X. AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY…

X. AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

WE hold an agent responsible not only for his intention, but for any known concomitant of his act, as also for any such unknown concomitant of it as we attribute to want of due attention. But for anything which he could not be aware of he is not responsible. Hence certain classes of agents--animals, children, idiots, madmen--are totally or partially exempted from moral blame and legal punishment.

Though animals are undoubtedly capable of acting, we do not regard them as proper objects of moral indignation. The reason for this is not merely the very limited scope of their volitions and their inability to foresee consequences of their acts, since these considerations could only restrict their responsibility within correspondingly narrow limits. Their total irresponsibility rests on the presumption that they are incapable of recognising any act of theirs as right or wrong. If the concomitant of an act is imputable to the agent only in so far as he could know it, it is obvious that no act is wrong which the agent could not know to be wrong.

It is a familiar fact that, by discipline, we may teach domesticated animals to live up to a certain standard of behaviour, but this by no means implies that we awake in them moral feelings. When some writers credit dogs and apes with a conscience,[1] we must remember that an {250} observer's inference is not the same as an observed fact.[2] It seems that the so-called conscience in animals is nothing more than an association in the animal's mind between the performance of a given act and the occurrence of certain consequences, together with a fear of those consequences.[3]

[Footnote 1: Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 352. Perty, Seelenleben der Thiere, p. 67. Brehm, From North Pole to Equator, p. 298.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence, p. 399.]

[Footnote 3: Cf. ibid. p. 405.]

The following is one of the most striking instances of what Professor Romanes regards as "conscience" in animals; it refers to a terrier which had never, even in its puppyhood, been known to steal, but on the contrary used to make an excellent guard to protect property from other animals, servants, and so forth, even though these were his best friends. "Nevertheless," says Professor Romanes, "on one occasion he was very hungry, and in the room where I was reading and he was sitting, there was, within easy reach, a savoury mutton chop. I was greatly surprised to see him stealthily remove this chop and take it under a sofa. However, I pretended not to observe what had occurred, and waited to see what would happen next. For fully a quarter of an hour this terrier remained under the sofa without making a sound, but doubtless enduring an agony of contending feelings. Eventually, however, conscience came off victorious, for emerging from his place of concealment and carrying in his mouth the stolen chop, he came across the room and laid the tempting morsel at my feet. The moment he dropped the stolen property he bolted again under the sofa, and from this retreat no coaxing could charm him for several hours afterwards. Moreover, when during that time he was spoken to or patted, he always turned away his head in a ludicrously conscience-stricken manner. Altogether I do not think it would be possible to imagine a more satisfactory exhibition of conscience by an animal than this; for . . . the particular animal in question was never beaten in its life." The author then adds in a note that "mere dread of punishment cannot even be suspected to have been the motive principle of action."[4] It may be so, if by punishment be understood the infliction of physical pain. But it can hardly be doubted that the terrier suspected his master to be displeased with his behaviour, and the dread of displeasure or reproof may certainly have been the sole reason for his bringing back the stolen food. Among {251} "high-life" dogs, as Professor Romanes himself observes, "wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of producing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain."[5] But fear of the anticipated consequences of an act, even when mixed with shame, is not the same as the moral feeling of remorse. There is no indication that the terrier felt that his act was wrong, in the strict sense of the word.

[Footnote 4: Romanes, 'Conscience in Animals,' in Quarterly Journal of Science, xiii. 156 sq.]

[Footnote 5: Idem, Animal Intelligence, p. 439.]

However, though most of us, on due reflection, would deny that animals are proper objects of moral censure, there is a general tendency to deal with them as if they were. The dog or the horse that obstinately refuses to submit to its master's will arouses a feeling of resentment which almost claims to be righteous; and the shock given to public feeling by some atrocious deed committed by a beast calls for retribution. As Adam Smith observes, "the dog that bites, the ox that gores, are both of them punished. If they have been the causes of the death of any person, neither the public, nor the relations of the slain, can be satisfied, unless they are put to death in their turn: nor is this merely for the security of the living, but, in some measure, to revenge the injury of the dead."[6]

[Footnote 6: Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 137.]

If thus our own resentment towards an animal which has caused some injury, when not duly tempered by reason, often comes near actual indignation, it is not surprising to find that, at the lower stages of human civilisation, animals are deliberately treated as responsible agents. The American Indian who eats the vermin which molest him defends his action by arguing that, as the animal has first bitten him, he is only retaliating the injury on the injurer.[7] The custom of blood-revenge is often extended to the animal world. The Kukis, says Mr. Macrae, "are of a most vindictive disposition; blood must always be shed for blood; if a tiger kills {252} any of them, near a Parah [or village], the whole tribe is up in arms, and goes in pursuit of the animal; when if he is killed, the family of the deceased gives a feast of his flesh, in revenge of his having killed their relation. And should the tribe fail to destroy the tiger, in this first general pursuit of him, the family of the deceased must still continue the chase; for until they have killed either this, or some other tiger, and have given a feast of his flesh, they are in disgrace in the Parah, and not associated with by the rest of the inhabitants. In like manner, if a tiger destroys one of a hunting party, or of a party of warriors, on an hostile excursion, neither the one nor the other (whatever their success may have been) can return to the Parah, without being disgraced, unless they kill the tiger."[8] Of the Sea Dyaks we are told that they will not willingly take part in capturing an alligator, unless the alligator has first destroyed one of themselves; "for why, say they, should they commit an act of aggression, when he and his kindred can so easily repay them? But should the alligator take a human life, revenge becomes a sacred duty of the living relatives, who will trap the man-eater in the spirit of an officer of justice pursuing a criminal. . . . The man-eating alligator is supposed to be pursued by a righteous Nemesis; and whenever one is caught, they have a profound conviction that it must be the guilty one, or his accomplice, for no innocent leviathan could be permitted by the fates to be caught by man."[9] So, also, the Malagasy will never kill a crocodile, except in retaliation for one of their friends or neighbours who has been destroyed by a crocodile. "They believe that the wanton destruction of one of these reptiles will be followed by the loss of human life, in accordance with the principle of lex talionis. The inhabitants living in the neighbourhood of the lake Itàsy, to the west of the central province, are accustomed to make a yearly proclamation {253} to the crocodiles, warning them that they shall revenge the death of some of their friends by killing as many voày in return, and warning the well-disposed crocodiles to keep out of the way, as they have no quarrel with them, but only with their evil-minded relatives who have taken human life."[10]

[Footnote 7: Harmon, Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America, p. 327. Southey, History of Brazil, i. 223. Cf. Bastian, Der Mensch in der Geschichte, iii. 25.]

[Footnote 8: Macrae, 'Account of the Kookies,' in Asiatick Researches, vii. 189.]

[Footnote 9: Perham, 'Sea Dyak Religion,' in Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. 10, p. 221 sq. Cf. Frazer, Golden Bough, ii. 390.]

[Footnote 10: Sibree, The Great African Island, p. 269.]

Animals are not only exposed to the blood-feud, but are often exposed to regular punishment. This is the case among the Mambettu in Central Africa. Casati mentions the following instance:--"A goat was chased and persecuted by a dog, and in the fight for self-defence the latter received a thrust from the goat's horn. The poor dog, which was the valuable property of a powerful man, died shortly after. This serious matter was much discussed and commented upon, and finally referred to the king for judgment. The poor goat was sentenced to be slaughtered before its victim's corpse, its flesh was served to the Mambettu [that is, people of the superior race], and that of the dog to the Mege [that is, people of the conquered race]."[11] Among the Maori, according to Polack, the crime of impiety is not confined to man only, but even a pig straying over a sacred place incurs the punishment of death.[12] In Muhammedan East Africa, some time ago, a dog was publicly scourged for having entered a mosque.[13] The Bogos kill a bull or cow which causes the death of a man.[14] According to the native code of Malacca, if a buffalo or a head of cattle "be tied in the forest, in a place where people are not in the habit of passing, and there gore anybody to death, it shall be put to death"; but the owner of the animal shall not be held liable.[15] According to Hebrew law, "if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten"; and, in the case of sexual intercourse {254} between a man, or woman, and a beast, not only the human offender, but the beast, is to be put to death.[16] It is prescribed in the Vendîdâd that, if a mad dog which bites without barking, smite a sheep or wound a man, "the dog shall pay for the wound of the wounded as for wilful murder."[17] Plato had undoubtedly borrowed from Attic custom or law the idea which underlies the following regulation in his 'Laws':--"If a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsman of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsman appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the borders."[18] In various European countries animals have been judicially sentenced to death, and publicly executed, in retribution for injuries inflicted by them. Advocates were assigned to defend the accused animals, and the whole proceedings, trial, sentence, and execution, were conducted with all the strictest formalities of justice.[19] These proceedings seem to have been particularly common from the end of the thirteenth till the seventeenth century; the last case in France occurred as late as 1845.[20] Not only domestic animals, but even wild ones, were thus put on trial.[21] "In 1565 the Arlesians asked for the expulsion of the grasshoppers. The case came before the Tribunal de l'Officialité, and Maître Marin was assigned to the insects as counsel. He defended his clients with much zeal. Since the accused had been created, he argued that they were justified in eating what was necessary to them. The opposite counsel cited the serpent in the Garden of Eden, and sundry other animals {255} mentioned in Scripture, as having incurred severe penalties. The grasshoppers got the worst of it, and were ordered to quit the territory, with a threat of anathematisation from the altar, to be repeated till the last of them had obeyed the sentence of the honourable court."[22] From an earlier period we have records of maledictions and excommunications of vermin and obnoxious insects. In 1120, a bishop of Laon is reported to have excommunicated the caterpillars which were ravaging his diocese, with the same formula as that employed the previous year by the Council of Rheims in cursing the priests who persisted in marrying in spite of the canons.[23] Such maledictions and excommunications, however, were probably regarded rather as magical means of expulsion than as punishments.[24] Not long ago, when swarms of locusts ravaged the gardens of Tangier, the Shereef of Wazzan expelled the injurious animals by spitting into the mouth of one of them.

[Footnote 11: Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria, i. 176.]

[Footnote 12: Polack, Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders, i. 240.]

[Footnote 13: von Amira, Thierstrafen und Thierprocesse, p. 30.]

[Footnote 14: Munzinger, Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos, p. 83.]

[Footnote 15: Newbold, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, ii. 257.]

[Footnote 16: Exodus, xxi. 28 sq. Leviticus, xx. 15 sq.]

[Footnote 17: Vendîdâd, xiii. 31. Cf. ibid. xiii. 32 sqq.; Yasts, xxiv. 44.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Leges, ix. 873.]

[Footnote 19: Chambers, Book of Days, i. 127. Pertile, 'Gli animali in giudizio,' in Atti del R. Instituto Veneto, ser. vi. vol. iv. 139. ]

[Footnote 20: von Amira, Thierstrafen, pp. 2, 15, 16, 28 sq. In England such proceedings seem to have hardly occurred at all (ibid. p. 15), but, as we shall see, an animal which caused the death of a man was forfeited as deodand.]

[Footnote 21: See Chambers, op. cit. i. 127 sq.]

[Footnote 22: Marlinengo-Cesaresco, Essays in the Study of Folk-Songs, p. 183 sq.]

[Footnote 23: Desmaze, Les pénalités anciennes, p. 31 sq.]

[Footnote 24: This is the opinion of von Amira, who, however--as it seems to me, without sufficient evidence--suggests that the maledictions did not refer to ordinary animals, but to human souls or devils in disguise (Thierstrafen, p. 16 sqq.).]

It has been suggested that the mediæval practice of punishing animals after human fashion was derived from the Mosaic law.[25] But this hypothesis does not account for the comparatively late appearance of the practice, nor for the fact that, in some cases, other punishments short of death were inflicted upon offending beasts.[26] It seems much more probable that the procedure in question developed out of an ancient European custom, to which it stood in the relationship of punishment to revenge.[27] According to the customs or laws of various so-called Aryan peoples--Greeks,[28] Romans,[29] Teutons,[30] Celts,[31] Slavs,[32]--an {256} animal which did some serious damage, especially if it caused the death of a man, was to be given up to the injured party, or his family, obviously in order that it might be retaliated upon.[33] According to the Welsh Laws, "that is the only case in which the murderer is to be given up for his deed."[34] The fact that afterwards, in the later Middle Ages, this form of reprisal was in certain instances transformed into regular punishment, only implies that the principle according to which punishment succeeded vengeance in the case of human crimes was, by way of analogy, extended to injuries committed by animals.

[Footnote 25: Ibid. pp. 4, 47 sqq.]

[Footnote 26: Pertile, loc. cit. p. 148.]

[Footnote 27: Cf. Brunner, Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und französischen Rechtes, p. 517 sqq.]

[Footnote 28: Plutarch, Vita Solonis, 24. Xenophon, Historiæ Græcæ, ii. 4. 41.]

[Footnote 29: Institutiones, iv. 9. Digesta, ix. 1.]

[Footnote 30: Lex Salica (cod. i.), 36. Lex Ripuariorum, 46. Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer, p. 664 sqq. Brunner, Forschungen, p. 513 sqq.]

[Footnote 31: Ancient Laws of Ireland, i. 161; iv. 177, 179, 181. Welsh Laws, iv. i. 17 (Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, p. 391).]

[Footnote 32: Macieiowski, Slavische Rechtsgeschichte, iv. 333.]

[Footnote 33: See Lex Wisigothorum, viii. 4. 20; Schwabenspiegel, Landrechtbuch, 204; Dirksen, Civilistische Abhandlungen, i. 104; von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts, i. 123; Hepp, Die Zurechnung auf dem Gebiete des Civilrechts, p. 103; Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer, p. 664; Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, ii. 556; Idem, Forschungen, p. 513.]

[Footnote 34: Welsh Laws, iv. 1. 17 (Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, p. 391).]

There has been considerable diversity of opinion concerning the purpose of inflicting punishments upon animals. Some writers suggest that it was possibly done with a view to deterring other animals from committing similar injuries.[35] According to others, the animal was executed in order that the hateful act should be forgotten; Gratian, referring to St. Augustine,[36] says, "Non propter culpam, sed propter memoriam facti pecus occiditur, ad quod mulier accesserit."[37] A theory which has gained much adherence explains the punishment as a symbolic act, performed for the purpose of inspiring horror of the crime into the minds of men.[38] M. Thonissen maintains that, at Athens, "on frappait l'animal auteur d'un homicide, afin que le peuple, en voyant périr un être privé de raison, conçut une grande horreur pour l'effusion du sang humain."[39] It has also been supposed that the animal was punished with intention to intimidate those {257} who were responsible for its acts,[40] or that it was killed because it was dangerous.[41] But the true solution of the problem seems simple enough. The animal had to suffer on account of the indignation it aroused. It was regarded as responsible for its deed.[42] In early records the punishment is frequently spoken of as an act of "justice";[43] and the protests of Beaumanoir and others against this opinion[44] only show that it was held in good earnest, if not by all, at least by many. From certain details we can also see how closely the responsibility ascribed to animals resembled the responsibility of men. In some of the texts of the Salic law the animal is spoken of as "auctor criminis."[45] In an ancient Irish law-tract it is said that, when a bee has blinded a person's eye, the whole hive "shall pay the fine," and "the many become accountable for the crime of one, although they all have not attacked."[46] Youth was a ground for acquittal, as appears from a case which occurred at Lavegny in 1457, when a sow and her six young ones were tried on a charge of their having murdered and partly eaten a child: whilst the sow, being found guilty, was condemned to death, the young pigs were acquitted on account of their youth and the bad example of their mother.[47] In Burgundy, a distinction was made between a mischievous dog that entered a room through an open door and one that committed a burglary; the latter was a larron, and was to be punished as such.[48] The repetition of a crime aggravated the punishment;[49] {258} and the animal "principal" was punished more severely than the "accessories.[50]

[Footnote 35: Leibniz, Essais de Theodicée, p. 182 sq. Lessona, quoted by d'Addosio, Bestie delinquenti, p. 145.]

[Footnote 36: St. Augustine, Quæstiones in Leviticum, 74 (ad Lev. xx. 16): "Nam pecora inde credendum est jussa interfici, quia tali flagitio contaminata, indignam refricant facti memoriam" (Migne, Patrologiæ cursus, xxxiv. 709).]

[Footnote 37: Gratian, Decretum, ii. 15. 1. 4. Cf. Mishna, fol. 54, quoted by Rabbinowicz, Législation criminelle du Talmud, p. 116.]

[Footnote 38: Ayrault, Des procès faicts au cadaver, aux cendres, à la mémoire, aux bestes brutes, fol. 24. Ortolan, Éléments du droit pénal, p. 188. Tissot, Le droit pénal, i. 19 sq.]

[Footnote 39: Thonissen, Le droit pénal de la république Athénienne, p. 414.]

[Footnote 40: Du Boys, quoted by d'Addosio, op. cit. p. 139.]

[Footnote 41: Lessona, quoted ibid. p. 145.]

[Footnote 42: Cf. Post, Die Grundlagen des Rechts, p. 359; Friedrichs, 'Mensch und Person,' in Das Ausland, 1891, pp. 300, 315; and, especially, d'Addosio, op. cit. p. 146 sqq.: "Nel medioevo si punì l'animale perchè lo si ritenne in certo modo conscio delle sue azioni, in certo modo libero, in certo modo responsabile."]

[Footnote 43: von Amira. op. cit. p. 9.]

[Footnote 44: Beaumanoir, Les coutumes du Beauvoisis, lxix. 6, vol. ii. 485 sq. Chambers, op. cit. i. 127. Lichtenberg, Vermischte Schriften, iv. 481.]

[Footnote 45: Lex Salica, edited by Hessels, coll. 209-212, 215.]

[Footnote 46: Ancient Laws of Ireland, iv. 179.]

[Footnote 47: Chambers, op. cit. i. 128.]

[Footnote 48: Ancien Coutumier de Bourgogne, 23 (Revue historique de droit français et étranger, iii. 549): "Il deust hauoir faire justice del larron."]

[Footnote 49: Pertile, loc. cit. p. 148: "La Carta de Logu d'Eleonora giudicessa d'Arborea (1395) prescrive: che venendo trovato un asino in danno sui fondi altrui, per la prima volta gli si tagli un orecchio; la seconda, l'altro; e la terza, si confischi la bestia consegnandola alla corte principesca." Cf. Vendîdâd, xiii. 32 sqq.]

[Footnote 50: d'Addosio, op. cit. p. 16.]

Considering the feelings to which even the cultured mind is susceptible with reference to a mischievous beast, it is not difficult to understand the attitude of the ignorant. The savage, not only momentarily, while in a rage, but permanently and in cold blood, obliterates the boundaries between man and beast. He regards all animals as practically on a footing of equality with man. He believes that they are endowed with feelings and intelligence like men, that they are united into families and tribes like men, that they have various languages like human tribes, that they possess souls which survive the death of the bodies just as is the case with human souls. He tells of animals that have been the ancestors of men, of men that have become animals, of marriages that take place between men and beasts. He also believes that he who slays an animal will be exposed to the vengeance either of its disembodied spirit, or of all the other animals of the same species which, quite after human fashion, are bound to resent the injury done to one of their number.[51] Is it not natural, then, that the savage should give like for like? If it is the duty of animals to take vengeance upon men, is it not equally the duty of men to take vengeance upon animals?

[Footnote 51: Tylor, Primitive Culture, i. 467 sqq. Frazer, Golden Bough, ii. 389 sqq. Liebrecht, Zur Volkskunde, p. 17. Achelis, Moderne Völkerkunde, p. 373 sqq. Idem, 'Animal Worship,' in Open Court, xi. 705 sq. Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturvölker, ii. 180 (Negroes). von den Steinen, Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens, p. 351. Im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, p. 350 sqq. Dorman, Origin of Primitive Superstitions, pp. 223, 253. Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, i. 331 (Tarahumares). Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xix. pp. 250, 261 sq. Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' ibid. xviii. 423. Hose and McDougall, 'Relations between Men and Animals in Sarawak,' in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxxi. 173 sqq., especially p. 205 sq.]

Nor are these beliefs restricted to savages. Muhammedans maintain, not only that animals will share with men the general resurrection, but that they will be judged according to their works. Their tradition says that God "will raise up animals at the last day to receive {259} reward and to show His perfection and His justice. Then the hornless goat will be revenged on the horned one."[52] We can hardly wonder that the Zoroastrian law inflicted punishments on dogs which hurt men or animals, when we read in the Vendîdâd that a dog has the characters of eight sorts of people.[53] The fable and the Märchen for a long time related in good earnest their stories of animals that behaved exactly like men.[54] Even to this day, in certain districts of Europe, as soon as a peasant is dead, it is customary for his heir to announce the change of ownership to every beast in the stall, and to the bees also;[55] and in some parts of Poland, when the corpse of the rustic proprietor is being carried out, all his cattle are let loose, that they may take leave of their old master.[56] In the Middle Ages animals were sometimes accepted as witnesses; a man who was accused of having committed a murder in his house appeared before the tribunal with his cat, his dog, and his cock, swore in their presence that he was innocent, and was acquitted.[57] It was not only the common people that ascribed intelligence to beasts. According to Porphyry, all the philosophers who have endeavoured to discover the truth concerning animals have acknowledged that they to a certain extent participate of reason;[58] and the same idea is expressed by Christian writers of a much later date. In the sixteenth century, Benoît wrote that animals often speak.[59] In the middle of the following century, Hieronymus Rorarius published a book entitled 'Quod animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine.' And about the same time Johann Crell, in his 'Ethica Christiana,' expressed the opinion that animals at all events possess faculties analogous to reason and free-will, that they have something similar to virtues and vices, that they {260} deserve something like rewards and punishments, and are consequently punished by God and man.[60] This, as it seems to me, is the correct explanation of the mediæval practice of punishing animals, even though, in some cases, as M. Ménabréa observes, the obnoxious animal was regarded as an embodiment of some evil spirit and was punished as such.[61] The beast or insect was retaliated upon for the simple reason that it was regarded as a rational being.

[Footnote 52: Koran, vi. 38. Sell, Faith of Islám, p. 223.]

[Footnote 53: Vendîdâd, xiii. 44 sqq.]

[Footnote 54: See Grimm, Reinhart Fuchs, p. i. sqq.]

[Footnote 55: Ralston, Songs of the Russian People, p. 315. Wuttke, Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart, p. 428.]

[Footnote 56: Ralston, op. cit. p. 318.]

[Footnote 57: Michelet, Origines du droit français, pp. 76, 279 sq. Chambers, op. cit. i. 129.]

[Footnote 58: Porphyry, De abstinentia ab esu animalium, iii. 6.]

[Footnote 59: Benoît, quoted by d'Addosio, op. cit. p. 214.]

[Footnote 60: Crell, Ethica Christiana, ii. 1, p. 65 sq.:--"Hinc aliquid etiam virtuti et vitio simile, seu recte et prave factum: quorum illud est, cum bruta naturæ suæ ductum sequuntur, hoc cum a naturali via exorbitant. Unde tandem etiam aliquid **præmio aut p[oe]næ, et huic quidem maxime simile. Unde bestias etiam a Deo punitas, aut p[oe]nas certas lege illis constitutas, cernimus."]

