The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 (part 5 of 5)
Nordau throws light upon numerous mooted phenomena of modern art and literature, pointing out their diseased features. One is really surprised at the extent of his work. All in all, it may be foreseen that Koch’s doctrine of the “psychopathical minor factors”—or those psychical factors which constitute the border-line between mental health and disease—will clear up much more extensive fields than they have, when applied in the direction indicated by Nordau. KOCH has now published the third part of his work, (which I have repeatedly mentioned in The Monist) and thus completed it. He concludes his last volume with these words: “The domain of the ‘psychopathical minor factors’ is a wide and very interesting one. Whosoever enters profoundly into it will learn to look at much in life with different eyes from those with which he began, will understand many men and many human acts, which before he did not understand. There are yet many scientific treasures to be unearthed in this field, and I hope that I shall win many a coadjutor. I hope, also, that qualified men will make this theory of the psychopathical minor factors fruitful in wider fields and for greater problems.”
It is a common belief that it is pre-eminently in our time that psychical disorders and psychical minor factors play so great a rôle. But that in the sense of Nordau they are not of so recent origin a careful reader will learn from a new work of LUDWIG GEIGER, the well-known historian of literature and civilisation (Paetel, Berlin). Its title is: Berlin, 1688-1840: Geschichte des geistigen Lebens der preussischen Hauptstadt. As yet, only the first volume has appeared, which extends to the death of Frederick the Great. The reader, however, would obtain an entirely wrong impression of the work if he were to believe that psychiatrical points of view are expressly dwelt upon in this book. To find them he must read between the lines. The book is an extraordinarily painstaking history of the civilisation of Berlin, taken from the sources, and giving especial prominence to intellectual factors. We shall reserve the detailed discussion of this important work for another occasion, perhaps until it is fully completed.
CHRISTIAN UFER.
BOOK REVIEWS.
HAND-COMMENTAR ZUM NEUEN TESTAMENT. IV. EVANGELIUM, BRIEFL UND OFFENBARUNG DES JOHANNES. Bearbeitet von H. J. Holtzmann. Zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. (Freiburg I. B. and Leipsic: 1893. J. C. B. Mohr.)
The fourth gospel, of all the sacred writings of the New Testament, has always been the reviewer’s favorite book. Its profundity, its wealth of philosophical ideas, the fervor of its author’s religious sentiment, and the spiritual grace that pervades the whole book, exercised an unspeakable charm on my mind. This gospel was the first to rouse my doubts in the belief of literal inspiration, and it was again the one, which, after the severest storms of infidelity had blown over, reconciled me to the spirit of Christianity. Thus the perusal of Professor Holtzmann’s commentary again arouses the recollections of former struggles, and I find that even to-day the first chapter of the fourth gospel has lost none of its fascination. It is a wonderful book, and its author is a man whom I always longed to meet and shake hands with, over a span of almost two millenniums and a world-wide abyss of difference of opinion.
Only those who are familiar with the difficulties of the St. John literature of the New Testament can really appreciate this latest work of Prof. H. J. Holtzmann. He presents in a most clear and concise manner the problems involved, together with their various solutions, critically arranged. He carefully avoids obtruding on the reader his own views. He stands before us as a faithful compiler only. I say “only,” but this “only” means a great deal. It does not mean that he suppresses or conceals his own views, it means that he states the facts with scrupulous impartiality. If there is any partiality apparent in his treatment of the sacred writings, it is the reverent attitude he preserves whenever love of truth obliges him to accept the negative result of critical investigations. And where is there a theological scholar to-day, who is orthodox enough to dare to accept the theory that the gospel of St. John was written by the apostle? Holtzmann carries his impartiality to the extent of not rejecting this old traditional idea, concerning the authorship of the fourth gospel, but the evidence against it is overwhelmingly sufficient to satisfy the most narrowminded believer. Holtzmann teaches us at the same time to understand the spirit of the first and second century of our era, and thus excludes from the beginning the old prejudice, that if the author were not the man whom he impersonated his work must be regarded as a fraud. The historical value of the book lies in the revelations it gives us concerning the religious demands of the times in which it was written. The fourth gospel originated when the Jewish religiosity of growing Christianity began to expand into cosmic universality. The author was undoubtedly a Jew-Christian, whose home most likely was Ephesus. Ephesus was the place where we find the first beginnings of Christian Alexandrianism. Here the Logos-idea was introduced into Christian thought. Philo, the Alexandrian Jew, had already represented Moses as the incarnation of the divine Logos. Should not now a Christian familiar with Philo’s philosophy apply the same method to Jesus of Nazareth? Some work adapted to satisfy the wants of the time and especially the religious yearnings for knowledge as a means of edification was needed. The Christ-idea had taken a definite shape in the imagination of the Christian congregations of Asia Minor, consisting of diaspora Jews and Gentiles, and their Christ-idea found a worthy expression in the picture of Jesus of Nazareth as we have it in the fourth gospel.
