Chapter VII
The bivouac on the Field of Quatre Bras, during the night of the 16th, continued undisturbed until about an hour before daylight, when a Cavalry Patrol having accidentally got between the adverse Picquets near Piermont, caused an alarm in that quarter that was quickly communicated to both Armies by a rattling fire of musketry, which, rapidly augmenting, extended itself along the line of the Advanced Posts. Among the first who hastened to ascertain the origin and nature of the engagement was PICTON, who, together with other Staff Officers, as they arrived in succession, on discovering that no advance had been attempted or intended on either side, soon succeeded in restoring confidence. Similar exertions were successfully made on the part of the French Officers, and as day began to break upon the scene, both parties resumed their previous tranquillity. In this untoward affair, the Picquets furnished by KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade, and by the 3rd Brunswick Light Battalion were sharply engaged, and a Picquet of the Field Battalion Bremen suffered considerably.
It was not long before WELLINGTON, who had slept at Genappe, arrived at Quatre Bras, where he found Major General Sir HUSSEY VIVIAN, whose Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the 10th British Hussars (under Colonel QUENTIN), of the 18th British Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. HENRY MURRAY), and of the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonel VON WISSELL), was posted on the left of that point with two strong Picquets thrown out; one, of the 18th Hussars, under Captain CROKER, on the Namur road, and the other, of the 10th Hussars, under Major the Hon. FREDERICK HOWARD, in front--with a Picquet from the latter, under Lieutenant ARNOLD, on the right of the Namur road.
VIVIAN, on being asked what account he could give of the Enemy, communicated to the Duke the result of his observations, which were necessarily very limited, as, with the exception of the firing that had taken place, as before mentioned, along the line of Picquets, the French had continued perfectly quiet, and had as yet given no indication of any offensive movement.
The Duke then took a general survey of the Field, and while sweeping the horizon with his telescope, he discovered a French Vedette on some rising ground, in the direction of Fleurus, and a little to the right of the high road leading to Namur, apparently belonging to some Picquet thrown out from NEY's extreme Right on the previous night, after the battle had ceased; or to some detached Corps placed in that quarter for the purpose of observation, and for the maintenance of the communication between NAPOLEON and NEY. The Duke had received no intelligence of BLÜCHER; and, probably, judging from the advanced position of the Vedette in question that whatever might have been the result of the Battle of Ligny, the Prussians could not have made any forward movement likely to endanger NEY's Right, he came to the conclusion that it was quite possible that, on the other hand, NAPOLEON might have crossed the Namur road, and cut off his communication with BLÜCHER, with the design of manoeuvring upon his Left and Rear, and causing him to be simultaneously attacked by NEY. His Grace therefore desired VIVIAN to send a strong Patrol along the Namur road to gain intelligence respecting the Prussian Army.
A Troop of the 10th Hussars, under Captain GREY, was accordingly despatched on this duty, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, one of the Duke's Aides de Camp. As the Patrol advanced along the road, the Vedette before mentioned began to circle, evidently to give notice of the approach of an Enemy, and then retired. This induced the Patrol to move forward with great caution, so as to guard against the possibility of being cut off. Nevertheless it continued, but with all due precaution, advancing along the road, until after passing a few scattered cottages, comprising a hamlet called Petit Marbais, it reached, about a mile and a half further on, some rising ground, about five miles from Quatre Bras, and beyond which was another height. A Vedette was observed posted upon the latter, but who had evidently not yet discovered the approach of Captain GREY's Troop. Down in the intervening hollow was an isolated house, at the door of which stood a dismounted Sentry, and some horses were standing in an adjoining yard.
Captain GREY directed Lieutenant BACON to patrol towards the house, while he remained with the remainder of the Troop, concealed from the Enemy's view, a disposition favoured by the nature of the ground, and the trees in the hedges, on both sides of the road. When Lieutenant BACON's party moved forward, it was discovered by the Vedette, who began circling, and fired his carabine. The French Picquet posted in the house instantly rushed out; several of the men had their jackets and accoutrements off; and the Post could easily have been captured, had the special duty on which the British Patrol was engaged admitted of an attack. The French turned out very quickly and galloped to the rear along the high road, while BACON's party was recalled. A few French Cavalry galloped up to the Vedette on the Heights, but evinced no disposition to advance.
It had now become sufficiently evident that, commencing from this point, the French were in possession of the Namur road; but the principal object which Sir ALEXANDER GORDON had in view was yet to be attained. The Patrol now retired a little until it reached a cross road, which a peasant pointed out as the Prussian line of retreat. Pursuing this track, the Patrol, within an hour, reached Tilly; where General ZIETEN, who had been placed in temporary command of the Cavalry, was covering the retreat of the Prussian Army.
After remaining here about a quarter of an hour, during which Sir ALEXANDER GORDON obtained from General ZIETEN the most ample information respecting the movements of the Prussians, the Patrol commenced its return, at a quick pace, striking into a cross road, which joined the high road at a point nearer to Quatre Bras than the one whence it had quitted it. The Patrol reached Quatre Bras at about half past seven o'clock; and Sir ALEXANDER GORDON immediately reported to the Duke that the Prussians had retreated towards Wavre, that the French occupied the ground on which the Battle had been fought; but that they had not crossed the high road, along which the Patrol had proceeded almost into the immediate vicinity of their Advanced Posts.
This latter circumstance was very remarkable, and served to satisfy WELLINGTON that, either NAPOLEON's victory had not been followed up with a vigour and an effect, by which the safety of his own Army would have been perilled, or, that it had not been of a character sufficiently decisive to have enabled the French Emperor to avail himself of such a vantage ground.
Having ascertained that the contingency for which, as has already been explained, he was fully prepared, had actually taken place; he instantly decided upon retrograding his troops to a position in front of the point of junction of the roads leading from Charleroi and Nivelles upon Brussels, in which he might rely upon the co-operation of a sufficient portion of BLÜCHER's forces from Wavre with his own, by which he would be enabled to confront NAPOLEON and his main Army with ample means, and thus attain that great aim and end of all strategy, of "operating with the greatest mass in a combined effort upon a decisive point."
Hence, a change in the direction of the previously ordered movements became necessary, and the following instructions were issued:--
"To General Lord HILL.
"17th June 1815.
"The Second Division of British Infantry to march from Nivelles on Waterloo, at 10 o'clock.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, now at Nivelles, to march from that place on Waterloo, at 10 o'clock. Those Brigades of the Fourth Division at Braine le Comte, and on the road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine le Comte this day.
"All the baggage on the road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles to return immediately to Braine le Comte, and to proceed immediately from thence to Hal and Bruxelles.
"The spare Musket Ammunition to be immediately parked behind Genappe.
"The Corps under the command of Prince FREDERICK of Orange will move from Enghien this evening, and take up a position in front of Hal, occupying Braine le Château with two Battalions.
"Colonel ESTORFF will fall back with his Brigade on Hal, and place himself under the orders of Prince FREDERICK."
Shortly after the departure of the before mentioned Patrol of the 10th Hussars, along the Namur road, the Duke received some despatches from England, to which he gave his attention; and now that he had satisfied himself as to the real state of things, and issued his Orders for the movements of his distant troops, as also for the retreat of those present in the Field, he laid himself down on the ground near Quatre Bras, covered his head with one of the newspapers he had been reading, which had accompanied those despatches, and appeared to fall asleep.
After remaining some time in this state, he again rose, mounted his horse, and rode a little distance down the Field in front of Quatre Bras. He then looked about through his telescope, and expressed to those about him his astonishment at the perfect stillness of the Enemy, remarking at the same time, "What if they should be also retiring? It is not at all impossible."
A second Officer, Lieutenant MASSOW, had been despatched from the Prussian to the Anglo-Allied Head Quarters; and it was about this time that he reached the Duke, with a verbal communication respecting the retreat upon Wavre, and the position intended to be assumed in that quarter. It was of a nature which, taken altogether, was so far satisfactory, that WELLINGTON immediately sent a verbal message by this Officer to BLÜCHER, acquainting him with his intended retrograde movements, and proposing to accept a battle, on the following day, in the position in front of Waterloo, provided the Prince would detach two Corps to his assistance.
* * * * *
The following is the manner in which the retreat of the Anglo-Allied Infantry, then in full operation, was executed. It was an important matter to mask the retreat as much as possible, so as to gain time for the free and unimpeded movement of the Army along the high road leading to the position in front of Waterloo. For this purpose, the Light Troops continued to maintain the line of Outposts, until their respective Supports, which had remained stationary sufficiently long to conceal the retreat of the troops in their rear, began also to retire.
The First and Fifth British Divisions, and the Second Dutch-Belgian Division, as also the Brunswick Corps, effected their retreat in excellent order, notwithstanding the delay that was created by the narrowness of the bridge and street of Genappe. Their retreat was covered by ALTEN's Division, to which were added for this purpose, the 1st Battalion of the 95th British Rifles, the 2nd and 3rd Brunswick Light Battalions, the Brunswick Advanced Guard Battalion, and the Light Companies of BYNG's Brigade of Guards.
The main body of ALTEN's Division commenced its retreat about eleven o'clock. OMPTEDA's Brigade of the King's German Legion was withdrawn to Sart à Mavelines, which it immediately occupied, as also the Wood of Les Censes in its front. HALKETT's British Brigade then retired secretly until it reached some favourable ground, a little distance in rear of OMPTEDA's Brigade, upon which it was immediately drawn up. KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade was withdrawn still further to the rear, and occupied a third position. Thus posted, the Division was ordered, in the event of being attacked, to retire by Brigades alternately.
It was a little before midday when the Light Troops of ALTEN's Division began to retire. They occupied the advanced line, commencing from the southern extremity of the Wood of Bossu on the right, extending along Gemioncourt and the inclosures of Piermont, and crossing the Namur road on the left: from which line they gradually and slowly fell back upon OMPTEDA's Brigade, in a manner evincing admirable skill, steadiness, and regularity.
In order more effectually to mask the movements on the Allied side of the Namur road, the whole of the Cavalry was drawn up in two lines immediately contiguous to, and in rear of, that road; the Heavy Cavalry forming the Second Line, and Picquets being thrown out from the First Line, to relieve those of the retiring Infantry.
The main body of ALTEN's Division now commenced its further retreat; but not by alternate Brigades, this mode having been directed only in the event of an attack; the latter retired successively in the order in which they stood, preserving their relative distances, so that they might commence the alternate system of retreat, if attacked. To facilitate the passage of other portions of the Army through the narrow defile of the bridge and town of Genappe, this Division retired by Bezy, and crossed the Genappe, lower down the stream, by the bridge of Wais le Hutte.
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In the early part of the morning, NEY had, like his opponent, been ignorant of the result of the Battle of Ligny; but he was aware that the Anglo-Allied Army had been considerably reinforced during the night, principally by the arrival of its Cavalry.
The Marshal calculated that if NAPOLEON had gained a victory, and crossed the Namur road, the longer WELLINGTON remained in the position of Quatre Bras, the greater the danger he incurred of having not only his communication with BLÜCHER effectually cut off, but also his main line of retreat upon Brussels intercepted; and that in such a case it was wiser not to advance against the British General, as the latter might then retire, and thus elude the effect of a combined operation between NAPOLEON's and his own forces. He also judged that if, on the other hand, the French Emperor had been defeated, an attack made on his own part, upon the Anglo-Allied Army, might subject himself to the risk of having to contend against a combined operation between WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER; and thus expose both his own and NAPOLEON's forces to the probability of being defeated in detail.
In this uncertainty, NEY sent a message by General Count FLAHAUT, who happened to be still with him, and who was returning to rejoin the Emperor wherever he might be found, expressive of his anxiety to learn the result of the action of the preceding day. In the mean time, he kept his troops in a state of perfect quietude; his main body was posted in reserve on the Heights of Frasne, between which and the Outposts there were intermediate Columns of Support; but no movement whatever was attempted.
NEY at length received the information he had solicited, in a despatch from SOULT, wherein the result of the Battle of Ligny was briefly described. It also stated that NAPOLEON was proceeding, with the principal portion of his forces, to the Mill of Bry, close to which the high road leads from Namur to Quatre Bras, and that therefore it would not be practicable for the Anglo-Allied Army to act against him (NEY); but that, should such a case happen, the Emperor would march directly upon it by that road, while NEY should attack it in front, and in this manner that Army would at once be destroyed. The despatch required from NEY a report of the exact position of his forces, and an account of all that was going on in his front.
Hence it is evident that NEY's opinion, that a victory at Ligny ought to be followed up by a combined attack upon WELLINGTON, perfectly coincided with NAPOLEON's views; but while NEY was thus justified in remaining inactive during the early part of the day, the fact of the Emperor's not moving directly upon Genappe with the morning's dawn, and his excessive delay in breaking up his bivouac at Ligny, are inexplicable. A glorious opportunity had presented itself for the attainment of his original design of defeating both Armies in detail, but which was completely lost by a most extraordinary and fatal want of energy and vigour in seizing upon the advantages which the victory of Ligny had placed within his reach.
NEY, having ascertained that NAPOLEON's forces were in motion, had commenced the advance of his own troops, when a second despatch reached him, dated, "in front of Ligny, at noon," intimating that the Emperor had just posted a Corps of Infantry and the Imperial Guard in advance of Marbais, that he wished him to attack the Enemy at Quatre Bras, and force him from his position; and that his operations would be seconded by the Corps at Marbais, to which point his Majesty was proceeding in person.
Upon discovering that the Anglo-Allied Infantry had retired, and that the troops around, and in rear of, Quatre Bras, consisted of Cavalry covering the retreat, NEY brought forward his own Cavalry in advance, and appeared to regulate its movements so that its attack might be directed against the Front of the British simultaneously with that of the Cavalry which he now perceived advancing along the Namur road against its Flank.
About this time, the 10th Hussars were moved across the Namur road, and down the slope in front where they were halted, in echelon of Squadrons; and while they were thus posted, WELLINGTON and his Staff came to the front of the Regiment. From this spot the Duke was attentively watching, through his telescope, the dispositions and movements of the French, whom he could discover as soon as they reached the Quatre Bras side of Little Marbais; when all at once at a distance of about two miles, masses were seen forming on the side of the Namur road, conspicuously glittering in the sun's rays; by which the Duke was at first induced to believe that they were Infantry, whose bayonets were so brilliantly reflected; but it was soon discovered that they were Cuirassiers.
After a short time, these were observed to advance, preceded by Lancers, and it was not long before the Picquet of the 18th British Hussars, posted on that road, began skirmishing, as did also the Picquet of the 10th British Hussars, more in the front of the position, and likewise, still further to the right, in front of Quatre Bras, a Picquet consisting of a Squadron of the 11th British Light Dragoons, detached from Major General VANDELEUR's Brigade, which comprised the 11th Light Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel SLEIGH), the 12th Light Dragoons (under Colonel the Hon. FREDERICK PONSONBY), and the 16th Light Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel HAY). The 10th Hussars then fell back again into their proper place in the line. VIVIAN now took up a new alignment, throwing back his Left so as to present a front to the Enemy's advance, and to protect the left of the position. VANDELEUR's Brigade was then in Right Rear of VIVIAN's and close to Quatre Bras.
The Anglo-Allied Infantry having, some time previously, entirely crossed the Genappe, with the exception of the Light Companies of the Second Brigade of Guards on the right, and of the 1st Battalion 95th British Regiment (Rifles), on the left, which troops had been directed to remain until the last moment, and were now retiring to Genappe (where they were subsequently drawn up at the entrance of the town), and the Duke having satisfied himself that a formidable body of the French Cavalry was endeavouring to fall upon him and to molest his retreat, it became a question with his Grace, at that moment, how far it might be advisable to offer any serious resistance to the advance of the Enemy; but Lieutenant General the Earl of UXBRIDGE, the Commander of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry, having remarked that, considering the defiles in the rear, and the distance to which the great mass of the Infantry had already retired and from which it could offer no immediate support, he did not think the Cavalry was favourably situated for making such an attempt, the Duke assented to the correctness of this view, and requested his Lordship at once to carry into effect the retreat of the Cavalry.
UXBRIDGE immediately made the following dispositions for this purpose. The First or Household Brigade of Heavy Cavalry commanded by Major General Lord EDWARD SOMERSET, and consisting of the 1st Life Guards (under Lieutenant Colonel FERRIOR), of the 2nd Life Guards (under Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. EDWARD P. LYGON), of the Royal Horse Guards, or Blues (under Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT CHAMBRE HILL), and of the 1st (or King's) Dragoon Guards (under Colonel FULLER), together with the Second Brigade of Heavy Cavalry, commanded by Major General the Honourable Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY, consisting of the 1st, or Royal Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel CLIFTON), of the 2nd Royal North British Dragoons, or Scots Greys (under Colonel HAMILTON), and of the 6th, or Inniskilling Dragoons (under Colonel MUTER), formed the Centre Column, which was to retire by the Brussels high road.
VANDELEUR's and VIVIAN's Brigades constituted the Left Column, which was to effect its retreat by a Bridge over the Genappe at Thuy, still lower down the stream than that by which ALTEN's Infantry Division had crossed.
The Right Column was formed of part of the Third Light Cavalry Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir WILLIAM DÖRNBERG, the 1st and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonels BÜLOW and DE JONQUIÈRES), while the remaining Regiment, which was the 23rd British Light Dragoons (under Colonel the Earl of PORTARLINGTON), was employed as a portion of the Rear Guard of the Centre Column. The 15th British Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel DALRYMPLE), belonging to the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, under Major General Sir COLQUHOUN GRANT, was also attached to the Right Column; while of the two remaining Regiments of the Brigade, the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonel LINSINGEN), and the 7th British Hussars (under Colonel Sir EDWARD KERRISON), the former had been left in occupation of a line of Posts on the French frontier, extending from Courtrai, through Menin, Ypres, Loo, and Fürnes, to the North Sea, and the latter formed a part of the Rear Guard of the Centre Column. This Right Column was to pass the Genappe by a ford higher up the stream than the town of Genappe.
These skilful dispositions had scarcely been arranged, when the Picquet of the 18th Hussars, on the left, came in at a good round trot, followed by two or three Squadrons of French Cavalry, upon which VIVIAN's Battery of Horse Artillery, opened a fire whereby their advance was checked. The Enemy, however, was observed to be very active in bringing up his Artillery, which soon opened upon the Hussar Brigade. VIVIAN, having received the Earl of UXBRIDGE's instructions to retire, accompanied with an intimation that he would be supported by VANDELEUR's Brigade, then in his rear, and observing that the French Cavalry was pressing forward in great numbers, not only in his front, but also on his flank, he put his Brigade about, and retired in line, covered by the Skirmishers. The French followed, with loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" and just as the Brigade reached a sort of hollow, their guns again opened, throwing shells, which mostly flew over the heads of the 18th Hussars, against which Regiment they appeared to be principally directed. In the mean time, VANDELEUR's Brigade had been drawn up in support, on rather a commanding position, and VIVIAN approached it in the full expectation that it would open out for the passing through of his own men, and take the Rear Guard in its turn; but on the Hussars arriving within fifty or sixty yards of the Fourth Brigade, VANDELEUR put it about, and retired--VIVIAN not being aware that VANDELEUR had previously received Orders to retire and leave the road clear for the retreat of the Cavalry in his front. VIVIAN immediately occupied the ground thus vacated, and, with a view to check the Enemy's advance more effectually, ordered the 18th Hussars to charge, as soon as the French approached within favourable reach.
The weather, during the morning, had become oppressively hot; it was now a dead calm; not a leaf was stirring; and the atmosphere was close to an intolerable degree; while a dark, heavy, dense cloud impended over the combatants. The 18th Hussars were fully prepared, and awaited but the command to charge, when the Brigade guns on the right commenced firing, for the purpose of previously disturbing and breaking the order of the Enemy's advance. The concussion seemed instantly to rebound through the still atmosphere, and communicate, as an electric spark, with the heavily charged mass above. A most awfully loud thunder clap burst forth, immediately succeeded by a rain which has never, probably, been exceeded in violence even within the tropics. In a very few minutes the ground became perfectly saturated; so much so that it was quite impracticable for any rapid movement of the Cavalry. The Enemy's Lancers, opposed to the Sixth British Brigade, began to relax in their advance, and to limit it to skirmishing; but they seemed more intent upon endeavouring to envelope, and intercept the retreat of, the Hussars. VIVIAN now replaced the 18th Hussars by the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, as Rear Guard, with Orders to cover well the Left Flank and Left Front of the Brigade. He had already sent off his Battery of Horse Artillery, to cross the Genappe by the Bridge of Thuy, and despatched an Aide de Camp to VANDELEUR, to request he would move his Brigade as quickly as possible across that Bridge, so that he might meet with no interruption in his retreat, in the event of his being hard pressed.
Of the Centre Column, the Heavy Brigades of Lord EDWARD SOMERSET and Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY had retired along the Charleroi road, and were taking up a position on some high ground, a little in rear of Genappe, on either side of that road. The detached Squadron of the 11th Light Dragoons (under Captain SCHREIBER), was withdrawn and directed to retire through the above town. The 23rd Light Dragoons were also withdrawn, and posted upon the ascent between Genappe and the position occupied by the two Heavy Brigades. The 7th Hussars continued on the south side of Genappe, as Rear Guard.
Neither the Centre, nor the Right, Column experienced any serious molestation in its retreat while on the French side of the Genappe: large bodies of Cavalry were seen in motion, but their Advanced Guards limited their attacks to skirmishing.
At length the 7th Hussars retired through Genappe, after having thrown out their Right Squadron, commanded by Major HODGE, as Rear Guard, to cover the retreat of the Centre Column, regulating its proceedings in conformity with such Orders as it might receive from Major General Sir WILLIAM DÖRNBERG, who had been desired to superintend the movements of the Skirmishers. Major HODGE led out the Right Troop, under Captain ELPHINSTONE, to skirmish, while Lieutenant STANDISH O'GRADY, who commanded the Left Troop, held the high road, from which he had occasionally to send assistance to the former, and frequently to advance, to enable the Skirmishers to hold their ground, as their movements were difficult, through ploughed fields so soft that the horses always sank up to their knees, and sometimes to their girths. In this manner, every inch of ground was disputed, until within a short distance of Genappe.
Here DÖRNBERG informed Lieutenant O'GRADY that he must leave him; that it was of the utmost importance to face the Enemy boldly at this spot, as the Bridge in the town of Genappe was so narrow that the Squadron would have to pass it in file; that he was to endeavour as much as possible to obtain time for drawing off the Skirmishers, but not to compromise his Troop too much. Lieutenant O'GRADY then called in his Skirmishers, and advanced with his own Troop boldly up the road at a trot. The Cavalry immediately opposed to him, went about, followed by him for some distance; and he thus continued alternately advancing and retiring, until he saw all the Right Troop safe on the road in his rear. He then began to retire at a walk, occasionally halting and fronting, until he turned the corner of the town of Genappe: when he filed the men from the left, and passed through the place at a gallop. Upon the arrival of the Squadron at the opposite entrance of Genappe, it was posted between this point and the main body of the 7th Hussars, which had been drawn up on the road in a column of divisions, prepared to check the advance of the Enemy on his debouching from the town.