[Footnote 61: Ménabréa, De l'origine de la forme et de l'esprit des jugements rendus au moyen-age contre les animaux, p. 35.]

At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate things are treated as if they were responsible agents. The Kukis take revenge not only on a murderous tiger, but on a murderous tree. "If a man should happen to be killed, by an accidental fall from a tree, all his relations assemble, and cut it down; and however large it may be, they reduce it to chips, which they scatter in the winds, for having, as they say, been the cause of the death of their brother."[62] Among the aborigines of Western Victoria, "when the spear or weapon of an enemy has killed a friend, it is always burnt by the relatives of the deceased; but those captured in battle are kept, and used by the conquerors."[63] The North American Redskins, when struck with an arrow in battle, "will tear it from the wound, break and bite it with their teeth, and dash it on the ground."[64] The British Guiana Indian, when hurt either by falling on a rock, or by the rock falling on him, "attributes the blame, by a line of argument still not uncommon in more civilised life, to the rock."[65] The gods of the Vedic age cursed the trees which had injured them.[66] Xerxes commanded {261} that the Hellespont should be stricken with three hundred lashes,[67] and Cyrus "wreaked his vengeance" on the river Gyndes by dispersing it through three hundred and sixty channels.[68] Pausanias relates that when Theagenes had died, one of his enemies went up to his statue every night, and whipped the brass. At last, however, "the statue checked his insolence by falling on him; but the sons of the deceased prosecuted the statue for murder. The Thasians sank the statue in the sea, herein following the view taken by Draco, who, in the laws touching homicide which he drew up for the Athenians, enacted that even lifeless things should be banished if they fell on anybody and killed him."[69] As Dr. Frazer remarks, the punishment of inanimate objects for having accidentally been the cause of death was probably much older than Draco.[70] At Athens there was a special tribunal for the purpose.[71] Demosthenes states that, if a stone or a piece of wood or iron or any such thing fell and struck a man, and the person who threw the thing was not known, but the people knew, and were in possession of, the object which killed the man, that object was brought to trial at the court of the Prytaneum.[72] Plato lays down the following rule in his 'Laws':--"If any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods,--whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border."[73] Teutonic law, which still recognised the principle of private revenge, treated the inanimate murderer with less ceremony.[74] According to the Laws of Alfred, when men were at work together in {262} a forest, and by misadventure one let a tree fall on another, which killed him, the tree belonged to the dead man's kinsfolk if they took it away within thirty days.[75] Later on, in England, a thing by which death was caused was "forfeited to God, that is to the King, God's Lieutenant on earth, to be distributed in works of charity for the appeasing of God's wrath."[76] This law remained in force till 1846.[77]

[Footnote 62: Macrae, in Asiatick Researches, vii. 189 sq.]

[Footnote 63: Dawson, Australian Aborigines, p. 53.]

[Footnote 64: Robertson, History of America, i. 351 sq.]

[Footnote 65: Im Thurn, op. cit. p. 354.]

[Footnote 66: Oldenberg, Religion des Veda, p. 518.]

[Footnote 67: Herodotus, vii. 35.]

[Footnote 68: Ibid. i. 190.]

[Footnote 69: Pausanias, vi. 11. 6. Cf. ibid. v. 27. 10.]

[Footnote 70: Frazer, Pausanias, ii. 371.]

[Footnote 71: Aristotle, De republica Atheniensium, 57. Pausanias, i. 28. 10.]

[Footnote 72: Demosthenes, Contra Aristocratem, 76, p. 645.]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Leges, ix. 873 sq.]

[Footnote 74: See Trummer, Vorträge über Tortur, &c. i. 376 sq. Brunner, Forschungen, p. 521 sqq.]

[Footnote 75: Laws of Alfred, ii. 13.]

[Footnote 76: Coke. Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, p. 57.]

[Footnote 77: Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, iii. 78. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. ii. 473.]

In some of these cases superstitious dread may have been a motive for destroying or banishing the instrument of death. There are facts which prove that such an object is looked upon as a source of danger. According to the Ripuarian law, people are forbidden to make use of a thing which has been "auctor interfectionis";[78] and in Norway, in quite modern times, sickles, axes, and other objects with which men have been killed, have been seen lying about abandoned and unused.[79] Again, among the aborigines of West Australia, if a person has been killed by a thrust of the native wooden spear, ghici, his country-men think that his soul remains in the point of the weapon which caused his death, and they burn it after his burial, so that the soul may depart.[80] But it is also obvious that an inanimate thing which is the cause of a hurt is apt to evoke a genuine feeling of resentment. We kick the chair over which we stumble, we curse the stone which hurts us; Dr Nansen says that, when he was crossing Greenland, it would have caused him "quite real satisfaction" to destroy a sledge which was **"heavy to draw."[81] When we thus behave as if the offending object were capable of feeling our resentment, we for a moment vaguely believe that it is alive.[82] But our anger very soon passes {263} away when we realise the true nature of its object. The case is different with men at earlier stages of civilisation. They do not suppose that things which hurt them are senseless; on the contrary, they personify such things, not only hastily and momentarily, but deliberately and permanently; hence their resentment lasts. The Guiana Indian, says Sir E. F. Im Thurn, "attributes any calamity which may happen to him to the intention of the immediate instrument of its infliction, and he not unnaturally sees in the action of this instrument evidence of its possession of a spirit."[83] Trees, especially, are very commonly supposed to possess souls similar to those of men, and are treated accordingly.[84] Pausanias writes that "lifeless things are said to have inflicted of their own accord a righteous punishment on men"; and as the best and most famous instance of this he mentions the sword of Cambyses.[85] In England the inanimate murderer was to be given up to the kinsmen of the slain surely not as a compensation for the loss they had suffered, but as an object upon which their vengeance was to be wreaked.[86] It was called la bane, that is, "the slayer"; Bracton also calls it the "malefactor."[87] It did not matter that its owner was recognised as innocent; the punishment was not intended for him.[88] But in some well-defined cases the "slayer" was free from guilt. A ship or other vessel from which a person was drowned by misfortune was not forfeited as deodand in case the accident happened in salt water--as Coke indicates, on account of the great dangers to which the vessel is exposed "upon the raging waves in respect of the wind and tempest."[89] Moreover, if a boy under fourteen fell from a cart, or from a horse, it was {264} no deodand, "because he was not of discretion to look to himself," and so the cart, or horse, could not be regarded as blamable. But if a cart ran over a boy, or a tree fell upon him, or a bull gored him, it was deodand, because, apparently, it went out of its way to kill him.[90] The fact of motion was one of considerable importance in the case of animals and inanimate things, as it was in the case of men. Thus Bracton would distinguish between the horse which throws a man and the horse off which a man tumbles, between the tree that falls and the tree against which a man is thrown; and, as a general rule, a thing was not a deodand unless it could be said "movere ad mortem."[91] If anybody was drowned by falling from a ship under sail, not only the ship itself but the things moving in it were deemed the cause of his death; whereas the merchandise lying at the bottom of the vessel was not presumed to be guilty, and consequently was not forfeited.[92] But if any particular merchandise fell upon a person and caused his death, that merchandise became a deodand, and not the ship.[93] As Mr. Holmes observes, a ship is the most persistent example of motion giving personality to a thing. "She" is still personified not only in common parlance, but in courts of justice. In maritime cases of quite recent date judges of great repute have pronounced the proceeding to be, not against the owner, but "against the vessel for an offence committed by the vessel."[94]

[Footnote 78: Lex Ripuariorum, lxx. 1.]

[Footnote 79: Liebrccht, Zur Volkskund, p. 313.]

[Footnote 80: Salvado, Mémoires historiques sur l'Australie, p. 260 sq.]

[Footnote 81: Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 213 sq.]

[Footnote 82: Cf. Dugald Stewart, Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, i. 125; Hall, 'Study of Anger,' in American Journal of Psychology, x. 506 sq.]

[Footnote 83: Im Thurn, op. cit. p. 354.]

[Footnote 84: See Frazer, Golden Bough, i. 169 sqq.]

[Footnote 85: Pausanias, i. 28. 11.]

[Footnote 86: Pollock and Maitland, ii. 474.]

[Footnote 87: Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ, fol. 116, vol. ii. 236 sq.]

[Footnote 88: Holmes, Common Law, p. 25.]

[Footnote 89: Bracton, op. cit. fol. 122, vol. ii. 286 sq. Coke, op. cit. p. 58. Sir James Stephen supposes (op. cit. iii. 78) that "deodands were not in use at sea, because the local customs of England did not extend to the high seas." But Coke expressly says (p. 58) that there can be no deodand of the ship even "in aqua salsa, being any arm of the sea, though it be in the body of the County."]

[Footnote 90: Coke, op. cit. p. 57. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, i. 422. Stephen, op. cit. iii. 78.]

[Footnote 91: Bracton, op. cit. fol. 136 b, vol. ii, 400 sq. Hale, op. cit. i. 420 sqq. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 474, n. 4. Stephen, op. cit. iii. 77. Holmes, op. cit. p. 25 sq.]

[Footnote 92: Britton, i. 2. 14, vol. i. 16.]

[Footnote 93: Hale, op. cit. i. 422.]

[Footnote 94: Holmes, op. cit. p. 29.]

* * * * *

Like the lower animals, human beings in their earliest childhood are incapable of forming notions of right and wrong, hence they are not responsible for any act of theirs. Responsibility commences with the dawn of a moral consciousness, and increases along with the evolution of the intellect. Only by slow degrees the capacity of recognising {265} act as right or wrong develops in the child. It soon learns that certain acts are forbidden, but to know that an act is forbidden is not the same as to recognise it as wrong. Nor does the knowledge of a moral rule involve the ability to apply that rule in particular cases. Nor can the youthful intellect be expected to possess the same degree of foresight as the intellect of a grown-up man. Hence the total or partial irresponsibility of childhood and early youth.

This irresponsibility is admitted by the laws of civilised nations. In England,[95] Scotland,[96] and the United States,[97] children under seven are absolutely exempt from punishment. In other modern countries criminal responsibility does not commence until the age of nine,[98] ten,[99] twelve,[100] or fourteen.[101] In some it is to be decided in each case whether a child is punishable or not.[102] Thus the French Code Pénal provides that a person under eighteen years of age shall not be punished if it be decided that he has acted without discernment (sans discernement) whereas, if he has acted with discernment (avec discernement), his punishment is to be mitigated according to a fixed scale.[103] Most laws set down an intermediate period between that of complete irresponsibility and that of complete responsibility. According to English law there is a presumption that children from seven to fourteen are not possessed of the degree of knowledge essential to criminality, though this presumption may be rebutted by proof to the contrary;[104] and, according to the German Strafgesetzbuch, a person from twelve to eighteen may be acquitted if, when he committed the offence, he did {266} not possess the intelligence requisite to know that it was criminal.[105] Other laws, again, regard a certain age eo ipso as a ground of extenuation, its upper limit being fixed sometimes at sixteen,[106] sometimes at eighteen,[107] sometimes at twenty,[108] sometimes at twenty-one.[109]

[Footnote 95: Stephen, op. cit. ii. 97 sq.]

[Footnote 96: Erskine-Rankine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, p. 546.]

[Footnote 97: Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law, § 368, vol. i. 209.]

[Footnote 98: Italian Codice Penale, art. 53. Spanish Código Penal reformado, art. 8, § 2.]

[Footnote 99: Austrian (Finger, op. cit. i. 110), Dutch (van Hamel, in Législation pénale comparée, edited by von Liszt, p. 444), Portuguese (Tavares de Medeiros, ibid. p. 199), Russian (Foinitzki, ibid. p. 529) law.]

[Footnote 100: German Strafgesetzbuch, art. 55.]

[Footnote 101: Swedish (Uppström, in Législation pénale comparée, p. 483), Finnish (Forsman, ibid. p. 565) law.]

[Footnote 102: French, Belgian, Ottoman law (Rivière, ibid. p. 7).]

[Footnote 103: Code Pénal, art. 66 sqq.]

[Footnote 104: Stephen, op. cit. ii. 98. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, p. 50.]

[Footnote 105: Strafgesetzbuch, art. 56.]

[Footnote 106: Dutch law (van Hamel, loc. cit. p. 444).]

[Footnote 107: Spanish (Código Penal reformado, art. 9, § 2), Swedish (Uppström, loc. cit. p. 484), Finnish (Forsman, loc. cit. p. 566) law.]

[Footnote 108: Austrian law (Finger, op. cit. i. 112).]

[Footnote 109: Italian (Codice Penale, art. 56), Russian (Foinitzki, loc. cit. p. 529), Portuguese (Tavares de Medeiros, loc. cit. p. 199), Brazilian (Codigo Penal dos Estados Unidos do Brazil, art. 42, § 11) law. According to the Ottoman Penal Code, art. 40, "a guilty person who has not arrived at the age of puberty may not be punished with the punishment enacted against the offence of which he has been found guilty."]

Roman law, as it seems, made out a præsumptio juris of general incapacity to commit a crime under puberty, rebuttable by evidence of capacity, at any rate in the age called "next to puberty," the limits of which are not clearly settled.[110] In the Irish Book of Aicill it is said that "the man who incites a fool is he who pays for his crime"; and to this the Commentary adds that a man is a fool till the end of seven years, and a fool of half sense till the end of fourteen[111]--a provision similar to that of Canon Law.[112] According to Muhammedan law, the rule of talion is applicable only to persons of age.[113] In China criminal responsibility is affected not only by youth, but by old age as well. "Offenders whose age is not more than seven nor less than ninety years, shall not suffer punishment in any case, except in that of treason or rebellion." "Any offender whose age is not more than ten nor less than eighty years, . . . shall, when the crime is capital, but not {267} amounting to treason, be recommended to the particular consideration and decision of His Imperial Majesty." And "any offender whose age is not more than fifteen, nor less than seventy years . . . shall be allowed to redeem himself from any punishment less than capital, by the payment of the established fine, except in the case of persons condemned to banishment as accessories to the crimes of treason, rebellion, murder of three or more persons in one family, or homicide by magic or poisoning, upon all of which offenders the laws shall be strictly executed."[114]

[Footnote 110: Clark, Analysis of Criminal Liability, p. 70. von Jhering, Das Schuldmoment im römischen Privatrecht, p. 42 sqq. Mommsen Römisches Strafrecht, p. 75 sq. In the Institutiones (i. 22) puberty is fixed at the completion of the fourteenth year for males, and of the twelfth for females. According to the Law of the Twelve Tables, children were punished for theft, though less severely than adults (Gellius, Noctes Atticæ, xi. 18. 8. Pliny, Historia naturalis, xviii. 3).]

[Footnote 111: Ancient Laws of Ireland, iii. 157.]

[Footnote 112: Katz, Grundriss des kanonischen Strafrechts, p. 8.]

[Footnote 113: Sachau, Muhammedanisches Recht, p. 762. Jaffur Shurreef says (Qanoon-e-Islam, p. 36) that, among the Muhammedans of India, previous to the period of puberty all the good and evil deeds of boys and girls are laid to the charge of their parents.]

[Footnote 114: Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. xxii. sq.]

According to early custom, children who have committed an injury are sometimes,[115] but not always,[116] subject to the rule of retaliation. Even in Homeric Greece, manslaughter committed in childhood seems to have been visited with banishment for life.[117] In other cases parents are responsible for the deeds of their children.[118] Among the West African Fjort, for instance, children are not themselves liable for their actions, but the injured party can claim compensation from the parents if he likes to do so.[119] Among the Teutons, "like the master for the slave, the father answered for and made claims on behalf of the child. The ceremony of investing him with arms as a wehrhaft, or weapon-bearing member of the community, was the usual period for the assumption of rights and liabilities; and this customarily (not always) took place at the age of twelve."[120] According to ancient Swedish law, an injury was treated in the same way as if it had been accidental, in case the offender was under the age of fifteen;[121] according to the Icelandic Grágás, in case he was {268} under sixteen.[122] However, as we have seen, accidental injuries had to be paid for. Where offences are dealt with according to the principle of compensation, it is impossible to decide how far parents' liability for their children involves a recognition of the moral irresponsibility of the child, or is simply due to the fact that children, having no property, are themselves unable to compensate. That the latter point of view was largely adopted by early custom and law appears from the fact that, when compensation was succeeded by punishment, the period of irresponsibility was reduced. In England the age-limit of twelve years, which prevailed in Anglo-Norman days, was afterwards disregarded in criminal cases.[123] We read in the Northumberland Assize Roll, A.D. 1279, "Reginald . . . aged four, by misadventure slew Robert . . . aged two; the justice granted that he might have his life and members because of his tender age."[124] A little later we hear that a child under the age of seven shall not suffer judgment in a case of homicide.[125] In 1457, an infant of four was held liable in trespass, though the language of the court shows a disposition to exempt the infant.[126] From the eighteenth century instances are recorded of a girl of thirteen who was burnt for killing her mistress, and of a boy of eight who was hanged for arson.[127] In 1748, a boy of ten, being convicted for the murder of a girl of five, was sentenced to death, and all the judges to whom this case was reported agreed that, "in justice to the publick," the law ought to take its course. The execution, however, was respited, and the boy at last had the benefit of His Majesty's pardon.[128] It appears from these facts, and from others of a similar character referring to continental countries,[129] that there has been a tendency to raise the age {269} at which full legal responsibility commences. And we have reason to hope that legislation has not yet said its last word on the subject.

[Footnote 115: Senfft, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse, p. 449 (Marshall Islanders). Miklosich, 'Blutrache bei den Slaven,' in Denkschriften d. kaiserl. Akadamie d. Wissensch. Philos.-hist. Classe, Vienna, xxxvi. 131 (Turks of Daghestan). See also supra, p. 217 sq.]

[Footnote 116: Lang, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse, p. 257 (Washambala).]

[Footnote 117: Iliad, xxiii. 85 sqq. Cf. Müller, Dissertations on the Eumenides, p. 95.]

[Footnote 118: Nicole, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse p. 132 (Diakité-Sarrakolese). Marx, ibid. p. 357 (Amahlubi).]

[Footnote 119: Dennett, in Jour. African Society, i. 276.]

[Footnote 120: Wigmore, 'Responsibility for Tortious Acts,' in Harvard Law Review, vii. 447.]

[Footnote 121: Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen, p. 642 sq. Nordström, Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens historia, ii. 73. Cf. von Amira, Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht, i. 375 sq.]

[Footnote 122: Grágás, Vigsloþi, 32, vol. ii. 63.]

[Footnote 123: Wigmore, loc. cit. p. 447.]

[Footnote 124: Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of Northumberland, p. 323.]

[Footnote 125: Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 84.]

[Footnote 126: Wigmore, loc. cit. p. 447 sq. n. 7.]

[Footnote 127: Wilson, History of Modern English Law, p. 124.]

[Footnote 128: Foster, Report of Crown Cases, p. 70 sqq.]

[Footnote 129: Trummer, op. cit. i. 428, 432 sqq. (Germany). Jousse, Traité de la justice criminelle de France, ii. 617; Tissot, Droit pénal, i. 30 (France).]

* * * * *

The principle that intellectual incapacity lessens or excludes responsibility also applies to idiots and madmen. Though idiots are able to acquire some knowledge of general moral rules, the application of those rules is frequently beyond their powers;[130] and their capacity of foreseeing the consequences of their acts is necessarily very restricted. The same to some extent holds good of madmen; but, as will be shown in the next chapter, there is another ground for their irresponsibility besides the derangement of the intellect.

[Footnote 130: von Krafft-Ebing, Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen Psychopathologie, p. 70.]

All modern laws admit that, at least under certain circumstances, idiocy or madness exempts a person from criminal responsibility. According to Roman law, lunatics were even free from the obligation of paying indemnities for losses inflicted by them;[131] and so mild was their lot at Rome, that it became a practice for citizens to shirk their public duties by feigning madness.[132] Even savages recognise that lunatics and maniacs are not responsible for their deeds. The Abipones maintained that it was "wrong and irrational to use arms against those who are not in possession of their senses."[133] Among the North American Potawatomis many "are said to be 'foolish,' and not sensible of crime."[134] The Iroquois are "persuaded that a person who is not in his right senses is not to be reprehended, or at least not to be punished."[135] Hennepin states that "they had one day in the year which might be called the Festival of Fools; for in fact they pretended to be mad, rushing from hut to hut, so that if they ill-treated any one or carried off anything, they would say next day, {270} 'I was mad; I had not my senses about me.' And the others would accept this explanation and exact no vengeance."[136] The Melanesians "are sorry for lunatics and are kind to them, though their remedies are rough"; at Florida, for instance, a man went out of his mind, chased people, stole things and hid them, but "no one blamed him, because they knew that he was possessed by a tindalo ghost."[137] Among the West African Fjort fools and idiots are not responsible personally for their actions.[138] Among the Wadshagga crimes committed by lunatics are judged of more leniently than others.[139] Among the Matabele madmen, being supposed to be possessed of a spirit, "were formerly under the protection of the King."[140] In Eastern Africa the natives say of an idiot or a lunatic, "He has fiends."[141] El Hajj [(]Abdssalam Shabeeny states that in Hausaland "a man guilty of a crime, who in the opinion of the judge is possessed by an evil spirit, is not punished."[142]

[Footnote 131: von Vangerow, Lehrbuch der Pandekten, iii. 36. von Jhering, Das Schuldmoment im römischen Privatrecht, p. 42. Thon, Rechtsnorm und subjectives Recht, p. 106, n. 70.]

[Footnote 132: Digesta, xxvii. 10. 6.]

[Footnote 133: Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abipones, ii. 234.]

[Footnote 134: Keating, Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River, i. 127.]

[Footnote 135: Charlevoix, Voyage to North America, ii. 24 sq.]

[Footnote 136: Hennepin, Description de la Louisiane, Les M[oe]urs des Sauvages, p. 71 sq.]

[Footnote 137: Codrington, Melanesians, p. 218.]

[Footnote 138: Dennett, in Jour. African Society, i. 276.]

[Footnote 139: Merker, quoted by Kohler, in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss. xv. 64.]

[Footnote 140: Decle, Three Years in Savage Africa, p. 154.]

[Footnote 141: Burton, Lake Regions of Central Africa, ii. 320.]

[Footnote 142: [(]Abdssalam Shabeeny, Account of Timbuctoo and Housa, p. 49.]

