Opening…

Introduction

“There is nothing more excellent or more useful for the Church of God and the welfare of souls than the office of Confessor. By his sacred ministry the sinner is lightened of the burden of sin, freed from the yoke of Satan and concupiscence, and clothed again with the robe of innocence previously lost. Weak knees are confirmed (Is. xxxv. 3); that is, men weak and idle in mind receive new vigor, and lastly the just are aroused and enkindled to persevere in goodness and to reach with freshly spurred zeal for the crown of justice laid up for them (2 Tim. iv. 8).

“How great and arduous is the office of Confessor appears clearly from the fact that by it he is made a judge in the place of Christ and that of his judgment he must some day render a strict account to the Supreme Judge. To him, therefore, apply the words with which the pious king of Israel charged the judges appointed by him, ‘Take heed what you do: for you exercise not the judgment of man, but of the Lord God; and whatever you judge, it shall redound to you’ (2 Paral. xix. 6). In this tribunal, however, the priest may not consider himself to be only a Judge to hear the culprit’s confession, to correct him, and then, having imposed sentence, to send him away. He must also act the part of the Shepherd and, following the example of the Good Shepherd, must know his sheep, bring back to the fold those that strayed away and fell among thorns, and finally lead them unto wholesome pastures and the waters of eternal refreshment. He must be a Physician giving suitable remedies to the sick, and treating and healing with anxious and skillful hand the wounds of the soul. Lastly he must be a Father, and like the father in the Gospel cheerfully receive with the kiss of peace the prodigal son returning from exile, where he had been lost and consumed by hunger and filth; he must vest the son found again with the first robe, refresh him with the fatted calf and delicious dishes, and restore him to the former place and dignity of heir and son.

“Therefore let the priest who goes to hear confession seriously ponder over these offices of judge, shepherd, physician, and father, and endeavor, as far as in him lies, to fulfill them in deed and work. Above all let him remember that he acts in the place of Christ and as an ambassador for God, as the Apostle often tells us” (Conc. Balt. Pl. II. nn. 278, 279, 280).

The present volume is a practical commentary upon these weighty words of the Fathers of the Baltimore Council. The tremendous responsibility of the Catholic priest exercising the ministry of the Sacrament of Penance must appear in a truly dazzling light to the mind of every one who but glances over the following pages. Human intelligence can never fully grasp the true significance of this divine sacrament, which works at the same time forgiveness of sin and sanctification by grace; which is for poor fallen man at once the judgment of God’s infinite hatred of sin and the manifestation of His infinite mercy for the repentant sinner; which brings humiliation and punishment while it fills the soul returning to God with unspeakable joy and comfort. Who can tell the number of souls troubled by sin and sinful temptations who have found peace and consolation, strength and holy courage in this sacrament? the number of souls kept not only for days, but for years in the bondage of evil passion and Satan who were, by the words of absolution, freed from that ignominious slavery and led again to enjoy the freedom of the children of God? the number of souls snatched from the brink of perdition by the strong hand of God extended to them through His minister in the confessional? the number of souls buried in spiritual death by grievous sin who were brought out from their tombs to supernatural life and the sunshine of heavenly grace by the power of sacramental confession? Only the book of life reveals them all.

To be the minister of such a sacrament is, indeed, a glorious calling. Most excellent in itself and most useful for the Christian people is the office of Confessor. But the Fathers of the Council tell us it is also a most arduous office. In very truth, the faithful administration of the Sacrament of Penance demands a great deal more of the personal coöperation of the minister with the recipient than any other sacrament. Not to mention the fact that in the other sacraments, marriage alone excepted, the acts of the recipient desirous to receive the sacrament have nothing directly to do with the substance and validity of the sacrament, while in confession these acts are not a mere condition, but form the materia ex qua the sacrament arises, there is not the slightest doubt whatever of the most serious and grave duty of the confessor to assist the penitent as far as possible towards a worthy and profitable confession. He is not only bound, as in all other sacraments, to insure the validity of the sacrament and to assure himself of the required disposition of the recipient, but here more than elsewhere he must himself effect and bring forth, as well as he can, the worthy and right disposition of the penitent. Nor is this all. Confession is not merely to free the sinner from sin for a few passing moments; it must so strengthen his will and direct his heart that he will avoid the coming danger and resist the future temptation. Herein lies the difficult and arduous task of the confessor. It is in the discharge of this duty that the priest needs all the love and charity, patience and meekness, of the spiritual father; all the prudence and close attention, the knowledge and experience of the spiritual physician; all the understanding of the holy law and the firmness, impartiality, and discretion of the spiritual judge; the watchful care and patient search of the spiritual shepherd; the holy knowledge and wisdom of the spiritual teacher; the fervid prayer, saintly life, and burning zeal for souls necessary to him who is to be the minister of Jesus Christ unto sinful man redeemed by His precious blood.

Even this is not all. Confession is not only a means of cleansing the sinner from the stain of sin and vice, and of giving him strength and courage in the battle against temptation; but it is also to help the just and holy man to rise continually higher on the ladder of Christian perfection. It is the sacrament for saint and sinner. The greatest saints of God in holy Church had the greatest reverence and desire for holy confession. St. Charles Borromeo went to confession every day. Hence the tender care of the flowers and fruits of Christian virtue in the heart of his penitent is another important duty of the father confessor. How is he to fulfill it in a manner profitable to the penitent and to himself, unless he is well acquainted with the principles and facts of the spiritual life by a thorough study of Christian ascetics and the earnest practice of Christian perfection? What a responsibility when a soul called by God to the higher walks of Christian life, and willing to follow the call, be it in the world or in the cloister, falls into the hands of an ignorant, neglectful, or heedless confessor! But what glory to God, what happiness of soul, what merit for heaven, when by holy zeal and skillful effort the minister of God in holy confession leads the Christian soul, panting after God as the hart panteth after the fountains of water (Ps. xlii. 2), into the sanctuary of God’s love, grace, and mercy! What a glorious ministry!

We can only hope and pray that Catholic priests will carefully read the beautiful and instructive lessons that Dr. Schieler’s book offers, and ponder over them day and night. There is no greater blessing for Church and State, society and individual, than an army of priests who are confessors according to the spirit of Christ; for they are in a fuller sense than others “good stewards of the manifold grace of God” (1 Petr. iv. 10).

✠ S. G. MESSMER.

EDITOR’S PREFACE

An English translation of Dr. Schieler’s exhaustive work on “The Sacrament of Penance,” for the use of theological students and missionary priests, had been advised by some of our bishops and professors of theology. It was felt that, under present conditions, a work in the vernacular on a subject which involved to a very large extent the practical direction of souls was an actual necessity for many to whom the Latin texts dealing with the important questions of the Confessional were for one reason or another insufficient.

There was one serious objection to the publication of a work in English, which, since it deals with most delicate subjects, might for this reason cause an unqualified or prejudiced reader to misunderstand or pervert its statements, so as to effect the very opposite of what is intended by the Church in her teaching of Moral and Pastoral Theology. Between the two dangers of a lack of sufficiently practical means to inform and direct the confessor and pastoral guide of souls in so difficult and broad a field as is presented by the missions in English-speaking countries, and the fear that a manual from which the priest derives his helpful material of direction may fall into the hand of the ill-advised, for whom it was not intended, the latter seems the lesser evil, albeit it may leave its deeper impression upon certain minds that see no difficulty in using the sources of information in which the Latin libraries abound.

One proof of both the necessity and the superior advantage of having a vernacular expression of this branch of theological literature, for the use of students and priests in non-Latin countries, is readily found in the fact that authorized scholarship and pastoral industry in Germany have long ago seen fit to supply this need for students in its theological faculties, and for priests on the mission, and that the benefit of such a course has shown itself far to overlap the accidental danger of an unprofessional use of the source of Moral Theology in the hands of a lay-reader, or one hostile to the Catholic Church who might pervert its doctrine and arouse the zeal of the prudish.

The work was, therefore, not undertaken without serious weighing of the reasons for and against its expediency from the prudential as well as moral point of view. As a competent translator of it, the name of the Rev. Richard F. Clarke, S.J., of the English Province, whose editions of Spirago’s catechetical volumes had given him the advantage of special experience in kindred work, suggested itself to the publishers. Father Clarke actually undertook the translation, and had fairly completed it when death overtook him. The manuscript was placed in my hands with a request to prepare it for publication. After much delay, due to a multiplicity of other professional duties, I found it possible, with the coöperation of the Rev. Dr. Charles Bruehl, who kindly consented to undertake the principal work of revision, to complete the volume which is now placed at the disposal of our clergy. There is probably room for some criticism in parts wherein I have undertaken to alter the expressions of the author and of the original translator, with a view of accommodating the matter to the temperament of the English reader. In this I may have sinned at times both by excess and by deficiency; but these blemishes can, I trust, be eliminated in future editions of a work which, for the rest, contains so much of instructive material as to prove itself permanently useful to the theologian and pastor.

In some cases I would not wish to be understood as sharing the author’s views, nor should I have deemed an insistence upon the often-cited opinions of casuists quite so essential in a work of this kind as it seemed to the learned author. But in this I did not feel authorized to depart from his text, even if I had not fully appreciated the advantage of his ample references and quotations in matters of detail. Whatever we think of the author’s personal views, his citations of the masters in the science of morals give to his book certain advantages entitled to recognition.

With these restrictions borne in mind, it would be difficult to exaggerate the usefulness of a work such as this, which directs the priest in the sacramental ministry of Penance as indicated by the laws and practice of the Church.

The aim of every pastor must in the first place be to rouse the consciences of the individual members of his flock to motives of pure and right living. The Gospel of Christ furnishes the model of such living, and the Church is the practical operator under whose direction and authority the principles of the Gospel are actively carried into society, from the lowest to the highest strata. The sacramental discipline of the Confessional is the directest and most powerful instrument by which the maxims and precepts of the Gospel are made operative and fruitful in the individual conscience. A prominent non-Catholic writer of our day has characterized the Catholic Church as the Empire of the Confessional. So she is, and her empire is the strongest, the most penetrating, permanent, and effective rule for the good conduct of the individual and the peace and prosperity of the community that can be conceived.

On the proper operation, therefore, of the Sacrament of Penance depends in the first place all that we can look for of satisfaction and peace upon earth. But the administration of the Sacrament of Penance is solely in the hands of the priest or confessor. If he knows what to do, if he is wisely diligent in doing what the discipline of the Confessional instructs him to do, he will rule his people with order and ease, he will gain their gratitude and their love, he will reap all the fruits of a happy ministry, and his name will be in benediction among men of good will within and without the fold.

The Confessional is a tribunal. It demands a certain knowledge of the law, exercise of discretion and prudence in the application of the law, and the wisdom of kindly counsel to greater perfection. As the lawyer, the judge, the physician, learn their rules of diagnosis and prescription in the first instance from books and then from practice, so the future confessor, for three or four years a student of theology, deems it his first and most important duty to study Moral Theology, and this with the single and almost exclusive purpose of making use of it in the Confessional. Moral Theology gives him the principles of law and right, the rules to apply them to concrete cases, and certain precedents by way of illustration, in order to render him familiar with actual and practical conditions. But the young priest learns much more during the first few months and years of his actual ministry by sitting in the Confessional and dealing with the consciences of those who individually seek his direction.

There is some danger that the practical aspect, with all the distracting circumstances of sin’s work in the soul, may in time obscure the clear view of principles and make the confessor what the criminal judge is apt to become during long years of incumbency, oversevere or overindulgent, as his temper dictates. He may thus lose that fine sense of discrimination, that balanced use of fatherly indulgence and needful correction, which the position of the representative of eternal justice and mercy demands.

To obviate this result, which renders the Confessional a mere work of routine and absolution, instead of being, as it should be, a means of correction and reform, the priest, like the judge, needs to read his books of law and to refurbish his knowledge of theory and practice and his sense of discernment. But the theological texts with which he was familiar under the Seminary discipline, where nothing distracted him from the attentive use of them, are not now so readily at hand. Their Latin forms are a speech which, if not more strange and difficult than during his Seminary course, seems more distant and uninviting. The priest, even the young priest, would rather review his Moral Theology in the familiar language in which he is now to express his judgments to his penitents.

This fact alone suggests the pertinent use of the book before us. There the confessor, the director of the conscience, finds all that he was taught in his Moral Theology. He finds much more; for the author has made the subject a specialty of treatment which leads him to light up every phase of the confessor’s task. He has himself studied all the great masters in the direction of souls from the Fathers of the Church down to the Scholastics of the thirteenth century; and more especially those that follow, who have entered into the theory and art of psychical anatomy—Guilelmus Paris, Cardinal Segusio, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Gerson, St. Charles Borromeo, Toletus, De Ponte, St. Francis of Sales, Lugo, Lacroix, Concina, Cajetan, and Bergamo, St. Alphonsus, Reuter, and finally those many doctors of the last century who have written upon the duties of the confessor in the light of modern necessities and special canon law.

It is hardly necessary to explain to the priest who has passed over the ground of the sacramental discipline as found in his theological text-books, how the subject is here presented in the detail of analysis and application to concrete conditions. Penance is a Virtue and it is a Sacrament. To understand the full value of the latter we must examine its constituent elements, the matter, form, conditions, the dispositions and acts of the penitent, sorrow for sin, purpose of amendment, actual accusation of faults in the tribunal—requisites which are dealt with by Professor Schieler in the traditional manner, but with clearness and attention to detail.

Of special importance are the suggestions in the third chapter, touching the integrity of the Confession: the number, circumstances certain and doubtful, of the sins, and the reasons which excuse the penitent from making a complete confession; likewise the treatment of invalid confessions, of general confessions, their purpose, necessity, or danger as the case may be; satisfaction, its acceptance or commutation.

The main object of the treatise lies, however, as might be supposed, in the exposition of the confessor’s powers and jurisdiction, and of the reservation and abuse of faculties. These matters are in the first place discussed from the theoretical standpoint. Then follows the application, which takes up the second principal part of the work. Here we have the confessor in the act of administering the Sacrament. He is told how he is to diagnose the sinner’s condition by the proposal of questions and by ascertaining his motives—how far and to what end this probing is lawful and wise. Next the qualities of the confessor, his duties and responsibilities, are set forth in so far as they must lead him to benefit his penitent both in and out of the tribunal of penance. The obligation of absolute secrecy or the sigillum is the subject of an extended chapter.

From the general viewpoint which the confessor must take of his penitent’s condition and the safeguards by which he is to protect the penitent both as accused and accuser, our author leads us into the various aspects of the judge’s duties toward penitents in particular conditions. Thus the sinner who is in the constant occasion of relapse into his former sin, the sinner who finds himself too weak to resist temptation, the penitent who aims at extraordinary sanctity, the scrupulous, the convert, form separate topics of detailed discussion. The last part of the volume deals with the subjects of confessions of children, of young men and young women, of those who are engaged to be married, of persons living in mixed marriage, of men, religious women, of priests, and of the sick and dying.

Some of our readers may recall that we have protested against too implicit a reliance on an artificial code of weights and measures in the matter of sin; and to them it may seem that in seconding the translation of such a work as this we go contrary to the principles advocated, because our author presents the same application of canon law and judicial decision which has been sanctioned by the great moralists and canonists of the schools. But let the reader remember that in the text-books of the Seminary, we have as a rule the principles and precepts presented in their skeleton form so as to leave the impression of fixed maxims, which cannot be altered, although they are in many cases only the coined convictions of individual authors, to whose authority the student is taught to swear allegiance. In the present volume principles and precepts are so discussed that they admit of an all-sided view, and as a result do not hinder that freedom of judgment which is so essential a requisite in a good judge and, therefore, in a confessor. For the rest we felt it, of course, to be our duty toward the author to preserve his train of thought and reasoning, and if anything is needed to make his exposition especially applicable to our missionary conditions of time and place, it will be easily supplied by any one who shall have read and studied the present work.

H. J. HEUSER.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONFESSIONAL

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Part I

PENANCE AS A VIRTUE AND AS A SACRAMENT

1. The Virtue of Penance.

At all times penance has been the necessary means (necessitate medii ad salutem) of obtaining pardon for those who had committed mortal sin. “If we do not do penance, we shall fall into the hands of the Lord,” is the warning of the Old Testament (Ecclus. ii. 22). And when God sent His prophets, it was to arouse men to repentance by the announcement of His wrath, and threatening punishments. The forerunner of Our Lord solemnly exhorts the assembled crowds, “Do penance; the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Our Lord Himself insists on the same point with awful determination, “Unless you do penance you shall all likewise perish” (Luke xiii. 3). He proclaims as the task of His own public ministry and the great mission of His Church, “to call sinners to repentance” (Luke v. 32). Accordingly, the burden of the Apostles’ preaching was, “Do penance” (Acts ii. 38), for “God hath also to the gentiles given repentance unto life” (Acts xi. 18).

Thus penance is indispensable to the sinner by divine ordinance, as the Council of Trent expressly teaches (Sess. xiv. c. 1). It is not less clearly dictated by natural law. “For reason prompts man to do penance for the sins which he has committed; but divine command determines the manner according to which it is to be performed.”[1]

Taken in its widest sense, penance may be defined as a regret for some past action. Such a regret is not necessarily virtuous, for a morally indifferent or even a good action may be to us a source of displeasure and grief. But even in its restricted meaning, denoting grief, on account of some bad action, penance does not yet include the idea of virtue. Grief is caused by the perception of anything we look upon as an evil. Now sin may be regarded as an evil in more than one way. Then only does our penance rise to the height of a virtue, if we feel sorry for our sins, not by reason of some temporal disadvantage we have incurred, but for God’s sake, whose holy law we have transgressed and whose majesty we have outraged. In other words, the virtue of penance requires that we detest sin as an evil of a higher, supernatural order.

Penance is not a virtue of its own and specifically distinct from other virtues. St. Thomas considers it as belonging to the virtue of justice, because by it we perform an act of justice toward God, since we restore to Him the honor of which sin has deprived Him, and make reparation for our wrongdoings.[2] Apparently, it springs from the virtue of religion, as an effect thereof; for to detest one’s sin as an injustice done to God implies an acknowledgment of His sovereign goodness and majesty. This submission to God is an act of the virtue of religion.[3] Furthermore, Lehmkuhl[4] is right in attaching the act of penance to virtues of different species. For sin, being in many ways an evil and opposed to holiness and duty, may be deplored from different reasons; and so our penance belongs to that virtue which supplies the motive of sorrow. Thus, a sinner may loathe his impurity from a love of purity, his intemperance from a love of temperance, his pride from a love of humility; he may also abhor sins because they are repugnant to more general virtues, such as the love of God and gratitude toward God.[5]

The virtue of penance, thus being a complete destruction of all affection to sin, has an intimate bearing on the Sacrament of Penance. It is the disposition required on the part of the sinner, not only for the worthy, but also for the valid reception of the Sacrament. It represents, so to speak, the matter of the Sacrament, so that without it the Sacrament is null and void. Consequently, it enters as a constituent part into the very essence of the Sacrament.

The most important act of the virtue of penance is an act of the will and is called contrition. It is contrition that gives birth to penance, vivifies and animates it. Without contrition, there is no remission of sin; for it alone leads to a sincere avowal of our guilt and a meritorious satisfaction.

The second act of penance is the confession of sin: it is penance exercised by speech. Justice exacts that the guilty should acknowledge their wickedness, and also make amends for the sins committed by words. The third act of penance is satisfaction in expiation of our misdeeds. The bad deed is compensated by some good action, which we are not bound to do, but which we perform in order to supply for our past deficiencies. This is penance in deed.

These three acts of penance are most intimately connected with the Sacrament, and this union imparts to them a special efficacy and strength; for the imperfect virtue, which of itself is unable to effect justification, by its elevation to sacramental dignity acquires the power of conferring sanctifying grace.[6]

2. The Sacrament of Penance.

The arguments for the existence of the Sacrament of Penance do not form part of our task; they come within the scope of dogmatic theology. We shall only point out some theological propositions on which our subsequent dissertations are based.

1. Jesus Christ gave to His apostles and their successors in the holy ministry the power of forgiving and retaining sins committed after Baptism.

2. This power is judicial and is exercised in the form of a judicial process. On this evident deduction from the words of the institution is based the entire Catholic teaching concerning the Sacrament of Penance.

3. The exercise of this judicial power constitutes a Sacrament, the object of which is to reconcile the sinner to his God.

4. The outward sign of the Sacrament is the exercise of the judicial functions; this comprises, on the one hand, the acts of the penitent,—contrition, confession, and satisfaction; and on the other, the priestly absolution, being the sentence delivered by the representative of God.

5. The grace conferred by the Sacrament is the remission of all sins, embracing the effacement of the guilt, the obliteration of the eternal punishment, and the condonation of, at least, a portion of the temporal punishment. This remission of sin is accomplished by the infusion of sanctifying grace, which, moreover, constitutes a title to certain actual graces, helping the penitent to bring forth worthy fruits of penance, to overcome temptation, to avoid relapse, and to amend his life.

At the same time the infused virtues are restored and the merits of former good works lost by sin are regained.