The British Left Cavalry Column continued its retreat, which was towards the little Bridge of Thuy, by deep narrow lanes, converted by the tremendous pour of rain into perfect streams. VIVIAN withdrew the 10th and 18th Hussars from the position he last occupied, but on their approaching the Genappe an interruption occurred in consequence of VANDELEUR's Brigade not having effected its passage across the Bridge; and the delay became so great that he was induced to put about the 18th Hussars, with a view to their affording a Support to the 1st German Hussars, should they require it. In a short time after this, VANDELEUR's Brigade resumed its progress: the 10th Hussars followed; and, as the 1st Hussars, with which Regiment VIVIAN himself was at the moment, continued to maintain a vigorous and effective skirmish, he ordered the 18th to resume its retrograde movement; having previously directed that some men of the 10th Hussars should be dismounted on reaching the opposite bank of the Genappe, and be prepared with their carbines to defend the passage, should the retreat of the remainder of the Brigade be severely pressed. After skirmishing some time, VIVIAN despatched a Squadron of the 1st German Hussars to the Bridge, and the moment he began to do so, the French Cavalry again pushed forward with so much boldness and rapidity as to interpose between the Left Squadron and the main body of the Regiment, and to compel that Squadron to pass the Genappe lower down than the Bridge over which the Brigade passed the little stream. Having ascertained that all was ready, VIVIAN galloped down the road to the Bridge with the remainder of the 1st German Hussars. The French followed them, loudly cheering, but as soon as the Hussars cleared the Bridge, and the Enemy's Dragoons reached it, some of the dismounted men that had been formed along the top of the opposite bank, in rear of a hedge, overlooking the Bridge and a hollow way, through which the road led from it up the ascent, opened a fire upon the foremost of the French Lancers that had come up to the other end of the Bridge, while the remainder of the 10th, and the whole of the 18th Hussars, were drawn up along the rising ground or bank. The good countenance here shown by VIVIAN's Brigade, combined with the soft and miry state of the ground after the thunderstorm had set in, completely checked the pursuit by the Enemy's Cavalry, which now turned towards the high road.
The Left Cavalry Column, after VIVIAN's Brigade had remained in its position for some little time, continued its retreat without further molestation (the Enemy having contented himself with merely detaching a Patrol to watch its movements) along a narrow cross road, running nearly parallel with the Charleroi high road, and leading through the Villages of Glabbaix, Maransart, Aywiers, Frischermont, Smohain, and Verd Cocou. Here VIVIAN's Brigade arrived in the evening, in the vicinity of the Forest of Soignies, and bivouacked; while VANDELEUR's Brigade passed the night somewhat nearer to the ground which had been selected for the position to be taken up by the Anglo-Allied Army.
The Right Cavalry Column, consisting only, as previously stated, of the 1st and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, and of the 15th British Hussars, effected its retreat in good order, protected by its Skirmishers, as far as the ford, which it crossed above Genappe. At this point, the French Cavalry suspended its pursuit, and proceeded, in like manner as that on the right had done, to join the main body on the high road; while the British Right Cavalry Column continued its retreat unmolested towards the position of Waterloo, in rear of which it bivouacked.
A large body of French Cavalry, consisting of from sixteen to eighteen Squadrons, was now entering Genappe by the Charleroi road, followed by the main body of the French Army under NAPOLEON.
The Earl of UXBRIDGE, who was desirous of checking the Enemy's advance, so as to gain sufficient time for the orderly retreat of the Anglo-Allied Army, and to prevent a compromise of any portion of the rearmost troops, decided upon embracing the advantage which the narrow Defile of Genappe seemed to present in aid of his design. The town consists mainly of houses lining the high road, on the Brussels side of the Bridge. The road then ascends a ridge, the brow of which is about six or seven hundred yards distant, and here Lord UXBRIDGE had halted the Heavy Brigades of Lord EDWARD SOMERSET and of Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY, and posted them so as to cover the retirement of the Light Cavalry. At first, he formed them in line; SOMERSET's on the right, and PONSONBY's on the left, of the high road; but observing by the Enemy's formidable advance, that the Light Cavalry would soon be compelled to fall back, his Lordship drew up SOMERSET's Brigade in a Column of half Squadrons upon, but close to, the right of the road itself, so as to admit of troops retiring by its left; and formed PONSONBY's Brigade into a Column of Half Squadrons upon the left of the high road, and somewhat to the rear. The 7th Hussars were formed at some little distance in the rear of Genappe, and the 23rd Light Dragoons were drawn up in support of that Regiment, and about midway between it and the Heavy Cavalry on the Height. The Squadron of the 7th Hussars, under Major HODGE, it will be recollected, was halted between the main body of that Regiment and the town of Genappe.
Thus posted, the Centre retiring Cavalry Column remained about twenty minutes, when loud shouts announced that the French had entered the town. Presently a few horsemen appeared galloping out of the street, and dashed at speed into Major HODGE's Squadron. They were found, on being taken, to be quite inebriated. In a few moments afterwards, the French Column showed its head within the town; the leading Troop consisted of Lancers, all very young men, mounted on very small horses, and commanded by a fine looking, and, as it subsequently appeared, a very brave man. The Column remained about fifteen minutes within the town, its head halted at the outlet facing the British Rear Guard, and its flanks protected by the houses. The street not being straight, and the rear of the Column not being aware that the front had halted, continued pressing forward, until the whole mass became so jammed that it was impossible for the foremost ranks to go about, should such a movement become necessary.
Their apparent hesitation and indecision induced Lord UXBRIDGE, who stood upon some elevated ground adjoining the right of the road, to order the 7th Hussars to charge. The latter, animated by the presence of the Commander of the Cavalry, who was also their own Colonel, rushed forward with the most determined spirit and intrepidity; while the French, awaiting the onslaught, opposed to them a close, compact, and impenetrable phalanx of lances; which, being securely flanked by the houses, and backed by a solid mass of horsemen, presented a complete chevaux de frise. Hence, it is not surprising that the charge should have made no impression upon the Enemy; nevertheless, the contest was maintained for some considerable time; the Hussars cutting at their opponents, and the latter parrying and thrusting, neither party giving way a single inch of ground; both the Commanding Officer of the Lancers, and Major HODGE, commanding the leading Squadron of the Hussars, were killed, gallantly fighting to the last.
The French had by this time established a Battery of Horse Artillery on the left of Genappe and upon the opposite bank of the river, from which they opened a brisk fire upon the British Cavalry in support, and several shot struck the main body of the 7th Hussars, upsetting men and horses, and causing great impediments in their rear. The French Lancers now advanced, and drove the 7th Hussars upon their Reserve; but here the 7th rallied, renewed their attack, and forced back the Lancers upon the town. The latter having been reinforced, rallied, in their turn, and drove back the Hussars. These, however, again rallied, and resolutely faced their opponents, with whom they gallantly continued a fierce encounter for some time longer, when to terminate a conflict which was most obstinate and sanguinary without being productive of any favourable result, but in which the bravery of the 7th Hussars shone most conspicuously, and became the theme of admiration of all who witnessed it, Lord UXBRIDGE decided upon withdrawing that Regiment and charging with the 1st Life Guards. As soon as the Hussars went about, in pursuance of the Orders received, the Lancers followed them. In the mêlée which ensued, the French lost quite as many men as did the Hussars; and when at length the latter were able to disengage themselves, the former did not attempt to follow them. The 7th retired through the 23rd Light Dragoons, took the first favourable turn off the road and reformed in the adjoining field.
During this contest, the French, having become sensible of the evil that might arise from the closely wedged state of the Cavalry in the town, began to clear the rear of the most advanced portions of the Column, so as to admit of more freedom of movement in case of disaster. A Battery of British Horse Artillery had taken post close to a house on the Height occupied by the Heavy Cavalry, and on the left of the road; and it was now replying to the French Battery on the opposite bank of the river.
So exceedingly elated were the French with having repulsed the 7th Hussars in this their first serious encounter with the British Cavalry, that immediately on that Regiment retiring, the whole Column that was in Genappe raised the war cry, and rent the air with shouts of "En avant!--En avant!" evincing the greatest impatience to follow up this momentary advantage, and to attack the Supports; for which, indeed, the opportunity appeared very favourable, as the ranks of the latter were suffering considerable annoyance from the well directed and effective fire of the French guns on the opposite bank of the river.
They now abandoned the secure cover to which they had been indebted for their temporary success, and were advancing up the ascent with all the confidence of a fancied superiority, when the Earl of UXBRIDGE, seizing upon the advantage presented for attacking them while moving up hill, with their Flanks unsupported, and a narrow Defile in their rear, and being also desirous of affording the 1st Life Guards an opportunity of charging, brought forward that Regiment through the 23rd Light Dragoons, who opened out for its passage to the front. The Life Guards now made their charge, most gallantly headed by Colonel Sir JOHN ELLEY, Deputy Adjutant General, who, at the moment of contact with the Enemy, began by cutting down two men right and left. It was truly a splendid charge; its rapid rush down into the Enemy's mass, was as terrific in appearance as it was destructive in its effect; for although the French met the attack with firmness, they were utterly unable to hold their ground a single moment, were overthrown with great slaughter, and literally ridden down in such a manner that the road was instantaneously covered with men and horses, scattered in all directions. The Life Guards, pursuing their victorious course, dashed into Genappe, and drove all before them as far as the opposite outlet of the town.
This brilliant and eminently successful charge made a deep impression upon the Enemy, who now conducted his pursuit with extreme caution. The 23rd Light Dragoons, which had supported the 1st Life Guards in their charge, became again the last Regiment in the Rear Guard, and continued so during the remainder of the retreat. PONSONBY's Brigade had deployed to the right of the high road, and the guns were so disposed as to take advantageous positions, retiring en échiquier.
The Enemy, after quitting Genappe, tried to get upon the Flanks of the Centre retiring Column, chiefly upon the Right Flank; but the Royals, Greys, and Inniskillings, manoeuvred beautifully; retiring by alternate Squadrons, and covered by their own Skirmishers, who completely beat the French Light Cavalry in that kind of warfare. Finding that from the deep state of the ground, there was not the least danger of his being turned by the Enemy, Lord UXBRIDGE gradually withdrew PONSONBY's Brigade to the high road. He kept the Light Cavalry, protected by the Household Brigade, as the Rear Guard, and slowly retired into the chosen position in front of Waterloo, the guns and rockets constantly plying the Enemy's Advance, which, although it pressed forward twice or thrice, and made preparations to attack, never ventured to come to close quarters with its opponents; and the Column received from it no further molestation.
On arriving at the foot of the Anglo-Allied position, the 23rd Light Dragoons moved off to the (Allied) right of the high road, and into the hollow in which lies the Orchard of the Farm of La Haye Sainte. Here they were drawn up, prepared to meet the French Advanced Guard, should it follow them, or to fall upon its Flank, should it venture to continue its march along the road. The latter, however, halted upon the Height which intervenes between La Haye Sainte and La Belle Alliance, and opened a fire upon the Centre of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Line, above the former Farm, from two Batteries of Horse Artillery.
PICTON, who was then upon the rising ground in rear of La Haye Sainte, and who was intently watching the Enemy's advance along the high road, perceived Columns of Infantry advancing from La Belle Alliance. He immediately took upon himself to unite the two Batteries nearest at hand, which were those under Major LLOYD of the British Artillery, and Major CLEEVES of the King's German Legion (although not belonging to his own Division), and to place them in position on the high ground close to the Charleroi road. The guns immediately opened a brisk cannonade upon the French Columns, of which they had obtained a most accurate range just as their leading Divisions had entered the inclosed space between the high banks which line the high road where it is cut through the Height before mentioned as intervening between La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte. This mass of the Enemy's Infantry suffered severely from the fire, to which it stood exposed about half an hour: for the head of the Column having been unable to retrograde, in consequence of the pressure from its rear, and prevented by the high bank on either side of the road from filing off to a flank, could not readily extricate itself from so embarrassing a situation.
During the whole of this fire, the Allied Batteries were replied to, though very ineffectually, by the two Batteries of French Horse Artillery posted on the Height in question.
It was now twilight: the approaching darkness was greatly accelerated by the lowering aspect of the sky. Picquets were hastily thrown forward by both Armies, and to so great a height had the mutual spirit of defiance arisen, that the near approach of opposing parties, advancing to take up their ground for the night, led to little Cavalry affairs, which, though unproductive of any useful result to either side, were distinguished, on different points of the Lines, by a chivalrous bravery which seemed to require a prudent restraint.
In one of these affairs, Captain HEYLIGER of the 7th Hussars, made a very brilliant charge with his Troop; and when the Duke of WELLINGTON sent to check him, his Grace desired to be made acquainted with the name of an Officer who had displayed so much gallantry. A very spirited charge was also made by the Right Troop of the 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, under Lieutenant HUGO; who was allowed by his Commanding Officer to volunteer for that service, and who, from the vicinity of Hougomont, boldly rushed up the Height intervening between that point and Mon Plaisir, and gallantly drove back a portion of the French Advanced Guard of Cavalry; recapturing at the same time three carriages filled with British sick and wounded.
* * * * *
The manner in which the Duke of WELLINGTON withdrew his Army from the position of Quatre Bras to the one of Waterloo, must ever render that retreat a perfect model of operations of this nature, performed in the immediate presence of a powerful Enemy. Those dispositions which have been described as having been made by him for the purpose of masking the retirement of the main body, of affording perfect security to the passage of the Defile in his rear, and of ensuring the orderly and regular assembly of the several Corps on the ground respectively allotted to them in the new position, evince altogether a degree of skill which has never been surpassed.
In such operations, the covering of the Army by its Cavalry and Light Troops necessarily forms an important feature; and a glance at the manner in which this duty was fulfilled by the Earl of UXBRIDGE, with the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and a few Light Battalions, at his disposal, is sufficient to show that the exemplification of such feature on this occasion was exceedingly beautiful. Indeed, so orderly and so perfect were all the arrangements connected with this retreat, from its commencement to its close, that the movements partook more of the appearance of a Field Day upon a large scale, than of an operation executed in the actual presence of an Enemy; and this was particularly observable as regarded the protection afforded by the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, which manoeuvred to admiration, and in a style that, combined with the brilliant charge by the 1st Life Guards at Genappe, evidently impressed the Enemy with a due sense of the efficiency of the gallant troops immediately in his front. It may here also be remarked, that the judicious dispositions made by Lord UXBRIDGE in covering this retreat, and the high degree of confidence with which he inspired the Cavalry, afforded well grounded anticipations of the success likely to attend his measures when conducting that Cavalry in the open battle field, on which, it was foreseen, its prowess would so very soon be tested. The British and German portion of the Cavalry was in excellent order, and seemed already to have imbibed, in a high degree, that gallant bearing and chivalrous spirit, which it beheld and admired in its distinguished Chief.
In the course of the evening, the Duke received from Prince BLÜCHER a reply to the request he had made for his support in the position he was now occupying. It was highly characteristic of the old man, who had written it, in the following terms, without previously conferring with, or addressing himself to, any one:--"I shall not come with two Corps only, but with my whole Army; upon this understanding, however, that should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on the 19th."
* * * * *
The Duke, who, as has already been explained, had, from the commencement of the Campaign, considered it very possible that NAPOLEON would advance by the Mons road, still entertained apprehensions of an attempt on the part of his opponent to turn him by Hal, and seize Brussels by a coup de main. For this, however, he was fully prepared, having made his dispositions for the security of that Flank, in the manner pointed out in the following instructions, which he issued to Major General the Hon. Sir CHARLES COLVILLE:--
"17th June 1815.
"The Army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its present position in front of Waterloo.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, at Braine le Comte, are to retire at daylight tomorrow morning upon Hal.
"Major General COLVILLE must be guided by the intelligence he receives of the Enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien.
"Prince FREDERICK of Orange is to occupy with his Corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible.
"The Army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo tomorrow.
"Lieutenant Colonel TORRENS will inform Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES COLVILLE of the position and situation of the Armies."
The respective lines of Picquets and Vedettes had scarcely been taken up along the low ground that skirted the front of the Anglo-Allied position, and the last gun had just boomed from the Heights, when "heaven's artillery," accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, again peeled forth in solemn and awful grandeur; while the rain, pouring down in torrents, imparted the utmost gloom and discomfort to the bivouacs, which the opposing Armies had established for the night, upon the ground destined to become celebrated in history, even to the remotest ages.
Chapter VIII
It was not until the night of the 16th, after ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps d'Armée had retired to Tilly and Gentinnes, that it was decided the Prussian Army should retreat upon Wavre. This decision was communicated in the Orders then transmitted from the Prussian Head Quarters to the First and Second Corps d'Armée (ZIETEN's and PIRCH's) directing them to bivouac at Bierge and St Anne, in the vicinity of Wavre; as also in the Orders forwarded, on the next morning, to the bivouacs of the Third and Fourth Corps (THIELEMANN's and BÜLOW's), at Gembloux and Basse Bodecée, directing them to fall back, and bivouac at La Bavette and Dion le Mont near Wavre.
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps retired by Mont St Guibert, in rear of which Defile the latter Corps remained a considerable time as Rear Guard, while the former marched on to WAVRE, where it arrived about midday, crossed the Dyle, and took up its position at Bierge. PIRCH followed the same route, but took post on the right bank of the Dyle, between St Anne and Aisemont.
With the first glimmering of daylight the troops, which, under the command of General JAGOW, had continued in full possession of Bry and its immediate vicinity during the night, began to retire, firstly, in the direction of Sombref, and thence to Gembloux, which they reached before the arrival of THIELEMANN's Corps. After the receipt of the Order pointing out the direction of the retreat, JAGOW conducted these troops, in the course of the 17th, towards their respective Brigades.
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, whose Cavalry Brigade with half a Horse Battery, formed the Rear Guard of the line of retreat of ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, received Orders to take up a concealed position between Tilly and Gentinnes, thence to watch the movements of the Enemy; and, as soon as he found himself pressed by the latter, to fall back upon the Defile of Mont St Guibert.
THIELEMANN, who, it will be recollected, had received a message from GNEISENAU, leaving it optional with him to retire by Tilly or Gembloux, according to circumstances, decided on falling back upon the latter point; being well aware that the Enemy was in possession of the Villages of St Amand and Ligny, and of the Field of Battle to within a very short distance from Sombref.
He had collected together his widely disseminated Brigades, and drawn in his Advanced Posts; an operation which, executed in the darkness of the night, retarded his departure so much that it was two o'clock in the morning before the Reserve Artillery, which formed the head of the Column, struck into the road which at Point du Jour, leads from the Namur chaussée to Gembloux. The Rear Guard of this line of retreat, which consisted of the Ninth Infantry Brigade, under Major General BORCKE, and the Reserve Cavalry, under General HOBE, and was drawn up along the Namur road, having in its front the Fleurus chaussée, leading directly towards the Enemy, did not commence its march until after four o'clock, when the sun had risen. The main body of the Corps reached Gembloux at six o'clock in the morning.
On approaching this place, THIELEMANN learned that BÜLOW had posted the Fourth Corps about three miles in rear of Gembloux, upon the old Roman road; whereupon Major WEYRACH, Aide de Camp to Prince BLÜCHER, who had continued with THIELEMANN during the night of the 16th, set off to seek out the Field Marshal, and to report to him the position and attendant circumstances of the Third and Fourth Corps d'Armée. He soon succeeded in discovering the Prussian Head Quarters at Mélioreux, and communicated the above important information to Count GNEISENAU.
THIELEMANN gave his own Corps a halt on the other side of the town, in order that his troops might obtain rest and refreshment.
* * * * *
The Advance of BÜLOW's Corps had reached Basse Bodecée, upon the old Roman road, at nightfall of the 16th of June. Here that General became acquainted with the loss of the Battle of Ligny: whereupon he ordered the Brigades of his Corps to be posted at intervals along this road, with the exception of the Thirteenth (under Lieutenant General HAKE), which was directed to bivouac more to the rear, near Hottoment, where the same road is intersected by that which conducts from Namur to Louvain.
Both Corps remained for some hours in a state of uncertainty as to the direction to be taken for forming a junction with the First and Second Corps. THIELEMANN wrote to BÜLOW that he had received no Orders from Prince BLÜCHER, but that he presumed the retreat was upon St Trond. He also stated that he had not been followed by the Enemy, but that he had heard distant firing on the right, which he concluded was connected with the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army.
At length, about half past nine o'clock, Prince BLÜCHER's Aide de Camp, Major WEYRACH, arrived at BÜLOW's Head Quarters, and brought the Orders for the retreat of the Fourth Corps to Dion le Mont, near Wavre, by Walhain and Corbaix. The Orders also required that BÜLOW should post the main body of his Rear Guard (which consisted of the Fourteenth Brigade) at Vieux Sart; as also that he should send a Detachment, consisting of one Regiment of Cavalry, two Battalions of Infantry, and two guns of Horse Artillery, to the Defile of Mont St Guibert, to act, in the first instance as a Support to Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who was at Tilly, and then, upon the latter falling back, to act as Rear Guard in this direction. Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR was accordingly detached upon this duty with the 10th Hussars, the Fusilier Battalions of the 11th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regiment of Pomeranian Landwehr, together with two guns from the Horse Battery No. 12. The Corps itself moved directly upon Dion le Mont, and on reaching the Height near that town, on which is situated the public house of A tous vents, took up a position close to the intersection of the roads leading to Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux.
* * * * *
At two o'clock in the afternoon, THIELEMANN commenced his march upon Wavre; where the Corps arrived late in the evening, and took up its position at La Bavette, leaving the Ninth Infantry Brigade (General BORCKE) and the Cavalry Brigade of Colonel Count LOTTUM, on the right bank of the Dyle. In this position the Corps was now rejoined by Colonel MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, which had retired by Tilly; as also by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr, and the two Squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, which troops had been left at Dinant. The Squadron of the 7th Uhlans that had been detached to Onoz, also joined, but having fallen in with a superior force of the Enemy's Cavalry, had experienced a great loss. The two Squadrons of the 9th Hussars, belonging to this Corps, had not yet arrived from Ciney.
* * * * *
The Prussian Head Quarters were established, early on the 17th, at Wavre. The veteran Field Marshal, who was still suffering considerably in consequence of his fall, was obliged to seek rest the moment he arrived there, and did not quit his bed during the remainder of the day.