The idea that derangement of the mind is due to spiritual possession, often makes the idiot or the insane an object of religious reverence.[143] The Macusis regard lunatics as holy.[144] The Brazilian Paravilhana believe that idiots are inspired.[145] According to Schoolcraft, "regard for lunatics, or the demented members of the human race, is a universal trait among the American tribes."[146] So, also, the African Barolong give a kind of worship to deranged persons, who are said to be under the direct influence of a deity.[147] A certain kind of madness was regarded by the ancient Greeks as a divine gift, and consequently as "superior to a sane mind."[148] Lane states that, among the modern {271} Egyptians, an idiot or a fool is vulgarly regarded "as a being whose mind is in heaven, while his grosser part mingles among ordinary mortals; consequently he is considered an especial favourite of heaven. Whatever enormities a reputed saint may commit (and there are many who are constantly infringing precepts of their religion), such acts do not affect his fame for sanctity; for they are considered as the results of the abstraction of his mind from worldly things--his soul, or reasoning faculties, being wholly absorbed in devotion--so that his passions are left without control. Lunatics who are dangerous to society are kept in confinement, but those who are harmless are generally regarded as saints."[149] The same holds good of Morocco. Lunatics are not even obliged to observe the Ramadan fast, the most imperative of all religious duties; of a person who, instead of abstaining from all food till sunset, was taking his meal in broad daylight in the open street, I heard the people forgivingly say, "The poor fellow does not know what he is doing, his mind is with God."[150]

[Footnote 143: Cf. Tylor, Primitive Culture, ii. 128.]

[Footnote 144: Andree, Ethnographische Parallelen, Neue Folge, p. 3.]

[Footnote 145: von Martius, Beiträge zur Ethnographie Amerika's, i. 633.]

[Footnote 146: Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, iv. 49.]

[Footnote 147: Tylor, Primitive Culture, ii. 130.]

[Footnote 148: Plato, Phædrus, p. 244.]

[Footnote 149: Lane, Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, p. 237.]

[Footnote 150: Cf. Gråberg di Hemsö, Specchio geografico, e statistico dell' impero Marocco, p. 182 sq.]

On the other hand there are peoples who treat their lunatics in a very different manner. The tribes of Western Victoria put them to death, "as they have a very great dread of mad people."[151] In Kar Nicobar madness is said to be the only cause for a death "penalty" that seems to exist there, the afflicted individual being garrotted with two pieces of bamboo;[152] but this practice seems to be a method of getting rid of a dangerous individual, rather than a penalty in the proper sense of the word. Among the Washambala a lunatic who commits homicide is killed--as our informant observes, "not really on account of his deed, but in order to prevent him from causing further mischief."[153] Among the Turks of Daghestan, we are told, mad people are subject to the rule of blood-revenge.[154]

[Footnote 151: Dawson, op. cit. p. 61.]

[Footnote 152: Distant, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. iii. 6.]

[Footnote 153: Lang, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse, p. 257.]

[Footnote 154: Miklosich, loc. cit. p. 131.]

{272} In China lunatics are held responsible for their acts, although the ordinary penalty applicable is commuted, as for instance, in murder to imprisonment with fetters subject to His Majesty's pleasure. But when a lunatic deliberately kills his parents or grandparents, a representation will not serve; he is to be executed at once on the spot where the murder was committed or on the city execution ground, and the sentence--slicing to pieces--is to be carried out in all its horror though the lunatic be already dead.[155]

[Footnote 155: Alabaster, Commentaries on Chinese Law, pp. 93, 96. Cf. Douglas, Society in China, pp. 72, 122.]

According to ancient Welsh law, no vengeance is to be exercised against an idiot,[156] nor is the king to have any fine for the act of such a person.[157] But, "if idiots kill other persons, let galanas [that is, blood-money] be paid on their behalf, as for other persons; because their kindred ought to prevent them doing wrong."[158] The Swedish provincial laws treated an injury committed by a lunatic in the same manner as an injury by misadventure, provided that the relatives of the injurer had publicly announced his madness, or, according to some laws, had kept him tied in bonds which he had broken; but if they had omitted to do so, the injury was treated as if it had been done wilfully.[159] The Icelandic Grágás even lays down the rule that a madman who has committed homicide shall suffer the same punishment as a sane person guilty of the same crime.[160] In England, in the times of Edward II. and Edward III., proof of madness appears not to have entitled a man to be acquitted, at least in case of murder, but to a special verdict that he committed the offence when mad, and this gave him a right to pardon.[161] Such a right, indeed, implies the admission that lunacy has a claim to forbearance; but from what we know about the treatment of lunatics during the Middle Ages and much later, we cannot be sure that the insane offender escaped {273} all punishment. In a case which occurred in 1315, it was presented that a certain lunatic wounded himself with a knife, and finally died of his wounds; his chattels were confiscated.[162] Lord Bacon says in his 'Maxims of the Law,' "If an infant within years of discretion, or a madman, kill another, he shall not be impeached thereof: but if he put out a man's eye, or do him like corporal hurt, he shall be punished in trespass"; in these latter cases, "the law doth rather consider the damage of the party wronged, than the malice of him that was the wrong-doer."[163] In none of the German town-laws before the beginning of the seventeenth century is there any special provision for the offences of lunatics;[164] and, according to the Statutes of Hamburg of 1605, though a madman who kills a person shall not be punished as an ordinary manslayer, he is yet to be punished.[165] In Germany recognised idiots and madmen were not seldom punished with great severity, and even with death, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[166] One of the darkest pages in the history of European civilisation may be filled with a description of the sufferings which were inflicted upon those miserable beings up to quite modern times.[167] Many of them were burnt as witches or heretics, or treated as ordinary criminals. For unruly and crazy people, who nowadays would be comfortably located in an asylum, whipping-posts and stocks were made use of. Shakespeare speaks of madmen as deserving "a dark house and a whip";[168] and Swift observes that original people like Diogenes and others, if they had lived in his day, would have been treated like madmen, that is, would have incurred "manifest danger of phlebotomy, and whips, and chains, and dark chambers, and straw."[169] The writings of {274} Esquirol, the parliamentary debates on the asylums of Bedlam and York, and the reports presented under the auspices of La Rochefoucauld to the National Assembly of 1789, contain a picture unique in its sadness--"a picture of prisons in which lunatics, criminal lunatics, and criminals are huddled together indiscriminately without regard to sex or age, of asylums in which the maniac, to whom motion is an imperious necessity, is chained in the same cell with the victim of melancholia whom his ravings soon goad into furious madness, and of hospitals in which the epileptic, the scrofulous, the paralytic and the insane sleep side by side--a picture of cells, dark, foul, and damp, with starving, diseased, and naked inmates, flogged into submission, or teased into fury for the sport of idle spectators."[170]

[Footnote 156: Dimetian Code, ii. 1. 32 (Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, p. 200).]

[Footnote 157: Venedotian Code, ii. 28. 3 (ibid. p. 98).]

[Footnote 158: Welsh Laws, iv. 1. 2 (ibid. p. 389).]

[Footnote 159: von Amira, Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht, i. 375.]

[Footnote 160: Grágás, Vigsloþi, 33, vol. ii. 64.]

[Footnote 161: Stephen, op. cit. ii. 151.]

[Footnote 162: Wigmore, loc. cit. p. 446.]

[Footnote 163: Bacon, Maxims of the Law, reg. 7 (Works, vii. 347 sq.).]

[Footnote 164: Trummer, op. cit. i. 428.]

[Footnote 165: Ibid. i. 432.]

[Footnote 166: Ibid. i. 438 sqq.]

[Footnote 167: See Tuke, Chapters in the History of the Insane in the British Isles, p. 43 sq.; Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease, p. 10 sq.; Lecky, History of European Morals, ii. 85 sqq.]

[Footnote 168: Shakespeare, As you Like it, iii. 2.]

[Footnote 169: Swift, Tale of a Tub, sec. 9 (Works, x. 163).]

[Footnote 170: Wood-Renton, 'Moral Mania,' in Law Quarterly Review, iii. 340.]

Whatever share indifference to human suffering may have had in all these atrocities and all this misery, it is likely that thoughtlessness, superstition, and ignorance have had a much larger share. We have noticed that, when a certain deed gives a shock to public feelings, the circumstances in which it has been committed are easily lost sight of. Considering that the Chinese punish persons who have killed their father or mother by pure accident, it is not surprising that they punish madmen who kill a parent wilfully. Even a man like Smollett, the well-known writer, thought it would be neither absurd nor unreasonable for the legislature to divest all lunatics of the privilege of insanity in cases of enormity, and to subject them "to the common penalties of the law."[171] Moreover, as we have seen, madness is often attributed to demoniacal possession,[172] and in other cases it is regarded as a divine punishment.[173] From a pagan {275} point of view this would make the lunatic an object of pity or dread, rather than of indignation; as the Roman legislator said, the insane murderer ought not to be punished, because his insanity itself is a sufficient penalty.[174] But in Christian Europe, where up to quite recent times men were ever ready to punish God's enemies, a lunatic, who was supposed to have the devil in him, or whose affliction was regarded as the visitation of God upon heresy or sin,[175] was a hateful individual and was treated accordingly. Finally, we have to take into account that the sensibility of a lunatic was thought to be inferior to that of a sane person;[176] that the mental characteristics of insanity were little understood; and that, in consequence, many demented persons were treated as if they were sane because they were thought to be sane, and others, though recognised as lunatics, were treated as responsible because they were thought to be responsible. The history of the English law referring to insanity bears sad testimony to the ignorance of which lunatics have been victims in the hands of lawyers.

[Footnote 171: Smollett, quoted by Tuke, op. cit. p. 96.]

[Footnote 172: See also Doughty, Arabia Deserta, i. 258 sq.; Westermarck, 'Nature of the Arab [vG]inn illustrated by the Present Beliefs of the People of Morocco,' in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxix, 254; Andree, op. cit. p. 2 sq.; Tuke, op. cit. p. 1; Pike, History of Crime in England, i. 39; von Krafft-Ebing, op. cit. p. 5.]

[Footnote 173: Plato, Leges, ix. 854. Esquirol, Des maladies mentales, i. 336.]

[Footnote 174: Digesta, i. 18. 14; xlviii. 9. 9.]

[Footnote 175: Wood-Renton, loc. cit. p. 339.]

[Footnote 176: Ibid. p. 339.]

From the year 1724 there is a dictum of an English judge to the effect that a man who is to be exempted from punishment "must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast."[177] From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the power of distinguishing right from wrong in the abstract was regarded as the test of responsibility;[178] whilst in the existing doctrine, dating from the trial of M[(]Naughten in 1843, the question of knowledge of right and wrong, instead of being put generally and indefinitely, is put in reference to the particular act at the particular time of committing it.[179] This series of doctrines certainly shows a noteworthy progress {276} in discrimination. But at the same time the answers given by the fourteen English judges to the questions put to them by the House of Lords in consequence of M[(]Naughten's case still display an ignorance which would nowadays be hardly possible. In reply to the question--"If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?"--the judges declared that, on the assumption "that he labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, . . . he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment."[180] The mistake committed in this answer does not lie in the conclusion, but in the premise. "Here," as Professor Maudsley observes, "is an unhesitating assumption that a man, having an insane delusion, has the power to think and act in regard to it reasonably; that, at the time of the offence, he ought to have and to exercise the knowledge and self-control which a sane man would have and exercise, were the facts with respect to which the delusion exists real; that he is, in fact, bound to be reasonable in his unreason, sane in his insanity."[181] Modern science, however, teaches us another lesson. It has shown that a delusion of the kind suggested never stands alone, but is in all cases the result of a disease of the brain which interferes more or less with every function of the mind, and that few insane persons who do violence can be truly said to have a full knowledge of the nature and quality of their acts at the time they are performing {277} them.[182] A perhaps still greater defect in the doctrine of the fourteen judges is the absence of all reference to the influence of insane impulses; but with this subject we are not concerned at present. In this connection my object has been merely to show that the irresponsibility of the insane, in so far as it depends on intellectual derangement, has been generally recognised in proportion as their intellectual derangement has been recognised, and that the exceptions to this rule are explicable from beliefs which, though materially affecting the treatment of the insane, have no reference to the principle of responsibility itself.

[Footnote 177: Howell, Collection of State Trials, xvi. 765.]

[Footnote 178: Harris, Principles of the Criminal Law, p. 18. Kenny, op. cit. p. 53.]

[Footnote 179: Clark and Finnelly, Reports of Cases decided in the House of Lords, x. 202.]

[Footnote 180: Ibid. x. 211.]

[Footnote 181: Maudsley, op. cit. p. 97.]

[Footnote 182: Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics, p. 72 sq. Maudsley, op. cit. p. 96.]

* * * * *

There are temporary states of mind in which the agent no more knows what he is doing than an idiot or a madman, such as somnambulism, narcosis, fury. For these states, of course, the rule holds good, that nobody is responsible for what he does in ignorance, although he may be responsible for his ignorance. Responsibility in connection with anger and rage will be more appropriately dealt with in another place. I shall here restrict myself to the case of drunkenness.

A person is irresponsible, or only partly responsible, for what he does when drunk, according as he is ignorant of the nature of his act, as also in so far as the intoxicant contributed to the rise of some powerful impulse which determined his will. If he commits an offence in a state of extreme intoxication, he can reasonably be blamed only for what he did when sober. If he made himself drunk for the purpose of committing the offence, then the offence is intended, and he is equally responsible for his act as if he had accomplished it straightway. If he became intoxicated without any fault of his, for instance, if he did not know, and could not know, the intoxicating quality of the liquor which made him drunk, he is free from blame. But in other cases he is guilty of heedlessness, or rashness, or, if he foresaw the danger, of blamable indifference to {278} the probable consequences of his act. This is the clear theory of the question. But we cannot expect to find it accurately expressed in practice.

Very generally drunkenness is recognised as a ground of extenuation. We hear from various sources that the North American Indians were exceedingly merciful to intoxicated offenders. According to Charlevoix, the Iroquois "suffer themselves to be ill used by drunken people, without defending themselves, for fear of hurting them. If you endeavour to shew them the folly of this conduct, they say, 'Why should we hurt them? They know not what they do.'" Even "if a savage kills another belonging to his cabin, if he is drunk (and they often counterfeit drunkenness when they intend to commit such actions),[183] all the consequence is, that they pity and weep for the dead. 'It is a misfortune (they say), the murderer knew not what he did.'"[184] James makes a similar statement with reference to the Omahas.[185] In his description of the aborigines of Pennsylvania, Blome observes, "It is rare that they fall out, if sober; and if drunk they forgive it, saying, it was the drink, and not the man that abused them."[186] Benjamin Franklin tells us of some Indians who had misbehaved in a state of intoxication, and in consequence sent three of their old men to apologise; "the orator acknowledged the fault, but laid it upon the rum, and then endeavoured to excuse the rum."[187] The detestable deeds which men did under the influence of pulcre, or the native Mexican wine, the Aztecs attributed to the god of wine or to the wine itself, and not in the least to the drunken man. Indeed, if anybody spoke ill of or insulted an intoxicated person, he was liable to be punished for disrespect to the god by which that person was supposed to be possessed. {279} Hence, says Sahagun, it was believed, not without ground, that the Indians made themselves drunk on purpose to commit with impunity crimes for which they would have been punished if they had committed them sober.[188]

[Footnote 183: Cf. Hennepin, op. cit. p. 71.]

[Footnote 184: Charlevoix, op. cit. ii. 23, 25. According to Loskiel (History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the Indians in North America, i. 16), the Iroquois, though they laid all the blame on the rum, punished severely murder committed in drunkenness.]

[Footnote 185: James, Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, i. 265.]

[Footnote 186: Blome, in Buchanan, North American Indians, p. 328.]

[Footnote 187: Franklin, Autobiography, ch. ix. (Works, i. 164).]

[Footnote 188: Sahagun, Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España, i. 22, vol. i. 40.]

Among the Karens of India "men are not unfrequently killed in drunken broils; but such cases are not allowed by Karen custom to be a cause of action. No price can be demanded for persons who lose their lives in such circumstances. It is argued there was no malice, no intention to kill; and the person who died was perhaps as much to blame as the man who killed him; and people are not well responsible for what they do in a state of intoxication."[189] Among the Kandhs, "for wounds, however serious, given under circumstances of extreme provocation, or in a drunken squabble, slight compensation is awarded."[190] Among some of the Marshall Islanders blood-revenge is generally not taken for an act of homicide which has been committed in drunkenness, compensation being accepted instead.[191] So, also, according to the ancient law of the East Frisians, a man who has killed another when drunk is allowed "to buy off his neck by a sum of money paid to the king and to the relatives of the slain."[192]

[Footnote 189: Mason, in Jour. As. Soc. Bengal, xxxvii. pt. ii. 146.]

[Footnote 190: Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, p. 82.]

[Footnote 191: Jung, quoted by Kohler, in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss. xiv. 446.]

[Footnote 192: Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht, iii. 18.]

Roman law regarded drunkenness as a ground of extenuation;[193] the Jurist Marcian mentions ebrietas as an example of impetus, thereby intimating that a drunken person, when committing a crime, should not be put on the same footing with an offender acting in cold blood, and calculating his act with clear consciousness.[194] In Canon law drunkenness is said to be a ground which deserves the indulgence of a reasonable judge, because whatever is done in that state is done without consciousness on the part of the actor.[195] Indeed, had not God shown {280} indulgence for the offence committed by Lot when drunk?[196] Partly on the authority of Roman law, partly on that of Canon law, the earliest practitioners of the Middle Ages followed the principle that drunkenness is a ground of extenuation; and this doctrine remained strongly rooted in the later jurisprudence, in which a drunken person was likened to one under the influence of sleep, or drunkenness was regarded as equivalent to insanity.[197] It was not until the sixteenth century that a mere general rule, with regard to drunkenness as a ground of extenuation, was felt to be insufficient. Since the time of Clarus, especially, the opinion began to prevail, that the effect of the highest degree of drunkenness was, indeed, to exempt from the punishment of dolus, but that the offender was still subject to the punishment of culpa, except in two cases, namely, first, when he inebriated himself intentionally, and with a consciousness that he might commit a crime while drunk, in which case the drunkenness was not allowed to be any ground of exculpation at all; and, secondly, when he became intoxicated without any fault on his part, as, for example, in consequence of inebriating substances having been mingled with his wine by his comrades, in which case he was relieved even from the punishment of culpa.[198] These views, in the main, gradually determined the German practice, and similar opinions prevailed in the practice of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands.[199] In the annals of Prussian criminal justice of 1824, a case is reported of a man who was punished with only one year's imprisonment for having killed his little child in a state of drunkenness.[200] In other countries a different principle was acted upon. An ordinance of Francis I. declared that drunkenness should not in any case absolve from the ordinary punishment;[201] and this rule was sanctioned and {281} applied by the later French jurisprudence.[202] In the Code Pénal, the state of drunkenness is not mentioned as a mitigating circumstance; yet the rigour of the law has been tempered by the doctrine that intoxication produces a temporary insanity and that every kind of insanity is a ground of exculpation.[203] In England,[204] Scotland,[205] and the United States,[206] a state of voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime. Speaking of a person who commits homicide when drunk, Hale says that "by the laws of England such a person shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses."[207] However, in a case where the intention with which the act was done is the essence of the offence, the drunkenness of the accused may be taken into account by the jury when considering the motive or intent with which he acted.[208] According to Chinese law, also, intoxication does not affect the question of responsibility.[209]

[Footnote 193: Digesta, xlviii. 19. 11. 2; xlix. 16. 6. 7. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 1043.]

[Footnote 194: Digesta, xlviii. 19. 11. 2.]

[Footnote 195: Gratian, Decretum, ii. 15. 1. 7.]

[Footnote 196: Ibid. ii. 15. 1. 9.]

[Footnote 197: Mittermaier, Effect of Drunkenness on Criminal Responsibility, p. 6.]

[Footnote 198: Clarus, Practica criminalis, qu. lx. nr. 11 (Opera omnia, ii. 462).]

[Footnote 199: Mittermaier, op. cit. p. 7. Du Boys, Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne, p. 290. Italian Codice Penale, art. 46 sqq. Spanish Código Penal reformado, art. 9, §6.]

[Footnote 200: Zeitschr. f. die Criminal-Rechts-Pflege in den Preussischen Staaten, edited by Hitzig, iii. 60.]

[Footnote 201: Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, xii. 527.]

[Footnote 202: Mittermaier, op. cit. p. 8.]

[Footnote 203: Ibid. p. 12 sq. Rivière, loc. cit. p. 7.]

[Footnote 204: Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, ii. 165.]

[Footnote 205: Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, i. 38. Erskine-Rankine, op. cit. p. 545.]

[Footnote 206: Bishop, op. cit. § 400 sq. vol. i. 231 sqq.]

[Footnote 207: Hale, op. cit. i. 32.]

[Footnote 208: Harris, op. cit. p. 21. Stephen, Digest, art. 32, p. 22.]

[Footnote 209: Giles, Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio, ii. 30, n. 2.]

The great forbearance with which injuries inflicted in a state of intoxication are treated by various peoples at comparatively low stages of civilisation, is no doubt, to some extent, due to lack of foresight. Failing to anticipate the harmful consequences which may follow from drunkenness, they also fail to recognise the culpability of indulging in it. The American Indians are notorious drunkards, and look upon drunkenness as a "delightful frolick."[210] Among the Kandhs drunkenness is likewise universal, and their "orgies are evidently not regarded as displeasing to their gods."[211] The belief that an intoxicated person is possessed with a demon and acts under its influence, also helps {282} to excuse him.[212] On the other hand, where the law makes no difference between an offender who is sober and an offender who is drunk, the culpability of the latter is exaggerated in consequence of the stirring effect which the outward event has upon public feelings. So great is the influence of the event that certain laws, most unreasonably, punish a person both for what he does when drunk and for making himself drunk. Thus Aristotle tells us that legislators affixed double penalties to crimes committed in drunkenness.[213] The same was done by Charles V., in an edict of 1531,[214] and by Francis I. in 1536.[215] Hardly more reasonable is it that the very society which shows no mercy whatever to the intoxicated offender, is most indulgent to the act of intoxication itself when not accompanied by injurious consequences. Of course it may be argued that drunkenness is blamable in proportion as the person who indulges in it might expect it to lead to mischievous results. It has also been said that, if drunkenness were allowed to excuse, the gravest crimes might be committed with impunity by those who either counterfeited the state or actually assumed it. Some people even maintain that inebriation brings out a person's true character. In a Chinese story we read, "Many drunkards will tell you that they cannot remember in the morning the extravagances of the previous night, but I tell you this is all nonsense, and that in nine cases out of ten those extravagances are committed wittingly and with malice prepense."[216] However, with all allowance for such considerations, I venture to believe that in this, as in many other cases where an injury results from want of foresight, the extreme severity of certain laws is largely due to the fact that the legislator has been more concerned with the external deed than with its source.

[Footnote 210: Adair, History of the American Indians, p. 5. Catlin, North American Indians, ii. 251. Colden, in Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iii. 191. Prescott, ibid. iii. 242. James, op. cit. i. 265.]

[Footnote 211: Campbell, Wild Tribes of Khondistan, p. 165. Macpherson, op. cit. p. 81 sq.]

[Footnote 212: Cf. Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi. 424.]

[Footnote 213: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, iii. 5. 8.]

[Footnote 214: Damhouder, Praxis rerum criminalium, lxxxiv. 20, p. 241.]

[Footnote 215: Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, op. cit. xii. 527.]