On zealous penitents, besides, special gifts are bestowed, such as peace of heart, cheerfulness of mind, and great spiritual consolation.

Though the Sacrament of Penance is administered after the fashion of a judicial trial, still its administration deviates in many points from the customs of forensic practice. The chief points of divergence are the following:—

1. The aim which the secular judge has in view is to convict the criminal, and by the infliction of a penalty, proportioned to the nature and the greatness of the crime, to restore the order of justice violated by the offense; the acquittal of the innocent is only a secondary consideration. The sacramental judge, on the contrary, reestablishes the relations between God and man, destroyed by sin, not so much by imposing a punishment, as by effecting a reconciliation. His chief preoccupation is the individual welfare of the penitent; the verdict, therefore, is a sentence of absolution and release from guilt; however, the sinner must perform a certain penance, to be determined by the confessor.

2. It follows from this that the final sentence in the tribunal of penance, by which the case is decided, is always one of acquittal. Any other sentence passed in the sacramental court is only intermediate, amounting to a temporary postponement of absolution.

3. In the ordinary session of justice, besides the judge and the accused, we find a prosecutor, witnesses, and pleaders. In the sacramental court there are only the judge and the sinner, who is his own prosecutor, pleading guilty. The proceedings are shrouded in perfect secrecy. The bench cites the criminal against his will, and holds him by force; at the confessional, the sinner presents himself of his own free will. The spiritual judge must credit the account of the penitent, be it in his favor or disfavor, since he alone can bear witness to the state of his conscience. Only when there is moral certainty of the opposite, may the priest distrust the statements of the sinner. On the contrary, the ordinary judge has the right to reject any plea advanced by the criminal.[7]

3. Necessity of the Sacrament of Penance.

The Council of Trent declared in its fourteenth session, with regard to this point: “The Sacrament of Penance is as necessary to those who have incurred mortal sin after baptism, as baptism itself is to those who are not yet regenerated.”[8] It follows from this teaching of the Council that, since Baptism is indispensable to eternal salvation, penance is equally necessary. To use the exact language of theologians, it is necessary in re vel saltem in voto. Which means that those who can actually receive the Sacrament are bound to have recourse to it in order to be freed from their sins; but that those for whom the reception of this Sacrament is for any reason impossible, will be cleansed from their sins by the desire of receiving it. This desire is always included in perfect contrition.[9]

For when Our Lord granted to His apostles the power of forgiving or retaining sins, and thereby instituted the Sacrament of Penance for the remission of grievous sin, committed after Baptism, He evidently asserted it to be His will that the sinner should be subjected to the power of the keys by the reception of this Sacrament, the latter thus becoming a necessary means of obtaining pardon for grievous sin committed after baptismal regeneration. The power of the keys vested in the apostles and their successors would be a useless gift if the faithful, without submitting to that power, could be released from their sins and gain the heavenly kingdom. The more so, as the priest possesses also the power of retaining sins; a power unfavorable to the sinner; but which the sinner could elude if the Sacrament of Penance had not been made a necessary means of forgiveness. Nor would the sinner undergo the inconveniences connected with the reception of the Sacrament of Penance, if he were not persuaded of Christ’s precept, imposing the Sacrament of Penance as a means of reconciliation. Venial sins, however, are forgiven without reference to the Sacrament of Penance, as we shall show in another place.[10]

Thus, by divine precept, all who have incurred mortal sin after Baptism are bound to receive this Sacrament. The obligation is absolute (per se) in danger of death; for, in this case, the reception is necessary. Hence those are bound who are suffering of a dangerous disease; a mother before her first confinement, or before any subsequent birth, if her travails are of an especially alarming nature; a criminal sentenced to death, before his execution; and any one foreseeing the lack of another opportunity for his whole life of making a confession.

There are other times in the course of our life when the obligation of confession becomes actual and pressing; the Church, acting according to the intentions of Christ, has specified these occasions more particularly. For the Sacrament was not instituted merely to dispose man for his passage from this life, but also to heal his spiritual infirmities, to shield him against relapse into sin, and to strengthen him to lead a virtuous life. Consequently, we would frustrate the object of the Sacrament if we were to postpone its reception to the hour of death.

Per accidens it is obligatory to receive this Sacrament: (1) for a person who desires or is bound to receive holy Communion, and who happens to be in a state of mortal sin; (2) when the Sacrament of Penance is the only means for overcoming a temptation or avoiding grievous sin; (3) when any one feels himself incapable of making an act of perfect contrition, and yet is by his duties required to be in a state of grace; for instance, if one has to administer a Sacrament, or simply because one realizes that it is wrong to remain in a state of enmity with God for any considerable period.[11]

The divine precept of approaching the Sacrament of Penance does not urge immediately that a mortal sin has been committed, for it is an affirmative command, and affirmative precepts do not press of their own accord, but only at certain times and under given circumstances. Besides, the Church’s precept of an annual confession for all the faithful, who have fallen into mortal sin, proves sufficiently that divine law does not enforce confession immediately after committing mortal sin.

The precept of the Church concerning the Sacrament of Penance binds only those who have sinned mortally. For the Church’s intention is merely to define more clearly the extent of the divine command; so the ecclesiastical precept does not exceed the limits of the divine precept, and Christ commanded only that mortal sin should be confessed. Hence one who has committed no mortal sin is not subject to the law of the Church prescribing yearly confession. In practice, however, the question has no import; for which of the faithful, guilty only of venial sin, would omit to go to confession at least once a year, or would think of receiving holy Communion without previously having confessed?[12]

He who has committed a mortal sin, but, forgetting all about it, confesses only venial sins, and some days later remembers again the mortal sin, is, according to a probable opinion, no longer subject to the precept of yearly confession; for, since the confession was valid, the mortal sin omitted by sheer forgetfulness is forgiven; and there only remains the obligation of submitting the forgotten sin to the power of the keys in the next confession.[13]

For the same reason alleged above, the law of the Church extends only to those who have reached the age of discernment, and whose minds are sufficiently developed to render them capable of sin. It is impossible[14] to fix any definite limit of age in this matter. Much depends on the child’s personal gifts, its training and education. In each individual case the moral maturity of the child must be gauged by its general accomplishments and its ways of acting. During the ordinary course of religious instruction, the pastor will find ample material on which to base a decision; in case of doubt, the testimony of the parents and the teachers may be taken into account.[15] Seven years is usually assigned as the age at which children of average ability and proper training have arrived at the period of discretion which enables them to understand the malice of mortal sin.

Hence it becomes a duty to instruct the children for confession when they have reached about the seventh or eighth year, or, according to circumstances, even earlier. But even children of an inferior age, if they seem to have sufficient understanding, should not be allowed to die without absolution, though it be pronounced only conditionally. Of course, the priest will help them to elicit the necessary acts of contrition and purpose of amendment. This should be done though it be doubtful that the child has committed a sin or if it has forgotten the sin committed.

It is not a good practice, therefore, to defer the instruction of children on this Sacrament to their ninth year or later; since it does an injustice to the more intelligent children. Moreover, in the case of those children who are sick, this lack of early preparation is apt to deprive them of both the Sacrament of Penance and Extreme Unction, which is a serious matter, if they have been capable of committing mortal sin.[16]

The precept of the Church imposes annual confession, saltem semel in anno. Beyond this, time and season are not specified. Theologians interpret the law in general as follows: all who are conscious of mortal sin are bound to confess within the period between January 1 and December 31, or, what practically amounts to the same, within the time comprised between the Easter of one year and the Easter of the following year. For, whoever makes his confession with a view to his Easter Communion, certainly does confess within the limits of a civil year, though the earlier or later date of Easter may make the interval elapsing between the confessions more than a year.

Since the precept of yearly confession refers only to mortal sins, the common teaching of theologians is that, whosoever has accused himself at Easter time of venial sin only, but falls into mortal sin before the year has expired, must go to confession again before the end of the year, in order to fulfill the ecclesiastical precept.[17]

The faithful, however, adds Lehmkuhl, should be exhorted never to put off the reception of the Sacrament, or at least the eliciting of an act of perfect contrition, when they have had the misfortune of offending God grievously; for a soul in the state of mortal sin is in a most deplorable and dangerous condition. Still we are not authorized to insist on this as being an obligation imposed by the Church, since some distinguished theologians maintain the contrary.[18]

He who one year, whether by his own fault or not, fails to make his confession, but during the next confesses all his sins, satisfies thereby the obligations with respect to both years, in the case, at least, when, during the current year, he has committed a mortal sin which he includes in his confession; for he has fulfilled the precept which enjoins reconciliation with God. If, on the contrary, the penitent has committed only venial sins in the current year, and confessed them along with the mortal sins of the previous year, and later on falls into grievous sin, he is obliged to make another confession in order to comply with the law of the Church.[19]

He who has not confessed for a whole year, must, according to the more common and probable opinion, confess as soon as possible; because the Church has defined the period for fulfilling the precept, not for the purpose of limiting the obligation to a determinate date, but to incite men to perform their duty in proper time (non ad finiendam sed ad urgendam obligationem). Hence, a man would sin against the precept as often as he shirked an opportunity of making the neglected confession, thereby renewing the intention not to obey the law.[20]

He who has sinned grievously, and foresees that in the course of the year he shall be prevented from going to confession, must avail himself of the presently occurring opportunity, for in these circumstances the duty of confessing is actually pressing.

The precept of the Church prescribes, moreover, that the faithful confess their sins sincerely (fideliter). By a bad confession we cannot discharge our duty. This was distinctly confirmed by Alexander VII, condemning a proposition to the contrary. (Prop. 14.)

A further provision of the Lateran decree, to confess proprio sacerdoti, which formerly obliged the faithful to make their annual confession to their own parish priest, bishop, vicar-general, or the Pope, has long been abrogated by a recognized universal contrary practice. Confession may, therefore, be made to any priest duly authorized by the bishop.[21]

The excommunication for the violation of the Church’s precept of annual confession, as of Paschal Communion, is not a pœna latæ, but a pœna ferendæ sententiæ.

The ardent wish of the Church is that her children should confess frequently during the year. This is apparent from the wording of the law. Frequent confession is of the greatest usefulness to all without exception, to the sinner as well as the just. It destroys the evil inclinations born by sin and averts its terrible consequences.

1. Although, absolutely considered, a single confession made worthily and with due preparation is able to arrest us in the downward career of vice, to extinguish the long-nourished flame of passion, to correct our evil inclinations and habits, to confirm us in grace, and to insure us against relapse; yet this is not the ordinary course of things. When we are cleansed from our sins by the Sacrament, we have yet to face a long struggle with the remains of sin; for the wounds inflicted by sin, though closed by the grace of absolution, leave us in a weakened condition, and may easily reopen. To effect a perfect cure of the soul, and to purify its inclinations and habits, there exists no more efficacious means than frequent confession. It leads us to greater watchfulness over ourselves, constitutes an act of humility, forces us to renew our good resolutions; it equips us with many special graces, intended to assist us in our spiritual warfare, and to enable us to persevere in the paths of virtue in spite of the manifold difficulties which we encounter.

2. Frequent confession is also the most powerful means to counteract the disastrous consequences of sin. The most fatal of these are: blindness of the soul, hardening of the heart and final impenitence. As often as we go to confession, the great salutary truths of our religion are recalled to our mind. We reflect on God and our last end, on Jesus Christ and His love and mercy, on the wickedness and the dreadful punishments of sin, on our august duties, and on God’s holy law. Frequent confession is an antidote against the hardening of the heart, since it arouses in us a profound hatred of sin, love for God, fear of His wrath, and the desire of accomplishing His will. Finally, as at every confession we again banish sin from our hearts, frequent confession is the best preparation for a penitent life and a happy death.

Also the just derives great benefits from frequent confession; he is more and more cleansed from the lesser faults, committed daily; the grace and love of God are increased in his heart, and special helps to overcome his failings and weakness are granted to him. The oftener the just man approaches this holy Sacrament, the more fully does he partake of its peculiar graces.[22]

4. Forgiveness of Venial Sin.

By divine and ecclesiastical precept we are bound only to confess mortal sins; there is no obligation to confess venial sins; these may be forgiven without receiving the Sacrament of Penance. “Venial sins, by which we are not shut out from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, though they be rightly and profitably declared in confession, as the practice of pious people demonstrates, may be omitted without guilt, and be expiated by many other methods.” Such is the teaching of the Council of Trent.[23]

Before enumerating the methods by which venial sins can be remitted we wish to observe:—

1. The most necessary condition for the remission of any sin, and therefore also of venial sin, is contrition. So long as a man is attached to sin and does not detest it, God cannot forgive it, for He is infinitely holy and just. It is not, however, absolutely necessary to specify the sins and make a formal act of sorrow for them, otherwise David’s prayer Ab occultis meis munda me (Ps. xviii. 13) would be useless and the remission of forgotten sins impossible. Virtual contrition is sufficient, i.e. the sinner must be actually contrite for all his sins, and from universal motives which apply even to those sins of which he is unconscious or which he has forgotten. He must also have the intention of including in that contrition all the sins by which he has offended God. Although venial sin is more easily forgiven than mortal, yet this forgiveness is impossible without at least a virtual contrition for it. For when a man falls into venial sin he turns inordinately to creatures, not, however, as in mortal sin, by entirely abandoning God, his last end, and unreservedly giving himself up to creatures. This attachment to creatures, however, makes it necessary that he should, if not formally and explicitly, at least virtually and implicitly, turn away from them and combat this guilty affection for creatures by a contrary act of the will. A work done to please God, or a mere act of love without abhorrence of sin, does not remit that sin. As venial sin may coexist with the general habit of the love of God, so it may coexist with a particular act of that love; for a man can make an act of perfect love or even an act of perfect contrition and still retain a leaning toward some particular venial sin.[24]

2. Since the presence of venial sin is compatible with that of sanctifying grace, and since a man can be sorry for one venial sin without being necessarily sorry for another, it follows that one venial sin may be forgiven and others left unforgiven.

3. A penitent who is burdened with both mortal and venial sins may by perfect contrition or the Sacrament of Penance be freed from his mortal sins and yet be left with his venial sins still upon him because he is not sorry for these.

4. Hence, if a man is in the state of mortal sin, his venial sins cannot be remitted without the mortal sin being at the same time forgiven; for God cannot forgive one who will not acknowledge and love Him as Lord and God; and, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, just as mortal sin is forgiven by the influx of sanctifying grace, so the remission of venial sin is dependent on a movement of grace or love, which therefore must be actually present.[25]

Venial sins are forgiven:—

1. By the Sacrament of Penance, and that directly and ex opere operato, when they are submitted in confession to the power of the keys with formal contrition and purpose of amendment.

2. “By many other means,”[26] such as:—

(a) All the Sacraments; they remit sins ex opere operato, and especially those sins which are opposed to the particular end of the Sacrament. For the object of every Sacrament is the sanctification of souls, and hence the removal of all that hinders this sanctification. Now venial sins in particular, by hindering the conferring of richer graces, are an obstacle in the way of attaining sanctity. Cardinal Lugo, in treating this subject, illustrates it by the attitude of two friends: “Even where, in the strict nature of things, we cannot expect that the influx of grace should cause the remission of sins, yet it is in accordance with good feeling that where fresh and closer ties of friendship have been formed, little offences should be condoned. If, then, the influx or increase of grace is a new bond of friendship between God and the just man, uniting him more intimately with God, an embrace of love, so to speak, and a kiss of peace, it is probable and reasonable to suppose that there is granted also a remission of the smaller sins which have been retracted.”[27]

It is always, however, necessary and sufficient to elicit at least a virtual or implicit contrition, contained in a pious and supernatural affection toward God, which is opposed to venial sins, and is consequently a virtual horror and retraction of the same.[28]

Not all the Sacraments, however, effect this forgiveness in the same manner. Next to the Sacrament of Penance, Baptism and Extreme Unction have a peculiar power, because they were instituted by Christ for the very purpose of forgiving sins. If an adult who had been purified of original sin and of his mortal sins by perfect love and contrition (the Baptism of desire), but, on account of his attachment to venial sins, was not yet freed of these, were to receive Baptism, all his venial sins for which he had at least virtual contrition would be forgiven through this Sacrament. For, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, Baptism effects a new birth, and in consequence the remission of sins, with the exception, of course, of those venial sins which the newly baptized person has not yet renounced.[29]

Of Extreme Unction the Council of Trent, referring to James v. 15, teaches that it forgives the sins which defile the soul, and removes the remains of sin.[30]

With respect to the Holy Eucharist the same Council[31] declares that although the forgiveness of sin is certainly not the principal fruit of this Sacrament, yet, in accordance with our Lord’s commands, we should receive it in order thereby to be freed from our daily trespasses and strengthened against mortal sin.

Hence there is no doubt that the Holy Eucharist removes venial sins. But theologians do not agree how it produces this effect—whether, as in the case of the three preceding Sacraments, immediately, ex opere operato, or only mediately, ex opere operantis. The champions of both views appeal to St. Thomas, who on the one hand teaches that the Holy Eucharist acts after the manner of bodily food, repairing what in the heat of concupiscence we have lost by venial sin, and on the other hand declares the peculiar grace (res sacramenti) of this Sacrament to be caritas, and that not only quantum ad habitum sed etiam quantum ad actum; in other words charity is elicited in this Sacrament, and through its operation venial sins are forgiven.[32]

Suarez interprets St. Thomas as teaching that the Holy Eucharist effects the remission of venial sins ex opere operato, and this interpretation would seem to have the preference over that of theologians who, with St. Alphonsus, insisting on the words just quoted, hold that the Sacrament of the Eucharist works ex opere operantis.[33]

The three remaining Sacraments, of Confirmation, Orders, and Marriage, do not so directly imply forgiveness of venial sin; still they pour into the soul of the recipient a new grace, and so they, too, must be considered as remitting venial sins when no obstacle is put in the way.[34] The range of this power varies according as the grace conferred in the Sacrament is more or less opposed to some particular sin or kind of sins. The most efficacious of the last-named Sacraments in eliminating venial sin is that of Confirmation, because its influence extends to the whole life of faith and grace, strengthening and bringing it to perfection.[35] Holy Orders give grace to the recipient, so that he may attain the holiness and perfection that befit his state, and in consequence they also purify from sin.[36] Finally, Matrimony remits venial sins because it confers the grace by which concupiscence is curbed and restrained, and by which the recipients are enabled to fulfil their duties of mutual sanctification.

(b) Venial sins are likewise removed by the holy sacrifice of the Mass, which of its own nature is a sacrifice of atonement, a sacrificium vere propitiatorium.[37] It works this forgiveness, as theologians teach, per modum impetrationis, therefore mediately, by obtaining for the sinner from God the grace of contrition or other virtues, excluding affection for sin.[38]

(c) The sacramentals also destroy venial sins. “By the use of the sacramentals the faithful confess and awaken their faith, hope, reverence for God, a longing for interior holiness and sinlessness, or a horror of sin, and sorrow for past offences. The symbols blessed or used by the Church confer a grace which produces or strengthens desires and acts of different virtues, which in turn destroy venial sin and atone for it.”[39] Hence a sacramental possesses power of remitting sin in proportion as its character and the blessing of the Church cause it to excite or strengthen acts of virtue in the faithful. The Church has a sacramental especially designed for the remission of venial sins, and makes use of it on those occasions when the faithful need greatest purity of heart. It consists of the two prayers: Misereatur vestri, etc., and Indulgentiam, absolutionem, etc.[40] To these we may add the use of holy water, which, in accordance with the intention and prayers of the Church when she blesses it, is designed to ward off the devil’s influence from animate and inanimate creatures and to protect them from impurity, sickness, and harm.[41] The effect of the other sacramentals in procuring remission of venial sins is not so direct. The more they are of their own nature suited to awaken contrition, and the more directly the intention in the use of them is directed to the cleansing from sin, so much the more effectual are they in this respect.[42]

(d) Contrition by itself also procures the remission of venial sins, and more especially when it is perfect (contritio), since, then, it destroys mortal sin and is, therefore, still more efficacious in the case of venial. Perfect contrition removes all venial sins if it is universal, that is to say if it extends to all venial sins, or if a man is disposed never more to commit venial sin and would be sorry for all his past sins, if they were present to his mind. On the other hand, an act of perfect contrition does not remit all venial sins, if it extends only to this or that particular venial sin, or if a person is disposed to avoid only one or other of his venial sins.[43]

According to the teaching of the more numerous and distinguished theologians, even imperfect contrition remits venial sins; this imperfect contrition (attritio) must spring from some supernatural motive referring to God—such for instance as the thought that venial sin is a violation of the obedience or reverence due to God.[44] By attritio the affection toward sin is entirely uprooted and the will is withdrawn from the sin, man turns again to God as his last end, and expiates his fault by his sorrow.[45]

(e) Moreover, the “love of God above all things” remits venial sins if it is actual and formally or virtually opposed to venial sin.[46]

(f) Lastly, venial sins are forgiven by good works done from a motive of penance (ex affectu pœnitentiæ), especially those to which Holy Scripture assigns the virtue of destroying venial sin. Such are: prayer[47] (John xiv. 13 s.; xvi. 23), almsgiving and fasting, especially the works of mercy and mortification (Ecclus. iii. 33; iv. 1-11; Tob. iv. 11; Dan. iv. 24; Matt. v. 7; John iii. 5-10; 1 Reg. vii. 5, etc.; 1 Esdras viii. 21, etc.). Cf. S. Thom. II. II. Q. 147, art. 1 et 3.[48]

5. The Constituent Parts of the Sacrament of Penance in General.

As in the other Sacraments a distinction is made between the matter and the form, so too in the Sacrament of Penance; but with a certain difference, which appears from the fact that the Council of Trent speaks of the matter of this Sacrament as a quasi-materia. The Catechismus Romanus[49] states this more fully when it says: This Sacrament is distinguished from the other Sacraments especially in this, that the matter of the other Sacraments is a substance produced by nature or art, while in the Sacrament of Penance it is the acts of the penitent, especially the contrition, confession, and satisfaction; yet it is not because these acts are not to be considered as truly matter of the Sacrament that the Holy Council calls them quasi-materia (“as it were the matter”), but because they are not materially or externally applied, like water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation. These three acts of the penitent are styled by the Council of Trent the parts (partes) of the Sacrament of Penance “in so far as they are required by God’s ordinance in the penitent for the completeness of the Sacrament and for the entire and perfect remission of sin.”[50] To these must be added the absolution of the priest, which constitutes the form. Hence we have to consider as parts of the Sacrament: (1) contrition, (2) confession, (3) satisfaction, and (4) absolution.[51]

The three acts of the penitent have not all, however, the same importance. The satisfaction belongs to the Sacrament only in so far as its integrity and its complete efficacy are concerned; hence it is not an essential, but only an integral part of the Sacrament. It is true that the power of imposing on the penitent a suitable satisfaction belongs essentially to the administration of this Sacrament; hence also the penitent is obliged to accept this penance and to declare himself willing to perform it. The actual performance of the penance, however, is not necessary in order that the Sacrament should produce its effect.[52]

The confession or self-accusation of the penitent in presence of the priest is the principal matter of this Sacrament, for this is necessary in se and per se, in order that the confessor may form a judgment and administer the Sacrament.

