The Great Sieges of History (part 4 of 4)

The Great Sieges of History (part 4 of 4)

The position of Ismaïl, situated upon the Danube, in Bessarabia, tempted the court of St. Petersburg, then at war with the Turks, to endeavour to make the conquest of it. This was one of the most important cities of the Turkish empire in its European provinces. It had a numerous population, and a garrison of forty-three thousand men, commanded by Auduslu Pacha, one of the best of the Ottoman generals. Provisions and munitions were abundant, and its artillery powerful. Its walls, having a circuit of a mile from one bank of the Danube to the other, were from three to four toises high; at their feet was a fosse from seven to eight toises deep; they were crowned by pieces of large calibre. Between the polygons of Bender and Brock, there was a fausse-braie, near a cavalier, capable of containing many thousand soldiers. The water side was strongly defended by batteries making a horizontal fire. At the beginning of November, 1790, General Sudowitsch, with several bodies of troops, made the approaches upon Ismaïl, whilst Admiral Ribas blockaded it with a flotilla of a hundred row-boats. They obtained some advantages at sea, but the rigours of the winter obliged Sudowitsch to raise the siege. When informed of this, the court of St. Petersburg, accustomed to find no difficulty insurmountable, ordered Field-marshal Potemkin to return immediately before Ismaïl and take possession of it. The marshal felt all the difficulties of the undertaking, but he obeyed. Arrived upon the Pruth, he detached Lieutenant-General Potemkin with orders to bury himself under the ruins of Ismaïl; but his efforts were not more successful than those of Sudowitsch. Suwarrow then came up with a regiment of infantry, a thousand Arnauts, and two hundred Cossacks. The land army consisted of twenty-eight thousand men, of whom near one-half were Cossacks. The first care was to exercise these irregular troops in the manœuvres of an assault. Many days were employed in reconnaissances, in order that the general officers might be well acquainted with the posts they were to attack. When all the observations necessary had been made, batteries were raised, to lead the Turks to believe that they were preparing to make a regular siege, and not to carry Ismaïl by assault. On the 9th of December, Suwarrow sent the seraskier a letter from Prince Potemkin, to persuade him to surrender. The seraskier replied that he advised the Russians to retire, if they were unwilling to experience absolute want in an advanced season, and perish with famine and misery before a place amply provided with everything. Suwarrow, the next day, sent another note to the seraskier, in which he announced to him, that if he did not hoist the white flag that very day, the place should be taken by assault and the whole garrison be put to the sword. Many Turks were inclined to surrender; but the seraskier was resolved to risk everything, and made no reply. Suwarrow immediately assembled a council of war, and spoke as follows to his troops: “Brave warriors, remember to-day all your victories, and continue to prove that nothing can resist the arms of Russians. The affair in hand is not one that can be deferred, but it concerns an important place, the possession of which will decide the glory of the campaign, and which the proud Ottomans consider impregnable. Twice already has the Russian army laid siege to Ismaïl, and twice has it retreated from it. There only remains for us, as the third attempt, to conquer or to die with glory.” This speech inflamed the ardour of his soldiers, and an assault was decided upon. Suwarrow received a courier from Prince Potemkin, recommending him not to risk an assault if he was not sure of succeeding. Suwarrow replied in these few lines: “My plan is settled. The Russian army has already been twice at the gates of Ismaïl; it would be disgraceful for it to retire a third time.” Some Cossacks deserted in the evening, and informed the Ottomans of the approaching attack. The principal part of the garrison remained all night upon the ramparts. To make the Turks believe they were short of powder, the Russians fired but little during the night which preceded the assault. All measures being taken, by four o’clock in the morning the columns were formed: there were six on the land side and three upon the Danube. The Cossacks destined to mount to the assault were all on foot, and their lances had almost all been reduced to five feet in length, to render them more useful in the mêlée. The first column by water, commanded by General Islenief, consisted of two battalions of grenadiers, one battalion of chasseurs, and two thousand five hundred Cossacks. They had on board their shallops a hundred and thirty pieces of cannon. The second column had the same number of boats and cannon. In the third, and in the reserve, were two hundred and thirty-seven pieces of cannon, divided among a great number of barks, flat-bottomed boats, and floating batteries. Among the troops embarked were the prince de Ligni, the colonel duke de Richelieu, and the count de Langeron. A circumstance is remembered in which the count de Langeron, an emigrant, exhibited to the haughty Potemkin, the czarina’s favourite, a pride worthy of a Frenchman. Langeron, as an emigrant, was talking with him about the troubles which agitated France. “Colonel,” said he, “your compatriots are mad; I should require nothing but my grooms to bring them to reason.” Langeron could not suffer his nation to thus spoken of, and replied haughtily,--“Prince, I do not think that you and all your army could do it.”

The weather, which had been fine and serene during the night, grew cloudy towards daybreak, and a thick fog enveloped the horizon till nine o’clock. All the columns marched in silence. At the aspect of the walls, the whole army halted in consternation. Suwarrow exclaimed to those who were near him, “You see those walls; they are very high; but the empress commands us to take possession of them.” He then suddenly fell upon his knees, arose, and marched to the assault, followed by all his army. The Turks did not fire a shot till the Russians were within three or four hundred paces of them, but then saluted them with a shower of mitrailles, which did them great injury. They however approached the fosse, in which there was in several places water up to the shoulders, threw in their fascines, planted their ladders against the ramparts, many parts of which were so high that they were obliged to tie two together, although every one was five toises long. As in some places the besiegers did not find this expedient quick enough, they assisted each other with as much vivacity as address, and climbed up the ramparts with the aid of their bayonets. The arquebusiers fired from the edge of the fosse upon the Turks who defended the ramparts, to prevent them from beating back the assailants. The second column, commanded by the Marshal de Lasci, arrived first, but was not assisted with sufficient energy by the first and third. The first had had to overcome a great difficulty: it had met with a chain of strong palisades, which extended to the banks of the Danube. The grenadiers, who were at the extremity of the palisades, rushed against them, one after the other, to turn them; and those most distant from that spot jumped over them. Another fosse was yet to be got over before they reached the ramparts. The Russian grenadiers took possession of the first bastion, and attacked without order the cavalier which was between that work and the second; but in doing so, they lost many men. Kutusow, who had taken the two left polygons on the side of the left bank of the Danube, would have arrived upon the rampart at the same time as the second column, if he had not been obliged to send assistance to the fourth and fifth columns, which had met with a vigorous resistance. The fosse was full of water at the place where these columns were obliged to cross; the men, being up to their middles, soaked their long Cossack clothes, and had great trouble in disengaging themselves from them. They mounted the ladders, but when they came to the ramparts, they could not maintain themselves there; the two columns were thrown back at the same time. They were separated by the gate of Bender; eight or ten thousand Turks made a sortie from that gate, uttering frightful war-cries. Among these were a great number of women armed with poniards. The besieged charged all at once, in all parts; the infantry of the reserve came to the rescue, and made way with their bayonets; the Cossacks, finding themselves supported, repulsed the Turks. Such as could not gain the bridge to re-enter Ismaïl, were cut in pieces or smothered in the fosse. The Russians then made a fresh effort, surmounted all resistance, and established themselves upon the rampart of the bastion which was assigned to them. Kutusow, however, remarked that the two battalions of reserve, although masters of the rampart, could not yet hold out against the enemy; he in consequence sent them a battalion of chasseurs, who enabled them to keep their position. Every bastion having a powder-magazine under the rampart, the conquerors immediately established a strong guard there, in order that the enemy might not be able to set fire to it and blow up the troops. There consequently followed slight actions between the besiegers and the besieged, who still continued to endeavour to introduce themselves there, but they could not succeed; so that no accident happened. Day began to appear, and every one could ascertain his position, which, till that time, had only been indicated by the different war-cries of the two nations. Whilst the Turkish infantry was fighting in the fosses near the Bender gate, a numerous body of cavalry fell upon the camp of the besiegers, where the Cossacks received them with so much vigour, that scarcely any of them returned, and the Bender gate fell into the hands of the Russians.