[Footnote 216: Giles, op. cit. ii. 30.]

XI. MOTIVES

NO enlightened and conscientious moral judge can regard his judgment as final, unless he know the motive, or motives, of the volition by which his judgment is occasioned. But in ordinary moral estimates little attention is paid to motives. Men desire that certain acts should be performed, and that certain other acts should be abstained from. The conative causes of acts or forbearances are not equally interesting, and they are often hidden. They are considered only in proportion as the moral judgment is influenced by reflection.

Take, for instance, acts which are performed from a sense of duty. It is commonly said that a person ought to obey his conscience. Yet, in point of fact, by doing so he may expose himself to hardly less censure than does the greatest villain. The reason for this is not far to seek. A man's moral conviction is to some extent an expression of his character, hence he may be justly blamed for having a certain moral conviction. And the blame which he may deserve on that account is easily exaggerated, partly because people are apt to be very intolerant concerning opinions of right and wrong which differ from their own, partly owing to the influence which external events exercise upon their minds.

Somewhat greater discrimination is shown in regard to motives consisting of powerful non-volitional conations which in no way represent the agent's character, but to which {284} he yields reluctantly, or by which he is carried away on the spur of the moment. In many such cases even the law--which regards it as no excuse if a person commits a crime from a feeling of duty[1]--displays more or less indulgence to the perpetrator of a harmful deed.

[Footnote 1: Cf. the case Reg. v. Morby, Law Reports, Cases determined in the Queen's Bench Division, viii. 571 sqq.]

Thus, in the eye of the law, compulsion is oftentimes a ground of extenuation. Strictly speaking, a volition can never be compelled into existence;[2] to act under compulsion really means to act under the influence of some non-voluntary motive, so powerful that every ordinary human will would yield to it. As Aristotle puts it, pardon is given when "a man has done what he ought not to have done through fear of things beyond the power of human nature to endure, and such that no man could undergo them. And yet, perhaps, there are some things which a man must never allow himself to be compelled to do, but must rather choose death by the most exquisite torments."[3] This principle has been in some degree recognised by legislation. In many cases of felony, if a married woman commits the crime in the presence of her husband, the law of England presumes that she acts under his coercion, and therefore excuses her from punishment, unless the presumption of law is rebutted by evidence;[4] but children and servants are not acquitted if committing crimes by the command of a parent or a master.[5] Besides the presumption made in favour of married women, compulsion by threats of injury to person or property is recognised as an excuse for crime only, as it seems, in cases in which the compulsion is applied by a body of rebels or rioters, and in which the offender takes a subordinate part in the offence.[6] In a time of peace, on the other hand, though a man be violently assaulted, and have no other possible {285} means of escaping death but by killing an innocent person, if he commit the act he will be guilty of murder; "for he ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent."[7] It has even been laid down as a general principle that "the apprehension of personal danger does not furnish any excuse for assisting in doing any act which is illegal."[8] But the English law relating to duress per minas, and to constraint in general, seems to be harsher both than most modern continental laws[9] and than Roman law.[10] Some of the Italian practitioners were even of opinion that a person who committed homicide by the command of his prince or some other powerful man was exempt from all punishment.[11] According to the Talmud, any offence perpetrated under compulsion or in mortal fear is excusable in the eye of the law, excepting only murder and adultery.[12]

[Footnote 2: Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 40, n. 1.]

[Footnote 3: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, iii. i. 7 sq.]

[Footnote 4: Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, i. 44 sqq. 434. Harris, Principles of the Criminal Law, p. 25. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, ii. 105 sq.]

[Footnote 5: Hale, op. cit. i. 44. Harris, op. cit. p. 26.]

[Footnote 6: Stephen, op. cit. ii. 106.]

[Footnote 7: Hale, op. cit. i. 51. Harris, op. cit. p. 24 sq.]

[Footnote 8: Denman, C. J., in Reg. v. Tyler, reported in Carrington and Payne, Reports of Cases argued and ruled at Nisi Prius, viii. 621.]

[Footnote 9: Code Pénal, art. 64; Chauveau and Hélie, Théorie du Code Pénal, i. 534 sqq. Italian Codice Penale, art. 49. Spanish Código Penal reformado, art. 8, § 9 sqq. Finger, Compendium des österreichischen Rechtes--Das Strafrecht, i. 119. Foinitzki, in Législation pénale comparée, edited by von Liszt, p. 530 (Russian law). Ottoman Penal Code, art. 42.]

[Footnote 10: Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 653. Janka, Der strafrechtliche Notstand, p. 48.]

[Footnote 11: Janka, op. cit. p. 60. A different view, however, is expressed by Covarruvias (De matrimoniis, ii. 3. 4. 6 sq. [Opera omnia, i. 139]):--"Metus numquam excusat nec a mortali, nec a veniali crimine. Peccatum maximum malum, nec eo quid grauius."]

[Footnote 12: Benny, Criminal Code of the Jews according to the Talmud Massecheth Synhedrin, p. 125.]

Suppose, again, that the motive of breaking the law is what has been called "compulsion by necessity." The old instance of shipwrecked persons in a boat unable to carry them all is a standing illustration of this principle. Sir James Stephen says, that "should such a case arise, it is impossible to suppose that the survivors would be subjected to legal punishment."[13] Yet, in a very similar case, occurring in the year 1884, they were. Three men and a boy escaped in an open boat from the shipwreck of the yacht Mignonette. After passing eight days without food, and seeing no prospect of relief, the men killed the boy, who was {286} on the verge of death, in order to feed on his body. Four days later they were rescued by a passing ship; and, on their arrival in England, two of the men were tried for the murder of the boy. The defence raised was that the act was necessary for the purpose of self-preservation. But it was held by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, that such necessity was no justification of the act of causing death when there was a distinct intention to take away the life of another innocent person. However, the sentence of death was afterwards commuted by the Crown to six months' imprisonment.[14] In the same case it was even said that if the boy had had food in his possession, and the others had taken it from him, they would have been guilty of theft.[15] Bacon's proposition that "if a man steal viands to satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor larceny,"[16] is not law at the present day.[17] It was expressly contradicted by Hale, who lays down the following rule:--"If a person, being under necessity for want of victuals, or clothes, shall upon that account clandestinely, and animo furandi steal another man's goods, it is felony and a crime by the laws of England punishable with death; altho the judge, before whom the trial is, in this case (as in other cases of extremity) be by the laws of England intrusted with a power to reprieve the offender before or after judgment, in order to the obtaining the king's mercy."[18] Britton excuses "infants under age, and poor people, who through hunger enter the house of another for victuals under the value of twelve pence."[19] According to the Swedish Westgöta-Lag, a poor man who can find no other means of relieving himself and his family from hunger may thrice with impunity appropriate food belonging to somebody else, but if he does so a fourth time he is punished for theft.[20] The Canonist says, "Necessitas legem non {287} habet"[21]--"Raptorem vel furem non facit necessitas, sed voluntas."[22] This principle has the sanction of the Gospel. Jesus said to the Pharisees, "Have ye not read what David did, when he was an hungered, and they that were with him; How he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shewbread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the priests?"[23]

[Footnote 13: Stephen, op. cit. ii. 108. So, also, according to Bacon's Maxims of the Law, reg. 5 (Works, vii. 344), homicide is in such a case justifiable.]

[Footnote 14: Reg. v. Dudley and Stephens, in Law Reports, Cases determined in the Queen's Bench Division, xiv. 273 sqq.]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. xiv. 276.]

[Footnote 16: Bacon, Maxims of the Law, reg. 5 (Works, vii. 343).]

[Footnote 17: Reg. v. Dudley and Stephens, in Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division, xiv. 286.]

[Footnote 18: Hale, op. cit. i. 54.]

[Footnote 19: Britton, i. 11, vol. i. 42.]

[Footnote 20: Westgöta-Lagen II. þiufua bolker, 14, p. 164 sq.]

[Footnote 21: Gratian, Decretum, iii. 1. 11.]

[Footnote 22: Ibid. iii. 5. 26.]

[Footnote 23: St. Matthew, xii. 1 sqq.]

According to Muhammedan law, the hand is not to be cut off for stealing any article of food that is quickly perishable, because it may have been taken to supply the immediate demands of hunger.[24] We are told that "no Chinese magistrate would be found to pass sentence upon a man who stole food under stress of hunger."[25] In ancient Peru, according to Herrera, "he that robb'd without need was banish'd to the Mountains Andes, never to return without the Inga's leave, and if worth it paid the value of what he had taken. He that for want stole eatables only was reprov'd, and receiv'd no other punishment, but enjoyn'd to work, and threatened, that if he did so again, he should be chastiz'd by carrying a stone on his back, which was very disgraceful."[26] We even hear of savages who regard "compulsion by necessity" as a ground of extenuation. Among the West African Fjort robbery of plantations, committed in a state of great hunger, is exempt from punishment in case there is no deception or secrecy in the matter; however, payment for damage done is expected.[27] Cook says of the Tahitians:--"Those who steal clothes or arms, are commonly put to death, either by hanging or drowning in the sea; but those who steal provisions are bastinadoed. By this practice they wisely vary the punishment of the same crime, when committed from different motives."[28]

[Footnote 24: Lane, Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, p. 121.]

[Footnote 25: Giles, Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio, ii. 217, n. 5.]

[Footnote 26: Herrera, General History of the West Indies, iv. 337.]

[Footnote 27: Dennett, in Jour. African Society, i. 276.]

[Footnote 28: Cook, Journal of a Voyage round the World, p. 41 sq.]

{288} A special kind of self-preservation is self-defence. Here the ground of justification is not merely the motive of the agent, but also the wrongness or criminality of the act which he tries to prevent. Hence the right of inflicting injuries as a necessary means of self-preservation has been more generally recognised in the case of self-defence than in other cases of "compulsion by necessity." "Vim vi repellere" was regarded by the ancients as a natural right,[29] as a law "non scripta, sed nata";[30] and the same view was taken by the Canonist.[31] Even in the savage world self-defence and killing in self-defence are not infrequently justified by custom.[32] But in other instances the influence of the external event makes itself felt also in the case of self-defence. Among the Fjort, though a person who kills another in self-defence is exempt from punishment, he is expected to pay damages.[33] Among the Hottentots self-defence is regarded as a mitigating circumstance, but not as an excuse in the full sense of the word.[34] Among other peoples it is not considered at all.[35] Among the ancient Teutons a person who committed homicide in self-defence had to pay wer;[36] and in Germany such a person seems to have been subject to punishment still in the later Middle Ages.[37] In England, in the thirteenth century, he was considered to deserve royal pardon, but he also needed it.[38]

[Footnote 29: Digesta, xliii. 16. i. 27: "Vim vi repellere licere Cassius scribit idque ius natura comparatur."]

[Footnote 30: Cicero, Pro Milone, 4 (10).]

[Footnote 31: Gratian, Decretum, i. 1. 7.]

[Footnote 32: Merker, quoted by Kohler, in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss. xv. 64 (Wadshagga). Lang, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse, p. 257 (Washambala).]

[Footnote 33: Dennett, in Jour. African Society, i. 276.]

[Footnote 34: Kohler, in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss. xv. 353.]

[Footnote 35: Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse, p. 50 (Banaka and Bapuku). Tellier, ibid. p. 176 (Kreis Kita). Marx, ibid. p. 357 (Amahlubi). Senfft, ibid. p. 450 (Marshall Islanders).]

[Footnote 36: Geyer, Lehre von der Nothwehr, p. 88 sqq. Trummer, Vorträge über Tortur, &c. i. 430. Stemann, Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov, p. 659. Cf. Leges Henrici I. lxxx. 7; lxxxvii. 6.]

[Footnote 37: Trummer, op. cit. i. 428 sqq. von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, Lehrbuch des Peinlichen Rechts, p. 64. Brunner observes (Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, ii. 630), "Nicht das Benehmen des Getöteten war die causa des Todschlags, sondern nur die feindselige Absicht des Todschlagers."]

[Footnote 38: Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ, fol. 132 b, vol. ii. 366 sqq. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. ii. 574.]

{289} In self-defence there should of course be a proportion between the injury which the aggressor intended to inflict and the injury inflicted on him by the person attacked. The most widely-recognised ground on which life is allowed to be taken in self-defence is danger of death. But it is not the exclusive ground. Among the Wakamba "a thief entering a village at night can be killed"; though, if he is, the incident generally gives rise to a blood-feud between his family and the family of the slayer.[39] In Uganda "there is no penalty for killing a thief who enters an enclosure at night";[40] and among various peoples at higher stages of culture we likewise find the provision that a nocturnal thief or house-breaker may be killed with impunity, though a diurnal thief may not.[41] This law, however, seems to have been due not so much to the fact that by night the proprietor had less chance of recovering his property, as to the greater danger to which he was personally exposed.[42] The Roman Law of the Twelve Tables allows the diurnal thief also to be killed, in case he defends himself with a weapon;[43] and, as regards the nocturnal thief, Ulpian expressly says that the owner of the property is justified in killing him only if he cannot spare the life of the thief without peril to himself.[44] The same rule was laid down by Bracton[45] and by Grotius. The latter observes, "No one ought to be slain directly for the sake of mere things, which would be done if I were to kill an unarmed flying thief with a missile, and so recover my goods: but if I am myself in danger of life, then I may repel the danger even with danger to the life of another; nor does this cease to hold, however I have come into that danger, whether by trying to retain my property, or to {290} recover it, or to capture the thief; for in all these cases I am acting lawfully according to my right."[46]

[Footnote 39: Decle, Three Years in Savage Africa, p. 488.]

[Footnote 40: Ashe, Two Kings of Uganda, p. 294.]

[Footnote 41: Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. cclxxvii. p. 297 (Chinese). Exodus, xxii. 2 sq. Lex Duodecim Tabularum, viii. 11 sq. Plato, Leges, ix. 874. Lex Baiuwariorum, ix. (viii.) 5. Du Boys, Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne, p. 288 (Spanish Partidas).]

[Footnote 42: Cf. Gregory IX. Decretales, v. 12. 3; Mishna, fol. 72, quoted by Rabbinowicz, Législation criminelle du Talmud, p. 122.]

[Footnote 43: Lex Duodecim Tabularum, viii. 12. Cicero, Pro Milone, 3 (9).]

[Footnote 44: Digesta, xlviii. 8. 9.]

[Footnote 45: Bracton, op. cit. fol. 144 b, vol. ii. 464 sq.]

[Footnote 46: Grotius, De jure belli et pacis, ii. 1. 12. 1.]

According to the law of England, a woman is justified in killing one who attempts to ravish her; and so also the husband or father may kill a man who attempts a rape on his wife or daughter, if she do not consent.[47] We meet with similar provisions in many other laws, modern and ancient.[48] St. Augustine says that the law allows the killing of a ravisher of chastity, either before or after the act, in the same manner as it permits a person to kill a highwayman who makes an attempt upon his life.[49] According to the Talmud, it is permissible to kill a would-be criminal, in order to prevent the commission of either murder or adultery "to save an innocent man's life, or a woman's honour"; but when the crime has already been accomplished, the criminal cannot be thus disposed of.[50]

[Footnote 47: Harris, op. cit. p. 145.]

[Footnote 48: Erskine-Rankine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, p. 558. Ottoman Penal Code, art. 186. Nordström, Bidrag till den svenska samhälls-författningens historia, ii. 349 (ancient Swedish laws). Plato, Leges, ix. 874.]

[Footnote 49: St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, i. 5 (Migne, Patrologiæ cursus, xxxii. 1227).]

[Footnote 50: Benny, op. cit. p. 125. Rabbinowicz, op. cit. p. 124.]

Among many peoples who in other cases prohibit self-redress, an adulterer and an adulteress may be put to death by the aggrieved husband, especially if they be caught flagrante delicto. Such a custom prevails in various uncivilised societies where justice is generally administered by a council of elders or the chief.[51] Among the ancient {291} Peruvians "a man killing his wife for adultery was free; but if for any other fault he died for it, unless he were a man in dignity, and then some other penalty was inflicted."[52] According to Chinese penal law, "when a principal or inferior wife is discovered by her husband in the act of adultery, if such husband at the very time that he discovers kills the adulterer, or adulteress, or both, he shall not be punishable."[53] By the law of Nepal, the Parbattia husband retains the privilege of avenging, with his own hand, the violation of his marriage bed, and anyone, save a learned Brahman or a helpless boy, who instead of using his own sword, should appeal to the courts, would be covered with eternal disgrace.[54] In all purely Moslem nations custom "overwhelms with ignominy the husband or son of an adulteress who survives the discovery of her sin; he is taboo'd by society; he becomes a laughing-stock to the vulgar, and a disgrace to his family and friends."[55] According to the 'Lex Julia de adulteriis,' a Roman father had a right to kill both his married daughter and her accomplice if she was taken in adultery either in his house or in her husband's, provided that both of them were killed, and that it was done at once. The husband, on the other hand, had no such right as to his wife in any case, and no such right as to her accomplice unless he was an infamous person or a slave, taken, not in his father-in-law's house, but in his own.[56] However, it seems that in more ancient times the husband was entitled to kill an adulterous wife;[57] and his right of self-redress in the case of adultery was again somewhat extended by Justinian beyond the very narrow limits set down by the Lex Julia.[58] According to an Athenian law, "if one man shall kill another . . . after catching him with his wife, or with his mother, or with a {292} sister, or with a daughter, or with a concubine whom he keeps to beget free-born children, he shall not go into exile for homicide on such account."[59] Ancient Teutonic law allowed a husband to kill both his unfaithful wife and the adulterer, if he caught them in the act;[60] according to the Laws of Alfred, an adulterer taken flagrante delicto by the woman's lawful husband, father, brother, or son, might be killed without risk of blood-feud.[61] In the thirteenth century, however, there are already signs that, in England, the outraged husband who found his wife in the act of adultery might no longer slay the guilty pair or either of them, although he might emasculate the adulterer.[62] The present law treats the killing of an adulterer taken in the act in the same way as homicide committed in a quarrel; by slaying him, the husband is guilty of manslaughter only, though, if the killing were deliberate and took place in revenge after the fact, the crime would be murder. This seems to be the only case in English law in which provocation, other than by actual blows, is considered sufficient to reduce homicide to manslaughter, if the killing be effected by a deadly weapon.[63] There are corresponding provisions in other modern laws.[64] As a rule, flagrant adultery does not justify homicide, but serves as an extenuating circumstance.[65] But according to the French Code Pénal, "dans le cas d'adultère . . . le meurtre commis par l'époux sur son épouse, ainsi que sur le complice, à l'instant où il les surprend en flagrant délit dans la maison conjugale, est excusable."[66] And in Russia, though the law does not exempt from punishment a {293} husband who thus avenges himself, the jury show great indulgence to him.[67]

[Footnote 51: Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, p. 45; Stewart, in Jour. As. Soc. Bengal, xxiv. 628 (Kukis). Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, p. 83; Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal, iii. 76 (Kandhs). Anderson, Mandalay to Momien, p. 140 (Kakhyens). MacMahon, Far Cathay and Farther India, p. 273 (Indo-Burmese border tribes). Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, iii. 130. von Brenner, Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras, pp. 211, 213. Modigliani, Viaggio a Nías, p. 495. Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 364. Dyveyrier, Exploration du Sahara, p. 429 (Touareg). Barrow, Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa, i. 207 (Kafirs). Among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, however, "a man is fined for murder, if he kills an adulterer or adulteress in the act, although he be the husband of the adulteress" (Maclean, Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs, p. 111). Among the Wakamba, "if a man is caught in adultery at night, the husband has a right to kill him; but if the injured man thus takes the law into his own hands in the daytime, he is dealt with as a murderer" (Decle, op. cit. p. 487).]

[Footnote 52: Herrera, op. cit. iv. 338.]

[Footnote 53: Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. cclxxxv. p. 307.]

[Footnote 54: Hodgson, Miscellaneous Essays, ii. 235, 236, 272.]

[Footnote 55: Burton, Sind Revisited, ii. 54 sq.]

[Footnote 56: Digesta, xlviii. 5. 21 sq.]

[Footnote 57: Gellius, Noctes Atticæ, x. 23. 5. Cf. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 625.]

[Footnote 58: Novellæ, cxvii. 15.]

[Footnote 59: Demosthenes, Contra Aristocratem, 53, p. 637.]

[Footnote 60: Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen, p. 823. Nordström, op. cit. ii. 62 sq. Stemann, op. cit. p. 325.]

[Footnote 61: Laws of Alfred, ii. 42.]

[Footnote 62: Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 484. The same right is granted by a Spanish mediæval law to a father, or a husband, who finds a man having illegitimate sexual intercourse with his daughter, or wife (Du Boys, Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne, p. 93).]

[Footnote 63: Hale, op. cit. i. 486. Harris, op. cit. p. 145. Cherry, Lectures on the Growth of Criminal Law, p. 82 sq.]

[Footnote 64: Italian Codice Penale, art. 377. Spanish Código Penal reformado, art. 438. Ottoman Penal Code, art. 188.]

[Footnote 65: Günther, Idee der Wiedervergeltung, iii. 233 sqq.]

[Footnote 66: Code Pénal, art. 324.]

[Footnote 67: Foinitzki, loc. cit. p. 548.]

Whilst the law referring to self-defence has gradually become more liberal, the law referring to self-redress in the case of adultery has thus, generally speaking, become more severe. The reason for this is obvious. A husband who slays his unfaithful wife or her accomplice does not defend, but avenges himself; and it is to be expected that a society in which punishment has only just succeeded revenge should still admit, or tolerate, revenge in extreme cases. The privilege granted to the outraged husband is not the sole survival of the old system of self-redress lingering on under the new conditions. According to Kafir custom or law, the relatives of a murdered man become liable only to a very light fine if they kill the murderer.[68] The ancient Teutons, at a time when their laws already prohibited private revenge, did not look upon an avenger of blood in the same light as an ordinary manslayer;[69] and even the Church recognised the distinction.[70] Some of the ancient Swedish laws entirely excused homicide committed in revenge immediately after the crime.[71] According to the Östgöta-Lag, an incendiary taken in flagrancy might be at once burnt in the fire,[72] and ancient Norwegian law permitted the slaying of a thief caught in the act.[73] In the Laws of Ine there is an indication that a thief's fate was at the discretion of his captor,[74] and a law of Æthelstan implies that the natural and proper course as to thieves was to kill them.[75] In the Laws of King Wihtræd it is said, "If any one slay a layman while thieving; let him lie without 'wergeld.'"[76] So also, according to Javanese law, if a thief be caught in the act it is lawful to put him to death.[77] For our present {294} purpose it is important to note that all such cases imply a recognition of the principle that an act committed on extreme provocation requires special consideration. To declare that an adulterer or adulteress caught in flagrancy, or a manifest thief, may be slain with impunity, is a concession to human passions, which are naturally more easily aroused by the sight of an act than by the mere knowledge of its commission. It was for a similar reason that the Law of the Twelve Tables punished furtum manifestum much more heavily than furtum nec manifestum;[78] and that the Laws of Alfred imposed death as the penalty for fighting in the King's hall if the offender was taken in the act, whereas he was allowed to pay for himself if he escaped and was subsequently apprehended.[79]

[Footnote 68: Maclean, op. cit. p. 143. Cf., however, ibid. p. 110.]