Contrition is a necessary constituent of the Sacrament but merely in se not per se ipsum, and only as contained in the accusation, which is an outward manifestation of the contrition; for contrition is not per se subject to the senses, but must be outwardly shown in some way in order to become manifest.[53] “The contrite accusation, therefore, realizes all the conditions of the matter in the Sacraments.”[54]

Theologians draw a further distinction in this Sacrament between the proximate and the remote matter (materia proxima et remota). Proxima materia consists of the acts which the penitent has to perform, and remota materia of the sins committed after Baptism which the penitent has repented of and confessed and for which he must do satisfaction.[55]

6. Of the Remote Matter of the Sacrament of Penance in Particular.

The remote matter of this Sacrament are, as we have already seen, the sins committed after Baptism. Those committed before Baptism are forgiven entirely in Baptism, wherefore they are not, properly speaking, subject to the Sacrament of Penance. Again, a man is not under the Church’s jurisdiction till he is baptized, and this Sacrament of Penance is administered by virtue of the jurisdiction which the Church exercises over her members. The sins which are confessed are not, however, materia ex qua, as is water in the Sacrament of Baptism, by means of which the Sacrament is conferred, but materia circa quam, with regard to which the penitent performs the necessary acts and receives absolution. As, for example, in a lawsuit the matter proposed for decision and the sentence are called the matter of the case, so here the sins which form the object of the sacramental process instituted for the remission of sins are regarded as the remote matter of penance.[56] This remote matter is divided into:—

1. Necessary and free matter (necessaria et libera), i.e. necessary as a consequence of the divine command, by which definite sins (a definite materia remota) must be submitted to the sacramental tribunal and the power of the keys, so that the penitent who wilfully neglects this course cannot receive the Sacrament validly. By free matter we understand those sins which the penitent voluntarily confesses whilst not bound to do so by divine law.

2. Certain and doubtful (certa et dubia), i.e. matter which in the judgment of the confessor is a certain and valid object of absolution; or matter regarding which absolution cannot be pronounced without misgiving.

3. Finally, sufficient and insufficient (sufficiens et insufficiens), i.e. such matter as suffices for the administering of the Sacrament and the granting of absolution, whether the matter be necessary or free, and such over which sacramental absolution cannot be pronounced.

Necessary matter comprises all grievous sins committed after Baptism and not at any former time submitted directly to the power of the keys; of all and each of them the penitent is obliged to accuse himself.

Sins are remitted directly when they have been remitted per se quite independently of other sins. This is the case when they have been explicitly confessed to a priest having the required jurisdiction. Sins are forgiven indirectly when they are remitted in conjunction with other sins, and not per se. This happens when a penitent omits a sin through invincible ignorance or forgetfulness or inability; or if a confessor without proper jurisdiction, for serious reasons, gives absolution. In both cases such sins are remitted in conjunction with the other sins which have been explicitly confessed and over which the priest had jurisdiction. This must be so, for a penitent cannot at the same time experience God’s mercy by the remission of the sins which he has confessed and also be an object of God’s wrath with respect to his other sins; moreover, the inpouring grace, through the remission of the sins that have been confessed, is not compatible with the presence of mortal sin remaining in the soul.

It is in consequence of Christ’s institution that all the sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly forgiven, and also the sins only indirectly forgiven, must of necessity be revealed to the priest; for in appointing the priest to be His representative, Christ made him the judge before whom all mortal sins must be brought, that, in virtue of the power of the keys, he might pass sentence of loosing or binding.[57] Over sins which have not yet been directly remitted the confessor has pronounced no judgment, for they were unknown to him; hence, in accordance with Christ’s command, even sins indirectly forgiven must be submitted by confession to the power of the keys in order that they may obtain direct forgiveness.[58]

The following classes of sins are sufficient and free matter for confession:—

(a) The venial sins committed after Baptism. These are matter sufficient because Christ gave His priests power to forgive all sins, therefore also venial sin; and the Council of Trent teaches that it is good and wholesome to confess venial sins. Since, however, the recommendation of the Council imposes no obligation to confess them, as they may be remitted by other means, they are free matter.

(b) Sins already directly forgiven are also free matter. Since they have already been remitted by sacramental absolution they may be said to exist no longer. Nevertheless, though they have been forgiven, one may renew his sorrow for them, and on that account the absolution may be given again validly, even if no other sins be presented. This is proved by the general practice of the faithful and the unanimous teaching of theologians, who declare that contrite confession of a past sin is always materia proxima of the Sacrament; a sin which has received forgiveness remains always a sin of the past and so can be made the object of sorrow and of sacramental accusation.[59]

Moreover the highest authority in the Church favors this view; for Benedict XI teaches[60]: “Though it be not necessary, yet we consider it very wholesome to repeat the confession of special sins on account of the humiliation which they cause.” Although, in these words, the Holy Father speaks of humiliation only as the advantage to be drawn from the confession of previously forgiven sin, it is quite evident that he does not intend to exclude the great benefits which the absolution pronounced over these sins must bring, for the confessions of which the Pope speaks are made only in order to obtain absolution.[61]

Thus, besides this salutary humiliation, the confession of forgiven sins and the absolution again pronounced over them cause an increase of sanctifying grace and a remission of temporal punishment, augment the hatred for sin, and dispose the penitent, who has only human shortcomings or venial sins of less moment to disclose, better toward a sincere contrition. How in this case the true notion of “absolution,” which is in fact identical with the influx of sanctifying grace, is preserved, remains for the dogmatic theologian to settle; for our purpose it is enough to indicate briefly Lugo’s explanation. “As,” says the learned Cardinal, “after making a vow I can bind myself afresh to its observance by renewing the vow in a manner which binds me independently of the former promise, so God may again waive His right of punishing sin, by a renewal of the compact with man to pardon past sins, and this repeated renunciation of the divine right is as efficacious as the first, and is made by a new infusion of sanctifying grace.”[62]

Since venial sins and mortal sins already directly remitted are free matter, it is not necessary to accuse one’s self of them with such accuracy and perfection regarding number and species as in the case of necessary matter, even if there be nothing else to confess. In this case we cannot urge the two reasons for which the accusation of mortal sins not yet confessed must include the details of species and number, for neither has God ordered it, nor is it required in order that the judicial power may be properly exercised with regard to them. Hence it suffices to accuse one’s self in such a way as to enable the priest to form some sort of judgment. That this is possible if the sin is confessed at least generically (generice) is seen from other cases. For instance, a man who knows that on one occasion he sinned gravely against the sixth commandment but has forgotten the exact specific nature of the sin, or that he has sinned gravely but has quite forgotten what the sin was, is obliged, as all theologians teach, to confess that he has sinned gravely against purity, or, in the latter instance, that he had committed a mortal sin. Many extend this obligation to a sin which is only doubtfully mortal, of which the penitent cannot any longer remember the species, and which moreover is the only sin weighing upon his conscience.[63]

We have viewed our subject with respect to the validity of the Sacrament. Let us see how in practice a general accusation may be made, and how far such general accusations are valid and permissible matter for absolution.

1. A penitent may accuse himself thus: “I have sinned and I accuse myself of the sins of my whole life,” and if the confessor has no other knowledge of these sins, such an accusation is general in the widest sense; to this class belongs also an accusation conveyed by an expression of sorrow without any explicit avowal of sin.

2. A more particular but still general accusation is: “I accuse myself of all the mortal sins which I have committed.”

3. Yet more precise is the accusation: “I accuse myself of all the lies I have told, or of all the sins I have committed against purity, or justice, or this or that particular virtue,” thus pointing out the virtue or the command against which he has sinned, but without giving the ultimate specific character (infima species) of the sin.

4. Finally, the penitent may declare the ultimate species (infima species) of the sin without determining the precise act and without the specific circumstances and their number; e.g. I accuse myself of all profanations of the name of God, of all sinful looks dangerous to purity, of all deception in my dealings with my neighbor, etc.

When there is question in the confession of materia libera:—

1. The last two methods of general accusation are sufficient for the valid and licit administration of the Sacrament, whether the whole confession consist of such a general accusation or whether this general accusation be added to a confession of venial sins to make sure of contrition. The second method of accusation might perhaps be allowed; but if any one wished to make the whole confession by this second method of general accusation, embracing in this manner sins already confessed without some sort of a special mention of venial sins lately committed, the confessor might well object and could not easily give absolution unless in case of some pressing necessity. If, however, sins not yet explicitly confessed are declared, and a general accusation is added of the second kind for the sake of security, this may be considered as sufficient both quoad valorem and quoad liceitatem. For the accusation, “I have sinned mortally,” is not quite vague, as it expresses a certain degree of sinfulness which may very well be (and at times is all that can be obtained) the object of a judicial sentence.

2. An entirely vague accusation, although there be necessary matter, may be accepted as being sufficient in cases of extreme necessity—when a detailed accusation is impossible and absolution must be given. For instance:—

(a) At the time of death, when the dying man can no longer speak or is unconscious, and has already shown signs of a desire for absolution; for, according to the Roman Ritual, such a man is to be absolved (absolvendus est), and this official book of the Church suggests nothing about making the absolution conditional.

(b) In other cases of impending death, when the desire for absolution is expressed by any sort of sign; e.g. in a shipwreck where there is not time to make a full accusation.

(c) If a penitent is too ignorant or too weak-headed, even with the help of the confessor’s questions, to render an accurate account, at least absolution may at times be given to such a penitent if he has not had it for a long period.[64]

3. When it is a question of venial sins only (on the supposition that these either alone or in conjunction with other doubtful matter have been confessed), the confessor may not give absolution for an accusation which is quite vague, for such an accusation offers no entirely certain matter for absolution, and from what is allowed in danger of death we may not conclude that the same will suffice for the validity of absolution in cases where there is no urgency. A confession, for instance, delivered by a messenger is permissible only in the case of imminent death where no other means can be devised; this is clear from the propositions condemned by Clement VIII and Paul V. In any other case, the unanimous voice of theologians declares such a confession invalid. Hence if valid matter can be presented, it must be done if absolution is to be given.

This is clear, too, on the merits of the case itself. One may always presume that the desire which a dying man expresses for absolution is at least a hesitating, if not definite, acknowledgement of having committed mortal sin by the fact that he considers absolution necessary and desirable; but if a man, though able, accuses himself of no definite sins to his confessor, it is tantamount to a declaration that he has committed only venial sins. Now the confession of mortal sin in general contains something definite; whereas an accusation of venial sin in general is altogether vague; hence the causa judicialis in this case is quite unknown, and no sentence can be passed where the charge is unknown and undetermined.

Finally, it is quite foreign to the practice of the Church to make a confession by the formula, “I have no mortal sins; I am sorry for my venial sins, and I ask absolution.” He who evades, therefore, a fuller accusation of his venial sins, when he could make one, is unworthy of absolution, which is intended to be given by the Church only to those who make a definite accusation.[65] Though, adds Laymann,[66] no one is bound by any law to confess venial sins, yet whoever wishes to receive sacramental absolution must accuse himself at least of some venial sin, in specie.[67] Suarez says, and rightly, that the validity of such an accusation may be defended speculatively, but that practically it is to be condemned on account of the uncertainty of the matter. “I declare, then,” he continues, “that, though we are not strictly bound to confess the species of the venial sins, yet, supposing that we wish absolution, we are bound to offer certain and definite matter. But in case of necessity or where it is impossible to make a more definite accusation (as might happen in the case of a man who is dying) such matter would doubtlessly be sufficient.”[68]

“Since, then,” concludes Lehmkuhl, “outside the cases of necessity or impossibility a vague confession of only venial sins does not supply definite matter, it is not sufficient to add it to the particular confession in order to have a more secure ground for a valid absolution than by the accusation of the smaller sins committed since the last confession, unless the confessor from previous knowledge of the penitent can decide whether sufficiently definite matter is presented to him in this vague general assertion.”[69]

In consequence the following rules are recommended in practice:—

1. If, in order to secure unquestionably definite matter from the past life of the penitent, some sin or other is confessed in addition to those committed since the last confession, it ought to be done by mentioning the virtue or the commandment which was violated.

2. Some really grave sin ought to be mentioned.

3. It should not be mentioned out of mere routine, but with real sorrow of heart.

4. Since of late a number of writers defend the mere vague accusation on this free matter as valid and permissible[70] even outside cases of necessity, the confessor when unable to get more definite matter may acquiesce and grant absolution.

5. If one desires to derive real spiritual profit from the confession of venial sins, too great minuteness as well as too great vagueness must be avoided; some particular venial sin which causes more uneasiness than the rest might be made a subject of more especial sorrow and more careful accusation, otherwise in many cases the sorrow as well as the accusation and purpose of amendment are likely to be too vague, if not completely absent. It has been pointed out previously that gross ignorance on the part of the penitent is a reason for taking a very general accusation as valid for absolution.

In practice the confessor should attend to the following rules:—

In the case of a penitent who accuses himself of no sin in particular, let the priest inquire whether this be due to the fact that the penitent has really not committed any mortal sin, or to invincible ignorance, or to a rooted habit of sin which has produced in the penitent a darkening of the intellect and a recklessness with regard to his salvation. If the penitent accuses himself of no sin in particular because he is really quite unconscious of grave trespass, the confessor might suggest to him a few lesser sins such as are usually committed by people in the same station of life, and ask if, since the last confession or in his past life, he has ever given way to such sins—if, for instance, he has offended his neighbor, or been violent, angry, disobedient, careless in prayer, etc. If the penitent answers in the affirmative to one or other of these questions, the confessor should excite him to repentance and purpose of amendment, so far as he sees it necessary, and then absolve him. If, however, the penitent answers all questions with a No, and cannot be induced to acknowledge any sin of his past life, further questioning should be avoided, and the penitent urged to make an act of sorrow for all the sins of his whole life, especially those committed against his neighbor, or against obedience, etc. If the penitent accede to this, as often happens, in spite of his former declaration that he is not conscious of any sin even in his past life, the priest should arouse him to sorrow and a firm resolution, and absolve him conditionally if the penitent has not received absolution for a long time.

With such penitents there will be reason to suspect that their disposition comes from want of knowledge of the most necessary truths of salvation. If the priest discover this to be the case—as he may by a few judicious questions—he may not absolve him till after instruction in these necessary truths. Ordinarily it will be well to instruct him at once before leaving the confessional, for fear that he should neglect approaching the Sacraments—a consequence much to be apprehended—or take no pains to get instructed. If, however, the priest finds out that the cause of the ignorance is a rooted habit of sin, or the insensibility following on certain sins which have so fatal an effect in this matter—as, for instance, impurity or drunkenness—he must exercise great patience, putting before the penitent earnestly the awful consequences of his sinful life, instruct him, and in every possible way prepare him with true apostolic zeal to receive worthily the sacrament, either immediately or later, if the absolution be deferred, and to fulfill his resolutions of making an earnest amendment.[71]

7. The Form of the Sacrament.

The form of the Sacrament, “in which its power principally lies,”[72] consists of the words which the priest utters over the penitent: Ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, Amen. To these words the custom of the Church has added others which have become fixed in the ritual and are prescribed, though “they do not belong to the essence of the form and are not necessary for the conferring of the Sacrament.”[73]

There is no doubt that the words Ego te absolvo, or te absolvo simply (since the pronoun Ego is contained in the verb absolvo), belong to the essence of the form. These words are de essentia formæ, because, as St. Thomas says,[74] they signify the virtus clavium et totum Sacramenti effectum.

According to most theologians the words a peccatis tuis do not belong to the essence and the validity of the Sacrament; for this view we may quote St. Thomas and the authority of the Roman catechism, which says: “The form is: Ego te absolvo.” The words a peccatis tuis are sufficiently indicated by the accusation of the penitent and the act of the priest who gives absolution. Other theologians, however, maintain that these words are essential, arguing that since Christ in instituting the Sacrament used the words, “Whose sins you shall forgive,” the remission of sins ought to be expressly mentioned. Though the first view is the more probable, the words ought not to be omitted in practice, since in the conferring of the Sacraments the safer opinion should be followed.[75]

If the words absolvo a peccatis tuis were used, omitting the word te, the form would still be probably valid, since te is sufficiently implied in the word tuis; in practice, however, this view ought not to be taken, but the safer opinion followed.[76] The absolution would certainly be invalid if the priest said only absolvo, because the object of the absolution is not indicated and the sense is indefinite.[77]

The words In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, Amen, are certainly not of the essence of the form, since Christ in instituting the Sacrament made no reference to the Blessed Trinity; they are, however, most appropriately added to express that the priest absolves from sin by the authority and power of God.[78]

In cases of necessity absolution may be given by the same priest to many persons at the same time, while he says, Ego vos absolvo a peccatis vestris; thus, for instance, soldiers may be absolved at the beginning of a battle. As many Sacraments are conferred as there are persons absolved, if they give any token of sorrow and in some way confess their sinfulness.[79]

The Rituale Romanum prescribes how a priest should give absolution, and, as it is the official book of the Church, he is bound to follow its directions. Any unauthorized change would be a sin because it is a breach of the commands of the Church; indeed the confessor would sin grievously if he wished to introduce any change into the form of absolution.

“When the priest is about to give absolution,” is the direction of the Ritual, “after imposing a penance on the penitent and the latter having accepted it, let him say: Misereatur tui omnipotens Deus et dimissis peccatis tuis perducat te ad vitam æternam. Amen. Then he raises his right hand over the penitent and says: Indulgentiam, absolutionem et remissionem peccatorum tuorum tribuat tibi omnipotens et misericors Dominus. Amen.

“Dominus noster Jesus Christus te absolvat, et ego auctoritate ipsius te absolvo ab omni vinculo excommunicationis (suspensionis) et interdicti in quantum possum et tu indiges. Deinde ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis in nomine Patris ✠ et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen.

“If the penitent is not a cleric, the word suspensionis is omitted.” Then follows the prayer: “Passio Domini nostri Jesu Christi, merita beatæ Mariæ Virginis et omnium Sanctorum, quidquid boni feceris et mali sustinueris, sint tibi in remissionem peccatorum, augmentum gratiæ et præmium vitæ æternæ. Amen.”

If there are many penitents to be heard and in urgent confessions, the Misereatur and Indulgentiam may be omitted and simply the Dominus noster, etc., said. The prayer Passio Domini, etc., may also be left out.[80] It is recommended, however, not to omit this last prayer, because by virtue of it (so teaches St. Thomas) the good works of the penitent acquire the character of sacramental satisfaction, and a share in the merits of Christ as well as those of our blessed Lady and of the saints.[81]

“In cases of pressing necessity, in danger of death, the priest may simply say: Ego te absolvo ab omnibus censuris et peccatis in nomine Patris ✠ et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen.”

