over and above what each of the said States is entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between them, respectively, upon their admission into the Union and the United States, the sum of twelve and a half per centum upon the net amount of the sales of the public lands, which, subsequent to the day aforesaid, shall be made within the several limits of the said States; which said sum of twelve and a half per centum shall be applied to some object or objects of internal improvement or education, within the said States, under the direction of their several legislatures.'
"This twelve and a half per centum is to be taken out of the net proceeds of the land sales, before any apportionment is made; and the same seven States, which are first to receive this proportion, are also to receive their due proportion of the residue, according to the ratio of general distribution.
"Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy, in regard to this provision, what more need be said to demonstrate its objectionable character, than that it is in direct and undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the States, before a single cession was made; that it abrogates the condition upon which some of the States came into the Union; and that it sets at nought the terms of cession spread upon the face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the public land is held by the federal government?
"In the apportionment of the remaining seven eighths of the proceeds, this bill, in a manner equally undisguised, violates the conditions upon which the United States acquired title to the ceded lands. Abandoning altogether the ratio of distribution, according to the general charge and expenditure provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the federal representative population. Virginia, and other States, which ceded their lands upon the express condition that they should receive a benefit from their sales, in proportion to their part of the general charge, are, by the bill, allowed only a portion of seven eighths of their proceeds, and that not in the proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the ratio of their federal representative population.
"The constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it 'shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State,' it virtually provides that these compacts, and the rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative power, which shall only make all 'needful rules and regulations' for carrying them into effect. All beyond this, would seem to be an assumption of undelegated power.
"These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to pay for that Union, without which, they plainly saw, it could not be preserved. It was not for territory or State power that our revolutionary fathers took up arms; it was for individual liberty, and the right of self-government. The expulsion, from the continent, of British armies and British power was to them a barren conquest, if, through the collisions of the redeemed States, the individual rights for which they fought should become the prey of petty military tyrannies established at home. To avert such consequences, and throw around liberty the shield of union, States, whose relative strength, at the time, gave them a preponderating power, magnanimously sacrificed domains which would have made them the rivals of empires, only stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of themselves and the other confederated States. This enlightened policy produced union, and has secured liberty. It has made our waste lands to swarm with a busy people, and added many powerful States to our confederation. As well for the fruits which these noble works of our ancestors have produced, as for the devotedness in which they originated, we should hesitate before we demolish them.
"But there are other principles asserted in the bill, which would have impelled me to withhold my signature, had I not seen in it a violation of the compacts by which the United States acquired title to a large portion of the public lands. It reasserts the principle contained in the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was compelled to withhold my consent, for reasons contained in my message of the 27th May 1830, to the House of Representatives. The leading principle, then asserted, was, that Congress possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys of the United States for objects of a local character within the States. That principle, I cannot be mistaken in supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American people, and all subsequent reflection has but satisfied me more thoroughly that the interests of our people, and the purity of our government, if not its existence, depend on its observance. The public lands are the common property of the United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a part of the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from, and appropriate a portion of, this public revenue to certain States, providing expressly that it shall 'be applied to objects of internal improvement or education within those States,' and then proceeds to appropriate the balance to all the States, with the declaration that it shall be applied 'to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper.' The former appropriation is expressly for internal improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind of improvements, and, therefore, in express violation of the principle maintained in my objections to the turnpike road bill, above referred to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and gives the money to be applied to any local purpose whatsoever. It will not be denied, that, under the provisions of the bill, a portion of the money might have been applied to making the very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference, and must, of course, come within the scope of the same principle. If the money of the United States cannot be applied to local purposes through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended through the agency of the State governments.
"It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our revenue which could be speedily effected by Congress, without injury to the substantial interests of the country, there might be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the treasury; and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them over to the State governments, the more immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The principle and the object was, to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by them under a system which could not at once be abandoned; but even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to save the general government from grasping unlimited power over internal improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.