Whilst the land columns were marching against Ismaïl, other columns were formed upon the Danube. The first, composed of a hundred boats, manned by troops, prepared to make a descent, advanced in two lines, keeping up a continual fire; the second line, consisting of brigantines, floating batteries, double shallops, and lançons, followed it. The fire became still more warm as these two lines approached each other. The Turks had on the water side a work of small height, but great strength, furnished with eighty-three cannon of large calibre, fifteen mortars, and a howitzer of six hundred pounds of balls. The fire of the mortars of the second line covered the cannonade of the first; when they had arrived at some hundreds of paces from the shore, the second line divided, and placed itself on the two wings of the first; in this fashion it formed a half-circle. Both sides kept up a warm fire of mitrailles, and the combat lasted an hour. But as it was still night, some Russian battalions only suffered, without any vessel being sunk. About seven in the morning the total descent was effected. The Turks had abandoned the few vessels they had left. The resistance was brave and persistent, particularly on this side, which was defended by more than ten thousand Turks. The greater part of these were put to the sword, the rest saved themselves in the chanas, or houses solidly built with stone.

At eight o’clock, the Russians were masters of the ramparts on the water side, as well as on that of the land. A terrible conflict then commenced in the interior of the city, in the streets and public places, to which the inhabitants came from all parts. There were skirmishes beyond number, both sides fighting with equal inveteracy. The Turks defended themselves with desperation, maintaining an incessant fire from the windows, particularly in the narrow streets. The Russians swept the larger ones with the fire of twenty field-pieces, to which the Turks, having no cannon but in their chanas, could not respond. There were two thousand Turks in the first chana that was attacked: they made great havoc among the Russians with their artillery. Suwarrow ordered it to be taken, and it was escaladed, in spite of a determined resistance, and, for the first time, during the day some hundreds of prisoners were made; the unfortunate Auduslu Pacha had taken refuge in a still more considerable chana. The combat there lasted more than two hours; cannon were required to batter in the gate. Two thousand of the best Janissaries defended themselves in this place with all the rage of despair; but the Russian grenadiers rushed in the moment there was an opening, with advanced bayonets, and all were cut to pieces, with the exception of a very few hundred prisoners: the pacha was of this number. He came out into the open place; a chasseur perceiving a rich poniard in his girdle, thought it his duty to take it from him. As several Turks still had arms, a Janissary, who was near the seraskier, endeavouring to repulse the chasseur with his sabre, wounded a captain of chasseurs in the face. The Russians instantly charged their bayonets upon all that remained: they massacred the greater part, the brave seraskier being of the number: scarcely a hundred men of his immediate train escaped. Petty conflicts still continued in every place capable of the slightest defence; every post was carried at a heavy expense of blood. The terrible resistance made by the Turks was more like frantic rage than the opposition of trained soldiers; the women even fearlessly encountered the Russians, armed with poniards and other weapons. All the Russian commanders faced danger with heroic courage, and their soldiers as bravely seconded them; the mêlée lasted ten entire hours, without the Russians in the least heeding the superiority of the Turks in number. The city was given up to pillage; thirty-three thousand Ottomans there perished in one day! and ten thousand were made prisoners! A single man had saved himself in a fortified house; he was slightly wounded, but contrived to drop from a window into the Danube, where he was fortunate enough to meet with a plank, by means of which he gained the opposite shore. This man carried the vizier the news of the loss of Ismaïl; there were no less than six sultans among the dead. The Russians lost fifteen thousand men. Suwarrow wrote Prince Potemkin these few words: “The Russian flag floats over the ramparts of Ismaïl.” He was equally laconic to the empress Catherine II. “Madame, the haughty Ismaïl is at your feet.” The booty of this city was valued at ten millions of piastres. Inaccessible to every interested view, Suwarrow, according to his custom, abstained from sharing any part of it; satisfied with the harvest of glory he had reaped, he disdained wealth. But he did not, in a similar spirit, respect the rights of humanity; the massacre of thirty-three thousand men in one day, with the murder of women, children, and unarmed soldiers, procured him the name of Muley Ismaïl, in allusion to the barbarous emperor of Morocco, who had borne that name. The empress of Russia caused a medal to be struck to perpetuate the memory of this important conquest. A year after, Ismaïl, which had cost so much blood, was restored to the Turks as a guarantee of the peace between the two powers--and forty-eight thousand human beings had been slaughtered, and countless women and children had perished or been rendered miserable, to secure the conquest of it!

“O, but man, proud man! Dressed in a little brief authority, Most ignorant of what he’s most assured, His glassy essence,--like an angry ape, Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven, As make the angels weep!”

BOMMEL.

A.D. 1599.

If this siege were not interesting on account of its forming part of the noble struggle which rescued the Netherlands from the domination of the Spaniards, it would command our notice from being the time and place when one of the great scientific operations of war was first brought into use.

The Spaniards having penetrated, in 1599, into the island of Bommel, formed by the Wahal, in the duchy of Gueldres, hastened to lay siege to the capital city of that island. Prince Maurice came to its succour, with the greater part of his army. He encamped on the opposite bank of the Wahal, reinforced the garrison with a thousand men, and, with great rapidity, threw two bridges over the river, above and below the besieged city; the first, destined for the infantry, was but a collection of little barks; but the second, for the cavalry, was composed of large pontoons, and was wide enough for the passage of two chariots abreast. Having completed this operation, he ordered three thousand infantry and four hundred horse, whom he charged most particularly with the defence of Bommel, to cross over into the island. This place being too small for such a numerous garrison, it was lodged without, and immediately covered itself with a good intrenchment, well flanked with redoubts, and defended by a wide ditch. This intrenchment furnished the first model of what has since been called the covered way.[18] This happy invention contributed much to the failure of the Spanish expedition. They had not yet perfected their intrenchments, when the Dutch artillery, established on the banks of the Wahal, the fire of the armed barks, and that of the place, thundered all at once against their ramparts. The Spaniards, however, after many efforts, succeeded in sheltering themselves from this multiplied tempest; they raised good intrenchments, they placed cannon in battery, and began to assail in earnest both the city and the intrenched camp. The besieged did not oppose a less number of works or less courage to the Spanish attacks. Towards the end of May, the garrison of Bommel fell all at once upon every one of the enemy’s quarters; it might have been supposed that they came to fight a regular battle, and not to clear out trenches or overthrow works. Both sides fought with the greatest resolution; but at length the resistance of the Spaniards disheartened the Dutch, and they retreated after a contest of three hours. They returned to the charge the following night, persuaded that they should surprise the besiegers. They succeeded in the first moments; but the Spaniards having recovered themselves, the Dutch were obliged to abandon their attack. Three days after, they perseveringly made fresh efforts, which proved likewise unfortunate. Fatigued with their endeavours to overcome so many obstacles and such obstinate enemies, the Spaniards, finding they made no considerable progress, determined to raise the siege towards the end of June, after having lost two thousand men.