The fact that the author of the fourth gospel was a Jew-Christian, appears from his readiness to explain Jewish customs. He knows Judaism, and is familiar with Jerusalem as it appeared after the destruction of the temple. The probability is that he wrote his gospel between 120 and 140. He is comparable to Matthew in so far as both are greatly interested in the controversy between Gentiles versus Jews, yet Matthew’s Israel has grown into the world-wide cosmos. The frequent occurrence of the very word “cosmos” in the fourth gospel is remarkable. In the same way the Greek term γιγνώσκειν (to know) appears besides the older term πιστεύειν (to believe), which latter is a translation of a Jewish conception, still employed so vigorously by St. Paul. The author of the fourth gospel is not familiar with Galilee and does not seem to care for consistency in the details of his accounts, for he frequently contradicts his own statements. The most important differences between his and the three synoptic gospels are the accounts as to the main field of Jesus’s activity, which according to St. John was Judea, according to the synoptic gospels Galilee, and the day of Jesus’s death, which according to St. John is the 14th of Nisan, according to the synoptic gospels the 15th of Nisan, so that if we follow the latter, Jesus would have been tried and condemned, against all Jewish customs, on one of the greatest festival days. Holtzmann rightly warns the reader, that whatever may speak in favor of the synoptic gospels as being, in general, historically more correct, the author of the fourth gospel might have had some special source for this particular fact.—
The Revelation of St. John has given more trouble to the Christian exegesis than any other book, and light was not shed upon its plan and construction, until it was found to be one instance only of a whole class of literary productions. When we consider the Revelation of St. John in the same line with other apocalyptic works, and when we understand the mental disposition of the pious Jews shortly before and after Christ, we have a clew to the enigmatic visions which are unrolled before our eyes.
The expectations of the Jews in the times of the Maccabees were disappointed again and again. The great events of the world did not justify the national hopes, and God did not seem to care about fulfilling his promises. The last prophet, who called himself Malachi, or “the messenger of God,” proclaimed the message of the Lord, “Yet I loved Jacob,” and he comforts the faithful who still endure in all their tribulations, that “a book of remembrance is written before him for them that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name.” After Malachi, a number of revelations appeared, which, to the satisfaction of the Messianic expectations, explained the events of the world, and prophesied that those only who should persevere until the end would be called upon to rule, together with the “Son of Man,” who is to come to smite the heathens and to rule them with an iron rod. The first apocalyptic author, who wrote in 164 B. C., impersonated Daniel, the prophet, who had lived about 400 B. C. The powerful nations of the world are represented as beasts, the fourth and last beast being the Macedonian empire. It has ten horns, that is, rulers, the last one being Antiochus Epiphanes. As soon as his power is broken, the power over the earth will be given to Israel, which is called the Son of Man. The power of the tenth horn was broken, indeed, yet the Messianic hopes remained unfulfilled, and thus new prophecies were wanted, which should again explain the plans of the Almighty, so that the faithful would still endure and hope. Thus, Henoch was written, and after Henoch the Assumption of Moses, the book of Baruch, and other revelations.
The apocalyptic literature is characterised by Messianic expectations and eschatological reflections. The end of the present course of affairs is said to be near at hand and a new order will be established in which the faithful shall rule for a whole millennium and the wicked be tormented.