"But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire proceeds of one source of revenue, and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise the money for supporting the government, and meeting the general charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public lands a perpetual charge upon the treasury. It does not return to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the government by which they are not wanted; but compels the people to pay moneys into the treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for distribution to their State governments. If this principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time, without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if a sufficient supply should be obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might complain, and, to put an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming any new principle, need go but one step further, and put the salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill.
"It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the States, will all political power be substantially concentrated. The State governments, if governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendaries and instruments of the central power.
"I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their State governments, and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control. They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their State governments, thus amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately deprive us of the blessings now derived from our happy union.
"However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the treasury should be returned to the people through their State governments, I cannot assent to the principle that a surplus may be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury among the States without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every State government and institution, as well as for making every local improvement, however trivial, I cannot give it my assent.
"It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old States or the new from the system of distribution which this bill proposes, if it were otherwise unobjectionable. It requires no argument to prove, that if three millions of dollars a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the treasury by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old States will receive annually a sum of money from the treasury, but they will pay in a larger sum, together with the expenses of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of seven eights of the proceeds of land sales which they are to receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole. Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss in the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true because it may not at first be palpable. Their receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The governments of the States will receive seven dollars, for which the people of the States will pay eight. The large sums received will be palpable to the senses; the small sums paid, it requires thought to identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were given them from the public treasury, for which they were at the same time required to pay in taxes, direct or indirect, eight hundred.
"I deceive myself greatly if the new States would find their interests promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their true policy consists in the rapid settling and improvement of the waste lands within their limits. As a means of hastening those events, they have long been looking to a reduction in the price of public lands upon the final payment of the national debt. The effect of the proposed system would be to prevent that reduction. It is true, the bill reserves to Congress the power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details, as now arranged, would probably be forever to prevent its exercise.
"With the just men who inhabit the new States, it is a sufficient reason to reject this system, that it is in violation of the fundamental laws of the republic and its constitution. But if it were a mere question of interest or expediency, they would still reject it. They would not sell their bright prospect of increasing wealth and growing power at such a price. They would not place a sum of money to be paid into their treasuries, in competition with the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of their population. They would not consider a small or large annual sum to be paid to their governments, and immediately expended, as an equivalent for that enduring wealth which is composed of flocks and herds, and cultivated farms. No temptation will allure them from that object of abiding interest, the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory in peace and their defence in war.
"On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey, and sale. Although these expenses have not been met by the proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will be hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By meeting in the treasury so much of the general charge as arises from that source, they will be hereafter, as they have been heretofore, disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, according to the compacts of cession. I do not doubt that it is the real interest of each and all the States in the Union, and particularly of the new States, that the price of these lands shall be reduced and graduated; and that, after they have been offered for a certain number of years, the refuse, remaining unsold, shall be abandoned to the States, and the machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It cannot be supposed the compacts intended that the United States should retain forever a title to lands within the States, which are of no value; and no doubt is entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the States.
"This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle, violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already has the price of those lands been reduced from two dollars per acre to one dollar and a quarter; and upon the will of Congress, it depends whether there shall be a further reduction. While the burdens of the East are diminishing by the reduction of the duties upon imports, it seems but equal justice that the chief burden of the West should be lightened in an equal degree at least. It would be just to the old States and the new, conciliate every interest, disarm the subject of all its dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity of our happy Union."
Statement respecting the revenue derived from the public lands, accompanying the President's Message to the Senate, December 4th, 1833, stating his reasons for not approving the Land Bill:
Statement of the amount of money which has been paid by the United States for the title to the public lands, including the payments made under the Louisiana and Florida treaties; the compact with Georgia; the settlement with the Yazoo claimants; the contracts with the Indian tribes; and the expenditures for compensation to commissioners, clerks, surveyors, and other officers, employed by the United States for the management and sale of the Western domain; the gross amount of money received into the treasury, as the proceeds of public lands, to the 30th of September, 1832; also, the net amount, after deducting five per cent., expended on account of roads within, and leading to the Western States, &c., and sums refunded on account of errors in the entries of public lands.