[Footnote 69: Wilda, op. cit. p. 562. Stemann, op. cit. p. 582 sq.]

[Footnote 70: Wilda, op. cit. pp. 180, 565. Labbe-Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio, xii. 289.]

[Footnote 71: Nordström, op. cit. ii. 414 sq.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. ii. 416.]

[Footnote 73: Wilda, op. cit. p. 889.]

[Footnote 74: Laws of Ine, 12. Cf. Stephen, op. cit. i. 62.]

[Footnote 75: Laws of Æthelstan, iv. 4.]

[Footnote 76: Laws of Wihtræd, 25.]

[Footnote 77: Crawfurd, op. cit. iii. 115.]

[Footnote 78: Institutiones, iv. 1. 5.]

[Footnote 79: Laws of Alfred, ii. 7.]

The difference between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, under the disturbance of great excitement caused by a wrong done to himself, has been widely recognised. There are instances reported of savages who distinguish between murder and manslaughter. And the laws of all civilised nations agree in regarding, on certain conditions, passion aroused by provocation as a mitigating circumstance at the commission of a crime.

The Australian Narrinyeri, as we have seen, have a tribunal, called tendi, consisting of the elders of the clan, to which all offenders are brought for trial. "In case of the slaying by a person or persons of one clan of the member of another clan in time of peace, the fellow-clansmen of the murdered man will send to the friends of the murderer and invite them to bring him to trial before the united tendies. If, after full inquiry, he is found to have committed the crime, he will be punished according to the degree of guilt. If it were a case of murder, with malice aforethought, he would be handed over to his own clan to be put to death by spearing. If it should be what we call manslaughter, he would receive a good thrashing, or be banished from his clan, or compelled to go to his mother's {295} relations."[80] In the Pelew Islands, if two natives are quarrelling, and the one says to the other, "Your wife is bad," the insulted party is entitled to chastise the provoker with a stone, and is not held liable even if the latter should die in consequence.[81] The Eastern Central Africans "are aware of the difference between murder and homicide," even though the punishment of the two crimes is often the same.[82] Among the Kandhs only slight compensation is awarded "for wounds, however serious, given under circumstances of extreme provocation."[83] "Valdeyak, or manslaughter," says Georgi, "is not capital among the Tungusians, when it has been occasioned by some antecedent quarrel. The slayer is however whipped, and obliged to maintain the family of the deceased: he undergoes no reproaches on account of the affair; but on the contrary is considered as a brave and courageous man for it."[84]

[Footnote 80: Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, Native Tribes of South Australia, p. 34 sq.]

[Footnote 81: Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in Journal des Museum Godeffroy, iv. 43 sq.]

[Footnote 82: Macdonald, Africana, i. 172.]

[Footnote 83: Macpherson, op. cit. p. 82.]

[Footnote 84: Georgi, Russia, iii. 83. Cf. also Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi. 186.]

Among the ancient Peruvians, "when one killed another in a quarrel, the first thing enquired into was, who had been the aggressor; if the dead man, then the punishment was slight, at the will of the Inga; but if the surviver had given the provocation, his penalty was death, or at least perpetual banishment to the Andes, there to work in the Inga's fields of corn, which was like sending him to the galeys. A murderer was immediately publickly put to death, tho' he were a man of quality."[85] Among the Mayas of Yucatan and Nicaragua, in case of great provocation or absence of malice, homicide was atoned by the payment of a fine.[86]

[Footnote 85: Herrera, op. cit. iv. 337 sq.]

[Footnote 86: Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific States, ii. 658.]

From certain passages in the Mosaic law the conclusion has been drawn that the ancient Hebrews did not consider it obligatory to inflict death upon him who had killed his neighbour in a fit of passion.[87] It is said that a man shall be put to death if he "come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile,"[88] or if he "hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for him, and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he die."[89] On the other hand, he shall be allowed a resort to a city {296} of refuge if "he lie not in wait,"[90] or if he thrust his neighbour "suddenly without enmity."[91]

[Footnote 87: Goitein, Das Vergeltungsprincip im biblischen und taltmudischen Strafrecht, p. 33 sqq.]

[Footnote 88: Exodus, xxi. 14.]

[Footnote 89: Deuteronomy, xix. 11 sq.]

[Footnote 90: Exodus, xxi. 13.]

[Footnote 91: Numbers, xxxv. 22, 25.]

Professor Leist suggests that in ancient Greece, at a time when blood-revenge was a sacred duty in the case of premeditated murder, homicide committed without premeditation could be forgiven by the avenger of blood.[92] Plato, in his 'Laws,' draws a distinction between him "who treasures up his anger and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval," and him "who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense." The deed of the latter, though not involuntary, "approaches to the involuntary," and should therefore be punished less severely than the crime perpetrated by him who has stored up his anger.[93] Aristotle, also, whilst denying that "acts done from anger or from desire are involuntary,"[94] maintains that "assaults committed in anger, are rightly decided not to be of malice aforethought, for they do not originate in the volition of the man who has been angered, but rather in that of the man who so angered him."[95] And he adds that "everyone will admit that he who does a disgraceful act, being at the same time free from desire, or at any rate feeling desire but slightly, is more to be blamed than is he who does such an act under the influence of a strong desire; and that he who, when not in a passion, smites his neighbour, is more to be blamed than is he who does so when in a passion."[96] Cicero likewise points out that "in every species of injustice it is a very material question whether it is committed through some agitation of passion, which commonly is short-lived and temporary, or from deliberate, prepense, malice; for those things which proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of slighter moment than those which are inflicted by forethought and preparation."[97]

[Footnote 92: Leist, Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte, pp. 325, 352.]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Leges, ix. 867.]

[Footnote 94: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, iii. 1. 21.]

[Footnote 95: Ibid. v. 8. 9.]

[Footnote 96: Ibid. vii. 7. 3.]

[Footnote 97: Cicero, De officiis, i. 8.]

Of ancient Russian law M. Kovalewsky observes, "L'existence d'une excitation violente est prise en considération, par notre antique législation, qui déclare le crime accompli sous leur influence non imputable."[98] According to ancient Irish law, "homicide was divisible into the two classes of simple manslaughter and murder, the difference between which lay in the {297} existence or absence of malice aforethought, the fine in the latter being double what it was in the former case"; and for a wound which was inflicted inadvertently in lawful anger, the payment was made upon a diminished scale.[99] The ancient Teutons, also, held a wrong committed in sudden anger and on provocation to be less criminal than one committed with premeditation in cold blood;[100] this opinion seems partly to be at the bottom of the distinction which they made between open and secret homicide.[101] According to the law of the East Frisians, a man who kills another without premeditation may buy off his neck with money, not so he who commits a murder with malice aforethought.[102] It is curious that Bracton should take no notice of the different grades of evil intention which may accompany voluntary homicide, and that he should omit altogether the question of provocation;[103] Beaumanoir, the French jurist, who lived in the same age, mentions in his 'Coutumes du Beauvoisis' provocation as an extenuating circumstance,[104] and the same view was taken by the Church.[105] Coke, in his Third Institute--which may be regarded as the second source of the criminal law of England, Bracton being the first--gives an account of malice aforethought, and adds, "Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice forethought, upon some sudden falling out. Delinquens per iram provocatus puniri debet mitius."[106] Hume says that in Scotland "the manslayer on suddenty was to have the benefit of the girth or sanctuary: he might flee to the church or other holy place; from which he might indeed be taken for trial, but to be returned thither, safe in life and limb, if his allegation of chaude melle were proved."[107] All modern codes regard provocation under certain circumstances as a mitigating circumstance.[108] According to the criminal law of Montenegro, great provocation may even relieve a homicide of all guilt.[109]

[Footnote 98: Kovalewsky, Coutume contemporaine, p. 291.]

[Footnote 99: Ancient Laws of Ireland, iii. pp. xciii. cx.]

[Footnote 100: Wilda, op. cit. p. 560 sqq., 701. Stemann, op. cit. p. 574. von Amira, in Paul's Grundriss der germanischen Philologie, ii. pt. ii. 174.]

[Footnote 101: Wilda, op. cit. p. 569. von Amira, loc. cit. p. 173.]

[Footnote 102: Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht, iii. 17 sq.]

[Footnote 103: Cf. Stephen, op. cit. iii. 33.]

[Footnote 104: Beaumanoir, Coutumes du Beauvoisis, xxx. 101, vol. i. 454 sq.]

[Footnote 105: Gregory III. Judicia congrua penitentibus, 3 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. xii. 289).]

[Footnote 106: Coke, Third Institute, p. 55.]

[Footnote 107: Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, i. 365.]

[Footnote 108: Günther, op. cit. iii. 256 sqq.]

[Footnote 109: Ibid. iii. 255 sq.]

It has been said that a man who acts under the influence of great passion has not, at the time, a full knowledge of the nature and quality of his act, and that {298} the clemency of the law is "a condescension to the frailty of the human frame, to the furor brevis, which, while the frenzy lasteth, rendereth the man deaf to the voice of reason."[110] But the main cause for passion extenuating his guilt is not the intellectual disability under which he acts, but the fact that he is carried away by an impulse which is too strong for his will to resist. This is implied in the provision of the law, that "provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide unless the person provoked is at the time when he does the act deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he has received."[111]

[Footnote 110: Foster, Report of Crown Cases, p. 315.]

[Footnote 111: Stephen, Digest, art. 246, p. 188.]

That anger has been so generally recognised as an extenuation of guilt is largely due to the fact that the person who provokes it is himself blamable; both morality and law take into consideration the degree of provocation to which the agent was exposed. But, at the same time, the pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will may by itself be a sufficient ground for extenuation. In certain cases of mental disease a morbid impulse or idea may take such a despotic possession of the patient as to drive him to the infliction of an injury. He is mad, and yet he may be free from delusion and exhibit no marked derangement of intelligence. He may be possessed with an idea or impulse to kill somebody which he cannot resist. Or he may yield to a morbid impulse to steal or to set fire to houses or other property, without having any ill-feeling against the owner or any purpose to serve by what he does.[112] The deed to which the patient is driven is frequently one which he abhors, as when a mother kills the child which she loves most.[113] In such cases the agent is of course acquitted by the moral judge, and if he is condemned by the law of his country and its guardians, the reason for this can be nothing but ignorance. We must remember that this form of madness was hardly known even to medical {299} men till the end of the 18th century,[114] when Pinel, to his own surprise, discovered that there were "many madmen who at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but who were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the affective faculties had alone sustained injury."[115] And there can be no doubt that the fourteen English judges who formulated the law on the criminal responsibility of the insane, made no reference to this manie sans délire simply because they had not sufficient knowledge of the subject with which they had to deal.[116]

[Footnote 112: Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease, p. 133 sqq. von Krafft-Ebing, Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen Psychopathologie, p. 308 sqq.]

[Footnote 113: Gadelius, Om tvångstankar, p. 168 sq. Paulhan, L'activité mentale, p. 374.]

[Footnote 114: Maudsley, op. cit. p. 141.]

[Footnote 115: Pinel, Traité médico-philosophique sur l'aliénation mentale, p. 156: "Je ne fut pas peu surpris de voir plusieurs aliénés qui n'offroient à aucune époque aucune lésion de l'entendement, et qui étoient dominés par une sorte d'instinct de fureur, comme si les facultés affectives seules avoient été lésées."]

[Footnote 116: Sir James Stephen (Digest, art. 28, p. 20 sq.) thinks it possible that, according to the present law of England, an act is not criminal if the person who does it is, at the time when it is done, prevented by any disease affecting his mind from controlling his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control has been produced by his own default.]

* * * * *

That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with reference to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good, not only of moral blame, but of moral praise. Every religion presents innumerable examples of people who do "good deeds" only in expectation of heavenly reward. This implies the assumption that the Deity judges upon actions without much regard to their motives; for if motives were duly considered, a man could not be held rewardable for an act which he performs solely for his own benefit. We are told that the homage which the Chinese "render the gods and goddesses believed to be concerned in the management of the affairs of this world is exceedingly formal, mechanical, and heartless," and that "there seems to be no special importance attached to purity of heart."[117] According to Caldwell, "the Hindu religionist enjoins the act alone, and affirms that motives have nothing to do with merit."[118] The argument, "Obey the law because it will {300} profit you to do so," constitutes the fundamental motive of Deuteronomy, as appears from phrases like these: "That it may go well with thee," "That thy days may be prolonged."[119] Speaking of the modern Egyptians, Lane observes that "from their own profession it appears that they are as much excited to the giving of alms by the expectation of enjoying corresponding rewards in heaven as by pity for the distresses of their fellow-creatures, or a disinterested wish to do the will of God."[120] Something similar may be said, not only of the "good deeds" of Muhammedans, but of those of many Christians. Did not Paley expressly define virtue as "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness"?[121]

[Footnote 117: Doolittle, Social Life of the Chinese, ii. 397.]

[Footnote 118: Caldwell, Tinnevelly Shanars, p. 35.]

[Footnote 119: Cf. Montefiore, Hibbert Lectures, p. 531.]

[Footnote 120: Lane, Modern Egyptians, p. 293.]

[Footnote 121: Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, i. 7 (Complete Works, ii. 38).]

Such views, however, cannot hold their ground against the verdict of the scrutinising moral consciousness. They have been repeatedly contradicted by the great teachers of morality. Confucius required an inward sincerity in all outward practice, and poured scorn on the pharisaism which contented itself with the cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter.[122] He said that, "in the rites of mourning, exceeding grief with deficient rites is better than little demonstration of grief with superabounding rites; and that in those of sacrifice, exceeding reverence with deficient rites is better than an excess of rites with but little reverence."[123] "Sacrifice is not a thing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has its birth in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given to it by ceremonies."[124] The virtuous man offers his sacrifices "without seeking for anything to be gained by them."[125] "The Master said, 'See what a man does. Mark his motives.'"[126] The popular Taouist work, called 'The Book of Secret Blessings,' inculcates the necessity {301} of purifying the heart as a preparation for all right-doing.[127] The religious legislator of Brahmanism, whilst assuming in accordance with the popular view that the fulfilment of religious duty will be always rewarded to some extent, whatever may be the motive, maintains that the man who fulfils his duties without regard to the rewards which follow the fulfilment, will enjoy the highest happiness in this life and eternal happiness hereafter.[128] According to the Buddhistic Dhammapada, "if a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage. . . . If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him."[129] In his description of the Buddhists of Mongolia, the Rev. James Gilmour observes:--"Mongol priests recognise the power of motive in estimating actions . . . . The attitude of the mind decides the nature of the act. He that offers a cup of cold water only, in a proper spirit, has presented a gift quite as acceptable as the most magnificent of donations."[130] With reference to the Hebrews, Mr. Montefiore says:--"If it were true that the later Judaism of the law laid exclusive stress in its moral teaching upon the mere outward act and not upon the spirit--upon doing rather than being, as we might nowadays express it--we should scarcely find that constant harping upon the heart as the source and seat of good and evil. What more legal book than Chronicles? Yet it is there that we find the earnest supplication for a heart directed towards God. . . . The eudæmonistic motive is strongest in Deuteronomy; it is weakest with the Rabbis."[131] Few sayings are quoted and applied more frequently in the Rabbinical literature than the adage which closes those tractates of the Mishna which deal with the sacrificial law:--"He that brings few offerings is as he that brings many; let his heart be directed {302} heavenward."[132] The same faults which Jesus chastises in the hypocritical Rabbis of his day are also chastised in the Talmud. It is said, "Before a man prays let him purify his heart,"[133] and, "Sin committed with a good motive is better than a precept fulfilled from a bad motive."[134] Rabbi Elazar says, "No charity is rewarded but according to the degree of benevolence in it, for it is said, 'Sow (a reward) for yourselves in giving alms as charity, you will reap according to the benevolence.'"[135] Nor is the doctrine which requires disinterested motives for the performance of good deeds foreign to Muhammedan moralists. "Whatever we give," says the author of the Akhlâk-i-Jelâli, "should be given in the fulness of zeal and good-will. . . . We should spend it simply to please God, and not mix the act with any meaner motive, lest thereby it be rendered null and void."[136]

[Footnote 122: Cf. Legge, Religions of China, p. 261 sq.; Girard de Rialle, Mythologie comparée, p. 214.]

[Footnote 123: Lî Kî, ii. 1. 2. 27. Cf. Lun Yü, iii. 4. 3.]

[Footnote 124: Lî Kî, xxii. 1.]

[Footnote 125: Ibid. xxii. 2.]

[Footnote 126: Lun Yü, ii. 10. 1 sq.]

[Footnote 127: Douglas, Confucianism and Taouism, p. 272.]

[Footnote 128: Wheeler, History of India, ii. 478.]

[Footnote 129: Dhammapada, 1 sq.]

[Footnote 130: Gilmour, Among the Mongols, p. 239.]

[Footnote 131: Montefiore, op. cit. pp. 483, 533. 1 Chronicles, xxii. 19; xxviii. 9; xxix. 18 sq. 2 Chronicles, xi. 16; xv. 12; xvi. 9.]

[Footnote 132: Montefiore, op. cit. p. 484.]

[Footnote 133: Ibid. p. 174.]

[Footnote 134: Nazir, fol. 23 B, quoted by Hershon, Treasures of the Talmud, p. 74.]

[Footnote 135: Succah, fol. 49 B, ibid. p. 11.]

[Footnote 136: Quoted by Ameer Ali, Ethics of Islâm, p. 38 sq.]

XII. FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS--CHARACTER

THE observation has often been made that in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments, which tell people what they ought not to do, are much more prominent than the positive commandments, which tell them what they ought to do. The main reason for this is that negative commandments spring from the disapproval or acts, whereas positive commandments spring from the disapproval of forbearances or omissions, and that the indignation of men is much more easily aroused by action than by the absence of it. A person who commits a harmful deed is a more obvious cause of pain than a person who causes harm by doing nothing, and this naturally affects the question of guilt in the eyes of the multitude. A scrutinising judge of course carefully distinguishes between willfulness and negligence, whereas, to his mind, a forbearance is morally equivalent to an act. The unreflecting judge, on the other hand, is much less concerned with the question of wilfulness than with the distinction between acting and not-acting. Even the criminal laws of civilised nations take little cognisance of forbearances and omissions;[1] and one reason for this is that they evoke little public indignation. Even if it be admitted that the rules of beneficence, so far as details are concerned, must be left in a great measure to {304} the jurisdiction of private ethics, the limits of the law on this head, as Bentham remarks, seem "to be capable of being extended a good deal farther than they seem ever to have been extended hitherto." And he appropriately asks, "In cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him?"[2]

[Footnote 1: Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, ii. 113. Hepp, Zurechnung auf dem Gebiete des Civilrechts, p. 115 (Roman law).]

[Footnote 2: Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 322 sq. To a certain extent, however, this has been admitted by legislators even in the Middle Ages. Frederick II.'s Sicilian Code imposed a penalty on persons who witnessed conflagrations or shipwrecks without helping the victims, and a fine of four augustales on anyone who, hearing the shrieks of an assaulted woman, did not hurry to her rescue (Constitutiones Napolitana sive Siculæ, i. 28, 22 [Lindenbrog, Codex legum antiquarum, pp. 715, 712]). Bracton says (De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ, fol. 121, vol. ii. 280 sq.) that he who could rescue a man from death and did not do it, ought not to be exempt from punishment. It was a principle of the Canon law that he who does not prevent the infliction of an injury upon his neighbour when it lies in his power to do so, is to be regarded as an accomplice in the offence (Geyer, Lehre von der Nothwehr, p. 74. Gregory IX. Decretales, v. 12, 6. 2: "Qui potuit hominem liberare a morte, et non liberavit, eum occidit").]

The more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater the importance which it attaches to positive commandments. This is well illustrated by a comparison between Old and New Testament morality. As Professor Seeley observes,[3] "the old legal formula began 'thou shalt not,' the new begins with 'thou shalt.' The young man who had kept the whole law--that is, who had refrained from a number of actions--is commanded to do something, to sell his goods and feed the poor. Condemnation was passed under the Mosaic law upon him who had sinned, who had done something forbidden--the soul that sinneth shall die; Christ's condemnation is pronounced upon those who had not done good--'I was an hungered and ye gave me no meat.' The sinner whom Christ habitually denounces is he who has done nothing." This characteristic is repeatedly manifested in His parables--as in the case of the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side; in the case of Dives, of whom no ill is recorded except that a beggar lay at his {305} gate full of sores and yet no man gave unto him; in the case of the servant who hid in a napkin the talent committed to him. However, to say that the new morality involved the discovery of "a new continent in the moral globe,"[4] is obviously an exaggeration. The customs of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but positive injunctions as well. To be generous to friends, charitable to the needy, hospitable to strangers, are rules which, as will be seen, may be traced back to the lowest stages of savagery known to us. The difference in question is only one of degree. Of the Bangerang tribe in Victoria Mr. Curr observes:--"Aboriginal restraints were, in the majority of cases, though not altogether, of a negative character; an individual might not do this, and might not eat that, and might not say the other. What he should do under any circumstances, or that he should do anything, were matters with which custom interfered less frequently."[5]

[Footnote 3: Seeley, Ecce Homo, p. 176.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 179.]

[Footnote 5: Curr, Recollections of Squatting in Victoria, p. 264 sq.]

Whilst the unreflecting mind has a tendency to overlook or underrate the guilt of a person who, whether wilfully or by negligence, causes harm by doing nothing, it is on the other hand, apt to exaggerate the guilt of a person who, not wilfully but out of heedlessness or rashness, causes harm by a positive act. In reality the latter person is blamable not for what he did, but for what he omitted to do, for want of due attention, for not thinking of the probable consequences of his act or for insufficient advertence to them. But the superficial judge largely measures the agent's guilt by the actual harm done, and in many cases even attributes to carelessness what was due to sheer misfortune.

As Sir F. Pollock and Prof. Maitland rightly observe, it is not true that barbarians will not trace the chain of causation beyond its nearest link--that, for example, they will not impute one man's death to another unless that other has struck a blow which laid a corpse at his feet.[6] {306} Among the Wanyoro, should a girl die in childbirth, the seducer is also doomed to die, unless he ransom himself by payment of some cows.[7] Among the Wakamba, if a man is the second time guilty of manslaughter in a state of drunkenness, the elders may either sentence him to death, "or make the seller of drink pay compensation to the family of the victim."[8] According to the native code of Malacca, if vicious buffaloes or cattle "be tied in the highway, where people are in the habit of passing and repassing, and gore or wound any person, the owner shall be fined one tahil and one paha, and pay the expense necessary for the cure of the wounded individual. Should he be gored to death, then the owner shall be fined according to the Diyat, because the owner is criminal in having tied the animal in an improper place."[9] In the Laws of Alfred it is said that, if a man have a spear over his shoulder and anybody stake himself on it, the man with the spear has to pay the wer.[10] According to an ancient custom, in vogue in England as late as the thirteenth century, one who was accused of homicide was, before going to the wager of battle, expected to swear that he had done nothing through which the dead man had become "further from life and nearer to death";[11] and damages which the modern English lawyer would without hesitation describe as "too remote" were not too remote for the author of the so-called 'Laws of Henry I.'[12] "At your request I accompany you when you are about your own affairs; my enemies fall upon and kill me; you must pay for my death.[13] You take me to see a wild beast show or that interesting spectacle a madman; beast or madman kills me; you must pay. You hang up your sword; some one else knocks it down so that it cuts me; you must pay."[14] In all these cases you did something that helped to bring {307} about death or wound, and you are consequently held responsible for the mishap.

