II. OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT…

II. OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT

Sect. 1. To say nothing here of the homonymy of the word indifferent, but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose, it signifieth such a mean betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is alike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptive of either of them. Indifferens, saith Calepin, is that quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum. Aquinas(1170) calleth that an indifferent action which is neither good nor evil. Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque mala in se est, saith a later writer.(1171)

But Dr Forbesse(1172) liketh to speak in another language. He will have that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary; and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandment of God; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action.(1173) The one he calleth bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth bonitas specialis, causans, et propter quam. This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.

Sect. 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punishment. What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he saith(1174) that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.

Ans. 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking only of individual actions, and that actus individuatur a circumstantus et adjecto modo, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no more in effect, but that actus quo ad speciem is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I go to hear God’s word upon the Lord’s day, let this action of mine be considered quo ad individuum, is it any otherwise remunerable than in respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman’s action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,(1175) if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum, implying that if, on the other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, etiam quo ad individuum.

But, I reply, what means he by these words, in se? Means he the individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other than this, quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum. And, besides, the Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione specici?(1176) Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by in se, understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of things indifferent, in se, per se, or sua natura, they mean only things indifferent quo ad speciem. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said nonsense, for so we should take his words, quamvis quoad speciem sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum.

Sect. 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or quo ad speciem, and likewise respectu adjecti modi, whereas a woman’s action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, respectu modi, for, in se, or, quo ad speciem, it hath no remunerable goodness in it.

Ans. What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions quo ad speciem? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered quo ad individuum.

That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing to agree to it quo ad individuum, as if to speak of Peter quatenus est homo, and to speak of him quatenus est individuum signatum, or res singularis sub specie hominis, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary because of the commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of it quo ad individuum, but as the specifical nature of that action of hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we speak of this individual action, quo ad individuum, we cannot consider it otherwise than respectu adjecti modi, because, in moral actions, modus adjectus is principium individuationis, and nothing else doth individualise a moral action.

Sect. 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad individuum, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only in objecto modo; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,(1177) Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And again: Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, causans and concomitans, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger,(1178) est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Human moral actions are called good or evil, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith Aquinas,(1179) thereupon inferring that illis mores dicuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui à ratione discordant. Dr Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,(1180) in hac cum fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium. Nay, those actions we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered quo ad individuum, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner quo ad individuum, as hath been showed.

Sect. 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the Doctor’s speculation about the nature of things indifferent.

For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that which is hot to that which is cold, yet bonum bona non contrariatur in moralibus.(1181) The reason of the difference is, because bonitas physica, or relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem, saith Scalliger;(1182) and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other; but bonum virtutis, saith Aquinas(1183) non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be opponed to another.

2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be medium inter bonum et malum morale; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other, but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?

3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth(1184) out of the Helvetic Confessor Jerome’s definition of a thing indifferent, and approveth it. Indifferens, saith he, illud est quod nec bonum nec malum est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habeas nec injustitiam. Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent, making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), have righteousness in them, as all men know.

III. WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING INDIFFERENT IN ACTU EXERCITO

Sect. 1. For our better light in this question I will premit these considerations, 1. When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all the circumstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus,(1185) upon those words of Seneca, Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, &c., saith, that without those circumstances of things, persons, times, places, facti ratio non constat. Circumstances sometimes constituunt rerum earum quae aguntur speciem, say our divines,(1186) meaning that circumstances do make an action good or bad. Humani actus, say the schoolmen,(1187) non solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur. It is not every man’s part, saith one of our opposites,(1188) to judge de circumstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam. “Some circumstances, saith another of them,(1189) are intrinsical and essential to actions, and specially making up their nature.” The principal circumstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:—

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur quomodo, quando.

The first circumstance which maketh an action good or bad is quis, which designeth the person: If a magistrate put to death a malefactor, the action is good; but if a private person put him to death, it is evil.

The second is quid, which noteth the quality or condition of the object: If a man take sua, the action is good; if aliena, it is evil.

The third is ubi: If men banquet in their own houses, the action is good; if in the church, it is evil.

The fourth is quibus auxiliis: If men seek health by lawful means, the action is good; if by the devil, or his instruments, it is evil.

The fifth is cur: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love to him, and desire to reclaim him, the action is good; if out of hatred and spleen, the action is evil.

The sixth is quomodo: For he who doth the work of the Lord carefully doth well; but he who doth it negligently doth evil.

The seventh is quando: To do servile work upon the six days of labour, is good; but to do it upon the Lord’s Sabbath, is evil.

2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the former; and it is this: The goodness or badness of a human action may be considered two ways, viz., either in actu signato, and quo ad speciem; or in actu exercito, and quo ad individuum; for an action is said to be specificated by its object, and individuated by its circumstances; so that, when an action is good or evil in respect of the object of it, then it is called good or evil quo ad speciem: when it is good or evil in respect of the circumstances of it, then it is said to be good or evil quo ad individuum.

3. Human actions, whether considered quo ad speciem, or quo ad individuum, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason, or from bare imagination only. To this latter kind we refer such actions as are done through incogitancy, while the mind is taken up with other thoughts; for example, to scratch the head, to handle the beard, to move the foot, &c.; which sort of things proceed only from a certain stirring or fleeting of the imagination.

4. Let it be remembered, that those things we call morally good, which agree to right reason; those morally evil which disagree from right reason; and those indifferent which include nothing belonging to the order of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor dissonant from the same.

5. When we speak of the indifferency of an individual action, it may be conceived two ways: either absolute et sine respectu ad aliud; or comparate et cum respectu ad aliud. In the free-will offerings, if so be a man offered according as God had blessed and prospered his estate, it was indifferent to offer either a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat; but if he chose to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be indifferent, but either good or evil. When we speak of the indifferency of an action comparate, the sense is only this, that it is neither better nor worse than another action, and that there is no reason to make us choose to do it more than another thing; but when we speak of the indifferency of an action considered absolutely and by itself, the simple meaning is, whether it be either good or evil, and whether the doing of the same must needs be either sin or evil doing.

6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed or forsaken, according to these three rules delivered to us in God’s word: 1. The rule of piety; 2. The rule of charity; 3. The rule of purity.

The first of these rules we find, 1 Cor. x. 31, “Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God;” and Rom. xiv. 7, 8, “For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord:” where the Apostle, as Calvin noteth,(1190) reasoneth from the whole to the part. Our whole life, and, by consequence, all the particular actions of it, ought to be referred to God’s glory, and ordered according to his will. Again, Col. iii. 17, “And whatsoever ye do, in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus.” In the expounding of which words Dr Davenant saith well, that Etiam ille actiones quæ sunt sua natura adiaphoræ, debent tamen à Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc est, juxta voluntatem Christi, et ad gloriam Christi.

The second rule is the rule of charity; which teacheth us not to use anything indifferent when scandal riseth out of it: Rom. xiv. 21, “It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;” yea, though it do not weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so lawful or indifferent in its own nature, the law of charity bindeth us to abstain from it: Rom. xiv. 19, “Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify another;” Rom. xv. 2, “Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification;” 1 Cor. x. 23, “All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not:” where the Apostle teacheth, that in cibo, &c.,(1191) “In meat, drink, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to look whether they be lawful, but that, farther, we are to look whether to do or omit the same be expedient, and may edify.” The Bishop of Winchester, preaching upon John xvi. 7, “I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go away,” &c., marketh, that Christ would not go away without acquainting his disciples with the reason of it; and that reason was, because it was for their good: whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should avoid Hophni’s non vult enim, and make our vult our enim, 1 Sam. ii. 15; that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason for our will; 2. That we should not, with the Corinthians, stand upon licet,—it is lawful, but frame our rule by expedit,—it is expedient, 1 Cor. vi. 13; x. 23; 3. That our rule should not be Caiaphas’ expedit nobis, but Christ’s expedit vobis,—for you it is good, you, the disciples, John xi. 50; and make that the rule of our going out and our coming in. The heathens themselves could say that we are born, partly for God, partly for our country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more ought Christians to understand that we are not born for ourselves, but for Christ and his church. And as in the whole course of our life, so especially in the policy of the church, we may do nothing (be it never so indifferent in itself) which is not profitable for edification: 1 Cor. xiii. 26, “Let all things be done to edifying.” From which precept Pareus inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the church which doth not manifestly make for the utility of all and every one; and that therefore not only unknown tongues, but cold ceremonies and idle gestures should be exploded out of the church.

The third rule is the rule of purity, which respecteth our peace and plerophory of conscience, without which anything is unclean to us, though it be clean and lawful in its own nature: Rom xiv. 14, “To him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean,” therefore si quis aliquam in cibo immunditiem imagineter, eo libere uti non potest.(1192) Whatsoever indifferent thing a man in his conscience judgeth to be unlawful, he may not lawfully do it: Rom xiv. 5, “Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;” and verse 23, “He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.” Nefas est omnino, saith Calvin,(1193) quippiam aggredi quod putes illi (domino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis illi placere. Now if a thing indifferent be used according to these three rules, the use of it is not only lawful but expedient also; but if it be not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogether unlawful.

Sect. 3. And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it can never be lawfully used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that the use of a thing indifferent is never lawful to us when we have no other warrant for using the same beside our own will and arbitrement.

Dr Forbesse speaks unadvisedly whilst he saith,(1194) Evenit nonnunquam, &c.: “It falleth out sometimes that that which was expedient for thee to do yesterday, and to omit this day, thou mayest, notwithstanding, afterward either do it, or not do it, according to thy arbitrement:” As if, forsooth, our using of things indifferent should not evermore be determined by the rule of expediency which God’s word giveth us, but sometimes by our own will. Dr Davenant(1195) could not dream that any, except the ignorant common people, could be of this opinion which Dr Forbesse holdeth Fallitur vulgus, saith he, _dum judicat licere __ sibi, uti victu, vestitu, sermone, aut quacunque re adiaphora pro arbitrio suo; nam haec omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt_.

Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing at our own pleasure; so neither may the church, at her will and pleasure, command the use of it: but as our practice, so the church’s injunction must be determined and squared according to the former rules. And if any man think that, in the using of things indifferent, he may be led and ruled by the church’s determination, without examining any further, let him understand that the church’s determination is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by higher rules.

Dr Forbesse, perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his cause, desireth to subject them to the church’s determination, and to make it our highest rule. Jam autem, saith he,(1196) in talium rerum usu, id edificat, quod pacificum; illud est pacificum quod est ordinatum; is autem decens ordo est in ecclesia ab ipso Christo constitutus, ut in talibus non suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiatur ecclesia, et exhibeatur praepositis obedientia.

He hath been speaking of the rules which God’s word giveth us concerning the use of things indifferent; and all of them he comprehendeth under this rule, that we should hear the church, and obey them who are set over us, as if God’s rules were subordinate to men’s rules, and not theirs to his. We say not that every man may use things indifferent sua arbitratu, but we say withal, that neither may the church command the use of things indifferent suo arbitratu. Both she in commanding and we in obeying must be guided by the rules of Scripture.

They who are set over us in the church have no power given them of Christ which is not for edifying, Eph. iv. 12. The counsel of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem (which is a lively pattern of a lawful synod to the world’s end) professed they would lay no other burden upon the disciples except such things as the law of charity made necessary for shunning of scandal, Acts xv. 28; and so that which they decreed had force and strength to bind a charitate propter scandalum, saith Sanctius;(1197) but suo arbitratu they enjoined nothing. Cartwright saith, “It appeareth by this place that there may be no abridgement of liberty simply decreed, but in regard of circumstance, according to the rule of edification.”(1198) And if the church’s decrees and canons be not according to the rules of the word; yet, forasmuch as every one of us shall give account of himself and his own deeds, we must look that whatsoever the church decree, yet our practice, in the use or omission of a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.

We may not, for the commandment of men, transgress the rule of piety, by doing anything which is not for God’s glory, and ordered according to his will; neither ought any of us to obey men, except “for the Lord’s sake,” 1 Pet. ii. 13, and “as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God,” Eph. vi. 6; which teacheth us the manner how we ought to obey men, namely, propter Christum et sicut Christus praecipit;(1199) for if we should know no more but the will of man for that which we do, then we should be the “servants of men,” not the servants of Christ. Neither yet may we for any human ordinance break the rule of charity; “But whatsoever either would weaken, or not edify our brother, be it never so lawful, never so profitable to ourselves, never so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined, Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and unto the fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it.”(1200)

Nor, lastly, may we obey men, so as to break the law of purity, and “perform any action with a doubtful conscience; that is, whereof either the world hath not,(1201) nor we out of it have no warrant, in which case tender consciences must be tendered rather than be racked by authority, for be the things in themselves never so lawful, &c., they are utterly unlawful to me without such information.” Whereas, therefore, some say, that in the use of matters indifferent, the laws of those who are set over us ought to rule us; we still answer that our practice may not be ruled by any law of man, except it be according to the rules of the word, whereof one is this, Tantum oportere esse obedientiae studium in Christianis,(1202) ut nihil agant, quod non existiment vel potius certi sint placere Deo.

Sect. 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the question in hand, we say, 1. As touching those actions which proceed from bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate quo ad speciem, forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason, but is like Gehazi, running away without his master’s leave, let the learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such actions may be and are of a civil quo ad individuum,(1203) or in respect of the circumstances, which show forth in them reprovable temerity, incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, quo ad speciem, yet none of them are, nor can be indifferent, quo ad individuum. The reason of this difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or kind,(1204) from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another man’s goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise of them when we speak of them quo ad individuum, because as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent, quo ad individuum; because oportet (saith Thomas(1205)) quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis. Friar Ambrosius Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of Trent,(1206) that to do good was a work, the concurrences of all circumstances is necessary, but the want of one only is sufficient for an evil, so that howsoever among the works considered in general, some are indifferent, yet in the singular there is no medium between having all the circumstances and wanting some; therefore every particular action is good or evil; and because among the circumstances the end is one, all works referred to a bad end are infected. He further alleged St. Augustine, that it is sin not only to refer the action to a bad end, but also not to refer it to a good end. Thus spake the learned friar very appositely; and the same is the judgment of our own divines. De bis rebus indifferentibus (saith Martyr(1207)) statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque natura sua indifferentiam habeant, sed quando ad electionem descenditur nihil est indifferens; and so saith Pareus likewise.(1208)

Sect. 5. These things are so plain and undeniable, that Dr Forbesse(1209) himself acknowledged no less than that every individual human action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodness which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the last end, and the doing of it in faith; which goodness, if it be wanting, the action is evil. Notwithstanding, he will have some actions, even quo ad individuum, called indifferent, for this respect, because they are neither commanded of God, and so necessary to be done, nor yet forbidden, and so necessary to be omitted.

Of an individual action of this kind, he saith: Manet homini respectu istius actus plena arbitrii libertas moralis; tum ea quae exercitii seu contradictionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quae specificationis seu contrarietatis libertas appellatur. He holdeth, that though such an action be done in faith, and for the right end (which general goodness, he saith, is necessary to the action, and commendeth a man to God), yet the action itself is indifferent, because it is not necessary; for a man hath liberty to omit the same, or to do another thing; which he illustrateth by this example:—

If the widow Sempronia marry at all, it is faith, because, as the Apostle teacheth, whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Now whilst everything is condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as Calvin observeth:(1210) 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor approven by the word of God. 2. Such actions, as though they be approven by the word of God, yet the mind, wanting this persuasion, doth not cheerfully address itself to the doing of them. But, I pray, doth the word underprop or approve the use of anything indifferent, if it be not used according to the foresaid rules, and, by consequence, conveniently and profitably?

Sect. 9. The Doctor thinks it enough that, in the use of a thing indifferent, I believe it is lawful for me to do this thing, albeit I believe and certainly know that it is lawful to me to omit it, or do the contrary; so that the doing of a thing in faith inferreth not the necessity of doing it: but for answer hereunto we say,

1. We have sufficiently proven that it is never lawful for us to do anything which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be persuaded not only of the lawfulness of the thing, but of the expediency of doing it.

2. Of his comparing of things indifferent together, and not considering them positively and by themselves, we have also said enough before.

3. The doing of a thing in faith inferreth the expediency and profit of doing it, and that is enough to take away the indifferency of doing it; for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else unlawful to be done (as hath been showed), it followeth that either it ought to be done, or else it ought to be left undone; therefore it is never indifferent nor free to us to do it, or leave it undone, at our pleasure.

4. Because the Doctor (I perceive) sticketh upon the term of necessity, and will have everything which is not necessary to be indifferent; therefore, to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostom and the author of the interlineary gloss upon Matt. xviii. 7, take the meaning of those words, “It must needs be that offences come,” to be this, it is profitable that offences come. Which gloss, though it be not to be received, yet as Camero noteth,(1211) it is ordinary to call that necessary which is very profitable and expedient. Besides this, I say, we further maintain, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we deliberate upon to do is never lawful to be done except it be also necessary, though not necessitate absoluta seu consequentis, yet necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione. Paul’s circumcising of Timothy was lawful only because it was necessary, for he behoved by this means to win the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned him,(1212) otherwise he could not safely have preached the gospel among them. Therefore he had done wrong if he had not circumcised Timothy, since the circumcising of him was according to the rules of the word, and it was expedient to circumcise him, and unexpedient to do otherwise. And (because de partibus idem est judicium) whensoever the use of any indifferent thing is according to the rules of the word, that is, when it is profitable for God’s glory, and man’s edification, and the doer is persuaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be done) the use of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but ought not to be admitted) the omission of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful.

Again, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against or not according to the said rules, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be admitted) the omission of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but may not, neither ought to be done) the doing of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful. For which it maketh, that the apostles in their decree, allege no other ground for abstinence from blood and things strangled (which were in their nature indifferent), but the necessity of abstaining caused and induced by the foresaid rules, Acts xv. 28.

The Apostle showeth that that measure of liberality whereunto he exhorted the Corinthians was not by any divine commandment necessary, yet he adviseth it as a thing expedient, 2 Cor. viii. 8, 10. And were not the Corinthians thereunto bound, because of this expediency of the matter, though it was not necessary? Juxta verbum, &c.: “According to God’s word (saith the Bishop of Salisbury(1213)) we are obliged to glorify God by our good works, not only when necessity requireth, but also when ability furnisheth, and opportunity occurreth,” Gal. vi. 10; Tit. ii. 14.

Sect. 10. As touching the scope of all this dispute, which is the indifferency of the controverted ceremonies, we shall hear sundry reasons against it afterward. For the present, I say no more but this: As in every case, so most especially when we meddle with the worship of God, or any appurtenance thereof, the rules of the word tie us so straitly, that that which is in its own nature indifferent ought either to be done, or to be left undone, according as it is either agreeable or not agreeable to these rules; and so is never left free to us to be done or omitted at our pleasure: for if at all we be (as certainly we are) abridged of our liberty, chiefly it is in things pertaining to divine worship.

But I marvel why Dr Forbesse discourseth so much for the indifferency of the ceremonies; for, lib. 1, cap. 7, he holdeth, that there were just reasons in the things themselves why the pretended Assembly of Perth should enjoin the five articles; some of which he calleth very convenient and profitable, and others of them necessary in themselves. Sure, if he stand to that which he hath there written, he cannot choose but say that it is unlawful, both for us and for all Christians anywhere, to omit the controverted ceremonies; and that all such as have at any time omitted them, have thereby sinned, in leaving that undone which they ought to have done—for the conveniency and necessity of them which he pretendeth is perpetual and universal.

Chapter IV

OF THE RULE BY WHICH WE ARE TO MEASURE AND TRY WHAT THINGS ARE INDIFFERENT.

Sect. 1. That the word of God is the only rule whereby we must judge of the indifferency of things, none of our opposites, we hope, will deny. “Of things indifferent (saith Paybody(1214)) I lay down this ground, that they be such, and they only, which God’s word hath left free unto us.”

Now these things which God’s word leaveth free and indifferent (in respect of their nature and kind) are such things as it neither showeth to be good nor evil. Where we are further to consider, that the word of God showeth unto us the lawfulness or unlawfulness, goodness or badness of things, not only by precepts and prohibitions, but sometimes also, and more plainly, by examples. So that, not only from the precepts and prohibitions of the word, but likewise from the examples recorded in the same, we may find out that goodness or badness of human actions which taketh away the indifferency of them.

And as for those who will have such things called indifferent as are neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God, I ask of them whether they speak of plain and particular precepts and prohibitions, or of general only? If they speak of particular precepts and prohibitions, then, by their rule, the baptising of young children, the taking of water for the element of baptism; a lecturer’s public reading of Scripture in the church upon the Sabbath day; the assembling of synods for putting order to the confusions of the church; the writing and publication of the decrees of the same; and sundry other things which the word hath commended unto us by examples,—should all be things indifferent, because there are not in the word of God either particular precepts for them, or particular prohibitions against them. But if they speak of general precepts and prohibitions, then are those things commanded in the word of God for which we have the allowed and commended examples of such as we ought to follow (for, in the general, we are commanded to be followers of such examples, Phil. iv. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xi. 1; Eph. v. 1), though there be no particular precept for the things themselves thus exemplified.

Sect. 2. To come, therefore, to the ground which shall give us here some footing, and whereupon we mind to rear up certain superstructions, we hold, that not only we ought to obey the particular precepts of the word of God, but that also “we are bound to imitate Christ, and the commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident they had special reasons moving them thereto, which do not concern us:” which ground, as it hath been of a long time holden and confirmed by them of our side, so never could, nor ever shall, our opposites subvert it. It is long since the Abridgement confirmed and strengthened it, out of those places of Scripture: Eph. v. 1, “Be ye therefore followers of God, as dear children;” 1 Cor. xi. 1, “Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ;” 1 Thess. i. 6, “And ye became followers of us and of the Lord;” Phil. iii. 17, “Brethren, be followers together of me.”

This ground is also at length pressed by Cyprian, who showeth(1215) that, in the holy supper of the Lord, Christ alone is to be followed by us; that we are to do what he did; and that we ought not to take heed what any man hath done before us, but what Christ did, who is before all.

Sect. 3. But Bishop Lindsey(1216) asketh of us, if we hold this rule, what is the cause why, at the celebration of the sacrament, we bless not the bread severally by itself, and the cup severally by itself, seeing Christ did so, yet having no cause to move him which concerns not us.