BARCELONA.

A.D. 1705.

However unimportant it may appear in the vast page of history, no English account of sieges can be complete without a notice of that of Barcelona, in which he who may be called the last of our knights maintained so nobly that British good faith which we claim as our proudest characteristic.

In 1705, the earl of Peterborough commanded the army of the Archduke Charles, competitor with Philip V., the grandson of Louis XIV., in conjunction with the prince of Darmstadt. The siege was dragged on to a great length, and Peterborough was thinking of re-embarking his English soldiers, when he learnt that the prince of Darmstadt had been killed in carrying the intrenchments which covered Mount Joire and the city. A few days after, a bomb burst in the fort over the powder-magazine; the fort was taken, and the city consented to capitulate. The viceroy was conferring with Peterborough at the city gates, and the articles were not yet signed, when, on a sudden, cries and screams of distress were heard in the city: “You are betraying us!” exclaimed the viceroy; “we are capitulating loyally, and there are your English, who have entered the city by the ramparts, slaughtering, pillaging, and violating.” “You are mistaken,” replied Peterborough, “it must be the troops of the prince of Darmstadt. There is only one means of saving your city; let me enter the place at once with my English; I will make all quiet, and will then return to the gate, to complete the capitulation.” The tone with which he spoke this convinced the Spanish governor of his good faith, and he was allowed to enter Barcelona with his officers. As he expected, he found the Germans and Catalans sacking the houses of the principal citizens; he made them abandon their prey, and drove them out. Among the victims about to be sacrificed to the lust of the soldiery was the duchess of Popoli; he extricated her from the hands of the ruffians, and restored her to her husband. When the tumult was appeased, he returned to the gate and terminated the capitulation, offering a fine example of observance of his word given to a conquered enemy.

Lord Peterborough was certainly more an eccentric man than a great one, and yet, like Don Quixote’s, many of his eccentricities had a strong leaning to the side of greatness. Plutarch would have made a fine story of the above anecdote; it belongs to the character of the real hero, of whom, though abounding in great soldiers, modern history contains so few.

To show the importance of such a trait to the reputation of a nation, we have only to observe with what high praise the historians of other countries mention this act of simple good faith.

GIBRALTAR.

A.D. 1779–1783.

As in the history of mankind there are some persons so remarkable and universally known as to make a notice of them almost a work of supererogation, so there are events, which, from the interest they have excited, and the consequences that have attended them, demand, in a work of this description, a much less detailed account than others of less importance: they have created deep and widely-spread excitement during their enactment, and have produced historians worthy to commemorate them. And such is the siege of Gibraltar. This stupendous rock has now remained in the hands of the British one hundred and fifty years! We can only judge of the anomaly of this circumstance by bringing it home by comparison. Suppose the Spaniards, in their zeal for religion, had determined to seize upon the rocky point of the Land’s End, in Cornwall, or the Isle of Anglesea, in Wales, to facilitate their intercourse with Catholic Ireland, this would have been with them quite as legitimate an object as our trade with the Levant is to us. And yet we hold it, in spite of all the hostile efforts of the Spaniards to retake it; and what is still more strange, in spite of treaties of peace, at which such chance acquisitions are generally restored to the right owner. In the same manner the British held Calais, a French town, from the reign of Edward III., 1346, to that of Henry II. of France and Mary of England, when it was taken by surprise by the duke of Guise in 1557. As may be naturally supposed, the proud Spaniards have not quietly submitted to such a disgrace as that of having an inseparable portion of their country held by a foreign and frequently rival power: they have made several efforts to regain it, the most conspicuous of which comes within the scope of this work.

But, as we said above, the history of this siege has been so well written and is so generally known, that Drinkwater has placed it in the same position as Homer has that of Troy;--we could not pass it by, but yet we are not called upon to be particular in our account of it: the world does not stand in need of our history; it has one, better than any we could produce. Gibraltar was one of the fruits of the War of Succession: England took up arms to keep a Bourbon from the throne of Spain, and, during the conflict, an enterprising admiral, Sir George Rooke, added this gem to her crown. There are politicians who think the retention more a point of honour than a real advantage, but such discussions are not within our limits.

The war of 1762 did not present a favourable opportunity for retaking Gibraltar; Chatham was too vigorous a minister to allow a chance of such a loss; but England being at war with her colonies and with France, encouraged Spain, in 1779, to come to a rupture with her, for the well-understood purpose of attempting the great object of the national wish. That this was so, was rendered plain by preparations to cut off the African supplies of provisions to the rock, before war had actually taken place.

Gibraltar is situated in Andalusia, the most southern province of Spain. The rock is seven miles in circumference, running out into the sea in the form of a promontory of more than three miles in length, and is joined to the continent by an isthmus of low sand. The promontory, or rock, at the foot of which stands the town, is upwards of one thousand three hundred feet in height, and appears to have been formerly surrounded by the sea. The breadth of the isthmus at the foot of the rock is about nine hundred yards, but grows much wider as it approaches the country. Across this isthmus, at about a mile’s distance from the garrison, the Spaniards have drawn up a fortified line, extending one thousand seven hundred yards, and embracing both shores, with a strong fort of masonry at each end. That both parties, under such extraordinary circumstances, should exhaust art in their means of defence, and be always on the watch against surprise, we may readily imagine; but what gives the garrison a great advantage in this respect is its commanding height, from which it can see everything that approaches it, by either land or sea. Thus in the whole of this long siege, they appear to have been able to ascertain all that was going on in the enemy’s camp, and to descry every hostile vessel in time to be prepared for it.

Until we come to the great finale, this siege was little more than a blockade, and that imperfect. And yet, with the exception of the “Iliad,” we know of none that is so interesting. Drinkwater’s account has exactly the same charm as Robinson Crusoe’s journal; the events are so minute, and brought so completely home to the apprehension of the reader by the plain and graphic style of the author, that you forget it is an awful reality, and enjoy it as you would a fiction. But such a narrative we cannot adopt into our pages: to transfer it wholly would be dishonest towards a fine work; to garble it would not redound to our credit.

When the re-capture of this member of their own country was undertaken, as there was much difficulty, there was proportionate glory in the enterprise, and the eyes of all Europe were turned towards the Herculean straits. Every exertion was made by Spain--neither labour, money, nor blood was spared. The valour of her troops was ably directed by her generals, and persistently exercised through length of time and difficulties of obstacles enough to cool the ardour of the most devoted partisans. But in addition to the immense advantage of situation, upon a lofty impregnable rock, open to almost constant succour by sea, the British garrison had the still further good fortune of being commanded by a governor most admirably suited to the post. As you read the details of this memorable siege, you cannot help being struck with the idea that General Elliott’s government was a parental one. Never-flinching courage, sleepless watchfulness, consummate prudence, and far-discerning foresight, were joined in him to a kindliness of heart and an urbanity of manners, that made all he required from the troops and officers he was placed over a labour of love. And yet his bonhomie did not overcome his judgment; though never severe, he was never falsely indulgent; he could punish when he was called upon to do so for the public good, as readily, though not as willingly, as he could encourage merit or devotedness by promotion or reward. It may be asserted that Elliott was never so placed as to display the genius of a great commander: but this we deny. In a difficult, isolated position, he was in no instance at a loss; no danger approached him that he was not prepared to meet, and no opportunity for gaining an advantage offered itself that he did not seize.