Payment on account of the purchase of Louisiana:
Principal, $14,984,872 28 Interest on $11,250,000 8,529,353 43 ------------- $23,514,225 71
Payment on account of the purchase of Florida:
Principal, $4,985,599 82 Interest to 30th September, 1832, 1,489,768 66 ------------- $6,475,368 48 Payment of compact with Georgia, 1,065,484 06 Payment of the settlement with the Yazoo claimants, 1,830,808 04 Payment of contracts with the several Indian tribes (all expenses on account of Indians), 13,064,677 45 Payment of commissioners, clerks, and other officers, employed by the United States for the management and sale of the Western domain, 3,750,716 43 -------------- $49,701,280 17 -------------- Amount of money received into the treasury as the proceeds of public lands to 30th September, 1832, $39,614,000 07 Deduct payments from the treasury on account of roads, &c., 1,227,375 94 -------------- $38,386,624 13 --------------
T. L. SMITH, Reg.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, } Register's Office, March 1, 1833. }
Such was this ample and well-considered message, one of the wisest and most patriotic ever delivered by any President, and presenting General Jackson under the aspect of an immense elevation over the ordinary arts of men who run a popular career, and become candidates for popular votes. Such arts require addresses to popular interests, the conciliation of the interested passions, the gratification of cupidity, the favoring of the masses in the distribution of money or property as well as the enrichment of classes in undue advantages. General Jackson exhibits himself as equally elevated above all these arts--as far above seducing the masses with agrarian laws as above enriching the few with the plundering legislation of banks and tariffs; and the people felt this elevation, and did honor to themselves in the manner in which they appreciated it. Far from losing his popularity, he increased it, by every act of disdain which he exhibited for the ordinary arts of conciliating popular favor. His veto message, on this occasion was an exemplification of all the high qualities of the public man. He sat out with showing that these lands, so far as they were divided from the States, were granted as a common fund, to be disposed of for the benefit of all the States, according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever; and that by the principles of our government and sound policy, those acquired from foreign governments could only be disposed of in the same manner. In addition to these great reasons of principle and policy, the message clearly points out the mischief which any scheme of distribution will inflict upon the new States in preventing reductions in the price of the public lands--in preventing donations to settlers--and in preventing the cession of the unsalable lands to the States in which they lie; and recurs to his early messages in support of the policy, now that the public debt was paid, of looking to settlement and population as the chief objects to be derived from these lands, and for that purpose that they be sold to settlers at cost.
Chapter XCI
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS.--THE MEMBERS, AND PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.
On the second day of December, 1833, commenced the first session of the Twenty-third Congress, commonly called the Panic session--one of the most eventful and exciting which the country had ever seen, and abounding with high talent. The following is the list of members:
SENATE.
MAINE--Peleg Sprague, Ether Shepley.
NEW HAMPSHIRE--Samuel Bell, Isaac Hill.
MASSACHUSETTS--Daniel Webster, Nathaniel Silsbee.
RHODE ISLAND--Nehemiah R. Knight, Asher Robbins.
CONNECTICUT--Gideon Tomlinson, Nathan Smith.
VERMONT--Samuel Prentiss, Benjamin Swift.
NEW YORK--Silas Wright, N. P. Tallmadge.
NEW JERSEY--Theodore Frelinghuysen, S. L. Southard.
PENNSYLVANIA--William Wilkins, Samuel McKean.
DELAWARE--John M. Clayton, Arnold Naudain.
MARYLAND--Ezekiel F. Chambers, Joseph Kent.
VIRGINIA--Wm. C. Rives, John Tyler.
NORTH CAROLINA--Bedford Brown, W. P. Mangum.
SOUTH CAROLINA--J. C. Calhoun, William C. Preston.
GEORGIA--John Forsyth, John P. King.
KENTUCKY--George M. Bibb, Henry Clay.
TENNESSEE--Felix Grundy, Hugh L. White.
OHIO--Thomas Ewing, Thomas Morris.
LOUISIANA--G. A. Waggaman, Alexander Porter.
INDIANA--Wm. Hendricks, John Tipton.