Ans. 1. Beside the common blessing of the elements, in the beginning of the action, we give thanks also in the several actions of distribution, saying after this or the like manner: “The Lord Jesus, the same night he was betrayed, took bread, and when he had given thanks (as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to die for us) he brake it,” &c. “In like manner also, after supper, he took the cup, and, when he had given thanks (as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to shed his blood for us), he gave it,” &c. Which form (we conceive) may be construed to be an imitation of the example of Christ.

2. Though we did not observe such a form; yet there were two reasons to move Christ to give thanks severally, both at the giving of the bread, and at the giving of the cup, neither of which concerneth us: 1. The eucharistical supper was one continued action with the other supper which went before it; for it is said, “That whilst they did eat, he took bread,” &c. Wherefore, for more distinction of it from that supper which immediately proceeded, it was fit that he should give thanks severally at the giving of each element. 2. He had to do with the twelve apostles, whose hearts being so greatly troubled with sorrow, John xvi. 6, and whose minds not well comprehending that which they heard concerning the death of Christ, John xvi. 12, much less those mystical symbols of it, especially at the first hearing, seeing, and using of the same, it was needful for their cause distinctly and severally to bless those elements, thereby to help the weakness of their understanding, and to make them the more capable of so heavenly mysteries.

Sect. 4. Now, having heard that which the Bishop had to say against our rule, let us examine his own. He holdeth,(1217) That in the actions of Christ’s apostles, or the customs of the church, there is nothing exemplary and left to be imitated of us, but that which either being moral, is generally commanded in the decalogue, or being ceremonial and circumstantial, is particularly commanded by some constant precept in the gospel.

Ans. 1. This rule is most false; for it followeth from it that the example of the apostles’ making choice of the element of water in baptism, and requiring a confession of faith from the person who was to be baptised; the example also both of Christ and his apostles using the elements of bread and wine in the holy supper, a table at which they did communicate, and the breaking of the bread, are not left to be imitated of us; because these things are ceremonial, but not particularly commanded in the gospel. So that according to the rule which the Bishop holdeth, we sin in imitating Christ and his apostles in those things, forasmuch as they are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

2. His weapons fight against his own fellows, who allege (as we have showed elsewhere) the custom of the church(1218) is a sufficient warrant for certain ceremonies questioned betwixt them and us, which are not particularly commanded by any precept in the gospel. These the Bishop doth unwittingly strike at it whilst he holdeth that such customs of the church are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

Sect. 5. Wherefore we hold still our own rule for sure and certain. Christ’s actions are either amanda, as the works of redemption; or admiranda, as his miracles; or notanda, as many things done by him for some particular reason proper to that time and case, and not belonging to us, which things, notwithstanding, are well worthy of our observation; or imitanda, and such are all his actions which had no such special reason moving him thereto as do not concern us.

Calvin, upon 1 Cor. xi. 1, saith well, that the Apostle there calls back both himself and others to Christ, Tanquam unicum recte agendi exemplar; and Polycarpus Lycerus, upon Matt. xvi. 24, under that command of following Christ, comprehendeth the imitations of Christ’s actions.

Most certainly it is inexcusable presumption to leave the example of Christ, and to do that which seemeth right in our own eyes, as if we were wiser than he. And now, having laid down this ground, we are to build certain positions upon it, us follows.

Chapter V

THE FIRST POSITION WHICH WE BUILD UPON THE GROUND CONFIRMED IN THE FORMER CHAPTER.

Sect. 1. From that which hath been said of following Christ, and the commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident that they had some such special reason moving them to do that which they did, as doth not concern us, our first inference is this: That it is not indifferent for a minister to give the sacramental elements of bread and wine out of his own hand to every communicant; forasmuch as our Lord commanded his apostles to divide the cup among them, that is, to reach it one to another, Luke xxii. 17. Some of the interpreters are of opinion, that the cup spoken of by the Evangelist in that place is not the same whereof he speaketh after, ver. 20; but they are greatly mistaken; for if it were as they think, then Christ did again drink before his death of that fruit of the vine whereof we read ver. 18, which is manifestly repugnant to his own words. Wherefore, as Maldonat observeth(1219) out of Augustine and Euthimius, there was but one cup; whereof Luke speaketh, first, by anticipation, and, afterward, in its own proper place.

Sect. 2. But Bishop Lindsey(1220) falleth here upon a very strange speculation; and tells us, that if all the disciples did drink, howbeit they did not deliver the cup one to another, but received it severally from Christ’s own hand, they divided the same among them; because every one takes his part of that which is parted, they divide the whole among them. Alas! that I should blot paper with the confutation of such fooleries. I believe, when his Majesty hath distributed and divided so many lands and revenues among the prelates of Scotland, every one of them takes his part, but dare not say, though, that they have divided these lands and revenues among themselves. Can twenty or forty beggars, when an alms is distributed among them, because every one of them getteth his part, say, therefore, that they themselves have parted it among them? What, then, shall be said of the distributor who giveth to every one his part severally, and by himself? That man who required that his brother should divide the inheritance with him, did not, I trow, desire Christ to cause his brother to take his own part of the inheritance (there was no fear that he would not take his part); but he desired that his brother might give to him his part. So that, to divide anything among men, is not to take it, but to give it. And who did ever confound parting and partaking, dividing a cup and drinking a cup, which differ as much as giving and receiving. Thus we conclude, that when Christ commanded the apostles to divide the cup among them, the meaning of the words can be no other than this, that they should give the cup one to another; which is so plain that a Jesuit(1221) also maketh it to follow upon this command, that Christ did reach the cup non singulis sed uni, qui proximo, proximus sequenti, et deinceps daret. Hence it is that Hospinian(1222) thinks it most likely that Christ brake the bread into two parts, earumque alteram dederit illi qui proximus ei ad dextram accumbebat, alteram vero ei qui ad sinistram, ut isti deinceps proxime accumbentibus porrigerent, donec singuli particulam sibi decerpsissent.

VI. ANOTHER POSITION BUILT UPON THE SAME GROUND

Sect. 1. Our next position which we infer, is this: That it is not indifferent to sit, stand, pass, or kneel, in the act of receiving the sacramental elements of the Lord’s supper, because we are bound to follow the example of Christ and his apostles, who used the gesture of sitting in this holy action, as we prove from John xiii. 12; from Matt. xxvi. 20, with 26; Mark xiv. 18, with 22.

Our opposites here bestir themselves, and move every stone against us. Three answers they give us, which we will now consider.

First, They tell us that it is not certain that the apostles were sitting when they received this sacrament from Christ, and that adhuc sub judice lis est. Yet let us see what they have to say against the certainty hereof.

Bishop Lindsey objecteth, that, between their eating of the paschal supper and the administration of the sacrament to the disciples, five acts intervened: 1. The taking of the bread; 2. The thanksgiving; 3. The breaking; 4. The precept, “Take ye, eat ye;” 5. The word, whereby the element was made the sacrament. In which time, saith he, the gesture of sitting might have been changed.

Ans. It is first of all to be noted, that the apostles were sitting at the instant when Christ took the bread, for it is said that he took bread whilst they did eat; that is (as Maldonat(1223) rightly expoundeth it), Antequam surgerent, antequam mensae et ciborum reliquiae removerentur; and so we use to say that men are dining or supping so long as they sit at table and the meat is not removed from before them. To Christ’s ministering of the eucharistical supper together with the preceding supper, Christians had respect when they celebrated the Lord’s supper together with the love-feasts. Probabile est eos ad Christi exemplum respexisse, qui eucharistiam inter coenandum instituit, saith Pareus.(1224) But of this we need say no more; for the Bishop himself hath here acknowledged no less than that they were sitting at that time when Christ took the bread. Only he saith, that there were five acts which intervened before the administration of the sacrament to the disciples (whereof the taking of the bread was the first), and that in this while the gesture of sitting might have been changed; which is as much as to say, when he took the bread they were sitting, but they might have changed this gesture, either in the time of taking the bread, or in the time of thanksgiving, or in the time of breaking the bread, or whilst he said, “Take ye, eat ye,” or lastly, in the time of pronouncing those words, “This is my body” (for this is the word whereby, in the Bishop’s judgment, the element was made the sacrament, as we shall see afterward).

Now but, by his leave, we will reduce his five acts to three; for thus speaketh the text, “And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed it and break it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat, this is my body,” Matt. xxvi. 26; Mark xiv. 22. Whence it is manifest, that the giving of the bread to the disciples, which no man, I suppose, will deny to have been the administration of it, went before the two last acts which the Bishop reckoneth out. Nothing, therefore, is left to him but to say, that their gesture of sitting might have been changed, either in the taking or in the blessing, or in the breaking, or else between the taking and the blessing, or between the blessing and the breaking; yet doth the text knit all the three together by such a contiguity and connection as showeth unto us that they did all make up but one continued action, which could not admit any interruption.

Sect. 2. I saw a prelate sit down to his breakfast, and, as he did eat, he took some cups, and, having called for more, he said, he thanked God that he was never given to his belly; and with that he made a promise to one in the company, which he brake within two days after. Would any man question whether or not the prelate was sitting when he made this promise, forasmuch as between his sitting down to meat and the making of the promise there intervened his taking of some cups, his calling for more, and his pronouncing of these words, I thank God that I was never given to my belly? Yet might one far more easily imagine a change of the prelate’s gesture than any such change of the apostles’ gesture in that holy action whereof we speak. Because the text setteth down such a continued, entire, unbroken, and uninterrupted action, therefore Calvin gathereth out of the text that the apostles did both take and eat the sacramental bread whilst they were sitting. Non legimus, saith he,(1225) prostratos adorasse, sed ut erant discumbentes accepisse et manducasse. Christus, saith Martyr,(1226) eucharistiam apostolis una secum sedentibus aut discumbentibus distribuit. G. J. Vossius(1227) puts it out of doubt that Christ was still sitting at the giving of the bread to the apostles. And that the apostles were still sitting when they received the bread, Hospinian(1228) thinks it no less certain. They made no doubt of the certainty hereof who composed that old verse which we find in Aquinas:(1229)—

Rex sedet in coena, turba cinctus duodena; Se tenet in manibus; se cibat ipse cibus.

Papists also put it out of controversy; for Bellarmine acknowledgeth(1230) that the apostles could not externally adore Christ by prostrating themselves in the last supper, quando recumbere cum eo illis necesse erat; where we see he could guess nothing of the change of their gesture. Intelligendum est, saith Jansenius,(1231) dominum in novissima hac coena, discubuisse et sedisse ante et post comestum agnum. Dr Stella sticketh not to say,(1232) distribuit salvator mundi panem discumbentibus.

Sect. 3. But now having heard Bishop Lindsey, let us hear what Paybody(1233) will say. He taketh him to another subterfuge, and tells us, that though we read that Christ took bread whilst they did eat, yet can it not be concluded hence that he took bread whilst they did sit; because, saith he, “as they did eat,” is expounded by Luke (chap. xxii. 20) and Paul (1 Cor. xi. 25) to be after they had done eating, or after supper. Thus is their languages divided. Bishop Lindsey did yield to us, that when Christ took bread they were sitting; and his conjecture was, that this gesture of sitting might have been changed after the taking of the bread. Paybody saw that he had done with the argument if he should grant that they were sitting when Christ took bread, therefore he calleth that in question. Vulcan’s own gimmers could not make his answer and the Bishop’s to stick together.

But let us examine the ground which Paybody takes for his opinion. He would prove from Luke and Paul, that when Matthew and Mark say, “As they were eating, Jesus took bread,” the meaning is only this, After supper, Jesus took bread; importing, that Christ’s taking of bread did not make up one continued action with their eating, and that therefore their gesture of sitting might have been changed between their eating of the preceding supper and his taking of the sacramental bread.

Whereunto we answer, that there are two opinions touching the suppers which Christ did eat with his disciples that night wherein he was betrayed. And whichsoever the reader please to follow, it shall be most easy to break all the strength of the argument which Paybody opposeth unto us.

Sect. 4. First, then, some do think that Christ, having kept the passover according to the law (which is not particularly related, but supposed, by the evangelists), sat down to a common or ordinary supper, at which he told the disciples that one of them should betray him. And of this judgment are Calvin and Beza, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Pareus, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Fulk and Cartwright, against the Rhemists, upon 1 Cor. xi. 23; Tolet and Maldonat, upon John xiii. 2; Cornelius Jansenius, Conc. Evang., cap. 131; Balthazar Meisnerus, Tract, die Fest. Virid., p. 256; Johannes Forsterus, Conc. 4, de Pass., p. 538; Christophorus Pelargus, in John xiii., quest. 2, and others. The reasons whereby their judgment is confirmed are these:—

1. Many societies convened to the eating of the paschal supper by twenties.(1234) And if twenty was often the number of them who convened to the eating of the same (which also confirmeth their opinion who think that other men and women in the inn did eat both the paschal and evangelical supper together with the apostles in Christ’s company), it is not very likely (say some) that all those were sufficiently satisfied and fed with one lamb, which, after it was eight days old, was allowed to be offered for the passover, as Godwin noteth.(1235) Neque esus umus agni, saith Pareus, toti familiae sedandae fami sufficere poterat.(1236)

2. The paschal supper was not for banquetting or filling of the belly, as Josephus also writeth.(1237) Non tam exsatiendae nutriendaeque naturae, saith Maldonat, quam servandae legalis ceremoniae causa sumebatur.(1238) Non ventri, saith Pareus, sed religionis causa fiebat.(1239) But as for that supper which Christ and his apostles did eat immediately before the eucharistical, Cartwright doubts not to call it a carnal supper,(1240) an earthly repast, a feast for the belly, which lets us know, that the sacramental bread and wine was ordained, not for feeding their bodies, which were already satisfied by the ordinary and daily supper, but for the nourishment of the soul.

3. That beside the paschal and evangelical suppers, Christ and his apostles had also that night another ordinary supper, Fulk proveth by the broth wherein the sop was dipped,(1241) John xiii. 26. Whereas there was no such broth ordained by the divine institution to be used in the paschal supper.

4. That there were two suppers before the eucharistical they gather from John xiii. For, first, the paschal supper was ended, ver. 2, after which Christ washed his disciples’ feet. And thereafter we read, ver. 12, resumptis vestibus rursum ad caenam ordinariam consedisse.(1242) The dividing of the passover into two services or two suppers had no warrant at all from the first institution of that sacrament, for which cause they think it not likely that Christ would have thus divided it according to the device and custom of the Jews in latter times, for so much as in marriage (and much more in the passover) he did not allow of that which from the beginning was not so. Neither seemeth it to them any way probable, that Christ would have interrupted the eating of the passover with the washing of his disciples’ feet before the whole paschal supper was ended, and they had done eating of it.

Sect. 5. But others (and those very judicious too) are of opinion, that that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his disciples’ feet, and at which he told them that one of them should betray him, was not an ordinary or common supper (because the paschal supper was enough of itself to satisfy them), but a part of the paschal supper. And from the Jewish writers they prove that so the custom was to divide the passover into two courses or services. As for that wherein Christ dipped the sop, they take it to have been the sauce which was used in the paschal supper, called charoseth, of which the Hebrews write, that it was made of the palm tree branches, or of dry figs, or of raisins, which they stamped and mixed with vinegar till it was thick as mustard, and made like clay, in memory of the clay wherein they wrought in Egypt, and that they used to dip both the unleavened bread and the bitter herbs into this sauce. And as touching that place, John xiii., they expound it by the custom of the Jews, which was to have two services or two suppers in the passover; and take those words, ver. 2, “Supper being ended,” to be meant of the first service, and sitting down again to supper, ver. 12, to be meant of the second service.

Sect. 6. If those two opinions could be reconciled and drawn together into one, by holding that that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his disciples’ feet, was (for the substance of it) a common supper, but yet it hath been and may be rightly called the second service of the paschal supper, for that it was eaten the same night wherein the paschal lamb was eaten, so should all the difference be taken away; but if the maintainers of these opinions will not be thus agreed, let the reader consider to which of them he will adhere.

If the first opinion be followed, then it will be most easily answered to Paybody, that inter coenandum instituta fuit eucharistia, cum jam rursum mensoe accubuissent. Sed post coenam paschalem, et usum agni legalis.(1243) When Matthew and Mark say, As they did eat, Jesus took bread, they speak of the common or ordinary supper; but when Luke and Paul say, that he took the cup after supper, they speak of the paschal supper, which was eaten before the common supper.

Again, if the reader follow the other opinion, which holdeth that Christ had no other supper that night before the evangelical except the paschal only, yet still the answer to Paybody shall be easy; for whereas he would prove from those words of Luke and Paul, “Likewise also the cup after supper,” that when Matthew and Mark say, “As they did eat, Jesus took bread,” their meaning is only this, “After supper Jesus took bread,” he reasoneth very inconsiderately, forasmuch as Luke and Paul say not of the bread, but of the cup only, that Jesus took it after supper. And will Paybody say, that he took the cup so soon as he took the bread? If we will speak with Scripture, we must say, that as they did eat the preceding supper (to which we read they sat down) Jesus took bread; for nothing at all intervened betwixt their eating of that other preceding supper, and his taking of the eucharistical cup, there intervened the taking, blessing, breaking, distributing, and eating of the bread.

Now, therefore, from that which hath been said, we may well conclude that our opposites have no reason which they do or can object against the certainty of that received tenet, that the apostles received from Christ the sacramental bread and wine whilst they were sitting. Dr Forbesse himself(1244) setteth down some testimonies of Musculus, Chamier, and the professors of Leyden, all acknowledging that the apostles, when they received the Lord’s supper, were still sitting.

Sect. 7. The second answer that our opposites hath given us, followeth: They say, that though the apostles did not change their gesture of sitting which they used in the former supper, when all this is granted to us, yet there is as great difference betwixt our form of sitting and that form of the Jews which the apostles used as there is betwixt sedere and jacere.

Ans. 1. Put the case it were so, yet it hath been often answered them, that the apostles kept the table-gesture used in that nation, and so are we bound herein to follow their example, by keeping the table-gesture used in this nation. For this keeping of the usual table gesture of the nation wherein we live is not a forsaking but a following of the commendable example of the apostles, even as whereas they drank the wine which was drunk in that place, and we drink the wine which is drunk in this place, yet do we not hereby differ from that which they did.

2. The words used by the evangelists signify our form of sitting no less than the Jewish, Calepine, Scapula, and Thomasius, in their dictionaries, take ἀναπίπτω, ἀνακλίνω, ἀνακλίνομαι, ἀνάκειμαι, ποράκειμαι, κατάκειμαι, and the Latin words discumbo, recumbo, accumbo (used by Arias, Montanus, Beza, Marlorat, Tremellius, &c., in their versions), not only for lying, but also for such sitting as is opposed to lying, even for sitting upright at table after our custom.

3. There is not so great a difference betwixt our form of sitting and that which the Jews used as our opposites allege. For as Didoclavius showeth out of Casaubon;(1245) their sitting at banquets was only with a leaning upon the left arm, and so not lying, but sitting with a certain inclination. When, therefore, we read of lecti discubitorii tricliniares, in quibus inter coenandum discumbebant,(1246) we must understand them to have been seats which compassed three sides of the table (the fourth side being left open and void for them who served), and wherein they did sit with some sort of inclination.

Yet Bishop Lindsey is bold to aver,(1247) that the usual table gesture of the Jews was lying along, and this he would prove from Amos vi. 4, “They lie upon beds of ivory, they stretch themselves out upon their couches.”

Ans. 1. If we should yield to this prelate his own meaning wherein he taketh these words, yet how thinks he that the gesture of drunkards and gluttons, which they used when they were pampering themselves in all excess of riot, and for which also they are upbraided by the Spirit of God, was either the ordinary table-gesture of the Jews, or the gesture used by Christ and his apostles in their last supper?

2. If any gesture at all be touched in those words which the prelate citeth, it was the gesture they used when they lay down to sleep, and not their table-gesture when they did eat; for mitta and ngheres (the two words which Amos useth) signify a bed or a couch wherein a man useth to lay himself down to sleep. And in this sense we find both these words, Psal. vi. 7, “All the night make I my bed (mittathi) to swim: I water my couch (ngharsi) with my tears.” The Shunnamite prepared for Elisha a chamber, and therein set for him a bed (mitta), and a table, and a stool, and a candlestick, 2 Kings iv. 10. The stool or chair was for sitting at table, but mitta, the bed, was for lying down to sleep. Now, the prelate, I hope, will not say, that the lecti tricliniares, wherein the Jews used to sit at table, and which compassed three sides of the same (as hath been said), were their beds wherein they did lie and sleep all night.

But, 3. The place must be yet more exactly opened up. That word which is turned in our English books, they lie, cometh from the radix schachav, which in Pagnin’s lexicon is turned dormire. We find, Ruth iii. 7, lischcav, which Arias Montanus turned ad dormiendum, to sleep. Our own English translation, 2 Sam. xi. 9, saith, “Uriah slept,” where the original hath vauschcav; and the very same word is put most frequently in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, where they speak of the death of the kings of Judah and Israel. Pagnin turneth it et dormivit; and our English translators everywhere, “And he slept with his fathers,” &c. These things being considered, we must, with Calvin, read the place of Amos thus: Qui decumbunt vel dormiunt in lectis. The other word which the prophet useth is seruchim. Our English version turneth it, “They stretch themselves out;” but Pagnin, Buxtorff, Tremellius, and Tarnovius, come nearer the sense, who read redundantes, superfluentes, or luxuriantes; which sense the English translation also hath in the margin. The Septuagints followed the same sense, for they read, κατασπαταλὼντες, i.e., living in pleasure. So, 1 Tim. v. 6, she that lived in pleasure, σπαταλῶσοι; and, James v. 5, Ye have lived in pleasure, ἐσπαταλησατε. The radix is sarach, redundavit, or luxuriavit. So, Exod. xxvi. 12, sarach, and, verse 13, saruach, is put for a surplusage or superfluous remainder, redundans superfluum, as Tremellius readeth. Now, then, it is evident that the thing which Amos layeth to the charge of those who were at ease in Zion, in the words which the prelate citeth against us, is, that they slept upon beds of ivory (such was their softness and superfluity), and swimmed in excessive pleasures upon their couches; and, incontinent, their filthy and muddy stream of carnal delicacy and excessive voluptuousness which defiled their beds, led him back to the unclean fountain out of which it issued, even their riotous pampering of themselves at table; therefore he subjoineth, “And eat the lambs out of the flock,” &c. For ex mensis itur ad cubilia, ex gula in venerem, saith Cornelius à Lapide, commenting upon the same text. Thus have I cleared the place in such sort, that the Bishop cannot but shoot short of his aims; wherefore I go on to other replies.