The two points were,--for the English, the rock, town, and fortress of Gibraltar; for the Spaniards and French, Algeziras, a town situated on the other side of the bay, five and a half miles from Gibraltar. Algeziras had been a city of great importance, and in the middle of the fourteenth century was wrested by Alonzo XI., king of Castile, from the hands of the Moors. This appears to have been a kind of crusade, and one in which the English chivalry took a prominent part; John of Gaunt, and the earls of Derby, Leicester, Salisbury, and Lincoln, all being present. It is likewise said that cannon were first used by the Moors in this siege against their assailants, and were adopted by the English, two years after, at the battle of Crecy, from observing the powerful effects of them. The Spaniards had the great advantage of being masters of the country behind and around them; and though the English had a small naval force in their port, they never had sufficient to prevent constant annoyances from the gun and bomb-boats of Algeziras. Many an anticipated succour, in a vessel which was viewed with delight from the rock, was cut off by the Spanish boats, and carried into Algeziras before the eyes of the disappointed garrison.

With the commencement of the war in 1779, the siege of Gibraltar may be said to have begun. It was, in truth, but an imperfect blockade, but it subjected the garrison to all the watchfulness, labour, and preparation of a real siege. The Spaniards were actively employed in fortifying all their best points; they encamped before the garrison, and erected additional batteries in their lines, but still did not fire upon the town or fort. General Elliott, however, found their proceedings so unmistakable in their purpose, and knowing that war had been declared, he saluted them at their works with a few rounds of shot.

This took place on the 5th of July, 1779; and from that date to the 26th of November, 1781, the siege or blockade was one continuance of mutual attempts at annoyance, interspersed with occasional want of provisions and attacks of the scurvy on the part of the garrison, frequent boat-assaults, always attended with repulses, on the side of the allies; with a strange but perpetual desertion of individuals from both garrison and army. But at the last-named period the enemy had constructed such formidable batteries, and appeared to be approaching so inconveniently near, that General Elliott determined upon the bold expedient of a sortie. This was effected with his usual prudence, foresight, and spirit. As soon as the gates were shut, and the evening gun fired, a considerable detachment was ordered to assemble on the Red Sands, at midnight, with devils, fire-fagots, and working implements, to make a sortie on the enemy’s batteries; the general and other officers to be employed were in the mean time convened, and, lest some matters might have escaped him in the multiplicity of arrangements, the governor desired every person to propose, without restraint, whatever would, in his or their opinion, further promote the success of the enterprise. We place the last passage in italics, as a lesson to self-sufficient commanders: no captain ever more completely performed the duties intrusted to him by his country, and yet he was never averse to receiving advice from the lowest of his staff. On a subsequent occasion an important use of red-hot shot was suggested to him, by Lieutenant-General Boyd, his second in command, and, without the least of the paltry jealousy some superiors would have felt, he not only openly adopted the idea, but intrusted the execution of it to his friend who had thought of it.

“The detachment being formed in three lines, the right column in the rear and the left in front, tools for demolishing the works were delivered to the workmen, and the following directions for their destination were communicated to the principal officers:--‘The right column to lead and march through Forbes’s barrier for the extremity of the parallel, keeping the eastern fence of the gardens close on their left. The centre immediately to follow, marching through Bay-side barrier, and directing their route through the gardens for the mortar-batteries. The left column to bring up the rear, marching along the strand for the gun-batteries. No person to advance before the front unless ordered by the officer commanding the column: and the most profound silence to be observed, as the success of the enterprise may depend thereon. The 12th and Hardenberg’s regiments to form in front of the works, as assaulting corps, and are to detach to the right and left, as occasion may require. The reserve to take post on the furthest gardens. When the works are carried, the attacking troops are to take up their ground in the following manner:--The grenadiers of Reden’s and La Motte’s behind the parallel; the 39th and 73rd flank companies along the front of the fourth branch; and the 72nd grenadiers and light infantry with their right to the fourth branch and left to the beach.’

“The force consisted of ninety-nine officers, one hundred and forty-seven subalterns, and two thousand and thirty-four rank and file.

“By the time the destination of the columns was made known to the different officers, and other arrangements had taken place, the morning of the 27th was far advanced; and as the moon had then nearly finished her nightly course, the detachment, about a quarter before three o’clock, began its march by files from the right of the rear line to the attack. Although nothing could exceed the silence and attention of the troops, the enemy’s advanced sentries discovered the right column before they passed Forbes’s barrier, and after challenging fired upon them. Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, commanding this column, finding they were alarmed, immediately formed the attacking corps, and pushed on at a brisk pace for the extremity of the parallel; there, finding no opposition, he took possession, and the pioneers began to dismantle the works. Part of Hardenberg’s regiment, which was attached to this column, mistook the route of the grenadiers, owing to the darkness of the morning; and in pursuing their own, found themselves, before they discovered their error, in front of the St. Carlos battery. In this dilemma no other alternative offered but pressing forward, which they gallantly did, after receiving the enemy’s fire. Upon mounting the parapet, the enemy precipitately retreated, and with great difficulty they descended the stupendous work, forming with their left to the tower. They were thus situated, when Lieutenant-Colonel Duchenhausen, at the head of the 39th flank companies, entered the St. Carlos battery, and naturally mistaking them for his opponents, fired, and wounded several. Further mischief was, however, prevented by the countersign; and the Hanoverians joined the remainder of the corps, which now formed en potence in front of the parallel. The 73rd flank companies were equally successful in their attacks, and Lieutenant-Colonel Trigge, with the grenadiers and light company of the 72nd regiment, carried the gun-batteries with great gallantry. The ardour of the assailants was irresistible. The enemy on every side gave way, abandoning in an instant, and with the utmost precipitation, those works which had cost them so much expense, and employed so many months to perfect.

“When our troops had taken possession, the attacking corps formed agreeably to their orders, to repel any attack which the enemy might make to prevent the destruction of the works, whilst the 12th regiment took post in front of the St. Carlos battery, to sustain the western attack; and the reserve, under Major Maxwell, drew up in the further gardens. The exertions of the workmen and artillery were wonderful. The batteries were soon in a state for the fire-fagots to operate, and the flames spread with astonishing rapidity into every part. The columns of fire and smoke which rolled from the works beautifully illuminated the troops and neighbouring objects, forming altogether a coup d’œil from the rock, not possible to be described.

“In an hour, the object of the sortie was fully effected; and trains being laid to the magazines, Brigadier Ross ordered the advanced corps to withdraw, and the sustaining regiments to cover their retreat; but by some oversight, the barrier at Forbes’s was locked after the flank companies had returned; which might have proved of serious consequence to Hardenberg’s regiment, as they were from that circumstance under the necessity of following the 12th regiment through Bay-side barrier.

“Several small quantities of powder took fire whilst the detachment was on its retreat; and just as the rear had got within the garrison, the principal magazine blew up with a tremendous explosion, throwing up vast pieces of timber, which, falling into the flames, added to the general conflagration. Although the enemy must have been early alarmed, not the smallest effort was made to save or avenge their works. The fugitives seemed to communicate a panic to the whole; and instead of annoying the English troops from the flanking forts, their artillery directed a ridiculous fire towards the town and our upper batteries, whence we continued a warm and well-served discharge of round shot on their forts and barrier. Only two officers and sixteen privates were taken prisoners, and, so little opposition being made, very few were killed in the works.