[Footnote 6: Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. ii. 470.]

[Footnote 7: Emin Pasha in Central Africa, p. 83.]

[Footnote 8: Decle, Three Years in Savage Africa, p. 487.]

[Footnote 9: Newbold, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, ii. 256 sq.]

[Footnote 10: Laws of Alfred, 36.]

[Footnote 11: Leges Henrici I. xc. 11. Bracton, op. cit. fol. 141 b, vol. ii. 440 sq.]

[Footnote 12: Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 470 sq.]

[Footnote 13: Leges Henrici I. lxxxviii. 9.]

[Footnote 14: Ibid. xc. 11. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 471.]

But though early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an event to its source, they easily fail to distinguish between external and internal causes, to discover where there is guilt or not, and, in case of carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the offender's guilt. Ancient Teutonic law, as we have seen, distinguished between vili and vadhi. It punished the involuntary manslayer less heavily than the voluntary one, but it punished him all the same; and whether the unintended deed was combined with heedlessness or was purely accidental was a question with which the law did not at all concern itself.[15] According to the Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, "if the doctor has treated a gentleman for a severe wound with a lancet of bronze, and has caused the gentleman to die, or has opened an abscess of the eye for a gentleman with the bronze lancet and has caused the loss of the gentleman's eye, one shall cut off his hands."[16] In the Mosaic law distinction was made between presence and absence of enmity in the manslayer, but the difference between carelessness and misfortune was not considered,[17] except when the instrument of death was a goring ox.[18] However, in this, as in many other respects, great progress was made by the later legislation of the Jews. The Rabbis took considerable pains to distinguish between purely accidental homicide and homicide due to carelessness; the former they exempted from all punishment, whereas the latter incurred the punishment of confinement to a city of refuge.[19] They even distinguished between cases in which the death was exclusively due to the carelessness of the agent, and cases in which the deceased contributed to it by some blamable act of his own. A father or a teacher {308} who in punishing his son or pupil unintentionally caused his death, and a person who by order of the Sanhedrim inflicted corporal punishment on a culprit and in doing so happened by mistake to kill him--such persons were not confined in a city of refuge, but escaped punishment altogether.[20] Whatever else may be said of these provisions, they certainly show remarkable discernment in a point where legislators of a ruder type have been very indiscriminate. In the oldest English records we see no attempt to distinguish cases in which the dead man himself was reprehensible from others in which no fault could be imputed to him, and we find that many horses and boats bore the guilt which should have been ascribed to beer.[21] When a drunken carter was crushed beneath the wheel of his cart, the cart, the cask of wine which was in it, and the oxen that were drawing it, were all deodand.[22] According to the customary law of the Ossetes, if a stolen gun went off in the hands of the thief who was carrying it away, and killed him, the thief's kin had a just feud against the owner of the gun.[23]

[Footnote 15: Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen, p. 578. Geyer, op. cit. p. 88. Brunner, Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und französischen Rechtes, p. 499.]

[Footnote 16: Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, 218.]

[Footnote 17: Numbers, xxxv. 16 sqq. Deuteronomy, xix. 4 sqq.]

[Footnote 18: Exodus, xxi. 28-32, 35 sq. Cf. Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, 250 sqq.]

[Footnote 19: Rabbinowicz, Législation criminelle du Talmud, p. 173 sqq.]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 174. Benny, Criminal Code of the Jews according to the Talmud Massecheth Synhedrin, p. 115 sq.]

[Footnote 21: Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 474, n. 4.]

[Footnote 22: Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of Northumberland, p. 96 sq.]

[Footnote 23: Kovalewsky, Coutume contemporaine, p. 295.]

Modern laws generally hold a person liable for harm caused by him through want of ordinary care and foresight, and it depends on the nature of the case whether he will have to pay damages or to suffer punishment. Yet, as we have previously noticed, his punishment is determined not only by the degree of carelessness of which he was guilty or the danger to which he exposed his fellow-men, but, largely, by the harm resulting; whereas, if nobody happens to be hurt, little notice is taken of his fault. To such an extent are men's judgments in these matters influenced by external facts, that even nowadays many among ourselves will hold a person answerable for all the damage which directly ensues from an act of his, even though no foresight could have reasonably been expected {309} to look out for it.[24] Not long ago there were plausible, if insufficient, grounds adduced for asserting that in English courts a plea that there was neither negligence nor an intent to do harm was no answer to an action which charged the defendant with having hurt the plaintiff's body.[25] And of late years attacks have been made by continental jurists upon the Roman principle that there is no liability where there is no fault[26]--a principle which, more or less modified, has been adopted by modern laws.[27] Although they take pains to point out the difference between punishment and indemnification, the very language they use indicates the quasi-ethical basis on which their theory rests. It is only just, they say, that he who has caused the evil should compensate for it, since the injured party "is still much more innocent than he." And the "sense of justice" is appealed to for compelling a man who faints in the street and in the fall happens to break some fragile articles to indemnify the owner for his loss.[28] Thus, whilst loss from accident is generally allowed to lie where it falls, an exception is made where the instrument of misfortune is a human being. This is a most unreasonable exception, but one not difficult to explain. People are ready to blame a person who commits a harmful deed, whether he deserves blame or not; at the same time they are apt to overlook the indirect and more remote cause of the harm which lies in the sufferer's own conduct. Hence the liability, if not the guilt, is laid on him who is a cause of pain by doing something, even though it be by merely spasmodic contractions of his muscles; whereas the other party, who only exposed himself to the risk of being hurt, is regarded as the "more innocent."

[Footnote 24: Holmes, Common Law, p. 80.]

[Footnote 25: Stanley v. Powell, in Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division, 1891, i. 86 sqq. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 475 sq.]

[Footnote 26: von Jhering, Schuldmoment im römischen Privatrecht, passim, especially pp. 20 sqq., 40 sqq. Hepp, op. cit. p. 106.]

[Footnote 27: Forsman, Bidrag till läran om skadestånd i brottmål, p. 158 sq. Pollock, Law of Torts, p. 129 sqq.]

[Footnote 28: Thon, Rechtsnorm und subjectives Recht, p. 106, n. 71.]

Whilst culpability or quasi-culpability is thus imputed to the innocent committer of a harmful deed, little or no {310} censure is passed on him whose want of foresight or want of self-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect is sufficiently remote. This is exemplified by the frivolous leniency with which drunkenness, not long ago, was looked upon in many civilised countries, and by the criminal indifference with which law and public opinion still regard the production of offspring that are almost with certainty doomed to misery on account of the vices, poverty, or bodily infirmities of the parents. To interfere here, it is argued, would be to intrude upon the individual's right of freedom, or to meddle with the affairs of Providence. But men are not, generally, allowed to do mischief simply in order to gratify their own appetites, and Providence might equally well be called in to answer for any other kind of human shortcoming. I presume the true explanation to be, that in this, as in many other kindred cases, the cause and effect are so distant from each other that the near-sighted eye does not distinctly perceive the connection between them. Indeed, there is hardly any other point in which the moral consciousness of civilised men still stands in greater need of intellectual training than in its judgments on cases which display want of care or foresight. And there is no safer measure of the moral enlightenment of a man than the scrupulosity with which he considers the possible consequences of acts, and the number of positive commandments which are contained in his catalogue of duties.

* * * * *

That moral indignation and moral approval are from the very beginning felt, not with reference to certain modes of conduct per se, but with reference to persons on account of their conduct, is obvious from the intrinsic nature of those emotions. As we noticed before, they derive one of their most essential characteristics from their being directed against sensitive agents. Hence they may as naturally give rise to judgments on human character as to judgments on human conduct. And even when a moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of the {311} agent's will as a whole. The forgiveness which follows sincere repentance, and the distinction made between injuries committed deliberately in cold blood and injuries committed in the heat of passion, indicate that men, in their moral judgments, are apt to consider something more than a momentary volition. The same tendency is at the bottom of the common practice of punishing a second and third offence more severely than the first.

Among the Masai, "if a man is convicted of a particular crime several times, or constitutes himself a public nuisance, he is proclaimed an outlaw, his property is confiscated, and he is beaten away from any settlement or village he goes near. Unless an outlaw can find friends among non-Masai tribes, he dies of starvation."[29] Among the Wakamba "a murder is judged by the elders; if it is a man's first offence of that kind he is punished by a fine. . . . But a man convicted for the second time of murder is killed at once, everyone setting on him the moment judgment is delivered. . . . For rape a first offender is flogged, and has to pay a fine of one cow; for the second offence he is killed."[30] Among the Wyandots of North America, "a woman guilty of adultery, for the first offence is punished by having her hair cropped; for repeated offences her left ear is cut off."[31] The laws of the Incas, also, were more lenient to a first offence than to a second;[32] and in the kingdom of Mechoacan, whilst the first theft was not severely punished, the thief who repeated his crime was thrown down a precipice and his carcass was left to the birds of prey.[33] Among the Aleuts, for the first theft "corporal punishment was inflicted; for the second offence of the kind some fingers of the right hand were cut off; for the third, the left hand and sometimes the lips were amputated; and for the fourth offence the punishment was death." Other crimes, again, "were punished at first by reprimand by the chief before the community, and upon repetition the offender was bound and kept in such a condition for some time."[34] The Kamchadales "burn the hands of people who have been frequently caught in theft, but for the first offence the thief must restore what he hath stolen, and live alone {312} in solitude, without expecting any assistance from others."[35] Among the Ainu, "for breaking into the storehouse or dwelling of another, a very sound beating was administered for the first offence; for the second, sometimes the nose was cut off, sometimes the ears, and in some cases both the nose and ears were forfeited. . . . Persons who had committed such a crime twice were driven bag and baggage out of the home and village to which they belonged."[36] Among the Murray Islanders repetition of an offence such as murder or robbery generally incurred a penalty of death, whereas the first offence was punished only by a fine.[37] According to the Javanese Níti Sástra, if a man violates the law, he may for the first transgression be punished by a pecuniary fine, for the second by a punishment affecting his person, but for the third he may be punished with death.[38] The Penal Code of the Chinese prescribes that, for the first offence, individuals convicted of being concerned in a theft shall be branded in the lower part of the left arm with two words signifying thief, that for the second offence they shall be branded again with the same words in the lower part of the right arm, but that for the third offence they shall suffer death by being strangled, after remaining the usual period in confinement.[39] In Nepal, in the case of theft or petty burglary, for the first offence one hand is cut off, for the second the other hand, whilst the third offence is capital.[40] Herodotus mentions with approval that in ancient Persia not even the king was allowed to put any one to death for a single crime.[41] According to the Vendîdâd, the gravity of a crime does not depend only on the gravity of the deed, but on its frequency as well.[42] In ancient Rome the repetition of a crime aggravated its punishment.[43] According to early English law, the punishment upon a second conviction for nearly every offence was death or mutilation.[44] In modern European legislation, the principle that the criminality of certain crimes is increased by their repetition is generally recognised.

[Footnote 29: Hinde, The Last of the Masai, p. 108.]

[Footnote 30: Decle, op. cit. p. 487.]

[Footnote 31: Powell, 'Wyandot Government,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. i. 66.]

[Footnote 32: Herrera, General History of the West Indies, iv. 338 sqq.]

[Footnote 33: Ibid. iii. 255.]

[Footnote 34: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in Tenth Census of the United States, p. 152.]

[Footnote 35: Krasheninnikoff, History of Kamschatka, p. 179.]

[Footnote 36: Batchelor, Ainu and their Folk-lore, p. 285.]

[Footnote 37: Hunt, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xxviii. 6.]

[Footnote 38: Raffles, History of Java, i. 262.]

[Footnote 39: Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. cclxix. p. 285.]

[Footnote 40: Hodgson, Miscellaneous Essays, ii. 235.]

[Footnote 41: Herodotus, i. 137.]

[Footnote 42: Vendîdâd, iv. 17 sqq.]

[Footnote 43: Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 1044.]

[Footnote 44: Stephen, op. cit. i. 58.]

The more a moral judgment is influenced by reflection, the more it scrutinises the character which manifests itself {313} in that individual piece of conduct by which the judgment is occasioned. But however superficial it be, it always refers to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, to a person regarded as a cause of pleasure or pain. This holds good of savage and civilised men alike. Even tame animals, in response to a hurt or a benefit, behave differently towards different persons according to their previous experience of the agent.

Chapter XIII

WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER--MORAL VALUATION AND FREE-WILL

WE have examined the general nature of the subjects of moral judgments from an evolutionary point of view. We have seen that such judgments are essentially passed on conduct and character, and that allowance is made for the various elements of which conduct and character are composed in proportion as the moral judgment is scrutinising and enlightened. But an important question still calls for an answer, the question, Why is this so? We cannot content ourselves with the bare fact that nothing but the will is morally good or bad. We must try to explain it.

After what has been said above the explanation is not far to seek. Moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, because such judgments spring from moral emotions; because the moral emotions are retributive emotions; because a retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or something looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and because a living being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will. The correctness of this explanation I consider to be proved by the fact that not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena {315} exactly similar in nature to those on which moral judgments are passed.

Like moral indignation, the emotion of revenge can be felt only towards a sentient being, or towards something which is believed to be sentient. We may be angry with inanimate things for a moment, but such anger cannot last; it disappears as soon as we reflect that the thing in question is incapable of feeling pain. Even a dog which, in playing with another dog, hurts itself, for instance, by running into a tree, changes its angry attitude immediately it notices the real nature of that which caused it pain.[1]

[Footnote 1: Hiram Stanley, Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling, p. 154 sq.]

Equivalent to injuries resulting from inanimate things are injuries resulting accidentally from animate beings. If my arm or my foot gives a push to my neighbour, and he is convinced that the push was neither intended nor foreseen nor due to any carelessness whatever on my part, surely he cannot feel angry with me. Why not? Professor Bain answers this question as follows:--"Aware that absolute inviolability is impossible in this world, and that we are all exposed by turns to accidental injuries from our fellows, we have our minds disciplined to let unintended evil go by without satisfaction of inflicting some counter evil upon the offender."[2] Perhaps another answer would be that an accidental injury in no way affects the "self-feeling" of the sufferer. But neither of these explanations goes to the root of the question. Let us once more remember that even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked; and this can neither be the result of discipline, nor have anything to do with the feeling of self-regarding pride.[3] The reason is that the dog scents an enemy in the person who kicks him, but not in the one who stumbles. My neighbour, more clearly still, makes a distinction between a part of my body and myself as a {316} volitional being, and finds that I am no proper object of resentment when the cause of the hurt was merely my arm or my foot. An event is attributed to me as its cause only in proportion as it is considered to have been brought about by my will; and I, regarded as a volitional and sensitive entity, can be a proper object of resentment only as a cause of pain.

[Footnote 2: Bain, Emotions and the Will, p. 185.]

[Footnote 3: The Koussa Kafirs, according to Lichtenstein (Travels in Southern Africa, i. 254), expect a similar discrimination from the elephant; for "if an elephant is killed . . . they seek to exculpate themselves towards the dead animal, by declaring to him solemnly, that the thing happened entirely by accident, not by design."]

We can hardly feel disposed to resent injuries inflicted upon us by animals, little children, or madmen, when we recognise their inability to judge of the nature of their acts. They are not the real causes of the mischief resulting from their deeds, since they neither intended nor foresaw nor could have foreseen it. "Why," says the Stoic, "do you bear with the delirium of a sick man, or the ravings of a madman, or the impudent blows of a child? Because, of course, they evidently do not know what they are doing. . . . . Would anyone think himself to be in his perfect mind if he were to return kicks to a mule or bites to a dog?"[4] Hartley observes, "As we improve in observation and experience, and in the faculty of analysing the actions of animals, we perceive that brutes and children, and even adults in certain circumstances, have little or no share in the actions referred to them."[5]

[Footnote 4: Seneca, De ira, iii. 26 sq.]

[Footnote 5: Hartley, Observations on Man, i. 493.]

Deliberate resentment considers the motives of acts. Suppose that a man tells us an untruth. Our feelings towards him are not the same if he did it in order to save our life as if he did it for his own benefit. Moreover, our anger abates, or ceases altogether, if we find that he who injured us acted under compulsion, or under the influence or a non-volitional impulse, too strong for any ordinary man to resist. Then, the main cause or the injury was not his will, conceived as a continuous entity. It yielded to the will of somebody else, reluctantly, as it were out of necessity, or to a powerful conation which forms no part of his real self. He was merely an instrument in another's hands, or he was "beside himself," "beyond himself," "out of his {317} mind." When we are angry, says Montaigne, "it is passion that speaks, and not we."[6] The religious psychology of the ancient Greeks ascribed acts committed upon sudden excitement of mind to the Ate which bewilders the mind and betrays the man into deeds which, in his sober senses, he is heartily sorry for. Hence the Ate has in its train the Litae--the humble prayers of repentance, which must make good, before gods and men, whatever has been done amiss.[7] The Vedic singer apologises, "It is not our own will, Varuna, that leads us astray, but some seduction--wine, anger, dice, and our folly."[8] In the Andaman Islands violent outbreaks of ill-temper or resentment are looked upon as the result of a temporary "possession," and the victim is, for the time being, considered unaccountable for his actions.[9] Madness, as we have seen, is frequently attributed to demoniacal possession. In ancient Ireland, again, it was believed to be often brought on by malignant magical agency, usually the work of some druid, hence in the Glosses to the Senchus Mór a madman is repeatedly described as one "upon whom the magic wisp has been thrown."[10] What a person does in madness is not an act committed by him.

"Was 't Hamlet wrong'd Laertes? Never Hamlet: If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away, And when he's not himself does wrong Laertes, Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it. Who does it, then? His madness: if 't be so, Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong'd; His madness is poor Hamlet's enemy."[11]

[Footnote 6: Montaigne, Essais, ii. 31 ([OE]uvres, p. 396).]

[Footnote 7: Iliad, ix. 505 sqq. Müller, Dissertations on the Eumenides, p. 108.]

[Footnote 8: Rig-Veda, vii. 86. 6.]

[Footnote 9: Man, in Jour. Anthrop. Inst. xii. 111.]

[Footnote 10: Joyce, Social History of Ancient Ireland, i. 224.]

[Footnote 11: Shakespeare, Hamlet, v. 2.]

We resent not only acts and volitions, but also omissions, though generally less severely; and when a hurt is attributed to want of foresight, our resentment is, ceteris paribus, proportionate to the degree of carelessness {318} which we lay to the offender's charge. A person appears to us as the cause of an injury which we think he could have prevented by his will. But a hurt resulting from carelessness is not to the same extent as an intentional injury caused by the will. And the less foresight could have been expected in a given case, the smaller share has the will in the production of the event.

Our resentment is increased by a repetition of the injury, and reaches its height when we find that our adversary nourishes habitual ill-will towards us. On the other hand, as we have noticed in a previous chapter,[12] the injured party is not deaf to the prayer for forgiveness which springs from genuine repentance. Like moral indignation, non-moral resentment takes into consideration the character of the injurer.

[Footnote 12: Supra, ch. iii.]

Passing to the emotion of gratitude, we find a similar resemblance between the phenomena which give rise to this emotion and those which call forth moral approval. We may feel some kind of retributive affection for inanimate objects which have given us pleasure; "a man grows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff which he has long made use of, and conceives something like a real love and affection for them."[13] But gratitude, involving a desire to please the benefactor, can reasonably be felt towards such objects only as are themselves capable of feeling pleasure. Moreover, on due deliberation we do not feel grateful to a person who benefits us by pure accident. Since gratitude is directed towards the assumed cause of pleasure, and since a person is regarded as a cause only in his capacity of a volitional being, gratitude presupposes that the pleasure shall be due to his will. For the same reason motives are also taken into consideration by the benefited party. As Hutcheson observes, "bounty from a donor apprehended as morally evil, or extorted by force, or conferred with some view of self-interest, will not procure real good-will; nay, it may raise indignation."[14] {319} Like moral approval, gratitude may be called forth not only by acts and volitions, but by absence of volitions, in so far as this absence is traceable to a good disposition of will. And, like the moral judge, the grateful man is, in his retributive feeling, influenced by the notion he forms of the benefactor's character.

[Footnote 13: Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 136.]

[Footnote 14: Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, p. 157.]

The cognitions by which non-moral resentment and gratitude are determined are thus, as regards their general nature, precisely similar to those which determine moral indignation and approval. Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain. This solves a problem which necessarily baffles solution in the hands of those who fail to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments, and which, when considered at all, has, I think, never been fully understood by those who have essayed it. It has been argued, for instance, that moral praise and blame are not applied to inanimate things and those who commit involuntary deeds, because they are administered only "where they are capable of producing some effect";[15] that moral judgment is concerned with the question of compulsion, because "only when a man acts morally of his own free will is society sure of him";[16] that we do not regard a lunatic as responsible, because we know that "his mind is so diseased that it is impossible by moral reprobation alone to change his character so that it maybe subsequently relied upon."[17] The bestowal of moral praise or blame on such or such an object is thus attributed to utilitarian calculation;[18] whereas in reality it is determined by the nature of the moral emotion which lies at the bottom of the judgment. And, as Stuart Mill observes (though he never seems to have realised the full import of his objection), whilst we may administer praise and blame with the express design of influencing conduct, "no anticipation of salutary effects {320} from our feeling will ever avail to give us the feeling itself."[19]

[Footnote 15: James Mill, Fragment on Mackintosh, p. 370.]

[Footnote 16: Ziegler, Social Ethics, p. 56 sq.]

[Footnote 17: Clifford, Lectures and Essays, p. 296.]

[Footnote 18: See also James Mill, op. cit. pp. 261, 262, 375.]

[Footnote 19: Stuart Mill, in a note to James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, ii. 323.]