4. If the apostles, when they received the Lord’s supper, or the Jews, when they did eat at table, were lying all along, how could their mouths receive drink unspilt? or how could they have the use of both their arms? which the Bishop himself would not, I am sure, gainsay, if he would once try the matter in his own person, and essay to eat and drink whilst lying along.

5. The words used by Matthew, chap. xxvi. 10, and by Mark, chap. xiv. 18, where they speak of Christ sitting down with the twelve, is also used by John, chap. vi. 11, where he speaketh of the peoples’ sitting down upon the grass to eat the loaves and fishes: and will any man think that the people did eat lying along upon the grass, where they might far better sit upright?

6. If our opposites like to speak with others, then let them look back upon the testimonies which I have alleged before. Jansenius putteth discubuisse et sedisse; Martyr, sedentibus aut discumbentibus. Pareus useth the word consedisse; Meisnerus,(1248) consedendo; Evangelista, saith Dr Stella,(1249) dicit dominum discubuisse, id est sedisse ad mensam.

7. If they like to speak to themselves: Camero,(1250) speaking of John’s leaning on Christ’s bosom at supper, saith, Christus autem sedebat medius; Dr Morton saith,(1251) it cannot be denied that the gesture of Christ and his apostles at the last supper was sitting,—only, saith he, the evangelists leave it uncertain whether this sitting was upright, or somewhat leaning.

Sect. 8. Their third answer is, that Christ’s sitting at the last supper is no more exemplary and imitable than the upper chamber, or the night season, or the sex and number of communicants, &c.

Ans. 1. As for the sex and number of communicants, Dr Fulk(1252) rightly observeth, that it is not certain from Scripture that twelve men only, and no women, did communicate (as Bishop Lindsey(1253) would have us certainly to believe); but suppose it were certain,(1254) yet for this, and all the other circumstances, which are not exemplary, there were special reasons either in the urgency of the legal necessity, or in the exigency of present and accidental occasions, which do not concern us: whereas the gesture of sitting was freely and purposely chosen, and so intended to be exemplary, especially since there was no such reason moving Christ to use this gesture of sitting as doth not concern us.

The Bishop saith,(1255) that his sitting at the former supper might have been the reason which moved him to sit at the eucharistical supper; but if Christ had not purposely made choice of the gesture of sitting as the fittest and most convenient for the eucharistical supper, his sitting at the former supper could be no reason to move him, as may appear by this example: There are some gentlemen standing in a nobleman’s waiting-room; and after they have stood there a while, the nobleman cometh forth; they begin to speak to him, and, as they speak, still they stand. Now, can any man say that the reason which moveth them to stand when they speak to the nobleman, is, because they were standing before he came to them? So doth the Bishop come short of giving any special reason for Christ’s sitting which concerneth not us. He can allege no more but Christ’s sitting at the former supper, which could be no reason, else he should have also risen from the eucharistical supper to wash the disciples’ feet, even as he rose from the former supper for that effect. Wherefore, we conclude, that Christ did voluntarily, and of set purpose, choose sitting as the fittest and best beseeming gesture for that holy banquet.

Finally, Hooker’s(1256) verdict of the gesture of Christ and his apostles in this holy supper is, “That our Lord himself did that which custom and long usage had made fit; we, that which fitness and great decency hath made usual.” In which words, because cause he importeth that they have better warrants for their kneeling than Christ had for his sitting (which is blasphemy), I leave them as not worthy of an answer. Howsoever, let it be noted that he acknowledged, by kneeling they depart from the example of Christ.

VII. OTHER POSITIONS BUILT UPON THE FORMER GROUND

Sect. 1. The third consequence which we infer upon our former rule of following the example of Christ is, that it is not a thing indifferent to omit the repetition of those words, “This is my body,” enunciatively and demonstratively in the act of distributing the eucharistical bread; and far less is it indifferent so to omit this demonstrative speech in the distribution, as in place of it to surrogate a prayer to preserve the soul and body of the communicant unto everlasting life. Our reason is, because Christ (whose example herein we ought to follow) used no prayer in the distribution, but that demonstrative enunciation, “This is my body.” But we go forward.

Sect. 2. The fourth position we draw from the same rule is, that it is not indifferent for a minister to omit the breaking of the bread at the Lord’s table after the consecration and in the distribution of it, because he ought to follow the example of Christ, who, after he had blessed the bread, and when he was distributing it to them who were at table, brake it,(1257) manibus comminuendo panem acceptum in partes, but had it not carved in small pieces before it was brought to the table. Hence G. J. Vossius(1258) doth rightly condemn those who, though they break the bread in multas minutias, yet they break it not in actu sacramentali. Such a breaking as this (he saith well) is not mystica, but coquinaria.

Sect. 3. The fifth position, drawn from the very same ground is, that it is not indifferent for a minister, in the act of distribution, to speak in the singular number, Take thou, eat thou, drink thou; because he should follow the example of Christ, who, in the distribution, spake in the plural number, Take ye, eat ye, drink ye; and he who followeth not Christ’s example herein, by his speaking in the singular to one, he maketh that to be a private action betwixt himself and the communicant, which Christ made public and common by his speaking to all at one time.

Sect. 4. How idly Bishop Lindsey(1259) answereth to these things, it cannot but appear to every one who considereth that we do not challenge them for not breaking the bread at all,—for not pronouncing at all these words, “This is my body,” or for never pronouncing at all these speeches in the plural, Take ye, eat ye, drink ye,—but for not breaking the bread in the very act of distribution,—for not pronouncing demonstratively those words, “This is my body,” in the very act of distribution,—for not speaking in the plural number, “Take ye,” &c.—in the very act of distribution, as Christ did, having no other reasons to move him than such as concern us. Why, then, did not the Bishop say something to the point which we press him with? or shall we excuse him because he had nothing to say to it?

Sect. 5. Now, last of all, we find yet another point, whereby the Bishop(1260) departeth from the example and mind of Christ. He saith that, by the sacramental word, “This is my body,” the bread is made the sacrament, &c.; and that without this word, &c., all our prayers and wishes should serve to no use. Where he will have the bread to be otherwise consecrated by us than it was consecrated by Christ; for that Christ did not consecrate the bread to be the sacrament of his body by those words, “This is my body,” it is manifest, because the bread was consecrated before his pronouncing of those words; or else what meaneth the blessing of it before he brake it? It was both blessed and broken, and he was also distributing it to the disciples, before ever he said, “This is my body.” Beza saith, Benedictionem expresse ad panis consecrationem et quidem singularem, refert; et omnes nostri referunt, consecrationem intelligentes, &c. Pareus saith,(1261) Qua ex communi cibo, in spiritualis alimoniae sacramentum transmutetur. Wherefore we must not think to sanctify the bread by this prescript word, “This is my body,” but by prayer and thanksgiving, as Christ did. Our divines hold against the Papists,(1262) Verba illa quoe in sacramento sunt consecrata, non esse paucula quoedam proscripta; sed praecipue verba orationis, quoe non sunt proescripta; and that, “through use of the prayers of the church, there is a change in the elements.”(1263) Dr Fulk objecteth(1264) against Gregory Martin, “Your popish church doth not either as the Greek liturgies, or as the churches in Ambrose and Augustine’s time, for they hold that the elements are consecrated by prayer and thanksgiving.” I know none who will speak with Bishop Lindsey in this point except Papists: yet Cornelius à Lapide could also say, Eucharistia conficitur et conditur sacris precibus.(1265)

Sect. 6. I say not that these words, “This is my body,” have no use at all in making the bread to be a sacrament; but that which giveth us dislike is,

1. That the Bishop maketh not the word and prayer together, but the word alone, to sanctify the bread and wine. Now, if both the word and prayer be necessary to sanctify the creatures for the food of our bodies, 1 Tim. iv. 5, much more are they necessary to sanctify them for the food of our souls. Neque enim solis domini verbis consecratio sit, sed etiam precibus.(1266) The fathers, saith Trelcatius,(1267) had not only respect to those five words, “For this is my body,” dum eucharistiam fieri dixerunt mystica precc, invocatione nominis divini, solemni benedictione, gratiarum actione. 2. That he makes not the whole word of the institution to sanctify the bread, but only that one sentence, “This is my body;” whereas Christ’s will is declared, and, consequently, the elements sanctified by the whole words of the institution,(1268) “Jesus took the bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat, this is my body which is broken for you, this do in remembrance of me,” &c.

That he acknowledged not the bread, though sanctified by prayer, to be the sacrament, except that very word be pronounced, “This is my body.” Now, when a minister hath, from Christ’s will and institution, declared that he hath appointed bread and wine to be the elements of his body and blood, when he hath also declared the essential rites of this sacrament.

And, lastly, when, by the prayer of consecration, he hath sanctified the bread and wine which are present, put the case, that all this while those prescript sentences, “This is my body,” “This cup is the New Testament in my blood,” have not been pronounced, yet what hindereth the bread and wine from being the sacramental elements of the Lord’s body and blood? It is sounder divinity to say, that the consecration of a sacrament doth not depend ex certa aliqua formula verborum.(1269) For it is evident that, in baptism, there is not a certain form of words prescribed, as Bellarmine also proveth;(1270) because Christ saith not, “Say, I baptise thee in the name,” &c.: so that he prescribeth not what should be done. Aquinas likewise holdeth,(1271) that the consecration of a sacrament is not absolutely tied to a certain form of words. And so saith Conradus Vorstius,(1272) speaking of the eucharist. Wherefore Vossius(1273) doth rightly condemn the Papists, quod consecrationem non aliis verbis fieri putant, quam istis, hoc est corpus meum, et hic est sanguis meus.

Chapter VIII

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE NOT THINGS INDIFFERENT TO THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND; BECAUSE SHE DID ABJURE AND REPUDIATE THEM BY A MOST SOLEMN AND GENERAL OATH.

Sect. 1. Having spoken of the nature of things indifferent, and showed which things be such; also of the rule whereby to try the indifferency of things: which rule we have applied to certain particular cases;—it remaineth to say somewhat of the main and general purpose, which is principally questioned in this last part of our dispute, viz., whether cross, kneeling, holidays, bishopping, and the other controverted ceremonies wherewith our church is pressed this day, be such things as we may use freely and indifferently? The negative (which we hold) is strongly confirmed by those arguments which, in the third part of this our dispute, we have put in order against the lawfulness of those ceremonies. Notwithstanding we have thought fit to add somewhat more in this place. And, first, we say, whatsoever be the condition of the ceremonies in their own nature, they cannot be indifferently embraced and used by the church of Scotland, which hath not only once cast them forth, but also given her great oath solemnly to the God of heaven, both witnessing her detestation of the Roman Antichrist’s “five bastard sacraments, with all his rites, ceremonies, and false doctrine, added to the ministration of the true sacraments, without the word of God; all his vain allegories, rites, signs, and traditions, brought in the kirk, without or against the word of God;” and likewise “promising, and swearing to continue,” as well “in the discipline and use of the holy sacraments,” as “in the doctrine,” of this reformed church of Scotland, which then first she embraced and used after she was truly reformed from Popery and popish abuses. And this which I say may be seen in the general Confession of Faith, sworn and subscribed by his Majesty’s father, of everlasting memory, anno 1580, and by the several parochines in the land, at his Majesty’s strait command; which also was renewed and sworn again, anno 1596, by the General Assembly, by provincial assemblies, by presbyteries and particular parish churches.

Sect. 2. No reformed church in Europe is so strictly tied by the bond of an oath and subscription, to hold fast her first discipline and use of the sacraments, and to hold out popish rites, as is the church of Scotland. And who knoweth not that an oath doth always oblige and bind, quando est factum de rebus certis et possibilibus, vere ac sine dolo præmeditate, ac cum judicio, juste, ad gloriam Dei, et bonum proximi?(1274) What one of all those conditions was here wanting? Can we then say any less than a pope said before us:(1275) Non est tutum quemlibet contra juramentum suum venire, nisi tale sit, quod servatum vergat in interitum salutis æternæ? O damnable impiety, which maketh so small account of the violation of the aforesaid oath, which hath as great power to bind us as that oath of the princes of Israel made to the Gibeonites, had to bind their posterity, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2; for it was made by the whole incorporation of this land, and hath no term at which it may cease to bind. Nay (in some respects) it bindeth more straitly than that oath of the princes of Israel. For, 1. That was made by the princes only; this by prince, pastors, and people: 2. That was made rashly (for the text showeth that they asked not counsel from the mouth of the Lord); this with most religious and due deliberation: 3. That was made to men; this to the great God: 4. That sworn but once; this once and again.

Sect. 3. Some of our opposites go about to derogate somewhat from the binding power of that oath of the princes of Israel. They are so nettled therewith that they fitch hither and thither. Dr Forbesse(1276) speaketh to the purpose thus: Juramentum Gibeonitis praestitum contra ipsius Dei mandatum, et inconsulta Deo, non potuissent Josuae et Israelitae opere perficere nisi Deus, extraordinarie de suo mandato dispensasset, compassione poenitentis illius populi Gibeonitei, et propter honorem sui nominis, ut neque foedifragorum fautor, neque supplicium paenitentium aspernator esse videretur.

Ans. 1. If the oath was against the commandment of God, what dishonour had come to the name of God though he had not patronised the swearers of it, but hindered them from fulfilling their oath? If a Christian swear to kill a pagan, and hereafter repent of his oath, and not perform it, can there any dishonour redound thereby to the name of Christ? The Doctor, forsooth, must say so.

2. Where hath he read of the repentance of the Gibeonites, which God would not despise?

3. If an oath made against the commandment of God (the breach of the commandment being dispensed with) bindeth so strictly and inviolably as that oath of the princes of Israel did, how much more ought we to think ourselves strictly and inviolably bound, by the solemn oath of the church of Scotland, which was not repugnant but most consonant to the word of God, even our adversaries themselves being judges? for thus speaketh one of them: _Quod antem jurarunt nostrates, __ non erat illicitum, sed a nobis omnibus jure praesture potest ac debet_;(1277) so that the Doctor hath gained nothing, but loosed much, by that which he saith of the Israelites’ oath: he hath even fanged himself faster in the snare which he thought to escape.

O but, saith the Doctor, that which they did, either in swearing or in performing their oath, against the express commandment of God, we may not draw into an ordinary example.

Ans. It was against the commandment of God; no man will say that we should follow either their swearing or their performing of their oath. Yet, in the meantime, the Doctor is pressed with this argument, that if their unlawful oath (in the case of God’s dispensation) did bind their posterity, much more doth that oath of the church of Scotland (which the Doctor hath acknowledged lawful and commendable) bind us this day.

Sect. 4. But, 4. Albeit the Doctor hath hereby given us scope and advantage enough against himself; nevertheless, for the truth’s sake, I add, that it cannot be showed how that oath of the princes of Israel was against the express commandment of God; but it rather appeareth that it was agreeable to the same. For, as Tremellius(1278) hath it noted, that commandment, Deut. xx., whereby the Israelites were commanded to save alive nothing in the cities of the Canaanites, was to be only understood of such cities among them as should make war with them, and be besieged by them. But the Gibeonites were not of this sort; for they sought their lives before the Israelites came to them. And by the same means Rahab and her father’s house got their life, because they sought it, Josh. ii. Calvin also serveth:(1279) Jussos fuisse Israelitas pacem omnibus offere. And Junius, upon Deut. xx., distinguisheth well two laws of war given to Israel.

The first law is concerning offering peace to all; which law is general and common as well to the Canaanites as to foreign nations: “When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee.” Which commandment was afterward observed by Israel; of whom we read, “That when Israel was strong, they put the Canaanites to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out,” Josh. xvii. 13; Judges i. 28: by Solomon also, who did not cut off the people that were left of the Hittites and the Amorites, but only made them to pay tribute, 2 Chron. viii. 7, 8. That which I say is further confirmed by another place, Josh. xi. 19, 20, where it is said, “There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel save the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon; all other they took in battle. For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses.” From which words it appeareth, that if the Canaanites had made peace with the children of Israel, they were to show them favour; and that they were bound by the commandment of the Lord to destroy them, then only, and in that case, if they would not accept peace, but make war; whence it cometh, that the cause of the destruction of the Canaanites is imputed to their own hardness and contumacy in not accepting of peace, and not to any commandment which God had given to Israel for destroying them. In a word, it was voluntas signi, which, in one place, Deut. xx. 10, showed the Israelites what was their duty, namely, to offer peace to all, even to the Canaanites, and not to cut them off if they should accept the peace; but it was voluntas beneplaciti, which, as we read in another place, Deut. vii. 2, decreed to deliver the Canaanites before the Israelites, that is, to harden their hearts to come against them in battle, and so to overrule the matter, by a secret and inscrutable providence, that the Israelites might lawfully and should certainly destroy them and show them no mercy. Even as that same God who, by one word, showed unto Abraham what was his duty, bidding him offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2, by another word signified unto him what he had decreed to be done, forbidding him to lay his hand upon the lad, or to do anything unto him, ver. 12. But this, I know, will be very unsavoury language to many Arminianised conformitants.

The other law of war which Junius, upon Deut. xx., observeth, prescribed to the Israelites how they should deal with them who refused their peace. And here only was the difference made betwixt the cities which were very far off and the cities of the Canaanites, Deut. xx. 15, 16; but the first law was common, as hath been proven.

Joseph Hall seemeth to deny that the oath of the princes of Israel had any power to bind, but upon another ground than Dr Forbesse took to himself. “It would seem very questionable (saith Hall(1280)) whether Joshua needed to hold himself bound to this oath; for fraudulent conventions oblige not; and Israel had put in a direct caveat of their vicinity.”

Ans. I marvel how it could enter in his mind to think this matter questionable, since the violation of that oath was afterwards punished with three years’ famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2. Yet let us hearken to his reasons. One of them is forged; for the princes of Israel who sware unto them put in no caveat at all. The text saith only in the general, that they sware unto them, Josh. ix. 15. As touching his other reason, it is answered by Calvin,(1281) Juris jurandi religio, saith he, eousque sancta apud nos esse debet, ne erroris praetextu à pactis discedemus, etiam in quibus fuimus decepti. Which, that it may be made more plain unto us, let us, with the Casuists, distinguish a twofold error in swearing.(1282) For if the error be about the very substance of the thing (as when a man contracts marriage with one particular person, taking her to be another person) the oath bindeth not; but if the error be only about some extrinsical or accidental circumstance (such as was the error of the Israelites’ taking the Gibeonites to dwell afar off when they dwelt at hand), the oath ceaseth not to bind.

Sect. 6. This much being said for the binding power of that oath of the church of Scotland, let us now consider what shifts our opposites use to elude our argument which we draw from the same; where, first, there occurreth to us one ground which the Bishop of Edinburgh doth everywhere beat upon in the trace of this argument, taken out of the 21st article of the Confession of Faith, wherein we find these words: “Not that we think that any policy and an order in ceremonies can be appointed for all ages, times, and places; for as ceremonies, such as men have devised, are but temporal, so may and ought they to be changed when they foster rather superstition than that they edify the kirk using the same: ‘whereupon the Bishop concludeth,(1283) that none who sware the aforesaid article could, without breach of this oath, swear that the ceremony of sitting at the receiving of the sacrament could be appointed for all ages, times, and places.’ ”

Ans. None of us denieth that article: we all stand to it. For that which it pronounceth of ceremonies must be understood of alterable circumstances, unto which the name of ceremonies is but generally and improperly applied, as we have showed elsewhere;(1284) neither can we, for professing ourselves bound by an oath ever to retain sitting at the receiving of the sacrament in this national church of Scotland, be therefore thought to transgress the said article.

For, 1. The article speaketh of ceremonies devised by men, whereof sitting at the sacrament is none, being warranted (as hath been showed) by Christ’s own example, and not by man’s device.

2. The article speaketh of such ceremonies as rather foster superstition than edify the church using the same; whereas it is well known that sitting at the communion did never yet foster superstition in this church; so that the Bishop did very unadvisedly reckon sitting at the communion among those ceremonies whereof the article speaketh.

Sect. 7. But the Bishop hath a further aim, and attempteth no less than both to put the blot of perjury off himself and his fellows, and likewise to rub it upon us, telling us,(1285) “That no man did by the oath oblige himself to obey and defend that part of discipline which concerneth these alterable things all the days of his life, but only that discipline which is unchangeable and commanded in the word. Yea (saith he), we further affirm, that every man who sware to the discipline of the church in general, by virtue of the oath standeth obliged, not only to obey and defend the constitution of the church that was in force at the time of making his oath, but also to obey and defend whatsoever the church thereafter hath ordained, or shall ordain, &c., whether thereby the former constitution be established or altered,” &c. The same answer doth Dr Forbesse also return us.(1286)

Ans. 1. Here is a manifest contradiction; for the Bishop saith that every man did, by this oath, oblige himself only to obey and defend that discipline which is unchangeable and commanded in the word. And yet again he seemeth to import (that which Dr Forbesse plainly avoucheth(1287)), that every man obliged himself by the same oath to obey and defend all that the church should afterwards ordain, though thereby the former constitutions be altered. The Bishop doth, therefore, apparently contradict himself; or, at the best, he contradicteth his fellow-pleader for the ceremonies.

2. That ancient discipline and policy of this church which is contrary to the articles of Perth, and whereunto we are bound by the oath, was well grounded upon God’s word, and therefore should not have been ranked among other alterable things.

3. Whereas the Bishop is of opinion that a man may, by his oath, tie himself to things which a church shall afterwards ordain, he may consider, that such an oath were unlawful, because not sworn in judgment, Jer. iv. 2. Now this judgment which is required as one of the inseparable companions of a lawful oath, is not executio justitiae, but judicium discretionis, as Thomas teacheth;(1288) whom Bullinger and Zanchius(1289) do herein follow. But there is no judgment of discretion in his oath who swears to that he knows not what, even to that which may fall out as readily wrong as right.