Such is the form of absolution according to the prescription of the Roman Ritual. The confessor is at liberty to make use of the above abbreviations under the circumstances mentioned. It would be very wrong to attempt to put in all the prayers, if there were danger of a man dying without receiving absolution; in this case the priest must use the shorter form given by the Ritual.[82]

The priest will be more eager to carry out the directions of the Church if he reflects on the meaning of the prayers which precede and follow the absolution; the former constitute an admirable preparation for that great act of mercy, the latter a most appropriate crowning of the same; all secure a special help for the penitent. Even the blessing which, according to some rituals, the priest is enjoined to give with the words: Dominus sit in corde tuo et in labiis tuis ut digne et competenter (or rite) confitearis peccata tua. In nomine Patris ✠ et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen, is important. The accusation of so many sins is a heavy burden to the penitent; false shame and the devil will unite to deter him from a sincere accusation; and so the priest prays that the Lord with His grace may so act on the heart of the penitent that with sincerity and contrition he accuses himself of what burdens his conscience. In the Misereatur the priest prays that God may grant in His mercy remission of the sins which the penitent confesses, and give him eternal life (anticipando by sanctifying grace, and perfectly in the next world). The Indulgentiam contains the same petition for “grace, absolution, and remission,” of sins confessed and of all others; it is not meant as a mere repetition, as a sort of compliance with Our Lord’s counsel of insisting on the first petition; but in the repetition of the synonyms the priest is no doubt intended to plead for God’s mercy and power that the penitent may have complete forgiveness of sin. This perfect forgiveness includes also the remission of the temporal penalties, since these, as the reliquiæ peccatorum, are so intimately connected with the sin itself that in early Christian times they were briefly included under the category of peccata, and the Church, in the so-called general absolution given on the occasion of a plenary indulgence of temporal punishment, still uses the formula indulgentiam plenariam et remissionem omnium peccatorum tibi concedo.

Then the priest goes on to reconcile the penitent to the Church by the removal of all censures which close the door to the Sacraments and other means of grace. This absolution from censure should always precede that of the sins as a measure of precaution even when no sins involving censure have been confessed. The Church insists on this, and many moralists teach that the confessor by omitting this absolutio a censuris would commit a venial sin by his disobedience to the command of the Church. Even in cases of the most pressing urgency the priest should use the form: Ego te absolvo ab omnibus censuris et peccatis in nomine Patris, etc.[83] St. Alphonsus does not regard this omission as a sin if the priest uses the formula of absolution with the intention of absolving from censure as well as sin, and he argues from the words of the Council of Trent, which says only that this clause is added laudabiliter.[84] If, however, a penitent has incurred a censure and the priest first absolves from the sin and afterwards from the censure, such inversion of the order would be matter of grievous sin when the censure is excommunication debarring from the reception of the Sacraments; not, however, in the case of suspension or interdict. This inversion would also be a grievous sin even if the priest intended to absolve from both sins and censures, although in this case the words absolvo te a peccatis tuis can be understood of the absolution from censures on account of the intimate connection between the two.[85] Such an absolution, therefore, would be valid though given in defiance of the Church’s prescription, for the censure does not affect the validity but only the lawfulness of the absolution.[86]

The penitent must be present and the absolution pronounced over him by the confessor if it is to be valid. This is abundantly clear from the divine institution of the Sacrament, from the practice of the Church, and from a decree of the Head of the Church. Hence the absolution cannot be given in writing nor by signs. According to the teaching of the Councils of Florence and Trent the form of this Sacrament, as of all the others (except that of matrimony, where a mere sign of consent is sufficient), is in the words which the priest must pronounce and articulate over the penitent. The Sacraments owe their institution to Christ; for, though matrimony existed as a divine institution before His coming, it was sanctified by Him and raised to the dignity of a means of grace in His Church. The essential rites of the Sacraments were defined by Christ, and we learn them from Scripture or tradition. We know from a uniform tradition that the form of all the Sacraments except matrimony consists essentially in words articulated by the lips; as for the Sacrament of Penance, the evidence is clear as well from the actual use prescribed in all penitentials and from the teaching of the Fathers, as from the decree of Eugenius IV to the Armenians.

It is not, however, necessary that the words of absolution should be heard by the penitent or others; in fact it is recommended to say them in a low voice, so that, in case absolution is for some reason withheld from a penitent, others may not know of it.

The fact that the absolution should be pronounced in words requires as its complement that the penitent should be present, for the words Ego te absolvo are not such as we would address to a person when absent, but thus we speak to one who is nigh. The form must certainly be applied to the matter actually present; moreover, according to the Council of Trent the sinner should present himself before the tribunal as the accused. This is quite clear, too, from the constant tradition of the Church, in which all penitentials contain a form which is pronounced over one who is present, and either explicitly require the immediate presence of the penitent before the confessor or evidently suppose it; nor do we find in the whole of antiquity any clear instance of a sacramental absolution pronounced over an absent person.

A confession, therefore, made to a priest by writing or by messenger is invalid if the absolution is given to the penitent in his absence. Moreover, the absolution is illicit and invalid if given to an absent penitent even though the confession has been made by him in person to the priest. Further, too, the absolution is illicit and invalid which is given to a present penitent who has not confessed in person to the priest—if, for instance, the confession has been by letter; exception is made for the case where the penitent presents himself to the priest and for some good reason accuses himself only in general of sins about which he has informed the confessor by letter, if the latter at the time of the confession retains a knowledge of the sins in particular.[87]

The præsentia moralis of the penitent is sufficient for absolution. This condition is satisfied if the priest and the penitent are sufficiently near to hear one another when they speak in an ordinary tone of voice, though cases may occur where the voice must be exerted a little more than is usual.[88] In general greater proximity is required for valid absolution than is demanded for hearing a preacher or for satisfying the obligation of hearing Mass.[89]

St. Alphonsus declares with respect to this subject that Tamburini is justified in rejecting the view of Leander, who holds that the moral presence is secured if the priest sees the penitent or is sensibly aware of his presence.[90] A man may be seen at a distance at which it would be impossible to hold speech with him in the usual manner or even by raising the voice. If in case of necessity absolution must be given at a distance, it should be given sub conditione.

Hence to secure the validity of the absolution it is required (1) that the confessor and the penitent should not be in rooms which are in no way connected; and if (2) they are in the same room, they should not be too far apart, certainly not more than twenty paces; if the distance is notably less, there need be no misgiving about the validity of the absolution; finally (3) the required proximity is secured if the priest knows that the penitent is present.

(a) If the penitent has already left the confessional but is still close by the confessor, he may and ought to be absolved, even, according to Lugo, Tamburini, and others, if he be so merged in the crowd that he cannot be seen; the confessor must, however, be certain that he is not or cannot be far off; for the penitent is still morally present and has the desire of receiving absolution. The penitent ought, however, to be recalled if this can be done without causing disturbance or remark.

(b) If, through fear of infection or for other reasons, the priest cannot enter a sick-room, he may validly absolve the penitent from the window or the door.[91]

(c) If at a distance a priest sees some one falling from a height or into the water, or if he knows that some one is buried under the ruins of a building, etc., he should give absolution conditionally.[92]

Absolution must, under ordinary circumstances, be given absolutely; for weighty reasons it may and ought to be given conditionally (conditione).

8. Conditional Absolution.

It is the unanimous teaching of all theologians that in certain cases, for weighty reasons, the Sacraments may be administered conditionally, and, what is more, must be so administered. With regard to Baptism and Extreme Unction this is prescribed by the Roman Ritual, with regard to Confirmation by Benedict XIV, with regard to the Holy Eucharist, where a doubt exists as to the validity of the consecration, by the Rubrics of the Mass, and with regard to Orders by the S. Congregatio Concilii.[93]

The question now under consideration is whether the Sacrament of Penance given conditionally is valid.

Many theologians were of opinion that a conditional absolution was opposed to the judicial character of this Sacrament. They argued that the conditional form was not judicial, and in particular would not admit a condition with regard to law (conditio juris), on which the confessor was bound to pronounce judgment (e.g. if thou art prepared, disposed, etc.), whereas they permitted a condition with regard to the fact (conditio facti) (e.g. if thou art alive). This distinction is, however, irrelevant; for even though the question of the penitent’s disposition be left undecided, still the priest judges (1) of the sins which have been confessed, and (2) gives his sentence on the apparent worthiness and preparation of the penitent and the penance to be imposed; and (3) judges on the advisability of conferring conditional absolution or not, according to the effect it will have on the penitent. In any case, the argument from the difference which a conditional sentence would create between a human court and the sacramental tribunal proves nothing, since the two courts differ in many points.[94] It is to be particularly noted that the sentence of an earthly court is always carried out; while the effect of the sentence which the priest pronounces in the divine tribunal always depends on conditions known only to God, so that the priest’s sentence is always conditional even when it is pronounced in an absolute form. A conditional sentence is in no way inconsistent with the nature of a judicial judgment either in general or in the Sacrament of Penance.

Lehmkuhl enlarges on this point:[95] “It is not repugnant in a civil tribunal for a judge to give sentence with a condition like the following, for instance: ‘If payment be not made by a certain date,’ or to grant a hearing to a plaintiff ‘provided that such or such document be found among his papers,’ which document, of course, he will order to be searched for by trustworthy men. Indeed, every sentence of a human tribunal, whether in civil or in criminal causes, is seldom pronounced without the implicit condition ‘if the evidence of the witnesses be true’; for unless it rested upon this supposition and condition, the sentence would be unjust and consequently null, more especially if pronounced by any but the supreme authority.”

Thus the sacramental sentence always presupposes that the penitent is telling the truth and has real sorrow; under such circumstances the confessor may be mistaking even when he thinks he is certain, all the more so as the sacramental sentence is pronounced always ministerially, and, in order to be efficacious, must be in accordance with the sentence of God. This, however, is no impediment to the absolution being for the most part pronounced absolutely both as to form and intention. This the confessor must observe as long as he has no solid ground for thinking that his judgment is not in accordance with God’s; for a condition which rests only on a possibility or on a groundless suspicion is practically not worth considering and ought not to be acted upon; in reality it is quite sufficiently implied in the nature of the case.

If, however, for some good reason it is to be feared that the judgment of the confessor is different from that of God, while the pressing necessity of the case, or the good of the penitent requires that absolution be given even though doubtful, reverence for the Sacrament demands that the condition be added explicitly in word, or at least in the mind, so that it amounts to a protest on the part of the priest that where the condition is in default he withdraws his intention of pronouncing the sacred words of absolution in the person of Christ.

The opponents of conditional absolution urge in favor of their view the proposition that in doubt about the validity of the Sacraments the safer opinion must be followed. With regard to the validity of conditional absolution there is no doubt, since the views of its opponents have no probability either intrinsic or extrinsic. Moreover, it is not true that the safer opinion with regard to the validity of the Sacraments is always to be followed; for, since the Sacraments were instituted for man’s benefit, cases occur in which the Sacraments must be exposed to the danger of nullity, in order to help one who is in extreme spiritual necessity. An instance in point would be the case of a dying man whose dispositions are doubtful. To let him die without absolution would surely expose him to the certain danger of damnation. Supposing he were in good dispositions, whatever misgivings I might have on the subject, should I not be responsible for his damnation? I might have opened the gates of heaven to him and I have not done it! Am I then to absolve him without any condition? But supposing he is not disposed; even if the Sacrament were not nullified, I should be guilty of having exposed it to the danger of invalidity. From such a dilemma the only escape is the use of conditional absolution; by it I can help the dying man if he is in good dispositions, and I insure the Sacrament against nullity when I have the intention of not conferring it unless the man be disposed.[96]

Hence theologians teach that absolution given sub conditione is valid if the condition be fulfilled; the condition, however, must be de præsenti or de præterito; absolution given under a conditio de futuro would be invalid, for in a conditio de futuro the minister of the Sacrament has no intention of conferring the Sacrament hic et nunc; his intention would rather be to confer the Sacrament when the condition will have been fulfilled; by that time, however, the matter is no longer present which for the validity of the Sacrament must be joined to the form. On the other hand, the Sacrament may be validly given under a condition de præsenti or de præterito, because the intention is absolute if the condition is fulfilled; if not fulfilled, the intention of administering the Sacrament is wanting, so that the Sacrament is not exposed to irreverence. In this case the conditional intention passes into an unconditional one, i.e. becomes absolute. But the conditional intention is efficacious for validity only if the condition is completed or satisfied at the moment when the matter and form of the Sacrament are brought together. The absolution would also be valid if it were given with the condition: “if you are alive, if you are baptized, if you are present, if you really intend to make restitution”; while an absolution would be invalid if given under conditions such as, “if you are predestined, if it be in the mind of God that you will make restitution this year,” since such knowledge is withheld from men. Finally, an absolution given with the condition, “if you are going to improve,” would also be invalid.[97]

It is also allowed to give absolution sub conditione when there is just reason for so doing; and in case of necessity the priest is bound under mortal sin to give conditional absolution.[98]

The view of some theologians is to be condemned who hold that one may impart conditional absolution for any insignificant reason, or without urgent need, or in any doubt of the requisite dispositions even in a penitent burdened with mortal sin. This is a doctrine which bears too openly the stamp of laxity, and it is pernicious to souls. What a number of sacrileges would follow from such a practice! The confessor would be no longer a faithful and prudent minister of the Sacrament, he would be casting pearls before swine, and by his too easy compliance in giving absolution he would imperil the souls of his penitents.[99]

On the other hand, we cannot admit the teaching of those theologians[100] who hold that absolution sub conditione is permitted only in extreme necessity or in great danger.

A sufficient reason for imparting absolution under condition would be in the case where unconditional absolution would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity on account of a reasonable doubt of the existence of some one or other of the requisites for the validity of the Sacrament, and where at the same time by putting off the absolution the penitent would be exposed to danger of real spiritual harm.

From what has been said we gather that in the following cases absolution may be given sub conditione:—

1. If the priest doubt whether he has absolved a penitent who has confessed a mortal sin.

2. In doubt whether the penitent in question is morally present.

3. In doubt whether the penitent is alive or already dead.

4. If the priest doubt (dubio facti) whether he has jurisdiction, and the confession must be made; in such a case the confessor must tell the penitent that he has given absolution only sub conditione, so that if proof be forthcoming later on that jurisdiction was wanting, the penitent will know that he has not been absolved and must accuse himself again of the mortal sins mentioned in that confession. If the doubt turn on the question of law (dubium juris), i.e. on a point where theologians do not agree whether absolution can be given in such a case, the absolution may be pronounced without any condition.[101]

5. In doubt whether the matter be sufficient: this may happen (a) when an adult is baptized sub conditione and is to be absolved at the same time; and (b) when a penitent declares only some imperfections, and there is doubt whether they are really venial sins, and when the same penitent can offer no certain sins of his past life. To such a penitent absolution may, according to a probable view, be given at intervals, so that he may not be deprived for long of the benefits of the Sacrament of Penance; absolution in such cases ought not to be given more than once a month. For the same reason absolution can be given sub conditione when the penitent, unable to present certain matter from his past life, has only sins of less moment to confess and there is doubt as to the existence of sorrow for such sins.[102] Moreover, if the penitent offer no certain matter, the confessor is not bound to inquire for it in order to give absolution, and after making vain inquiry he is not obliged to give absolution sub conditione, since the penitent in such case has no sure claim to it.

If, however, any doubt exists as to the presence of necessary matter, or whether a sin confessed along with the imperfections be mortal or not, for which, however, the penitent is certainly contrite, then absolution under condition must be given.

6. In doubt whether the necessary dispositions with regard to mortal sin are present conditional absolution may sometimes, though not always, be given; it must be given when urgent reasons counsel such a step. For instance:—

(a) To those who are in danger of death, from whatever cause.

(b) When the penitent honestly thinks he is well disposed, and when the confessor fears that if absolution be refused or put off, the penitent may fall into worse ways or be frightened away from the Sacraments, or that he will certainly receive some other Sacrament, as, for instance, Marriage or Confirmation, in an unworthy state.

Finally, conditional absolution may be given to children and others of whom it is doubtful whether they possess sufficient use of reason or the necessary knowledge of the truths of faith. These may receive conditional absolution not only when in danger of death, but also when they have to fulfill the law of the Church, and especially if they have confessed a sin which is doubtfully or probably mortal; they must be so absolved even if they are relapsing sinners, for while in doubtfully disposed penitents who have the full use of reason absolution must be delayed, since hopes may be entertained that they will return better disposed later, in the case of children or feeble minded no such hope can be well entertained. Indeed, according to a probable view such penitents may receive conditional absolution at intervals of two or three months, when they confess only venial sins, that they may not go for any considerable time without the grace of the Sacrament. The confessor is, however, obliged to instruct children and feeble-minded persons and to dispose them for absolution.[103]

We answer some objections urged against the doctrine that in the cases mentioned absolution may be given conditionally.

1. This practice is full of danger and is the cause of many sins.

The practice is full of danger, it is true, if absolution is given indiscriminately without necessity or some special reason; if, however, the rules given above are observed, it is no longer dangerous or harmful.

2. It is further objected that a penitent conditionally absolved will approach the altar and make a sacrilegious communion, a risk not to be incurred lightly.

The confession of such a penitent is not sacrilegious, hence the communion is not; for, by supposition, the penitent is in good faith. At the worst the communion would be without fruit or profit; nor can we say that the communion is quite useless, for its reception is an occasion for eliciting different acts of virtue. Indeed, according to the common teaching on this subject, the communicant who receives in mortal sin and with imperfect contrition, yet in good faith, is placed thereby in a state of grace. To make an act of imperfect contrition should not be a great difficulty, since holy communion usually arouses pious emotions of love and sorrow in those who approach in good faith.

3. It is likewise objected that a conditionally absolved penitent will never confess his sins again, and if he is not rightly disposed will die in his sins.

It may be replied that doubtfully absolved sins are remitted (a) by the reception of holy communion, as we have already shown; (b) indirectly in the following confession along with the other sins which he confesses, even if he were never again to submit them to the keys. If it be urged here that the penitent might never come to confession again, we should reply that such a case is extremely rare and to be treated as quite improbable. On the contrary, the penitent would be exposed to much graver risk of his salvation if, in a situation of such necessity as we postulate for the giving of conditional absolution, he were to be dismissed without it.

4. Another objection is drawn from the first of the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, whence it appears that no one may presume to follow a probable opinion in dispensing the Sacraments. The conclusion drawn is that no one may give an absolution which is doubtfully valid.

This practice is absolutely forbidden where the validity of the Sacrament and the welfare of the individual are endangered by such administration of the Sacrament; if, however, necessity or solid reasons demand such practice, it is allowed.[104] Moreover, the proposition condemned by Innocent is concerned only with the essential portions of the Sacrament, the validity of matter and form in so far as these depend on the minister of the Sacrament. In our case the matter is presented by the penitent and is outside the control of the minister. Otherwise, indeed, penitents might often enough be dismissed without absolution, for frequently no certainty can be had as to their dispositions, but at most a greater or lesser probability.

5. Finally some would limit the use of conditional absolution to cases of the greatest rarity and of most pressing necessity—when, for instance, a dying man is quite unconscious or already in his agony; for in any other case it is entirely his own fault if he be doubtfully disposed. This is the view of the anonymous author of the Letters against the distinguished work of Cardinal Gousset: Justification de la doctrine de Saint Liguori.[105]

This objection is based on several false premises:—

1. It is untrue that one who is doubtfully disposed is certainly indisposed; it is at least per se untrue, for it is a contradiction in terms.

2. It is untrue that the penitent is always responsible for not seeming certainly disposed; for he can be quite prepared without the confessor knowing about it; again, as long as he is not certainly unprepared, he may be actually in the proper dispositions.

3. Many considerations respecting the penitent’s salvation may, as we have seen, urge the confessor to decide on giving rather than refusing absolution. At times the priest would be guilty of the gravest imprudence by putting off the absolution till extreme need should arise, when the penitent might be unable to avail himself of the Sacrament. “Do you wish to put off the reconciliation of the dying man to his God till the moment when he can no longer express his wishes? Will you, in order to make the absolution certain, wait till the penitent is at the last gasp, so that it is doubtful if he is capable of receiving the Sacrament?... I repeat, the Sacraments are made for men, not men for the Sacraments. By pursuing such a course you would act in opposition to Him who out of His mercy gave us the Sacrament; you would depart from the spirit of the Church which, like a tender mother, administers the Sacraments, when you maintain that we can only apply the principle of sacramenta propter homines in cases where the dying sinner cannot even by signs express what is going on in the recesses of his soul.”[106]

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Part II

THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, OR THE ACTS OF THE PENITENT

9. Who can Receive the Sacrament of Penance.

Every man who has fallen into formal sin after Baptism is capable of receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Whoever, therefore, has not yet been baptized, or, having been baptized, has committed no sin since Baptism, is incapable of sacramental absolution. All children who have not attained to the use of reason are unable to receive this Sacrament; to these we may add such adults as cannot make that use of their reason which is necessary for disposing them to receive this Sacrament.