“Thus was this important attack executed beyond the most sanguine expectations of every one. The event challenges greater admiration, when we reflect that the batteries were distant near three-quarters of a mile from the garrison, and only within a few hundred yards of a besieging enemy’s lines, mounting one hundred and thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The detachment had only four privates killed, and one officer and twenty-four privates wounded. The ordnance spiked in the enemy’s works amounted to ten thirteen-inch mortars and eighteen twenty-six pounders. Although subject to the little derangements naturally attending on a night attack, not one musket, working-tool, or other instrument, was left behind.”

Such is Captain Drinkwater’s account of a spirited and successful action of which he was an eye-witness. The French historians of the siege say that the British could not stand against the fire of the batteries, and retreated. This is one of the innumerable contradictions to truth offered by French authors whenever the military honour of their country is concerned. They always forget that their contemporaries and posterity will judge which party was victor in a conflict, by the results. Victor Hugo poetically said, that Buonaparte was never conquered: at Moscow it was fire--at Waterloo it was fate. Headers of history are nevertheless convinced of the reality of the two defeats, by the events which followed them.

The affair had now been so prolonged, and had excited so much attention throughout Europe, that the Spaniards and French began to think it a point of honour to subdue this general on his rock; and the duke de Crillon, accompanied by the eminent French engineer D’Arçon, and followed by an army of thirty thousand men, came to Algeziras. Immediately upon his arrival, D’Arçon changed the mode of attack: it had been previously mostly confined to the land side of the rock; he, most unfortunately for the cause he served, directed almost all his offensive efforts from the sea, and yet by no means neglecting his fortifications. General Elliott’s principal extraordinary preparation consisted in grates and various apparatus for heating shot, as he found red-hot balls by far the most efficient instrument of destruction he could employ. But he was too watchful and prudent a commander to let this engross all his attention: in addition to constant labours at the works, he ordered holes to be blasted in the rocks, nearly on a level with the water, from which he could pour showers of stones and other missiles upon his assailants. He likewise had a number of gun-boats built; and, having received supplies and reinforcements from the British fleet under Lord Hood, he felt himself in a condition to cope with his powerful enemies. Determined to have no idle hands, even the serjeants and drummers were armed with muskets; and musicians, who had before been exempted from duty, had to exchange their instruments for firelocks and shovels. The strength of the garrison with the marine brigade, including officers, amounted to seven thousand five hundred men.

The comte d’Artois and the duke de Bourbon joined the Spanish and French armies; after whose arrival many civilities passed between the besieging camp and the garrison. The French general sent presents of game, fruit, vegetables, and ice, to the governor, accompanied by a letter breathing the highest respect and admiration for his courage, talents, and firmness. Here again is the beautiful simplicity, combined with military virtues, displayed in the character of Elliott; he might be imagined an ancient Roman rather than a modern soldier of fortune. He accepts the presents with a courtesy due to the kindness with which they were offered; but requests they may not be repeated, as it is his pride and pleasure to live as plainly as the humblest soldier in his army.

After a good deal of sharp preliminary sparring on both sides, the awful conflict came on. In our account of this, we shall mostly adhere to the very words of the historian of the siege, convinced that no other can lay it so plainly and yet so interestingly before our readers.

“In the evening of the 7th of September, a little before midnight, two large lights appeared on the shore of the Orange-grove battery, and at the same time, two similar fires were seen behind Fort St. Philip; whence, if a line was produced, it would to appearance have intersected the former about eight hundred or nine hundred yards to the north-west of the old mole head. These unusual signals made many conjecture that the enemy were sounding in that quarter. A few rounds were accordingly fired at intervals in that direction from the north bastion.

“By the morning of the 8th, the preparations in the department of the artillery, under General Boyd’s direction, were completed, and the success of the attack in a great measure depending upon embracing the favourable moment, it was no longer deferred. At seven o’clock, the town-guards being relieved, the firing commenced from all the northern batteries which bore upon the western part of the parallel, and was supported through the day with admirable precision and vivacity. The effect of the red-hot shot and carcases exceeded our most sanguine expectations. In a few hours, the Mahon battery of six guns, with the battery of two guns on its flank, and great part of the adjoining parallel, were on fire, and the flames, notwithstanding the enemy’s exertions to extinguish them, burnt so rapidly, that the whole of these works before night were consumed. The St. Carlos and St. Martin batteries, however, on this occasion, escaped the fate they had formerly experienced, but they were so much damaged, that the greater part was taken down.

“For near an hour, the enemy continued silent spectators of our cannonade. About eight, they fired a few guns from the St. Martin battery, and between nine and ten returned our fire from Fort St. Philip and Barbara, with the seven-gun battery in the lines, and soon after, from eight new mortar-batteries in the parallel. This tardiness in returning our fire in some degree we attributed to the works being confused with materials, and some of the batteries being deficient in ammunition. It might, however, be owing to want of discretionary orders, as an officer of rank was observed to enter the lines about the time when their cannonade became general; a reinforcement also marched down from the camp.

“The astonishing bravery displayed by the enemy in their repeated attempts to extinguish the flames, could not fail to attract the particular notice and admiration of the besieged. Urged on most probably by emulation, they performed prodigies of valour, so that their loss, under so well-directed a fire, must have been very considerable. The French brigade had one hundred and forty killed and wounded, and the Spanish casualties most likely bore an equal proportion. About four o’clock in the afternoon the cannonade abated on both sides, and the enemy soon after were totally silent, though the garrison continued its usual fire. The British had two or three killed and several wounded. Lieutenant Boag, of the artillery, and Ensign Gordon, of the 58th regiment, were of the latter number. The former officer had been wounded before; on this occasion, he was pointing a gun from Hanover battery in the lines, when a shell fell in the battery. He had scarcely time to throw himself down in an embrasure, when the shell burst, and fired the gun under the muzzle of which he lay. The report immediately deprived him of hearing, and it was some time before he recovered a tolerable use of that faculty. Major Martin, of the same corps, had likewise a very fortunate escape from a twenty-six pounder, which shot away the cock of his hat close to the crown. This anecdote is inserted because it is commonly believed that if a cannon-ball of large diameter passes so near the head of a person, the wind of it is generally fatal. The major was considerably stunned by the passage of the shot, but experienced little further injury. In the forenoon of the 8th, two more ships of the line removed to the Orange-grove, followed some time afterwards by twenty-two gun and mortar boats; and in the evening, one of the French men-of-war joined them from Algeziras. In the course of the day, a number of troops were embarked on board such of the battering-ships as were finished; and at night, the garrison artillery replaced the ammunition in the expense magazines, which had been used to such good purpose in the morning.