4. Whereas the Bishop and the Doctor allege that every man who sware to the discipline of this church standeth obliged to obey all that the church ordained afterward, they greatly deceive themselves.

For, 1. The discipline spoken of in the promissory part of the oath must be the same which was spoken of in the assertory part. Now that which is mentioned in the assertory part cannot be imagined to be any other but that which was then presently used in this church at the time of giving the oath; for an assertory oath(1290) is either of that which is past or of that which is present: and the assertory part of the oath whereof we speak was not of any discipline past and away, therefore of that which was present. Moreover, Thomas(1291) doth rightly put this difference betwixt an assertory and a promissory oath, that the matter of a promissory oath is a thing to come, which is alterable, as concerning the event. Materia autem juramenti assertorii, quod est de praeterito vel praesenti, in quandam necessitatem jam transiit, et immutabilis facta est. Since, then, the discipline spoken of in the assertory part was no other than that which was used in this church when the oath was sworn; and since the promissory part is illative upon, and relative unto the matter of the assertory part; therefore we conclude the discipline spoken of in the promissory part could be no other than that which was then presently used in this church at the swearing of the oath.

2. Since the doctrine mentioned in that oath is said to have been professed openly by the King’s Majesty, and the whole body of this realm, before the swearing of the same, why should we not likewise understand the discipline mentioned in the oath to be that which was practised in this realm before the swearing of the same?

3. This is further proved by the word continuing. We are sworn to continue in the obedience of the doctrine and discipline of this church; but how can men be said to continue in the obedience of any other discipline than that which they have already begun to obey? This the Bishop seems to have perceived, for he speaks only of defending and obeying, but not of continuing to obey, which is the word of the oath, and which proveth the discipline there spoken of and sworn to to be no other than that which was practised in the church when the oath was sworn. 4. Whilst we hold that he who sweareth to the present discipline of a church, is not by virtue of this oath obliged to obey all which that church shall ordain afterward, both the school and the canon law do speak for us. The school teacheth, that canonicus qui jurat se servaturum statuta edita in aliquo collegio, non tenetur ex juramenta ad servandum futura;(1292) the canon law judgeth, that qui jurat servare statuta edita, &c., non tenetur ex juramento ad novitur edita.(1293)

Sect. 8. But we are more fully to consider that ground whereby the Bishop thinketh to purge himself, and those of his sect, of the breach of the oath. He still allegeth,(1294) that the points of discipline for which we contend are not contained in the matter of the oath. Now, as touching the discipline of this church which is spoken of in the oath, he questioneth what is meant by it.(1295)

Ans. 1. Put the case, it were doubtful and questionable what is meant by the word discipline in the oath; yet pars tutior were to be chosen. The Bishop nor no man among us can certainly know, that the discipline meant and spoken of in the oath by those that swear it, comprehendeth not under it those points of discipline which we now contend, and which this church had in use at the swearing of the oath. Shall we, then, put the breach of the oath in a fair hazard? God forbid; for, as Joseph Hall(1296) noteth from the example of Joshua and the princes, men may not trust to shifts for the eluding of an oath. Surely the fear of God’s name should make us tremble at an oath, and to be far from adventuring upon any such shifts.

2. The Bishop doth but needlessly question what is meant by the discipline whereof the oath speaketh; for howsoever in ecclesiastical use it signify oftentimes that policy which standeth in the censuring of manners, yet in the oath it must be taken in the largest sense, namely, for the whole policy of the church; for, 1. The whole policy of this church did at that time go under the name of discipline;(1297) and those two books wherein this policy is contained were called The Books of Discipline. And, without all doubt, they who sware the oath meant by discipline that whole policy of the church which is contained in those books. Howbeit (as the preface of them showeth) discipline doth also comprehend other ecclesiastical ordinances and constitutions which are not inserted in them. 2. Doctrine and discipline, in the oath, do comprehend all that to which the church required, and we promised, to perform obedience; therefore the whole policy of the church was meant by discipline, forasmuch as it was not comprehended under doctrine.

Sect. 9. The Bishop(1298) objecteth three limitations, whereby he thinketh to seclude from the matter of the oath that policy and discipline which we plead for.

First, he saith, that the matter of the oath is the doctrine and discipline revealed to the world by the gospel, and that this limitation excludeth all ecclesiastical constitutions which are not expressly or by a necessary consequence contained in the written word.

2. That the matter of the oath is the doctrine and discipline which is received, believed and defended, by many notable churches, &c., and that this limitation excludeth all these things wherein the church of Scotland hath not the consent of many notable churches, &c.

3. That the doctrine and discipline which is the matter of the oath, is particularly expressed in the Confession of Faith, &c., and that in this confession of faith, established by parliament, there is no mention made of the articles controverted, &c.

Ans. I might here show how he confoundeth the preaching of the evangel with the written word; likewise how falsely he affirmeth, that the points of discipline for which we plead, are neither warranted by the Scripture nor by the consent of many notable churches. But to the point: These words of the oath, “We believe, &c., that this is the only true Christian faith and religion, pleasing God, and bringing salvation to man, which now is by the mercy of God revealed to the world by the preaching of the blessed evangel, and received, believed and defended, by many and sundry notable kirks and realms, but chiefly by the kirk of Scotland, the King’s Majesty, and three Estates, &c., as more particularly expressed in the Confession of our Faith, &c.,” are altogether perverted by the Bishop; for there is no discipline spoken of in these words, but afterward. Why, then, talks he of a discipline revealed to the world by the gospel, having the consent of many notable churches, and expressed in the Confession of Faith? And if the Bishop will have any discipline to be meant of in these words, he must comprehend it under the Christian faith and religion, which bringeth salvation unto man. But this he cannot do with so much as the least show of reason. Thus put we an end to the argument taken from the oath of God, wishing every man amongst us, out of the fear of God’s glorious and fearful name, duly to regard and ponder the same.

Chapter IX

A RECAPITULATION OF SUNDRY OTHER REASONS AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

Sect. 1. That the ceremonies are not indifferent to us, or such things as we may freely practise, we prove yet by other reasons:

For, 1. They who plead for the indifferency of the ceremonies must tell us whether they call them indifferent in actu signato, or in actu exercito; or in both these respects. Now, we have proven,(1299) that there is no action deliberated upon, and wherein we proceed with the advice of reason, which can be indifferent in actu exercito, and that because it cannot choose, but either have all the circumstances which it should have (and so be good), or else want some of them, one or more (and so be evil). And for the indifferency of the ceremonies in actu signato, though we should acknowledge it (which we do not), yet it could be no warrant for the practice of them, or else the believing Gentiles might have freely eaten of all meats, notwithstanding of the scandal of the Jews, for the eating of all meats freely was still a thing indifferent, in actu signato.

Sect. 2. The ceremonies are not indifferent eo ipso, that they are prescribed and commended unto us as indifferent; for, as Aquinas(1300) resolveth out of Isidore, every human or positive law must be both necessaria ad remotionem malorum and utilis ad consecutionem bonorum. The guides of God’s church have not power to prescribe any other thing than that which is good and profitable for edifying; for they are set not as lords over Christ’s inheritance, but as ministers for their good: “It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, (say the apostles and elders to the churches,) to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things,” Acts xv. 28. They would not, you see, have enacted a canon about those things, howbeit indifferent in their own nature, had they not found them necessary for the eschewing of scandal. And as for the civil magistrate, he also hath not power to prescribe any thing which he pleaseth, though it be in itself indifferent; “for he is the minister of God unto thee for good,” saith the Apostle, Rom. xiii. 4. Mark that word, for good,—it lets us see that the magistrate hath not power given him to enjoin any other thing than that which may be for our good. Non enim sua causa dominantur, saith Calvin;(1301) sed publico bono; neque effroeni potentia proediti sunt, sed quoe subditorum saluti sit obstricta. Now, the first and chief good which the magistrate is bound to see for unto the subjects, is (as Pareus showeth(1302)), bonum spirituale. Let us, then, either see the good of the ceremonies, or else we must account them to be such things as God never gave princes nor pastors power to enjoin; for howsoever they have power to prescribe many things which are indifferent, that is to say, neither good nor evil in their general nature, yet they may not command us to practise any thing which in the particular use of it is not necessary or expedient for some good end.

3. The ceremonies are not indifferent, because, notwithstanding that they are prescribed and commended unto us as things in themselves indifferent, yet we are by the will and authority of men compelled and necessitated to use them. Si vero ad res suo natura medius accedat coactio, &c., then, say the Magdeburgians.(1303) Paul teacheth, Col. ii., that it is not lawful to use them freely: “If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances (touch not, taste not, handle not, which are all to perish with the using), after the commandments and doctrines of men.” Hence is Tertullian taxed(1304) for inducing a necessity in things indifferent. Now, with how great necessity and co-action the ceremonies are imposed upon us, we have made it evident elsewhere.(1305)

Sect. 4. 4. Whatever be the quality of the ceremonies in their own nature, they are not indifferent to us; neither may we freely practice them, because Papists make advantage of them, and take occasion from them to confirm sundry of their errors and superstitions, as we have likewise elsewhere made evident.(1306) Now, _cum adiaphora rapiuntur __ ad confessionem, libera esse desinunt_, saith the Harmony of Confessions.(1307) Mark rapiuntur. Though they get no just occasion, yet, if they take occasion, though unjustly, that is enough to make us abstain from things indifferent. Etiam ea, saith Balduine,(1308) quoe natura sunt sua liberoe observationis, in statu confessionis, cum ab adversariis eorum mutatio postulatur, fiunt necessaria.

Sect. 5. 5. Things which are most indifferent in themselves become evil in the case of scandal, and so may not be used. So hold the Century writers;(1309) so Pareus;(1310) so Zanchius;(1311) so Chemnitius;(1312) so Augustine;(1313) and so hath the Apostle taught.(1314) But that out of the practice of the ceremonies there groweth active scandal unto the weak, we have most clearly proven.(1315) Wherefore, let them be in their own nature as indifferent as anything can be, yet they are not indifferent to be used and practised by us; and whosoever swalloweth this scandal of Christ’s little ones, and repenteth not, the heavy millstone of God’s dreadful wrath shall be hanged about his neck, to sink him down in the bottomless lake; and then shall he feel that which before he would not understand.

Sect. 6. 6. It is not enough for warrant of our practice that we do those things which are indifferent or lawful in themselves, except they be also expedient to be done by us according to the Apostle’s rule, 1 Cor. vi. 12. But I have proven that many and weighty inconveniences do follow upon the ceremonies,(1316) as namely, that they make way and are the ushers for greater evils; that they hinder edification, and in their fleshly show and outward splendour, obscure and prejudice the life and power of godliness; that they are the unhappy occasions of much injury and cruelty against the faithful servants of Christ, that they were bellows to blow up, and are still fuel to increase the church-consuming fire of woeful dissentions amongst us, &c. Where also we show,(1317) that some of our opposites themselves acknowledge the inconveniency of the ceremonies; wherefore we cannot freely nor indifferently practise them.

Sect. 7. 7. These ceremonies are the accursed monuments of popish superstition, and have been both dedicated unto and employed in the public and solemn worship of idols, and therefore (having no necessary use for which we should still retain them) they ought to be utterly abolished, and are not left free nor indifferent to us, which argument I have also made good elsewhere,(1318) and in this place I only add, that both Jerome,(1319) Zanchius, and Amandus Polanus,(1320) do apply this argument to the surplice, holding, that though it be in itself indifferent, yet quia in cultu idololatrico veste linea utuntur clerici papaxi, et in ea non parum sanctimoniae ponunt superstitiosi homines; valedicendum est, non solum cultui idololatrico, sed etiam omnibus idololatriae monumentis, instrumentis et adminiculis. Yea, Joseph Hall himself, doth herein give testimony unto us, for upon Hezekiah’s pulling down of the brazen serpent, because of the idolatrous abuse of it, thus he noteth:(1321) “God commanded the raising of it, God commanded the abolishing of it. Superstitious use can mar the very institutions of God, how much more the most wise and well-grounded devices of men!” And further, in the end of this treatise, entitled, The Honour of the Married Clergy, he adjoineth a passage taken out of the epistle of Erasmus Roterodamus to Christopher, Bishop of Basil, which passage beginneth thus: “For those things which are altogether of human constitution must (like to remedies in diseases) be attempered to the present estate of matters and times. Those things which were once religiously instituted, afterwards, according to occasion, and the changed quality of manners and times, may be with more religion and piety abrogated.” Finally, If Hezekiah be praised for breaking down the brazen serpent (though instituted by God) when the Israelites began to abuse it against the honour of God, how much more (saith Zanchius(1322)) are our reformers to be praised, for that they did thus with rites instituted by men, being found full of superstitious abuse, though in themselves they had not been evil!

Sect. 8. 8. The ceremonies are not indifferent, because they depart too far from the example of Christ and his apostles, and the purer times of the church; for instead of that ancient Christian-like and soul-edifying simplicity, religion is now by their means busked with the vain trumpery of Babylonish trinkets, and her face covered with the whorish and eye-bewitching fairding of fleshly show and splendour; and I have also showed particularly(1323) how sundry of the ceremonies are flat contrary to the example of Christ and his apostles and the best times.

Sect. 9. 9. The ceremonies make us also to conform, and like the idolatrous Papists, whereas it is not lawful to symbolise with idolaters, or to be like them in a ceremony of man’s devising, or anything which hath no necessary use in religion; such a distance and a dissimilitude there is required to be betwixt the church of Christ and the synagogue of Satan; betwixt the temple of God and the kingdom of the beast; betwixt the company of sound believers and the conventicles of heretics who are without; betwixt the true worshippers of God and the worshippers of idols, that we cannot, without being accessory to their superstitious and false religion, and partaking with the same, appear conform unto them in their unnecessary rites and ceremonies. Durandus tells us,(1324) that they call Easter by the Greek and not by the Hebrew name, and that they keep not that feast upon the same day with the Jews, and all for this cause, lest they should seem to Judaise. How much more reason have we to abstain from the ceremonies of the church of Rome lest we seem to Romanise! But I say no more in this place, because I have heretofore confirmed this argument at length.(1325)

Sect. 10. 10. The ceremonies, as urged upon us, are also full of superstition; holiness and worship are placed in them, as we have proven by unanswerable grounds,(1326) and by testimonies of our opposites themselves. Therefore were they never so indifferent in their own general nature, this placing of them in the state of worship maketh them cease to be indifferent.

Sect. 11. 11. The ceremonies against which we dispute are more than matters of mere order, forasmuch as sacred and mysterious significations are given unto them, and by their significations they are thought to teach men effectually sundry mysteries and duties of piety. Therefore they are not free nor indifferent, but more than men have power to institute; for except circumstances and matters of mere order there is nothing which concerneth the worship of God left to the determination of men, and this argument also hath been in all the parts of it fully explained and strengthened by us,(1327) which strongly proveth that the ceremonies are not indifferent, so much as quo ad speciem. Quare doctrina à nobis tradita (these be Zanchius’ words(1328)) non licere nobis, aliis externi cultus ceremoniis Deum colere, quam quas ipse in sacris literis per apostolis proescripsit, firma ac certa manet.

Sect. 12. 12. Whatsoever indifferency the ceremonies could be thought to have in their own nature, yet if it be considered how the church of Scotland hath once been purged from them, and hath spued them out with detestation, and hath enjoyed the comfortable light and sweet beams of the glorious and bright shining gospel of Christ, without shadows and figures, then shall it appear that there is no indifferency in turning back to weak and beggarly elements, Gal. v. 9. And thus saith Calvin(1329) of the ceremonies of the interim, that granting they were things in themselves indifferent, yet the restitution of them in those churches which were once purged from them, is no indifferent thing. Wherefore, O Scotland! “strengthen the things which remain, that are ready to die,” Rev. iii. 2. Remember also from whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do the first works; or else thy candlestick will be quickly removed out of his place, except thou repent, Rev. ii. 5.

THE END.

A BROTHERLY EXAMINATION OF SOME PASSAGES OF MR COLEMAN’S LATE SERMON UPON JOB XI. 20.

A BROTHERLY EXAMINATION

OF SOME PASSAGES OF

MR COLEMAN’S LATE SERMON UPON JOB XI. 20,

AS IT IS NOW PRINTED AND PUBLISHED:

BY WHICH HE HATH,

TO THE GREAT OFFENCE OF VERY MANY,

ENDEAVOURED TO STRIKE AT THE VERY ROOT OF ALL SPIRITUAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL GOVERNMENT,

CONTRARY TO

THE WORD OF GOD, THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT, OTHER REFORMED CHURCHES,

AND THE VOTES OF THE HONOURABLE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,

AFTER ADVICE HAD WITH THE REVEREND AND LEARNED

ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES.

BY GEORGE GILLESPIE,

MINISTER AT EDINBURGH, 1642.

EDINBURGH:

ROBERT OGLE, AND OLIVER & BOYD.

M. OGLE & SON, AND WILLIAM COLLINS, GLASGOW.

J. DEWAR, PERTH. W. MIDDLETON, DUNDEE. G. & R. KING, ABERDEEN.

W. M’COMB, BELFAST.

HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO., AND JAMES NISBET & CO., LONDON.

1645.

REPRINTED BY A. W. MURRAY, MILNE SQUARE, EDINBURGH.

1844.

NOTICE.

In order to render the following controversial writings of Gillespie intelligible to the general reader, we have judged it expedient to prefix to the “Brotherly Examination” that portion of Coleman’s sermon on which Gillespie thought it his duty to animadvert. And as a tolerably full account of the whole controversy between Coleman and Gillespie will be found in the Memoir of Gillespie’s Life, we refrain from occupying space with any additional remarks here.

EXTRACT FROM COLEMAN’S SERMON.

“All eyes are upon government, they look upon it as the only help. If anywhere, here let wisdom be used. To prescribe is above me, only let me offer two or three rules, which may either be helpful to the work, or useful to the workmen.

“1. Establish as few things by divine right as can well be. Hold out the practice but not the ground: it will gather more, nay all, that hold it not unlawful; men differently principled may meet in one practice. It may be, will be of larger extent than it must be. This (the divine right) was the only thing that hindered union in the Assembly. Two parties came biassed, the one with a national determination, the other with a congregational engagement. The reverend Commissioners from Scotland were for the divine right of the presbyterial, the Independents for the congregational government. How should either move? where should both meet? Here was the great bar, which, if you can avoid, you may do much.

“2. Let all precepts, held out as divine institutions, have clear scriptures. I could never yet see how two co-ordinate governments, exempt from superiority and inferiority, can be in one state; and in Scripture no such thing is found, that I know of. That place, 1 Cor. v., takes not hold of my conscience for excommunication, and I admire that Matt. xviii. so should upon any; yet these two are the common places on which are erected the chiefest acts of ruling. And when I see not an institution, nor any one act of government in the whole Bible performed, how can it be evinced that a ruling elder is an instituted officer? Let the Scripture speak expressly, and institutions appear institutions, and all must bow.

“3. Lay no more burden of government upon the shoulders of ministers than Christ hath plainly laid upon them. The ministers have other work to do, and such as will take up the whole man, might I measure others by myself. It was the king of Sodom’s speech to Abraham, ‘Give me the persons; take thou the goods:’ so say I, Give us doctrine; take you the government. As is said, Right Honourable, give me leave to make this request in the behalf of the ministry, Give us two things, and we shall do well—learning and a competency.

“4. A Christian magistrate, as a Christian magistrate, is a governor in the church. Christ has placed government in his church, 1 Cor. xii. 28. Of other governments, beside magistracy, I find no institution; of them I do, Rom. xii. 1, 2. I find all government given to Christ, and to Christ as Mediator, Eph. i. 22, 23. I desire all to consider it. To rob the kingdom of Christ of the magistrate, and his governing power, I cannot excuse, no not from a kind of sacrilege, if the magistrate be His.”

A BROTHERLY EXAMINATION, &c.

I have before touched this purpose in the third branch of the third application of my second doctrine; and did, in my sermon in the Abbey church, express my thoughts of it at some length. But as I was then unwilling to fall upon such a controversy so publicly, and especially in a Fast sermon, if that which I intend to examine had not been as publicly and upon the like occasion delivered; so now, in the publishing, I have thought good to open my mind concerning this thing distinctly, and by itself. That which had been too late to be preached after sermon is not too late to be printed after sermon. Others (upon occasion offered) have given their testimony against his doctrine; and I should think myself unfaithful in the trust put upon me, if, upon such an occasion, I should be silent in this business; and I believe no man will think it strange that a piece of this nature and strain get an answer; and I go about it without any disrespect either to the person or parts of my reverend brother. Only I must give a testimony to the truth when I hear it spoken against; and I hope his objections have made no such impression in any man’s mind as to make him unwilling to hear an answer. Come we therefore to the particulars.

Four rules were offered by the reverend brother, as tending to unity, and to the healing of the present controversies about church government. But in truth his cure is worse than the disease; and, instead of making any agreement, he is like to have his hand against every man, and every man’s hand against him.

The first rule was this, “Establish as few things jure divino as can well be;” which is, by interpretation, as little fine gold, and as much dross as can well be. “The words of the Lord are pure words: as silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times,” Psal. xii, 6. What you take from the word of God is fine “gold tried in the fire” (Rev. iii. 18); but an holy thing of man’s devising is the dross of silver. Can he not be content to have the dross purged from the silver except the silver itself be cast away? The very contrary rule is more sure and safe; which I prove thus:—

If it be a sin to diminish or take aught from the word of God, insomuch that it is forbidden under pain of taking away a man’s part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city; then as many things are to be established jure divino as can well be. But it is a sin to diminish or take aught from the word of God, insomuch that it is forbidden under pain of taking away a man’s part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city; therefore as many things are to be established jure divino as can well be.