In the course of the forenoon, Lieutenant MASSOW, who had been despatched with a message to the Duke of WELLINGTON, returned with the one from his Grace, communicating the intention of the latter to fall back upon Waterloo and accept a battle there, provided he received the support of two Prussian Corps. (See page 264.) There was every disposition to enter into this proposal, but some degree of uncertainty existed as to whether BÜLOW's Corps would join the Army on the 17th, as also a certain misgiving respecting the Park of Ammunition of both ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, which had been directed upon Gembloux, a circumstance that excited apprehensions as to the possibility of furnishing the much needed supply of ammunition to these Corps which were at hand. In this state of uncertainty, no other resolution could be adopted than that of holding the position in front and in rear of the Dyle (with the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Corps as far forward as Mont St Guibert), until the required ammunition should be obtained; and BLÜCHER deferred replying to WELLINGTON's communication, in the hope that his Army would very soon be relieved from the unpleasant circumstances above mentioned.
* * * * *
While the Prussians were thus effecting their retreat in good order, along the cross roads of that part of the country (high road there was none), no corresponding activity manifested itself on the part of the French, whom the morning's dawn found still lying in their bivouac. Their Vedettes stood within half a mile of the Columns of THIELEMANN's Rear Guard; the retreat of which, not having commenced until after sunrise, might have been easily remarked: and had the French detached but the smallest Patrol, they could not have failed to discover the direction of that retreat--whether towards Namur or Gembloux.
It was not until after THIELEMANN had retired a sufficient distance to escape further notice that any disposition for movement occurred to disturb the perfect quietude of their repose. Then, PAJOL with a Division of his Light Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General Baron SOULT, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars, was detached in pursuit of the Prussians. He struck into the Namur road, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant General Baron TESTE's Infantry Division of LOBAU's Corps (the Sixth), followed in support, and took up a position on the Heights of Mazy.
PAJOL had not proceeded very far when he perceived a Prussian Battery retiring upon Namur, which he lost no time in capturing and forwarding to Head Quarters; where the circumstance strengthened the belief that BLÜCHER had retreated by that road. It was the Prussian Horse Battery No. 14, belonging to the Second Corps, which, having towards the end of the Battle expended every shot, had driven off the Field to procure a fresh supply of ammunition, but had not succeeded in falling in with the Reserve Ammunition Waggons. The Battery neither returned to its own Corps, nor did it comply with THIELEMANN's express Order to march upon Gembloux, but consumed much time in uselessly driving first in one direction, and then in another. It was accompanied at this moment by a Squadron of the 7th Prussian Uhlans, which the Third Corps had neglected to recall from Onoz. The Squadron retired on the approach of the French Cavalry, and escaped with a loss of 30 men; but all the guns fell into the hands of the Enemy.
PAJOL, feeling at last some reason to doubt that Namur was a point in the Prussian retreat, diverged from the high road, and proceeded to St Denis, where he was joined by TESTE's Division. A Brigade of EXCELMANS' Cavalry Corps had been detached to offer support to PAJOL, should the latter require it; but in consequence of certain information, gained upon the road, it was subsequently directed to proceed towards Gembloux, on approaching which it discovered traces of the Prussian retreat.
GROUCHY, who commanded the Right Wing of the French Army in NAPOLEON's absence, repaired early in the morning to the Emperor's Quarters at Fleurus, for instructions, according to an Order he had received to that effect on the previous evening. He was desired to wait and accompany the Emperor, who was going to visit the Field of Battle. The latter, however, did not start from Fleurus until between eight and nine o'clock, and on reaching St Amand, he examined the approaches by which this Village had been attacked the day before; then, he rode about the Field, gave directions for the care of the wounded; and, as he passed in front of different Regiments, that were falling in without arms on the ground where they were bivouacked, he was received with loud cheers. He addressed himself to nearly all the Corps, and assured them of the lively satisfaction he had felt on witnessing their conduct in the battle. Having dismounted, he conversed freely, and at great length, with GROUCHY and GÉRARD, on the state of public opinion in Paris, the different political parties, and on various other subjects quite unconnected with those military operations upon the successful issue of which depended the stability of his present power.
That NAPOLEON should have neglected to follow up the advantages which fortune had thrown in his way on the morning of the 17th of June, is quite incomprehensible. With the exception of a Prussian Picquet at Gentinnes, his whole front as far as Gembloux, was perfectly clear of an Enemy. WELLINGTON was still in position at Quatre Bras, where his Left had become exposed by the retreat of the Prussians, and in rear of which point was the Defile of Genappe. There was nothing to prevent NAPOLEON from marching directly upon that Defile; and supporting, by a vigorous attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left and Rear, a simultaneous movement against the Front by the force under NEY. Whither had fled the mighty spirit which had shone forth with such dazzling brilliancy in former Wars, and which had never displayed the energy of its powers of combination, and activity in following up successes, more eminently than in the Campaign of the previous year? When before did he omit pressing every advantage to the utmost, or neglect to seize that moment of time, in which, having defeated one portion of his Enemies, he was enabled to fall with combined force upon another? His Army was not more fatigued than was that of WELLINGTON, which had arrived at Quatre Bras by forced marches. The troops which he subsequently did lead upon that point, when it was too late, consisting chiefly of the Imperial Guard and the Sixth Corps, were comparatively fresh. The former had not been engaged at Ligny until towards the termination of the action, when they suffered scarcely any loss; the latter, which arrived later, had remained intact. The idea of forming a junction with NEY, with a view of attacking WELLINGTON, was certainly entertained; but its execution was most unaccountably and unnecessarily delayed until its intended effect could not but fall powerless upon a vigilant Enemy, fully prepared, by having improved the precious moments of time, thus lost, to detect the purpose of the movement, and to ward off the intended blow.
With an Army greatly inferior in numbers to the united forces of his adversaries, NAPOLEON's prospects of success rested exclusively upon his utmost skill and address, not only in preventing that union of force, but also in so planning, arranging, and executing his combinations, that having succeeded in defeating one opponent with a superior mass, he might then precipitate himself in like manner upon another, at the very moment when the latter might be occupied or engaged with one of his Marshals. This would have exacted of him the most untiring energy, the application of all his great resources in strategical science, a lightning-swift decision, and a daring resolution both in adopting and in executing all his movements. It was by the exercise of such powerful mental resources as these, that, unaided by a sufficiently corresponding amount of physical force, he had conducted the Campaign of 1814; but the spirit by which they were conceived, and the genius which instinctively seized the means of their execution, seemed to have abandoned him in this, his last, Campaign: a faint gleam of the old spirit was visible in its opening movements, but it was now rather a wildfire, dazzling him for a moment, on the downward path to his destiny, than the Star which had so often led him to victory. The last flash of his genius was brief, and, on the memorable plains of Fleurus, seemed to disappear, and leave him in utter darkness.
The same fatal inactivity which had marked the French Emperor's proceedings on the evening of the 15th, and during the morning of the 16th, again manifested itself upon the 17th of June: and it was not until nearly noon of this day, upon receiving a report of a reconnaissance, made in the direction of Quatre Bras, and upon learning that a considerable body of Prussians had been discovered at Gembloux, that he made any disposition for the movement of his troops, beyond the previous detaching of PAJOL's Light Cavalry in pursuit of the Prussians along the Namur road.
He now ordered the following troops to proceed to occupy a position in advance of Marbais, across the Namur road, facing Quatre Bras:--
LOBAU's Infantry Corps (the Sixth), with the exception of the Twenty First Division, under Lieutenant General TESTE, which had already been detached in support of PAJOL;
MILHAUD's Corps of Heavy Cavalry (Cuirassiers), Lieutenant General Baron SUBERVIE's Light Cavalry Brigade, from PAJOL's Corps;
the Third Light Cavalry Division (belonging to the Third Corps), under Lieutenant General Baron DOMON; and the Imperial Guard, both Cavalry and Infantry.
To Marshal GROUCHY he confided the pursuit of the Prussians, and for this purpose he placed at his disposal as great an extent of force as his limited means would admit: a force, certainly not sufficient to enable that Marshal to confront the whole Prussian Army, should the latter, after having rallied and concentrated its strength, make a stand against him, but quite so to enable him to watch its movements, and to manoeuvre so as to maintain his communication with the main Army, and, if pressed by superior numbers, to effect a junction with NAPOLEON.
The following were the troops thus detached under GROUCHY:--
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+ | |Infantry|Cavalry|Artillery|Guns| +---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+ |Third Corps, General Count VANDAMME | 14,508 | | 936 | 32| | | | | | | |Fourth Corps, General Count GÉRARD | 12,589 | 2,366 | 1,538 | 38| | | | | | | |Twenty first Division (Sixth Corps), }| | | | | | Lieutenant General Baron TESTE }| 2,316 | | 161 | 8| | | | | | | |Fourth Division (First Cavalry Corps),}| | | | | | Lieutenant General Count PAJOL }| | 1,234 | 154 | 6| | | | | | | |Second Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant }| | | | | | General Count EXCELMANS }| | 2,817 | 246 | 12| | +--------+-------+---------+----+ | | 29,413 | 6,417 | 3,035 | 96| |Deduct loss on 16th, | 3,900 | 800 | 400 | | | +--------+-------+---------+----+ | Total | 25,513 | 5,617 | 2,635 | 96| +---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
33,765 men and 96 guns.
The Seventh Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General GIRARD (belonging to the Second Corps) having suffered very severely in the Battle, was left upon the Field.
NAPOLEON's instructions to GROUCHY were extremely simple and concise: "Pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon as you come up with them, and never let them out of your sight. I am going to unite the remainder of this portion of the Army with Marshal NEY's Corps, to march against the English, and to fight them if they should hold their ground between this and the Forest of Soignies. You will communicate with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras." No particular direction was prescribed, because the Emperor was totally ignorant of the real line of the Prussian retreat. At the same time he was strongly impressed with the idea that BLÜCHER had retired upon Namur and Liege, with a view to occupy the line of the Meuse, whence he might seriously endanger the Right of the French Army, as also its main line of operation, should it advance upon Brussels.
GROUCHY did not hesitate to remark to the Emperor, that the Prussians, having commenced their retreat at ten o'clock the previous night, had gained several hours' start of the troops with which he was to follow them; that although the reports received from the Advanced Cavalry conveyed no positive information as to the direction in which the great mass of the Prussian Army had effected its retreat, appearances as yet seemed to justify the supposition that BLÜCHER had fallen back upon Namur; and that as he would thus have to pursue in a direction contrary to that which NAPOLEON was himself going to take, with very little chance of being able to prevent the execution of any dispositions the Prussians might have resolved upon when quitting the Field of Battle, he begged to be allowed to follow the Emperor in his projected movement upon Quatre Bras.
NAPOLEON declined to entertain this proposition, repeated the Order he had already given to him, adding that it rested with him (GROUCHY) to discover the route taken by the Prussians, whose defeat he was to complete by attacking them the moment he came up with them; while he himself would proceed to fight the English.
* * * * *
The Order was immediately given for the advance of the troops previously assembled near Marbais, preceded by SUBERVIE's Division of Light Cavalry, as Advanced Guard. By the time they reached Quatre Bras, which was about two o'clock, the whole of WELLINGTON's Infantry had crossed the Genappe, and was retiring along the high road to Brussels, protected by the Cavalry, which was now pressed by the French, in the manner described in the preceding Chapter.
The march of the French troops through Bry, in the direction of Quatre Bras, became known to the Prussians through Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who still held his Cavalry Brigade, even at this time, posted in rear of Tilly. Shortly afterwards, some of the French Cavalry having approached, he began to retire slowly towards Mont St Guibert, and, as he frequently formed up, in wait for the Enemy, he did not reach that point until the evening of the 17th. Here he found Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR, who had arrived with his Detachment, and had received Orders to maintain the Defile.
* * * * *
Upon the departure of NAPOLEON, GROUCHY ordered VANDAMME and GÉRARD to get their Corps under arms, and to move them, in the first instance, to the junction of the Gembloux road with that to Namur; and having subsequently received intelligence that a considerable body of Prussians had passed through the former town, he desired that those two Corps should continue their movement upon that point. In the mean time, he repaired to the Advanced Posts of EXCELMANS' Dragoons, which were by this time beyond Gembloux. It was part of this Cavalry which followed Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, on the left. They merely threw out Skirmishers against him; and, as night set in, they abandoned the pursuit in this direction.
The Corps of VANDAMME and GÉRARD did not reach Gembloux until very late in the evening. The former was posted in advance, the latter, in rear, of the town; near which also, and on the right bank of the Ormeau, was stationed the Sixth Light Cavalry Division, under General VALLIN, who succeeded to the command, upon Lieutenant General MAURIN being wounded at the Battle of Ligny. The First Brigade of Lieutenant General CHASTEL's Tenth Cavalry Division, consisting of the 4th and 12th Dragoons, under General BONNEMAIN, was pushed on to Sart à Wallain, and the 15th Dragoons (from General VINCENT's Brigade of the Ninth Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron SOULT), were detached to Perwès. From both these points, reports were sent into Gembloux that the Prussians had retired upon Wavre.
PAJOL, with his Light Cavalry and TESTE's Infantry Division, had returned from St Denis, between Namur and Gembloux, to the original position occupied by the latter in the morning, at Mazy, in the immediate vicinity of the Field of Ligny; a movement for which no satisfactory cause has ever been assigned.
The extent of information obtained by GROUCHY concerning the Prussian retreat, and the nature of the dispositions which he adopted in consequence, will be best explained by the following despatch which he addressed to the Emperor:--
"Gembloux, le 17 Juin, "Gembloux, 17th June, à dix heures du soir. at ten o'clock in the evening.
"Sire,--J'ai l'honneur de vous "Sire,--I have the honour to report rendre compte que j'occupe to you that I occupy Gembloux, Gembloux et que ma Cavalerie est à and that my Cavalry is at Sauvenières. L'Ennemi, fort d'environ Sauvenières. The Enemy, about thirty trente mille hommes, continue thousand men strong, continues his son mouvement de retraite; movement of retreat. We have seized on lui a saisi ici un parc de 400 here of his, a pen of 400 horned bêtes à cornes, des magasins et des cattle, magazines and baggage. bagages.
"Il paraît d'après tous les rapports, "It would appear according to qu'arrivés à Sauvenières, les all the reports, that, on arrival at Prussiens se sont divisés en deux Sauvenières, the Prussians divided Colonnes: l'une a dû prendre la themselves into two Columns: one route de Wavre, en passant par of which took the road to Wavre, Sart à Wallain, l'autre Colonne passing by Sart à Wallain; the paraît s'être dirigée sur Perwès. other Column would appear to have been directed on Perwès.
"On peut peutêtre en inférer "It may perhaps be inferred from qu'une portion va joindre WELLINGTON, this that one portion is going to et que le Centre, qui est l'Armée join WELLINGTON; and that the de BLÜCHER, se retire sur Liège: Centre, which is the Army of une autre Colonne avec de BLÜCHER, is retiring on Liege. l'Artillerie ayant fait son mouvement Another Column with Artillery having de retraite par Namur, le Général made its retreat by Namur, General EXCELMANS a Ordre de pousser ce EXCELMANS has the Order to push this soir six Escadrons sur Sart à Wallain evening six Squadrons on to Sart à et trois Escadrons sur Perwès. Wallain, and three Squadrons on to D'après leur rapport, si la masse Perwès. According to their report, des Prussiens se retire sur Wavre, if the mass of the Prussians is je la suivrai dans cette direction, retiring on Wavre, I shall follow afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner them in that direction, so as to Bruxelles, et de les séparer de prevent them from reaching Brussels, WELLINGTON. and to keep them separated from WELLINGTON.
"Si, au contraire, mes renseignemens "If, on the contrary, my enquiries prouvent que la principale prove that the principal Prussian force Prussienne a marche sur Perwès, force has marched on Perwès, I je me dirigerai par cette ville shall proceed by that town in à la poursuite de l'Ennemi. pursuit of the Enemy.
"Les Généraux THIELEMANN et "Generals THIELEMANN and BORSTEL faisaient partie de BORSTEL formed part of the Army l'Armée que Votre Majesté a that your Majesty defeated yesterday. battue hier; ils étaient encore ce They were still here at 10 o'clock matin à 10 heures ici, et ont this morning, and have announced annoncé que vingt mille hommes des that twenty thousand of their men leurs avaient été mis hors de combat. have been disabled. They Ils ont demande en partant asked, in leaving, the distances of les distances de Wavre, Perwès Wavre, Perwès, and Hannut. et Hannut. BLÜCHER a été BLÜCHER has been slightly wounded blessé légèrement au bras, ce qui in the arm; which, however, has not ne l'a pas empêché de continuer hindered him from continuing to à commander après s'être fait command after having his wound panser. Il n'a point passé par dressed. He has not passed by Gembloux. Gembloux.
"Je suis avec respect, de "I am with respect, Votre Majesté, "Sire, "Sire, le fidèle sujet, "The faithful subject of "Le Maréchal Comte DE "YOUR MAJESTY, GROUCHY." "Marshal Count DE GROUCHY."
Although the information conveyed in this despatch was incorrect on some points, and imperfect on others, inasmuch as it represented that Prussian Columns had retired upon Namur and Perwès, which was not the case, and gave no account of the Columns (First and Second Corps) which had retreated by Tilly and Gentinnes, still it was well calculated to satisfy NAPOLEON, that at least the spirit of his instructions had been understood by the Marshal. The latter had stated that he suspected a portion of the Prussian troops was proceeding to join WELLINGTON, and that, should he ascertain, through his Cavalry detached to Sart à Wallain and Perwès, that the great mass of the Prussians was retiring upon Wavre, it was his intention to pursue them in that direction, "so as to prevent them from reaching Brussels, and to keep them separated from WELLINGTON."
Four hours afterwards (that is, at two o'clock on the morning of the 18th) he sent off another despatch to the Emperor, reporting that he had decided on marching upon either Corbaix or Wavre.
* * * * *
The retreat of the Prussian Army, after its defeat at Ligny on the 16th of June, was conducted with great skill, and executed in very good order. By detaining THIELEMANN's Corps upon the Field of Battle until the morning of the 17th, ample security was afforded to the line of retreat by Gembloux; and by not withdrawing BÜLOW's Corps from that town until THIELEMANN drew near to it, the distance between the main bodies of these two Corps became so limited as to present the ready means of opposing their combined force to a vigorous pursuit should such be attempted.
By the evening of the 17th, the entire Prussian Army (with the exception of the Ninth and Thirteenth Brigades, and the Reserve Cavalry of the Third Corps, which arrived by six o'clock on the following morning) had assembled in the immediate vicinity of Wavre--two Corps on the right, and the remaining two Corps on the left, bank of the Dyle--in perfect order, and fully prepared to resume the offensive. Upon the two lines of retreat, the Rear Guards were well disposed at Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; where they continued during that night, and whence they retired leisurely on the following day. On the Prussian Left, Patrols were despatched towards the main road leading from Namur to Louvain. On the Right, a Detachment was sent from ZIETEN's Corps to Limale, on the left bank of the Dyle, to cover the Flank, and Patrols were pushed higher up the river, to communicate with the Post of Mont St Guibert. Major FALKENHAUSEN had been detached, during the day, to Seroulx for the purpose of reconnoitring the country in the vicinity of Genappe, and of the high road to Brussels; and he succeeded in discovering, from the wooded tracts beyond Seroulx, the advance of the French Army along the chaussée. Patrols were also detached towards Lasne, Couture, and Aywiers, to observe the Defiles along the rivulet of the Lasne.
Such were the dispositions of the defeated Prussians on the evening of the 17th, while the victorious French had not advanced beyond Gembloux. The former had fallen back, in good order, upon a line with, and a short distance from, the Anglo-Allied Army on their Right; while their opponents, though encountering no obstacle of importance, had made but little progress, and were widely diverging from, instead of closely co-operating with, the main Army from which they had been detached. These dispositions, so ably planned and so efficiently performed, were well calculated to facilitate the grand operation of the morrow, namely, BLÜCHER's flank movement to the right, to effect a junction with WELLINGTON.
The retreat to Wavre did not in any way incapacitate the Prussian Army for the resumption of actively offensive operations. With respect to its material, it so happened that the Park of Reserve Ammunition Waggons had, in the first instance, been directed upon Gembloux; and Colonel RÖHL, who superintended the Ordnance Department of the Army, sent his Aide de Camp during the night of the 16th to conduct this Reserve to Wavre; whilst he himself hastened to the latter town, for the purpose of putting the whole of the Artillery, accordingly as it arrived there, again in a fit state for action. The supply of ammunition, however, was necessarily incomplete; but in order to prevent any failure in this respect, should some mishap occur to the Park of Reserve Ammunition Waggons, a Courier was despatched to Maestricht, with directions for the speedy transport of a supply of ammunition from thence to the Army, by means of the common waggons of the country. Similar Orders were conveyed to Cologne, Wesel, and Münster: and, by way of precaution, an express was sent to Liege for the removal of the Battering Train to Maestricht; as also for the destruction, in case of danger, of the iron foundry in the Arsenal of the former place.
Fortunately, however, the Reserve Ammunition Waggons reached Wavre safely at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th. The Corps and Batteries were furnished with a complete supply of ammunition, and the Army was thus placed in a perfectly efficient state for commencing another battle. This turn of affairs was most encouraging, and BLÜCHER delayed not another moment in despatching to WELLINGTON the reply to which allusion has already been made. (See page 285.)
As regards the influence which the defeat at Ligny exercised over the morale of the Prussian Army, its injurious effects were made manifest amongst the newly raised drafts from the Rhenish and Westphalian Provinces, and from the Duchy of Berg. Of these troops, 8,000 men betook themselves to a flight which admitted of no check until they reached Liege and Aix la Chapelle. Among the Rhenish troops, particularly those from Provinces which had formerly belonged to France, there were many old French soldiers; and although several of them fought with great bravery, others evinced a bad disposition, and there were instances in which they passed over to their former companions in arms. Such, however, was not the case with the troops from the other western districts of the Prussian State: there was scarcely a single man amongst the missing, who belonged to any of the old Westphalian Provinces, Mark, Cleve, Minden, and Ravensberg, whilst several came from that of Münster.
But the morale of the great mass of the Prussian Army continued unshaken. The spirit of the troops was neither tamed nor broken; and their enthusiasm, though damped, had not been subdued. Unbounded confidence was placed in the firm decision and restless energy of their aged and venerated Chief; who, though suffering from the effects of his fall, by which his whole frame had sustained a severe shock, evinced not the slightest apprehension of fatal consequences to the Campaign resulting from this defeat. His unbending nature led him to cast aside for the moment those purely political interests and theoretically strategical principles, by which a more cautious and less enterprising Commander might have been induced to secure the line of the Meuse, and to preserve his direct communications with the Prussian States, and thus afford but a doubtful and an inefficient support to his Ally. Placing full reliance on the resources of his own mind, and on the stern, warlike character of his troops; he devoted his whole energies to the attainment of the one grand object--that of crushing NAPOLEON by combining with WELLINGTON. This confidence in himself and in his soldiers was strikingly and characteristically manifested in the concluding words of a General Order which he issued to the Army on the morning of the 17th. "I shall immediately lead you against the Enemy;--we shall beat him, because it is our duty to do so."