In order that a baptized person may make a valid and fruitful use of this Sacrament, he must elicit those acts which we have mentioned before; he must be genuinely sorry for his sins, be ready to do penance, and submit his sins to the power of the keys vested in the Church. These acts form not only the essential and necessary dispositions for receiving the Sacrament, but—and this is a peculiar feature of the Sacrament of Penance—they are also the materia proxima. The following sections will be devoted to the consideration of these acts in their double aspect.

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I. CONTRITION

10. Extent and Efficacy of Contrition.

The most prominent position among the acts of the penitent belongs to contrition.

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent contrition is a hearty sorrow and detestation for past sin together with a firm resolution to sin no more.[107]

We must investigate more closely the essence of this contrition. Contrition is a hearty sorrow; this sorrow is interior; hence the prophet speaks of a rending of the heart (scindite corda vestra!—Joel ii. 13), and so contrition is called contritio cordis, a grinding of the heart. A merely external show of sorrow, the mere recital of an act of contrition, is therefore not a true sorrow. Moreover, since sorrow is a moral act and all moral acts proceed from the will, sorrow must have its roots in the will.

Many very different things may cause us great grief; for instance, the death of a dear relation, the loss of earthly goods, the failure of our plans and undertakings, the suffering of wrongs and affronts, experience of ingratitude and unkindness, a thoughtless word which one has uttered, a mere breach of etiquette that one has committed. Contrition, however, is grief of the soul for past sin.

The sins of others may cause us real and deep feelings of pain. What fervent Christian is unconcerned at the many sins which are daily committed and the many affronts offered to God? We are pained by them, but we cannot be contrite for them. We can have contrition only for the sins which we have ourselves committed—de peccato commisso, as the Council of Trent expresses it.

This being the case, sorrow as understood in this connection is not to be confused with:—

(a) Merely speculative sorrow (dolor intellectivus), i.e., the mere knowledge of the hatefulness and horror of sin. Reason when not blinded can recognize and must recognize clearly the hatefulness and wickedness of sin; yet in spite of this knowledge the will may cling to it and love it; indeed such cases are of frequent occurrence.

(b) Or the feeling of guilt or the remorse of conscience (terrores conscientiæ) which Luther taught to be of the essence of true sorrow. The feeling of guilt may be present without the help of our will, and even against our will. Remorse of conscience may be roused in us without our wishing it, and it may happen that we cannot allay it even when we wish to do so.

(c) Finally, the resolve to amend, the resipiscentia, and even the giving up of the sin is not of itself true sorrow; a man may forsake his sin merely because he has indulged in it to excess, because it has no longer any attraction for him, or because he has become tired of it.

True sorrow is not merely a pain and bitterness of heart; it is also a real hatred and horror of sin; but hatred and horror are acts of the will, for it is the will which hates and loves, shrinks from an object or embraces it. The will may shrink from sin at the same time that sensuality makes us crave for the sin; the will, however, must not give way to the craving.

Sorrow and detestation of sin are in themselves distinct, yet they are so bound up in man’s nature, that, where there is detestation there is necessarily also sorrow, so that true and efficacious sorrow for sin, as sin, cannot exist without detestation of the same.[108]

As to the question whether contrition lies more in sorrow for sin or in detestation of it—in other words, in dislike, hatred, and aversion—theologians answer that contrition is founded principally on detestation for sin, and with reason, for:—

(a) By this detestation the sinner retracts his evil will and turns towards God; this detestation is, moreover, the cause of sorrow. When, therefore, it is asserted that the sinner should above all have sorrow for his sins, and when by this is understood a sorrowful hatred of sin, this is correct, for in this case horror of sin is there with its complement. Moreover, we must not lose sight of St. Alphonsus’ dictum[109] that there is no reason to doubt that one sentiment includes the other; he who has a horror of his sins is sorry for them, and whoever is supernaturally sorry for them detests them.

Since contrition is the most important element in the disposition of the sinner, it is proper to give in detail the acts which belong to contrition, and to show how the sinner may attain to perfect contrition.

First and foremost, a preliminary act of faith and hope of obtaining pardon by the merits of Christ should be made. How can he repent of his sins who does not believe that there is a God and that God is offended by sin, who does not believe that God is faithful to His promises and merciful to sinners, and who does not hope that God will pardon him? These acts of faith and hope, though they need not be made explicitly, are the foundations of contrition; on them are built up the remaining elements which go to form the perfect act. These are:—

1. The knowledge of the hatefulness of sin as an offense against God, and of the awful punishments which the sinner incurs. This knowledge is necessary in order to acquire contrition, for the law of man’s nature makes him love and strive for what his reason proposes to him under the appearance of good, and hate and avoid what it presents as evil.

2. An act of the will, which desires to avoid the evil now known as such; on this follows:—

3. The hatred of past sins which have caused that evil, and the desire of undoing the sin committed. This desire, in the abstract, is only a velleity and quite inefficacious, for that which is done cannot be undone; but it is of efficacy in so far as it means a wish to undo, if it were possible, the sin by which God has been offended and punishment incurred.

4. From this hatred there arises in the rational appetite or in the will a sorrow and real distress that the sins have been committed; hence also follows:—

5. In the sensitive appetite, by picturing to ourselves the horror and evil consequences of sin, a certain hatred and sorrow, which may become so keen as to produce sighs and tears.

6. The resolve and firm determination never more to sin and offend God, or, what comes to the same thing, a resolution to observe faithfully and perfectly God’s commands.

7. Finally, there appears in the truly repentant sinner a willingness to render satisfaction to God for past sins, to chastise and punish himself, and to repair God’s honor.[110]

Contrition is either perfect or imperfect[111] according as the sorrow and hatred arise from a motive of perfect love or of some supernatural motive which is inferior to perfect love. Since we understand here by love (caritas) the amor benevolentiæ, by which we love God above all things for His own sake, i.e. on account of His infinite perfections, we may define perfect contrition (contritio) as a sorrow and hatred for past sins together with a firm purpose never more to sin, because sin is an injury to God, who is loved above all things for His own sake.

Imperfect contrition (attritio) may be founded on many other supernatural motives; these are usually, as the Council of Trent declares, the fear of hell or punishment and the hatefulness of sin.[112] Thus imperfect contrition may be defined: sorrow and detestation of past sin with the determination never more to sin, because sin is an offense against God, who utterly abhors it on account of its hatefulness and avenges it with punishment. The thought of God, the supreme Lord of all, infinitely holy, to whom sin is detestable by its shamefulness, fills the sinner with confusion; the thought of God, who punishes sin with infinite justice, fills him with fear of the punishments of sin, and, impelled by this fear, he repents of having offended God by his sin.

Perfect and imperfect contrition coincide in this respect, that they are both a supernatural sorrow and hatred for sin regarded as an injury to God; they differ, however, specifically in this, that perfect contrition proceeds from perfect love of God, and imperfect contrition from a variety of other less noble motives; they also differ in their efficacy.[113]

11. The Essential Features of Perfect Contrition.

According to the unanimous teaching of theologians, which is based on the Council of Trent, perfect contrition proceeds from perfect love. The Council declares that contrition founded on caritas is perfect; that, in consequence, its perfection depends on caritas; hence in order to acquire a complete grasp of the nature of perfect contrition we must investigate the nature of love, its degrees and kinds.

The love of God, of which only there is question here, has for its object God alone, and the motive of this love is similarly always God Himself. There are many aspects under which God may be presented to us as an object of love, and these aspects determine the different degrees of love. First of all there are two kinds of this love: pure or disinterested love, amor benevolentiæ (amicitiæ), and selfish or interested love (amor concupiscentiæ). God can be loved because He is most worthy of love, because He is good, because He is the highest good. If we love God for His own sake because He is most lovable in Himself (prout est in se summum bonum), we have the first kind of love, the pure love of God; if we love Him on our own account because He is for us the highest good (prout nobis est summum bonum), we have the second kind of love. The pure love of God is called perfect love, the other imperfect. If now we consider more closely the imperfect love of God, we find two degrees. God is here the object of love in as much as He is good to man, i.e. on the one hand God confers His benefits on man on earth and His everlasting possession in heaven completes the happiness of man hereafter, and on the other hand the loss of God means to man on earth unhappiness and suffering and in the next life the eternal punishment of hell. If a man disregards totally the idea of God as a person to be loved and keeps in view only his own selfish interests, he evidently loves only himself, thinking merely of his own present and future well-being, his own joys and sufferings, his own reward and punishment. Such a love, which hardly deserves the name, is downright selfishness and is rightly called a mercenary love (amor mercenarius). This love corresponds to the fear which is called purely servile, timor serviliter servilis, that fear which hates only the punishment and not the sin, which cherishes the inclination to sin, so that a man would sin if he did not fear punishment. Both love and fear of this kind belong to the lowest degree and destroy all supernatural merit and reward.

But there is an imperfect love of God in which man’s heart really turns to God simply because God is good to him, it is true, yet so that he loves Him efficaciously and really and regards the loss of God as the loss of all good and the greatest of misfortunes. Since in such a love of God there is mingled a great deal of the love of self, so that one love is not present without the other, it cannot yet be called the pure love of God, but receives a special name, the love of chaste concupiscence, amor castæ concupiscentiæ. To this love corresponds that fear of eternal punishment, which does not exclude the thought of God, which fears the punishment of hell because it is the loss of the vision of God, i.e. the pœna damni. This love is called also the amor spei, because in it the hope of possessing God in heaven, the highest reward of all pure souls, is an essential element.

A higher grade of love, midway between this perfect and imperfect love, is called the love of gratitude, amor gratitudinis, in which we love God for the benefits which He has conferred. When this love is prompted more by the thought of the gifts than the giver, more by the benefit than by the love of the benefactor, it approaches in quality to the love of hope (amor spei); one reflects on the past, the other on the future. If, however, the motive of this love of gratitude directly regards the giver and his good will towards mankind, then God is loved with a pure love, for God’s benevolence and love towards men are intimately united with His perfections. This kind of love of gratitude may well be classed with pure love or caritas. It is a perfect love (1) because God is loved for His own sake, on account of His infinite goodness and love and generosity, which are identical with God Himself; (2) because it is a benevolent love. All love in respect of its object is either selfish or benevolent; now this love of gratitude is not selfish because it does not regard its own profit, nor does it strive to gain anything for itself; (3) because it is a love of friendship, for it is a love which wishes well to Him who loves us and makes a return of love for love.[114]

A great number of distinguished theologians assert that the love of gratitude is perfect love, and the contrition based on it perfect contrition.[115] The Council of Trent might be adduced in favor of this view, since in Sess. 14, cp. 5, can. 4, it enumerates among the motives of imperfect contrition merely the hatefulness of sin and its punishment without the least reference to the motive of gratitude. It is of considerable moment to settle this point exactly, for, as Deharbe says, “a man might never know how to elicit an act of perfect contrition if he were to form a false notion of perfect love. Who can deny that in many cases salvation depends on an act of perfect contrition, and that even where it is possible to receive the Sacrament of Penance it is always advisable to make at least an effort to arouse not only imperfect but also perfect contrition?”[116]

We should be loath to omit the remark that the love of Christ crucified is an eminent incentive to perfect love, and that the sorrow for sin which is founded on the thought that sin was the cause of the awful sufferings and shameful death of Our Saviour, belongs to perfect contrition. A man who is well disposed towards Christ, believing Him to be God, has all that is required to arouse perfect love; and if, influenced by this love, he detests and determines to avoid all that brought such great suffering on Christ, he is exercising an act of perfect love and contrition.[117]

This love is most intimately connected with the love of gratitude, since “for our sins was He wounded and for our iniquities was He stricken.” Indeed nothing is so calculated to fill us with gratitude towards God as the thought of all that the Son of God has done and suffered for us. The crib, the cross, and the Sacraments are the three great monuments of His enduring love towards us, and at the same time they are the three inexhaustible founts of motives of our love for Him. Hence it is that the Church recalls to us so frequently these benefits of Christ. “When we meditate upon her ceremonies and practices, the spirit of her feasts and solemnities, her altars and temples, her prayers, the sense of the liturgies and the object of her devotions, our thoughts are compelled to consider the marvelous love of God and what Our Saviour has done and suffered for us, and we are reminded to be thankful to the Lord and to requite His love with our love.”[118]

From this love of gratitude, as the first stage on the way to pure love, we may ascend yet higher and attain to that entirely pure love by which we seek God as the highest good in Himself, as infinite beauty, as complete perfection, as the source of all goodness, beauty, and perfection, without reference, so far as that is possible, to our own profit. This love is shown by joy in God’s perfections (amor complacentiæ); the soul which has this love forgets itself and is lost in the object of its love for which alone it lives; its sole desire is God’s happiness (amor benevolentiæ), and it would willingly add to it (amor desiderii) but since such increase is impossible it rejoices in things as they are (amor gaudii).

It cannot be disputed that such a disinterested love is possible on earth, since many pious souls have had it in an eminent degree; still it must be observed that although the higher stages of love surpass and in surpassing absorb the lower, they do not eliminate them entirely; on the contrary, this pure love does not and cannot exclude the love of hope. It is the explicit teaching of the Church that love for God on earth cannot be so disinterested as to exclude all thought of ourselves and our eternal welfare.

This stage of love answers to filial fear (timor filialis) when one thinks no longer about punishment nor fears it, but dreads to give displeasure or offense to the beloved one and carefully avoids all that arouses the anger of God.

The sorrow arising from perfect love is therefore perfect sorrow, contritio. This, like unselfish love, may have varying stages of intensity[119] and may be more or less perfect; no special degree of intensity, however, is required, and the lowest is sufficient. It is only right and desirable, however, that we should have the greatest sorrow possible for our sins, penetrating soul and body, so that the whole man may repent of his faults and the tools of sin become again instruments of love.[120] This, however, is not always in our power, and, being a grace, we must ask for it.

We may now sum up our conclusions: Perfect contrition, contritio, is the hatred of sin proceeding from a pure love of God with a firm resolution of amendment, a disposition which includes filial fear, and, so far from excluding the hope of salvation and fear of punishment, tends rather to develop them.[121]

12. The Effects of Perfect Contrition and the Obligation of Procuring it.

Perfect contrition restores the sinner to grace at once, even before he has approached the Sacrament of Penance, though the desire of receiving the Sacrament is necessary; it removes the eternal punishment and in part the temporal punishment.

The first part of this statement is fidei proxima, for the Council of Trent teaches[122] that perfect contrition reconciles man to God before the Sacrament is received, but that this reconciliation by perfect contrition is not effected without the desire, which is included in the act of contrition, of receiving the Sacrament. This doctrine was confirmed by the condemnation pronounced by Gregory XIII and Urban VIII on the twenty-first and thirty-second of the propositions of Baius. Baius and Jansenius taught among other things that perfect contrition without the Sacrament cannot restore to grace unless in exceptional circumstances, e.g. in martyrdom, at the hour of death, when there is no possibility of confessing, or when it is summe intensa.

Finally, this doctrine of the efficacy of perfect contrition is clearly expressed in Holy Scripture and in the monuments of tradition; the proofs belong to the domain of dogmatic theology.[123] We add only a single consideration which springs from a well-known principle: Perfect contrition arises from love and is in its essence nothing but an act of love. Now perfect love unites us to God, so that we live in Him and He in us.[124] This perfect union with God overcomes all separation from Him which arose through sin.

Such, then, is the effect of perfect contrition, however poor and weak it may be, for in spite of this it is a sorrow which is inspired and informed by perfect love. Nor does a greater or less degree change the species; the Council of Trent is positive in its declaration that perfect contrition reconciles us to God, and assigns no limit which must be attained before producing this effect. Such, too, is the unanimous teaching of St. Thomas,[125] St. Alphonsus,[126] and the other great theologians.

The sinner is restored to grace by perfect contrition without the Sacrament only when he has the intention of receiving it, for the actual, or at least intentional, reception of the Sacrament is the one single means ordained by Christ for the removal of mortal sin. This intention is included in the act of perfect contrition, as the Council of Trent goes on to teach; hence all theologians hold that the implicit desire (votum implicitum) is sufficient, for whoever has true contrition has the wish to fulfill all the commands of God, and hence the command of Christ enjoining the confession of sin.[127] Perfect contrition is an act of perfect love, and this urges man to fulfill the commands of God in accordance with Christ’s words: “He who loves Me will keep My word.”[128] Hence it may happen that a sinner is justified by an act of perfect contrition without any actual confession; it is sufficient that he does not exclude the purpose of confessing his sin.[129]

The resolution to confess the sin does not include the resolution to confess it as soon as possible (quam primum). It is enough to confess when a precept of God or of the Church urges.[130]

The other effect of perfect contrition, the remission of eternal punishment, follows from what we have been already considering; moreover the condemnation of Baius’ seventieth proposition makes this doctrine proxima fidei. This, too, is the teaching of all Catholic theologians.[131] The guilt is removed by sanctifying grace; but one who has sanctifying grace is a child of God, and has as his heritage a claim to heaven.

Finally, we gather from the Council of Trent[132] and the common doctrine of theologians[133] that a part also of the temporal punishment of sin, in proportion to the intensity of contrition, is remitted, so that a very great and perfect contrition may blot out all the temporal punishment.

Two very practical remarks, applicable both to confessor and to penitent, may find their place here.

Mortal sin is not forgiven, and the sinner is not reconciled to God, till he has made good the injury done to God; in other words, till he has done penance. This is a truth of faith.[134] It follows, then, that he who has the misfortune to fall into sin is obliged to repent of it, and in such wise as to obtain forgiveness; to adopt any other course is to frustrate the whole end of his existence. He must therefore make an act of perfect contrition, or supplement the imperfect contrition by the Sacrament of Penance.

This obligation is certainly pressing when there is danger of death, because it is the necessary means for salvation, and every man is bound by love of God and of himself to take precautions against being forever an enemy of God and of being involved in eternal damnation.

The question now arises whether on other grounds there is a strict obligation of making an act of perfect contrition, for instance, from the consideration of God who has been offended, or for our own interests, since we may die at any moment, and because one who is in a state of mortal sin is but little capable of avoiding other mortal sins.

The following answer may be given:—

1. God might have insisted that the sinner should make good at once after his sin the evil committed, and the injury done to God by mortal sin would be quite motive enough for such legislation. As a matter of fact God does not make any such demand; instead of insisting on His rights, He is long-suffering and permits the sinner to heap offense on offense.

On the other hand, a man cannot remain long in mortal sin without offending God again and once more incurring sin; for it is an insult to the love we owe to God to remain long a slave of the devil and an enemy of God, and such behavior on the part of the sinner makes him guilty of contempt of God’s friendship and rights. To incur, however, grievous sin in this way, the neglect to make an act of perfect contrition must have extended over a considerable time. As to what constitutes a considerable time, it is not easy to define a hard-and-fast limit; a period of several years would certainly be considerable, and it would be a grave sin to remain so long a time in the state of mortal sin; but a man who reconciles himself to God within the limits of the time prescribed by the Church for confession would certainly not incur a new sin per se, special circumstances, of course, being excluded which might demand that an act of perfect contrition be made at once.[135]

The possibility of dying before being reconciled to God is certainly a very strong motive to induce a man to consult the safety of his soul and to free it as soon as possible from the state of mortal sin; for at any moment death may surprise a man without warning. If, however, there be no pressing danger of death, that possibility is not sufficient to make delay of reconciliation a new sin; hence one who dies a sudden death may be plunged into hell by sins for which he had not atoned, but he would not be guilty of a new sin by having put off his repentance.

But there is an obligation to avoid putting off for a long time one’s conversion, and hence an act of perfect contrition after mortal sin, because a man in the state of mortal sin is in the greatest danger of falling into other mortal sins, since he has not strength enough to vanquish severe temptations and to withstand the violence of his passions, and since, as St. Gregory the Great[136] says, the unrepented mortal sins which burden his soul draw him by their weight into other worse sins. “Without sanctifying grace it is not possible to refrain long from mortal sin,” says St. Thomas;[137] the sinner might, if he wished, have the necessary moral strength to overcome temptation and to resist his passions; he might curb them by the divine power of grace; but there is the law of the distribution of God’s graces, that God gives only to those who love Him efficacious grace, and while a man persists of his own free will in the state of sin and enmity with God, he equivalently expresses his contempt of grace and so makes himself unworthy of it. As God is ever pouring richer and richer graces on those who make good use of them and coöperate with them, so He withdraws them from those who neglect and resist them. Hence we may adopt the well-founded teaching of St. Alphonsus,[138] who states that the sinner ought not to put off for longer than a month his reconciliation with God; in other words, that the act of perfect contrition should not be delayed beyond that time. By such delay he would incur a new sin. This subject, moreover, is intimately connected with the duty of eliciting the act of love; for according to a very probable opinion of many theologians, of whom the authority is recognized and approved by St. Alphonsus, we are bound to elicit at least once a month an act of love, because we should keep God’s commands either not at all or at least with great difficulty if we failed for so long a time to elicit such an act, and if we were so little solicitous about our duty of loving God. It is impossible to make an act of perfect love without bewailing one’s sins by which a God so infinitely worthy of love has been offended. Hence St. Alphonsus in his practical directions to confessors says:[139] “The duty of making an act of contrition is urgent when one is obliged to make an act of love.”[140]

Since the faithful for the most part are ignorant of any obligation of making an act of perfect contrition within a given time after falling into mortal sin, and, therefore, incur no sin by the non-fulfillment of it, the confessor need not trouble himself to make inquiries about it in the past life of his penitents; indeed he may abstain from instructing them on the existence of such obligation. But he should not fail—without, however, mentioning that neglect means a new sin—to urge his penitents by other motives to return to a state of grace, for the future, as quickly as possible after falling into mortal sin, at least by an act of perfect contrition, and, if occasion offer, by going to confession. Sad experience shows that one fall into mortal sin is very soon followed by others.[141]

Finally, there is an obligation (per accidens) to awaken perfect contrition when one has to exercise some act for which a state of grace is required and the Sacrament of Penance is not accessible. A priest, for instance, is in a state of mortal sin and is called upon to administer one of the Sacraments, or one of the faithful has to receive one of the Sacraments of the living and cannot get absolution beforehand. This also holds true if an act of perfect love has to be made; in this case every one is obliged, when there occurs to his mind a mortal sin not yet repented of, to detest the same and to be sorry for it from the motive of the love of God. According to the general opinion of theologians an act of love should be made in the hour of death, whence St. Alphonsus teaches that a dying man who has confessed with only imperfect sorrow should be recommended to elicit an act of perfect contrition, for it is impossible to make an act of love without bewailing the sins from the same motive of love.[142] Finally, this duty is pressing when one is exposed to severe temptations which cannot be overcome while one is in a state of enmity with God.