It must be remembered, withal, 1. That the question is not now, Whether this or that form of church government be jure divino; but, Whether a church government be jure divino; whether Jesus Christ hath thus far revealed his will in his word, that there are to be church-censures, and those to be dispensed by church-officers. The brother is for the negative of this question. 2. Neither is it stood upon by any, so far as I know, that what the Parliament shall establish concerning church government must be established by them jure divino If the Parliament shall, in a parliamentary and legislative way, establish that thing which really, and in itself, is agreeable to the word of God, though they do not declare it to be the will of Jesus Christ, I am satisfied, and, I am confident, so are others. This I confess, That it is incumbent to parliament-men, to ministers, and to all other Christians, according to their vocation and interest, to search the Scriptures, and thereby to inform their own and other men’s consciences, so as they may do in faith what they do in point of church government, that is, that they may know they are not sinning, but doing the will of God. And it ought to be no prejudice nor exception against a form of church government that many learned and godly divines do assert it from Scripture to be the will of God. And why should jus divinum be such a noli me tangere? The reason was given. “This was the only thing that hindered union in the Assembly (saith he). Two parties came biassed. The reverend commissioners from Scotland were for the jus divinum of the presbyterial, the Independents for the congregational government. How should either move? where should both meet?” If it was thus, how shall he make himself blameless, who made union in the Assembly yet more difficult, because he came biassed a third way, with the Erastian tenets? And where he asketh where the Independents and we should meet, I answer, In holding a church government jure divino, that is, that the pastors and elders ought to suspend or excommunicate (according to the degree of the offence) scandalous sinners. Who can tell but the purging of the church from scandals, and the keeping of the ordinances pure (when it shall be actually seen to be the great thing endeavoured on both sides), may make union between us and the Independents more easy than many imagine. As for his exceptions against us who are commissioners from the church of Scotland, I thank God it is but such, yea, not so much, as the Arminians did object(1330) against the foreign divines who came to the Synod of Dort. They complained that those divines were pre-engaged and biassed, in regard of the judgment of those churches from which they came; and that therefore they did not help, but hinder, union in that assembly. And might not the Arians have thus excepted against Alexander, who was engaged against them before he came to the Council of Nice? Might not the Nestorians have made the same exception against Cyril, because he was under an engagement against them before he came to the Council of Ephesus? Nay, had not the Jewish zealots the very same objection to make against Paul and Barnabas, who were engaged, not in the behalf of one nation, but of all the churches of the Gentiles, against the imposition of the Mosaical rites, and had so declared themselves at Antioch before they came to the synod at Jerusalem? Acts xv. 2. It is not faulty to be engaged for the truth, but against the truth. It is not blameworthy, but praiseworthy, to hold fast so much as we have already attained unto. Notwithstanding we, for our part, have also from the beginning professed, “That we are most willing to hear and learn from the word of God what needeth further to be reformed in the church of Scotland.”(1331)

The second rule which was offered in that sermon was this: “Let all precepts, held out as divine institutions, have clear scriptures,” &c.; “Let the Scripture speak expressly,” saith he. I answer: The Scripture speaks in that manner which seemed fittest to the wisdom of God; that is, so as it must cost us much searching of the Scripture, as men search for a hid treasure, before we find out what is the good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God concerning the government of his church. Will any divine in the world deny that it is a divine truth which, by necessary consequence, is drawn from Scripture, as well as that which, in express words and syllables, is written in Scripture? Are not divers articles of our profession,—for instance, the baptism of infants,—necessarily and certainly proved from Scripture, although it makes no express mention thereof in words and syllables? But let us hear what he hath said concerning some scriptures (for he names but two of them) upon which the acts of spiritual or ecclesiastical government have been grounded. “That place, 1 Cor. v., takes not hold (saith he) on my conscience for excommunication, and I admire that Matt. xviii. so should upon any.” It is strange that he should superciliously pass them over without respect to so great a cloud of witnesses in all the reformed churches, or without so much as offering any answer at all to the arguments which so many learned and godly divines of old and of late have drawn from these places for excommunication; which, if he had done, he should not want a reply. In the meantime, he intermixeth a politic consideration into this debate of divine right. “I could never yet see (saith he) how two co-ordinate governments, exempt from superiority and inferiority, can be in one state.” I suppose he hath seen the co-ordinate governments of a general and of an admiral; or, if we shall come lower, the government of parents over their children, and masters over their servants, though it fall often out, that he who is subject to one man as his master, is subject to another man as his father. In one ship there may be two co-ordinate governments, the captain governing the soldiers, the master governing the mariners. In these and such like cases you have two co-ordinate governments, when the one governor is not subordinate to the other. There is more subordination in the ministers and other church-officers towards the civil magistrate. For the minister of Christ must be in subjection to the magistrate; and if he be not, he is punishable by the law of the land as well as any other subject. The persons and estates of church-officers, and all that they have in this world, are subject to civil authority. But that which is Christ’s, and not ours, the royal prerogative of the King of saints, in governing of his church according to his own will, is not subject to the pleasure of any man living. But the reverend brother might well have spared this. It is not the independency of the church government upon the civil government which he intended to speak against, it is the very thing itself, a church government, as is manifest by his other two rules.

I come therefore to his next, which is the third rule: “Lay no more burden of government upon the shoulders of ministers than Christ hath plainly laid upon them.” He means none at all, as is manifest not only by his fourth rule, where he saith that he finds no institution of other governments beside magistracy, but also by the next words, “The ministers have other work to do (saith he), and such as will take up the whole man.” He might have added this one word more, that without the power of church government, when ministers have done all that ever they can, they shall not keep themselves nor the ordinances from pollution. Before I proceed any farther, let it be remembered, when he excludes ministers from government: First, It is from spiritual or ecclesiastical government, for the question is not of civil government. Secondly, He excludes ruling elders too, and therefore ought to have mentioned them with the ministers as those who are to draw the same yoke together, rather than to tell us of an “innate enmity between the clergy and the laity.” The keeping up of the names of the clergy and laity savoureth more of a domineering power than anything the brother can charge upon presbyteries. It is a point of controversy between Bellarmine(1332) and those that write against him; he holding up, and they crying down those names, because the Christian people are the κλῆρος, the heritage of the Lord as well as the ministers. Thus much by the way of that distinction of names; and, for the thing itself, to object an innate enmity between the ministers of the gospel and those that are not ministers, is no less than a dishonouring and aspersing of the Christian religion. To return, you see his words tend to the taking away of all church government out of the hands of church-officers. Now may we know his reasons? He fetcheth the ground of an argument out of his own heart: “I have a heart (saith he) that knows better how to be governed than govern.” I wish his words might hold true in a sense of pliableness and yielding to government. How he knows to govern I know not; but it should seem in this particular he knows not how to be governed; for after both houses of parliament have concluded “that many particular congregations shall be under one presbyterial government,” he still acknowledgeth no such thing as presbyterial government. I dare be bold to say he is the first divine, in all the Christian world, that ever advised a state to give no government to church-officers, after the state had resolved to establish presbyterian government; but let us take the strength of his argument as he pretendeth it. He means not of an humble pliableness and subjection (for that should ease him from his fear of an ambitious ensnarement, and so were contrary to his intention), but of a sinful infirmity and ambition in the heart, which makes it fitter for him and others to be kept under the yoke than to govern. And thus his argumentation runs: “Might I measure others by myself, and I know not why I may not (God fashions men’s hearts alike; and as in water face answers face, so the heart of man to man), I ingenuously profess I have a heart that knows better how to be governed than govern,—I fear an ambitious ensnarement, and I have cause,—I see what raised Prelacy and Papacy to such a height,” &c. The two scriptures will not prove what he would. The first of them, Psal. xxxiii. 15, “He fashioneth their hearts alike,” gives him no ground at all, except it be the homonomy of the English word alike, which in this place noteth nothing else but τὸ καθόλου,—all men’s hearts are alike in this, that God fashioneth them all, and therefore knoweth them all æque or alike (that is the scope of the place). The Hebrew jachad is used in the same sense, Ezra iv. 3, “We ourselves together will build;”(1333) they mean not they will all build in the like fashion, or in the same manner, but that they will build all of them together, one as well as another; so Psal. ii. 2, “The rulers take counsel together;” Jer. xlvi. 12, “They are fallen both together.” The other place, Prov. xxvii. 19, if you take it word by word as it is in the Hebrew, is thus: “As in water faces to faces; so the heart of man to man.” Our translators add the word answereth, but the Hebrew will suffer the negative reading, As in water faces answer not to faces. The Septuagint reads: “As faces are not like faces, so neither are the hearts of men alike.” The Chaldee paraphrase thus: “As waters and as countenances, which are not like one another, so the hearts of the sons of men are not alike.” Thus doth Mr Cartwright, in his judicious commentary, give the sense: “As in the water face doth not answer fully to face, but in some sort, so there may be a conjecture, but no certain knowledge of the heart of man.” But let the text be read affirmatively, not negatively, what shall be the sense? Some take it thus:(1334) A man’s heart may be someway seen in his countenance as a face in the water. Others(1335) thus: As a face in the water is various and changeable to him that looketh upon it, so is the heart of man inconstant to a friend that trusteth in him. Others(1336) thus: As a man seeth his own face in the water, so he may see himself in his own heart or conscience. Others(1337) thus: As face answereth face in the water, so he that looketh for a friendly affection from others, must show it in himself. It will never be proved that any such thing is intended in that place as may warrant this argumentation. There is a particular corruption in one man’s heart—for instance, ambition—which makes him unfit to be trusted with government; therefore the same corruption is in all other men’s hearts; even as the face in the water answereth the face out of the water so just, that there is not a spot or blemish in the one but it is in the other. I am sure Paul taught us not so when he said, “In lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves,” Phil. ii. 3. Nay, the brother himself hath taken off the edge of his own argument (if it had any) in his epistle printed before his sermon, where, speaking of his brethren, from whose judgment he dissenteth in point of government, he hath these words: “Whose wisdom and humility (I speak it confidently) may safely be trusted with as large a share of government as they themselves desire.” Well, but suppose now the same corruption to be in other men’s hearts, that they are in great danger of an ambitious ensnarement if they be trusted with government, is this corruption only in the hearts of ministers, or is it in the hearts of all other men? I suppose he will say, in all men’s hearts, and then his argument will conclude against all civil government. Last of all, Admit that there be just fears of abusing the power and government ecclesiastical,—let the persons to be intrusted with it be examined, and the power itself bounded according to the strictest rules of Christ. Let abuses be prevented, reformed, corrected. The abuse cannot take away the use where the thing itself is necessary. Why might he not have satisfied himself without speaking against the thing itself? Once, indeed, he seemeth to recoil, and saith, “Only I would have it so bounded, that it might be said, Hitherto shalt thou come, and here shalt thou stay thy proud waves,” yet by and by he passeth his own bounds, and totally renounceth the government to the civil power, which I shall speak to anon. But I must first ask, Whence is this fear of the proud swelling waves of presbyterial government? Where have they done hurt? Was it upon the coast of France, or upon the coast of Holland, or upon the coast of Scotland, or where was it? Or was it the dashing upon terra in cognita? He that would forewarn men to beware of presbyterial usurpations (for so the brother speaking to the present controversy about church government must be apprehended), and to make good what he saith falls upon the stories of Pope Paul V., and of the Bishop of Canterbury, is not a little wide from the mark. I should have expected some examples of evils and mischiefs which presbyterial government hath brought upon other reformed churches.

Well, the reverend brother hath not done, but he proceedeth thus: “It was the king of Sodom’s speech to Abraham, ‘Give me the persons, take thou the goods;’ so say I, Give us doctrine, take you the government: as is said, Right Honourable, give me leave to make this request in the behalf of the ministry. Give us two things and we shall do well: 1. Give us learning; and, 2. Give us a competency.”

This calls to mind a story which Clemens Alexandrinus tells us:(1338) When one had painted Helena with much gold, Apolles, looking upon it, “Friend (saith he), when you could not make her fair, you have made her rich.” Learning and competency do enrich. The Jesuits have enough of both, but that which maketh a visible ministerial church to be “beautiful as Tizrah, comely as Jerusalem,” that which maketh fair the outward face of a church, is government and discipline, the removing of scandals, the preserving of the ordinances from pollution. He had spoken more for the honour of God and for the power of godliness, if he had said this in the behalf of the ministry: It were better for us to want competency and helps to learning, than to partake with other men’s sins, by admitting the scandalous and profane to the Lord’s table. His way, which he adviseth, will perhaps “get us an able ministry, and procure us honour enough,” as he speaketh; but, sure, it can neither preserve the purity, nor advance the power of religion, because it putteth no black mark upon profaneness and scandal in church-members more than in any others. The king of Sodom’s speech cannot serve his turn except it be turned over, and then it will serve him as just as anything, thus: Give us the goods, take you the persons (or the souls, as the Hebrew and the Chaldee hath it); “Give us a competency,” saith he,—here he asketh the goods,—“take you the government,”—here he quitteth the persons or souls to be governed only by the civil power. However, as at that time Abraham would take nothing that was not his own, insomuch as he answereth the king of Sodom: “I will not take from a thread even to a shoe-latchet, and that I will not take anything that is thine,” Gen. xiv. 23; so this Parliament, I trust, shall be so counselled and guided of the Lord, that they will leave to the church what is the church’s, or rather to Christ what is Christ’s. And as Abraham had lift up his hand to the most high God to do that (ver. 32), so have the Honourable Houses, with hands lift up to the most high God, promised to do this.

And now, seeing I have touched upon the covenant, I wish the reverend brother may seriously consider whether he hath not violated the oath of God in advising the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon church-officers, but to take the government of the church wholly into their own hands. In the first article of the solemn league and covenant, there is thrice mention made of the government of the church; and namely, That we shall endeavour the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, according to the word of God, and the example of the best reformed churches. Where observe,

1. The extirpation of church government is not the reformation of it. The second article is indeed of things to be extirpated; but this of things to be preserved and reformed. Therefore as by the covenant Prelacy was not to be reformed, but to be abolished, so, by the same covenant, church government was not to be abolished, but to be reformed.

2. Church government is mentioned in the covenant as a spiritual, not a civil thing. The matters of religion are put together—doctrine, worship, discipline, and government; the privileges of Parliament come after, in the third article.

3. That clause, “According to the word of God,” implieth, that the word of God holdeth forth such light unto us as may guide and direct us in the reformation of church government.

4. And will the brother say that the example of the best reformed churches leadeth us his way; that is, to have no church government at all distinct from the civil government?

And so much concerning his third rule.

The fourth was this: “A Christian magistrate, as a Christian magistrate, is a governor in the church.” And who denieth this? The question is, Whether there ought to be no other government in the church beside that of the Christian magistrate. That which he driveth at is, That the Christian magistrate should leave no power of spiritual censures to the elderships. He would have the magistrate to do like the rich man in the parable, who had exceeding many flocks and herds, and yet did take away the little ewe-lamb from the poor man, who had nothing save that. The brother saith, “Of other governments besides magistracy, I find no institution; of them I do, Rom. xiii. 1, 2.” I am sorry he sought no better, else he had found more. Subjection and obedience is commanded, as due not only to civil but to spiritual governors, to those that are over us in the Lord, 1 Thess. v. 12; so, 1 Tim. v. 17, “Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honour;” Heb. xiii. 7, “Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God;” ver. 17, “Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves; for they watch for your souls.” And what understandeth he by “he that ruleth,” Rom. xii. 8? If the judgment of Gualther and Bullinger have any weight with him (as I suppose it hath) they do not there exclude, but take in, under that word, the ruling officers of the church.

But now, in the close, let the reverend brother take heed he hath not split upon a rock, and taken from the magistrate more than he hath given him. He saith, “Christian magistrates are to manage their office under Christ, and for Christ. Christ hath placed governments in his church, 1 Cor. xii. 28, &c. I find all government given to Christ, and to Christ as Mediator (I desire all to consider it), Eph. i. 3, 23, and Christ, as Head of these, given to the church.” If this be good divinity, then I am sure it will be the hardest task which ever he took in hand to uphold and assert the authority either of pagan or Christian magistrates.

First, He lets the pagan or infidel magistrate fall to the ground, as an usurper who hath no just title to reign, because all government is given to Christ, and to him as Mediator. But which way was the authority of government derived from Christ, and from him as Mediator, to a pagan prince or emperor?

Next, He will make it to fare little better with the Christian magistrate. For if the Christian magistrate be the vicegerent of Christ, and of Christ as Mediator; and if he be to manage his office under, and for Christ,—then the reverend brother must either prove from Scripture, that Christ, as Mediator, hath given such a commission of vicegerentship and deputyship to the Christian magistrate; or otherwise, acknowledge that he hath given a most dangerous wound to magistracy, and made it an empty title, claiming that power which it hath no warrant to assume.

God and nature hath made magistrates, and given them great authority; but from Christ as Mediator they have it not.

I find in Scripture, that church-officers have their power from Christ as Mediator; and they are to manage their office under and for Christ; and in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ do we assemble ourselves together, Matt. xviii. 20; in his name do we preach, Luke xxiv. 47; Acts iv. 17, 18; v. 28, 41; ix. 27; in his name do we baptise, Acts ii. 38; iv. 12, 16; xix. 5; in his name do we excommunicate, 1 Cor. v. 5. But I do not find in Scripture that the magistrate is to rule, or to make laws, or to manage any part of his office in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ. And as the Mediator hath not anywhere given such a commission and power to the magistrate, so, as Mediator, he had it not to give; for he was not made a judge in civil affairs, Luke xii. 14, and his kingdom is not of this world, John xviii. 36. How can that power which Christ as Mediator hath not received of the Father be derived from Christ to the Christian magistrate? I know that Christ, as he is the eternal Son of God, and “thought it no robbery to be equal with God,” doth, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, reign and rule over all the kingdoms of the sons of men. He that is Mediator, being God, hath, as God, all power in heaven and earth (and this power was given to him, Matt. xxviii. 18, both by the eternal generation, and by the declaration of him to be the Son of God with power, when he was raised from the dead, Rom. i. 4, even as he is said to be begotten, when he was raised again, Acts xiii. 33: he had relinquished and laid aside his divine dominion and power when he had made himself in the form of a servant, but after his resurrection it is gloriously manifested), and so he that is Mediator, being God, hath power to subdue his and his church’s enemies, and to make his foes his footstool. But as Mediator he is only the church’s King, Head, and Governor, and hath no other kingdom. The Photinians have defined the kingly office of Christ thus: “It is an office committed to him by God, to govern, with the highest authority and power, all creatures endued with understanding, and especially men, and the church gathered of them.”(1339) But those that have written against them have corrected their definition in this particular, because Christ is properly King of his church only.

As for those two scriptures which the brother citeth, they are extremely misapplied. He citeth 1 Cor. xii. 28 to prove that Christ hath placed civil governments in his church. If by the governments or governors there mentioned he understood the civil magistrates, yet that place saith not that Christ hath placed them, but that God hath done it.

Next, The Apostle speaks of such governors as the church had at that time; but at that time the church had no godly nor Christian magistrates. This is Calvin’s argument, whereby he proves that ecclesiastical, not civil governors, are there meant.

Thirdly, I ask, How can we conceive that civil government can come into the catalogue of ecclesiastical and spiritual administrations? for such are all the rest there reckoned forth.

Lastly, The brother, after second thoughts, may think he hath done another disservice to the magistrate, in making the magistracy to be below and behind the ministry. The Apostle puts them in this order: “God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments,” &c. How makes the brother this to agree with his interpretation.

Next, He citeth Eph. i. 21-23, to prove that all government is given to Christ, and to him as Mediator; and Christ, as Head of these, given to the church. But this place maketh more against him than for him; for the Apostle saith not that Christ is given to the church as the Head of all principalities and powers. The brother saith so; and, in saying so, he makes Christ a head to those that are not of his body.

The Apostle saith far otherwise: That God gave Christ “to be the head over all things to the church, which is his body;” which the Syriac readeth more plainly,—“And him who is over all he gave to be the head to the church.” He is a head to none but the church; but He who is head to the church “is over all, God blessed for ever,” Rom. ix. 5; yea, even as a man, he is over or above all. The very human nature of Christ which was raised from the dead, being set at the right hand of the Majesty of God, is exalted to a higher degree of honour and glory than either man or angel ever was, or ever shall he; so that He that is head of the church is over all, because he doth not only excel his own members, but excel all creatures that ever God made. It is one thing to say that Christ is exalted to a dignity, excellency, pre-eminence, majesty, and glory, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion; another thing to say that Christ is head of all principalities and governments, and, as Mediator, exerciseth his kingly office over these. The Apostle saith the former, but not the latter.

Shall I need to illustrate this distinction? Is there anything more known in the world? Will any say that he who excels other men in dignity, splendour, honour, and glory, must therefore reign and rule over all those whom he thus excels?

The Apostle saith indeed, in another sense, that Christ “is the head of all principality and power,” Col. ii. 10. But that is spoken of Christ not as he is Mediator, but only as he is God; and the Apostle’s meaning in those words is nothing but this: That Christ is true God, saith Tossanus; that he is omnipotent, saith Gualther; that he, being the natural Son of God, is together with the Father, Lord of all things, saith Bullinger.

That this is the meaning will soon appear:—

1. From the scope of the place, which is to teach the Colossians not to worship angels, because they are but servants, and the Son of God is their Lord and Head.

2. The Apostle expounds himself how Christ is the head of all principality and power: Col. i. 15-17, “Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature: for by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him: and he is before all things, and by him all things consist.” Now all this is, without controversy, to be understood not of the office, but of the person of Jesus Christ; not of his governing and kingly office, as he is Mediator, but to prove that he is true and very God; therefore Beza, Zanchius, Gualther, Bullinger, Tossanus, M. Bayne, and divers other interpreters upon the place, do generally agree that the Apostle (ver. 15-17) speaks of the dignity and excellency of the person of Jesus Christ, proving him to be true God; and that (ver. 18) he cometh to speak of his office, as he is Mediator: “And he is the head of the body, the church,” &c. So that we may distinguish a twofold headship of Jesus Christ: One, in regard of his Godhead,—and so he is head of all principality and power; another, in regard of his office of Mediatorship,—and so he is head of the church only. The present question is of the latter, not of the former. The former is common to the Son of God with the Father and the Holy Ghost; the latter is proper to Christ as God and man. The former shall continue for ever; the latter shall not continue for ever. The former doth not necessarily suppose the latter; but the latter doth necessarily suppose the former. Christ can reign as God, though he reign not as Mediator; but he cannot reign as Mediator and not reign as God. The object of the former is every creature; the object of the latter is the church gathered out of the world.