The Revelation of St. John represents this spirit of apocalyptic hopes among the early Christians of Asia Minor. It throws much light upon the conditions and the conceptions of a period concerning which we have very little information. We here see Christianity in its beginnings. The coloring of the Revelation is still Jewish. Its author stands in a conscious contrast to the Greek spirit which is about to change the properly Jewish character of the new doctrine. The author of the St. John revelation is a Jew to the backbone still; he denounces the antinomistic Christianity of the Gentiles as represented by Nocolaitanes whom, we are told, God hateth. He does not directly mention the apostle St. Paul, but there is little doubt that he is alluded to in Chap. II, 2, as one of them “which say they are apostles and are not.”
The more powerful the Greek spirit grew in the church, the weaker became these original features inherited from the diaspora Jews until they were dropped forever through the efforts of Origenes who made a decided and successful opposition to the belief in the millennium. Yet it took some time for the traditional view of the Messiah to change into the purer and more spiritual Christ-ideal There were two parties in the early church who spoke two radically different idioms; the one still cherished the old chiliasm, dreaming of the establishment of a millennium on earth. Their terminology moved always in the same allegories: they spoke of green and fat fields and of sulphurous abysses, of white horses and terrible beasts, of trees of life, of golden cities and of war and bloodshed, while the other party spoke of Logos, of the eternal Son through whom the world had been made, of “the dispensation of the fulness of the times in which God might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth,” of the pleroma and of aeons.
The Revelation of St. John is an expression of the former party and it was natural that after a complete victory of the latter party, Christian teachers knew not what to make of this book which shows Christian views by the side of an irreconcilable Judaism, and a worldly empire in Jerusalem, the beloved city with twenty-four Jewish elders representing the twelve tribes of Israel. The rest of Jerusalem is to be finally converted while there is no hope for paganism. The difference between Israelites and Gentiles remains a radical one even in the Holy City when the new heaven and the new earth has been created. The Gentile-Christians appear as citizens of a lower order. The Israelites alone live in the city while the Gentiles only walk in the light thereof, and they shall bring the glory and honor of the nations into it.
We have given a few glimpses of the problems of the St. John literature only. It is impossible to go over the whole field. Nor is it necessary to do so. Professor Holtzmann has given us so complete a presentation that we need but refer to his work which is indispensable to all interested in the literature of the New Testament. It will be the more valuable and welcome as it is furnished with an index, a feature rarely found in German books.
P. C.
DIE WILLENSFREIHEIT UND IHRE GEGNER. By Dr. Constantin Gutberlet. Fulda: Fuldaer Actiendruckerei. 1893.
Dr. Constantin Gutberlet regards the doctrine of free-will as a cardinal doctrine of Christianity. In the present booklet he endeavors to show that all attacks made upon it by unchristian savants have failed. He criticises Höffding, Lombroso, Wundt, Münsterberg, Lotze, P. Ree, and Schopenhauer, and establishes as his own view a theory of free-will which he calls “freedom of choice.” He says: “There is no decision without sufficient reason, but there may be without rational reason. The sufficient reason is that a greater good may be recognised as possessing ‘blind’ sides, that we can do without it and even reject it for the sake of these ‘blind’ sides. On the other hand, a lesser good may be given as an object of willing, and our willing by its own energy conditions the free decision of the will” (p. 25). Freedom of will is not a reversal of causation, which latter, according to Gutberlet, is “an absolutely necessary law” (p. 8 and passim).