“This unexpected insult undoubtedly precipitated the duke’s measures; and, by provoking him to the attack before the preparations in the other departments were ready to combine with him in a general and powerful effort against the garrison, served greatly to frustrate the enterprise. Apprehensive probably, that, elated by their good fortune, they might renew their attempts finally to destroy the land-works which had escaped, the duke determined to avoid the blow, which might be so dangerous in its consequences, by opening his batteries, even in their unfinished state. Actuated most probably by these motives, the embrasures of the new batteries were unmasked during the night of the 8th; and the succeeding morning at daybreak, the garrison were surprised to find every appearance in their works for firing upon them. Two rockets from the forts in the lines were the signals to begin; and the cannonade commenced at half-past five o’clock, with a volley of about sixty shells from all their mortar batteries in the parallel, succeeded by a general discharge of their cannon, amounting in the whole to about one hundred and seventy pieces of ordnance, all of large calibre. Their firing was powerful, and entirely directed against the works of the besieged, but was not, after the first round, altogether so tremendous and destructive as might have been expected from such a train of artillery. At intervals, from ten to twenty shells were in the air at the same moment, but their effects were not equal to the numbers expended. The town, southward of the King’s bastion, was little affected; but the northern front, and line-wall, leading from the Grand Parade to the North bastion, were exceedingly warm; and the lines and Landport were greatly annoyed by the shells from the howitzers, which were distributed in various parts of their parallel; Montague’s and Orange’s bastions seemed to be the centre of the enemy’s cross-fire, whilst the line-wall in their vicinity and to the southward was taken à revers by the shot which passed over the lines from the sixty-four-gun battery.

“Not imagining, from the rough appearance of the enemy’s works, that they could possibly retaliate so soon, the guards and pickets of the north end of the garrison were for some time exposed, and some casualties occurred; but they soon discovered whence they were chiefly annoyed, and consequently became more cautious. Lieutenant Wharton, of the 73rd regiment, was dangerously wounded at Landport.

“Whilst the land-batteries were thus pouring forth their vengeance upon the northern front, nine line-of-battle ships, including those under the French flag, got under way from the Orange-grove, and passing along the sea-line, discharged several broadsides at the garrison, and particularly at a settee which had just arrived under their guns from Algiers. When this squadron had got round Europa Point, they suddenly wore, and returning along the Europa, Rosia, and New Mole battery, commenced a regular and heavy fire upon the garrison. The marine brigade and artillery returned the salute till they passed, when the men-of-war wore and returned to the eastward. About the same time that the enemy were thus amusing the garrison at the southward, fifteen gun and mortar boats approached the town, and continued their fire for some time; but the artillery giving them a warm reception from the King’s bastion, two of them were towed off with precipitation, and the rest retired in great disorder. One was thought to be very considerably damaged, and some imagined that her gun was thrown overboard to save her from sinking.

“This mode of attacking on all sides exactly corresponded with what the garrison had heard was the plan of M. d’Arçon. He hoped, probably, to confound and overwhelm them, by presenting destruction under such various forms, and by the enormous quantity of fire which he poured in upon the garrison. The governor, however, did not approve of his troops being thus subjected to be harassed at his pleasure, and resolved, if possible, to put a stop to the sea attacks. For this purpose the furnaces and grates for heating shot, at the New Mole, were ordered to be lighted, and some new arrangements took place in the ordnance upon Windmill-hill. Towards dusk the enemy abated in the fire from their cannon, increasing, however, in the expenditure of shells, which being generally fired with short fuses, broke in the air. This practice seemed well calculated for the purposes in view. In the day they could observe with greater certainty the effect of their shot, and alter as circumstances directed; the firing at night must unavoidably be less depended upon: shells were therefore burst over the heads of the workmen of the besieged, to prevent them, if possible, from repairing at night the damage received in the day. Nevertheless it did not obstruct the duties in the department of the engineers, and the artillery were not hindered from further completing the expense magazine with ammunition. The 97th regiment[19] was now so far recovered as for some time to assist in the fatigue duties of the garrison; and this day the officers, with one hundred men, were added to the general roster. The town guards were likewise ordered to assemble in Southport ditch.

“The enemy’s men-of-war, as General Elliott had expected, repeated their attack very early in the morning of the 10th. Each ship carried a light at her mizen-peak; but they did not appear near enough to produce much effect. They were received with a well-supported fire, and the next morning one of them was to be observed at Algeziras, with her bowsprit unshipped. The remaining eight renewed their cannonade about nine in the forenoon, and killed two of the marine brigade, and wounded a serjeant of artillery and two other men. After they had passed as before, they wore ship, apparently with an intention of continuing their visits; but suddenly put about, hauled their wind, and anchored off the Orange-grove. The governor was afterwards informed that the discovery of a red-hot shot on board one of the ships was the immediate cause of this hasty manœuvre.

“The enemy continued their firing from the isthmus, recommencing at morning gun-fire on the 10th from their gun-batteries. At seven o’clock, including the expenditure on the eighth, they had discharged 5,227 shot and 2,302 shells, exclusive of the number fired by the men-of-war and mortar-boats. The garrison, on the contrary, took no further notice of them than to return a few rounds from the terrace batteries at their working parties, who were repairing the damage done on the 8th, and completing the rest of the works. In the course of the day the Brilliant and Porcupine frigates were scuttled by the navy in the New Mole; and at night the engineers, with a working party, cleared the lines of rubbish, and restored those traverses which had been demolished. At night the enemy’s fire was under the same regulation as the preceding evening.

“The next morning, when the garrison guards were being relieved, a signal was made at the town, near the quarry, under the Queen of Spain’s Chair, and the enemy’s cannonade became excessively brisk: fortunately few casualties occurred. Their firing, when this object ceased to engage them, seemed to be principally directed against the obstructions at Landport, and in that part of the garrison. Many of the palisades in the covered way were destroyed, and the chevaux-de-frise considerably injured; artificers were, however, constantly detached to repair those breaches, so that the whole were kept in a better state than might be expected. In the afternoon the garrison began to conclude that the attack with the battering-ships was no longer to be deferred. Several detachments of soldiers embarked from the camp, and others were standing on the neighbouring eminences, which, with the appearance in the evening of signals like those which had been observed on the night of the 7th, led the besieged to believe that every preparation was complete; and the wind at that time blowing gently in the bay, from the north-west, favoured the conjecture. Landport and Waterport guards were immediately reinforced, the furnaces and grates for heating shot were lighted, and the artillery ordered to man the batteries.

“Thus prepared, the garrison waited their approach, for it seemed to be the general opinion that the battering-ships would advance and be moored in the night, that they might be less exposed to annoyance in this duty, and open together, with greater effect, at daybreak. Attention was, however, called off from the bay to the land side, where the enemy had set fire to the barriers of Bay-side and Forbes’s, and the whole of those palisades to the water’s edge were instantly involved in flames. The northern guards and pickets were immediately under arms, and a smart discharge of musketry was directed upon several parties, which, by the light of the fire, were discovered in the meadows. The enemy increasing their bombardment, and nothing new happening in consequence of the conflagration, the pickets and guards were remanded under cover, but the artillery continued upon the batteries. The garrison had scarcely recovered from this alarm, before the gun and mortar boats, with the bomb-ketches, began to bombard the northern front, taking their station off the King’s bastion, extending towards Fort St. Philip. They commenced about an hour after midnight, and their fire, added to that of the land-batteries, exceedingly annoyed Waterport and the vicinity. The out-pickets were again under arms, but providentially the British loss was trifling. The garrison returned a few rounds from the sea-line, but still disregarded the batteries on the isthmus, excepting when their workmen appeared, or were thought to be employed. Major Lewis, commandant of the artillery, was unfortunately amongst the wounded; but, however meritorious an officer, his second supplied his place admirably during his confinement.

“When the gun-boats retired, nothing new occurred till the morning of the 12th: the enemy’s fire continued to be supported at the average of four thousand rounds in the twenty-four hours. About eight o’clock reports were received from Europa guard that a large fleet had appeared in the Straits from the westward. The wind was brisk, and there was scarcely time to form any opinion concerning them ere they approached the bay, and proved to be the combined fleets of France and Spain; consisting of seven three-deckers, and thirty-one ships of two decks; with three frigates, and a number of xebeques, bomb-ketches, and hospital-ships, the whole under the command of ten admirals and a broad pendant. In the afternoon they were at anchor in the bay, between the Orange-grove and Algeziras.