This digression concerning the headship of Jesus Christ may for the future prevent divers objections, so I shall return.

And now (I desire all to consider it) there is not one word in those three last verses of Eph. i. which will give any ground for that which the brother with so much confidence averreth. Ver. 21 affordeth this argument against him: The honour and dignity of Jesus Christ there spoken of hath place “not only in this world, but also in that which is to come.” But the kingdom and government which is given to Christ, as Mediator, shall not continue in the world to come (for when Christ hath put his enemies under his feet, he shall deliver up the kingdom to the Father, and reign no longer as Mediator, 1 Cor. xv. 24, 25); therefore the government given to Christ, as he is Mediator, cannot be meant in that place, but the dignifying, honouring, preferring, and exalting of Christ to a higher degree of glory than either man or angel.

Come on now and see whether ver. 22 maketh any whit more for him: He “hath put all things under his feet;” that is, saith Zanchius, all things but the church, which is his body. But this must be meant in respect of the decree and foreknowledge of God, as Jerome expounds the place; and so doth the Scripture expound itself: Heb. ii. 8, “But now we see not yet all things put under him;” 1 Cor. xv. 25, “He must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet;” Acts ii. 34, 35, “Sit thou on my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footstool.” Now, when Christ shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power, and shall put his enemies under his feet, then he shall cease to reign any more as Mediator (which I have even now proved); but before that be done he reigns as Mediator. So that it can never be proved that the meaning of these words, “He hath put all things under his feet,” is, that all government in this world is given to Christ as Mediator; and whoever saith so, must needs acknowledge that Christ’s exercising of government, as he is Mediator, over all principalities and powers, shall continue after all things shall be put under his feet; or that Christ shall not govern as Mediator, “till all things be put under his feet,” which is so contrary to the Apostle’s meaning, that Christ shall then cease to reign as Mediator.

The next words, “And he gave him to be the head over all things to the church,” do furnish another argument against him. Christ’s headship, and his government as Mediator, are commensurable, and of an equal extent. Christ is a head to none but to his church; therefore no government is given to him as Mediator but the government of his church.

The last verse doth further confirm that which I say; for the Apostle, continuing his speech of the church, saith, “Which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.” He calls the church Christ’s fulness, in reference to his headship, that which makes him full and complete so far as he is a head or king. Having his church fully gathered, he hath his complete kingdom, his perfect body; and this being done, he wants nothing, so far as he is Mediator: so that the Holy Ghost doth here, as it were on purpose, anticipate this opinion, lest any should think all civil government is given to Christ as Mediator. Though, as God, he filleth heaven and earth, yet, as Mediator, his filling of all in all extends no further than his body, his church, which is therefore called his fulness.

Finally, To avoid the mistake of this place, and upon the whole matter, let these three things be well distinguished in the Mediator Jesus Christ. 1. His ὑπεροχὴ or δυχα, his eminence and highness in respect of the glory and majesty he is exalted to, far above whatsoever is highest among all the creatures. 2. His δύναμις, the power by which he can, and doth by degrees, and will more and more subdue his and his church’s enemies, and dash them in pieces like a potter’s vessel, and break them with a rod of iron. 3. His βασιλεία, his kingly power, by which he exerciseth acts of government. These three are distinguished in an earthly king, the first two being of a larger extent than the third. The conclusion of that prayer which our Lord taught his disciples doth distinguish the same three in God: “Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory.” Now these being distinguished in the Mediator Jesus Christ, I conclude with these three distinct assertions (the truth whereof I hope I have made to appear): 1. As Mediator, he is exalted and dignified above all creatures, and his glory is above all the earth; 2. As Mediator, he exerciseth acts of divine power and omnipotence over all creatures, in the behalf of, and for the good of his church, and restraineth, or diverteth, or destroyeth all his church’s enemies; 3. As Mediator, he is king, head, and governor to none but his church: neither was all government put in his hand, but that of the church only.

I could enlarge myself further against that most dangerous principle, “That all government, even that which is civil, is given to Christ, and to him as Mediator;” but let these things suffice for the present. The reverend brother’s opinion will find better entertainment among the Jews, who expect a temporal monarchy of the Messiah; and among Papists, who desire to uphold the Pope’s temporal authority over kings, as Christ’s vicegerent upon earth.

NIHIL RESPONDES: OR A DISCOVERY OF THE EXTREME UNSATISFACTORINESS OF MR COLEMAN’S PIECE.

NIHIL RESPONDES:

OR

A DISCOVERY

OF THE

EXTREME UNSATISFACTORINESS OF MR COLEMAN’S PIECE,

PUBLISHED LAST WEEK UNDER THE TITLE OF

“A BROTHERLY EXAMINATION RE-EXAMINED.”

WHEREIN HIS SELF CONTRADICTIONS;

HIS YIELDING OF SOME THINGS, AND NOT ANSWERING TO OTHER THINGS OBJECTED AGAINST HIM;

HIS ABUSING OF SCRIPTURE; HIS ERRORS IN DIVINITY;

HIS ABUSING OF THE PARLIAMENT, AND ENDANGERING THEIR AUTHORITY; HIS ABUSING OF THE ASSEMBLY;

HIS CALUMNIES, NAMELY, AGAINST THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND AND AGAINST MYSELF;

THE REPUGNANCY OF HIS DOCTRINE TO THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT;—

ARE PLAINLY DEMONSTRATED.

BY GEORGE GILLESPIE,

MINISTER AT EDINBURGH, 1642.

“Understanding neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm.”—1 TIM. i. 7.

EDINBURGH:

ROBERT OGLE, AND OLIVER & BOYD.

M. OGLE & SON, AND WILLIAM COLLINS, GLASGOW.

J. DEWAR, PERTH. W. MIDDLETON, DUNDEE. G. & R. KING, ABERDEEN.

W. M’COMB, BELFAST.

HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO., AND JAMES NISBET & CO., LONDON.

1645.

REPRINTED BY A. W. MURRAY, MILNE SQUARE, EDINBURGH.

1844.

After that Mr Coleman had preached and printed such doctrine as I was, in my conscience, fully persuaded was contrary to the covenant of the three kingdoms, and destructive (if it were put in practice) to the reformation of religion, he having also flatly and publicly imputed to the Commissioners from the church of Scotland a great part of the fault of hindering union in the Assembly here, I thought myself obliged in duty, and in the trust which I bear, to give a public testimony against his doctrine (which others did also) upon occasion not sought, but by divine providence, and a public calling then offered, first for preaching, and after for printing, in either of which I think there did not appear the least disrespect or bitterness towards the reverend brother. The Lord knows my intention was to speak to the matter, to vindicate the truth, and to remove that impediment of reformation by him cast in; and if he, or any man else had, in meekness of spirit, gravely and rationally, for clearing of truth, endeavoured to confute me, I ought not, I should not, have taken it ill; but now, when this piece of his against me, called “A Brotherly Examination Re-examined” (I think he would or should have said examined, for this is the first examination of it), I find it more full of railing than of reasoning, of gibing than of gravity; and when polemics do so degenerate, the world is abused not edified. He tells me if I have not work enough I shall have more. I confess the answering of this piece is no great work; and the truth is, I am ashamed I have so little to make answer unto; yet I shall do my best to improve even this work to edification. When other work comes I wish it be work indeed, and not words. Res cum re, ratio cum ratione concertet, as the father said: Arguments, Sir, arguments, arguments, if there be any: you have affirmed great things, and new things, which you have not proved. The assertions of such as are for a church government in genere, and for the presbyterial government in specie, are known; their arguments are known, but your solutions are not yet known. If Mr Prynne’s book against the suspension of scandalous persons from the sacrament be the work for the present which he means, I hope it shall be in due time most satisfactorily spoken unto, both by others and by myself. I desire rather solid than subitane lucubrations. In the meanwhile, “Let not him that putteth on his armour boast as he that putteth it off.” And let the brother that puts me in mind of other work remember that himself hath other work to do which he hath not yet done.

I have, for better method and clearness, divided this following discourse into certain heads, taking in under every head such particulars in his reply as I conceive to be most proper to that point.

THAT MR COLEMAN DOTH NOT ONLY PREVARICATE, BUT CONTRADICT HIMSELF, CONCERNING THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

He tells us often that he doth not deny to church officers all power of church government, but only the corrective part of government; that the doctrinal and declarative power is in the ministry; see p. 11, 14. He denieth that he did “advise the Parliament to take church government wholly into their own hands: I never had it in my thoughts (saith he) that the Parliament had power of dispensing the word and sacraments.” I must confess it is to me new language, which I never heard before, that the dispensing of the word and sacraments is a part of church government; sure the word government is not, nor never was, so understood in the controversies concerning church government. But if it be, why did the brother in his sermon oppose doctrine and government? “Give us doctrine (said he); take you the government.”

But behold now how he doth most palpably contradict himself, in one and the same page; it is the 11th. “I know no such distinction of government (saith he), ecclesiastical and civil, in the sense I take government for the corrective part thereof; all ecclesiastical (improperly called) government being merely doctrinal; the corrective or punitive part being civil or temporal.” Again, within a few lines, “I do acknowledge a presbyterian government; I said so expressly in my epistle; and do heartily subscribe to the votes of the house.” If he heartily subscribe to the votes and ordinances of Parliament, then he heartily subscribeth that elderships suspend men from the sacrament for any of the scandals enumerate, it being proved by witnesses upon oath: this power is corrective, not merely doctrinal. He must also subscribe to the subordination of congregational, classical, and synodical assemblies in the government of the church, and to appeals from the lesser to the greater, as likewise to ordination by presbyteries. And, I pray, is all this merely doctrinal? And will he now subscribe heartily to all this? How will that stand with the other passages before cited? or with p. 17, where it being objected to him, that he takes away from elderships all power of spiritual censures, his reply neither yieldeth excommunication nor suspension, but admonition alone, and that by the ministers who are a part of the elderships, not by the whole eldership consistorially. Again, p. 14, he confesseth: “I advised the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon them, whom he, this commissioner, thinks church officers, pastors and ruling elders.” Now I argue thus: He that adviseth the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon ministers and ruling elders, he adviseth the Parliament to do contrary to their own votes and ordinances, and so is far from subscribing heartily thereunto. But Mr Coleman, by his own confession, adviseth the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon ministers and ruling elders; therefore, &c. How he will reconcile himself with himself let him look to it.

Page 11. He takes it ill that one, while I make him an enemy to all church government, then only to the presbyterial. Only is his own addition. But I had reason to make him an enemy to both, for so he hath made himself; yea, in opposing all church government, he cannot choose but oppose presbyterial government, for the consequence is necessary, a genere ad speciem,—negatively though not affirmatively. If no church government, then no presbyterial government.

THE PARTICULARS IN MY BRIEF EXAMINATION, WHICH MR COLEMAN EITHER GRANTETH EXPRESSLY, OR ELSE DOTH NOT REPLY UNTO.

My argument, p. 32, proving that as many things ought to be established jure divino as can well be, because he cannot answer it, therefore he granteth it.

Page 5. He had in his sermon called for plain and clear institutions, and let Scripture speak expressly. Now, p. 7, he yieldeth that it is not only a divine truth (as I called it) but clear scripture, which is drawn by necessary consequence from Scripture.

He hath not yet, though put in mind, produced the least exception against the known arguments for excommunication and church government drawn from Matt, xviii. and 1 Cor. v. He tells the affirmer is to prove; but the affirmers have proved, and their arguments are known (yea he himself, p. 1, saith, “I have had the opportunity to hear almost what man can say in either side,” speaking of the controversy of church government); therefore he should have made a better answer than to say that those places did not take hold of his conscience; yet if he have not heard enough of those places, he shall, I trust, ere long hear more.

He had said, I could never yet see how two co-ordinate governments, exempt from superiority and inferiority, can be in one state, p. 35. I gave him three instances: A general and an admiral; a father and a master; a captain and a master of a ship. This, p. 8, he doth not deny, nor saith one word against it; only he endeavoureth to make those similes to run upon four feet, and to resemble the General Assembly and the Parliament in every circumstance. But I did not at all apply them to the General Assembly and the Parliament; only I brought them to overthrow that general thesis of his concerning the inconsistency of two co-ordinate governments, which, if he could defend, why hath not he done it?

His keeping up of the names of clergy and laity being challenged by me, p. 36, he hath not said one word in his Re-examination to justify it.

I having, p. 37, 38, confuted his argument drawn from the measuring of others by himself, whereby he did endeavour to prove that he had cause to fear an ambitious ensnarement in others as well as in himself, God having fashioned all men’s hearts alike, now he quitteth his ground, and saith nothing for vindicating that argument from my exceptions.

I showed, p. 40, his misapplying of the king of Sodom’s speech, but neither in this doth he vindicate himself.

That which I had at length excepted against his fourth rule concerning the magistrate, and his confirmation thereof, he hath not answered, nor so much as touched anything which I had said against him, from the end of p. 42 to the end of p. 48, except only a part of p. 43, and of p. 44, concerning 1 Cor. xii. 28. Some contrary argumentations he hath, p. 21, of which after, but no answer to mine.

Page 10, He digresseth to other objections of his own framing, instead of taking off what I had said.

HIS ABUSING OF THE SCRIPTURES.

Mr Coleman did ground an argument upon Psal. xxxiii. 15; Prov. xxvii. 29, which cannot stand with the intent of the Holy Ghost, because contrary to other scriptures and to the truth, as I proved, p. 38. He answereth, in his Re-examination, that my sense may stand, and his may stand too. But if my sense may stand, which is contrary to his, then his argument had no sure ground for it; yea, that which I said was to prove that his consequence, drawn from those scriptures, did contradict both the apostle Paul’s doctrine and his own profession, which still lieth upon him since it is not answered.

Page 14, He citeth 1 Cor. x. 32, “Give none offence, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the church of God,” to prove that all government is either a Jewish government, or a church government, or a heathenish government, and that there is no third. Yes, Sir, yourself hath given a third (for you have told three), but transeat cum cæteris erroribus. To the matter. This is a perverting of scripture to prove an untruth; for the government of generals, admirals, majors, sheriffs, is neither a Jewish government nor a church government, nor a heathenish government. Neither doth the Apostle speak anything of government in that place. He maketh a distribution of all men who are in danger to be scandalised—not of governments; and if he had applied the place rightly to the Parliament of England, he had said, They are either of the Jews, or of the Gentiles, or of the church of God: and this needeth not an answer. But when he saith, “The English Parliament is either a Jewish government, or a church government, or a heathenish government,” I answer, It is none of these, but it is a civil government.

Page 15, Declaring his opinion of church government he citeth Rom. xiii. 4, “To execute wrath upon him that doeth evil,” to prove that the punitive part belongs to the Christian magistrate. But what is this to the punitive part which is in controversy,—spiritual censures, suspension from the sacraments, deposition from the ministry, excommunication? The punitive part spoken of, Rom. xiii., belongeth to all civil magistrates, whether Christian or infidel.

Page 18. He maketh this reply to 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. xvii.; Heb. xiii. 7, 17: “Why, man, I have found these an hundred and an hundred times twice told, and yet am I as I was.” Why, Sir, was the argument so ridiculous? I had brought those places to prove another government (and, if you will, the institution of another government) beside magistracy, which he said he did not find in Scripture. Here are some who are no civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians in the Lord, 1 Thess. v. 12; Paul writeth to Timothy of elders that rule well, 1 Tim. v. 17; the churches of the Hebrews had some rulers who had spoken to them the word of God, Heb. xiii. 7; rulers that watched for their souls as they that must give an account, ver. 17. Now let the reverend brother speak out, What can he answer? Were these rulers civil magistrates? Did the civil magistrate speak to them the word of God? If these rulers were not magistrates but ministers, I ask next. Is it a matter of indifferency, and no institution, to have a ministry in a church or not? I hope, though he do not acknowledge ruling elders jure divino, yet he will acknowledge that the ministers of the word are jure divino; yet these were some of the rulers mentioned in the scriptures quoted. Let him loose the knot, and laugh when he hath done.

Page 19, 20, He laboureth to prove from 1 Cor. xii. 28, that Christ hath placed civil government in his church; and whereas it is said, that though it were granted that civil governments are meant in that place, yet it proves not that Christ hath placed them in the church. He replieth, “I am sure the Commissioner will not stand to this: he that placed governors was the same that placed teachers.” But his assurance deceiveth him; for upon supposition that civil governments are there meant (which is his sense), I deny it, and he doth but petere principium. God placed civil governments, Christ placed teachers; God placed all whom Christ placed, but Christ did not place all whom God placed. Next, whereas it was said, that governments in that place cannot be meant of Christian magistrates, because at that time the church had no Christian magistrates, he replieth, That Paul speaks of governments that the church had not, because in the enumeration, ver. 29, 30, he omits none but helps and governments. I answer, The reason of that omission is not because these two were not then in being (for God had set them as well as the rest in the church, ver. 28), but to make ruling elders and deacons contented with their station, though they be not prophets, teachers, &c. Thirdly, I asked, How comes civil government into the catalogue of ecclesiastical and spiritual administrations? His reply is nothing but an affirmation, that Christian magistracy is an ecclesiastical administration, and a query whether working of miracles and gifts of healings be ecclesiastical. Ans. Hence followeth, 1. That if the magistrate cease to be Christian he loseth his administration; 2. That though a worker of miracles cease to be Christian, yet it is a question whether he may not still work miracles. Lastly, Where I objected that he puts magistracy behind ministry, he makes no answer, but only that he may do this as well as my rule puts the nobility of Scotland behind the ministry. No, Sir, we put but ruling elders behind ministers in the order of their administrations because the Apostle doth so. It is accidental to the ruling elder to be of the nobility, or to nobles to be ruling elders: there are but some so, and many otherwise. That of placing deacons before elders, 1 Cor. xii. 28, is no great matter; sure the Apostle, Rom. xii., placeth elders before deacons.

HIS ERRORS IN DIVINITY.

1. Page 21, He admitteth no church government distinct from civil, except that which is merely doctrinal; and, p. 14, he adviseth the Parliament to take the corrective power wholly into their own hands, and exempteth nothing of ecclesiastical power from their hands but the dispensing of the word and sacraments. Hence it followeth that there ought to be neither suspension from the sacrament, nor excommunication, nor ordination, nor deposition of ministers, nor receiving of appeals, except all these things be done by the civil magistrate. If he say the magistrate gives leave to do these things, I answer, 1. So doth he give leave to preach the word and minister the sacraments in his dominions. 2. Why doth he then, in his sermon, and doth still, in his Re-examination, p. 14, advise the Parliament to lay no burden of corrective government upon ministers, but keep it wholly in their own hands? It must needs be far contrary to his mind that the magistrate gives leave to do the things above mentioned, they being most of them corrective, and all of them more than doctrinal. 3. He gives no more power to ministers in church government than in civil government; for, p. 11, he ascribeth to them a ministerial, doctrinal and declarative power, both in civil and ecclesiastical government.

2. Page 11, 14, He holds that the corrective or punitive part of church government is civil or temporal, and is wholly to be kept in the magistrate’s own hands; and, in his sermon, p. 25, he told us he sees not in the whole Bible any one act of that church government in controversy performed. All which how erroneous it is appeareth easily from 1 Cor. v. 13, “Put away from among yourselves that wicked person” (which Mr Prynne himself, in his Vindication, p. 2, acknowledged to be a warrant for excommunication); 2 Cor. ii. 6, There is a “punishment,” or censure, “inflicted of many;” 1 Tim. v. 19, “Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses.” Where acts of church government or censures were neglected it is extremely blamed; Rev. ii. 14, 15, 20. Was not all this corrective? yet not civil or temporal.

3. Page 9, Whereas I had said, That without church government ministers shall not keep themselves nor the ordinances from pollution, he replieth, That he understands neither this keeping of themselves from pollution, nor what this pollution of the ordinances is. I am sorry for it, that any minister of the gospel is found unclear in such a point. I will not give my own, but scriptural answers to both. The former is answered, 1 Tim. v. 22, Be not “partaker of other men’s sins: keep thyself pure.” It is sin to dispense ordinances to the unworthy, whether ordination, or communion in the sacrament. For the other, the pollution of ordinances is the Scripture language. I hope he means not to quarrel at the Holy Ghost’s language: Ezek. xxii. 26, “Her priests have violated my law, and have profaned mine holy things: they have put no difference between the holy and profane;” Mal. i. 7, “Ye offer polluted bread upon mine altar;” ver. 12, “Ye have profaned it;” Matt. xxi. 13, “Ye have made it a den of thieves;” Matt. vii. 6, “Neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet.”

4. Page 11, Whereas I had objected to him, that he excludeth ruling elders as well as ministers from government, he answers, That ruling elders are either the same, for office and ordination, with the minister (which, as he thinks, the Independents own, but not I), or they are the Christian magistrate; and so he saith he doth not exclude them. Mark here, he excludeth all ruling elders from a share in church government who are not either the same, for office and ordination, with the minister, or else the Christian magistrate; and so, upon the matter, he holdeth that ruling elders are to have no hand in church government. Those ruling elders which are in the votes of the Assembly, and in the reformed churches, have neither the power of civil magistracy (qua elders, and many of them not at all, being no magistrates), nor yet are they the same, for office and ordination, with the minister; for their office, and, consequently, their ordination to that office, is distinct from that of the minister among all that I know. And so, excluding all ruling elders from government who are neither magistrates, nor the same with ministers, he must needs take upon him that which I charged him with.