We would add another observation: Since perfect contrition is so pleasing to God and so helpful to those sinners especially who have fallen seriously, the pastor of souls should seize every opportunity of instructing the faithful and urging them to elicit such acts frequently, especially when they are in danger of death and have no opportunity of approaching the Sacrament of Penance. Children particularly should be taught on this subject, and a good form of the act given to them. They may have need of it themselves in order to be saved from eternal damnation, and they may come to the assistance of their elders at the hour of death; indeed experience teaches that well-instructed children more than once have reminded people in such straits of the act of perfect contrition, and have persuaded those persons to make it with them; finally, what has been learned in childhood will turn out useful to many in their old age.

13. Imperfect Contrition.

The effects of imperfect contrition (attrition) are not so great as those of perfect contrition. Imperfect contrition, which excludes the desire of sinning and includes the hope of pardon (this belongs to the sorrow necessary for the Sacrament of Penance), is the proximate disposition which the sinner must have if he is to be justified in the Sacrament of Penance. This is of faith.[143]

Passages almost innumerable of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, decrees of Councils and theologians, present this doctrine as revealed by God.[144]

Consequently it is the common and certain teaching of theologians that to receive the grace of the Sacrament of Penance imperfect contrition is sufficient, and that perfect contrition is not of necessity. The Council of Trent declares expressly: “Although imperfect contrition without the Sacrament of Penance is not able per se to restore the sinner to justifying grace, yet it disposes him for the reception of grace in this Sacrament.” The Council is speaking here of the ultimate or proximate disposition which, in union with the Sacrament, suffices for the remission of sin; for it opposes the efficacy of imperfect contrition with the Sacrament to its inefficacy without the Sacrament. Without the Sacrament it cannot produce justification, but disposes towards its reception in the Sacrament; it must therefore produce in the Sacrament this justification, and the disposition of which the Council speaks must be understood of the proximate disposition which is immediately followed by grace; otherwise the contrast drawn between the two would have no meaning.

This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the institution of the Sacrament. Christ’s object in instituting this Sacrament was to restore the baptized to the life of grace; if it did not really confer the grace of justification, it would have been a means frustrated of its end, and would not have the power which it was intended to have; it could not be expected to call for dispositions which of themselves would atone for sin, and this would be the case if perfect contrition were the required disposition. A remedy for a disease would be a poor gift if it could not cure the disease until the latter was already removed. Finally, the Church received the power of the keys in order that it might loose or retain sins; if perfect contrition were required as the necessary condition, the sins would not be remitted by the power of the keys, but by the dispositions of the penitent. Therefore imperfect contrition is sufficient for justification in the Sacrament of Penance.[145]

Since imperfect contrition in union with the Sacrament has the same effects as perfect contrition without the Sacrament, theologians say that the penitent becomes in the Sacrament ex attrito contritus; this expression is not to be understood of the act, as though attritio became contritio.

Imperfect contrition, as we have already seen, arises from the thought of the hideousness of sin and from the fear of the punishment which God in His justice inflicts on the sinner. The following are the classes into which, according to St. Thomas,[146] fear is divided:—

1. Worldly fear, timor mundanus, when man is feared more than God, or when one offends God in order to avoid suffering.

2. Natural fear, timor naturalis, the fear of temporal misfortunes.

3. Slavish fear, timor serviliter servilis, when one shrinks from sin merely from fear of punishment, and when one is ready to sin again if there were no punishment. Theologians say of such a man: solum manum cohibet, voluntatem autem non retrahit a peccato.

Quite distinct from this fear is:—

4. Servile fear, timor servilis, when a man fears the punishments which God inflicts on sin, and on that account really avoids and detests sin: qui non solum manum sed etiam voluntatem cohibet a peccato, as the schoolmen express it.

5. Filial fear, timor filialis seu castus, is the fear of a man who honors and loves God as his Lord and Father, and from that motive avoids sin and loves the law of God. The last two kinds of fear conjoined form:—

6. Mixed fear, timor mixtus seu initialis, which is the disposition of a man who fears sin because it offends God and also because it is punished. Hence St. Thomas gives a clear and short account of these last three kinds of fear: Sometimes man turns to God and clings to Him because he is afraid of evil. This evil may be twofold, the evil of punishment and the evil of guilt. If a man turn and cling to God from fear of punishment, this is servile fear; and when it is done from fear of guilt it is filial fear, for children are afraid of offending their father; if, however, it is done from the fear of the punishment and of the guilt, it is then timor initialis, which is intermediate between servile and filial fear.[147]

The sorrow proceeding from servile fear is attritio, that imperfect sorrow which, when it excludes the desire of sinning and is joined to the hope of pardon, disposes the sinner to receive the grace of justification in the Sacrament of Penance. It may now be asked whether, along with this imperfect sorrow based on fear as its only motive, there may not be required besides, in order to dispose the sinner proxime for the receiving of grace, some sort of love, at least initial, or whether this love be included in that sorrow. On this subject the Council has given no direct answer. In the seventeenth century this question was debated with such heat that Alexander VII (June, 1667), in order to establish peace, forbade, in the strongest terms and under pain of excommunication latæ sententiæ, that any of the disputants in this matter should accuse their opponents of heresy. Four distinct views were proposed and defended on this subject:—

1. The first view teaches that sorrow from the motive of fear, as long as it is true sorrow, is quite sufficient of itself for obtaining sanctifying grace in the Sacrament. This sorrow produces hatred and detestation of sin and a return to God’s law, and is inseparable from the hope of pardon. Hence the sinner becomes capable of receiving the grace of the Sacrament. Melchior Canus is the most famous of the defenders of this view, who are called Attritionists because they hold that mere attrition from the fear of the punishments inflicted on sin is a sufficient disposition. They thought that every sort of love was excluded from this contrition based on fear, a position which seems impossible both psychologically and in view of the action of grace; as was evidently the general opinion of the Fathers at the Council of Trent. Instead of the present clause in cap. 4: attritio eum ad gratiam in sacramento pœnitentiæ impetrandam disponit, another had been presented to them: ad constitutionem sacramenti sufficit, ac donum Dei esse ac Spiritus S. impulsum verissimum non adhuc quidem inhabitantis sed tantum moventis quo pœnitens adjutus (cum sine aliquo dilectionis in Deum motu esse vix queat) viam sibi ad justitiam munit et per eam ad Dei gratiam facilius impetrandum disponitur. Since it was urged that men of eminent learning made a distinction between such sorrow and love, the present form of the clause was chosen in order to avoid defining a scholastic question on which the Doctors were not of one mind; by using the word disponit the Council did not wish to mean a sufficient disposition, and to indicate this more clearly it purposely avoided the use of the word sufficit.[148]

2. The second opinion holds that the sorrow based on fear is sufficient only when there is joined with it some beginning of the love of God, as our highest good. This view supported by the most eminent theologians rests on solid foundations, and is now the more usual opinion among theologians. That there is nothing in this view opposed to the Council of Trent is clear from what has been said above on this point. In another place in the Sixth Session (cap. 6) there is indirect authority for it, where the Council, in describing the progress towards preparation for the first grace, teaches that the sinner who is disposing his soul for justification must begin to love God as the source of all justice.[149]

Hence as preparation for the first justification of adults a beginning at least of love is required. Now what is required for their first justification in Baptism, that, at the very least, is demanded for the second justification by Penance, since, as the Fathers express it, Penance is a toilsome Baptism, baptismus laboriosus; consequently if a distinction is to be made in terms of greater or less, greater dispositions are required for Penance than for Baptism. Moreover, the Council is unmistakably clear in its declaration that what it teaches with regard to the first justification applies equally to the justification by penance.[150]

In the place where the Council treats of the sorrow required as a preparation for the Sacrament of Penance, it speaks of it plainly as the beginning of a new life;[151] such it could not be if it did not include love, or at least the beginnings of love; for since the new life consists in the love of God, the beginning of the new life must of necessity include the beginning of the love of God.[152]

A third reason may be found in the very nature of the subject. According to the Church’s teaching, the justification of an adult means a real conversion, and this of itself includes a beginning of love. By mortal sin man turns from God to the creature; if the conversion is to be real, he must not only turn away from the creature, but also return to God, and that cannot happen without some initial love. Moreover, it is in the very nature of man ever to desire and love something as his highest good, be it the creature, as happens in mortal sin, or the Creator; since by his conversion he ceases to make the creature his sole object and aim, he must direct his desires to God the uncreated good, and so must love God at least as his highest good.

But this love which is required to accompany imperfect contrition in order to make it a sufficient disposition for obtaining grace in the Sacrament, is not the beginning of the amor benevolentiæ or the caritas perfecta or perfect love; for, as has been seen above, any act of contrition proceeding from perfect love in any degree at once restores a man to grace without the reception of the Sacrament; similarly the beginning of perfect love, joined with imperfect contrition, would justify the sinner without the Sacrament.[153] Penance would thus be a meaningless institution. It is rather the beginning of the amor concupiscentiæ or of the caritas imperfecta, in which we love God because He is good to us. This beginning of love is included in imperfect contrition, which arises chiefly from the fear of God’s punishments; for Holy Scripture (Ecclus. xxv. 16) calls the fear of God the beginning of love. Hope of eternal happiness is another motive, for, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, when we hope to obtain a benefit from any one we are drawn towards him and begin to love him. Whoever, then, has imperfect contrition and receives the Sacrament in the hope of pardon, already begins to love God as his liberator, his champion, his Lord. No special intensity is required in this love; it need only be the beginning of love, as long as the love is real—and this is called amor initialis.[154]

3. A third opinion demands, not a beginning of imperfect love, but perfect love in its first stages, that is, caritas initialis. It need not, however, be so strong as to suffice to remove sin of itself, nor need it be independent of other motives, such as servile fear. Such sorrow, however, would be no longer attritio, but contritio, which in any degree by itself justifies the sinner apart from the Sacrament.

4. The fourth opinion goes yet further and requires that along with attritio there should be not only pure love, but in such measure that of itself it should move the sinner to bewail his sins and give them up. This is of its nature contritio, whence the defenders of this last opinion are called contritionists.[155]

This question is not one of mere theoretical interest, but is of highly practical application; for if the acts of the penitent are the materia proxima of the Sacrament, and if it is the confessor’s duty to make certain of the presence of these acts before giving absolution, he must do so also with respect to contrition; for this reason he must study the nature and properties of contrition in order to secure the integrity of the Sacrament.

From this it is at once apparent that the contritionist must proceed differently from the attritionist. The former will, if he is true to his principles, not only investigate whether the penitent’s sorrow for sin be joined with belief and hope of pardon, but also whether that sorrow proceed from the love of God, or at least the beginning of it, which love must be a love of God above all things. This investigation, however, is very difficult, and wearisome to confessor and penitent, at least if the latter be uninstructed. The attritionist, on the contrary, merely inquires whether his penitent has sorrow springing from a motive of faith and the hope of forgiveness; this inquiry offers no difficulty to either confessor or penitent. Once it is established that the sorrow comes from a motive of faith and is joined to the hope of pardon, one may fairly presume and conclude that there is amor initialis, so that further investigation is superfluous; for if we hope for good from any one, we have already at least a beginning of love for him.

Moreover, the confessor will observe that since the view requiring a beginning of love with imperfect contrition is more probable than the opposite, probabilitate externa et interna, it is also the safer; since, however, in giving and receiving the Sacraments an explicit papal decision enjoins the adoption of the safer view, it is not only of counsel but of precept, strongly binding, to elicit before receiving the Sacrament of Penance together with contrition an act of love, if only initial love. Though the initial love which is comprised in the imperfect contrition is not the love of benevolence or caritas, but the amor concupiscentiæ, yet caritas is in no way excluded from it, and cannot be excluded without grievous sin on the part of the penitent. Would it not be the sign of a bad disposition if a man were expressly unwilling to avoid sin if it did not deprive him of heaven or lead him to hell? “I do not say,” says St. Francis de Sales on this subject, “that this sorrow excludes the perfect love of God; I say only that it does not of its own nature include it; it neither rejects it nor embraces it; it is not opposed to love, but it can exist without it.”

Thus imperfect contrition disposes the penitent towards perfect love. Any one who desires and hopes to attain so great a boon as the grace of God, all unmerited as it is, will certainly be unable to refrain from meditating on the infinite love which procures him this great grace, and from that he will rise to the love of God for His own sake as infinitely good and lovable. Hence St. Thomas says that whenever a man hopes to get a benefit from God he is led to love God for His own sake only.[156]

We add one more practical observation: The imperfect contrition arising from fear of hell, which excludes the desire of sin, and in which is contained at least virtually the hope of pardon, is quite sufficient to secure the fruit of the Sacrament of Penance; yet we ought to take pains that we have, as far as possible, perfect contrition, not only because this is more pleasing to God, but also because in this way the grace is made more certain and more grace is obtained and a greater measure of the temporal punishment remitted; because we are thus more sure of attaining true and necessary attrition, and finally, because we fulfill in this manner the precept which binds us to make, from time to time during our lives, an act of love. Indeed if a penitent chose to dwell only on the lowest motives of contrition, it would be a sign that his heart was not sufficiently fixed upon God, and there would be occasion for suspecting that there still lurked in his soul an undue affection for sin, curbed only by fear of punishment.[157]

14. The Necessary Qualities of Contrition.

If the Sacrament of Penance is to be received validly and with fruit, the contrition must be real, formal, supernatural, universal, supreme, and sacramental.[158]

1. First of all, the contrition must be real or genuine. Now contrition is, according to the Council of Trent, a grief of the soul and a horror of sin. A sorrow expressed only in words would be a sham sorrow; that would not do: a real sorrow is required. A sorrow merely imaginary, even without guilt on the part of the penitent, in which case his good faith would certainly save him from the guilt of a sacrilege, could not possibly supply for the want of a necessary and essential part of the Sacrament.[159] Hence God’s command by the prophet Joel: Scindite corda vestra et non vestimenta vestra—Rend your hearts and not your garments (the sign of mourning; Joel ii. 3). And truly it is meet that sorrow should begin there where sin had its origin, namely, in the heart; for from the heart, as the Scripture tells us, come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, etc.[160]

The contrition must be formal, i.e. explicit; a virtual or implicit contrition, such as is contained in another act, say in an act of love or the resolution to confess and receive absolution, is not enough even though it excludes the affection towards sin.

Thus a penitent might conceivably elicit an act of perfect love without making any act of contrition, and then, after confessing his sins, be justified in virtue of the act of perfect love, though he would not validly receive absolution if he confined himself to the act of love. The contrition must be quite explicit, for it is the essential matter of the Sacrament, and virtual matter here would be about as practical as virtual bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence it is not enough to say: “I love thee, O my God, above all things, because thou art the sovereign good; forgive me my sins.” Such words are only an act of love and a prayer for pardon, not a formal act of sorrow. The words must be explicit: “I am sorry for my sins.”[161]

Hence we see the error in the opinion held by several of the older theologians, who called attrition any kind of sorrow which did not come up to the standard of perfect contrition by want of an adequate motive of sorrow, or through deficiency of resolution of amendment, or because sin was not shunned as the greatest of evils.

Others besides have conjectured that it was necessary and sufficient for absolution in the Sacrament that the penitent believes he had contrition, i.e. that he ought to make efforts to be contrite and to believe that he has perfect contrition; such a putative sorrow, according to them, was sufficient, however distinct it might be from the sorrow of perfect contrition.

Both views are false. If imperfect contrition were only a velleity, instead of being a real horror of sin, it would not be sufficient for the Sacrament, and such sorrow could never be called genuine attrition. On the contrary, any sorrow which has the properties enumerated above is sufficient even if the penitent knowingly confine his efforts to imperfect contrition without aspiring to perfect it.[162]

There were also some theologians who maintained as a probable opinion that the virtual sorrow included in a formal act of love or in a resolution of amendment was sufficient. This view is stigmatized by Suarez as rash, by Vasquez as false. Other theologians, however, consider that this condemnation is too severe.

On this question Reuter[163] remarks that a penitent need not be worried about the formal act of sorrow if he has elicited an act of perfect love while reflecting on his sins (memor peccatorum), for it is morally impossible for any one with his sins before his eyes to elicit an act of perfect love of God without detesting his sins. The same may be said with regard to the purpose of amendment, for it is morally impossible to form it without having formal sorrow. This is made clear from the consideration of any practical resolution which is based on supernatural motives; for if the hatred of sin is not yet a formal detestation and sorrow of past sin, it becomes so in any one who reflects that he has been guilty of sin.[164]

2. The sorrow which disposes for the worthy reception of the Sacrament must on the one hand be prompted by divine supernatural grace which begins, accompanies, and perfects the whole work of salvation, and on the other must proceed from some supernatural motive based on faith; for the dispositions required for a supernatural gift must be supernatural. The second condition is more important, for God will certainly give grace to a man to do that which he is obliged to do. Merely natural or worldly love or fear will give rise to natural sorrow; supernatural sorrow springs from a supernatural fear or love of God. The distinction between the two is not merely quantitative but qualitative; they have nothing in common, and no amount of natural sorrow will ever rise to the dignity of supernatural sorrow. Natural sorrow is of no efficacy in the work of conversion. When the prophets exhort to repentance they do not confine themselves to exhort the sinner, “Be converted,” but, “Be ye converted to the Lord your God.” A true penitent was, in their eyes, not one who turned from his sins; they required that he should also turn to God. Sorrow, then, must have a religious character, must be prompted by divine grace, must spring either from fear or love of God.

If sorrow is to have this supernatural character, it must be based on supernatural motives suggested by faith. Faith is the first condition for justification which the Council of Trent demands of the sinner; in addition to this other conditions are laid down, especially the act of hope. These acts need not be formally elicited, but it is required that the motive of sorrow for sin should proceed from faith if it is to be of use for salvation.

We may thus approach the question which, as Lehmkuhl says, many moralists treat with a certain scrupulosity—whether before the Sacrament is received explicit acts of faith and hope must be made, or whether implicit acts are sufficient. Lehmkuhl himself answers the question as follows:[165] To require that the penitent should elicit an act of faith with its formal object explicitly and with deliberation before or apart from the act of contrition is unreasonable; there would be reason for it only in the case of a penitent who had lost his faith by sinning against it. But an act of faith meaning the assent to a proposition of faith which springs from the habit of faith (assensum in aliquam veritatem ut fide notam ab habitu fidei oriundum), is rightly demanded since it is otherwise impossible to derive contrition from a supernatural motive. Thus there is no doubt that a formal and explicit act of faith is necessary; but this is certainly present if the necessary contrition be there.

Accordingly St. Alphonsus is quite justified in believing that he can reconcile the divergent views of the theologians by teaching that formal faith is certainly necessary, but not reflex faith: that is a separate and distinct consideration of the grounds of faith. It is just the same with regard to hope; for if a man receive the Sacrament in a genuine spirit of penance in order to get forgiveness of his sins, he is making an act of hope explicite (though not yet reflexe, still exercite) that God will grant him pardon in the Sacrament through the merits of Christ.[166] All this, however, holds good only for the faithful who are instructed in the things necessary for salvation.

Our faith presents to our consideration many motives for contrition, which, as has been shown above, are reduced to two by the Council of Trent: fear of punishment and hatefulness of sin. This hatefulness may have many forms: the general malice which belongs to every sin (in so far as it is an injury to God our highest good, and rebellion against Him, or ingratitude to God our Father and Benefactor, or infamous unfaithfulness to Jesus our loving Redeemer), or the particular malice which is proper to each sin, since every sin has its own peculiar wickedness and is the opposite to some special virtue. A further motive is found in the sufferings and death of Christ, which may be considered a motive of caritas, and the loathsome state of the soul when deprived of sanctifying grace.