It is difficult to understand how Gutberlet, taking this view, can class himself among the indeterminists. From his premises, we should expect him to take the view which we have defended, that freedom of will is not contradictory to determinism. If freedom of will means freedom of choice, in which “we ourselves, as the contents of our ideas, feelings, and dispositions, are the cause not only of our activities, but also of our free decision” (p. 19), then our decisions are most certainly determined by our character. Gutberlet’s criticism of Wundt (pp. 167-171), who defends freedom of will and determinism, is wide of the mark, and it seems that Gutberlet is either not clear on this point himself or he does not draw the consequences of his own standpoint. Says Gutberlet: “Only on the supposition that there is no other than ‘mechanical’ causation of natural forces, can the determinist maintain that freedom abolishes the principle of causation. In the application of the principle of Causation ‘what happens has a cause’ to natural forces, the principle can be inverted thus: ‘when all sufficient causes are given, the effect follows with necessity.’ Yet if there are spiritual agents which stand above the mechanical causation of nature and natural forces, we cannot a priori declare that their effects follow with the same necessity from their character as is the case with nature. Accordingly, unless we assume the questionable theory that free causation is impossible, we cannot invert here the principle of causation and use it against free decision” (p. 168).
How does this sentence agree with Mr. Gutberlet’s statements that causation is an absolutely necessary law and that “we ourselves ... are the cause of our free decision.” Our decisions are determined by “our ideas, feelings, and dispositions,” and yet a sufficient cause determines its effect only if the causation is mechanical, not if it is spiritual. Gutberlet explains the difficulty as follows: “Certainly, if we did not reduce the free decision once made (die eingetretene freie Entscheidung), to an adequate cause, we should sin against logic and psychology. But we understand by ‘adequate cause of a decision’ not only the influence of motives, but also the energy of a free will.” Very well then, Mr. Gutberlet would be a determinist as much as Wundt. Decisions are determined by two factors: (1) by the motives (i. e. the objects which act as stimuli upon the will) and (2) by the character of the agent. Not everybody is affected by the same stimulus in the same way. One chooses this and another that motive, and his character determines the choice; and a man of a certain character, under definitely given conditions, will freely and yet necessarily choose a certain motive. Dr. Gutberlet, it appears to us, says yes and no in one breath.
Dr. Gutberlet is the editor of the Philosophisches Jahrbuch, a Roman Catholic periodical. He belongs to that class of men who by partisans of free thought are regarded as especially dangerous. He is not as narrow as the common type of defensores fidei. He studies the works of modern savants “whose intellectual superiority,” as he confesses, he “admires in many respects.” He is broader than most of his confreres, and thus he makes the creed of his church appear broader than it practically is. We can see no danger in the appearance of such men. It is true, he will make converts among the educated, or at least, he will keep some wavering elements within the pale of the church; for the Roman church is, upon the whole, still very hostile to progress. But, on the other hand, such a man is in his circles a missionary of science; he will help to broaden the views of his brethren. He is learning, and they will learn from him.
P. C.
GRUNDZÜGE DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE. By Wilhelm Wundt. Leipsic: Wilhelm Engelmann. 1893.
Wundt’s “Physiological Psychology” is perhaps justly regarded as his best and most valuable work. We have just received the first part of the fourth edition and may expect that the second part will soon appear. We intend to review the whole work as soon as completed, and will state here only that this new edition contains, among many emendations and additions, an explicit account of the modern methods of psychological investigations, with descriptions and illustrations of the most important instruments invented for that purpose.
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VERGLEICHEND-ENTWICKELUNGSGESCHICHTLICHE UND ANATOMISCHE STUDIEN IM BEREICHE DER HIRNANATOMIE. 3. RIECHAPPARAT UND AMMONSHORN. Abdruck aus Anatomischer Anzeiger. By Dr. L. Edinger. (Jena: 1893. Gustav Fischer.)
Dr. Edinger proves in this essay that in the cerebral evolution of animals the cortex makes its first appearance in the formation of the cornu ammonis. This convolution being the centre of smell, it is more than merely probable that smell sensations, or something analogous to smell sensations, were phylogenetically the first psychical functions.
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ÉTAT MENTAL DES HYSTÉRIQUES LES STIGMATES MENTAUX. By Pierre Janet. Paris: Rueff & Co. 1892.