5. Page 21, Where he makes reply to what I said against his argument from Eph. i. 19-21, he saith, He will blow away all my discourse with this clear demonstration, “That which is given to Christ he hath it not as God, and Christ as God cannot be given. But this place (Eph. i. 19-21) speaketh both of dignity given to Christ, and of Christ as a gift given; therefore Christ cannot be here understood as God.” This is in opposition to what I said, p. 45, concerning the headship and dignity of Christ, as the natural son of God, “the image of the invisible God,” Col. i. 15; and, p. 43, of the dominion of Christ, as he is the “eternal Son of God.” This being premised, the brother’s demonstration is so strong as to blow himself into a blasphemous heresy. I will take the proposition from himself, and the assumption from Scripture, thus: That which is given to Christ he hath it not as God. But all power in heaven and in earth is given to Christ, Matt. xxviii. 18; life is given to Christ, John v. 26; authority to execute judgment is given to Christ, ver. 27; all things are given into Christ’s hands, John iii. 35; the Father hath given him power over all flesh, John xvii. 2; He hath given him glory, John xvii. 22: therefore, by Mr Coleman’s principles, Christ hath neither life, nor glory, nor authority to execute judgment, nor power over all flesh, as he is the eternal Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, but only as he is Mediator, God and man. As for the giving of Christ as God, what if I argue thus? If Christ, as he is the eternal Son of God, or Second Person of the ever-blessed Trinity, could not be given, then the incarnation itself, or the sending of the Son of God to take on our flesh, cannot be called a giving of a gift to us. But this were impious to say; therefore, again, if Christ, as he is the Second Person of the blessed Trinity, could not be given, then the Holy Ghost, as the Third Person, cannot be given (for they are co-essential; and that which were a dishonour to God the Son were a dishonour to God the Holy Ghost); but to say that the Holy Ghost cannot be given as the Third Person, were to say that he cannot be given as the Holy Ghost. And what will he then say to all those scriptures that speak of the giving of the Holy Ghost, Acts xv. 8; Rom. v. 5; 1 John iv. 13, &c.?

Finally, As Mr Coleman’s demonstration hath blown away itself, so it could not hurt me were it solid and good (as it is not); for he should have taken notice, that, in my examination, I did not restrict the dignity given to Christ, Eph. i. 21, nor the giving of Christ, ver. 22, to the Divine nature only. Nay, I told, p. 44, 46, that these words of the Apostle hold true even of the human nature of Christ.

6. Page 21, He concludeth with a syllogism, which he calleth the scope of my discourse (I know not by what logic, the proposition being forged by himself, and contrary to my discourse); thus it is:—

Whosoever do not manage their office and authority under Christ, and for Christ, they manage it under the devil, and for the devil; for there is no middle—either Christ or Belial: he that is not with me is against me.

But, according to the opinion of the Commissioner, Christian magistracy doth not manage the office and authority thereof under Christ, and for Christ.

Therefore,—

He believes I shall be hard put to it to give the kingdom a clear and satisfactory answer. It is well that this is the hardest task he could set me.

The truth is, his syllogism hath quatuor terminos, and is therefore worthy to be exploded by all that know the laws of disputation. Those words in the proposition, “under Christ, and for Christ,” can have no other sense but to be serviceable to Christ, to take part with him, and to be for the glory of Christ, as is clear by the confirmation added, “He that is not with me is against me.” But the same words in the assumption must needs have another sense, “Under Christ, and for Christ;” that is, vice Christi, in Christ’s stead. For that which I denied was, That magistracy is derived from Christ as Mediator, or that Christ as Mediator hath given a commission of vicegerentship and deputyship to the Christian magistrate to manage his office and authority under, and for him, and in his name; as is clear in my examination, p. 42. Nay, Mr Coleman himself, a little before his syllogism, p. 19, takes notice of so much. His words are these: “The Commissioner saith, Magistracy is not derived from Christ: I say, Magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom; so that, though the Commissioners assertion be sound (which in due place will be discussed), yet it infringeth nothing that I said.” Now then, qua fide could he, in his argument against me, confound these two things which he himself had but just now carefully distinguished? If he will make anything of his syllogism he must hold at one of these two senses. In the first sense it is true that all are either for Christ or against Christ; and it is as true that his assumption must be distinguished. For, de facto, the Christian magistrate is for Christ when he doth his duty faithfully, and is against Christ if he be unfaithful. But, de jure, it holds true universally, that the Christian magistrate manageth his office under and for Christ; that is, so as to be serviceable for the kingdom and glory of Christ. In the second sense (which only concerneth me) taking “under and for Christ,” to be in Christ’s stead, as his deputies or vicegerents, so his assumption is lame and imperfect, because it doth not hold forth my opinion clearly. That which I did, and still do hold, is this: That the civil magistrate, whether Christian or pagan, is God’s vicegerent, who, by virtue of his vicegerentship, is to manage his office and authority under God, and for God; that is, in God’s stead, and as God upon earth: but he is not the vicegerent of Christ as Mediator, neither is he, by virtue of any such vicegerentship, to manage his office and authority under Christ, and for Christ; that is, in Christ’s stead, and as Christ Mediator upon earth. This was and is my plain opinion (not mine alone, but of others more learned), and Mr Coleman hath not said so much as yoυ to confute it. So much for the assumption. But in the same sense I utterly deny his proposition, as being a great untruth in divinity; for the sense of it can be no other than this: Whosoever do not manage their office and authority in Christ’s stead, or as deputies and vicegerents of Christ, as he is Mediator, they manage it in the devil’s stead, as the devil’s deputies and vicegerents. Now I assume pagan magistrates do not manage their office as the deputies and vicegerents of Jesus Christ, as he is Mediator, therefore as the devil’s deputies. Which way was the authority derived to them from Christ as Mediator? Mr Coleman, p. 19, saith in answer to this particular, formerly objected, that Christ is rightful king of the whole earth, and all nations ought to receive Christ, though as yet they do not. But this helpeth him not. That which he had to show was, that the pagan magistrate, even while continuing pagan and not Christian, doth manage his office as Christ’s deputy and vicegerent; if not, then I conclude by his principles, a pagan magistrate is the devil’s deputy and vicegerent, which is contrary to Paul’s doctrine, who will have us to be subject for conscience’ sake, even to heathen magistrates, as the ministers of God for good, Rom. xiii. 1-7. By the same argument Mr Coleman must grant that generals, admirals, majors, sheriffs, constables, captains, masters, yea, every man that hath an office, is either Christ’s vicegerent, or the devil’s vicegerent, than which what can be more absurd? I might, beside all these, show some other flaws in his divinity, as, namely, p. 9 and 13, he doth not agree to this proposition, that “the admitting of the scandalous and profane to the Lord’s table, makes ministers to partake of their sins;” and he supposeth that ministers may do their duty, though they admit the scandalous; but of this elsewhere.

HIS ABUSING OF THE HONOURABLE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

Most honourable senators, I humbly beseech you to look about you, and take notice how far you are abused by Mr Coleman.

1. While he pretendeth to give you more than his brethren, he taketh a great deal more from you, and, so far as in him lieth, even shaketh the foundation of your authority. The known tenure of magistracy is from God. He is the minister of God (for good, and the powers that are, are ordained of God, saith the Apostle). The magistrate is God’s vicegerent; but now this brother seeketh a new tenure and derivation of magistracy, which takes away the old. He told in his sermon, p. 27: “Christ hath placed governments in his church, 1 Cor. xii. 28; of other governments besides magistracy I find no institution, of them I do, Rom. xiii. 1, 2. I find all government given to Christ, and to Christ as Mediator (I desire all to consider it), Eph. i. 21-23; and Christ as head of those given to the church.” Here you have these three in subordination, God, Christ, and the Christian magistrate. God gives once all government, even civil, to Christ, and to him as Mediator. Well, but how comes it then to the magistrate? Not straight by a deputation from God. Mr Coleman’s doctrine makes an interception of the power. He holds that God hath put it in Christ’s hands as Mediator. How then? The brother holdeth that Christ, as Mediator, hath instituted and placed the Christian magistrate, yea, and no other government, in his church. This was the ground of my answer, p. 42, that he “must either prove from Scripture, that Christ, as Mediator, hath given such a commission of vicegerentship and deputyship to the Christian magistrate, or otherwise acknowledge that he hath given a most dangerous wound to magistracy, and made it an empty title, claiming that power which it hath no warrant to assume.” I added: “As the Mediator hath not anywhere given such a commission and power to the magistrate, so, as Mediator, he had it not to give; for he was not made a judge in civil affairs, Luke xii. 14; ‘And his kingdom is not of this world,’ John xviii. 36.” Now, but what reply hath he made to all this? Page 19, he saith, Granting it all to be true and sound, yet it infringeth not what he said. “The commissioner (saith he) saith magistracy is not derived from Christ.” I say, “Magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom.” But by his good leave and favour, he said a great deal more than this, for he spake of Christ’s being head of all civil governments, and his placing these in his church as he is Mediator. Yea, that fourth rule delivered by him in his sermon, did hold forth these assertions: 1. That God gave all government, even civil, to Christ, and to him as Mediator; 2. That Christ, as Mediator, hath power and authority to place, and substitute under and for him, the Christian magistrate; 3. That Christ hath placed and instituted civil governments in his church, to be under and for him, as he is Mediator; 4. That the Christian magistrate doth, and all magistrates should, manage their office under and for Christ (that is, as his vicegerents), he being, as Mediator, head of all civil government. Now instead of defending his doctrine from my just exceptions made against it, he resileth, and having brought the magistrate in a snare, leaves him there. He endeavours to vindicate no more but this, That magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom. But if he had said so at first, I had said with him, and not against him, in that point; and if he will yet hold at that, why doth he, p. 19, refer my assertion to further discussion?

Secondly, He hath abused the Parliament in holding forth that rule to them in his sermon, “Establish as few things jure divino as can well be.” And yet now he is made, by strength of argument, to acknowledge, p. 5, that this is a good rule, “Establish as many things jure divino as can well be.”

Thirdly, I having stated the question to be not whether this or that form of church government be jure divino, but whether a church government be jure divino; whether Christ hath thus far revealed his will in his word, that there are to be church censures, and those to be dispensed by church-officers. I said the brother is for the negative of this question, p. 32. This he flatly denieth, p. 5, 6, whereby he acknowledgeth the affirmative, that there is a church government jure divino, and that Jesus Christ hath so far revealed his will in his word, that there are to be church censures, and those to be dispensed by church-officers. But how doth this agree with his sermon? “Christ hath placed governments in his church. Of other governments (said he) beside magistracy I find no institution, of them I do.” Is magistracy church government? Are magistrates church officers? Are the civil punishments church censures? Is this the mystery? Yes, that it is. He will tell us anon that the Houses of Parliament are church officers; but if that bolt do any hurt I am much mistaken.

Fourthly, He professeth to subscribe to the votes of Parliament concerning church government, p. 11; and yet he still pleadeth that all ecclesiastical government is merely doctrinal, p. 11, the Parliament having voted that power to church-officers which is not doctrinal (as I showed before). And he adviseth the Parliament to keep wholly in their own hands the corrective part of church government, p. 14, though the Parliament hath put into the hands of elderships a power of suspension from the sacrament, which is corrective.

Fifthly, He did deliver, in that sermon before the honourable House of Commons, divers particulars, which being justly excepted against, and he undertaking a vindication, yet he hath receded from them, or not been able to defend them, as that concerning two co-ordinate governments in one kingdom; and his argument concerning the fear of an ambitious ensnarement in ministers, these being by me infringed, he hath not so much as offered to make them good.

Sixthly, Having acknowledged, under his own hand, that he was sorry he had given offence to the reverend Assembly, and to the Commissioners from Scotland, he now appealeth to the Parliament, and tells us they are able to judge of a scandalous sermon, and they thought not so of it, p. 3. I know they are able to judge of a scandalous sermon: that they thought not so of it, it is more than I know or believe. However I know they have a tender respect to the offence of others, even when themselves are not offended, and so they, and all men, ought to do according to the rule of Christ. For his part, after he had acknowledged he had given offence, it is a disservice to the Parliament to lay over the thing upon them. For my part, I think I do better service to the Parliament in interpreting otherwise that second order of the House, not only desiring, but enjoining Mr Coleman to print that sermon,—as near as he could,—as he preached it. This was not, as he takes it, one portion of approbation above all its brethren (for I shall not believe that so wise an auditory was not at all scandalised at the hearing of that which was contrary both to the covenant and to their own votes concerning church government, nor at that which he told them out of the Jewish records, that “Hezekiah was the first man that was ever sick in the world, and did recover”); but, as I humbly conceive it was a real censure put upon him, his sermon being so much excepted against and stumbled at, the honourable House of Commons did wisely enjoin him to print his sermon, that it might abide trial in the light of the world, and lie open to any just exceptions which could be made against it abroad, and that he might stand or fall to himself.

Seventhly, He abuseth the Parliament by arrogating so much to himself, as that his sermon “will, in the end, take away all difference, and settle union,” p. 3; and that his Model will be, when he is dead, “the model of England’s church government,” as he saith in his postscript. Whether this be prophesying or presuming I hope we are free to judge. And what if the wisdom and authority of the honourable Houses, upon advice from the reverend and learned Assembly, choose another way than this? Must all the synodical debates, and all the grave parliamentary consultations, resolve themselves into Mr Coleman’s way, like Jordan into Mare Mortuum.

Eighthly, He doth extremely wound the authority of Parliament in making their office to be a church office, and of the same kind with the minister’s office. P. 14, “Do not I hold ministers church officers?” And a little after, “I desire the Parliament to consider another presbyterian principle that excludes your honourable Assembly from being church officers.” If so, then the offices of the magistrate and of the minister must stand and fall together; that is, if the nation were not Christian the office of magistracy should cease as well as that of the ministry. And if he make the magistrate a church officer, he must also give him ordination, except, with the Socinians, he deny the necessity of ordination.

HIS ABUSING THE REVEREND ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES.

Whereas I had objected that his sermon had given no small scandal and offence, he replieth, p. 3, “But hath it given offence? To whom? I appeal to the honourable audience.” Is this candid or fair dealing, when he himself knew both that he had given offence, and to whom? I shall give him no other answer but his own declaration which he gave under his hand after he had preached that sermon:—

“For much of what is reported of my sermon I utterly deny; and refer myself to the sermon itself. For what I have acknowledged to be delivered by me, although it is my judgment, yet, because I see it hath given a great deal of offence to this Assembly and the reverend Commissioners of Scotland, I am sorry I have given offence in the delivery thereof. And for the printing, although I have an order, I will forbear, except I be further commanded.—THO. COLEMAN.”

Page 33, I had this passage: “And where he asketh where the Independents and we should meet,” I answer, “In holding a church government jure divino; that is, that the pastors and elders ought to suspend or excommunicate (according to the degree of the offence) scandalous sinners. Who can tell but the purging of the church from scandals, and the keeping of the ordinances pure (when it shall be actually seen to be the great work endeavoured on both sides), may make union between us and the Independents more easy than many imagine.” What reply hath he made to this? P. 6, “Sure I dream (awake then); but I will tell you news: The Presbyterians and Independents are (he should have said may be) united; nay, more, the Lutherans and Calvinists; nay, more yet, the Papist and Protestant; nay, more than so, the Turk and Christian.” But wherein? “In holding that there is a religion wherein men ought to walk.” No, Sir. They must be united upon the like terms; that is, you must first have Turks to be Christians, and Papists to be Protestants; and then you must have them as willing to purge the church of scandals, and to keep the ordinances pure. We will never despair of an union with such as are sound in the faith, holy in life, and willing to a church-refining and sin-censuring government in the hands of church officers. In the meanwhile, it is no light imputation upon the Assembly to hint this much, that the harmony and concord among the members thereof, for such a government as I have now named (though in some other particulars dissenting), can no more unite them than Turks and Christians, Papists and Protestants, can be united. And now I will tell you my news: The Presbyterians and Independents are both equally interested against the Erastian principles.

He reflecteth also upon the Assembly in the point of jus divinum, p. 6. But what his part hath been, in reference to the proceedings in the Assembly, is more fully, and in divers particulars, expressed in the Brief View of Mr Coleman’s New Model, unto which he hath offered no answer.

HIS CALUMNIES.

Page 3, He desireth me, with wisdom and humility, to mind what church-refining and sin-censuring work this church government, with all its activity, hath made in Scotland, in the point of promiscuous communicating. I shall desire him, with wisdom and humility, to mind what charity or conscience there is in such an aspersion. I dare say divers thousands have been kept off from the sacrament in Scotland, as unworthy to be admitted. Where I myself have exercised my ministry there have been some hundreds kept off; partly for ignorance, and partly for scandal. The order of the church of Scotland, and the acts of General Assemblies, are for keeping off all scandalous persons; which every godly and faithful minister doth conscientiously and effectually endeavour. And if, here or there, it be too much neglected by some Archippus, who takes not heed to fulfil the ministry which he hath received of the Lord, let him and his eldership bear the blame, and answer for it.

Page 4, I having professed my unwillingness to fall upon such a controversy in a Fast sermon, he replieth, “How can you say you were unwilling?” But how can you, in brotherly charity, doubt of it after I had seriously professed it? My doing it at two several Fasts (the only opportunities I then had to give a testimony to that presently controverted truth) is no argument of the contrary. May not a man do a thing twenty times over, and yet do it unwillingly?

Page 5, He slandereth those that did, in their sermons, give a public testimony against his doctrine; the occasion (as he gives out) not being offered, but taken. But had they not a public calling and employment to preach as well as himself? And if a Fast was not an occasion offered to them, how was a Fast an occasion offered to him to fall upon the same controversy first, and when none had dons the like before him.

A fourth calumny is this: He had first blamed two parties that they came biassed to the Assembly; I answered, How then shall he make himself blameless who came biassed a third way; which was the Erastian way; and that, for our part, we came no more biassed to this Assembly than the foreign divines came to the Synod of Dort, Alexander to the Council of Nice, Cyril to that of Ephesus, and Paul to the synod at Jerusalem. But now, p. 6, 7, instead of doing us right he doth us greater injury; for now he makes us biassed, not only by our own judgments, but by something adventitious from without; which he denieth himself to be (but how truly I take not on me to judge: beholders do often perceive the biassing better than the bowlers); yea, he saith that I have acknowledged the bias, and justify it. Where, Sir? where? I deny it. It is no bias for a man to be settled, resolved and engaged in his judgment for the truth, especially when willing to receive more light, and to learn what needeth to be further reformed. Hath he forgotten his own definition of the bias which he had but just now given? But he will needs make it more than probable, by the instances which I brought, that the Commissioners from Scotland came not to this Assembly as divines, by dispute and disquisition, to find out truth, but as judges, to censure all different opinions as errors; for so came foreign divines to Dort, Alexander to the Council of Nice, Cyril to Ephesus. Is it not enough that he slander us, though he do not, for our sakes, slander those worthy divines that came to the Synod of Dort, Alexander also, and Cyril, prime witnesses for the truth in their days? Could no less content him than to approve the objections of the Arminians against the Synod of Dort, which I had mentioned, p. 33? But he gets not away so. The strongest instance which I had given he hath not once touched: it was concerning Paul and Barnabas, who were engaged (not in the behalf of one nation, but of all the churches of the Gentiles) against the imposition of the Mosaical rites, and had so declared themselves at Antioch, before they came to Jerusalem. Finally, Whereas he doubts, though not of our willingness to learn more, yet of our permission to receive more: That very paper, first given in by us (which I had cited, and unto which he makes this reply), did speak not only of our learning, but of the church of Scotland’s receiving, and, which is more, there is an actual experiment of it, the last General Assembly having ordered the laying aside of some particular customs in that church, and that for the nearer uniformity with this church of England, as was expressed in their own letter to the reverend Assembly of Divines.

A fifth calumny there is, p. 9, 6. “The Commissioner is content that jus divinum should be a noli me tangere to the Parliament, yet blames what himself grants.” I was never content it should be a noli me tangere to the Parliament, but at most a non necesse est tangere, for so I explained myself, p. 32, 33. If the Parliament establish that thing which is agreeable to the word of God, though they do not establish it as jure divino, I acquiesce; in the meantime, both they and all Christians, but especially ministers, ought to search the Scriptures, that what they do in matters of church government, they may do it in faith and assurance, that it is acceptable to God. It was not of parliamentary sanction, but of divines doctrinal asserting of the will of God that I said, Why should jus divinum be such a noli me tangere?

6. It seems strange to him that I did at all give instance of the usefulness of church government in the preservation of purity in the ordinances and in church-members. He saith, For an Independent to have given this instance had been something; but it seems strange to him that “I should have given an instance of the power and efficacy of government, as it is presbyterial, and contradistinct to congregational.” This is a calumny against presbyterial government, which is neither privative nor contradistinct, but cumulative to congregational government; and the congregational is a part of that government which is comprehended under the name of presbyterial. But in cases of common concernment, difficulty, appeals, and the like, the preserving of the ordinances and church-members from pollution, doth belong to presbyteries and synods.

7. He saith of me, p. 9, “He ascribeth this power of purifying men, and means of advancing the power of godliness afterward, to government.” A calumny. It was only a sine quo non which I ascribed to government thus far, that without it, ministers “shall not keep themselves nor the ordinances from pollution,” p. 23. But that church government hath power to purify men, I never thought it, nor said it. That which I said of the power (which he pointeth at) was, that his way can neither preserve the purity, nor advance the power of religion, p. 40, and the reason is, because his way provideth no ecclesiastical effectual remedy for removing and purging away the most gross scandalous sins, which are destructive to the power of godliness. God must, by his word and Spirit, purify men, and work in them the power of godliness. The church government which I plead for against him, is a means subservient and helpful, so far as removere prohibens, to remove that which apparently is impeditive and destructive to that purity and power.

8. Having told us of the proud swelling waves of presbyterial government, I asked upon what coast had those waves done any hurt, France, or Scotland, or Holland, or terra incognita? He replieth, p. 12, “I confess I have had no great experience of the presbyterial government.” Why make you bold then to slander it, when you can give no sure ground for that you say? He tells us, His fears arise from Scotland and from London. The reverend and worthy ministers of London can speak for themselves oetatem habent, for my part, though I know not the particulars, I am bound in charity not to believe those aspersions put upon them by a discontented brother. But what from Scotland? “I myself (saith he) did hear the presbytery of Edinburgh censure a woman to be banished out of the gates of the city. Was not this an encroachment?” It had been an encroachment indeed, if it had been so. But he will excuse me if I answer him in his own language (which I use not), p. 3 and 5: “It is, at the best, a most uncharitable slander,” and “There was either ignorance or mindlessness in him that sets it down.”