Among the punishments which excite us to salutary contrition are first of all the fire of hell, and then purgatory.

All these motives may be called eternal; the pains of purgatory may be numbered among the eternal motives because they begin only when a man has passed from this life into eternity.

It is to be observed that any one of these motives is sufficient to awaken in us true contrition; nor is it necessary that we should choose a motive with which we made acquaintance first by revelation; we know many of these motives as well by reason as by faith; we must only take care that the motive which impels us to sorrow appeals to us not merely from the point of view of reason, but as proposed by faith. If, however, one is moved to contrition by a particular motive, namely, the peculiar malice of some sin even when this malice is made known to us by faith, it is better to add a universal motive either of fear or of the malice residing in all sin, so that the sorrow may not be insufficient or doubtful for any sin which, having escaped observation, was not repented of.

The sorrow which comes from the thought of the temporal sufferings of this life may be regarded as supernatural if these sufferings are looked upon as inflicted by God, as being signs of His anger, and as a sort of foretaste of His eternal punishments if we do not amend. Hence the sorrow which comes from the thought of earthly pains cannot be set down at once and absolutely as supernatural sorrow; the supernatural aspect must be kept in view, and then the sorrow may be regarded as supernatural and sufficient for approaching the Sacrament. Not only reason, but faith also, teaches us that in God’s providence sin has many evil consequences, and that on account of sin God strikes mankind with pains and calamities both private and public. Moreover, the Council of Trent enumerates among the motives of attrition “the fear of hell and of punishment,” and in the punishment we are to understand the pains of this life, for the Council mentions as an example the Ninivites who repented of their sins, moved by fear of the destruction of their city, which had been prophesied by Jonas, unless they did penance; nor are the Ninivites the only instance where God has threatened temporal punishment in order to frighten sinners and move them to penance. Not all theologians, however, admit temporal punishments as motives of supernatural sorrow (among them Vasquez and Toletus); they try to weaken the argument drawn from the Council of Trent by asserting that the Council does not speak of two motives, which apart from one another can give rise to sufficient contrition, but that the words are to be taken conjunctively, so that the fear of earthly punishments must be joined to fear of the pains of hell, since the latter only are made known to us by faith. Our proof is in no way invalidated by this argument; besides, many theologians, and those the most famous, stand by the first view, so that it may be considered as the sententia communis. The words of one of them, the eminent Suarez, may be quoted here. He writes:[167] “Hence I infer that such sorrow [as is required for the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance] must proceed from a divine and supernatural motive. That a temporal and human sorrow is not sufficient is plain from the words of the Council of Trent, and the reason is not to be misunderstood, for such a motive does not deprive the will of the affection towards sin.” And in another place he writes: “Vega (l. 13 in Trid. c. 14) concedes that sorrow based on the fear of other punishment apart from hell-fire is sufficient for attrition. This view is correct if we suppose that the fear is not merely human and natural. Granted that the pains be only temporal, if they are considered as inflicted by God, as proclaiming God’s anger, as being a foretaste in some way of the divine punishments in the next life if we do not reform, they can move us to a supernatural sorrow which may fairly be classed with the sorrow which is based on the fear of hell; thus we exercise the virtue of Christian hope when we look to God for temporal benefits in so far as they affect in any way our eternal life or fall under the special and supernatural providence of God.”

Since, however, the negative proposition denying the efficacy of sorrow springing from fear of earthly punishments for reception of the Sacrament is the safer one and is not altogether improbable, it is the view which must be adopted in practice; so a penitent should not confine himself to the thought of the temporal penalties, but use it to proceed to the consideration of the divine justice as revealed in eternal penalties, “for,” as Lugo expresses it, “this consideration will create the fear of God, who can inflict both one and the other penalty.” This last reflection will certainly move him to a determined resolution to avoid sin as the greatest of evils, and to avoid it even if that involves other suffering. If, however, a man dwell on the thought of the suffering which his sins have drawn upon him, or on the suffering which usually follows in the train of sin, he will not necessarily be induced thereby to resolve steadfastly to shun sin more than any other evil; for it is possible that the avoiding of sin may involve him in greater misfortunes in this life than those which would come from committing the sin; and it is impossible that the fear of a less evil will effectually nerve a man to endure the worse evil. Nevertheless the sorrow and purpose of amendment, if they are to be of any use for justification, must be such as to determine the man implicite to endure all the evils of this life rather than commit sin; and though the penitent is not obliged to reflect explicite on the matter, yet the motive of his sorrow and amendment must be so powerful that, as long as this motive is present, it would compel him to choose any suffering rather than sin. Finally, it may be mentioned that the consideration of the temporal suffering is a powerful weapon in the hands of the confessor to move an obstinate and unrepentant sinner to contrition, and thence to lead him to higher and safer motives.[168]

3. The sorrow must be universal (universalis), i.e. it must extend to all past sins, at least to those which are mortal. No single mortal sin can be forgiven unless it is repented of, nor without other mortal sins of which one has been guilty being forgiven, for none can be forgiven without sanctifying grace; but sanctifying grace is incompatible with mortal sin, for it is impossible that any one should be at the same time a child of God and the slave of the devil, worthy of everlasting reward and deserving eternal punishment; because “there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus” (Rom. viii. 1). Hence it is promised in Holy Scripture: “If the wicked do penance for all the sins which he hath committed, and keep all My commandments, ... living he shall live”;[169] and the second Lateran Council says, that a repentance would evidently be useless in which a man left out several sins and repented only of one; for it is written: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.” He who is attached to one sin shall no more cross the threshold of eternal life than one who is addicted to all possible sins.[170]

There are only two ways of attaining universal contrition; one way is to apply special motives of sorrow to each particular sin, the other is to repent of all sins, both the known and the unknown, through a universal motive. This universality does not require that one should reflect on all his sins so as to elicit an act of contrition for each particular sin; this is necessary only if a man confines himself to those motives which of their own nature do not apply to all mortal sins. In practice, however, it is strongly recommended to base the sorrow on universal motives. If, then, a man is sorry for his sins, his mortal sins at least, from a universal motive, and afterwards recalls other sins, he may confess them along with the rest and receive absolution for them without having to make a new act of contrition; this fresh act would be required if his repentance had proceeded from motives peculiar to each sin. Besides there arises at the fresh recollections of his other sins in a repentant sinner a renewal of his sorrow; this renewal is useful, for it insures a more perfect preparation, but it is not necessary.

We must distinguish between the universality of the sorrow and the universality of the purpose of amendment. The sorrow is general when it extends to all sins committed, at least to those which are mortal; the resolution, however, must be to avoid all mortal sins whether they have been committed or not.

If a penitent has only venial sins to confess, the sorrow need not be universal; it must have, however, the other properties.[171] Since venial sin may coexist in the soul along with sanctifying grace, the love of God is not lost, and since one venial sin may be forgiven apart from others, it is enough in preparing for confession to make an act of sorrow for one or other of the venial sins. Of course in such a case only those sins are forgiven which are repented of; nor is it incompatible with the essence of venial sin that a man should be really sorry for one, especially if it be peculiarly vile, without being sorry for the rest.

Still, the penitent should exert himself to be sorry for all the venial sins of which he accuses himself. It is no sin to confess venial sins for which one is not sorry, so long as materia sufficiens for which there is actual sorrow is offered to the power of the keys. It may be assumed that the penitent, confessing venial sins for which he is not sorry, does not care to be absolved from them; from these the confessor does not intend to absolve. Reasons may exist for confessing venial sins for which there is no real sorrow, e.g. in order to practice humility, to be better known and guided by one’s confessor, etc.[172]

4. The sorrow must be a sorrow surpassing all other sorrow (sovereign, supreme) which shrinks from past sin as a greater evil than any in the world, so that a man is prepared to forego every good and suffer any evil rather than fall into sin again. This sorrow must be supreme appretiative. Yet it is not required that the sensible feeling of pain should be infinitely great or surpassing all other pain; nor is it necessary that the heart should feel more keenly, or be more disturbed, or be more cast down than it would be by some earthly suffering or loss which should appeal more immediately to the sensitive faculties. Thus a man may experience a more intense and lively sorrow for temporal losses, such as the death of a dear friend or relation, and yet his contrition may be appreciatively much greater. Of this he would give ample proof if he were disposed to avoid sin, even though the sin could make good his losses. Hence it is not by the acuteness of the sensible suffering that sorrow for sin must surpass other pain, but by the displeasure at past sin and the determination of the will to endure all kinds of suffering and every temporal calamity and evil rather than consent to a single mortal sin. The sorrow for sin must therefore be appreciatively sovereign, not necessarily intensively so. The intensity makes no change whatever in the substance of an act. Though contrition is usually the more perfect the more intense it is, yet the intensity ought not to be aimed at, for it would only prepare the way for scruples; moreover, there is no proof that such intensity is necessary.[173]

Though the penitent must have a greater horror of sin than of any other evil, it is not necessary that he should make a deliberate comparison of it with other evils, and make a vivid picture of each particular misfortune, putting to himself the question whether he is ready to endure it in preference to committing sin. Indeed such a course would be highly imprudent and dangerous and likely to destroy the real contrition and purpose of amendment which he had, as well as to excite an inclination for the sin which he detested. Hence when such comparisons obtrude themselves on the mind of the penitent, he should positively reject them and cling to the absolute and unconditional general resolution of never sinning again, helping himself by the reflection that God’s grace will never be wanting at the right moment, and resolving with the help of that grace never more to sin.[174]

The question whether the sorrow can ever be excessive is already answered from the foregoing. The sorrow which is of the essence of contrition, i.e. displeasure at our past sins in so far as they are an injury to God, can never be excessive; the greater our love, the greater must be our displeasure, and love cannot be too great. As to the sensible feeling of sorrow which is not at all necessary for true contrition, this should never be carried so far as to interfere with the duty of self-preservation, though as a matter of course there is little occasion to fear that sensible sorrow will go so far. For the sensible sorrow over a spiritual evil is always somewhat remote and cannot easily be so acute as direct physical suffering or as the pain which comes from a misfortune appealing directly to the senses.[175]

As in contrition there is no definite intensity required, neither is any certain duration; for a man may in one moment elicit an act of perfect or imperfect contrition; it may be quite suddenly aroused by divine grace, as in the case of David when he exclaimed in his sorrow, “I have sinned against the Lord,” or as in the case of St. Peter, who at one glance of Jesus was melted into bitter tears. The moment contrition becomes actual it is sufficient for absolution. In practice, however, the faithful should be urged to spend some time before confession in rousing a genuine sorrow that will answer all demands, by reflecting with the help of God’s grace on the nature of sin and its consequences; moreover, they should be cautioned not to be satisfied with a mechanical repetition of an act of contrition, otherwise the sorrow may be wanting, or at its best be very weak. Yet sorrow is of the highest importance because it is the most essential of the actus pœnitentis, the very soul of confession.[176]

15. The Relation of Contrition to the Sacrament.

Finally, the sorrow must be sacramental, i.e. in connection with the Sacrament of Penance. For instance, in order that attrition along with the Sacrament may be able to restore a man to sanctifying grace, it must be joined with at least the implicit intention of receiving the Sacrament, and coexist virtually with the absolution.

A man who in preparing for confession bewails the sins which he has discovered in examining his conscience, makes an act of contrition ex intentione implicita of receiving the Sacrament. If, however, his sorrow is expressed without any intention of receiving the Sacrament or without any thought of confession, he must renew his act of sorrow in order to be sure of receiving absolution validly, unless he afterwards decides to go to confession in consequence of the still virtually enduring contrition, so that his confession proceeds from his sorrow. Hence the following conclusions are drawn:—

I. An act of contrition made without reference to the receiving of absolution makes the validity of the absolution doubtful.

II. It is not necessary, however, that the penitent should make the act of contrition in consequence of his resolution to go to confession. This is the usual practice, it is true, and certainly a very good one, but it is enough if by his contrition he be moved to make his confession, and if he thus unite his sorrow, still persevering, with the sacramental act. It is also sufficient if the penitent makes an act of sorrow in the interval between the confession of his sins and the giving of the absolution.[177]

The reason for making these demands upon the penitent is that the acts of the penitent are not only an interior preparation for, but they are the materia ex qua of, the Sacrament. The sorrow, therefore, must be brought into relation to the Sacrament; and since this doctrine is probable and is the common teaching, this relation must be established in practice at least ante factum, i.e. the confessor must before giving absolution take care that the penitent makes his act of sorrow with a view to the Sacrament.

Hence the question amounts really to this: What relation is demanded between the act of sorrow and the Sacrament? not whether such a relation be necessary; for, on the one hand, it cannot be defended with any probability that such relation is unnecessary, and, on the other hand, it is not in accordance with either truth or prudence that the penitent, before making the act of contrition, should establish its relation to the confession or be obliged to have the intention of receiving the Sacrament.

Some sort of bond, however, must exist between the contrition and the Sacrament. It is false to infer from the Catholic teaching of the Council of Trent that the eliciting of the act of sorrow or dolor in fieri, as it is called, is the materia proxima of the Sacrament; it is rather the sorrow already elicited or the dolor in facto esse, which is the matter of the Sacrament; it is not in or by itself proxima materia: it becomes so by means of the confession and in union with the confession. That sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the will of receiving the Sacrament. In other words, the sorrow must inform the confession, i.e. make the accusation a penitent or sorrowful confession, and apt to effect a reconciliation with God. If then the sorrow coexists in any way with the confession and is referred to it, that sorrow constitutes proxime the matter of the Sacrament and there is no necessity for the penitent to have the intention of confessing before making the act of contrition. In a similar way water is the matter of Baptism; it is not necessary that the water should be procured with the intention of conferring the Sacrament; it is quite enough to take the water which comes to hand and to apply it to the sacramental use. Now there can be no doubt that the sorrow also, though not elicited with a view to the Sacrament, can remain present in some way in the soul, and while so present may later on be brought into contact with and applied to the Sacrament. A man, for instance, who under the influence of his contrition seeks an opportunity of going to confession, or makes use of the opportunity of going which presents itself, has certainly not lost his contrition; he has it rather in greater abundance, though he reflects no more on his sorrow, nor even retains any certain recollection of it afterwards.

Lacroix has no sufficient reason for demanding that sorrow must be aroused with the view of going to confession, saying that otherwise the sorrow would not be a sacramental act, just as the pouring of water made without the intention of baptizing, though referred immediately afterwards to the baptismal act and the form added, is not a sacramental function. The comparison, we answer, is not to the point, for the sorrow is not in et per se materia proxima as is the pouring of the water in Baptism. If, however, a man poured out the water with some other intention, and then still in the act of pouring formed the intention of baptizing, the Baptism would be valid. The same argument holds for penance; hence that sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the wish to receive the Sacrament.

In the case quoted above where the penitent first confesses his sins and then makes his act of sorrow before receiving the Sacrament, or when he is moved to contrition by the words of his confessor, a difficulty may arise, since the confession must be a sorrowful one. Such an enumeration of the sins cannot, of course, be considered as informed by sorrow; the humble demand for absolution, however, takes up the accusation again and perfects it; and makes it materia proxima of the Sacrament.

If, on the contrary, the sorrow has been elicited with no idea at all of confessing the sin, there is reason for doubting whether an act so completely independent of the confession will become materia of the Sacrament. Absolution cannot be demanded in face of the probability of such an essential defect; yet one can hardly acquire sufficient certainty of the existence of such defect to make the repetition of the confession obligatory.[178]

III. The sorrow must coexist at least virtually with the absolution if it is to be sacramental. This virtual coexistence is secured if the sorrow is excited immediately before the accusation or the absolution, or even one, two, or four hours before confession; and St. Alphonsus admits that real sorrow may last one or two days and still be sufficient for absolution, when it comes from the desire of being reconciled with God, or when it urges a man to go to confession in order to avoid the sins along with the occasion of them. On the other hand, a sorrow removed by so long an interval would not be sufficient for valid absolution if the confession were made out of mere devotion, or in fulfilment of a vow, or for some similar reason. In these latter instances one or two hours is the widest limit which could be assigned for the virtual duration of the contrition. Hence we must condemn the teaching of some moralists that the act of sorrow endures over an unlimited time, and that it is quite sufficient if it is not retracted in the interval. Of course the act of contrition loses completely all its value for absolution by any retraction; and sorrow is retracted expressly by any new complacency in the sin or by any fresh mortal sin.

The reasons for the doctrine just given have already been laid down in the preceding paragraphs on the relation between contrition and absolution. The theologians fall back in particular on the analogy between the civil and sacramental tribunals. As in a civil process some time may elapse between the hearing of the case and the passing of the sentence without invalidating the sentence, so some interval may elapse between the sorrow and the absolution by which sentence is pronounced; this delay, however, must not be too long.[179]

In practice the priest must teach the faithful and insist on their renewing the act of sorrow immediately before confession, if it is some time since they made it, and also on a due amount of time being given to eliciting contrition, since the fruit of the Sacrament is more abundant in proportion to the care taken in preparing for it.

In the case, however, where confession has been made with genuine sorrow but without the necessary reference to the Sacrament, the penitent should not be obliged to repeat the confession, for the other view with regard to the sorrow, that it is not materia sacramenti, but only a disposition on the part of the penitent, is not altogether without probability; besides it is scarcely probable that the former act of contrition has not been renewed when the man intended to confess, and that it has no sufficient coexistence with the confession, or at least with the intention to confess. Only when there is danger of death or any risk of the penitent dying before receiving absolution again, the safer course, as far as possible, should be adopted; for on such important occasions prudence counsels us to guard against even slight doubts, so as not to jeopardize our eternal salvation.

It is certain, as we remarked above, that the act of contrition is retracted by a fresh mortal sin, and its effect, in consequence, no longer endures. It is not so easy to settle the question, with regard to venial sins, as to whether the sorrow for venial sin based on a universal motive is revoked by a fresh venial sin, or whether the sorrow continues. If it is conceded that the sorrow is revoked, scruples may easily arise if the sorrow has not been renewed immediately before confession. This practice is very good; but not necessary, if the fresh venial sin is less grievous than those which the penitent intended to confess when he made his act of sorrow.[180]

There is still another question to consider. An act of contrition is made, extending to all past sins, those which are forgotten as well as those which are remembered; must this be renewed if the penitent afterwards confesses the forgotten sins and desires a second absolution?

A renewal of the sorrow in this case does not seem necessary, provided that the sorrow in the first confession extended to all past sins, even those which by chance had escaped the memory; for in this case the process was not objectively complete. The sorrow and the implicit intention of receiving absolution were applied to all sins, even those inculpably forgotten; and as the renewal of the sorrow would not be at all necessary if the penitent, after making an act of contrition on universal grounds, recalls just before the absolution some sins forgotten and confesses them before the absolution is pronounced, so it is not necessary in the case mentioned, since it is much the same whether one receives many particular absolutions or a general one embracing all the sins. Such is the view of the greater number of the moralists. Lugo, St. Alphonsus, and Reuter may be mentioned particularly as favoring it; St. Alphonsus calls this teaching communis, Roncaglia moraliter certa, Sporer, Elbel, and many others probabilissima; it has been declared even indubitata apud omnes; pro ea stat, says Lugo, communis praxis. If in this case one or two confessors perhaps insist on the renewal of the sorrow, the greater number agree in acting differently or in suggesting it merely as a piece of advice.

The champions of the other view urge that the case is closed by the first absolution; if then absolution is to be given again, a new materia proxima is required, and even if the sorrow continue, it has no relation to the second absolution. It is easily seen that this is not a strong reason.[181] Yet though the renewal of the sorrow be not necessary for the validity of the absolution, it is advisable to make again the act of sorrow, which is easy to do and certainly increases the grace. The confessor deals prudently with a penitent under such circumstances when he requires him to make a short renewal of his act of contrition.[182]

The doctrine just developed is not only adopted ex communi sententia in the case more or less frequent, where a mortal sin which had been forgotten is confessed immediately after or very soon after absolution, but also in two other cases. For instance, a penitent in immediate danger of death must be absolved after one or two sins have been confessed; after this, if he be still alive, the confession is continued and completed. The other example is when a penitent (a very rare case) is absolved by his superior from the reserved sins only, and from the remaining sins by another confessor.[183]

The result of this doctrine ought not to be, however, that confessors and penitents become less solicitous about contrition for sins already remitted by the Sacrament. It may, however, as Ballerini remarks, be very useful in quieting scruples, especially of those who accuse themselves of venial sins and in addition tell some mortal sin already confessed and absolved; for if there is little ground for doubting the sorrow for past mortal sins in a penitent who has usually only venial sins to confess, and shows by his constant victories over temptation his aversion to mortal sin, yet certain anxious penitents are frequently troubled with scruples about their want of contrition, especially if they happen to hear a preacher who, with a zeal sometimes devoid of prudence, condemns the repeated confession of past sins made without true contrition. Such scruples may be overcome by various means, but especially by the doctrine just given.[184]

To conclude with a few practical questions:—

1. How must the confessor deal with a penitent who thinks he has only very slight contrition? He must first of all not be too hasty in deciding that this penitent is indisposed and without the necessary contrition; there are men whose hearts are so hard and inaccessible to sensible impressions that it is only with difficulty and at rare intervals that they are moved to a sensible sorrow, and such are easily inclined to think that they have not the proper dispositions. The confessor must remember that the feeling of sorrow is not at all required, but that a real grief over the past life and an earnest desire to amend are sufficient; he must satisfy himself that these dispositions are present and cannot demand more. He may, moreover, reasonably assume the presence of these dispositions in the penitent if the latter be willing to listen to warning and instruction, if he has at any time really endeavored to amend, if he is ready to perform the penance imposed, and to carry out other prescriptions of a like nature.[185]

2. When with regard to former confessions the priest wishes to ascertain whether the penitent has had real sorrow, the following points may serve as indications:—

(a) If the penitent has made use of the means suggested to him for overcoming the sin.