M. Pierre Janet, one of the most prominent disciples of Professor Charcot, presents in this little volume of two hundred and thirty-three pages a summary of the results of modern psychical research as it is understood at the Salpétrière. Charcot himself recommends the book to the medical profession. Janet investigates anæsthesia (Chap. I), amnesia, abulia, the diseases of motion, and the modifications of character. The author proposes to “describe the phenomena and endeavors to establish a rigorous determinism of their relations. The moral view of a diseased person,” he says, “ought to constitute a part of the clinical diagnosis while the psychical state must be closely investigated in its connection with physiological facts. This is the only way in which the physician can gain a knowledge of the entire man and understand the diseases which affect his organism.”
Professor Charcot states that Professor Janet’s researches on the mental state of hysterical persons were begun long ago and completed under his supervision; that they were expounded by M. Janet in the Spring of 1892 in a few lectures at the Salpétrière; that they tend to confirm the idea, often expressed in his own teachings, that hysteria is upon the whole a mental disease.
Hypnotism has long enough been regarded not only as harmless but even as a panacea for almost all the ailments of mankind. It would be well to heed Charcot’s warning, as hysterical diseases may be treated with better success, if the mystery that still surrounds them disappears before calm and scientific investigation.
ς.
L’ÉCOLE D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By l’Abbé Maurice de Baets. Gand: P. van Fleteren. 1893.
Dr. de Baets, Professor of Philosophy of the Gregorian University of Rome, Italy, and Secretary to the Bishop of Ghent, criticises in this elegantly printed little volume the modern school of criminal anthropology. He believes with Herbert Spencer that, if a great number of people accept certain errors, these errors must contain a kernel of truth. Professor de Baets says that he does not deny crime to be an outgrowth of the organism, to be inherited, to be closely connected with insanity, etc., but he cannot approve of criminal unaccountableness. The denial of responsibility, he says, is the denial of the wrong, and the denial of the wrong is the denial of morality. He sums up his view in italics on page 48: “Man is responsible for his acts in the measure that his acts depend on a free will.”
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AGAINST DOGMA AND FREE-WILL. By H. Croft Hiller. London: Williams and NORGATE. 1892.
The author has much to say against ecclesiasticism and sacerdotalism, and while he repudiates such men as Wundt and Ribot, he “begs to thank Drs. Weismann, Luys, and Ferrier from whose labors the views expressed in this treatise derive that scientific authentication without which they would be worthless.” The book is apparently a first venture into the stormy ocean of literary pursuits.
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALITY, OR THE ONE AND THE MANY. By Antoinette Brown Blackwell. New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1893.
The author trusts that she has “demonstrated a conscious immortality.” In a former book of hers entitled “The Physical Basis of Immortality,” 1876, she propounded “the theory of persistent mind-matter individuals” which are to be conceived as ultimate atoms. The present volume of five hundred and nineteen pages is written to show that “this conception of the ultimate atoms could consistently explain and harmonise mental and material phenomena and by coördinated interpretations of the most diverse processes simplify and unify nature and her manifestations.” The theory of the correlation of matter and mind is accepted; “Nature,” the author says, “is nothing if not mathematical,” and there are many passages to which no monistic thinker would take exception. Along with them we find statements, e. g. on the rhythmic motion of atoms, etc., which it will be difficult to prove. Her peculiar view is characterised in the following sentence: “All ultimate individualities may be identical in kind, but no obvious necessity decides that they must be, and in an order of things where other varieties are prevalent, the weight of evidence for the present is on the side of varieties, even in the ultimate units.” The author’s theory (if we rightly understand her) has been tried before. Some suggestions of Goethe’s seem to indicate that he believed in soul-monads, and the German psychologist Herbart erected on the assumption of material soul-atoms his system of a mathematical psychology in which sound science was curiously mingled with improbable vagaries. The author of “The Philosophy of Individuality,” although apparently quite well informed otherwise, has, strange enough, not taken notice either of Goethe or of Herbart. Perhaps she would have abandoned her theory if she had been fully familiar with Herbartism and the critique which it has received; for Herbart’s soul-atoms are to-day regarded as a thing of the past.
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DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER GEGENWART. By Prof. Rudolf Eucken. Leipsic: Veit & Co. 1893.