There is no banishment in Scotland but by the civil magistrate, who so far aideth and assisteth church discipline, that profane and scandalous persons, when they are found unruly and incorrigible, are punished with banishment or otherwise. A stranger coming at a time into one of our presbyteries, and hearing of somewhat which was represented to or reported from the magistrate, ought to have had so much, both circumspection and charity, as not to make such a rash and untrue report. He might have at least inquired when he was in Scotland, and informed himself better, whether presbyteries or the civil magistrate do banish. If he made no such inquiry, he was rash in judging; if he did, his offence is greater, when, after information, he will not understand.

9. He makes this to be a position of mine, p. 13, That “a learned ministry puts no black mark upon profaneness more than upon others.” A calumny. For, first, He makes me to speak nonsense; Secondly, I did not speak it of a learned ministry, but of “his way,” p. 40. How long ago since a learned ministry was known by the name of Mr Coleman’s way! His way is a ministry without power of government or church censures. Of this his way I said, that “it putteth no black mark upon profaneness and scandal in church members more than in any other;” and the reason is, because the corrective or punitive part of government he will have to be only civil or temporal, which striketh against those that are without, as well as those within. But the Apostle tells us of such a corrective government as is a judging of those that are within, and of those only, 1 Cor. v. 12; and this way (which is not only ours, but the apostolical way) puts a black mark upon profaneness and scandalous sins in church members more than in any others.

10. He saith of me, p. 17, “The Commissioner is the only man that we shall meet with, that, forsaking the words, judgeth of the intentions.” A calumny. I judged nothing but ex ore tuo; but in this thing he himself hath trespassed. I will instance but in two particulars: In that very place he saith, “Admonition is a spiritual censure in the Commissioner’s opinion.” Whence knows he that to be my opinion? Consistorial or presbyterial admonition given to the unruly may be called a censure; and if this were his meaning, then, ascribing to elderships power of admonition, he gives them some power of spiritual censures, and so something of the corrective part of government, which were contrary to his own principles. But he speaketh it of the ministers’ admonishing, who are but a part of the elderships, as himself there granteth. Now, where did I ever say or write, that admonition, by a minister, is a spiritual censure? Again, p. 4, he so judgeth me, that he not only forsaketh, but contradicteth my words, “How can you say you were unwilling?”

11. He saith, p. 16, “Now the Commissioner speaks out, &c. What! Not the Parliament of England meddle with religion?” A horrid calumny! Where have I said it? Dic sodes. I never preached before them but I exhorted them to meddle with religion, and that in the first place, and above all other things. I shall sooner prove that Mr Coleman will not have the Parliament of England to meddle with civil affairs, because he makes them church officers. It is a non sequitur. Their power is civil, therefore they are not to meddle with religion. It will be a better consequence: They are church officers: so he makes them, p. 14; and “Christian magistracy is an ecclesiastical administration,” so he saith, p. 20, therefore they are not to meddle with civil government.

THE REPUGNANCY OF HIS DOCTRINE TO THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT.

Mr Coleman, p. 13, acknowledgeth, that to assert anything contrary to the solemn league and covenant, is a great fault in any, in himself more than in divers others, if made out; he having, for his own part, taken it with the first, and not only so, but having administered it to divers others. Yes; and take this one circumstance more: In his sermon upon Jer. xxx. 21, at the taking of the covenant, Sept. 29, 1643, he answereth this objection against the extirpation of Prelacy: “But what if the exorbitances be purged away, may not I, notwithstanding my oath, admit of a regulated Prelacy?” For satisfaction to this objection he answereth thus: “First, We swear not against a government that is not; Secondly, We swear against the evils of every government, and doubtless many materials of Prelacy must of necessity be retained as absolutely necessary; Thirdly, Taking away the exorbitances, the remaining will be a new government and no Prelacy.” Let the brother now deal ingenuously. What did he understand by those materials of Prelacy absolutely necessary to be retained? Did he understand the dispensing of the word and sacraments, which is common to all pastors? Or did he understand the privileges of Parliament? Were either of those two materials of Prelacy? And if he had meant either of these, was this the way to satisfy that scruple concerning the extirpation of Prelacy? Again, What was that new government which he promised them after the taking away of the exorbitances of the old? Was it the minister’s doctrinal part? That is no new thing in England. Was it the Parliament’s assuming of the corrective part of church government, as he improperly distinguisheth, wholly and solely into their own hands, excluding the ministry from having any hand therein? This were a new government, I confess. But, sure, he could not, in any reason, intend this as a satisfaction to the scruples of such as desired a regulated Prelacy, whose scruples he then spoke to, for this had been the way to dissuade them from, not to persuade them to, the covenant.

But I go along with his Re-examination. P. 14, He explaineth himself and me thus: “He should have said that I advised the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon them whom he, this Commissioner, thinks church officers, then had he spoken true.” I thank him for his explanation. And, I pray, who were the church officers whom I said he excluded from church government? Were they not pastors and ruling elders? And doth not himself think these to be church officers? Yes; of the ministers he thinks so, but of ruling elders he seems to doubt, except they be magistrates. Well, but excluding those church officers from church government he takes with the charge. Why seeks he a knot in the rush? But now how doth he explain himself? He will have the Parliament to be church officers (of which before), and such church officers as shall take the corrective part of church government wholly into their own hands; yet not to dispense the word and sacraments, but to leave the doctrinal part to the ministry, and their power to be merely doctrinal, as he saith, p. 11. Thus you have his explanation. But doth this solve the violating of the covenant? Nay, it makes it more apparent; for the government of the church, which the first article of the covenant speaks of, is distinguished from the doctrinal part: “That we shall endeavour the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government.” So that, excluding pastors and ruling elders from the corrective part of government, and from all power which is not merely doctrinal, he thereby excludeth them from that discipline and government which the covenant speaks of as one special part of the reformation of religion. Come on to the reasons.

I had given four reasons; he takes notice but of three. This is the second time he hath told three for four, yet even these three will do the business.

1. “The extirpation of church government is not the reformation of it.” Here the brother addeth these words following as mine, which are not mine: “Therefore he that finds no church government breaks his covenant.” His reply is, “We must reform it according to the word of God, if that hold out none, here is no tailing.” He addeth a simile of a jury sworn to inquire into the felony of an accused person, but finds not guilty; and of three men taking an oath to deliver in their opinions of church government (where, by the way, he lets fall that I hold the national synod to be above all courts in the kingdom; which, if he means of ecclesiastical courts, why did he speak so generally? If he mean, above all or any civil courts, it is a gross calumny.) But now, if this be the sense which he gives of that first article in the covenant, then, 1. All that is in the second article might have been put into the first article: for instance, we might, in Mr Coleman’s sense, have sworn “to endeavour the reformation of Prelacy, and even of Popery itself, according to the word of God, and the example of the best reformed churches;” that is, taking an oath to deliver in our opinions of these things according to the word of God, and to inquire into the evils of church government by archbishops, bishops, deans, &c., whether guilty or not guilty. I strengthened my argument by the different nature of the first and second article. I said, “The second article is of things to be extirpated, but this of things to be preserved and reformed.” Why did he not take the strength of my argument and make a reply? 2. By the same principle of his we are not tied by the first article of our covenant to have any, either doctrine or worship, but only to search the Scriptures whether the word hold out any; for doctrine, worship, discipline and government, go hand in hand in the covenant. 3. His own simile hath this much in it against him. If a jury, sworn to inquire into the felony of an accused person, should, after such an oath, not only find the person not guilty, but further take upon them to maintain that there is no such thing as felony, surely this were inconsistent with their oath, so he that swears to endeavour the reformation of religion in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, and yet will not only dislike this or that form of government, but also hold that there is no such thing as church government, he holds that which cannot agree with his oath. 4. This answer of Mr Coleman, leaving it free to debate whether there be such as church government, being his only answer to my first argument from the covenant, must needs suppose that the government mentioned in the covenant, the reformation whereof we have sworn to endeavour, is understood even by himself of church officers’ power of corrective government, it being the corrective part only, and not the doctrinal part, which he casts upon an uncertainty whether the world hold out any such thing.

2. “Church government as mentioned in the covenant is a spiritual, not a civil thing. The matters of religion are put together,—doctrine, worship, discipline and government. The privileges of Parliament come after in the third article.” The reverend brother replies, “What if it be? therefore the Parliament is not to meddle with it, and why?” And here he runs out against me, as if I held that the Parliament is not to meddle with religion, an assertion which I abominate. Princes and magistrates’ putting off themselves all care of the matters of religion, was one of the great causes of the church’s mischief, and of popish and prelatical tyranny. But is this just and fair, Sir, to give out for my opinion that for which you are not able to show the least colour or shadow of consequence from any thing that ever I said? That which was to be replied unto was, Whether do not the materials of the first article of the covenant differ from the materials of the third article of the covenant? or whether are they the same? Whether doth the privilege of Parliament belong to the first article of the covenant? Whether is that government mentioned in the first article a civil thing or a spiritual? If civil, why is discipline and government ranked with doctrine and worship, and all these mentioned as parts of the reformation of religion? If spiritual, then why doth the brother make it “civil or temporal?” p. 11. To all this nothing is answered, but, “What if it be?” Then is my argument granted.

And to put it yet further out of question, I add other two arguments from that same first article of the covenant. One is this: In the first part of that first article we swear all of us to endeavour “the preservation of the reformed religion in the church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” where all know that the words “discipline” and “government” (especially being mentioned as two of the principal things in which the reformed religion in that church doth consist) signify church government and church discipline distinct both from doctrine and worship (which, by the way, how Mr Coleman endeavoureth to preserve, I will not now say, but leave it to others to judge), therefore, in that which immediately followeth,—our endeavouring “the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government,”—the words “discipline” and “government” must needs have the same sense thus far, that it is a church discipline and a church government distinct from the civil power of the magistrate, and distinct also from doctrine and worship in the church; for we cannot make these words, “discipline” and “government,” in one and the same article of a solemn oath and covenant, to suffer two senses differing toto genere (especially considering that the civil government is put by itself in another article, which is the third), unless we make it to speak so as none may understand it.

The other argument which I now add is this. In the third part of that first article we swear that we “shall endeavour to bring the churches of God in the three kingdoms to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of church government, directory for worship and catechising,” where, 1. Church government doth agree generically with a confession of faith, directory of worship, and catechising. I mean all these are matters of religion, none of them civil matters. 2. It is supposed there is such a thing as church government distinct from civil government, and therefore it is put out of all question, that so far there shall be an uniformity between the churches of God in the three kingdoms (and otherwise it were an unswearing of what was sworn in the first part of that article), but it tieth us to endeavour the nearest conjunction and uniformity “in a form of church government;” which were a vain and rash oath, if we were not tied to a church government in general, and that as a matter of religion. 3. The uniformity in a form of church government which we swear to endeavour must needs be meant of corrective government; it being clearly distinguished from the confession of faith and directory of worship. So that Mr Coleman’s distinction of the doctrinal part, and of the dispensing of the word and sacraments, cannot here help him.

From these two arguments (beside all was said before) I conclude that the covenant doth undeniably suppose, and plainly hold forth this thing as most necessary and uncontrovertible, that there ought to be a church government which is both distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal. And if so, what Apollo can reconcile Mr Coleman’s doctrine with the covenant? And now I go on.

My last reason formerly brought was this: “Will the brother say that the example of the best reformed churches leadeth his way?” For the covenant tieth us to a reformation of the government of the church both according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches: that as regula regulans; this as regula regulata.

The reverend brother replieth: 1. “The best reformed church that ever was went this way; I mean the church of Israel.”

Ans. 1. Is the church of Israel one of the reformed churches which the covenant speaks of? 2. Was the church of Israel better reformed than the apostolical churches? Why then calls he it the best reformed church that ever was? 3. That in the Jewish church there was a church government distinct from civil government, and church censures distinct from civil punishments, is the opinion of many who have taken great pains in the searching of the Jewish antiquities; and it may be he shall hear it ere long further proved, both from Scripture and from the very Talmudical writers.

2. “I desire (saith he) the Commissioner to give an instance in the New Testament of such a distinction (civil and church government) where the state was Christian.”

Ans. I desire him to give an instance in the New Testament of these three things, and then he will answer himself. 1. Where was the state Christian? 2. Where had the ministry a doctrinal power in a Christian state? 3. Where doth the New Testament hold out that a church government distinct from civil government may be where the state is not Christian, and yet may not be where the state is Christian? Shall the church’s liberties be diminished, or rather increased, where the state is Christian?

In the third and fourth place, the brother tells us of the opinions of Gualther, Bulhager, Erastus, Aretius. The question is of the examples of churches, not of the opinions of men. But what of the men? As for that pestilence that walketh in darkness through London and Westminster, Liastus’ book against Beza, let him make of it what he can, it shall have an antidote by and by. In the meanwhile, he may take notice, that, in the close of the sixth book, Erastus casts down that which he hath built, just as Bellarmine did, in the close of his five books of justification. But as for the other three named by the brother, they are ours, not his, in this present controversy. Gualther(1340) expounds 1 Cor. v. all along of excommunication, and of the necessity of church discipline; insomuch that he expounds the very delivering to Satan (the phrase most controverted by Erastus and his followers) of excommunication, and the not eating with the scandalous (ver 9-11) he takes also to import excommunication. He thinks also that ministers shall labour to little purpose except they have a power of government. Bullinger is most plain for excommunication, as a spiritual censure ordained by Christ, and so he understands Matt. xviv. 17.

Aretius holds(1341) that God was the author of excommunication in the Old Testament, and Christ in the New. And now are these three Mr Coleman’s way? Or doth not his doctrine flatly contradict theirs? Peradventure he will say, Yet there is no excommunication in the church of Zurich, where those divines lived, nor any suspension of scandalous sinners from the sacrament. I answer, This cannot infringe what I hold, that the example of the best reformed churches maketh for us and against him; for, 1. The book written by Lavater, another of the Zurich divines, de Ritibus et Institutis Ecclesioe Tigurinoe, tells us of divers things in that church which will make the brother easily to acknowledge that it is not the best reformed church, such as festival days, cap. 8, that upon the Lord’s days, before the third bell, it is published and made known to the people, if there be any houses, fields, or lands, to be sold, cap. 9. They have no fasts indicted, cap. 9, nor psalms sung in the church, cap. 10. Responsories in their Litany at the sacrament, the deacon upon the right hand saith one thing, the deacon upon the left hand saith another thing, the pastor a third thing, cap. 13. 2. Yet the church of Zurich hath some corrective church government besides that which is civil or temporal, for the same book, cap. 23, tells us, that in their synods, any minister who is found scandalous or profane in his life, is censured with deposition from his office, ab oficio deponitur. Then follows, finita censura, singuli decani, &c. Here is a synodical censure, which I find also in Wolphius,(1342) a professor of Zurich, and the book before cited, cap. 24,(1343) tells us of some corrective power committed to pastors and elders, which elders are distinguished from the magistrates. 3. The Zurich divines themselves looked upon excommunication as that which was wanting through the injury of the times; the thing having been so horribly abused in Popery, and the present licentiousness abounding among people, did hinder the erecting of that part of the church discipline at that time. But they still pleaded the thing to be held forth in Scripture, and were but expecting better times for restoring and settling of excommunication, which they did approve in Geneva, and in other reformed churches, who had received it. I give you their own words for the warrant of what I say.(1344)

I have been the longer upon this point as being the chief objection which can be made by Mr Coleman concerning that clause in the covenant, “The example of the best reformed churches.”

He hath only one thing more, which may well pass for a paradox. He will take an instance, forsooth, from Geneva itself, though presbyterian in practice. And why? Because in the Geneva Annotations upon Matt. ix. 16, it said, that “the external discipline is to be fitted to the capacity of the church.” “This is no Scotland presbytery,” saith the brother. Nay, Sir, nor yet Geneva presbytery; for it doth not at all concern presbytery. It is spoken in reference to the choosing of fit and convenient times for fasting and humiliation,—that as Christ did not, at that time, tie his disciples to fasting, it being unsuitable to that present time; so other like circumstances of God’s worship, which are not at all determined to the word, are to be accommodated to emergent occasions, and to the church’s condition for the time, which both Scotland and Geneva, and other reformed churches do.

If I have now more fully and convincingly spoken to that point of the covenant, let the brother blame himself that put me to it.

The Lord guide his people in a right way, and rebuke the spirit of error and division, and give us all more of his Spirit, to lead us into all truth, and into all self-denial, and grant that none of his servants be found unwilling to have the Lord Jesus Christ to reign over them in all his ordinances!

THE END.

MALE AUDIS; OR, AN ANSWER TO MR COLEMAN’S MALE DICIS.

MALE AUDIS;

OR

AN ANSWER TO MR COLEMAN’S MALE DICIS:

WHEREIN

THE REPUGNANCY OF HIS ERASTIAN DOCTRINE TO THE WORD OF GOD,

TO THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT, AND TO THE ORDINANCES OF PARLIAMENT;

ALSO HIS CONTRADICTIONS, TERGIVERSATIONS, HETERODOXIES, CALUMNIES,

AND PERVERTING OF TESTIMONIES,

ARE MADE MORE APPARENT THAN FORMERLY.

TOGETHER WITH

SOME ANIMADVERSIONS UPON MR HUSSEY’S PLEA FOR CHRISTIAN MAGISTRACY:

SHOWING,

THAT IN DIVERS OF THE AFORE-MENTIONED PARTICULARS HE HATH MISCARRIED AS MUCH AS,

AND IN SOME PARTICULARS MORE THAN, MR COLEMAN.

BY GEORGE GILLESPIE,

MINISTER AT EDINBURGH, 1649.

EDINBURGH:

ROBERT OGLE, AND OLIVER & BOYD.

M. OGLE & SON, AND WILLIAM COLLINS, GLASGOW.

J. DEWAR, PERTH. W. MIDDLETON, DUNDEE. G. & R. KING, ABERDEEN.

W. M’COMB, BELFAST.

HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO., AND JAMES NISBET & CO., LONDON.

1649.

REPRINTED BY A. W. MURRAY, MILNE SQUARE, EDINBURGH

1844.

PREFACE TO THE READER.

As I did not begin this present controversy, so I do not desire to hold up the ball of contention, yet having appeared in it (neither alone, nor without a calling and opportunity offered), I hold it my duty to vindicate the truth of Christ, the solemn league and covenant, the ordinances of Parliament, the church of Scotland, and myself. For this end was I born, and for this end came I into the world, that I might bear witness to the truth, whereunto I am so much the more encouraged, because it appeareth already in this debate, that magna est vis veritatis,—great is the force of truth, and so great, that my antagonists, though men of parts, and such as could do much for the truth, yet, while they have gone about to do somewhat against the truth, they have mired themselves in foul errors; yea, so far is in them lieth, have most dangerously shaken and endangered the authority of magistrates, who are God’s vicegerents, and particularly the authority of Parliament, and of parliamentary ordinances. They have stumbled and fallen, and shall not be able to rise but by the acknowledgment of the truth.

In this following reply, I have not touched much of the argumentative part in Mr Hussey’s Plea for Christian Magistracy, reserving most of it to another work, unto which this is a prodromus (howbeit much of what he saith is the same with what I did confute in my Nihil Respondes, and his book, coming forth a month after, takes no notice of that second piece of mine, but speaketh only to the first). Meanwhile, let him not believe that his big looking title can, like Gorgon’s head, blockify or stonify rational men, so as they shall not perceive the want or weakness of argument. It hath ever been a trick of adversaries to calumniate the way of God and his servants, as being against authority, but I will, by God’s assistance, make it appear to any intelligent man, that the reverend brother hath pleaded very much against magistracy, and so hath fallen himself into the ditch which he hath digged for others, whilst I withal escape.(1345)

But, now, what may be the meaning of Mr Coleman’s cabalistical title, Male Dicis Maledicis? Great philologists will tell him that maledico is taken in a good sense as well as in a bad, according to the difference of matter and circumstances. If any kind of malediction be justifiable, it is male dicere maledicis,—to speak evil to evil speakers, for “as he loved cursing, so let it come unto him as he delighted not in blessing, so let it be far from him.” But he doth worse, and his title, with a transposition of letters, will more fitly reflect upon himself male dicis de amicus. You, Sir, speak evil of your friends, and of those that never wronged you. For my part, I have not shared with him in evil speaking, nor rendered revilings for revilings. I am sorry that he is so extremely ill of hearing, as to take reason to be railing, and good sayings to be evil sayings. He applieth to himself the Apostle’s words, “Being reviled, we bless.” But where to find these blessings of his, those unwritten verities, I know not. I am sure he had spoken more truly if he had said, “Being not reviled, we do revile.”

For the matter and substance of his reply, there are divers particulars in it which serve rather to be matter of mirth than of argument, as that a Parliament parasite cannot be called an abuser of the Parliament, and that passage, “How can a clause delivered in a postscript, concerning my opinion of my way, be abusive to the Parliament?” A great privilege either of postscripts or of his opinions, that they cannot be abusive to the Parliament. Many passages are full of acrimony, many extravagant, and not to the point in hand, many void of matter. Concerning such Lactantius(1346) gives me a good rule, Otiosum est persequi singula,—it is an idle and unprofitable thing to persecute every particular. And much more I have in my eye the Apostle’s rule, “Let all things be done to edifying.” 1 Cor. xiv. 26. I have accordingly endeavoured to avoid such jangling, and such debates as are unprofitable and unedifying, making choice of such purposes as may edify, and not abuse the reader.

Peradventure some will think I might have wholly saved myself this labour. I confess I do not look upon that which I make reply unto, as if it were like to weigh much with knowing men, yet the Apostle tells me that some men’s mouths must be stopped, and Jerome tells me(1347) there is nothing written without skill, which will not find a reader with as little skill to judge, and some men grow too wise in their own eyes when they pass unanswered. Besides all this, a vindication and clearing of such things as I mentioned in the beginning, may, by God’s blessing, anticipate future and further mistakes. Read therefore and consider, and when thou hast done, I trust thou shalt not think that I have lost my labour. I pray the Lord that all our controversies may end in a more cordial union for prosecuting the ends expressed in the covenant and especially the reformation of religion, according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches, and more particularly the practical part of reformation, that the ordinances of Jesus Christ may be kept from pollution, profaneness and scandals shamed away, and piety commended and magnified.