Towards midnight of the 17th, a communication reached BLÜCHER from General MÜFFLING (already mentioned as having been attached to the British Head Quarters) to the following effect. "The Anglo-Allied Army is posted with its Right upon Braine l'Alleud, its Centre upon Mont St Jean, and its Left near La Haye; having the Enemy in its front. The Duke awaits the attack, but calculates upon Prussian support."
This intelligence was forwarded, at midnight, to General Count BÜLOW, accompanied by the following Order:--"You will therefore, at daybreak, march with the Fourth Corps from Dion le Mont, through Wavre, taking the direction of Chapelle St Lambert, in which vicinity you will keep your force concealed as much as possible, in case the Enemy should not, by that time, be seriously engaged with the Duke of WELLINGTON; but should it be otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack upon the Enemy's Right Flank. The Second Corps will follow you as a direct Support: the First and Third Corps will also be held in readiness to move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a Detachment in observation at Mont St Guibert; which, if pressed, will gradually fall back upon Wavre. All the Baggage Train, and everything not actually required in the Field of Action, will be sent to Louvain."
Instructions, in conformity with the above, were also forwarded to the Commanders of the other Corps; and a communication of these arrangements was despatched to General MÜFFLING, with an explanation that the fatigue of the troops could not possibly admit of earlier support. This General was, at the same time, requested to forward timely intelligence of the attack upon the Duke, and of the nature of that attack, that measures might be adopted accordingly.
* * * * *
At five o'clock on the morning of the 18th, PAJOL started from Mazy, with SOULT's Cavalry Division and TESTE's Infantry Division, marching by St Denis and Grand Lez, to Tourinnes; where he was to await further Orders. At about eight o'clock, EXCELMANS' Corps of Heavy Cavalry, consisting of eight Regiments of Dragoons, was put in motion; and at nine o'clock, VANDAMME's and GÉRARD's Infantry Corps began their march along one and the same road, by Sart à Wallain, upon Wavre. The Left of this Column was protected, towards the Dyle, by the advance of MAURIN's Division of Light Cavalry, under General VALLIN.
It was about half past ten o'clock, when EXCELMANS' Advanced Guard came up with the Prussian Rear Guard, on the road to Wavre. He immediately formed his troops in position, resting their Left upon the wooded ravine near the Farm of La Plaquerie, and their Right in the direction of Neuf Sart. While his Skirmishers were engaged with those of the Enemy, he sent the Chef d'Escadron D'ESTOURMEL, to inform Marshal GROUCHY of what was going on in front, and also to make known to him that the Prussian Army had continued its retreat upon Wavre during a part of the night and that morning, for the purpose of forming a closer communication with the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces.
The march of the Third and Fourth Corps was greatly retarded by the bad state of the roads, and frequent halts were occasioned by the narrowness and miry nature of the Defiles. GÉRARD, having preceded the Column, reached Sart à Wallain at eleven o'clock, where he found GROUCHY breakfasting in the house of M. HOLLAËRT, a Notary. In about half an hour after his arrival, Colonel SIMON LORIÈRE, who was acting as his Chief of the Staff, suddenly heard, while walking in the garden of the house, a distant but violent cannonade, of which he immediately went to apprise his General. GROUCHY repaired at once to the garden, accompanied by GÉRARD, VANDAMME, EXCELMANS, and several other Officers. He immediately called for M. HOLLAËRT, and asked him in what part of the country he considered this tremendous cannonade to be going on. The latter, pointing to the Forest of Soignies, replied that it must be in the direction of Planchenoit, Mont St Jean, and that vicinity.
GÉRARD then declared his opinion to be in favour of the expediency of marching in the direction of the cannonade, in order to connect the movements of the detached force more closely with NAPOLEON's operations; and offered to lead his own Corps towards the Battle. This measure was opposed by the Marshal, as also by General BALTUS, of the Artillery, who represented the difficulties of a march in which this Arm might be compromised. On the other hand, General VALAZE, Commanding Engineer of GÉRARD's Corps, after having coincided in the opinion expressed by the latter, observed that he had three Companies of Sappers, by aid of which he could remove many obstacles. GÉRARD then gave his assurance that he could at all events move on with the gun carriages and limbers.
GROUCHY, however, stated his determination to act in conformity with his instructions; which were, to pursue and attack the Prussians, and never to lose sight of them. It had just been intimated to him that his troops had come up with a Rear Guard of the Enemy's Infantry, and he did not consider his information was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that BLÜCHER was drawn up, in expectation of being attacked by him at Wavre; or that he would continue his retreat upon Brussels; or, that if, in manoeuvring to effect his junction with WELLINGTON, he would do so in front, or in rear, of the Forest of Soignies.
He has since declared, that he did not deem it his duty to follow the counsel given by GÉRARD, but to attack the Prussians; that to effect the proposed movement with the whole of his forces would have been acting contrary to his Orders; that to have detached only a portion of those forces in the direction of the Forest of Soignies, would have been to separate the two Corps of his Army by a river, whose waters were swollen by the rain, and whose banks were swampy, and thus have rendered their mutual support impossible, however essential it might have become; finally, that a war of inspiration appertains alone to the General in Chief, and that his Lieutenants must confine themselves to that of execution. Hence the march to Wavre was continued.
Whilst proceeding to the Advanced Guard, GROUCHY received the despatch, dated from the Farm of Caillou, the 18th of June, at ten o'clock in the morning, acquainting him that the Emperor was going to attack the Anglo-Allied Army, in its position at Waterloo; desiring him to direct his movements upon Wavre in such a manner as to draw his forces nearer to those of NAPOLEON, and, especially, to keep up a close communication with the latter.
The receipt of these instructions was not followed by any immediate change in GROUCHY's dispositions. He despatched no Cavalry force--not even a single Patrol--to watch any movements that might be attempted, or actually then in course of execution, by the Prussians, towards the Field on which the Emperor had intimated to him his intention of attacking the force under WELLINGTON; and hence it is almost needless to add, that he neglected to establish that close and active communication with the main Army which was so essentially important for the accomplishment of the object of the general plan of operations, and to which NAPOLEON had especially directed his attention in the before mentioned despatch. His sole aim seemed to be a direct advance upon Wavre; and this he carried into execution without at all detaching to, or in any way manoeuvring by, his left. On the contrary, upon arriving in person at the position occupied by EXCELMANS, he desired the latter to move to his right, and take post at Dion le Mont; and the ground thus vacated was shortly afterwards taken up by VALLIN's Light Cavalry Division.
* * * * *
At daybreak of the 18th of June, BÜLOW, in conformity with the Order which he had received during the previous night from BLÜCHER, quitted his position near Dion le Mont, to march through Wavre to St Lambert. This was the commencement of the important flank movement of the Prussians in support of the Anglo-Allied Army in position in front of Waterloo; and every measure of precaution was adopted with a view to its being carried into effect with certainty and safety. The sun had not yet risen when Major WITOWSKY was despatched with a Detachment of the 2nd Silesian Hussars, to Maransart, for the purpose of closely reconnoitring the Defiles of the Lasne, which had already been patrolled the evening before, and to observe the country in front of those Defiles, in the direction of the Enemy's position. Major FALKENHAUSEN, previously mentioned as having pushed a reconnaissance beyond Seroulx on the 17th, was now directed also to reconnoitre the Lasne. Scouring parties were sent out, which kept up the communication that had been opened the previous day with Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR at Mont St Guibert: the whole country between the Dyle and the Charleroi high road was carefully explored; and correct intelligence was continually sent to the rear concerning the French Army.
By means of this vigilant look out, the Prussians secured the important advantage of retarding the communications between the French Emperor and his Marshal, since it compelled the bearer of despatches to pursue a very circuitous route.
At half past nine o'clock, on the morning of the 18th, whilst BÜLOW's Corps was on the march to St Lambert, the following additional despatch was forwarded to General MÜFFLING:--
"Wavre, 18th June 1815, at half past nine o'clock.
"I request you will say to the Duke of WELLINGTON, in my name, that even ill as I am, I shall, nevertheless, put myself at the head of my troops, for the purpose of immediately attacking the Enemy's Right Flank, should NAPOLEON undertake anything against the Duke. If, however, the day should pass over without a hostile attack, it is my opinion that we ought tomorrow, with our combined forces, to attack the French Army. I commission you to communicate this as the result of my inward conviction, and to represent to him that I consider this proposal to be the best and most suitable in our present position.
"BLÜCHER."
The Prussians very soon discovered that the French had made no disposition whatever for the protection of their Right Flank. Major WITOWSKY had proceeded as far as Maransart before he fell in with an Enemy's Patrol; and Major FALKENHAUSEN found the Defiles of the Lasne perfectly free and unobserved. Upon receiving this intelligence, BLÜCHER decided upon supporting the Anglo-Allied Army, by directing the march of his whole force, or at least of three Corps, towards the Wood of Paris, and debouching from thence upon the Flank and Rear of the Enemy; and Major LÜTZOW was immediately despatched for the purpose of narrowly watching, from the other side of the above Wood, the French movements directed against the position of the Anglo-Allied Army.
No report as yet had been received from the Rear Guard, concerning GROUCHY's advance, and as BLÜCHER's object was now to gain the Defiles of the Lasne without interruption, and to occupy in force the Wood of Paris, he determined to avail himself of the time and opportunity which offered for the projected movement. Being, however, uncertain as to the amount of GROUCHY's force, the Prince deemed it advisable that Wavre should not be abandoned until the greater part of the Army had passed the Defiles of St Lambert; and with this view, he directed that as soon as BÜLOW's Corps should have proceeded beyond Wavre, ZIETEN's Corps was to commence its march by Fromont and Ohain to join the Left Wing of WELLINGTON's Army near La Haye. PIRCH's Corps was ordered to follow BÜLOW's in the direction of St Lambert; and THIELEMANN's Corps, after retaining possession of the Defile of Wavre sufficiently long to render the general movement of the Army secure, was then gradually to follow ZIETEN's Corps upon Ohain.
An unfortunate incident occurred during the passage of BÜLOW's Corps, through Wavre, which materially impeded the march of the troops. The Advanced Guard, consisting of the Fifteenth Brigade (under General LOSTHIN), with the 2nd Silesian Hussars, and a twelve pounder Battery, had scarcely passed through the town when a fire broke out in the main street, and extended itself with great rapidity. This not only caused a suspension of the march of the main body of the Corps, but created much alarm, in consequence of the great number of ammunition waggons in the place. Every exertion was made to extinguish the fire. The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, under Major LÖWENFELD, and the 7th Pioneer Company, were ordered upon this duty; and after they had encountered considerable difficulty, their efforts were crowned with success.
In the mean time the Advanced Guard of BÜLOW's Corps had continued its march, and reached St Lambert by eleven o'clock. The Sixteenth, and then the Thirteenth, Brigade arrived much later; and the Fourteenth Brigade, which formed the Rear Guard, was a long way behind. The Advanced Guard did not wait the arrival of the other Brigades, but proceeded forthwith to cross the Defile of St Lambert. Having effected the passage, which was attended with great difficulty, in consequence of the soft and miry state of the valley, it halted in the Wood of Paris, where it continued a considerable time, waiting for the approach of the main body. Patrols, however, from the 2nd Silesian Hussars, were immediately sent forward to feel for the Anglo-Allied Left, and to reconnoitre the French Right.
ZIETEN's Corps (the First) commenced its march, upon the left bank of the Dyle, towards Ohain, about noon.
Whilst BÜLOW's Reserve Cavalry, following the Thirteenth Infantry Brigade, was passing through Wavre, French Cavalry had penetrated between the Rear Guard of this Corps, at Vieux Sart, and the Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR at Mont St Guibert. The 2nd Pomeranian, and the 1st Silesian, Landwehr Cavalry were immediately detached from the Reserve Cavalry of the Corps, to aid in checking the advance of the Enemy.
The Prussian Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR, who was still at Mont St Guibert, having received intelligence of the approach of the French, decided on commencing his retreat towards Wavre. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who had fallen back early in the morning from Mont St Guibert, sent 150 Cavalry and two guns of Horse Artillery as a reinforcement to LEDEBUR. The latter now succeeded in forming a junction with the two Cavalry Regiments detached from the Reserve, as also, subsequently, with the Cavalry Brigade under SOHR, after a slight affair with the Third French Corps (VANDAMME's), whilst making good his retreat to Auzel.
PIRCH's Corps (the Second) broke up from its position between St Anne and Aisemont, on the right bank of the Dyle, about noon, for the purpose of passing the Defile of Wavre. The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, which occupied this town, was relieved by a Battalion of the 30th Regiment, belonging to the Third Corps (THIELEMANN's). PIRCH had just put his Corps in motion, with a view to cross the Dyle by the town of Wavre, when the approach of the Enemy was announced. The Defile was crowded with the troops; the progress of their march could not be otherwise than slow; and at this moment Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, whose Brigade formed the Rear Guard of the Corps, sent in word, that the Enemy presented a force of six Regiments of Cavalry, ten pieces of Artillery, and two strong Columns of Infantry.
The Wood of Sarats, close to the Farm of Auzel, was now occupied by some Battalions of the Eighth Brigade, the command of which had devolved upon Colonel RECKOW. PIRCH placed the whole of the Rear Guard under the Orders of General BRAUSE, the Commander of the Seventh Brigade, and reinforced Lieutenant Colonel SOHR with the 11th Hussars and four pieces of Horse Artillery. BRAUSE posted the remaining Battalions of the Eighth Brigade in rear of the Wood, and the three Regiments of Cavalry on the right, with the Foot Battery No. 12 in their front. The Seventh Brigade, deployed into line, remained in reserve.
Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR retired slowly before the Enemy, and formed a junction with the Eighth Brigade, under Colonel RECKOW; who maintained his position until three o'clock in the afternoon, against the Advanced Guard of VANDAMME's Corps. Between three and four o'clock, General BRAUSE ordered the retreat. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR crossed the Bridge at the Mill of Bierge, which was occupied by two Companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; and then followed the Reserve Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps, to which his Brigade belonged, but which he did not overtake until he reached the Field of Waterloo. The Enemy did not advance with much vigour; the retreat was conducted with perfect order, and the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr, under Major KRÜGER, distinguished itself on the occasion. After the passage of the river had been effected, the 1st Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr remained at Bierge until the Bridge was destroyed and the Mill set on fire. The 11th Hussars and the 2nd Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr were posted in observation of the passages across the Dyle, and did not rejoin the Corps before the following day.
BLÜCHER had quitted Wavre before eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and repaired to the vicinity of Limale, in order to make himself acquainted with the nature of the country in the direction of St Lambert. Whilst here, he received intelligence of the approach of the Enemy towards Wavre. Colonel CLAUSEWITZ, Chief of the Staff of the Third Corps, was immediately made the bearer of an Order for THIELEMANN to defend the position at this place, in the event of the Enemy advancing in force; but, should the latter cross the Dyle higher up the stream, or not appear in great strength (a point concerning which nothing positive was then known), he was to leave only a few Battalions in position at Wavre, and to follow the main Army, with his Corps, as a Reserve, in the direction of Couture.
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GROUCHY's movements, on the 17th and 18th, form so striking a feature in the history of this Campaign, and exercised so important an influence upon the fate of the decisive Battle of Waterloo, that it becomes an essential point in the study of that history, to examine how far he complied with, and carried into effect, the instructions received from his Master, and to what degree his proceedings, consequent upon his ascertaining the direction of the Prussian retreat, coincided with the general plan and object of NAPOLEON's operations. On a reference to the account of his transactions during the 17th, given in the despatch written at ten o'clock on that night, it appears he was completely ignorant of the line by which the principal mass of the Prussian Army had retreated, namely, that of Tilly and Gentinnes, by ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, although his Cavalry had driven back the Prussian Detachment from the latter place to Mont St Guibert, but from whence it appears to have been withdrawn in the night. His attention seems to have been much less devoted to this quarter than it was to his Right, in which direction he detached as far as Perwès. The main body of his forces did not proceed further than Gembloux on the 17th, that is, about five miles from the Field of Ligny.
Upon a first consideration, we are strongly impressed by the striking contrast between this march, in pursuit of a defeated Army, which had commenced its retreat on the previous night, and which presented no check to the advance, and the march of NAPOLEON from the same Field, by Quatre Bras and Genappe, as far as La Belle Alliance, in front of the Waterloo position, a distance of about sixteen or seventeen miles; and this, too, in rear of a victorious Army, with a Cavalry Rear Guard boldly and successfully impeding the advance of its pursuers. It must, however, be taken into account, that in one most important respect NAPOLEON possessed a decided advantage over GROUCHY--an advantage, the magnitude of which increased with every moment that elapsed after the wet weather had set in; for while the former moved the whole distance along a paved high road, the latter had to proceed entirely by cross roads, which may more properly be designated common field roads. It is to this particular point that both GROUCHY and GÉRARD refer in justification of the late arrival of the Infantry at Gembloux. Nevertheless, GROUCHY detached considerably to his Right, with his Cavalry, misled by the same idea which had prevailed with NAPOLEON, that BLÜCHER had retreated upon the Meuse; and the very circumstance of his Dragoons having reached Perwès on the night of the 17th, proves that had he organised a more extended, more combined, and more energetic reconnaissance, with the sixty five Squadrons of Cavalry which had been placed under his orders, he might have connected his operations on the right of the Dyle with those of NAPOLEON on the left of that river, by occupying the line of Nil St Vincent, Corbaix, Mont St Guibert, and the Bridge of Moustier. The only check he would have experienced would have been at the Prussian Post of Mont St Guibert; which, however, in the case of an active reconnaissance, as above, might have been attacked by a strong Detachment in front, and turned by Corbaix on its left.
To show the connection which this disposition would have secured with NAPOLEON's movements, it is only necessary to state, that the Third Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General DOMON, had been detached from the Emperor's Column to reconnoitre the country between the Dyle and the high road to Brussels; and that the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs à Cheval pushed as far as the Bridge of Moustier, on which line its Skirmishers exchanged a few carabine shots with some Prussian Dragoons, who did not, however, appear willing to engage further with them. It was by means of this reconnaissance that NAPOLEON ascertained the retreat, through Tilly and Gentinnes, of the principal Prussian Column, consisting of ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, although the line by which they retired was undiscovered by GROUCHY, in whose immediate sphere of operations it was situated.
But if such good grounds exist for inferring that, on the 17th, an earlier and a clearer insight into the Enemy's movements might have been obtained by the Corps detached in pursuit of the Prussians, and that when obtained, it would have rendered the communication with the operations of the main Army on the left of the Dyle, a matter not only important in the highest degree, but also perfectly practicable; and if a failure in this respect be attributable to the absence of sufficient energy and vigour on the part of GROUCHY, how much more forcibly does it not expose the extraordinary, the unaccountable, dilatoriness of NAPOLEON himself during the whole of the precious morning of the 17th! How striking a view it unfolds of what might have been accomplished, had the bivouac at Ligny been broken up a few hours earlier! Then, WELLINGTON's Army was still between Quatre Bras and the narrow Defile of Genappe, open to an attack in front by NEY, simultaneously with one in flank by the force collected at Marbais (a part of which might have been detached across the Genappe, towards the rear of the Anglo-Allied Army, by Villers la Ville and Bousseval, masked by the Wood of Berme); and the rearmost Corps of the Prussian Army (THIELEMANN's), which was retreating through Gembloux, might have been attacked with effect, by the superior force of all Arms under GROUCHY.
As regards GROUCHY's movements during the early part of the 18th, it is very remarkable, that although he had in his despatch, written at ten o'clock the previous night, communicated to NAPOLEON his surmises of an intended junction of a portion of BLÜCHER's forces with those of WELLINGTON, and his consequent intention of following the Prussians in the direction of Wavre, afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles, et de les séparer de WELLINGTON, and although he must or ought to have been aware that Wavre was only twelve miles distant from NAPOLEON's main line of operations, whereas Gembloux was about fifteen miles distant from Wavre, he not only delayed his departure from Gembloux until between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, but manoeuvred by his right; taking the more circuitous line, through Sart à Wallain, and rendering his operations still more dilatory by moving both VANDAMME's and GERARD's Corps along one and the same road. Had he not, from want of sufficient vigilance, continued ignorant of the fact, that the principal Prussian Column, consisting of the First and Second Corps, had retired upon Wavre, at so short a distance from his left as by the line of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont St Guibert, there can be very little doubt that he would have marched upon the latter point, which the Prussians, aware of its importance, had occupied with a Rear Guard; but even with the amount of information which he possessed, and with the inference justly impressed upon his mind that a co-operation between BLÜCHER and WELLINGTON was projected, we are at a loss to account for his not having moved upon Mont St Guibert, and manoeuvred by his left.
In his despatch, written at two o'clock in the morning, he mentioned to the Emperor his design of marching upon Corbaix or Wavre; a movement of which NAPOLEON, in his reply, expressed his approval; and if he had directed one of his Infantry Corps along the line of Corbaix and La Baraque, and the other by that of Mont St Guibert and Moustier, there can be no doubt that, even late as was the hour at which he started from Gembloux, he would, in a great measure, have fulfilled the expectations of his Imperial Master. In this case, he would naturally have so divided his Cavalry, that one portion would have scoured the country along the Front and Right of the Column marching by Corbaix and La Baraque, and the other portion would have been employed in a similar manner along the Front and Left of the Column moving upon Mont St Guibert and Moustier. Both at this point and at Ottignies, about eight hundred yards lower down the stream, there is a stone bridge across the Dyle. There is a direct road from Moustier to St Lambert, scarcely five miles distant, and another to the Field of Waterloo. The Cavalry in advance of the Left Column could not have failed to discover the Prussian troops in march to join the Left of WELLINGTON; for they were then passing slowly, and with extreme difficulty, through the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne. This discovery would have led to the Right Column being moved by its left, from La Baraque to Moustier; the Cavalry attached to it masking the movement as long as possible. The Left Column would then, in all probability, have followed its advanced Cavalry to St Lambert; and the Right Corps have either moved upon the same point as a reinforcement, or have diverged upon Lasne as a Support, upon which the former might have fallen back, if compelled to effect its retreat towards Planchenoit.