Prof. Rudolf Eucken discusses in this volume such topics as “Subjective—Objective”; “A priori—A posteriori”; “Monism—Dualism”; “Idealism, Realism, and Naturalism”; “Theoretical—Practical,” and so forth. It seems to us that Eucken has not yet fully succeeded in reconciling his philosophy with natural science. We are glad to notice that he has a critical eye for the shortcomings of naturalists under whose methods of classification and mechanical conceptions the properly spiritual of man would be eliminated. He is judicious in his exposition of the various problems, but we miss a final solution, such as would clearly state and recognise the truth in both. Nevertheless the book is sound, full of valuable information, and its perusal is to be recommended to every student of philosophy.
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THE ÆSTHETIC ELEMENT IN MORALITY. By Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph.D. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.
The book contains chapters on: (1) the theory of altruism; (2) the intrinsic worth of character; (3) an analysis of moral beauty; (4) an examination of the æsthetic method of ethics; and (5) the idea of obligation in æsthetics and ethics. The author’s knowledge of ethical theories appears to be limited. Duns Scotus, the Realist, is called a thoroughgoing Nominalist. In spite of such defects, we find much that is good in the book. In the end of his discussion the author says with truth: “When the element of the good, or that which is capable of clothing itself in the form of an ideal, is taken out of the conception of obligation, this latter degenerates into what is nothing more than mere submission to an arbitrary imperative....Prometheus, chained to the rocks for bringing the gift of fire to the wretched barbarous inhabitants of the earth, in defiance of the will of the ‘Father of gods and men,’ is one of the grandest productions of the human imagination, and were the Supreme Being such a one as Augustine and Calvin imagined him, we should despise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet.”
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PERIODICALS.
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.
CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 1 and 2.
DIE STABILITÄT DER RAUMWERTE AUF DER NETZHAUT. By _Franz Hillebrand_.
UEBER EIN OPTISCHES PARADOXON. (Second Article.) By _Franz Brentano_.
LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
This second article, “On an Optical Paradox,” is a rejoinder of Franz Brentano of Vienna to Th. Lipps. We gave an account of this interesting discussion in The Monist, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 153 et seqq. Professor Brentano insists on explaining the optical illusion concerning distances between two points, as seen in Fig. 1-3, by an overestimation of small and an underestimation of large angles. He complains of being misunderstood by Professor Lipps who substitutes “acute” for “small” and “obtuse” for “large”; for, says he, in comparisons both angles may be obtuse or both may be acute. Professor Brentano adds some more puzzling figures to prove his case; and, as in his first article, his propositions are ingenious and thought-stimulating; but his arguments do not suffice to convince us of the validity of his theory. We do not exactly intend to deny the general rule as to the overestimation of large and underestimation of small angles, but are inclined to believe that it will not serve as a sufficient explanation. We reproduce the most important figures devised by Brentano, and take the liberty of adding a few remarks and additional figures of our own.
Fig. 4 represents two right angles, one of which is divided into nine angles of 10° each. Brentano claims that we so overestimate the nine small angles as to take the undivided right angle as an acute one. I can only say that however much I have tried, I am not subject to the illusion.
In Fig. 5 we have on the straight line AB a series of stations which are connected with a common centre. The line AB is not a curve, but this figure reminds us of a perspective view of the sector of a circle. The drawing appears as the diagrammatic picture of a shield, the buckle of which is in C. Thus AB is conceived as representing a curve. It does not seem that a comparison of the angles has anything to do with the illusion.
How much perspective interferes with the optical illusions under discussion, impresses itself upon my mind, when I think of figure 5 as the diagram of a mountain, rising above the plane AB. If I imagine I stand below the plane, which may be a high table-land, the line AB appears to my eye straight. But when I imagine I am looking down upon the plane, the curvature of AB becomes very strongly marked.
In Fig. 6 we can detect no optical illusion. The line AB appears straight to us. The drawing reminds us of a sunrise on the ocean.