* * * * *

The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to another important problem--a problem which has called forth endless controversies--namely, the co-existence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect. It has been argued that responsibility, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is determined by causes; that "either free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion." The argument has been well summed up by Sir Leslie Stephen as follows:--"Moral responsibility, it is said, implies freedom. A man is only responsible for that which he causes. Now the causa causæ is also the causa causati. If I am caused as well as cause, the cause of me is the cause of my conduct; I am only a passive link in the chain which transmits the force. Thus, as each individual is the product of something external to himself, his responsibility is really shifted to that something. The universe or the first cause is alone responsible, and since it is responsible to itself alone, responsibility becomes a mere illusion."[20] We are told that, if determinism were true, human beings would be no more proper subjects of moral valuation than are inanimate things; that the application of moral praise and blame would be "in itself as absurd as to applaud the sunrise or be angry at the rain";[21] that the only admiration which the virtuous man might deserve would be the kind of admiration "which we justly accord to a well-made machine."[22] Nor are these inferences from the doctrine of determinism only weapons forged by its opponents; they are shared by many of its own adherents. Richard Owen and his followers maintained that, since a man's character is made for him, not by him, there is no justice in punishing {321} him for what he cannot help.[23] To Stuart Mill responsibility simply means liability to punishment, inflicted for a utilitarian purpose.[24] So also Prof. Sidgwick--whose attitude towards the free-will theory is that of a sceptic--argues that the common retributive view of punishment, and the ordinary notions of "merit," "demerit," and "responsibility," involve the assumption that the will is free, and that these terms, if used at all, have to be used in new significations. "If the wrong act," he says, "and the bad qualities of character manifested in it, are conceived as the necessary effects of causes antecedent or external to the existence of the agent, the moral responsibility--in the ordinary sense--for the mischief caused by them can no longer rest on him. At the same time, the Determinist can give to the terms 'ill-desert' and 'responsibility' a signification which is not only clear and definite, but, from an utilitarian point of view, the only suitable meaning. In this view, if I affirm that A is responsible for a harmful act, I mean that it is right to punish him for it; primarily, in order that the fear of punishment may prevent him and others from committing similar acts in future."[25]

[Footnote 20: Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 285.]

[Footnote 21: Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 41 sq.]

[Footnote 22: Balfour, Foundations of Belief, p. 25.]

[Footnote 23: Stuart Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 506.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 506 sqq.]

[Footnote 25: Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 71 sq.]

If these conclusions are correct it is obvious that, whether the infliction of punishment be justifiable or not, the feeling of moral indignation or moral approval is, from the deterministic point of view, absurd. And yet, as a matter of fact, these emotions are felt by determinists and libertarians alike. Apparently, they are not in the least affected by the notion that the human will is subject to the general law of cause and effect. Emotions are always determined by specific cognitions, and last only as long as the influence of those cognitions lasts. It makes me sorry to hear that some evil has befallen a friend; but my sorrow disappears at once when I find that the rumour was false. I get angry with a person who hurts me; but my anger subsides as soon as I recognise that the hurt was purely accidental. My indignation is aroused by an {322} atrocious crime; but it ceases entirely when I hear that the agent was mad. On the other hand, however convinced I am that a person's conduct and character are in every detail a product of causes, that does not prevent me from feeling towards him retributive emotions--either anger or gratitude, or moral resentment or approval. Hence I conclude that a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free-will. I hold that Spinoza is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else, because they think themselves to be free.[26] And I attribute the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism either to a failure to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments or to insufficient insight into the true nature of the moral emotions. At the same time it seems easy to explain the fallacy which lies at the bottom of that conception.

[Footnote 26: Spinoza, Ethica, iii. 49, Note.]

We have seen that the object of moral approval and disapproval is the will, and that a person's responsibility is lessened in proportion as his will is exposed to the pressure of non-volitional conations. Full responsibility thus presupposes freedom from such pressure, and, particularly, freedom from external compulsion. Hence the inference that it also presupposes freedom from causation, and that complete determination involves complete irresponsibility. Compulsion is confounded with causation; and this confusion is due to the fact that the cause which determines the will is actually looked upon in the light of a constraining power outside the will.

The popular mind has a strong belief in the law of cause and effect. When reflecting on the matter, it admits that everything which happens in this world has a cause; and if the natural cause is hidden, it readily calls in a supernatural cause to account for the event. Now, in the case of human volitions the chain of causation is often particularly obscure; as Spinoza said, whilst men are conscious of their volitions and desires, they "never even {323} dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire."[27] Hence, when in a philosophic mood, they are liable to attribute their acts to the influence of an external power ruling over human affairs, a god or an all-powerful fate. No doubt, Providence and Fate[28] may effect their purposes without the will of man as their tool; what happens "by chance," being frequently no less wonderful than any decree of a human will, may likewise be traced to a supernatural cause. But, on the other hand, the fact that the deeds of men are generally preceded by volitions, is so obvious that it could not escape even the simplest mind--indeed, so strongly are primitive men impressed by this fact that they are apt to attribute every event to a will. Acknowledging, then, the connection between volition and deed, the fatalist regards the former only as an instrument in the hands of a force outside the agent, which compels his will to execute its plans. Sometimes it reaches its goal in a way quite unforeseen by the agent himself. Muhammed said, "When God hath ordered a creature to die in any particular place, He causeth his wants to direct him to that place";[29] and it is a popular saying throughout Islam that "whenas Destiny descends she blindeth human sight."[30] Sometimes the external power causes its victim to will its decree, by exciting in him some irresistible passion, as when Zeus urged Clytemnestra to the slaughter of Agamemnon; or the volitions of a person are themselves regarded as decreed by that power. In Wärend, in Sweden, when somebody has killed another, as also when the manslayer himself suffers the penalty of death, the women say, full of compassion, "Well, this was his destiny, to be sure," or "Poor fellow, it was a pitiful fate."[31] In one of the Pahlavi texts the following words are put into the mouth of the Spirit of {324} Wisdom:--"Even with the might and powerfulness of wisdom and knowledge, even then it is not possible to contend with destiny. Because, when predestination as to virtue, or as to the reverse, comes forth, the wise becomes wanting in duty, and the astute in evil becomes intelligent; the faint-hearted becomes braver, and the braver becomes faint-hearted; the diligent becomes lazy, and the lazy acts diligently. Just as is predestined as to the matter, the cause enters into it, and thrusts out everything else."[32]

[Footnote 27: Ibid. pt. i. Appendix.]

[Footnote 28: In a Pahlavi text fate is defined as "that which is ordained from the beginning," and divine providence as that which the sacred beings "also grant otherwise" (Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad, xxiv. 6 sq.).]

[Footnote 29: Lane, Arabian Society in the Middle Ages, p. 6.]

[Footnote 30: Burton, in his translation of the Arabian Nights, i. 62, n. 2.]

[Footnote 31: Hyltén-Cavallius, Wärend och Wirdarne, i. 206.]

[Footnote 32: Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad, xxiii. 3 sqq.]

Nor is it only the popular mind that, when human volitions are concerned, interprets causation as compulsion. Even such philosophers as Hamilton[33] and Mansel[34] seemed quite unable to distinguish between determinism and fatalism. Professor Laurie likewise observes:--"Determinism is the term adopted of late years to veil fatalism and confound issues . . . . Freedom or fate, these are the sole alternatives."[35] Surely, it is those who identify determinism with fatalism that "confound issues." And a similar confusion lurks behind the main argument which has been adduced in support of free-will. It is said that "I ought" implies "I can," and that men are not accountable for what they cannot avoid. This is perfectly true if by "cannot" is meant compulsion, and by "can" freedom from compulsion. But it is certainly not true if "I can" is intended to mean that "I" am a first cause, not determined by anything else.

[Footnote 33: Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 410 sqq.]

[Footnote 34: Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 329 sqq.]

[Footnote 35: Laurie, Ethica, pp. 307, 319.]

When a person's will is believed to be constrained by a power outside him, he can obviously not be held responsible for what he does under the influence of such constraint. We are responsible only for that which is due to our will. A licentious man who has grown up in a corrupt society is less blamable than an equally licentious man who has always lived under conditions favourable to virtue; and if we hear of a criminal that he was kidnapped as a child by a band of pickpockets and trained to their profession, we {325} no doubt look upon him with some indulgence. In these cases, however, it may be said that, though the person's conduct is largely due to the influence of external circumstances upon his will, this influence was not irresistible, that he might have saved himself with an effort of will, and that consequently he is not wholly irresponsible. But in the case of a restraining destiny no escape is possible; the compulsion is complete. Hence the logical outcome of radical fatalism is a denial of all moral imputability, and a repudiation of all moral judgment.[36]

[Footnote 36: Of the inhabitants of North-Eastern Africa, Munzinger observes (Ostafrikanische Studien, p. 66):--"Seien sie Christen, Heiden, odor Mohammedaner, schreiben sie Leben und Tod, Glück und Unglück, Tugend und Verbrechen der unmittelbaren Hand Gottes zu. Mit dieser blinder Nothwendigkeit entschuldigt sich der Missethäter, tröstet sich der Unglückliche." Cf. also Doughty, Arabia Deserta, i. 155, on the Bedouins. However, men are not philosophers in the ordinary practice of life, hence the fatalist is generally as ready as anybody else to judge on his neighbour's conduct. According to various ancient writers, the power of destiny is limited so as not to exclude personal responsibility (see Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, i. 59 sq.).]

Not so with determinism. Whilst fatalism presupposes the existence of a person who is constrained by an outward power, determinism regards the person himself as in every respect a product of causes. It does not assume any part of his will to have existed previous to his formation by these causes; his will is not constrained by them, it is made by them. When we say of a person that he is influenced by external circumstances or subdued by fate, we regard him as existing independently of that which influences or subdues him, we attribute to him an innate character which is acted upon from the outside. He would have been different if he had grown up under different conditions of life, or if fate had left him alone. But it would be absolutely meaningless to say that he would be different if the causes to which he owes his existence had been different; for instance, if he were the offspring of different parents. This shows that we distinguish between the original self of a person and the self which is partly innate and partly the product of external circumstances. His innate character belongs to his original {326} self; and, strictly speaking, it is on the innate character only that the scrutinising moral judge, so far as possible, passes his judgment, carefully considering the degree of pressure to which it has been exposed both from the non-voluntary part of the individual himself and from the outside world.[37] According to the fatalist, the innate character is compelled; hence personal responsibility is out of the question. According to the determinist the innate character is caused; but this has nothing whatever to do with the question of responsibility. The moral emotions are no more concerned with the origin of the innate character than the aesthetic emotions are concerned with the origin of the beautiful object. In their capacity of retributive emotions, the moral emotions are essentially directed towards sensitive and volitional entities conceived, not as uncaused themselves, but only as causes of pleasure or pain.

[Footnote 37: That the proper subject of moral judgment is the innate character was emphasised by Schopenhauer in his prize-essays on Die Freiheit des Willens (Sämmtliche Werke, vii. 83 sqq.) and Die Grundlage der Moral (ibid. vii. 273 sqq.). The innate character, he says, that real core of the whole man, contains the germ of all his virtues and vices. And though Schopenhauer be mistaken in his statement that a person's character always remains the same, it seems to me indisputable that the succeeding changes to which it may be subject are imputable to him only in so far as they are caused by his innate character.]

XIV. PRELIMINARY REMARKS--HOMICIDE IN GENERAL

WE have discussed the general nature of those phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral blame or moral praise. We have seen that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, and we have seen why this is the case. It now remains for us to examine the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and to consider how these modes of conduct are judged of by different peoples and in different ages.

If carried out in every detail such an investigation could never come to an end. Among other things, it would have to take into account all customs existing among the various races of men, since every custom constitutes a moral rule. And the impossibility of any such undertaking becomes apparent when we consider the extent to which the conduct of man, and especially of savage man, is hampered by custom. Among the Wanika, for instance, "if a man dares to improve the style of his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary; if he should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of his fellows, he is instantly fined."[1] If, during the performance of a ceremony, the ancestors of an Australian native were in the habit of painting a white line across the forehead, their descendant must do the same.[2] Dr. Nansen's statement with reference to the Greenlanders, {328} that their communities had originally customs and fixed rules for every possible circumstance,[3] is essentially true of many, if not all, of the lower races.

[Footnote 1: New, Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa, p. 110.]

[Footnote 2: Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia, p. 11.]

[Footnote 3: Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 104.]

It is necessary, then, that we should restrict ourselves to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned. These modes of conduct may be conveniently divided into six groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property, and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as chiefly concern a man's own welfare, such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third group, which partly coincides with, but partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard as supernatural. We shall examine each of these groups separately, in the above order. And, not being content with a mere description of facts, we shall try to discover the principle which lies at the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case.

* * * * *

It is commonly maintained that the most sacred duty which we owe our fellow-creatures is to respect their lives. I venture to believe that this holds good not only among civilised nations, but among the lower races as well; and that, if a savage recognises that he has any moral obligations at all to his neighbours, he considers the taking of their lives to be a greater wrong than any other kind of injury inflicted upon them.

Among various uncivilised peoples, however, human life is said to be held very cheap.

The Australian Dieyerie, we are told, would for a mere trifle kill their dearest friend.[4] In Fiji there is an "utter disregard of {329} the value of human life."[5] A Masai will murder his friend or neighbour in a fight over a herd of captured cattle, and "live not a whit the less merrily afterwards."[6] Among the Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, murder "excites little sensation, excepting in the family of the person who has been murdered; and brings, it is said, no disgrace upon him who has committed it; nor uneasiness, excepting the fear of their revenge."[7] The Oráons of Bengal "are ready to take life on very slight provocation," and Colonel Dalton doubts whether they see any moral guilt in it.[8] Some of the Himalayan mountaineers are reported to put men to death merely for the satisfaction of seeing the blood flow and of marking the last struggles of the victim.[9] Among the Pathans, on the north-western frontier of the Punjab, "there is hardly a man whose hands are unstained," and each person "counts up his murders."[10]

[Footnote 4: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods, Native Tribes of South Australia, p. 258.]

[Footnote 5: Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, p. 115.]

[Footnote 6: Johnston, Kilima-njaro Expedition, p. 419.]

[Footnote 7: Burchell, Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa, ii. 554.]

[Footnote 8: Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, p. 256.]

[Footnote 9: Fraser, Journal of a Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains, p. 267.]

[Footnote 10: Temple, quoted by Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 343. For other instances of the indifference of savages to human life, see Egede, Description of Greenland, p. 123; Cranz, History of Greenland, i. 177; Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in Meddeleser om Grönland, x. 87, 179 sq.; Coxe, Russian Discoveries between Asia and America, p. 257 (Aleuts of Unalaska); Krasheninnikoff, History of Kamtschatka, p. 204; Steller, Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka, p. 294; Boyle, Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo, p. 116 (Malays); Powell, Wanderings in a Wild Country, p. 262 (aborigines of New Britain); Scaramucci and Giglioli, 'Notizie sui Danakil,' in Archivio per antropologia e la etnologia, xiv. 26; Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, ii. 310 (Gowane); Schweinfurth, Heart of Africa, i. 286 (Bongo); Arnot, Garenganze, p. 71 (Barotse); Tuckey, Expedition to Explore the River Zaire, p. 383 (Congo natives); Waul, Five Years with the Congo Cannibals, p. 105 (Bolobo).]

On the other hand, there are uncivilised peoples among whom homicide or murder is said to be hardly known.

Among the Omahas, "before liquor was introduced there were no murders, even when men quarrelled."[11] Captain Lyon could learn of no instances of manslaughter having ever occurred among the Eskimo of Igloolik.[12] In Tutuila, of the Samoa group, according to Brenchley, there had been but one case of assassination in the course of twenty years.[13] The Veddahs of Ceylon know of manslaughter only as a punishment.[14] {330} The Bedouin of the Euphrates, says Mr. Blunt, "is essentially humane, and never takes life needlessly. If he has killed a man in war he rather conceals the fact than proclaims it aloud, while murder or even homicide is almost unknown among the tribes."[15] Among the Bakwiri, in Cameroon, Zoller never heard of any person having killed a member of his own community.[16] Murders, says Caillié, "are rare among the Bambaras, and never committed by the Mandingoes."[17] Among the Wanika "wilful cold-blooded murders are almost unknown."[18] Among the Basutos perfect safety is enjoyed "on roads where the traveller might have been robbed a hundred times over without the least hope of aid, and in houses where the doors and windows have neither bolts nor bars," and cases of murder are very rare.[19]

[Footnote 11: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 369.]

[Footnote 12: Lyon, Private Journal, p. 350.]

[Footnote 13: Brenchley, Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. "Curaçoa" among the South Sea Islands, p. 58.]

[Footnote 14: Sarasin, Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon, iii. 539. Cf. Tennent, Ceylon, ii. 444. Hartshorne, in Indian Antiquary, viii. p. 320.]

[Footnote 15: Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, ii. 203. Cf. ibid. ii. 207.]

[Footnote 16: Zöller, Kamerun, i. 188.]

[Footnote 17: Caillié, Travels through Central Africa, i. 353.]

[Footnote 18: New, op. cit. p. 98.]

[Footnote 19: Casalis, Basutos, p. 301. For other instances, see Hall, Arctic Researches, p. 571 (Eskimo); Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abipones, ii. 148; Turner, Samoa, p. 178; Ellis, Tour through Hawaii, p. 429; Brooke, Ten Years in Saráwak, i. 61 (Sea Dyaks); Low, Sarawak, p. 133; Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 471 (Poggi Islanders); Steller, De Sangi-Archipel, p. 26; Riedel, De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua, p. 41 (Ambon and Uliase Islanders); von Siebold, Aino auf der Insel Yesso, pp. 11, 35; Munzinger, Ostafrikanische Studien, p. 532 (Barea and Kunáma); Holub, Seven Years in South Africa, ii. 319 (Marutse); Maclean, Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs, pp. 61, 143 sq.; Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p. 137.]

In other instances homicide is expressly said to be regarded as wrong.

The Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen hold it atrocious to kill a fellow-creature, except in some particular cases.[20] The Dacotahs say that it is a great crime to take their fellow's life, unless in revenge, "because all have a right to live."[21] In Tierra del Fuego homicide rarely occurs, as Mr. Bridges remarks, because of an inveterate custom according to which human life is held sacred: "le meurtrier est mis au ban de ses compatriotes; isolé de tous, il est fatalement condamné à périr de faim ou à tomber un jour sous les coups d'un groupe de justiciers improvisés."[22] The Andaman Islanders condemn murder as y[=u]bda, or sin.[23] The natives of Botany Bay, New {331} South Wales, though a trivial offence in their ideas justifies the murder of a man, "highly reprobate the crime when committed without what they esteem a just cause."[24] According to Mr. Curr's experience, the Australian Black undoubtedly feels that murder is wrong, and its committal brings remorse; even after the perpetration of infanticide or massacres, though both are practised without disguise, those engaged in them are subject to remorse and low spirits for some time.[25]

[Footnote 20: Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 162.]

[Footnote 21: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, ii. 195.]

[Footnote 22: Hyades and Deniker, Mission scientifique du Cap Horn, vii. 374, 243.]

[Footnote 23: Man, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xii. 112.]

[Footnote 24: Barrington, History of New South Wales, p. 19. Cf. Lumholtz, Among Cannibals, p. 126 (natives of Northern Queensland).]

[Footnote 25: Curr, The Australian Race, i. 100, 43 sq. For other instances, see Keating, Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River, i. 127 (Potawatomis); Harmon, Journal of Voyages in the Interior of North America, p. 348 (Indians on the east side of the Rocky Mountains); Hall, Arctic Researches, p. 572 (Eskimo); Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, ii. 162; Macdonald, Oceania, p. 208 (Efatese); Yate, Account of New Zealand, p. 145; Arbousset and Daumas, Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, p. 322 (Bechuanas); Fritsch, Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikra's, p. 322 (Hottentots).]

It is of particular importance in this connection to note that, in early civilisation, blood-revenge is regarded not as a private matter only, but as a duty, and that, where this custom does not prevail, the community punishes the murderer, frequently with death. We may without hesitation accept Professor Tylor's statement that "no known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one another indiscriminately."[26] In every society--even where human life is, generally speaking, held in low estimation--custom prohibits homicide within a certain circle of men. But the radius of the circle varies greatly.

[Footnote 26: Tylor, 'Primitive Society,' in Contemporary Review, xxi. 714.]

Savages carefully distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases allowed, and often regarded as praiseworthy. It is a very common notion in savage ethics that the chief virtue of a man is to be successful in war and to slay many enemies.

Among the Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush "killing strangers might or might not be considered inexpedient, but it would {332} hardly be considered a crime"; killing fellow-tribesmen, on the other hand, is looked upon in a very different light.[27] The Koriaks do not regard murder as a great crime, unless it occur within their own tribe.[28] The early Aleuts considered the killing of a companion a crime worthy of death, "but to kill an enemy was quite another thing."[29] To an Aht Indian the murder of a man is no more than the killing of a dog, provided that the victim is not a member of his own tribe.[30] According to Humboldt, the natives of Guiana "detest all who are not of their family, or their tribe; and hunt the Indians of a neighbouring tribe, who live at war with their own, as we hunt game."[31] In the opinion of the Fuegians, "a stranger and an enemy are almost synonymous terms," hence they dare not go where they have no friends, and where they are unknown, as they would most likely be destroyed.[32] The Australian Black nurtures an intense hatred of every male at least of his own race who is a stranger to him, and would never neglect to assassinate such a person at the earliest moment that he could do so without risk to himself.[33] In Melanesia, also, a stranger as such was generally throughout the islands an enemy to be killed.[34]

[Footnote 27: Scott Robertson, Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush, p. 194.]

[Footnote 28: Krasheninnikoff, op. cit. p. 232.]

[Footnote 29: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in Tenth Census of the Untied States, p. 155.]

[Footnote 30: Sproat, Scenes and Studies of Savage Life, p. 152.]

[Footnote 31: von Humboldt, Personal Narrative of Travels, v. 422.]

[Footnote 32: Stirling, in South Ammerican Missionary Magazine, iv. 11. Bridges, in A Voice for South America, xiii. 210.]

[Footnote 33: Curr, The Australian Race, i. 64, 85 sq. Mathew, in Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N. S. Wales, xviii. 398.]

[Footnote 34: Codrington, Melanesians, p. 345.]

In Savage Island the slaying of a member of another tribe--that is, a potential enemy--"was a virtue rather than a crime."[35] To a young Samoan it was the realisation of his highest ambition to be publicly thanked by the chiefs for killing a foe in mortal combat.[36] "According to Fijian beliefs, men who have not slain any enemy are, in the other world, compelled to beat dirt with their clubs--the most degrading punishment the native mind can conceive--because they used their club to so little purpose;[37] and in Futuna it was deemed no less necessary to have poured out blood on the field of battle in order to hold a part in the happy future life.[38] In the Western islands of Torres Straits "it was a meritorious deed to kill foreigners either in fair fight {333} or by treachery, and honour and glory were attached to the bringing home of the skulls of the inhabitants of other islands slain in battle."[39] In the Solomon Islands,[40] New Guinea,[41] and various parts of the Malay Archipelago, he who has collected the greatest number of human heads is honoured by his tribe as the bravest man; and some peoples do not allow a man to marry until he has cut off at least one human head.[42] Among many of the North American Indians, again, he who can boast of the greatest number of scalps is the person most highly esteemed.[43] Among the Seri Indians the highest virtue "is the shedding of alien blood; and their normal impulse on meeting an alien is to kill, unless deterred by fear."[44] Among the Chukchi "it is held criminal to thieve or murder in the family or race to which a person belongs; but these crimes committed elsewhere are not only permitted, but held honourable and glorious."[45] So, too, the Gallas consider it honourable to kill an alien, though criminal to kill a countryman.[46]

[Footnote 35: Thomson, Savage Island, p. 104. See also ibid. p. 94.]