MISSISSIPPI--George Poindexter, John Black.
ILLINOIS--Elias K. Kane, John M. Robinson.
ALABAMA--William R. King, Gabriel Moore.
MISSOURI--Thomas H. Benton, Lewis F. Linn.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
MAINE--George Evans, Joseph Hall, Leonard Jarvis, Edward Kavanagh, Moses Mason, Rufus McIntyre, Gorham Parks, Francis O. J. Smith.
NEW HAMPSHIRE--Benning M. Bean, Robert Burns, Joseph M. Harper, Henry Hubbard, Franklin Pierce.
MASSACHUSETTS--John Quincy Adams, Isaac C. Bates, William Baylies, George N. Briggs, Rufus Choate, John Davis, Edward Everett, Benjamin Gorham, George Grennell, jr., Gayton P. Osgood, John Reed.
RHODE ISLAND--Tristam Burges, Dutea J. Pearce.
CONNECTICUT--Noyes Barber, William W. Ellsworth, Samuel A. Foot, Jabez W. Huntington, Samuel Tweedy, Ebenezer Young.
VERMONT--Heman Allen, Benjamin F. Deming, Horace Everett, Hiland Hall, William Slade.
NEW YORK--John Adams, Samuel Beardsley, Abraham Bockee, Charles Bodle, John W. Brown, Churchill C. Cambreleng, Samuel Clark, John Cramer, Rowland Day, John Dickson, Millard Fillmore, Philo C. Fuller, William K. Fuller, Ransom H. Gillet, Nicoll Halsey, Gideon Hard, Samuel C. Hathaway, Abner Hazeltine, Edward Howell, Abel Huntington, Noadiah Johnson, Gerrit Y. Lansing, Cornelius W. Lawrence, George W. Lay, Abijah Mann, jr., Henry C. Martindale, Charles McVean, Henry Mitchell, Sherman Page, Job Pierson, Dudley Selden, William Taylor, Joel Turrill, Aaron Vanderpoel, Isaac B. Van Houten, Aaron Ward, Daniel Wardwell, Reuben Whallon, Campbell P. White, Frederick Whittlesey.
NEW JERSEY--Philemon Dickerson, Samuel Fowler, Thomas Lee, James Parker, Ferdinand S. Schenck, William N. Shinn.
PENNSYLVANIA--Joseph B. Anthony, John Banks, Charles A. Barnitz, Andrew Beaumont, Horace Binney, George Burd, George Chambers, William Clark, Richard Coulter, Edward Darlington, Harmar Denny, John Galbraith, James Harper, Samuel S. Harrison, William Hiester, Joseph Henderson, Henry King, John Laporte, Joel K. Mann, Thomas M. T. McKennan, Jesse Miller, Henry A. Muhlenberg, David Potts, jr., Robert Ramsay, Andrew Stewart, Joel B. Sutherland, David E. Wagener, John G. Watmough.
DELAWARE--John J. Milligan.
MARYLAND--Richard B. Carmichael, Littleton P. Dennis, James P. Heath, William Cost Johnson, Isaac McKim, John T. Stoddert, Francis Thomas, James Turner.
VIRGINIA--John J. Allen, William S. Archer, James M. H. Beale, Thomas T. Bouldin, Joseph W. Chinn, Nathaniel H. Claiborne, Thomas Davenport, John H. Fulton, James H. Gholson, William F. Gordon, George Loyall, Edward Lucas, John Y. Mason, William McComas, Charles F. Mercer, Samuel McDowell Moore, John M. Patton, Andrew Stevenson, William P. Taylor, Edgar C. Wilson, Henry A. Wise.
NORTH CAROLINA--Daniel L. Barringer, Jesse A. Bynum, Henry W. Connor, Edmund Deberry, James Graham, Thomas H. Hall, Micajah T. Hawkins, James J. McKay, Abraham Rencher, William B. Shepard, Augustine H. Shepperd, Jesse Speight, Lewis Williams.