“This great accumulation of force could not fail to surprise, if not alarm the garrison. It appeared as if the enemy meant, previous to their final efforts, to strike, if possible, a terror through their opponents, by displaying before them a more powerful armament than had probably ever been brought against any fortress. Forty-seven sail of the line, including three inferior two-deckers, ten battering-ships, deemed perfect in design and esteemed invincible, carrying two hundred and twelve guns; innumerable frigates, xebeques, bomb-ketches, cutters, gun and mortar boats, and smaller craft for disembarking men: these were assembled in the bay. On the land side were most stupendous and strong batteries and works, mounting two hundred pieces of heavy ordnance, and protected by an army of near 40,000 men, commanded by a victorious and active general, of the highest reputation, and animated with the immediate presence of two princes of the royal blood of France, with other dignified personages, and many of their own nobility. Such a naval and military spectacle is scarcely to be equalled in the annals of war. From such a combination of power, and favourable concurrent circumstances, it was natural enough that the Spanish nation should anticipate the most glorious consequences. Indeed, their confidence in the effect to be produced by the battering-ships passed all bounds; and, in the enthusiasm excited by the magnitude of their preparations, it was thought highly criminal even to whisper a doubt of success.

“In drawing these flattering conclusions, the enemy, however, seemed entirely to have overlooked the nature of that force which was opposed to them; for though the garrison scarcely consisted of 7,000 effective men, including the marine brigade, they forgot that they were now veterans in this service, had been a long time habituated to the effects of artillery, and were prepared by degrees for the arduous conflict that awaited them. They were, at the same time, commanded by officers of approved courage, prudence, and ability, eminent for all the accomplishments of their profession, and in whom they had unbounded confidence. Their spirits, too, were not a little elevated by the success attending the recent practice of firing red-hot shell, which, in this attack, they hoped would enable them to bring their labours to a period, and relieve them from the tedious cruelty of another vexatious blockade.

“In the morning of the 12th the governor reinforced the pickets of the line; nine of which, in future, were stationed in town, and distributed as follows: two at Waterport, two at Landport, two in the lines, and the remaining three in the picket-yard, with the field officer of the town district. The other picket of the line was continued at the southward.

“In the evening, about dusk, a number of men were observed to embark from the Orange-grove, on board the battering-ships; which, with the presence of the combined fleet, and the wind blowing favourably, induced the garrison to conclude that the important and long-meditated attack was not now to be deferred.

“The enemy’s cannonade was continued, almost on the same scale as the preceding days, during the night of the 12th. The next morning it was observed the combined fleet had made some new arrangements in their position or moorings, and that the remaining two battering-ships had joined the others at the Orange-grove, where their whole attacking force seemed to be now assembled. About a quarter before seven o’clock some motions were observed amongst their shipping; and soon after the battering-ships got under way, with a gentle breeze from the north-west, standing to the southward, to clear the men-of-war, and were attended by a number of boats. As the English naval officers were of opinion that the battering-ships would be brought before the garrison in the night, few suspected that their present manœuvres were preparatory to their commencing the attack; but, observing a crowd of spectators on the beach, near Point Mala, and upon the neighbouring eminences, and the ships edging down towards the garrison, the governor thought it would be imprudent any longer to doubt it. The town-batteries were accordingly manned, and the grates and furnaces for heating shot ordered to be lighted.

“Thus prepared for their reception, the garrison had leisure to notice the enemy’s evolutions. The ten battering-ships, after leaving the men-of-war, wore to the north, and a little past nine o’clock bore down in admirable order for their several stations; the admiral, in a two-decker, mooring about 900 yards off the King’s bastion, the others successively taking their places to the right and left of the flag-ship in a masterly manner, the most distant being about 1,100 or 1,200 yards from the garrison. The British artillery allowed the enemy every reasonable advantage, in permitting them without molestation to choose their distance; but as soon as the first ship dropped her anchors, which was about a quarter before ten o’clock, that instant the British fire commenced. The enemy were completely moored in a little more than ten minutes, and their cannonade then became, in a high degree, tremendous. The showers of shot and shells which were now directed from their land-batteries, the battering-ships, and, on the other hand, from the various works of the garrison, exhibited a scene of which perhaps neither the pen nor the pencil can furnish a competent idea. It is sufficient to say that upwards of four hundred pieces of the heaviest artillery were playing at the same moment: an instance which has scarcely occurred in any siege since the invention of those wonderful engines of destruction.

“After some hours’ cannonade, the battering-ships were found to be no less formidable than they had been represented. The heaviest shells often rebounded from their tops, whilst the thirty-two-pound shot seemed incapable of making any visible impression upon their hulls. The garrison frequently flattered themselves they were on fire; but no sooner did the smoke appear, than, with the most persevering intrepidity, men were observed applying water from their engines within to those places whence the smoke issued. These circumstances, with the prodigious cannonade which they maintained, gave the garrison reason to imagine that the attack would not be so soon decided as from the recent success against their land-batteries had been fondly expected. Even the artillery themselves, at this period, had their doubts of the effect of the red-hot shot, which began to be used about twelve, but were not general till between one and two o’clock. To show the spirit in which the defence was carried on, the men jocularly called the supplies of red-hot shot, obtained by making fires of wood in the corners of old buildings, ‘batches of roasted potatoes for the dons and monsieurs.’”

“The enemy’s cannon at the commencement were too much elevated; but about noon their firing was powerful and well-directed. The garrison casualties then became numerous, particularly on those batteries north of the King’s bastion, which were warmly assailed by the enemy’s flanking and reverse fire from the land. Though so vexatiously annoyed from the isthmus, the garrison artillery totally disregarded their opponents in that quarter, directing their sole attention to the battering-ships, the furious and spirited opposition of which served to excite their people to more animated exertions. A fire more tremendous, if possible, than ever, was therefore poured down from the rock; incessant showers of hot balls, carcases, and shells of every description, flew from all quarters; and, as the masts of several of the ships were shot away and the rigging of all was in great confusion, hopes of a favourable and speedy decision began to revive in the garrison.

“About noon, their mortar-boats and bomb-ketches attempted to second the attack from the battering-ships, but the wind having changed to the south-west and blowing a smart breeze with a heavy swell, they were prevented taking a part in the action. The same reason also hindered the British gun-boats from flanking the battering-ships from the southward.

“For some hours the attack and defence were so equally well supported, as scarcely to admit any appearance of superiority in the cannonade on either side. The wonderful construction of the ships seemed to bid defiance to the powers of the heaviest ordnance. In the afternoon, however, the face of things began to change considerably: the smoke which had been observed to issue from the upper part of the flag-ship appeared to prevail, notwithstanding the constant application of water, and the admiral’s second was perceived to be in the same condition. Confusion was now apparent on board several of the vessels, and by the evening their cannonade was considerably abated: about seven or eight o’clock it almost totally ceased, excepting from one or two ships to the northward, which from their distance had suffered little injury.