In this manner might GROUCHY have so far realised the anxious expectation of NAPOLEON as to have fallen upon BÜLOW flagrante delicto, and have materially procrastinated the co-operation of BLÜCHER with WELLINGTON on the 18th of June; a co-operation which a contrary proceeding, originating in fatal tardiness of movement, and exhibiting useless manoeuvring in a false direction, could not fail to render easy in execution and successful in result. But beyond such procrastination of the meditated junction of BLÜCHER's and WELLINGTON's forces, GROUCHY could have effected nothing. The junction itself could not have been prevented. The tendency of GROUCHY's movements had been too narrowly watched; the country between the Dyle and the Charleroi road to Brussels had been too vigilantly explored; and the movements, in succession, of the different Prussian Corps had been too nicely calculated and determined; to admit of the possibility of a failure, as regarded the arrival of a considerable portion of the Prussian forces on the Left of the Anglo-Allied Army.
BLÜCHER had made so admirable a disposition of his four Corps d'Armée, that two of them could at any time have combined, and therefore have presented a superior force to GROUCHY, at any point between Wavre and Planchenoit; whilst the remainder of the Army might have continued its march to the Field of Waterloo. Had Grouchy moved by St Guibert and Moustier upon St Lambert, THIELEMANN's Corps would then have been on the march towards Couture, according to his original instructions; and finding BÜLOW engaged with the Enemy, would have joined him. GROUCHY might then have contrived to hold both these Corps at bay, and thus have reduced the co-operating Prussian force at Waterloo to the two Corps under ZIETEN and PIRCH, besides considerably retarding that co-operation; since without having experienced the effects of any such interruption to the progress of the other Corps, as we have here supposed, these two Generals did not reach the Field of Battle until seven o'clock in the evening of the 18th.
Such is the extent of the advantage which, under the circumstances, GROUCHY would have gained by a march from Gembloux upon St Lambert; a most important one, no doubt, as time for pushing the struggle with WELLINGTON, with the whole force at his immediate disposal, before the arrival of the Prussians, was of the most vital consequence to NAPOLEON; and this advantage GROUCHY entirely lost by his march upon Wavre--a march which enabled BLÜCHER to appear with three, out of his four, Corps d'Armée, on the great and decisive Field of Action; and that in sufficient time to render the victory as complete as could reasonably be desired.
No exertions, however, on the part of GROUCHY, after he broke up from Gembloux on the morning of the 18th, could have effectually frustrated the junction of WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER. Two great errors, for which that Marshal was not accountable, reduced the contemplated junction from a measure of calculation to one of certainty. The first and principal of these has already been adverted to at some length, and cannot be too closely kept in view--the fatal neglect of a vigorous pursuit of the defeated Prussians, on the night of the 16th and morning of the 17th, by a detached Corps; combined with the extraordinary delay in the attack upon WELLINGTON at Quatre Bras, on the latter day. The second error arose from the want of a strong reconnaissance and vigilant look out on the right of the main French Army, on the morning of the 18th, followed up by the occupation of the Defiles of the Lasne.
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It was nearly four o'clock when VANDAMME's Corps arrived in front of the position which THIELEMANN was in the act of quitting, with a view to follow and support the remaining three Prussian Corps that were at that moment on the march towards the Field of Waterloo; and, with a fire that was opened from the French Batteries, commenced the Battle of Wavre, which will be described in its proper place in a subsequent Chapter.
Chapter IX
It rained incessantly during the night of the 17th, occasionally in torrents; whilst loud and frequent peals of thunder fell ominously on the ear of the toil-worn soldier, startling him from the fitful slumber, which was all the rest the chill and comfortless bivouac on the Field of Waterloo could afford him in that tempestuous night.
Scarcely had the morning dawned when the numerous groups, stretched around the smouldering remains of the bivouac fires, or couched in the hollows, or lying under such slender cover as the few trees and brushwood within range of the positions of their respective Regiments afforded, were seen gradually in motion; and as the eye of an observer wandered along the space which lay between the main bodies of the hostile Armies--a space varying in no greater width than from one thousand to fifteen hundred yards--the Officers in command of the several Picquets might be seen, on either side, withdrawing their Vedettes and Sentries from the very limited and almost conversational distance that had separated them from their opponents during the night, concentrating their Detachments, and establishing their Main Posts more within the immediate range of the respective positions occupied by the grand Armies.
As the morning advanced, the dense vapoury masses which had so long rolled slowly and heavily over the plain, gradually began, as if relieved by the constant discharge of their contents, to soar into a higher region, where, during the whole day, with little or but imperceptible motion, they hung spread out into a broad expansive vault, through which the rays of the sun were unable fully to penetrate, until just at the moment of its sinking from the scene of strife, when it shed the full blaze of its setting splendour upon the victorious advance of the Anglo-Allied Army. The drying and cleaning of firearms soon became general, and the continuous discharge of muskets, at rapid and irregular intervals, fell upon the ear like the rattle of a brisk and widely extended skirmish.
All at once, the scene became more animated and exciting. Drums, bugles, and trumpets were heard over the whole Field, sounding the "Assembly"; and never was the call to arms, in either Army, responded to with greater zeal, alacrity, and cheerfulness. While the Regimental inspections, tellings off, and preparatory arrangements of detail were proceeding, Staff Officers were seen galloping in various directions; and, shortly afterwards, the different Brigades, which, by their bivouacs had but faintly and irregularly traced the Line of Battle taken up by each Army, were moved and distributed in the precise order prescribed by the illustrious Chiefs who had on that day, and for the first and only time, met to measure swords.
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The Field of Waterloo is intersected by two high roads (chaussées) conspicuous by their great width and uniformity, as also by the pavement which runs along the centre of each. These two roads, the eastern one leading from Charleroi and Genappe, and the western from Nivelles, form a junction at the Village of Mont St Jean, whence their continuance, in one main road, is directed upon the capital of Belgium.
In front of the above junction; and offering, as it were, a natural military position for the defence of this approach to Brussels, a gentle elevated ridge of ground is intersected, at right angles, by the Charleroi road, about 250 yards north of the Farm called La Haye Sainte, and follows a westerly direction until about midway between the two high roads: whence it takes a south-westerly course, and terminates abruptly at its point of intersection with the Nivelles road, about 450 yards north of Hougomont, a Country Seat, with Farm, Offices, Gardens, Orchards, and Wood. On the east side, the ridge extends itself perpendicularly from the Charleroi road until it reaches a point, distant about seven hundred yards, where, elevating itself into a Mound or Knoll, it overlooks the Hamlet of Papelotte; and thence, taking a north-easterly course, expands into an open plateau.
This ridge constituted the position of the First Line of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army, which Line is more distinctly defined by a road, entering on the east side, from Wavre, by Ohain, and winding along the summit of the ridge until it joins the Charleroi high road just above La Haye Sainte; from which point of junction a cross road proceeds along the remaining portion of the ridge, and thus connects the two high roads with each other.
The undulations of the ground in rear of this position were admirably adapted to the disposition of the Second Line and Reserves, presenting a gently inclined reverse slope along nearly the whole extent of the ridge, with fine open and convenient stations for Cavalry, perfectly concealed from the Enemy's observation.
The Right of the main position is bounded by a valley, which has its source very considerably in rear of the Centre of the French position, by which it is intersected; and thence, sweeping round the southern and western inclosures of Hougomont, proceeds in the direction of Merbe Braine. Into this valley a ravine directs its course in rear of, and parallel with, the principal portion of the Right Wing of the Anglo-Allied position, at a distance from the latter varying from 200 to 250 yards; and between this ravine, which is intersected by the Nivelles road, and Merbe Braine, rises a sort of plateau, upon which was posted a portion of the Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Lord HILL, destined to act, as circumstances might require, either in reserve to the First Line, or en potence to it in repelling any attack upon that Flank of the Anglo-Allied Army.
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Upon the extreme Left of the First or main Line was stationed VIVIAN's Light Cavalry Brigade, comprising the 10th and 18th Hussars, and the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion. The two former Regiments were in Line, in rear of the Wavre road, and withdrawn a little from the crest of the ridge: the Right of the 10th resting upon a lane, which, leading up from Smohain, crossing over the position, and descending along its reverse slope, proceeds in the direction of the Village of Verd Cocou. The 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion were also in Line, and formed in reserve. The Left of the Brigade was completely en l'air, upon high, open, and flat ground; the main ridge widening considerably in that direction, as previously explained. A Picquet, consisting of a Squadron of the 10th Hussars (under Captain TAYLOR), occupied the Village of Smohain, down in the valley which, having its source a little to the westward of La Haye Sainte, takes an easterly and therefore parallel course with that part of the ridge which formed the Left Wing of the British position. The Advanced Post of this Picquet was on the further side of the Village, and its Vedettes formed a chain on the rising ground beyond, within half-carbine shot of some French Cavalry, standing dismounted in Close Columns. A party was detached from the Picquet as a Patrol on the road to Ohain.
The Village of Smohain, as also the Farms of La Haye and Papelotte, with adjacent houses and inclosures, were occupied by a portion of the Second Brigade of PERPONCHER's Division of the troops of the Netherlands. The Regiment of Orange Nassau, consisting of two Battalions, held Smohain and La Haye: while the Farm of Papelotte was occupied by the Light Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, which, together with the 2nd Battalion of this Regiment, and four guns of Captain BYLEVELD's Dutch-Belgian Battery of Horse Artillery, were posted upon the exterior slope, immediately under the brow of the main ridge, and a little to the westward of the lane leading directly up the slope from the Farm of Papelotte.
The Advanced Posts of these troops were at the foot, and their Line of Sentries extended along the brow, of the opposite slope of the valley; this Line receded towards the western limit of the Hamlet of Papelotte, where it joined the general Line of Picquets along the bottom of the exterior slope of the position of the Anglo-Allied Left Wing.
On the right of VIVIAN's Brigade, and having its own Right resting upon a narrow lane, forming a slight hollow way, lined with hedges, stood VANDELEUR's Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the 11th, 12th, and 16th British Light Dragoons, in Columns of Squadrons, by Regiments, Left in front. The lane on which its Right rested descending the interior slope of the position, joined the other lane which led from VIVIAN's Right to Verd Cocou.
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The extreme Left of the Infantry of the main Line of the position was formed by the Fifth Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel VINCKE, belonging to PICTON's Division. It was formed in Columns of Battalions, those of Hameln and Hildesheim (under Majors STRUBE and RHEDEN) in First, and those of Peine and Gifhorn (under Major Count LUDOLPH VON WESTPHALEN, and Major HAMMERSTEIN) in Second, Line; and was posted somewhat under the crest of the ridge, upon the reverse slope, and in rear of the junction of a lane leading up from Papelotte, with the Wavre road.
On the immediate right of VINCKE's Brigade, and having its own Right upon the Knoll which presents the highest and most commanding point along the position of the Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army, the Fourth Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel BEST, was drawn up. It formed part of the Sixth Division, and was composed of the Landwehr Battalions of Lüneburg, Verden, and Osterode, which were deployed in Front Line; and of Münden, which was in reserve. A Battery of Hanoverian Foot Artillery, under Captain RETTBERG, was attached to this Brigade, and, from the peculiarly favourable circumstances of the ground, which formed a sort of natural fieldwork, was most advantageously placed.
Upon the exterior slope of that portion of the ridge which lies between the before mentioned Knoll and the Genappe high road, BYLANDT's Brigade of PERPONCHER's Division of the troops of the Netherlands was deployed in Front Line. It consisted of the 27th Battalion of Dutch Light Infantry, the 7th Battalion of the Belgian Line, and of the 5th, 7th, and 8th Battalions of Dutch Militia. Of the above, the 5th Battalion of Dutch Militia was posted in reserve, along with the remaining four guns of Captain BYLEVELD's Battery of Horse Artillery attached to this Brigade, in rear of the straggling hedge which lines the Wavre road, between the Knoll and the Charleroi high road.
Upon the interior slope of the ridge, and at a distance of about two hundred yards from the Wavre road, was posted the Ninth Brigade of British Infantry, under Major General Sir DENIS PACK, in a Line of Battalion Columns, at deploying intervals. It consisted of the 3rd Battalion 1st Royal Regiment, the 1st Battalion 42nd Royal Highlanders, 2nd Battalion 44th Regiment, and of the 92nd Highlanders. The Left Regiment, the 44th, was stationed on the Knoll, in rear of the Right of BEST's Hanoverian Brigade; and on the right of the 44th stood, in succession, the 92nd, 42nd, and 1st Royals.
Upon the right, but more in advance, of PACK's Brigade, and at a short distance in rear of the hedge along the Wavre road, stood the Eighth Brigade of British Infantry, under Major General Sir JAMES KEMPT, also in Line of Battalion Columns, at deploying intervals, and comprising the 28th Regiment, the 32nd Regiment, the 1st Battalion 79th Highlanders, and the 1st Battalion 95th Rifles. The Right of the 32nd Regiment rested upon a high bank of the Charleroi road; on its left stood the 79th Highlanders, and the 28th formed the Left Regiment of the Brigade.
In the immediate front of the Right of the Brigade, and at a distance from the Wavre road of about 120 yards, there was a Knoll having on its right a large Sand Pit, adjoining the Charleroi road; and partially facing the small Garden in rear of La Haye Sainte. On the Allied side of the Knoll was a single hedge, extending about 150 yards from the Charleroi road in a direction parallel to the Wavre road. In the Sand Pit were posted two Companies of the 1st Battalion 95th British Rifles; the Knoll and hedge were occupied by another Company of the same Regiment. These Advanced Companies had placed an abatis across the high road, near that part of it which is joined by the hedgerow. The remaining Companies lined a portion of the Wavre road, commencing from the point of its intersection with the Charleroi road.
These two Brigades, namely, the Eighth and Ninth British, together with the Fifth Hanoverian Brigade, constituted the Fifth Division, under Lieutenant General Sir THOMAS PICTON.
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Along the continuation of the ridge on the right of the great Charleroi road, the Third Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES ALTEN, was disposed in the following order:--
The Second Brigade of the King's German Legion, commanded by Colonel OMPTEDA, which formed the Left of the Division, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Light Battalions (under Lieutenant Colonel VON DEM BUSSCHE, and Major BARING), and of the 5th and 8th Line Battalions of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonels LINSINGEN and SCHRÖDER).
The 1st Light Battalion was formed in Column of Companies at quarter distance, Left in front. It stood a little in rear of the cross road which unites the great Nivelles road with that of Charleroi, on which last its Left Flank rested. To the right of this Column stood the 5th Line Battalion, formed in Column at quarter distance upon one of its centre Companies. In rear of these two Columns, and fronting the deploying interval between them, stood the 8th Line Battalion, in Second Line, in Column of Companies, at quarter distance, upon one of its centre Companies.
The 2nd Light Battalion, under the command of Major BARING, occupied the Farm of La Haye Sainte.
The buildings of this Farm are so disposed as to form three sides of a square, the north side comprising the Farm House itself, with a portion of the stabling; the west side the remainder of the stables and cow houses; and the south side principally a large Barn: a brick wall, extending along the great road, unites the north and south buildings, and thus forms the fourth boundary of the large quadrangular farm yard.
On the south, or French, side of the Farm, and down in the valley, which here separates the Allied and French positions, lies an Orchard, about 240 yards long and 80 wide, having for its eastern boundary, the great road, in direct prolongation of the wall which incloses the farm yard on that side. This Orchard is inclosed within a hedgerow; as is also a Kitchen Garden, on the north side of the Farm, excepting the boundary of the latter along the road side, which is a continuation of the eastern wall.
A large gate and a doorway, the former almost facing the east end of the Barn, and the latter quite close to the east end of the dwelling house, lead from the yard into the great road; another gate, at the south end of the stabling which forms the western side, as also a large door from the west end of the Great Barn, lead both into a small narrow portion of the Orchard, whence there is an outlet into the open fields on the right. From the front door of the dwelling house, which faces the farm yard, there is a passage to the back or north side of the house, whence a door opens into the Kitchen Garden.
Since daybreak, the little garrison, amounting to scarcely 400 men, had been busily engaged in strengthening their Post to the fullest extent of the means within their reach, which, however, were extremely limited. Among the difficulties which they had to overcome, it may be remarked that, on the preceding evening, immediately after taking possession of the Farm, the soldiers had broken up the Great Barn door, on the west side, for firewood; and that, about the same period, the Carpenters of the Regiment were detached to Hougomont, in compliance with an Order received to that effect. Unfortunately, also, the mule laden with the Regimental trenching tools had been lost the day before, so that not even a hatchet was forthcoming. Loop holes were pierced through the walls; and a barricade was thrown across the high road, in prolongation of the south wall. The Battalion was composed of six Companies, of which Major BARING posted three in the Orchard, two in the Buildings, and one in the Garden.
On the right of OMPTEDA's Brigade stood the First Hanoverian Brigade, under Major General Count KIELMANSEGGE, consisting of the Field Battalions of Bremen, Verden, Duke of York, Grubenhagen, and Lüneburg. The last mentioned Battalion was formed in Column, at quarter distance, upon one of its centre Companies; the head of the Column in line with, and at a deploying interval from, that of the Right Column of OMPTEDA's Brigade. Next, on the right, at the proper interval for deployment, stood the two Battalions Verden and Bremen, in Contiguous Columns of Companies, at quarter distance; the former Right in front, the latter Left in front. The two Battalions York and Grubenhagen were formed in Second Line, in rear of the centre of the interval between the Battalions Lüneburg and Verden, in Contiguous Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, York Right, and Grubenhagen Left, in front.
On the right of KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade, was posted the Fifth British Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir Colin HALKETT, and comprising the 2nd Battalion 30th, the 1st Battalion 33rd, 2nd Battalion 69th, and 2nd Battalion 73rd, British Regiments. Its position was more forward than that of the other portion of ALTEN's Division, with which its front was in an oblique direction, its right shoulders having been brought forward so as to preserve the parallelism between the general Line and the crest of the main ridge. The 2nd Battalions 73rd and 30th Regiments formed Contiguous Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, the former Right, the latter Left, in front; and at a deploying interval for two Battalions from the head of the Column formed by the Bremen Battalion. The other two Battalions of this Brigade, the 1st Battalion 33rd and 2nd Battalion 69th Regiments, were formed in Contiguous Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, in Second Line, and in right rear of the 73rd and 30th Regiments; the 33rd Right, and the 69th Left, in front.
In rear of the centre of the interval between the Right of KIELMANSEGGE's, and the Left of HALKETT's Brigade, was posted, in Second Line, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment of Nassau, forming part of the Nassau Brigade, commanded by Major General KRUSE. The Battalion was in Column on a central Company. The remainder of this Brigade, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the same Regiment, was formed in Contiguous Columns, in a Third Line, as a Reserve.
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On the right of HALKETT's Brigade, the First British Division, commanded by Major General COOKE, was posted. It consisted of the First and Second Brigades of Guards, and was disposed in the following manner:--
The First Brigade commanded by Major General MAITLAND, and comprising the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, formed the Left Brigade of the Division. The 3rd Battalion stood in Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, on the crest of the ridge; and between it and the head of the Right Column of HALKETT's Brigade, there was a deploying interval for one Battalion. The 2nd Battalion was placed in Right Rear of the 3rd, also in Column of Companies, at quarter distance: it was on the reverse slope, and immediately under the crest of the ridge.
The Second Brigade, comprising the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd or Coldstream Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards, and commanded by Major General Sir JOHN BYNG, was posted on the crest of the ridge, between the First Brigade and the Nivelles road. The 2nd Battalion 3rd Foot Guards was on the left, the 2nd Battalion of the Coldstream Guards on the right, and more in advance on the brow of the hill; and the disposition was such, that the four Battalions of the Division were placed en échiquier.
The Buildings of Hougomont, its Gardens and Orchards, were completely overlooked from the commanding ground occupied by the Second Brigade, which formed the Reserve to the troops therein posted, consisting (including those in the Wood) of the four Light Companies of the Division, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, a Company of Hanoverian Field Riflemen, and a Detachment of a hundred men from the Field Battalion Lüneburg of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade.
The principal dwelling house or Château of Hougomont was a substantial brick building, of a square form. Adjoining its north-east angle was the Farmer's House, the east end of which abutted on the Great Garden; and in the angle between this house and the Château was a narrow tower, of the same height as the latter, to which its interior served as a staircase. At the south-east corner of, and communicating with, the Château stood a very neat little Chapel.
On the north, or British, side of the Château, was a spacious Farm yard, bounded on the west by a large Barn and a Shed, and on the east by Cow Houses and Stabling adjoining the Garden. There was a continuation of the Stabling along the north side, and a gateway; and near the centre of the yard there was a drawwell of which the superstructure formed a dovecot.
On the south, or French, side of the Château, and inclosing the latter, was the Court yard; of which a Barn on the west, the Gardener's House, some Stables and other Offices on the south, and the Garden Wall on the east, formed the boundaries. There was a communication between the Court and the Farm yard, by means of a doorway in the small portion of wall connecting the Château with the great Barn; and through the whole length of the latter building there was also a carriage way leading from the one Court into the other. A gateway, passing through a portion of the Gardener's House, led out from the Court yard to the south, or French, side; and from this gate a narrow road conducted across the open space between the Buildings and the Wood, through which it took its course in the same direction until it gained the fields beyond the inclosures. There was also a pathway from this road, commencing at the corner of the little Garden, and traversing the Wood in the direction of the south-east angle of the general boundary of the inclosures, whence it continued towards La Belle Alliance.
The approach to Hougomont from the Nivelles road was lined, nearly as far as the Château, by fine tall elms: it conducted to the gate of the Farm yard facing the British Line; and, sweeping along the west side, it led also to the South Gate of the Court yard. On the east side of the Buildings was a large Garden, laid out with all the formality which characterises the Flemish style. It was inclosed on the south and east sides by a high brick wall, and on the north side, facing the British Line, by a hedge. Adjoining the east side of the Garden, but considerably wider and longer than the latter, was the Large Orchard, and along the north side was the smaller Orchard--the latter bounded by a hedge and hollow way, and the former inclosed within high and compact hedges, partially lined by a ditch on the inner side. A prolongation of the southern hedge of the Great Orchard formed the boundary of the Wood facing the south Garden Wall, and in the narrow space between these two boundaries was a row of apple trees, which, together with the hedge, served to conceal, in a great measure, the Garden Wall from the view of an Enemy, approaching through the Wood. There was a small Garden in front of the Gardener's house, formed by the continuation of the south Garden Wall until it met another wall issuing perpendicularly from the South Gateway leading out of the Court yard. There were two inclosures on the west side, of which one served as a Kitchen Garden.
The Wood extended in length, southwards, about 350 yards, and its greatest width was about 280 yards. It was bounded on the west by another Orchard; and on the east by two large inclosures, of which the one nearest the Great Orchard was a grass field fenced with hedges, and lined by a ditch on the inner side.