SOUTH CAROLINA--James Blair, William K. Clowney, Warren R. Davis, John M. Felder, William J. Grayson, John K. Griffin, George McDuffie, Henry L. Pinckney.
GEORGIA--Augustine S. Clayton, John Coffee, Thomas F. Foster, Roger L. Gamble, George R. Gilmer, Seaborn Jones, William Schley, James M. Wayne, Richard H. Wilde.
KENTUCKY--Chilton Allan, Martin Beaty, Thomas Chilton, Amos Davis, Benjamin Hardin, Albert G. Hawes, Richard M. Johnson, James Love, Chittenden Lyon, Thomas A. Marshall, Patrick H. Pope, Christopher Tompkins.
TENNESSEE--John Bell, John Blair, Samuel Bunch, David Crockett, David W. Dickinson, William C. Dunlap, John B. Forester, William M. Inge, Cave Johnson, Luke Lea, Balie Peyton, James K. Polk, James Standifer.
OHIO--William Allen, James M. Bell, John Chaney, Thomas Corwin, Joseph H. Crane, Thomas L. Hamer, Benjamin Jones, Henry H. Leavitt, Robert T. Lytle, Jeremiah McLean, Robert Mitchell, William Patterson, Jonathan Sloane, David Spangler, John Thomson, Joseph Vance, Samuel F. Vinton, Taylor Webster, Elisha Whittlesey.
LOUISIANA--Philemon Thomas, Edward D. White.
INDIANA--Ratliff Boon, John Carr, John Ewing, Edward A. Hannegan, George L. Kinnard, Amos Lane, Jonathan McCarty.
MISSISSIPPI--Harry Cage, Franklin E. Plumer.
ILLINOIS--Zadok Casey, Joseph Duncan, Charles Slade.
ALABAMA--Clement C. Clay, Dixon H. Lewis, Samuel W. Mardis, John McKinley, John Murphy.
MISSOURI--William H. Ashley, John Bull.
Lucius Lyon also appeared as the delegate from the territory of Michigan.
Ambrose H. Sevier also appeared as the delegate from the territory of Arkansas,--Joseph M. White from Florida.
Mr. Andrew Stevenson, who had been chosen Speaker of the House for the three succeeding Congresses, was re-elected by a great majority--indicating the administration strength, and his own popularity. The annual message was immediately sent in, and presented a gratifying view of our foreign relations--all nations being in peace and amity with us, and many giving fresh proofs of friendship, either in new treaties formed, or indemnities made for previous injuries. The state of the finances was then adverted to, and shown to be in the most favorable condition. The message said:
"It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you upon the prosperous condition of the finances of the country, as will appear from the report which the Secretary of the Treasury will, in due time, lay before you. The receipts into the Treasury during the present year will amount to more than thirty-two millions of dollars. The revenue derived from customs will, it is believed, be more than twenty-eight millions, and the public lands will yield about three millions. The expenditures within the year, for all objects, including two millions five hundred and seventy-two thousand two hundred and forty dollars and ninety-nine cents on account of the public debt, will not amount to twenty-five millions, and a large balance will remain in the Treasury after satisfying all the appropriations chargeable on the revenue for the present year."
The act of the last session, called the "compromise," the President recommended to observance, "unless it should be found to produce more revenue than the necessities of the government required." The extinction of the public debt presented, in the opinion of the President, the proper occasion for organizing a system of expenditure on the principles of the strictest economy consistent with the public interest; and the passage of the message in relation to that point was particularly grateful to the old friends of an economical administration of the government. It said:
"But, while I forbear to recommend any further reduction of the duties, beyond that already provided for by the existing laws, I must earnestly and respectfully press upon Congress the importance of abstaining from all appropriations which are not absolutely required for the public interests, and authorized by the powers clearly legated to the United States. We are beginning a new era in our government. The national debt, which has so long been a burden on the Treasury, will be finally discharged in the course of the ensuing year. No more money will afterwards be needed than what may be necessary to meet the ordinary expenses of the government. Now then is the proper moment to fix our system of expenditure on firm and durable principles; and I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of a rigid economy, and an inflexible determination not to enlarge the income beyond the real necessities of the government, and not to increase the wants of the government by unnecessary and profuse expenditures. If a contrary course should be pursued, it may happen that the revenue of 1834 will fall short of the demands upon it; and after reducing the tariff in order to lighten the burdens of the people, and providing for a still further reduction to take effect hereafter, it would be much to be deplored if, at the end of another year, we should find ourselves obliged to retrace our steps, and impose additional taxes to meet unnecessary expenditures."