The same must be said about Figure 7. Brentano, in agreement with Lipps, claims that we are inclined to regard the distance between the ends of the two lines as larger than between the points. If there is any illusion at all, it seems to me, that on the contrary, the distance between the ends of the lines appears shorter. And why? We measure the distance by allowing our eyes to run from one point to the other and then comparing the measurements. This comparison is geometrically effected by combining the respective starting points, and thus judging as to the parallelism of these two lines mentally constructed. Whether or not the dots appear equidistant, depends upon the execution of all these operations. While directly measuring the distances between the points, we have an easier measurement where the lines are attached. The lines give to the points a certain vim; they almost appear to move with a velocity indicated by the length of the little lines, while the isolated dots present a very phlegmatic appearance.
In order to see what effects other positions of the lines produce, let us compare in Fig. 9 the several relations by covering the rest. If there is any illusion as to a and b, we should say that the points of a appear at a greater distance; as to b and c, we see the greater distance in c, as to c and d, we feel doubtful, while any comparison with e, tends strongly to convince us of their equal distance. The reason is obvious. The lines in e assist us in drawing the parallels, which we consciously or unconsciously construct in order to compare the distances.
A comparison like that of α and β in Fig. 8, where the equal length of the combining lines is very apparent, induced Brentano to regard the illusion which is observed in Figures 1-3 as due to the angles. In our opinion he is mistaken. For the illusion actually takes place in α and β; only it is quickly corrected with the help of the parallels, which, as in ε, assist the imagination in making an exact comparison. When we place α and β either at a sufficient distance, or are somehow prevented from making use of the parallel lines, we shall have the same illusion as appears in Figures 1, 2, 3. To prove this, we have but to bring the figure α in a slanting position, as is shown in λ, and the illusion is so strong that many will find it difficult to believe that λ is an electrotyped duplicate of α.
The mooted illusions are not sense-illusions, but illusions of judgment; and we believe that the explanation of these curious phenomena must be sought in the elements which unconsciously enter into the make-up of our judgments.
Lipps says that lines are felt to be movements. If a line is continued, albeit with a slight declination, the motion appears “free and victorious,” aspiring beyond itself; while, if confined in the corner of an acute angle, it seems cut off and impeded. The victoriously progressive motion is overestimated; the checked motion is underestimated.
Brentano, in order to meet Lipps’s objections, proposes a few additional figures, of which we reproduce the most important ones in Fig. 10-14.
It seems to us that the main part which the angles play in these or any other similar figures, consists in leading our imagination astray. The parallel lines which we attempt to construct for our comparison, switch slightly off with an inclination toward the angles.
But that is not all; there are other elements that affect our judgment at the very outset. In measuring a distance we do something, and in looking at a diagram we think something. The diagram is suggestive of some reality to which we compare it. All these ideas, be they conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, affect our judgment and are sometimes apt to lead it astray.
In addition we have to mention two things, the influence of which upon our verdict cannot be doubted; the one is the size of the entire figure, the other the vacuity of the distance to be measured: both tend to make the distance appear longer than it really is. To illustrate this, we add the three Figures 15, 16, 17 which contain no angles and yet show the same illusions.
The distance between the points in Figure 17 appears longer than in Figure 16, and in Figure 16 again longer than in Figure 15. The fact is, that before starting on our measurement-journey, we have in Figure 17 already traversed a good distance after having noted the extraordinarily lengthened boundary marks. The town A may be exactly as far as the town B, yet the journey to A will appear longer, if I have to ride an hour before I reach the station, while I may live opposite the terminus of the railroad to B.
When our eyes glide down from one point to the other, we pass in one case through an empty desert the dreariness of which is not interrupted. We almost lose our way and become lonesome in its monotony. If our way, however, is full of variations, we are pleasantly entertained and regard our journey as so much shorter. The contrast is most obvious in figure 10. The time-illusions as to the swiftness of hours of work or amusement and the slowness of moments of ennui have become proverbial among all nations. The more dreariness, the more marked is the lengthening of the distance, while even a partial accompaniment shortens the traversed road.
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CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 3 and 4.
THEORIE DES FARBENSEHENS. By H. Ebbinghaus.
UEBER DEN MUSKELSINN BEI BLINDEN. By Paul Hocheisen.
LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.
CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 2.