Although the site of the buildings of Hougomont was but slightly elevated above the valley, which, as already remarked, winds along the south and west inclosures, there was a gradual but uninterrupted ascent of the ground from thence as far as the eastern portion of the fence which divides the two inclosures, beyond the great Orchard; where it attained a height not much inferior to that of either the French or Allied Front Lines, between which it was centrically situated. On the south, or French, side of that hedge, the ground inclined at first gently, and then rapidly, into the valley; but on the west, throughout the extent of the Wood, and on the north of the Allied side, across the Great Orchard, the descent was everywhere very gradual.
Such was Hougomont--a decidedly important point in the Field of Battle, from its prominent position in the immediate front of the Right of the British line; and rendered ever memorable by the truly heroic and successful stand maintained throughout the day by the troops allotted for its defence.
* * * * *
From the first moment of the occupation of this Post, measures were concerted and adopted for strengthening the means of defence which it presented. During the night, the Garden Walls were pierced with numerous loopholes; and, in order to enable the men to fire down from the tops of the Walls upon their assailants, platforms constructed out of such materials as the place afforded were raised wherever the depth of the wall on the inner side rendered such a measure desirable. In many places, however, and especially on the eastern side, the ground formed embankments against the wall, sufficiently elevated to obviate the necessity of any additional aid for such purpose. The outer gates were closed up, with the exception of the one from the Farm yard, which faced the Anglo-Allied position, and which was left open in order to facilitate the communication with the latter. The different flanking fires which were offered by the relative situations of the Garden Walls, and the fences of the Orchards, Woods, and other inclosures, imparted to the Post a strength, of which, in the course of the action, due advantage was taken. In short, every precaution was adopted which the means at hand suggested for contributing to the security of the place; and the preparations that were in progress indicated, on the part of the troops stationed in this quarter, an intention to give the Enemy a warm reception, and a resolution to maintain a vigorous defence.
When, on the previous evening, the Light Companies of the Division were thrown into Hougomont, it was so arranged that those of the Second Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel MACDONELL, should occupy the Buildings and the Gardens: and that those of the First Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN, should hold the Great Orchard and the Wood; in which latter the Hanoverians and Nassauers were principally stationed.
* * * * *
The abrupt termination of the ridge along which the Allied Front Line was posted, at its point of junction with the Nivelles road, was in the direct rear of the buildings of Hougomont.
On the other side of the road, this termination presented a sudden and bold, though short, slope down into the long valley which, after sweeping by Hougomont, proceeds in the direction of Merbe Braine. A portion of the slope, including the summit, was covered with brushwood, and its base was bounded by a horse path, partially lined with a stunted hedge; forming, altogether, excellent cover for Light Infantry. On the other side of the valley, the ground ascends, at first abruptly, and then gradually, to the summit of that portion of the main ridge upon which the Left of the French Army rested; and from the point of junction of the Avenue conducting to Hougomont with the great Nivelles road, a narrow road leads directly up the opposite slope, and stretches across the ridge or plateau in the direction of Braine l'Alleud.
Along a portion of this road, principally consisting of a hollow way, were posted in advance, some Light Troops of the Anglo-Allied Army. They formed a part of the Fourth Brigade of the Fourth Division (under Colonel MITCHELL), attached to the Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Lord HILL. The Brigade consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the 14th British Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel TIDY), of the 23rd Fusiliers (under Colonel Sir HENRY ELLIS), and of the 51st British Light Infantry (under Lieutenant Colonel RICE), which troops were disposed in the following manner.
Along that portion of the Hougomont Avenue which is nearest to the Nivelles road was extended the Light Company of the 23rd Regiment. On its right was an abatis, which had been thrown across the great road; and close upon the right of this artificial obstacle, a Company of the 51st Regiment was posted. Four more Companies of this Regiment, and the Light Company of the 14th, were extended along the hollow way alluded to as stretching across the ridge, on the extreme Left of the French position. The remainder of the 51st stood in Column of Support, about two hundred yards in rear of the hollow way. The 23rd Regiment was stationed on the left of the Nivelles road, on the reverse slope, and immediately under the crest of the main ridge, in rear of the Second Brigade of Guards. The 14th Regiment was posted in Column on the southern descent from the plateau, on which was assembled the Second British Division; and from the view which it possessed of the ground occupied by the 51st, it was well placed as a Reserve to the Light Infantry. In a ravine, descending from the immediate Right of the Skirmishers of the Brigade down into the valley, was posted a Squadron of the 15th British Hussars (under Captain WODEHOUSE), from which a Picquet was detached to the right of the abatis, as also an intermediate one for keeping up the communication; and some Vedettes were thrown out to the right, having in their front a continuation of the ravine, possessing a more marked and distinct character.
* * * * *
The troops posted upon the plateau already described as situated on the west of the Nivelles road and in front of the Village of Merbe Braine, and which, together with Colonel MITCHELL's Brigade, constituted the extreme Right of the Anglo-Allied Army, under the command of Lord Hill, were available either as a Reserve to the main Line of Battle, or as a defence against any hostile attempt upon the Right Flank. They consisted of the main body of the Second Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir HENRY CLINTON. This was composed of the Third British Light Brigade, under Major General Sir FREDERICK ADAM; of the First Brigade of the King's German Legion, under Colonel DU PLAT; and of the Third Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel HALKETT.
ADAM's Brigade, consisting of the 52nd Regiment (under Colonel Sir JOHN COLBORNE), of the 71st Regiment (under Colonel REYNELL), of the 2nd Battalion of the 95th Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel NORCOTT), and two Companies of the 3rd Battalion of the latter Corps (under Lieutenant Colonel Ross), was, previous to the commencement of the Battle, posted between the Village of Merbe Braine and the Nivelles road, near where the latter is intersected by the cross road leading to Braine l'Alleud: but as soon as the first attack was made upon Hougomont (with which the Battle opened), it was advanced beyond this cross road, and stood, in Battalion Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, on the plateau; whence it overlooked the Nivelles road, and had a full view of that portion of the main Front Line to which the troops of CLINTON's Division formed a Reserve.
DU PLAT's Brigade of the King's German Legion, consisting of the 1st Line Battalion (under Major ROBERTSON), of the 2nd (under Major MÜLLER), of the 3rd (under Lieutenant Colonel WISSELL), and of the 4th (under Major REH), stood in Open Column, near the foot of the slope descending towards the Nivelles road.
HALKETT's Brigade, consisting of the Landwehr Battalions Bremervörde (under Lieutenant Colonel VON DER SCHULENBURG), Salzgitter (under Major HAMMERSTEIN), Osnabrück (under Major Count MÜNSTER), and Quackenbrück (under Major VON DEM BUSSCHE HÜNEFELD), was posted in Contiguous Close Columns of Battalions, on the north side of the plateau, near the village of Merbe Braine.
* * * * *
The Second general Line of the Anglo-Allied Army consisted entirely of Cavalry, British and German. Posted partly on the reverse slope of the main ridge, and partly in the hollows in rear, it was entirely screened from the Enemy's observation. The Brigades were formed, for the most part, by Regiments, in Close Columns of Squadrons, at deploying intervals.
Commencing from the right, near to the Nivelles road, stood the Fifth Brigade, under Major General Sir COLQUHOUN GRANT, consisting of the 7th and 15th Hussars, and of the 13th Light Dragoons (under Colonel DOHERTY.)
On the left of GRANT's Brigade was posted the Third Brigade under Major General Sir WILLIAM DÖRNBERG, consisting of the 23rd Light Dragoons, and of the 1st and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion. The Cumberland Hanoverian Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel HAKE) were attached to, and formed in rear of, this Brigade. They properly belonged to Colonel ESTORFF's Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade: as did also the Prince Regent's Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel FERDINAND Count KIELMANSEGGE), and the Bremen and Verden Hussars (under Colonel AUGUST VON DEM BUSSCHE); which Regiments were detached with the force at Hal.
Still more to the left, and in rear of the Right of ALTEN's Division, stood the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion, under Colonel Sir FREDERICK VON ARENTSSCHILDT.
Immediately on the right of the Charleroi road, and in rear of ALTEN's Division, the First or Household Brigade, under Major General Lord EDWARD SOMERSET, was drawn up. It comprised the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards (Blue), and the 1st Dragoon Guards.
On the left of the Charleroi road, and in rear of PICTON's Division, stood the Second Brigade, under Major General Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY; consisting of the 1st Dragoons (Royals), the 2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys), and the 6th Dragoons (Inniskillings).
The Fourth and Sixth Brigades, under Major Generals Sir JOHN VANDELEUR and Sir HUSSEY VIVIAN, were posted upon the extreme Left of the main Line of the position, as previously explained.
* * * * *
The Reserves consisted of the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron COLLAERT; of the Brunswick Corps, comprising both Cavalry and Infantry, the command of which, since the fall of the Duke, had devolved upon Colonel OLFERMANN; and of the Tenth British Brigade, under Major General Sir JOHN LAMBERT. The latter formed part of the Sixth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General the Hon. Sir LOWRY COLE; and had only just reached the Field, after having performed forced marches from Ghent.
COLLAERT's Division was stationed in rear of the Centre, and within the angle formed by the junction of the high roads leading from Charleroi and Nivelles. It comprised the First Brigade, commanded by Major General TRIP, and consisting of the 1st Dutch Carabiniers, the 2nd Belgian Carabiniers, and the 3rd Dutch Carabiniers; the Second Brigade, commanded by Major General GHIGNY, and consisting of the 4th Dutch Dragoons, and the 8th Belgian Hussars; and the Third Brigade, commanded by Major General VAN MERLEN, and consisting of the 5th Belgian Light Dragoons, and the 6th Dutch Hussars.
The Brunswick Corps was posted between the northern portion of the Village of Merbe Braine and the Nivelles road, on which its Left rested; and comprised the following troops:--a Regiment of Hussars, a Squadron of Lancers, the Advanced Guard Battalion (which was at this time detached to the right of Merbe Braine); a Light Infantry Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel BUTTLAR, consisting of the Guard Battalion, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Battalions; and an Infantry Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel SPECHT, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Line Battalions.
LAMBERT's Brigade was posted near the Farm of Mont St Jean; and consisted of the 4th Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel BROOKE), of the 27th Regiment (under Major HARE), and of the 40th Regiment (under Major HEYLAND).
In order to afford greater security to the Right Flank of the Anglo-Allied Army, and also to keep open the communication with the detached forces near Hal, and at Tubize, namely, the Corps of Prince FREDERICK of Orange, and the Sixth British and Sixth Hanoverian Brigades, under Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES COLVILLE; it was deemed essential to occupy the small town of Braine l'Alleud, about three quarters of a mile westward of Merbe Braine: and whence a road leads to Tubize, which is distant between eight and nine miles.
With this view, the Third Division of the Netherlands, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron CHASSÉ, was placed under the orders of General Lord HILL; a part of whose Corps, as previously explained, formed the extreme Right of the Anglo-Allied position. The First Brigade, under Colonel DITMERS, occupied the town itself. It consisted of the 35th Battalion of Belgian Light Infantry, the 2nd Battalion of the Dutch Line, and of the 4th, 6th, 17th, and 19th Battalions of Dutch Militia. The 17th Battalion, detached a little to the left, kept up the communication with CLINTON's British Division. The Second Brigade, under Major General D'AUBREMÉ, occupied a good position about half a mile in advance of Braine l'Alleud, upon a height on which stood the Farm of Vieux Foriez.
* * * * *
It was at a very early hour of the 18th, that Lieutenant Colonel TORRENS, Deputy Quartermaster General, reached Braine le Comte, and delivered to Sir CHARLES COLVILLE the Order (see page 285), for his falling back upon Hal. That General immediately put in motion his two Brigades. These consisted of the Sixth British Brigade, under Major General JOHNSTONE, and the Sixth Hanoverian Brigade, under Major General Sir JAMES LYON, accompanied by Major BROME's British Foot Battery. The remaining Brigade (the Fourth British, under Colonel MITCHELL), as also the other Foot Battery, belonging to the Fourth Division (Captain RETTBERG's Hanoverian), were on the Field of Waterloo. On reaching Tubize, COLVILLE fell in with the Advance of Prince FREDERICK's Corps: and as that was the point of junction with the road leading by Braine le Château and Braine l'Alleud to the position in front of Waterloo; he halted there, and despatched Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD, Assistant Quartermaster General to the Division, to report his proceedings to the Duke. His Grace expressed himself perfectly satisfied; and desired Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD to remain upon the Field of Waterloo, in order that he might be prepared to return to Sir CHARLES COLVILLE with any instructions which circumstances might induce the Duke to transmit to him.
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The Artillery of the Anglo-Allied Army, commanded by Colonel Sir GEORGE WOOD, was distributed in the following manner:--
On the extreme Left was a British Horse Battery[9] of six guns, under Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT GARDINER, with VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade. Upon the exterior slope of the main ridge, and above the Hamlet of Papelotte, were four guns of Captain BYLEVELD's Dutch-Belgian Horse Battery, attached to PERPONCHER's Division. The remaining four guns of this Battery were on the crest of the main ridge, in rear of that Division. On the highest point of the position of the Left Wing, and in front of the Right of BEST's Hanoverian Brigade, was posted Captain RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot Battery of six guns. In front of KEMPT's Brigade stood Major ROGERS's British Foot Battery of six guns. Major LLOYD's British, and Captain CLEEVES's King's German, Foot Batteries, of six guns each, were with ALTEN's Division. Major KUHLMANN's King's German Horse Battery, and Captain SANDHAM's British Foot Battery, of six guns each, were attached to COOKE's Division. All the above Batteries were posted in Front Line; as was also Lieutenant Colonel Sir HEW ROSS's British Horse Battery (from the Reserve), of six guns, which was posted on the height immediately in rear of La Haye Sainte, and near the intersection of the Wavre road with the Charleroi high road, in which latter two of its guns were stationed. Major SYMPHER's King's German Horse Battery, and Captain BOLTON's British Foot Battery, of six guns each, were attached to CLINTON's Division.
The remaining Horse Batteries were with the Cavalry. They were (exclusive of Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT GARDINER's already mentioned) Major BULL's of six howitzers; Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER SMITH's of six guns; Major WHINYATES's of six guns, and provided with rockets; Captain MERCER's of six guns; and Major RAMSAY's of six guns. Captain PETTER's Dutch-Belgian Horse Battery of eight guns, was attached to COLLAERT's Cavalry Division. The Dutch-Belgian Horse Battery under Captain VAN DER SMISSEN, and Foot Battery under Captain LUX, of eight guns each, were with CHASSÉ's Division at Braine l'Alleud. The Brunswick Horse Battery, under Captain HEINEMANN; and Foot Battery, under Major MOLL, of eight guns each, were with the Brunswick Corps. The British Horse Battery under Major BEANE, and Foot Battery under Captain SINCLAIR (belonging to the Sixth Division), as also the Hanoverian Foot Battery under Captain BRAUN, all three having six guns each, were in reserve near Mont St Jean.
The whole of the Batteries were engaged in the Front Line, more or less, during the course of the Battle.
* * * * *
This disposition of WELLINGTON's forces, so completely in accordance with the general features of the ground which he had selected with consummate judgment as the Field on which he was prepared to give battle to his imperial rival in the great art of war, was admirably calculated for either offensive or defensive measures. The opposite line of Heights, which the Enemy would naturally crown with the main Line of his forces, was fully within the effectual range of cannon shot; and no hostile movement could be made against any part of the position, that would remain undiscovered within the range of musketry. The formation of the ground in rear of the ridge, along the brow of which his Front Line was posted, was such as effectually to screen from the Enemy's observation any movements of the Supports and Reserves, preparatory to either a contemplated attack, or to the assembling of the necessary means of resistance at any threatened point. In rear of the main Front Line the ground was practicable for the movements of all Arms, the country was perfectly open, and the two high roads added still further to the facility of communication between the front and rear. The occupation of the Posts of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte presented important advantages in aid alike of offensive and defensive operations.
The Right Flank was rendered secure, not only by the position of CLINTON's Division, commanding the valley skirting the Village of Merbe Braine, but also by the occupation of the Town of Braine l'Alleud, whence CHASSÉ's Division could co-operate so as to render any attempt of the Enemy to turn that Flank a most hazardous experiment.
Although the Left of the main Front Line rested upon an open plain or elevated plateau, and was therefore completely en l'air: yet the Village of Smohain, the Farms of La Haye and Papelotte, together with the scattered houses and numerous enclosures on the abrupt slope descending into the valley in front, by being well garnished with Infantry, offered the means of protracted resistance; while Cavalry was at hand, on the high ground, to cover the latter if forced to retire, and to frustrate the complete development of the Enemy's disposition of attack. The latter description of force was also available in maintaining a vigilant look out for any direct flank attack; which, however, was the less to be apprehended in consequence of the preconcerted Prussian co-operation in that quarter.
* * * * *
The position also afforded ample security for a retreat. The two broad high roads uniting at a point in rear of the centre, greatly facilitated the retirement of unbroken masses upon Mont St Jean; while the Village itself, and the numerous buildings and inclosures which lined the great road as far as the Forest of Soignies, presented the ready means of securing the further retreat of those masses, which, it may be assumed, would have constituted a main Central Column.
On the right, the Villages of Merbe Braine, Le Mesnil, and L'Estraye, connected with Braine l'Alleud and with one another, as also with the Forest, by several cross roads, and intersected by numerous inclosures, were well calculated for the retirement of the extreme Right of the Army, by the advantages which they afforded for covering such retreat with Light Troops.
On the left, the ground was more open, but the distance between the position and the Forest was infinitely less, the latter stretching southward to the Village of Verd Cocou; and the troops retiring in this direction, being much closer to the high road, would have their Right in a great measure protected by the well defended retreat of the Central Column.
The Forest itself, consisting almost entirely of tall trees, unaccompanied by underwood, was passable for all Arms; it was intersected by numerous roads and lanes in every direction; and its southern extremity, adjoining the high road, was thickly skirted with houses and gardens, adding considerably to its capabilities for a vigorous stand against the further advance of an Enemy.
The retrograde march of the detached forces from Tubize and Hal upon Brussels, and their junction with the remainder of the Anglo-Allied Army in the position of Uccle, between that capital and the Forest of Soignies, will readily present itself to the minds of military men studying the dispositions and movements to which a retreat would have probably given rise; but this is a subject which, embracing as it naturally would, the consequent operations of the Prussians, opens a wide field for discussion, into which it is unnecessary to enter.
* * * * *
The general direction of the Front Line of the French Army was nearly parallel with that of the Anglo-Allies. The high road from Charleroi to Brussels, which intersected the Allied position near its Centre, also passed through the Centre of the French line. The point of this intersection was La Belle Alliance, a small Farm house and Inn; and the distance from the one position to the other, taken along the high road between these two points, was 1400 yards.
About two hundred yards in the French rear of this house is a summit, the altitude of which exceeds, by about thirteen feet, that of any point along the Anglo-Allied position. A ridge issuing from it, and extending in a north easterly direction towards Frischermont, formed the position of the Right Wing of the Front Line of the French Army.
On the west side, a road leading from the summit, descends rather rapidly as a hollow way down into and across the long valley that takes its course towards Hougomont, then ascends until it reaches another ridge, along which it winds round that Post, at a distance varying from 300 to about 440 yards, until it joins the Nivelles chaussée; and that winding road indicates pretty nearly the ground occupied by the Left Wing of the French Front Line.
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The Right Wing of this Line consisted of the First Corps d'Armée, commanded by Lieutenant General Count D'ERLON, comprising four Divisions of Infantry, and one of Light Cavalry.
Its Left Division, which was the Second, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron DONZELOT, rested its Left upon La Belle Alliance. The First Brigade of this Division, under General Baron SCHMITH, consisted of the 13th Regiment of Light Infantry and the 17th Regiment of the Line; the former comprising three, and the latter, two, Battalions. The Second Brigade, under General AULARD, consisted of the 19th and 51st Regiments of the Line, each comprising two Battalions. These Brigades were deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the right of the Second Division was the First, commanded by Lieutenant General ALIX. Its First Brigade, under General Baron QUIOT, consisted of the 54th and 55th Regiments of the Line, each comprising two Battalions. Its Second Brigade under General Baron BOURGEOIS, consisted of the 28th and 105th Regiments of the Line, each comprising two Battalions. The Brigades were deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the right of the First Division stood the Third, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron MARCOGNET. Its First Brigade, under General NOGUÈS, consisted of the 21st and 46th Regiments of the Line; and its Second Brigade, under General GRENIER, of the 25th and 45th Regiments of the Line; all four Regiments comprising two Battalions each. These two Brigades were, in like manner, deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the right of the Third Division, nearest to the extremity of the ridge, and immediately opposite the Farms of Papelotte and La Haye, was posted the Fourth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Count DURUTTE. Its First Brigade, under General Chevalier PEGOT, consisted of the 8th and 29th Regiments of the Line; and its Second Brigade, under General BRUE, of the 85th and 95th Regiments of the Line; all four Regiments comprising two Battalions each. These two Brigades were also deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
The Cavalry attached to this Corps, which was the First Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron JAQUINOT, was posted in a valley on the right of the Infantry: having in its front the Village of Smohain, which it held in observation, as also the Château of Frischermont, on the right of the valley; at the same time throwing out Patrols in the direction of Ohain. It was deployed in three Lines. Its First Brigade, under General BRUNO, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Chasseurs; and its Second Brigade, under General GOBRECHT, of the 3rd and 4th Lancers.
The Artillery attached to the Infantry Corps, consisting of five Batteries of eight guns each (including a Reserve Battery of eight twelve pounders), was ranged along the front of the different Divisions respectively; and the Battery of Horse Artillery--six guns--attached to the First Division of Cavalry, was posted on the right of the latter.
* * * * *
The Left Wing of the Front Line of the French Army was formed by the Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count REILLE, comprising three Divisions of Infantry and one of Light Cavalry.
Its Right Division, which was the Fifth, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron BACHELU, rested its Right upon La Belle Alliance, and was ranged along the descent from thence down into the valley, which, more westward, winds past Hougomont. The First Brigade of this Division, under General HUSSON, consisted of the 2nd Regiment of Light Infantry and the 61st Regiment of the Line, the former comprising two, and the latter, three, Battalions; and the Second Brigade, under General Baron CAMPY, of the 72nd and 108th Regiments of the Line, the former comprising two, and the latter, three, Battalions. The Brigades were deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the Left of the Fifth Division, and upon the Height facing the southern boundary of Hougomont, stood the Ninth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Count FOY. Its First Brigade, under General Baron GAUTHIER, consisted of the 92nd and 93rd Regiments of the Line, comprising two Battalions each. Its Second Brigade, under General Baron JAMIN, consisted of the 4th Regiment of Light Infantry, and of the 100th Regiment of the Line, each comprising three Battalions. These two Brigades were, in like manner, deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the left of the Ninth Division, and along the ridge of the western boundary of Hougomont, stood the Sixth Division, commanded by Prince JEROME NAPOLEON. Its First Brigade, under General Baron BAUDUIN, consisted of the 1st Regiment of Light Infantry and of the 3rd Regiment of the Line, the former comprising three, and the latter two, Battalions. Its Second Brigade, under General Baron SOYE, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the Line, comprising three Battalions each. These two Brigades were also deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the left of the Infantry, was posted the Light Cavalry attached to the Corps, namely, the Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron PIRÉ. Its First Brigade, under General Baron HUBERA, consisted of the 1st and 6th Chasseurs; and its Second Brigade, under General MATHIEU, of the 5th and 6th Lancers. It stood across the Nivelles high road, in three deployed Lines, rather under the crest of the ridge, on its reverse slope; and threw out Picquets in the direction of Braine l'Alleud, as also more to its left, thus keeping up a vigilant look out around this Flank of the Army.