The part of the message, however, which gave the paper uncommon emphasis, and caused it to be received with opposite, and violent emotions by different parts of the community, was that which related to the Bank of the United States--its believed condition--and the consequent removal of the public deposits from its keeping. The deposits had been removed--done in vacation by the order of the President--on the ground of insecurity, as well as of misconduct in the corporation: and as Congress, at the previous session had declared its belief of their safety, this act of the President had already become a point of vehement newspaper attack upon him--destined to be continued in the halls of Congress. His conduct in this removal, and the reasons for it, were thus communicated:
"Since the last adjournment of Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury has directed the money of the United States to be deposited in certain State banks designated by him, and he will immediately lay before you his reasons for this direction. I concur with him entirely in the view he has taken of the subject; and, some months before the removal, I urged upon the department the propriety of taking that step. The near approach of the day on which the charter will expire, as well as the conduct of the bank, appeared to me to call for this measure upon the high considerations of public interest and public duty. The extent of its misconduct, however, although known to be great, was not at that time fully developed by proof. It was not until late in the month of August, that I received from the government directors an official report, establishing beyond question that this great and powerful institution had been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the public officers by means of its money; and that, in violation of the express provisions of its charter, it had, by a formal resolution, placed its funds at the disposition of its President, to be employed in sustaining the political power of the bank. A copy of this resolution is contained in the report of the government directors, before referred to; and however the object may be disguised by cautious language, no one can doubt that this money was in truth intended for electioneering purposes, and the particular uses to which it was proved to have been applied, abundantly show that it was so understood. Not only was the evidence complete as to the past application of the money and power of the bank to electioneering purposes, but that the resolution of the board of directors authorized the same course to be pursued in future.
"It being thus established, by unquestionable proof, that the Bank of the United States was converted into a permanent electioneering engine, it appeared to me that the path of duty which the Executive department of the government ought to pursue, was not doubtful. As by the terms of the bank charter, no officer but the Secretary of the Treasury could remove the deposits, it seemed to me that this authority ought to be at once exerted to deprive that great corporation of the support and countenance of the government in such a use of its funds, and such an exertion of its power. In this point of the case, the question is distinctly presented, whether the people of the United States are to govern through representatives chosen by their unbiassed suffrages, or whether the money and power of a great corporation are to be secretly exerted to influence their judgment, and control their decisions. It must now be determined whether the bank is to have its candidates for all offices in the country, from the highest to the lowest, or whether candidates on both sides of political questions shall be brought forward as heretofore, and supported by the usual means.
"At this time, the efforts of the bank to control public opinion, through the distresses of some and the fears of others, are equally apparent, and, if possible, more objectionable. By a curtailment of its accommodations, more rapid than any emergency requires, and even while it retains specie to an almost unprecedented amount in its vaults, it is attempting to produce great embarrassment in one portion of the community, while, through presses known to have been sustained by its money, it attempts, by unfounded alarms, to create a panic in all.
"These are the means by which it seems to expect that it can force a restoration of the deposits, and, as a necessary consequence, extort from Congress a renewal of its charter. I am happy to know that, through the good sense of our people, the effort to get up a panic has hitherto failed, and that, through the increased accommodations which the State banks have been enabled to afford, no public distress has followed the exertions of the bank; and it cannot be doubted that the exercise of its power, and the expenditure of its money, as well as its efforts to spread groundless alarm, will be met and rebuked as they deserve. In my own sphere of duty, I should feel myself called on, by the facts disclosed, to order a scire facias against the bank, with a view to put an end to the chartered rights it has so palpably violated, were it not that the charter itself will expire as soon as a decision would probably be obtained from the court of last resort.