EINIGES ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG DER SITTENLEHRE. (First Article.) By J. Petzoldt.
KRITIK DER GRUNDANSCHAUUNGEN DER SOCIOLOGIE H. SPENCER’S. By P. Barth.
WERTHTHEORIE UND ETHIK. (Second Article.) By Chr. Ehrenfels. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 3.
ON ERRORS OF OBSERVATION. By Prof. James McKeen Cattell.
MINOR STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY OF CLARK UNIVERSITY.
ON THE DISCRIMINATION OF GROUPS OF RAPID CLICKS. By _Thaddeus L. Bolton_.
STATISTICS OF DREAMS. By Mary Whiton Calkins.
ON THE PRESSURE SENSE OF THE DRUM OF THE EAR AND “FACIAL VISION.” By F. B. Dresslar.
ON REACTION-TIMES WHEN THE STIMULUS IS APPLIED TO THE REACTING HAND. By J. F. Reigart and Edmund C. Sanford.
EXPERIMENTS UPON PHYSIOLOGICAL MEMORY BY MEANS OF THE INTERFERENCE OF ASSOCIATIONS. By John A. Bergström.
A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR WEBER’S LAW; WITH INDICATIONS OF A LAW OF SENSE MEMORY. By James H. Leuba.
A NEW PENDULUM CHRONOGRAPH. By Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D.
LABORATORY COURSE IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. (Fourth Paper.) By Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D. (Worcester, Mass.: J. H. Orpha.)
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 3.
GERMAN KANTIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY. By Dr. Erich Adickes.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NEO-KANTISM. By Prof. Andrew Seth.
MENTAL MEASUREMENT. By Prof. J. McK. Cattell.
BOOK REVIEWS. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & CO.)
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 5.
PSYCHOLOGIE DU MUSICIEN. 1. L’EVOLUTION DES APTITUDES MUSICALES. By L. Dauriac.
LA SOCIABILITÉ ET LA MORALE CHEZ LES ANIMAUX. By Houssay.
SUR LES IDÉES GÉNÉRALES. By Marchesini.
QUESTIONNAIRE SUR L’AUDITION COLORÉE, FIGURÉE ET ILLUMINÉE. By Gruber.
L’ATTENTION ET LES IMAGES. By F. Paulhan.
UNE ILLUSION D’OPTIQUE. By B. Bourdon.
SCIENCE ET SOCIALISME. G. Sorel.
ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)
CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 6.
LA NOUVELLE THÉORIE DE L’HÉRÉDITÉ DE WEISMANN. By Y. Delage.
UN CALCULATEUR DU TYPE VISUEL. By J.-M. Charcot and A. Binet.
PSYCHOLOGIE DU MUSICIEN.—II. L’OREILLE MUSICALE. By _L. Dauriac_.
REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.
CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 2.
LE MOUVEMENT ET LES ARGUMENTS DE ZÉNON D’ÉLÉE. By G. Noël.
LE PROBLÈME MORAL DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE DE SPINOZA. By _V. Delbos_.
LE CONCEPT DU NOMBRE CHEZ LES PYTHAGORICIENS. By G. Milhaud.
LE DIALOGUE DANS L’ENSEIGNEMENT DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. By _C. Mélinand_. (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)
CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 3.
LES PRÉTENDUS SOPHISMES DE ZÉNON D’ÉLÉE. By V. Brochard.
SPIR ET SA DOCTRINE. By A. Penjon.
ESSAI SUR LE CARACTÈRE GÉNÉRAL DE LA CONNAISSANCE. By _G. Remacle_.
PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.
CONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 2.
BEGRIFF DER PHILOSOPHIE. By Uebinger.
DIE OBJECTIVITÄT UND DIE SICHERHEIT DES ERKENNENS. By Isenkrahe.
DER BEGRIFF DES “WARREN.” (Concluded.) By Franz Schmid.
DER GRUNDPLAN DER MENSCHLICHEN WISSENSCHAFT. By _Bahlmann, S. J._
HANDSCHRIFTLICHES ZU DEN WERKEN DES ALANUS. By Bäumker. (Fulda, 1893.)