* * * * *
The Second general Line of the French Army was formed in the following manner:--
In the Centre, close along the west side of the Charleroi high road, stood the Sixth Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count LOBAU. Only two of its Divisions, the Nineteenth and Twentieth, were present; the Twenty First was with the Army under Marshal GROUCHY. Each of the two Divisions formed a Close Column of Battalions by Grand Divisions; the head of the Column of the Nineteenth Division being distant about a hundred yards in rear of the right of the Second Corps, and an interval of about two hundred yards was preserved between the rear of the Nineteenth Division and the head of the Column of the Twentieth Division.
The former was commanded by Lieutenant General Baron SIMMER; and its First Brigade, under General Baron DE BELLAIR, consisted of the 5th and 11th Regiments of the Line, the former comprising two, the latter, three, Battalions. Its Second Brigade, under General SIMMER, consisted of the 27th and 84th Regiments of the Line, comprising two Battalions each.
The Twentieth Division was commanded by Lieutenant General Baron JEANNIN: its First Brigade, under General BONY, consisted of the 5th Regiment of Light Infantry, and of the 10th Regiment of the Line; and its Second Brigade, under General TROMELIN, of the 107th Regiment of the Line; all three Regiments comprising two Battalions each.
There were three Batteries of Foot Artillery, of eight guns each, attached to the Divisions, including one of reserve; as also a Horse Battery of six guns. They were posted on the Left Flank of the Corps.
On the right of these two Divisions of the Sixth Corps, and separated from them by the high road only, were stationed the Third Light Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron DOMON, and the Fifth Light Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron SUBERVIE (belonging to the First Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Count PAJOL). They were formed in Close Column of Regiments by Squadrons. The First Brigade of the former, under General Baron DOMMANGET, consisted of the 4th and 9th Chasseurs; and the Second Brigade, under General Baron Vinot, of the 12th Chasseurs. The First Brigade of the Fifth Division, under General Count COLBERT, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Lancers; and the Second Brigade, under General MERLIN, of the 11th Chasseurs.
The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to these two Divisions, comprising six guns each, were posted on the Right Flank of the Column.
The Right Wing of the Second French general Line was composed of the Fourth Cavalry Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count MILHAUD, which was posted on a parallel ridge, in rear of the two central Divisions of the First Infantry Corps, and distant from them about two hundred yards. It was deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
The Corps consisted of two Heavy Cavalry Divisions--the Thirteenth, commanded by Lieutenant General WATHIER ST ALPHONSE, and the Fourteenth, under Lieutenant General Baron DELORT. The First Brigade of the Thirteenth Division, under General DUBOIS, consisted of the 1st and 4th Cuirassiers; the Second, under General Baron TRAVERS, of the 7th and 12th Cuirassiers. The First Brigade of the Fourteenth Division, under General Baron FARINE, consisted of the 5th and 10th Cuirassiers; and the Second, under General Baron VIAL, of the 6th and 9th Cuirassiers.
The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to this Corps, comprising six guns each, were stationed, one in the Centre, and the other on the Left Flank.
The Left Wing of the French Second general Line, composed of the Third Cavalry Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General KELLERMANN (Count DE VALMY), was posted about two hundred yards in rear of the Centre of the Second Infantry Corps. It was deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
The Corps consisted of two Heavy Cavalry Divisions: the Eleventh, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron L'HERITIER; and the Twelfth, under Lieutenant General ROUSSEL D'HURBAL. The First Brigade of the Eleventh Division, under General Baron PICQUET, consisted of the 2nd and 7th Dragoons; and the Second, under General GNITON, of the 8th and 11th Cuirassiers. The First Brigade of the Twelfth Division, under General Baron BLANCARD, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Carabiniers; and the Second, of the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers.
The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to this Corps, comprising six guns each, were posted one upon each Flank.
* * * * *
The Third general Line, forming the Grand Reserve of the whole Line of Battle, and comprising the entire force of the Imperial Guards, Cavalry and Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant General Count DROUOT, was thus formed.
The Infantry of the Imperial Guard constituted the Centre of the Reserve. It consisted of four Regiments of Grenadiers, four Regiments of Chasseurs, two Regiments of Tirailleurs, and two Regiments of Voltigeurs; each Regiment divided into two Battalions. The 1st and 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd of Chasseurs, formed the Old Guard, under Lieutenant General Count FRIANT; the 3rd and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 3rd and 4th of Chasseurs formed the Moyenne, or Middle, Guard, under Lieutenant General Count MORAND; the four Regiments of Tirailleurs and Voltigeurs constituted the Young Guard under Lieutenant General Count DUHESME. This force was posted somewhat in advance of the Farm of Rossomme, in six Lines of four Battalions each, at a distance of twenty yards from one another, and so disposed that the Charleroi high road alone separated the two Right, from the two Left, Battalions of each Line. To each description of the Infantry of the Imperial Guard; the Old, the Middle, and the Young, Guard, two Batteries, of eight guns each, were attached. These were stationed on either Flank; and the Reserve Artillery of the Guard, consisting of twenty four guns, was posted in rear of these Lines.
The Right Wing of the Third Line, or Reserve, consisted of the Light Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Lieutenant General LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTES, namely, the Chasseurs and Lancers of the Guard. It was posted at a distance of about two hundred yards in rear of the Fourth Cavalry Corps and deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first. The two Batteries of Horse Artillery belonging to the Corps, comprising six guns each, were posted in its centre.
The Left Wing of the Third Line, or Reserve, consisted of the Heavy Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Lieutenant General Count GUYOT, namely, the Grenadiers and Dragoons of the Guard. It was stationed in rear of the Third Cavalry Corps, and deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first. Its two Batteries of Horse Artillery, comprising six guns each, were posted in the centre.
This admirable order of battle, at once grand, simple, and imposing, and presenting to its skilful designer the most ample means of sustaining, by an immediate and efficient support, any attack, from whatever point he might wish to direct it, and of possessing everywhere a respectable force at hand to oppose any attack upon himself, from whatever quarter it might be made, was no less remarkable for the regularity and precision with which the several masses, constituting thirteen distinct Columns, advanced to their destined stations, than for the unusual degree of warlike pomp and high martial bearing with which the Lines drew up in this mighty battle array. The movements throughout were executed under the cheering and spirit stirring sounds of bugles, drums, and trumpets, sending forth the long cherished national military airs of the Republic and of the Empire. The weather had cleared up a little, and to the Anglo-Allied Army, the crowning of the opposite Heights by the French Lines, with all its accompanying circumstances, presented a magnificent spectacle.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON has frequently been blamed for having thus consumed some very precious time in a mere ostentatious display of his forces. Public opinion, however, should not suffer itself to be too easily influenced by the apparent justness of such censure, and it would be ungenerous to the established renown of the French Leader not to attach due weight to the following circumstances. In the account of the Battle attributed to the Emperor's own dictation, one cause of delay in commencing offensive operations is represented to have been the soft and miry state of the ground after the excessive rain which had fallen during the night; in consequence of which it was found impossible to manoeuvre the Artillery and the Cavalry, and it was considered advisable to wait until the ground had, in some degree, resumed its natural consistency. When, therefore, the manoeuvring of these two Arms was pronounced to be practicable, though attended with some difficulty, which, however, it was added, would gradually disappear; the employment of the interval in an orderly and a deliberate formation of a well-defined order of battle, was a measure scarcely questionable at the moment, however much the subsequent course of events may have proved that it militated against the chances of success on the part of the French.
The additional impulse which this imposing spectacle was calculated to impart to the moral force of his troops, is also well worthy of consideration. His soldiers, as they contemplated the extended double Front Line of Infantry, disposed as if about to enfold the Enemy in a deadly embrace, and the fluttering of gay lance flags on either extremity, indicating that its Flanks were duly protected; as they glanced at the Second general Line, a double one of Cavalry, superbly mounted, and proudly mailed in glittering helmet and cuirass; and, as they scanned the well disposed Reserves and serried Centre; their reliance on their own strength and in the resources of their Leader was unbounded, their anticipations of success were heightened, and their eager longing for the contest was greatly augmented. And while adverting to the grand spectacle in a moral point of view, it would be well to consider whether it may not have also been designed to exert a powerful influence on that portion of the Anglo-Allied forces with which the Emperor was tampering, in the full expectation of seeing them again range themselves under his victorious Eagles: but which WELLINGTON, with judicious foresight and prompt address, broke up as a united body, and distributed among his British troops; thus securing himself against the possible enactment of a scene similar to that which so powerfully contributed to NAPOLEON's disaster on the plains of Leipzig.
But supposing it to be admitted upon these grounds that the delay of the attack, having once been determined, was judiciously and advantageously employed, we ought also to consider whether the delay itself may not have been superinduced by motives of far higher import.
Although the miry state of the ground has been put forward as the ostensible cause, can we for a moment imagine that NAPOLEON was the man to have allowed himself to be deterred by such an obstacle from commencing the attack at an earlier hour; had he, at the moment, been sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of things to foresee that the delay, together with the possibility of a lengthened contest, and of the approach of aid to the British General from the Prussian side, tended to render his situation one of extreme peril?
May we not rather be justified in inferring, that his object was to gain time for the due execution and successful development of GROUCHY's operations! The despatch which the Emperor had received from GROUCHY, dated Gembloux, 17th June, at 10 P.M. (see page 300), clearly explained that General's intentions, which were, that should the mass of the Prussian forces retire upon Wavre, he would follow them in that direction, so as to prevent them from either reaching Brussels or forming a junction with WELLINGTON; but that if, on the other hand, they should fall back upon Perwès, he would advance towards that town in pursuit of them. In the former case, NAPOLEON's delay was likely to facilitate the combined operation; because in order to prevent the junction with WELLINGTON, GROUCHY required sufficient time to throw himself between the Prussians and the Emperor: and, in the latter case, the delay would be immaterial, because then the Prussian co-operation with WELLINGTON was not to be apprehended; and the battle with the Anglo-Allied Army would have to be fought by the Emperor, unsupported by GROUCHY.
It may, perhaps, be argued that NAPOLEON, by commencing his attack much earlier, would not have been under the necessity of employing a considerable portion of his Reserve against the Prussians in defence of his Right Flank, at a time when he so urgently needed them for following up and strengthening his attacks upon the Duke of WELLINGTON's line. There existed, however, no such striking disparity, in point of numbers, between WELLINGTON's forces, and his own, as to warrant his throwing away a chance amounting, according to the information he had already received, almost to a certainty, of being enabled to bring his greatest mass to bear against each Army separately: and which would doubtless have been the case as regards the Anglo-Allied Army, had GROUCHY, by the adoption of more vigorous and energetic measures, manoeuvred in such a manner as to sufficiently impede the Prussian co-operation by posting one of his Corps so as to command the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne, and holding the other in reserve, to be employed by either the Emperor or himself, according to circumstances.
Whether NAPOLEON was really actuated by any such motives, must remain a doubtful point. These remarks, however, are offered for the consideration of those who censure him for his delay in commencing the Battle of Waterloo.
* * * * *
The strength of the Anglo-Allied Army in the Field was as follows:--
+--------------------+---------+--------+----------+-----+ | |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Artillery.|Guns.| | +---------+--------+----------+-----+ |British | 15,181 | 5,843 | 2,967 | 78 | |King's German Legion| 3,301 | 1,991 | 526 | 18 | |Hanoverians | 10,258 | 497 | 465 | 12 | |Brunswickers | 4,586 | 866 | 510 | 16 | |Nassauers | 2,880 | -- | -- | -- | |Dutch-Belgians | 13,402 | 3,205 | 1,177 | 32 | | +---------+--------+----------+-----+ | Total | 49,608 | 12,402 | 5,645 | 156 | +--------------------+---------+--------+----------+-----+
GRAND TOTAL.
Infantry 49,608 Cavalry 12,402 Artillery 5,645 ------- Total 67,655 men, and 156 guns.
* * * * *
The French Army consisted of:--
Infantry 47,579 Cavalry 13,792 Artillery 7,529 ------- Total 68,900 men, and 246 guns.
* * * * *
The martial sounds already adverted to as having accompanied the march of the French Columns into position, had scarcely been wafted towards the Anglo-Allied Army, when mounted Officers were discerned galloping along the opposite Heights, and taking up the necessary alignments; and, presently, the simultaneous flashing of bayonets over dark masses, on various points, and the roll of drums, now become more distinctly audible, announced the arrival of the heads of the Columns destined to constitute the Front Line. As this gradually developed itself, and was seen extending on either side, from La Belle Alliance, and apparently almost overlapping both Flanks of the Allies, the scene became truly imposing and highly exciting. The two Armies were now fairly in presence of each other; and their mutual observation was governed by the most intense interest, and the most scrutinizing anxiety.
In a still greater degree did these feelings actuate their Commanders, while watching each other's preparatory movements, and minutely scanning the surface of the arena on which tactical skill, habitual prowess, physical strength, and moral courage, were to decide, not alone their own, but in all probability, the fate of Europe. Apart from national interests and considerations, and viewed solely in connection with the opposite characters of the two illustrious Chiefs; the approaching contest was contemplated with anxious solicitude by the whole military world. Need this create surprise when we reflect that the struggle was one for mastery between the far famed Conqueror of Italy, and the victorious Liberator of the Peninsula; between the triumphant Vanquisher of Eastern Europe, and the bold and successful Invader of the South of France! Never was the issue of a single Battle looked forward to as involving consequences of such vast importance--of such universal influence.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 9: For the sake of uniformity, and to prevent misconception, I have adopted, throughout this work, the terms "Horse Battery" and "Foot Battery," employed in all the Continental Armies, although in the British service the distinction is better known by the terms "Troop" and "Brigade."]
Chapter X
While the preparatory dispositions, alluded to in the preceding Chapter, were in progress, NAPOLEON ordered the following despatch to be forwarded to Grouchy:--
"En avant de la Ferme "In front of the Farm de Caillou, de Caillou, le 18 Juin, 18th June, à 10 heures du matin. at 10 o'clock in the morning.
"Monsieur le Maréchal, "Monsieur Marshal,
"L'Empereur a reçu votre "The Emperor has received dernier rapport daté de Gembloux. your last report dated from Vous ne parlez à sa Majesté que des Gembloux. You only speak to His deux Colonnes Prussiennes qui ont Majesty of the two Prussian passé à Sauvenières et Sarra Walin; Columns and Sarra Walin; however qu'une troisième Colonne, qui the reports say that a third était assez forte, a passé à Gery Column, which was pretty strong, et Gentinnes, se dirrigeant sur has passed by Gery and Gentinnes, Wavres. directing itself on Wavre.
"L'Empereur me charge de vous "The Emperor charges me to prévenir, qu'en ce moment S.M. va inform you, that at this moment faire attaquer l'Armée Anglaise qui His Majesty is going to attack the a pris position à Waterloo, près de English Army which has taken up a pris position à Waterloo, près de a position at Waterloo, near the a pris position à Waterloo, près de Forest of Soignies; so His Majesty la Forêt de Soignes; ainsi S.M. desires that you would direct your désire que vous dirigiez vos movemens movements on Wavre in such a sur Wavres, afin de vous manner as you may approach us, so rapprocher de nous, vous mettre en as to put yourself in touch with rapport d'opérations et lier les the operations and to knit up the communications, poussant devant vous communications; pushing before les Corps de l'Armée Prussienne you the Corps of the Prussian qui ont pris cette direction et qui Army which has taken that auraient pu s'arrêter à Wavres, ou direction, and which may have vous devez arriver le plus tôt halted at Wavre, where you should possible. arrive at the earliest possible moment.
Vous ferez suivre les Colonnes You will cause the Enemy's Ennemies qui ont pris sur votre Columns which have taken (the droite par quelques Corps Légers, road) on your right to be afin d'observer leur mouvements followed by some Light Corps, in et ramasser leurs fuyards; instruisez order to observe their movements moi immédiatement de vos and to collect their fugitives. dispositions et de votre marche, Instruct me immediately of your ainsi que des nouvelles que vous dispositions and of your march, as avez sur les Ennemis, et ne négligez well as of the news you may have pas de lier vos communications avec of the Enemy, and do not neglect to nous; l'Empereur désire avoir très knit up your communications with souvent de vos nouvelles. us. The Emperor desires to receive news from you very frequently.
"Le Major Général "The Major General DUC DE DALMATIE." DUKE DE DALMATIA."
It will thus be seen that GROUCHY's report, despatched from Gembloux on the previous night, was well calculated to inspire the Emperor with great confidence as to the result of his present plan of operations, notwithstanding the very little progress that had hitherto been made in that quarter; and which, as already remarked, must be ascribed principally to his own inactivity during the early part of the 17th. He approved of the movement upon Wavre, in pursuit of the great mass of the Prussian Army: but at the same time expressed his desire that it should be executed in such a manner as to draw the Detached Force more within the sphere of the operations of the main French Army; and above all, he enforced the necessity of maintaining a close communication with the latter.
Some time before the Battle commenced, a Prussian Patrol reached the Village of Smohain, in which was posted the Picquet of the 10th British Hussars, under Captain TAYLOR; whom the Officer accompanying the Patrol desired to report to the Duke of WELLINGTON that General Count BÜLOW was at St Lambert, and advancing with his Corps d'Armée. Captain TAYLOR immediately despatched Lieutenant LINDSEY, of the 10th, with the intelligence to Head Quarters, as directed. The Prussian Officer was certainly ignorant of the very slow progress made by the main body of BÜLOW's Corps; and the information which he thus conveyed to the Duke, before the Battle had commenced, naturally led the latter to calculate upon a much earlier arrival of the Prussians than could possibly take place: for, in point of fact, it was only BÜLOW's Advanced Guard which had then reached St Lambert.
* * * * *
The formation of the French Lines was scarcely completed when the magnificent and animating spectacle which they presented was heightened in an extraordinary degree by the passing of the Emperor along them, attended by a numerous and brilliant Staff. The troops hailed him with loud and fervent acclamations. There was depicted on their brows a deep rooted confidence in his ability, with such an Army, to chain victory to the car in which he had already advanced in triumph to within a few miles of the capital of Belgium. They exulted in the idea that they were now fairly ranged in battle array, under the Chief of their choice, and the idol of their devotion, against the Army of that nation which of all others had proved the most inveterate and the most enduring in its hostility to France; a nation which had not only by its wealth cemented and held together the great European league which had once precipitated that idol from the throne, but had also flung into the scale her own native strength and valour, by which the Fleets of the Empire had been destroyed, its Armies driven out of the Peninsula, and the sceptres of Spain and Portugal wrested from its grasp. They appeared as if excited by the assurance, that the hour had arrived in which the disasters of the Nile and Trafalgar, of Salamanca and Vittoria, were to be cast into the dark shade of oblivion, by the dazzling splendour of the triumph about to be achieved.
Never throughout the whole of his career had NAPOLEON received from his soldiers more unequivocal demonstrations of attachment to his person, of unlimited confidence in his power, of complete devotion to his cause, and of absolute submission to his will, than were manifested in this short and fatal Campaign by which that career was terminated. With an Army thus animated by one sentiment, and presenting in appearance and material all that his practised eye could desire, it may readily be conceived that he fully participated in the general confidence of a signal victory.
* * * * *
WELLINGTON's dispositions remained as previously described. Shortly before the action commenced, he rode down to Hougomont, and, proceeding by the Lane which crosses the Wood in the direction of La Belle Alliance, remained a few minutes at the point where the Lane reaches the eastern boundary of the Wood. Having made his observations upon that portion of the Enemy's Line which came under his view, he ordered the Light Companies of the British Guards that were in the Wood to be relieved by the Nassau Battalion and the Hanoverian Light Infantry. The former were then withdrawn to the Great Orchard, where the Light Companies of the First Brigade remained, while those of the Second Brigade moved on, along the rear of the inclosures, to the Lane which passes between the right of the Buildings and the Kitchen Garden, and leads into the Wood on that side.
The Duke next rode up to the high ground on the Nivelles road, unaccompanied by his Staff, to reconnoitre the Enemy's Left. He then rode along to the Left of his own Line as far as La Haye. When the action began, he was in front of the Left of the First Brigade of Guards.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON, having completed the inspection of his troops, proceeded to take up his own station upon the Height in rear of La Belle Alliance, which afforded him a commanding view of the whole Field. The Infantry Brigades speedily formed Lines of Battalion Columns respectively. The state of the ground was reported practicable for the movements of Artillery. All was in perfect readiness.
The anxiously looked for moment had now arrived.
The Emperor sent an Order to REILLE to begin the Battle by an attack upon Hougomont; and it was about half past eleven o'clock when, from the right of Prince JEROME's Division, a Column, advancing towards the south-western boundary of the Wood, rapidly extended itself into a strong line of Skirmishers. As they approached the Wood, a few straggling shots from behind the outermost trees and hedges gave warning that the defenders were prepared for resistance, and announced to both Armies that the Battle had actually commenced. The French, hastening their advance to obtain a better view of their opponents, began to single them out; and the shots from both sides, quickening in succession, speedily increased into a brisk and well sustained fire of musketry.
JEROME's supporting Columns had not advanced far when the Duke of WELLINGTON, with his Staff, galloped up to the spot on which the Coldstream Guards were formed; and having directed his glass upon the French Columns, the guns of Captain SANDHAM's Foot Battery, attached to COOKE's Division, were ordered to the front. They instantly unlimbered and opened the cannonade from the Anglo-Allied position. The first discharge was from a howitzer, the shell of which burst over the head of a Column moving towards the Hougomont inclosures. The shots from the remaining guns in succession also took effect; and the Battery was soon in full play. It was immediately followed up by an equally well directed fire from Captain CLEEVES's Foot Battery of the German Legion, in front of ALTEN's Division.
The Batteries of REILLE's Corps now opened in their turn, to draw off the fire from their Columns. NAPOLEON sent an Order to KELLERMANN to push forward his twelve pieces of Horse Artillery into the Front Line, facing Hougomont. The intervals between the reports from the guns on either side rapidly diminished: in a brief space of time no intervals could be distinguished; and the cannonade, increasing in violence every moment, now thundered forth in one continual roar.