"I called the attention of Congress to this subject in my last annual message, and informed them that such measures as were within the reach of the Secretary of the Treasury, had been taken to enable him to judge whether the public deposits in the Bank of the United States were entirely safe; but that as his single powers might be inadequate to the object, I recommended the subject to Congress, as worthy of their serious investigation: declaring it as my opinion that an inquiry into the transactions of that institution, embracing the branches as well as the principal bank, was called for by the credit which was given throughout the country to many serious charges impeaching their character, and which, if true, might justly excite the apprehension that they were no longer a safe depository for the public money. The extent to which the examination, thus recommended, was gone into, is spread upon your journals, and is too well known to require to be stated. Such as was made resulted in a report from a majority of the Committee of Ways and Means, touching certain specified points only, concluding with a resolution that the government deposits might safely be continued in the Bank of the United States. This resolution was adopted at the close of the session, by the vote of a majority of the House of Representatives."
The message concluded with renewing the recommendation, which the President had annually made since his first election, in favor of so amending the constitution in the article of the presidential and vice-presidential elections, as to give the choice of the two first officers of the government to a direct vote of the people, and that "every intermediate agency in the election of those officers should be removed." This recommendation, like all which preceded it, remained without practical results. For ten years committees had reported amendments, and members had supported them, but without obtaining in Congress the requisite two thirds to refer the proposition of amendment to the vote of the people. Three causes combined always to prevent the concurrence of that majority: 1. The conservative spirit of many, who are unwilling, under any circumstances, to touch an existing institution. 2. The enemies of popular elections, who deem it unsafe to lodge the high power of the presidential election, directly in the hands of the people. 3. The intriguers, who wish to manage these elections for their own benefit, and have no means of doing it except through the agency of intermediate bodies. The most potent of these agencies, and the one in fact which controls all the others, is the one of latest and most spontaneous growth, called "conventions"--originally adopted to supersede the caucus system of nominations, but which retains all the evils of that system, and others peculiar to itself. They are still attended by members of Congress, and with less responsibility to their constituents than when acting in a Congress caucus. A large proportion of the delegates are either self-appointed or so intriguingly appointed, and by such small numbers, as to constitute a burlesque upon popular representation. Delegates even transfer their functions, and make proxies--a prerogative only allowed to peers of the realm, in England, in their parliamentary voting, because they are legislators in their own right, and represent, each one, himself, as his own constituent body, and owing responsibility to no one. They meet in taverns, the delegates of some of the large States, attended by one or two thousand backers, supplied with money, and making all the public appliances of feasting and speaking, to conciliate or control votes, which ample means and determined zeal can supply, in a case in which a personal benefit is expected. The minority rules, that is to say, baffles the majority until it yields, and consents to a "compromise," accepting for that purpose the person whom the minority has held in reserve for that purpose; and this minority of one third, which governs two thirds, is itself usually governed by a few managers. And to complete the exclusion of the people from all efficient control, in the selection of a presidential candidate, an interlocutory committee is generally appointed out of its members to act from one convention to another--during the whole interval of four years between their periodical assemblages--to guide and conduct the public mind, in the different States, to the support of the person on whom they have secretly agreed. After the nomination is over, and the election effected, the managers in these nominations openly repair to the new President, if they have been successful, and demand rewards for their labor, in the shape of offices for themselves and connections. This is the way that presidential elections are now made in the United States; for, a party nomination is an election, if the party is strong enough to make it; and, if one is not, the other is; for, both parties act alike, and thus the mass of the people have no more part in selecting the person who is to be their President than the subjects of hereditary monarchs have in begetting the child who is to rule over them. To such a point is the greatest of our elections now sunk by the arts of "intermediate agencies;" and it may be safely assumed, that the history of free elective governments affords no instance of such an abandonment, on the part of legal voters, of their great constitutional privileges, and quiet sinking down of the millions to the automaton performance of delivering their votes as the few have directed.