[Footnote 36: Pritchard, Polynesian Reminiscences, p. 57.]

[Footnote 37: Seemann, Viti, p. 401. Cf. Williams and Calvert, op. cit. p. 97 sq.; Erskine, Islands of the Western Pacific, p. 248.]

[Footnote 38: Smith, in Jour. Polynesian Society, i. 39.]

[Footnote 39: Haddon, in Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits, v. 277.]

[Footnote 40: Romilly, Western Pacific, p. 73. Penny, Ten Years in Melanesia, p. 46. Codrington, op. cit. p. 345.]

[Footnote 41: Romilly, Western Pacific, p. 76.]

[Footnote 42: Bock, Head-Hunters of Borneo, pp. 216, 221, &c. (Dyaks). Bickmore, Travels in the East Indian Archipelago, p. 205 (Alfura of Ceram). Dalton, op. cit. p. 40 (Nagas of Upper Assam).]

[Footnote 43: The well-known practice of scalping, though very common, was not universal among the North American Indians (see Gibbs, 'Tribes of Western Washington and Northwestern Oregon,' in Contributions to N. American Ethnology, i. 192; Powers, Tribes of California, p. 321).]

[Footnote 44: McGee, 'Seri Indians,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethnol. xvii. 132.]

[Footnote 45: Georgi, Russia, iii. 183.]

[Footnote 46: Macdonald, Africana, i. 229. For other instances, see Harmon, op. cit. p. 301 (Tacullies); Burton, City of the Saints, p. 139 (Dacotahs); Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, p. 94 (Kandhs); MacMahon, Far Cathay, p. 262 (Indo-Burmese border tribes); Macdonald, Africana, i. 194 sq. (Eastern Central Africans); Johnston, Kilima-njaro Expedition, p. 419 (Masai).]

At the same time there are, among the lower races, various instances in which the rule, "Thou shalt not kill," applies even to foreigners. Hospitality, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, is a stringent duty in the savage world. Custom requires that the host should entertain and protect a stranger who comes as his guest, and by killing him the host would perpetrate an outrage hardly possible. Moreover, even in the case of intertribal relations, we must not conclude that what is allowed in war is also allowed in times of peace. The prohibition of homicide may extend beyond the tribal border, to {334} members of different tribes who for some reason or other are on friendly terms with each other.[47] We must not suppose that a tribe of savages generally either lives in a state of complete isolation, or is always at odds with its neighbours. In Australia, for instance, one tribe of natives, as a rule, entertains amicable relations with one, two, or more other tribes.[48] Among the Central Australian natives, say Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, "there is no such thing as one tribe being in a constant state of enmity with another"; on the contrary, where two tribes come into contact with one another on the border land of their respective territories, friendly feelings are maintained between the members of the two.[49] Some uncivilised peoples are even said to have no wars. The Veddahs of Ceylon never make war upon each other.[50] According to the reports of the oldest inhabitants of Umnak and Unalaska, the people there had never been engaged in war either among themselves or with their neighbours, except once with the natives of Alaska.[51] To the Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen war is "incomprehensible and repulsive, a thing for which their language has no word."[52]

[Footnote 47: See, e.g., Scott Robertson, op. cit. p. 194 (Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush).]

[Footnote 48: Curr, The Australian Race, i. 62 sq.]

[Footnote 49: Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia, p. 32.]

[Footnote 50: Sarasin, op. cit. iii. 488.]

[Footnote 51: Coxe, op. cit. p. 244.]

[Footnote 52: Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 162.]

That savages to some extent recognise the existence of intertribal rights in times of peace is obvious from certain customs connected with their wars. Some South Sea Islanders and North American Indians consider it necessary for a party which is about to attack another to give notice beforehand of their intention, in order that their opponents may be prepared to meet them.[53] The cessation of hostilities is often accompanied by the conclusion of a special treaty and by ceremonies calculated to make it binding.[54] The Tahitians, for instance, wove a wreath of {335} green boughs furnished by each side, exchanged two young dogs, and, having also made a band of cloth together, offered the wreath and the band to the gods with imprecations on the side which should first violate so solemn a treaty of peace.[55] Nor does savage custom always allow indiscriminate slaughter even in warfare. The inviolability of heralds is not infrequently recognised.[56] Among the aborigines of New South Wales the tribal messenger known to be a herald by the red net which he wears round his forehead, passes in safety between and through hostile tribes;[57] and among the North American Omahas "the bearer of a peace pipe was generally respected by the enemy, just as the bearer of a flag of truce is regarded by the laws of war among the so-called civilised nations."[58] And many uncivilised races have made it a rule in war to spare the weak and helpless.

[Footnote 53: Hale, U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology, p. 72 (Micronesians). Gibbs, loc. cit. p. 190 (Indians of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon).]

[Footnote 54: See Farrer, Military Manners and Customs, p. 162 sq.]

[Footnote 55: Ellis, Polynesian Researches, i. 318.]

[Footnote 56: See Farrer, Militarv Manners and Customs, p. 161.]

[Footnote 57: Fraser, Aborigines of New South Wales, p. 41.]

[Footnote 58: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 368.]

The Samoans considered it cowardly to kill a woman;[59] and even in Fiji the "enlightened party" objected to the killing of women, urging that it is "just as cowardly to kill a woman as a baby."[60] The Abipones, in their wars, "generally spared the unwarlike, and carried away innocent boys and girls unhurt."[61] An old Spanish writer tells us of the Guanches of Gran Canaria that, "in their wars, they held it as base and mean to molest or injure the women and children of the enemy, considering them as weak and helpless, therefore improper objects of their resentment";[62] and similar views prevail among the Berbers (Shlu[h.]) of Southern Morocco, as also among the Algerian Kabyles[63] and the Touareg.[64] Though the Masai and Wa-kikuyu "are eternally at war to the knife with each other, there is a compact between them not to molest the womenfolk of either party."[65] "The Masai," says Mr. Hinde, "never interfere with women in their raids, and the women cheer {336} loudly and encourage their relatives during the fight."[66] Among the Latukas, though women are employed as spies and thus become exceedingly dangerous in war, there is nevertheless a general understanding that no woman shall be killed.[67] The Basutos maintain that respect should be paid during war to women, children, and travellers, as also that those who surrender should be spared and open to ransom; and, though these rules are not invariably respected, the public voice always disapproves of their violation.[68]

[Footnote 59: Turner, Nineteen Years in Polynesia, p. 304.]

[Footnote 60: Seemann, Viti, p. 180.]

[Footnote 61: Dobrizhoffer, op. cit. ii. 141.]

[Footnote 62: Abreu de Galindo, History of the Discovery and Conquest of the Canary Islands, p. 66.]

[Footnote 63: Hanoteau and Letourneux, La Kabylie, ii. 76.]

[Footnote 64: Hourst, Sur le Niger et au pays des Touaregs, p. 223 sq.]

[Footnote 65: Thomson, Through Masai Land, p. 177.]

[Footnote 66: Hinde, The Last of the Masai, p. 6, n.*]

[Footnote 67: Baker, Albert N'yanza, i. 355.]

[Footnote 68: Casalis, op. cit. p. 223 sq. For regard paid to women, old people, and children in war, see also Richardson, Arctic Searching Expedition, i. 367 (Western Eskimo); Catlin, North American Indians, ii. 240; Azara, Voyages, ii. 145 (Payaguas).]

Sometimes custom even requires that the life of the captive shall be spared.

It is against Masai tradition to kill prisoners of war.[69] Among the Kabyles "il faut que l'exaspération des partis soit extrême pour qu'un blessé ou un prisonnier soit mis à mort."[70] The Touareg do not kill their prisoners after a fight.[71] Among the Bedouins of the Euphrates "the person of the enemy is sacred when disarmed or dismounted; and prisoners are neither enslaved nor held to other ransom than their mares."[72] "Captives," says Mr. Dorsey, "were not slain by the Omahas and Ponkas. When peace was declared the captives were sent home, if they wished to go. If not they could remain where they were, and were treated as if they were members of the tribe."[73] Among the Wyandots prisoners of war were frequently adopted into the tribe. "The warrior taking the prisoner has the first right to adopt him. If no one claims the prisoner for this purpose, he is caused to run the gauntlet as a test of his courage. If at his trial he behaves manfully claimants are not wanting, but if he behaves disgracefully he is put to death."[74]

[Footnote 69: Hinde, op. cit. p. 64.]

[Footnote 70: Hanoteau and Letourneux, op. cit. 75.]

[Footnote 71: Hourst, op. cit. p. 207.]

[Footnote 72: Blunt, op. cit. ii. 239.]

[Footnote 73: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 332.]

[Footnote 74: Powell, ibid. i. 68.]

Thus we notice even among uncivilised races very obvious traces of what is called "international law,"[75] if not as a rule, at least as an exception. On the other hand, the {337} readiness with which war is engaged in, not only in self-defence or out of revenge, but for the sake of gain, indicates how little regard is paid to human life outside the tribe. The Kandhs, for instance, maintain "that a state of war may be lawfully presumed against all tribes and nations with whom no express agreement to the contrary exists."[76] And if a few savage peoples live in perpetual peace, it seems that the chief reason for this is not a higher standard of morality, but the absence of all inducements to war.

[Footnote 75: See also Wheeler, The Tribe, and Intertribal Relations in Australia, passim.]

[Footnote 76: Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal, iii. 75.]

When we from the lower races pass to peoples more advanced in culture, we find that the social unit has grown larger, that the nation has taken the place of the tribe, and that the circle within which homicide is prohibited as a crime of the first order has been extended accordingly. But the old distinction between injuries committed against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains. Even when the subject is not touched upon in the laws referring to homicide we may, from the general attitude of the people towards members of other nations, infer that public opinion is not very scrupulous as to the taking of their lives. How the Chinese looked upon the "red-haired barbarians," the "foreign devils," is well known from recent history. In former days, Japan's attitude towards her neighbours and the whole world was that of an enemy and not of a friend.[77] The Vedic hymns are full of imprecations of misfortune upon men of another race.[78] That among the ancient Teutons the lot of a stranger was not an enviable one is testified even by language; the German word elender has acquired its present meaning from the connotation of the older word which meant an "outlandish" man.[79] The stranger as such--unless he belonged to a friendly, neighbouring tribe--had originally no legal rights at all; for his protection he was dependent on individual {338} hospitality, and hospitality was restricted by custom to three days only.[80] According to the Swedish Westgöta-Lag, he who killed a foreigner had to pay no compensation to the dead man's relatives, nor was he outlawed, nor exiled.[81] The Laws of King Ine let us understand in what light a stranger was looked upon:--"If a far-coming man, or a stranger, journey through a wood out of the highway, and neither shout nor blow his horn, he is to be held for a thief, either to be slain or redeemed."[82] However, as commerce increased and the stranger was more often seen in Teutonic lands, royal protection was extended to him; and a consequence of this was that thenceforth he who killed the stranger had to pay a wergeld, part, or the whole, of which went to the king.[83] In Greece, in early times, the "contemptible stranger"[84] had no legal rights, and was protected only in case he was the guest of a citizen;[85] and even later on, at Athens, whilst the intentional killing of a citizen was punished with death and confiscation of the murderer's property, the intentional killing of a non-citizen was punished only with exile.[86] The Latin word hostis was originally used to denote a foreigner;[87] and the saying of Plautus, that a man is a wolf to a man whom he does not know,[88] was probably an echo of an old Roman proverb. Mommsen suggests that in ancient days the Romans did not punish the killing of a foreigner, unless he belonged to an allied nation; but already in the prehistoric period a change was introduced, the foreigner being placed under the protection of the State.[89]

[Footnote 77: Griffis, Religions of Japan, p. 129.]

[Footnote 78: Roth, 'On the Morality of the Veda,' in Jour. American Oriental Society, iii. 338.]

[Footnote 79: Cf. Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer, p. 396; Gummere, Germanic Origins, p. 288.]

[Footnote 80: Grimm, op. cit. p. 397 sqq. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtgeschichte, i. 273.]

[Footnote 81: Westgöta-Lagen I. Af mandrapi, v. 4 p. 13.]

[Footnote 82: Laws of Ine, 20. Cf. Laws of Wihtræd, 28.]

[Footnote 83: Brunner, op. cit. i. 273 sq. Gummere, op. cit. p. 288. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. i. 52.]

[Footnote 84: Iliad, ix. 648.]

[Footnote 85: Hermann-Blümner, Lehrsbüch der griechischen Privatalterthümer, p. 492. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, ii. 325.]

[Footnote 86: Meier and Schömann, Der altische Process, p. 379.]

[Footnote 87: Cicero, De officiis, i. 12.]

[Footnote 88: Plautus, Asinaria, ii. 4. 88.]

[Footnote 89: Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 622 sqq.]

How little regard is felt for the lives of strangers also appears from the readiness with which war is waged on {339} foreign nations, combined with the estimation in which the successful warrior is held by his countrymen. The ancient Mexicans were never at a loss for an excuse to pick a quarrel with their neighbours, so as to be able to procure victims for sacrifices to their gods.[90] "No profession was held in more esteem amongst them than the profession of arms. The deity of war was the most revered by them, and regarded as the chief protector of the nation."[91] The Mayas not only wanted to increase their dominions by encroachments upon their neighbours' territory, but undertook raids with no other object than that of obtaining captives for sacrifice.[92] Speaking of the wars of the ancient Egyptians, M. Amélineau observes, "Nous n'avons pas un seul mot dans la littérature égyptienne, même dans les [oe]uvres égypto-chrétiennes, qui nous fasse entendre le plus léger cri de réprobation pour la guerre et ses horreurs."[93] Among the Hebrews the most cruel wars of extermination were expressly sanctioned by their religion. That an idolatrous people had no right to live was taken as a matter of course; but wars were also unscrupulously waged from worldly motives, and in their moral code there is no attempt to distinguish between just and unjust war.[94] Among the Mohammedans it is likewise the unbeliever, not the foreigner as such, that is regarded as the most proper object of slaughter. Although there is no precept in the Koran which, taken with the context, justifies unprovoked war,[95] the saying that "Paradise is under the shadow of swords"[96] is popularly applied to all warfare against infidels. Among the Celts[97] and Teutons a man's highest aspiration was to acquire military glory. The Scandinavians considered it a disgrace for a man to die {340} without having seen human blood flow;[98] even the slaying of a tribesman they often regarded lightly when it had been done openly and bravely. In Greece, in ancient times at least, war was the normal relation between different states, and peace an exception, for which a special treaty was required;[99] while to conquer and enslave barbarians was regarded as a right given to the Greeks by Nature. The whole statecraft of the early Republic of Rome was no doubt based upon similar principles;[100] and in later days, also, the war policy of the Romans was certainly not conducted with that conscientiousness which was insisted upon by some of their writers.

[Footnote 90: Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific States, ii. 420. Clavigero, History of Mexico, i. 371.]

[Footnote 91: Clavigero, op. cit. i. 363.]

[Footnote 92: Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 740, 745.]

[Footnote 93: Amélineau, L'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypte ancienne, p. 344.]

[Footnote 94: Cf. Seldeft, De Synedriis et Præfecturis Juridicis veterum Ebræorum, iii. 12, p. 1179 sqq.; Lament, Études sur l'histoire de l'humanité, i. 384 sq.]

[Footnote 95: This was later on admitted by Lane (Modern Egyptians, p. 574), who had previously maintained that the duty of waging holy war is strongly urged in the Koran.]

[Footnote 96: Pool, Studies in Mohammedanism, p. 246.]

[Footnote 97: Logan, The Scottish Gael, i. 101. de Valroger, Les Celtes, p. 186.]

[Footnote 98: Njála, ch. 40, vol. i. 167. Maurer, Rekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes, ii. 172.]

[Footnote 99: Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, ii. 280. Laurent, op. cit. i. 46. Plato, Leges, i. 625. Livy, xxxi. 29: "Cum alienigenis, cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis bellum est."]

[Footnote 100: Cf. Lecky, History of European Morals, ii. 257.]

However, the foreigner is not entirely, or under all circumstances, devoid of rights. Among the nations of archaic civilisation, as among the lower races, hospitality is a duty, and the life of a guest is as sacred as the life of any of the permanent members of the household. In various cases the commencement of international hostilities is preceded by special ceremonies, intended to justify acts which are not considered proper in times of peace. In ancient Mexico it was usual to send a formal challenge or declaration of war to the enemy, as it was held discreditable to attack a people unprepared for defence;[101] and, according to the fecial law of the Romans, no war was just unless it was undertaken to reclaim property, or unless it was solemnly denounced and proclaimed beforehand.[102] In some cases warfare is condemned, or a distinction is made between just and unjust war with reference to the purpose for which the war is waged. The Chinese philosophers were great advocates of peace.[103] According to Lao-Tsze, a superior man uses weapons "only on the compulsion of necessity";[104] there is no calamity greater {341} than lightly engaging in war,[105] and "he who has killed multitudes of men should weep for them with the bitterest grief."[106] In the Indian poem, Mahabharata, needless warfare is condemned; it is said that the success which is obtained by negotiations is the best, and that the success which is secured by battle is the worst.[107] Among the Hebrews the sect of the Essenes went so far in their reprobation of war that they would not manufacture any martial instruments whatever.[108] Roman historians, even in the case of wars with barbarians, often discuss the sufficiency or insufficiency of the motives "with a conscientious severity a modern historian could hardly surpass."[109] According to Cicero, a war, to be just, ought to be necessary, the sole object of war being to enable us to live undisturbed in peace. There are two modes of settling controversies, he says, one by discussion, the other by a resort to force. The first is proper to man, the second is proper to brutes, and ought never to be adopted except where the first is unavailable.[110] Seneca regards war as a "glorious crime," comparable to murder:--"What is forbidden in private life is commanded by public ordinance. Actions which, committed by stealth, would meet with capital punishment, we praise because committed by soldiers. Men, by nature the mildest species of the animal race, are not ashamed to find delight in mutual slaughter, to wage wars, and to transmit them to be waged by their children, when even dumb animals and wild beasts live at peace with one another."[111] History attests that the Romans, in their intercourse with other nations, did not act upon Cicero's and Seneca's lofty theories of international morality; as Plutarch observes, the two names "peace" and "war" are mostly used only as coins, to procure, not what is just, but what is expedient.[112] Yet there seems to have been a general {342} feeling in Rome that the waging of a war required some justification. In declaring it, the Roman heralds called all the gods to witness that the people against whom it was declared had been unjust and neglectful of its obligations.[113]

[Footnote 101: Clavigero, op. cit. i. 370. Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 420, 421, 423.]

[Footnote 102: Cicero, De officiis, i. 11.]

[Footnote 103: Cf. Lanessan, Morale des philosophes chinois, pp. 54, 107.]

[Footnote 104: Táo Teh King, xxxi. 2.]

[Footnote 105: Ibid. lxix. 2.]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. xxxi. 3.]

[Footnote 107: Mahabharata, Bhisma Parva, iii. 81 (pt. xii. sq. p. 6).]

[Footnote 108: Philo, Quod liber sit quisquis virtuti studet, p. 877.]

[Footnote 109: Lecky, History of European Morals, ii. 258.]

[Footnote 110: Cicero, De officiis, i. 11.]

[Footnote 111: Seneca, Epistulæ, 95.]

[Footnote 112: Plutarch, Vita Pyrrhi, xii. 3, p. 389.]

[Footnote 113: Livy, i. 32.]

Even in war the killing of an enemy is, under certain circumstances, prohibited either by custom or by enlightened moral opinion. Among the ancient Nahuas, who never accepted a ransom for a prisoner of war, the person of an ambassador was at all events held sacred.[114] In the 'Book of Rewards and Punishments,' which embodies popular Taouism, it is said, "Do not massacre the enemies who yield themselves, nor kill those who offer their submission."[115] The Hebrews, whilst being commanded to "save alive nothing that breatheth" of the cities which the Lord had given them for an inheritance, were to deal differently with cities which were very far off from them: to kill only the men, and to take to themselves the women and the little ones.[116] The Laws of Manu lay down very humane rules for a king who fights with his foes in battle:--"Let him not strike with weapons concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire. Let him not strike one who in flight has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands in supplication, nor one who flees with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says 'I am thine'; nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another foe; nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted with sorrow, nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight; but in all these cases let him remember the duty of honourable warriors."[117] The Mahabharata contains expressions of {343} similar chivalrous sentiments in regard to enemies. A car-warrior should fight only with a car-warrior, a horse-man with a horse-man, a foot-soldier with a foot-soldier. "Always being led by consideration of fitness, willingness, bravery, and strength, one should strike another after having challenged him. None should strike another who is confiding or who is panic-striken. One fighting with another, one seeking refuge, one retreating, one whose weapon is broken, and one who is not clad in armour should never be struck. Charioteers, animals, men engaged in carrying weapons, those who play on drums and those who blow conchs should never be smitten."[118] Among the Greeks, in the Homeric age, it was evidently regarded as a matter of course that, on the fall of a city, all the men were slain, and the women and children carried off as slaves;[119] but in historic times such a treatment of a vanquished foe grew rarer, and seems, under ordinary circumstances, to have been disapproved of.[120] The rulers of this land, says the messenger in the 'Heraclidæ,' do not approve of slaying enemies who have been taken alive in battle.[121] In Rome the customs of war underwent a similar change. In ancient days the normal fate of a captive was death, in later times he was generally reduced to slavery; but many thousands of captives were condemned to the gladiatorial shows, and the vanquished general was commonly slain in the Mamertine prison.[122] On the other hand, nations or armies that voluntarily submitted to Rome were habitually treated with great leniency. Cicero says:--"When we obtain the victory we must preserve those enemies who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity during the war; for example, our forefathers received, even as members of their state, the Tuscans, the Aequi, the Volscians, the Sabines, and the Hernici, but utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia. . . . And, while we {344} are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we have conquered by force, so those should be received into our protection who throw themselves upon the honour of our general, and lay down their arms, even though the battering rams should have struck their walls."[123]

[Footnote 114: Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 426, 412.]

[Footnote 115: Douglas, Confucianism and Taouism, p. 261.]

[Footnote 116: Deuteronomy, xx. 13 sqq.]

[Footnote 117: Laws of Manu, vii. 90 sq.]

[Footnote 118: Mahabharata, Bhisma Parva, i. 27 sqq. (pt. xii. sq. p. 2).]

[Footnote 119: Iliad, ix. 593 sq.]

[Footnote 120: Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, ii. 281 sqq.]

[Footnote 121: Euripides, Heraclidæ, 966.]

[Footnote 122: Laurent, op. cit. iii. 20 sq. Lecky, History of European Morals, ii. 257.]

[Footnote 123: Cicero, De officiis, i. 11.]