"----deep throated engines belch'd, whose roar Imbowel'd with outrageous noise the air."
The French Columns, as they moved towards Hougomont, were twice checked by the fire from the British Batteries; which, having been given with remarkable precision, appeared to cause considerable loss and disorder among them. At length they effected their advance. The French Skirmishers, followed by fresh Supports, had, in the mean time, made good their entrance into the Wood; and such was the boldness of their advance that they soon drove the Nassau Battalion and Hanoverian Riflemen before them. They were also pushing forward in considerable force across the inclosures adjoining the left of the Wood.
At this moment, WELLINGTON gave Orders, in person, to Major BULL's British Howitzer Horse Battery, which had just been drawn up on that part of the main ridge which was immediately in rear of the Great Orchard of Hougomont, to dislodge the Enemy's Infantry from those inclosures by means of shells. This service, which, considering the proximity of the Allied troops in the Wood, was of a very delicate nature, was executed with admirable skill, and attended with the desired effect. The Enemy was forced to abandon the fields in front of the Great Orchard; from which the Light Companies of the First Brigade of Guards now moved on, as did also those of the Second Brigade, from the Lane and Kitchen Garden on the right, to relieve the Nassauers and Hanoverians in the Wood. They dashed forward with the most determined resolution, blazing away in the very faces of their opponents, whose further advance they completely checked; and then gallantly pressing on, they gradually succeeded in clearing the Wood of the French Skirmishers.
With the exception of the cannonade maintained between the French Left and the Anglo-Allied Right Wing, and which was gradually extending towards the opposite extremities of the hostile Lines, the action was as yet confined to the Post of Hougomont.
About this time, a body of French Cavalry, issuing from the low ground near Papelotte, approached that part of the Anglo-Allied Left Wing which was occupied by BEST's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade, and Captain RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot Battery. It was a strong reconnaissance, made by the French to ascertain whether the summit on which the above Battery was posted had really been intrenched, its appearance, as viewed from the opposite Heights, having induced a supposition that such was the case. BEST, expecting to be attacked, immediately formed his Brigade into Battalion Squares; but the French Cavalry speedily retired.
JEROME now moved down fresh Columns to reinforce his Skirmishers. They were directed more against the Allied Right of the Wood, while a part of FOY's Division was ordered to support the attack by a simultaneous advance against the front. The descent of JEROME's troops was observed from the position of the extreme Right of the Allied Second Line, which afforded a partial view up the valley on that side of Hougomont. Two guns were therefore detached, under Captain NAPIER, from Captain BOLTON's Battery, to open a fire upon the advancing Columns; but they were instantly cannonaded by the Batteries on the French Extreme Left, particularly by the Horse Battery of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, on the Height intersected by the Nivelles road. The remaining guns of the Battery were brought into action, as were also those of Major SYMPHER's Hanoverian Horse Battery; and a vigorous fire was now maintained against both the attacking troops and the French guns. Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER SMITH, whose British Horse Battery was also with CLINTON's Division, but lower down the slope, commenced firing up the valley, across the Nivelles road, at one of JEROME's Columns; but on ascertaining that the latter was somewhat beyond the effectual range of his six pounders, he detached an Officer to the right of the Front Line in rear of Hougomont, to discover whether a more commanding position could be obtained for his Battery on that part of the Field.
In the mean time, JEROME's Skirmishers, having been very strongly reinforced, renewed their attack upon the Wood, in conjunction with FOY's Infantry on their right. The Light Companies of the British Guards presented a stout and desperate resistance, but were forced to yield to an overwhelming superiority of numbers. Retiring from tree to tree, and frequently hazarding a bold and obstinate stand, by which they suffered most severely, they at length withdrew from the unavailing contest: those of the Coldstream and 3rd Regiment seeking shelter partly in the Lane adjoining the right of the Château, and partly behind a Haystack which fronted the Wood near the south-west angle of the buildings; while those of the 1st Regiment fell back into the Great Orchard, on the left.
The French Skirmishers, finding themselves relieved for the moment from any immediate pressure upon their front, now rapidly advanced towards the Buildings and Garden. The hedge which lined the Wood on this side appeared to them, as it gradually presented itself to their view, to form also the boundary of the Great Garden. In the full confidence that this important post was now within their grasp, they rushed forward at the pas de charge to force an entrance. They were instantly and fatally undeceived. A deadly fire bursting forth from the loop holes and platforms along the Garden Wall, which was parallel to, and about thirty yards distant from, the hedge, laid prostrate the leading Files. Those which came up in rapid succession were staggered by the sudden and unexpected appearance of this little fortress. Not venturing upon an escalade, they were forced to take advantage of such cover as was afforded by the hedge and trees; whence they kept up a popping fire, though at fearful odds, with opponents so well concealed by the wall, as also by a row of apple trees which ran along its exterior.
The French Infantry were pushing forward through the Wood in support of this attack, when Major BULL's Horse Battery recommenced its fire; and a shower of howitzer shells fell amongst them, causing the greatest destruction and confusion in their ranks.
Again the defenders dashed forward from the Flanks, and regained a considerable portion of the Wood; whereupon Major BULL ceased firing in that direction, and pointed his guns on strong Columns of French Infantry in support, which he succeeded in causing to retrograde; notwithstanding the very galling fire to which he was himself at that time exposed, not only from the Batteries in his front, but also from PIRÉ's Horse Battery on the French Height adjoining the Nivelles road, by which his own Battery was completely enfiladed.
The French that were in the Wood having rallied, and obtained a vast preponderance of force, now advanced in a most determined manner against the Light Infantry of the British Guards, and compelled the latter to retire to their former posts on the Flanks of the Château and Gardens. At the same time, JEROME's Light Troops were advancing rapidly, and in great force, against the right of the Buildings. That portion of the Light Companies of the Coldstream and 3rd Regiment of Guards which was outside the Farm made a gallant stand, under cover of the Haystack, and from the Lane before mentioned. The Haystack itself was set on fire by the French in one of their attacks, and was now in full blaze. These Guardsmen held their ground with the greatest bravery until they saw themselves completely outflanked, and in danger of being cut off from all retreat.
They then hastily withdrew into the great Court Yard by the Gate which faces the Allied position; and which they instantly closed and endeavoured to block up with ladders, posts, barrows, or whatever was nearest at hand. The French, however, succeeded in forcing the Gate; but the defenders betook themselves to the nearest cover, whence they poured a fire upon the intruders, and then rushing forward, a struggle ensued which was distinguished by the most intrepid courage on both sides. At length, Lieutenant Colonel MACDONELL, Captain WYNDHAM, Ensigns GOOCH and HERVEY, and Sergeant GRAHAM, of the Coldstream Guards, by dint of great personal strength and exertions, combined with extraordinary bravery and perseverance, succeeded in closing the Gate against their assailants. Those of the latter who had entered the Court Yard fell a sacrifice to their undaunted and conspicuous gallantry.
The remainder of the French Skirmishers, passing on by the Left and to the Rear of Hougomont, and, crossing the Avenue leading to it from the Nivelles road, and the adjacent rivulet, spread themselves over some broken ground partially covered with brushwood. They were now immediately under the position to which Lieutenant Colonel SMITH had moved his Battery from its former station on the other side of the Nivelles road, and which was in front of the Extreme Right of the First Line of the Anglo-Allied Army. This Battery had just been hotly engaged with, and had suffered severely from, the Horse Battery posted in front of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Brigade; which had previously directed its fire upon BULL's guns, and which maintained the cannonade with Lieutenant Colonel SMITH's Battery for the purpose of covering the advance of these Light Troops. SMITH had succeeded in silencing the fire of his opponent; when the French Skirmishers, taking advantage of both the broken ground and the high corn beyond it, suddenly opened upon his Battery a popping fire so destructive in its effects, that in a few moments several of the Gunners and horses were killed, and so much damage was sustained by the limbers, that it became absolutely necessary to withdraw the guns into a little hollow way that led from the rear of the Battery into the Nivelles road, and in which it remained some time for the purpose of refitting and getting into order.
This daring onset of the French Skirmishers was checked by the advance of four Companies of the Coldstream Regiment of Guards, under Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD. They then fell back to the wall of the Farm yard, near which they collected a considerable force, when Colonel WOODFORD charged them. They gave way immediately, and withdrew from the contest; which afforded Colonel WOODFORD an opportunity of entering the Farm with a part of the reinforcement by the side door in the Lane. The remainder of the detached force occupied the inclosures between the Château and the Nivelles road.
During this advance of the French Skirmishers against the extreme Right of the Allied Front Line, the troops which formed their Support attempted again to force open the rear Gate of Hougomont. The individuals before mentioned as having closed the Gate, were, at the time, occupied in rendering it more secure by placing against it some pieces of ash timber that lay in the yard. The French failing in their endeavours to push in the Gate, a brave Grenadier volunteered to climb over and open it from the inside. Captain WYNDHAM, on perceiving the latter at the top of the gate, instantly desired Sergeant GRAHAM, whose musket he was holding whilst the latter was bringing forward another piece of timber, to drop the wood, take his firelock, and shoot the intruder. The Order was instantly obeyed; and the intrepid assailant, who, for any useful result, ought to have been accompanied by a score of his comrades, fell beneath GRAHAM's deadly aim. It was at this moment that the French Skirmishers who had advanced against the main position, were falling back upon their Support; and the whole of these troops were driven off by the advance of the four Companies of the Coldstream Guards, detached from the main position, as previously described.
In the mean time, the French Infantry in the Wood, finding their advance against the Garden so suddenly checked, endeavoured to turn it by its Left. With this view they were debouching through a large gap in the fence, forming an outlet from the Wood into the Orchard; when Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN, seizing the favourable opportunity, made a most gallant charge upon the head of the Column with the Light Companies of the First Brigade of Guards, and succeeded in driving the Enemy back into the Wood.
Shortly afterwards, a large body of the Enemy's Light Troops began to advance stealthily along the eastern hedge of the Hougomont inclosures, communicating at the same time with the Infantry in the Wood on their Left. This was immediately followed by a direct front attack upon the Orchard; which compelled Lord SALTOUN gradually to withdraw his greatly reduced force, from tree to tree, until he reached the hollow way in rear of that inclosure.
The Light Troops in front of ALTEN's Division, having perceived the French creeping along the hedge so as to turn the Left Flank of Hougomont, were on the point of forming to oppose them; but on the latter being pointed out to the Prince of ORANGE, who had just come to the front to make his observations, he coolly remarked:--"No, don't stir--the Duke is sure to see that movement, and will take some step to counteract it." He had scarcely spoken, when two Companies of the 3rd Regiment of British Guards, detached from the Allied Line, were seen advancing along the same hedge, in an opposite direction, to meet them.
Lord SALTOUN being thus reinforced upon his Left, and the French Skirmishers in his front having become exposed to a sharp flanking fire from the Guards lining the eastern Garden Wall, he resumed the offensive; cleared the Orchard of the Enemy, and reoccupied its front hedge: while the Detachment on the Left drove the French along the outer hedge, and down into the hollow whence they had debouched; and then joined the troops in the Great Orchard. The front Hedge of the Orchard, the front Wall of the Garden, with the Lane and Avenue on the right, constituted at this time the Outer Line of the defence of Hougomont.
* * * * *
During the progress of the contest of Hougomont, NEY had been occupied in making his preparatory dispositions for carrying into execution NAPOLEON's intended grand attack upon the Centre and Left of the Anglo-Allied line. The troops destined for this service consisted of the whole of D'ERLON's Corps d'Armée, and of ROUSSEL's Division of KELLERMANN's Cavalry Corps. Their advance was to be covered and supported by no less than ten Batteries, which were now brought forward and posted along a ridge that intervened between the French Right and the Allied Left Wing, affording the guns a range of from six hundred to eight hundred yards of the Duke's Line. These Batteries consisted of the three twelve-pounder Batteries of the First, Second, and Sixth Corps, drawn up with their Left close upon the Charleroi road; of the four Divisional Foot Batteries; of the Horse Battery belonging to JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry Brigade; and of the two Horse Batteries of MILHAUD's Corps of Cuirassiers, which stood in Second Line, in rear of D'ERLON's Corps--altogether seventy four guns.
This imposing force of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, exclusive of the ample Cavalry Reserves at hand, was not more than commensurate with the importance of the object which NAPOLEON had in view. His aim was not only to turn the Allied Left, but also to force the Centre of the position; and, by gaining possession of the Farms of La Haye Sainte and Mont St Jean, to cut off WELLINGTON's main line of communication by the high road to Brussels, and, at the same time, to prevent any contemplated junction of the Prussian and Anglo-Allied Armies.
This appeared to him preferable to any plan of operation against the Allied Right, where the skilful dispositions made by the Duke would require such a plan to embrace the attack and repulse of the troops occupying Braine l'Alleud, and the Post of Vieux Foriez, as well as the forcing of the position, en potence, held by Lord HILL; a consideration which, combined with a knowledge of the existence of a considerable body of Allied troops near Hal, and the fear of allowing himself to be induced into too great an extension of his own force towards his Left, caused him to resign all idea of attempting any movement of importance in that quarter.
He felt, moreover, that even a successful attack upon the Right would, in all probability, induce the Duke to fall back upon the Prussians; and thus effect that junction which it was his great object to frustrate: whereas, an attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left, which was not so strong, if successful, held out to him the prospect of his being enabled, by aid of the presumed vigorous co-operation on the part of GROUCHY, and the momentarily expected arrival of a portion of that Marshal's forces on his own Right, to defeat both Armies in detail.
The Batteries had been regularly posted and fully prepared for action, and the Infantry Columns had advanced to the inner brow of the intervening ridge, when NEY sent word to the Emperor that the preliminary arrangements were completed, and that he only waited His Majesty's Orders to commence the attack. NAPOLEON immediately took a general view of the Field of Battle, and continuing his observations beyond his Right, in order to discover, if possible, any indication of the approach either of GROUCHY or of a hostile force, he perceived in the direction of St Lambert an indistinct mass, having the appearance of a body of troops; and pointing out the object to SOULT, who was near him at the time, asked his opinion; whereupon the Marshal observed, that he really conceived it to be a Column on the march, and that there was great reason to believe it was a Detachment from GROUCHY. All the Staff directed their telescopes upon the point indicated; and, as the atmosphere was not very clear, different opinions were entertained: some asserting that what had been taken for troops were trees; others that they were Columns in position; whilst several agreed with SOULT, that they were troops on the march.
In this state of uncertainty and suspense, the Emperor sent for General DOMON, and desired him to proceed instantly with a strong reconnoitring party to the right, and procure correct intelligence; to put himself quickly in communication with the troops approaching from St Lambert; to effect a junction with them, if they belonged to Marshal GROUCHY, and to impede their advance if they proved to be Enemies. At the same time, the two Light Cavalry Divisions of DOMON and SUBERVIE proceeded some distance in the direction of the Wood of Paris; and were then drawn up en potence to the Right of the French Army.
Not long after DOMON's departure, NAPOLEON's impatience to ascertain the precise character of the distant Column was relieved by the arrival of an Officer of Chasseurs with a Prussian Hussar, who had just been taken prisoner; and who was the bearer of a letter, addressed by the Prussian General BÜLOW to the Duke of WELLINGTON, to acquaint the latter with his arrival at St Lambert. The prisoner stated that the Column which was perceptible in the vicinity of this Village, was the Advanced Guard of BÜLOW's Corps, which had not been engaged at Ligny; that he had been in the morning at Wavre; that the three other Prussian Corps were stationed close to that town, and had passed the previous night there, without perceiving any indication of an Enemy in their front; and that a Patrol of his own Regiment had advanced, during the night, as far as two leagues from Wavre without encountering any body of French troops.
SOULT who had just at that moment written the following letter to GROUCHY, in reply to his Second Report from Gembloux, immediately added a postscript, referring to the above intelligence, and sent off the despatch, accompanied by the intercepted communication and the Hussar's report.
"Du champ de Bataille "On the Field of Battle de Waterloo, le 18, à at Waterloo, the 18th, at une heure après midi. one o'clock in the afternoon.
"Monsieur le Maréchal, "Monsieur Marshal,
"Vous avez écrit ce matin, à "You wrote at two o'clock this deux heures, à l'Empereur que vous morning to the Emperor that you marcheriez sur Sart à Wallain; would march on Sart à Wallain; donc votre projet était de vous consequently your plan was to porter à Corbaix ou à Wavres: ce proceed to Corbaix or to Wavre. This mouvement est conforme aux movement is in accordance with the dispositions qui vous ont été dispositions which have been communiquées: cependant l'Empereur communicated to you: however the m'ordonne de vous dire que vous Emperor orders me to say to you devez toujours manoeuvrer dans that you ought always to manoeuvre notre direction; c'est à vous à voir in our direction. It is for you to le point où nous sommes pour vous consider our present position in régler en conséquence et pour lier order to guide yourself accordingly, nos communications, ainsi que pour and to knit up our communications être toujours en mesure pour in such a way as to be always tomber sur quelques troupes within limits to fall upon some Ennemies qui chercheraient à inquiéter of the Enemy's troops which would notre Droite, et les écraser. endeavour to annoy our Right, and En ce moment la bataille est engagée to crush them. At this moment sur la ligna de Waterloo. the Battle has commenced on the Le Centre de l'Armée Anglaise est line of Waterloo. The Centre of the à Mont Saint Jean, ainsi manoeuvrez English Army is at Mont St Jean, pour joindre notre Droite. so manoeuvre to join our Right.
"Le Duc DE DALMATIE. "The Duke of DALMATIA.
"P.S.--Une lettre qu'on vient "P.S.--A letter which has just d'intercepter porte que le Général been intercepted states that General BÜLOW doit attaquer notre Flanc. BÜLOW is about to attack our Flank. Nous croyons apercevoir ce Corps We believe we see this Corps on sur les Hauteurs de Saint Lambert; the Heights of Saint Lambert; ainsi ne perdez pas un instant pour therefore lose not an instant in vous rapprocher de nous et nous coming nearer to us and joining us, joindre, et pour écraser BÜLOW and in crushing BÜLOW whom you que vous prendrez en flagrant délit." will take in the very act."
The above letter is of much historical importance. Although conveying NAPOLEON's approval of GROUCHY's movement upon either Corbaix or Wavre, it clearly indicates the commencement of that anxiety and uneasiness of mind which the Emperor experienced through the fear of even the possibility of a want of just conception on the part of the Marshal, of the true spirit in which the combination of his movements with those of the main Army should be carried on. He draws the Marshal's attention to the necessity of his manoeuvring so as to prevent the execution of any hostile design against the Right Flank of the main Army, which is then engaged with WELLINGTON's forces, and names Mont St Jean, the Centre of the Duke's position, as a guiding point. This anxiety was naturally augmented very considerably by the discovery of BÜLOW's troops, and the postscript accordingly enjoins still more urgently the necessity of a close and active co-operation.
Very shortly after the Officer who was the bearer of this despatch had started, a message was sent in by General DOMON to the effect that his Scouts had fallen in with Detachments from the Enemy in the direction of St Lambert; and that he had just sent out Patrols towards other points to obtain intelligence of Marshal GROUCHY, and to communicate with him, if practicable.
It is to be observed, however, that the troops discovered by the French Cavalry did not belong to BÜLOW's main body, but merely to his Advanced Guard. The former was the mass first seen from La Belle Alliance, when it was moving across the Heights of St Lambert, on the right or opposite bank of the Lasne; but as explained in a preceding Chapter, it encountered great obstruction and much delay during its march towards the Field: whilst the latter, awaiting its arrival, rested concealed in the Wood of Paris, near Lasne.
Thus it appears that both Commanders were deceived as to the proximity of any considerable body of Prussians at this period of the day. Nevertheless, the conviction of such a proximity, while it imparted increased confidence to WELLINGTON, in regard to the speedy execution of the plan of combined operation which he had preconcerted with BLÜCHER, compelled NAPOLEON to employ additional vigilance and circumspection upon his Right Flank.
Great, however, as was the necessity for such vigilance; the measures that were adopted were lamentably deficient in energy, vigour, and judgement. Considering that the main body of BÜLOW's Corps was on the point of entering the Defile of St Lambert, in which it had to overcome the greatest difficulties; it appears unaccountable that the Officer employed in reconnoitring and patroling beyond the extreme Right of the French Army should not have urged the occupation of the Wood of Paris with a detached body of Infantry, with a view to impede BÜLOW's advance, and compel him to take a more circuitous route. In this manner the Prussian co-operation might have been so far obstructed or delayed as to secure to NAPOLEON the power of advancing against WELLINGTON with almost the entire of his force; and of thus, perhaps, accomplishing his grand object of defeating both Armies in detail.
No disposition of this kind was made; but, in place of it, DOMON's and SUBERVIE's Light Cavalry Divisions were moved to the right, en potence to the Front Line, their Picquets not extending beyond the plateau in front of the Wood of Paris. Whether this culpable neglect arose from the want of due penetration and foresight on the part of General DOMON; or from this Officer having been instructed not to act as if in command of a detached Corps, but only to take up a position, within a prescribed distance, en potence to the general Front Line; or, from an over confident expectation on the part of NAPOLEON of approaching aid from GROUCHY; are points not easily determined: but there can be no doubt that the error of not occupying the Wood of Paris with a strong body of Infantry, flanked and supported by the Cavalry, was fatal to the development of NAPOLEON's original design. One Infantry Division, combined with Domon's and SUBERVIE's Cavalry Divisions, would have sufficed for obstructing the debouching of BÜLOW's Corps from the almost impassable Defile of St Lambert; and compelling it to move by its right, into the line of march of ZIETEN's Corps, which did not reach the field before seven o'clock in the evening. To move by its left, along the deep and miry valley of the Lasne, would have been impracticable so long as the Wood of Paris and its vicinity continued to be occupied by the French.
In short, the importance of seizing upon the means that presented themselves for materially retarding, if not of completely frustrating, the co-operation of the principal portion of the Prussian forces, was of so vital a nature, that the French Emperor would have been justified in detaching the whole of LOBAU's Corps, along with the Cavalry already mentioned, under an experienced and enterprising General, such as LOBAU himself, to operate against the Prussians whilst these were occupied in passing the Defiles which led to his Right Flank. None of those troops were engaged with the Anglo-Allied Army during any part of the day; so that, without diminishing the numbers actually opposed to the latter, they might have been detached in the manner suggested: instead of remaining, as was the case, drawn up en potence on the immediate Field of Action, to be attacked by the Prussians, who were permitted to pass the Defiles without interruption, to collect their forces under cover of the Wood of Paris, to debouch from the latter successively and at their leisure, and to organise their movements of attack in perfect security, and with the most systematic order and regularity.