(b) If he has avoided at least the proximate occasions of sin.

(c) If the number of sins has become less.

(d) If the penitent is convinced that he had real sorrow and purpose of amendment; for it is a first principle in the Sacrament of Penance that the penitent’s word is to be taken, since he is there his own accuser and witness.[186]

The priest must act here with great prudence so as not to frighten away the penitent, and at the same time not to indulge in an indiscreet leniency by which he would himself commit sin and involve both the penitent and himself in ruin.

3. It is not easy for the confessor to discover when the penitent has not real contrition; the following directions, which Cardinal Denoff in his pastoral brought to the notice of all the confessors of his diocese, may be of use:—

(a) If the penitent approaches with a proud bearing as though despising the minister of Christ.

(b) If he answers with impatience and anger the questions which the confessor is bound to put.

(c) If in the course of his confession he constantly makes excuses and accuses others more than himself.

(d) If he mentions the gravest sins as though they were ordinary occurrences.

(e) If it is evident that he is trying to conceal a mortal sin which the confessor in the course of his examination has detected.

(f) If he refuses to accept a penance proportioned to the number and gravity of his sins, and given with all consideration for his circumstances.

(g) If he is unwilling to employ the necessary means to reform.

(h) If, finally, he belongs to the number of those unhappy sinners who seek ignorant or easy-going confessors, with a view of getting absolution only, without any intention of reforming.[187]

4. If the priest has to deal with an obstinate sinner, he must discreetly unite mildness and severity, but above all pray to God for him, since every good gift comes from the Father of light. He may picture to him God’s great mercy and the love of Jesus to give him courage; or he may try to soften the hardness of his heart by reminding him of God’s justice (cf. S. Alph. Praxis Confessar. cp. I).

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II. THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT

16. Necessity and Nature of the Purpose of Amendment.

According to the decision of the Council of Trent, as we have seen above, the resolution to amend as well as contrition is required for the valid reception of the Sacrament. With a true sorrow for sin is always conjoined the resolution to avoid it, so that we may say with regard to past sins sorrow means grief and horror, with regard to the future it means the resolution to amend. For instance, a man who hates the sin he has committed, because it is sin and in so far as it is sin, i.e. because it is an offense against God and the greatest misfortune which can befall a mortal, naturally extends that sorrow to everything which involves sin, and so to the sins of the future, since they offer the same grounds for hatred as the rest.

Now amendment is effected by the deliberate intention never to sin again for the future. A distinction is drawn between the express or formal resolve (propositum explicitum seu formale), as when, for example, a man thinks upon his future life and resolves to sin no more, and the implicit resolve contained in the sorrow (propositum implicitum seu virtuale); the latter is present when a man, without thinking upon his future life, repents of his sin in such wise that, if asked whether he intends for the future to avoid sin, he would most certainly answer in the affirmative.

It is a disputed point among theologians whether for the validity of confession an express (formal) resolve is necessary or one included in the act of contrition (a virtual resolve) is sufficient. Some teach absolutely (very few, however) that an express resolve is necessary, and appeal to the Council of Trent as requiring this condition, since, after defining the act of contrition, it adds the words: Cum proposito non peccandi de cætero.[188]

This argument is successfully invalidated by Cardinal Lugo,[189] who, in addition, brings convincing testimony that the very opposite conclusion may be drawn from the teaching of the Council. Since, moreover, as Ballerini shows in his notes on Gury’s text, only a very few theologians adopt that view, it can hardly lay any claim to probability.[190]

Other theologians teach absolutely that an express purpose of amendment is not necessary if the contrition proceed from a universal motive;[191] an implicit resolution is sufficient, and Lugo calls this opinion communis inter recentiores. Indeed most of the theologians endorse it. Ballerini cites seventy-three by name, with the passages in which they express their views.[192] It is also founded on solid intrinsic grounds, for, according to the doctrine of the Council (loco citato), attrition which excludes the desire of sinning is sufficient for the valid reception of the Sacrament; but, as we have seen, attrition excludes the desire of sinning, even when there is no formal purpose of amendment, for it detaches the heart of man from sin, and not only from past sin but from all sin.[193]

Finally, there are theologians who distinguish and say: If a penitent advert to the future, he must make a formal resolution to amend; if, however, as in the case of the dying, no thought of the future occurs to him, a formal resolution is not necessary; for it is hardly possible that a penitent who is really sorry for his sins and thinks upon the future should fail to make an express and formal resolve to amend. Yet this may very well happen, as Ballerini observes, to pious people, especially to such as are careful to avoid even slight deliberate venial sins, and are accustomed to make acts of sorrow for defects and to start afresh on the right way; for in them the resolution to avoid sin is not made just for the time when they prepare for confession, but it is rather an enduring habit of mind. Hence it is not matter of surprise that they should not think of renewing and confirming their resolution. Suarez makes this clear when, in speaking of perfect contrition, he asks whether an act of perfect love suffices for justification, or whether also an act of sorrow for sin be necessary; he replies that per se both are required, but that per accidens the act of perfect love suffices, for whoever makes an act of perfect love is undoubtedly restored to grace; but that if a man be conscious of sin, he is in duty bound to reëstablish his right relation to God and to make a formal and explicit act of displeasure and hatred with regard to the sin; to neglect this duty would prove that he had no real love. In a similar way the sinner who mourns for his past sins is naturally prompted to make a resolution of avoiding sin; hence the voluntary neglect of the purpose of amendment renders the act of contrition very suspicious.[194]

After exposing the three views which have divided theologians on this point, St. Alphonsus concludes: The last two views are certainly the more probable; but since the first has also a certain probability, it must in practice be followed ante factum. He holds that a penitent would be obliged to repeat his confession if he had confessed in good faith without an express purpose of amendment, though with real contrition such as would include a virtual purpose; his argument being that, since the first opinion is sufficiently probable, a penitent who had certainly incurred mortal sin is bound to avow the same in a confession that was certainly and not merely probably valid.[195] Now, as we have shown above, the first opinion can hardly lay claim to any probability, though the holy Doctor concedes it as such mainly because he was misled by Lacroix into believing that he had distinguished authorities on his side. Besides, St. Alphonsus teaches in another part of his Moral Theology (l. c. n. 505) that the penitent should not be obliged to repeat his confession unless there be a moral certainty of its invalidity—a doctrine quite in accordance with the sententia communis and with excellent reason maintained by Lacroix, Gobat, etc., in opposition to Antoine, one of the most conspicuous rigorists of his time.

In the case under consideration it may be decided with moral certainty that a confession made with a virtual purpose of amendment is rather valid than invalid, especially since, according to St. Alphonsus himself, the champions of all these opinions unite in declaring that a confession made without an express resolution of amendment need not be repeated, for they would certainly have decided for the repetition if they had thought such a confession invalid. Hence theologians deny communissima sententia that a formal purpose of amendment (if the contrition is based on a universal motive) is necessary necessitate sacramenti; they admit that confessions are valid without the express purpose of amendment. Add to this that St. Alphonsus in his Homo Apostolicus taught that confessions made with only a virtual purpose of amendment need not be repeated.[196]

We conclude with the following principles:—

1. In order to receive the Sacrament validly and to share in its essential effects, a virtual or implicit purpose of amendment is sufficient if the sorrow proceed from a universal motive.

2. If confession has been made without a formal and express purpose of amendment, there is no obligation to repeat the confession as though it had been invalid.

3. The faithful should be taught and urged to make a formal resolution of amendment in the course of their preparation for confession.

The reason of this last prescription is not so much to be found in any doubt with regard to confessions made without the express purpose of amendment, but to secure a more abundant fruit from the Sacrament. We shall certainly with the grace of God make more earnest endeavors to avoid sin and to reform if we expressly, deliberately, and with all our heart resolve to avoid sin. Indeed, as Lehmkuhl justly observes, apart from the grace of the Sacrament and the instruction and advice of our confessor, the frequent reception of this Sacrament serves to secure us against relapse, for our wills need a frequent stimulus to remain firm in the hatred of sin. Not infrequently one cause of our relapses is a weak purpose of amendment.[197]

17. Properties of the Purpose of Amendment.

The purpose of amendment must have the three following properties: it must be absolute or firm, efficacious, and universal. We shall consider these properties in detail.

The purpose of amendment must, first of all, be firm, answering to the contrition which detests sin above all other evils; so that a man under no circumstances, neither through fear of any evil or love of any good will think of swerving from his resolve. Thus the purpose of amendment is not a velleity, not a mere wish or a vague desire; it must be an absolute, fixed determination never to sin again; otherwise the penitent would not really detest sin nor really and thoroughly turn to God.

The resolution must then be so fixed that the penitent is resolved to overcome all the difficulties which may oppose its execution. The confessor will prudently refrain from placing before the penitent all the difficulties which will have to be faced in keeping the resolution or from revealing to the penitent all his obligations, if the latter be bona fide ignorant of them; “for,” says Suarez, “he might expose the penitent to the obvious danger of making no resolution, but rather of sinning again.” It is enough, continues the great theologian, if the confessor pictures to the penitent in general terms the hatefulness of sin, the goodness of God, the danger of eternal damnation, etc., and that the penitent in consequence of the exhortation forms a general resolution never to fall again into mortal sin.[198] The advice which Cardinal Cajetan gives to confessors is in much the same strain: They should not, he says, lead their penitents into temptation by their excessive and imprudent zeal in asking whether they are resolved to avoid sin even at the risk of suffering the greatest misfortunes, loss of goods, of health, or even of life itself; for questions of this kind would prove a snare to many penitents. His office should be rather to persuade them to love God above all things, and in consequence of this love to repent of their sins and avoid them for the future. In this way he will inflame the hearts of his penitents, without leading them into danger.[199]

The celebrated Lugo reminds us of the weakness of the human heart; the confessor is to take this weakness into account in dealing with the penitent, and not put before him singly and explicitly enormous difficulties which he should be ready to overcome rather than commit sin. In another place, treating of penitents given to ambition and sensuality, who have renounced their sins in confession though without great sorrow, but, conquered by the strength of their passion which they have only resisted feebly, have relapsed easily when occasion offered, he says: “Indeed we do not dare to represent clearly in detail the temptations or occasions of sinning which may occur, in order that the penitent may make his resolutions on each point, for there is good reason to fear that he will fail to retract his former sins even in confuso.”[200]

It is then sufficient per se that the penitent resolve in confuso to sin no more; a resolution of this kind, however, may be easily defeated by the contemplation of a peculiar difficulty. For this reason the penitent should renew frequently and earnestly his resolution never to sin again; if he do this and also pray, there is reason to hope that he will be victorious in the actual moment of trial. Men of strong will and steadfast heart may put before themselves and contemplate with their eyes open the difficulties in the way of avoiding sin and reforming their lives, and such conduct is helpful in the spiritual struggle, unless the subject be one in which the heart is vehemently carried away or where victory consists in flight. To conjure up difficulties and to review temptations which might disturb weak minds and lead them into danger[201] serves no good purpose and is not to be recommended.

From the foregoing it is abundantly evident:—

1. That the Jansenists and rigorists are wrong in maintaining that relapse into sin is a sign of a want of purpose. The resolution depends on the present frame of mind which, however strong it is, may easily waver. “The fact of a man sinning again does not prevent his former sorrow from having been real; as a man may be now seated who has been running, so a man may fall into sin who has been truly repentant; the nature of a former act is not changed by a subsequent act.”[202] And the Rituale Romanum[203] directs, as of great utility, to advise those who easily relapse into sin to confess often, once a month, or on certain feasts, and also to communicate; it presumes that such people in spite of their relapses have made good confessions; otherwise the penitent would be obliged to repeat his confessions as being invalid every time that he relapsed, which would certainly be opposed to the practice and universal belief of the faithful. If, however, a penitent relapse without any effort to overcome himself, it may be taken as a sign that he had no fixed determination, or there is ground for a suspicion, at least, of its absence; any one who is really determined to avoid sin will not easily forget his purpose; he will resist for some time at least, and will fall less easily and less often.[204]

2. Even if a penitent is conscious of his own weakness and knows that he will relapse in spite of his resolution and in spite of earnest effort, he cannot be considered as giving undoubted signs of weakness of purpose. It is only the rigorists who demand a firm conviction of not falling again.

If, however, a penitent is so afraid that he will fall again, or so convinced that he will repeat his sin as to despair of reforming, he cannot be absolved; not only does he fail in resolution—there is a fair suspicion at least that he has no fixed determination—but he distrusts God’s grace which is ever at hand, and, as experience proves, is always efficacious in helping men of good will to overcome difficulties and obstacles. Before giving such a penitent absolution he must be taught the fatal error of his ways, moved to sorrow for his despair, for such despair is sinful, and exhorted to great confidence in God’s grace. This is the doctrine of St. Alphonsus,[205] in which, as he himself confesses, he follows Busenbaum,[206] Concina, and Lacroix.[207]

If, finally, the penitent has misgivings from his previous experience of relapses, but not so strong as to deprive him of all confidence, he is not to be classed at once as indisposed; the confessor must persuade him to make a firm resolution against sin and encourage him to have confidence in God’s grace. If he succeed in arousing hope in him, and the penitent promise to have recourse to prayer in temptation, it is better to give absolution at once than to put it off. This class of penitents should be encouraged to confess frequently, for there is reason to hope that they have a fixed determination to improve; there is no presumption for the opposite view, since a strong resolution to avoid sin is quite compatible with the fear of a possible relapse.[208]

Still less would it be a sign of want of the requisite dispositions if the confessor were persuaded that the penitent could hardly be saved from a relapse; this conclusion may be drawn with moral certainty, or, at least, on strong presumption, from the ordinary occurrences of life; hence the necessary disposition on the part of the penitent can always be secured.

In practice it is not of infrequent occurrence that a penitent, otherwise of good will, alarmed by the difficulties of some undertaking, declares that he cannot avoid a certain sin, or refuses to make a promise for fear of breaking his word, or says he cannot trust himself. This happens in the case of those who are given to some evil habit, as, for instance, taking the name of God in vain, swearing, flying into a rage, etc. Such a penitent must not only be encouraged to trust to the help of divine grace, but be taught that all required of him is to have at the present moment (hic et nunc) the determination not to relapse, that he should not look too far ahead but make his resolution day by day. The confessor must take particular care that the penitent understands that that only is demanded of him which he freely acknowledges to be within his power. This end is obtained by suggesting methods to the penitent to be used when he is free from temptation as well as when he is attacked, and by impressing upon him that all demanded of him is to guard against committing sins knowingly and with full advertence.[209]

The resolution must, moreover, be efficacious, i.e. the penitent must be ready not only to avoid sin, but also to take the necessary means for avoiding it, especially by avoiding the proximate occasions; for whoever effectually desires some end must, of necessity, as far as lies in him, remove all impediments to it, and employ all the means which will lead to it. Hence theologians teach that the resolution must be efficax affectu; in the case, however, where it is not executione efficax, i.e. where the penitent fails to accomplish his purpose, it is not reasonable to conclude at once that a real and sufficient resolve was absent, though some presumption against the fixity of the purpose may be entertained. What has been said with respect to the steadfastness of the purpose of amendment may be applied to its efficaciousness, seeing that the two subjects are so intimately connected. Though it is undoubted that for valid confession the purpose of amendment must be fixed and efficacious, yet we are not to understand thereby that a man may never fail in his resolution. It is quite certain that men are so fickle that they will fall away frequently from determined and fixed resolutions, as we see, for instance, in the case of St. Peter, who, as we know, was sincerely pledged not to betray his Lord, and, yet, denied Him soon after, at the mere word of a maid servant.

The purpose of amendment, then, is fixed and efficacious when a man is determined really to carry out what he has proposed, though he may afterwards fail through fear of an obstacle or in the stress of temptation; this happens often enough even in the case of those who are aiming at Christian perfection. Hence, for valid reception of the Sacrament, the purpose of amendment is sufficiently efficacious if it keep a man from sin during the time that his resolution lasts.[210]

In order to be reasonably free from misgivings with regard to his resolution, the penitent should be morally certain that he desires to avoid sin at any cost for the rest of his life, despite all grounds he may have for believing that his resolution may become weak in course of time.

Finally, the resolution must be universal, i.e. it must extend to all mortal sins at least, not only those which have been committed, but also those which are possible. Here lies the distinction between the universality of the contrition and that of the purpose of amendment; for while the sorrow is universal which includes all the sins that have been committed, the resolution, in order to be valid, must embrace all possible mortal sins. If there remained but a single mortal sin which the penitent was unwilling to shun, his resolution would be vain and useless even with regard to his other sins, because it could not be founded on a universal motive, such as hatred of sin considered in the light of an offense against God. A resolution which is based on this motive extends to all mortal sins without reserve, because they are all an offense against God; and if but one be excepted, such a motive could not have influenced the purpose of amendment, which in consequence cannot be real and genuine.[211]

18. The Purpose of Amendment with regard to Venial Sin.

The purpose of amendment, as we have said, must extend at least to all mortal sins. With regard to venial sins it must be constant and efficacious, but not necessarily universal; for, since venial sin is consistent with the friendship and grace of God in the soul, one is not obliged to resolve on avoiding all of them: indeed no one sine speciali privilegio gratiæ can avoid all venial sins, and no one is called upon to resolve to accomplish the impossible; still there is an obligation to resolve to avoid them as much as possible, or at least to diminish their number. The following points will present the matter in detail:—

1. It is sufficient with respect to any venial sin to make an act of contrition and a purpose of amendment, even though these acts do not extend to all lighter venial sins of the same species; for the greater the sin the greater is the offense against God and the punishment due to it; and a man may well shrink from displeasing God beyond a certain point, though below that point he may be careless.

2. It is sufficient to make an act of sorrow and purpose of amendment with regard to some particular species of sin, or some vice, or some sins opposed to a particular virtue, especially if the penitent keeps before his mind those particular sins which have been committed with greater malice and deliberation.[212]

3. With much more reason may it be considered sufficient to make acts of sorrow and purpose of amendment for all perfectly deliberate venial sins on account of their greater guilt; such a universal sorrow must, however, include a fixed and efficacious resolution of amendment. With respect to venial sins which are not quite deliberate, the resolution to take more pains to avoid them is a sufficient purpose of amendment. In order that such a universal resolve may be of avail, a particular species of sin should be singled out and made the special object of contrition and amendment.

4. Moreover, it is the general teaching of moralists that it is enough to make acts of sorrow and amendment with regard to the frequency of venial sin if the penitent really resolve to reduce the number; it is necessary here, however, to guard against a very lax practice. Though such doctrine is possible in theory and such a purpose of amendment may be defended as sufficient for the Sacrament, yet it is not free from risk; hence St. Alphonsus in his book Praxis Confessarii distinctly states that a resolution founded only on the great number of venial sins without any sorrow for any particular venial sin is not sufficient for receiving the Sacrament, while in his Moral Theology he grants that such a resolution is permissible, and founds it on the doctrine of St. Thomas; for it is impossible, he says, to be sorry on account of the number of the venial sins without repenting at least of those that have been last incurred and which have raised the number.[213]

The above doctrine may be useful to the priest in appeasing scruples about past confessions, if the penitent is not in the habit of falling into grave sin, and fears that he may have confessed without sufficient sorrow and purpose of amendment. Ante factum, i.e. before confession or, at least, before absolution is given, this doctrine should be confined in praxi to the sorrow and amendment of sins not quite deliberate and incurred through carelessness; for the guilt of such sins lies chiefly in the carelessness by which a man fails to watch himself and his evil inclinations, so far as possible to repress and overcome them.

It is impossible for a man to preserve himself entirely from all these sins, hence it is enough to be resolved to use great vigilance in reducing the number.

Moreover, it may be observed that a man who keeps his conscience so pure that he has only indeliberate venial sins to confess will easily make a sufficient act of sorrow for past sins; but if a man always falls into the same sin, it is a fairly clear sign that he has no true contrition and no firm purpose of amendment; hence it is a useful practice to make more careful acts of sorrow and amendment with regard to some particular sin, or to add some grave sin of the past life with respect to which real sorrow and a firm purpose of amendment can be aroused.

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