“When their firing began to slacken, various signals were made from the southernmost ships, and as the evening advanced, many rockets were thrown up, to inform their friends, as afterwards learned, of their extreme danger and distress. These signals were immediately answered, and several boats were seen to row round the disabled ships. The garrison artillery at this period caused dreadful havoc amongst them. An indistinct clamour with lamentable cries and groans proceeded, during the short intervals of cessation, from all quarters; and a little before midnight, a wreck floated in under the townline-wall, upon which were twelve men, who only, out of threescore which were on board their launch, had escaped. These circumstances convinced the garrison that they had gained an advantage over the enemy; yet they did not conceive that the victory was so complete as the succeeding morning evinced. The British firing therefore was continued, though with less vivacity; but as the artillery from such a hard-fought day, exposed to the intense heat of a warm sun, in addition to the harassing duties of the preceding night, were much fatigued, and as it was impossible to foresee what new objects might demand their service the following day, the governor, about six in the evening, when the enemy’s fire abated, permitted the majority of the officers and men to be relieved by a picket of a hundred men from the marine brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Trentham; and officers and non-commissioned officers of the artillery were stationed in the different batteries, to direct the sailors in the mode of firing the hot shot.

“About an hour after midnight, the battering-ship which had suffered the greatest injury, and which had been frequently on fire the preceding day, was completely in flames, and by two o’clock in the morning of the 14th, she appeared as one continued blaze from stem to stern. The ship to the southward of her was also on fire, but did not burn with so much rapidity. The light thrown out on all sides by the flames enabled the artillery to point the guns with the utmost precision, whilst the rock and neighbouring objects were highly illuminated, forming with the constant flashes of the cannon, a mingled scene of sublimity and terror. Between three and four o’clock, six other of the battering-ships indicated the efficacy of the red-hot shot; and the approaching day now promised the British garrison one of the completest defensive victories on record.

“Brigadier Curtis, who was encamped with his brigade at Europa, being informed that the enemy’s ships were in flames, and that the calmness of the sea would permit his gun-boats to act, marched about three o’clock A.M. with a detachment to the New Mole; and, drawing up his twelve boats in such a manner as to flank the battering-ships, compelled their boats to abandon them. As the day approached and the garrison fire abated, the brigadier advanced and captured two launches filled with men. These boats attempted to escape, but a shot killing and wounding several men on board one of them, both surrendered, and were conducted to Ragged Staff. The brigadier being informed by the prisoners that many men were through necessity left by their friends on board the ships, he generously determined to rescue them. Some of these infatuated wretches nevertheless, it is said, refused at first the deliverance offered to them, preferring the death before them to being put to the sword, as they were taught to believe they should be if they submitted to the British. Being left, however, some moments to the horrors of their fate, they beckoned the boats to return, and resigned themselves to the clemency of their conquerors.

“Whilst the navy were thus humanely relieving their distressed enemy, the flames reached the magazine of one of the battering-ships to the northward, and it blew up about five o’clock, with a dreadful explosion. In a quarter of an hour after, another in the centre of the line met with a similar fate. The wreck from the latter spread to a vast extent, and involved the British gun-boats in the most imminent danger; one was sunk, but the crew were saved. A hole was forced through the bottom of the brigadier’s boat, his coxswain was killed, and the strokesman wounded, and for some time the crew were obscured in the cloud of smoke. After this very fortunate escape, it was deemed prudent to withdraw towards the garrison, to avoid the peril arising from the blowing up of the remaining ships. The brigadier, however, visited two other ships on his return, and landed nine officers, two priests, and three hundred and thirty-four soldiers and seamen, all Spaniards, which, with one officer and eleven Frenchmen, who had floated in the preceding evening, made the total number saved amount to three hundred and fifty-seven. Many of the prisoners were severely, and some of them dreadfully wounded. On being brought ashore, they were instantly conveyed to the garrison hospital, and every remedy was administered necessary for their different cases.” This is one of the brightest pages in the history of British warfare; so striking indeed, that even the enemies were eager to announce to the world what they owed to the humanity of the garrison; both French and Spanish writers are at least as warm in praise of Sir Roger Curtis’s noble exertions on this occasion, as the English historian of the siege.

“During the time that the marine brigade were encountering every danger in their endeavours to save an enemy from perishing, the batteries on the isthmus, which had ceased the preceding evening, most likely from want of ammunition, and which had opened again upon the garrison on the morning of the 14th, maintained a warm fire upon the town, which killed and wounded several men, and three or four shells burst in the air over the very spot where their countrymen were landed. This ungenerous proceeding could not escape the observation of the spectators in their camp, and orders were probably sent to the lines for the batteries to cease, as they were silent about ten o’clock.

“Notwithstanding the efforts of the marine brigade in relieving the terrified victims from the burning ships, many unfortunate men could not be saved. The scene at this time exhibited was as affecting as that which had been presented in the act of hostility had been terrible and tremendous. Men crying from amidst the flames for pity and assistance; others on board those ships where the fire had made little progress, imploring relief with the most expressive gestures and signs of despair; whilst several, equally exposed to the dangers of the opposite element, trusted themselves on various parts of the wreck to the chance of paddling themselves to the shore. A filucca belonging to the enemy approached from the Orange-grove, probably with the intention of relieving these unfortunate persons; but, jealous of her motives, the garrison suspected that she came to set fire to one of the battering-ships, which appeared but little injured, and obliged her to retire. Of the six ships which were still in flames, three blew up before eleven o’clock; the other three burned to the water’s edge, the magazines being wetted by the enemy before the principal officers quitted the ships. The admiral’s flag was on board one of the latter, and was consumed with the vessel. The remaining two battering-ships, it was hoped, might be saved as glorious trophies; but one of them unexpectedly burst out into flames, and in a short time blew up with a terrible report; and Captain Gibson representing it as impracticable to preserve the other, it was burnt in the afternoon under his direction. Thus the navy put a finishing hand to this signal defensive victory.

“During the hottest period of the cannonade the governor was present on the King’s bastion, whilst Lieutenant-General Boyd took his station upon the South bastion, animating the garrison by their presence.

“Whilst the enemy were cool and their ships had received little damage, their principal objects were the King’s bastion, and the line-wall north of Orange’s bastion. Their largest ships, which were about 1,400 tons burden, were stationed off the former, in order to silence that important battery, whilst a breach was attempted by the rest in a curtain extending from the latter to Montague’s bastion. The prisoners informed the garrison, that if a breach had been effected, their grenadiers were to have stormed the garrison under cover of the combined fleets. The private men complained bitterly of their officers for describing the battering-ships as invulnerable, and for promising that they were to be seconded by ten sail of the line, and all the gun and mortar boats. They further said that they had been taught to believe that the garrison would not be able to discharge many rounds of hot balls; their astonishment, therefore, was inconceivable when they discovered that they fired them with the same precision and vivacity as cold shot. The enemy’s loss, including the prisoners, could not be less than two thousand men. The casualties of the garrison, on the contrary, were so trifling, that it will appear almost incredible that such a quantity of fire, in almost all its destructive modes of action, should not have produced more effect. They amounted to one officer, two subalterns, and thirteen privates killed, and to five officers and sixty-three privates wounded!

“An annoying and vindictive firing was kept up occasionally by the besiegers, and warmly responded to by the garrison, but from the 15th of September the siege was little more than a badly-kept blockade. On the 2nd of February the governor received a note from the duke de Crillon, informing him that preliminaries of a general peace had been signed in January. He had likewise the supreme satisfaction to learn that the garrison of Gibraltar, for which he and his gallant garrison had fought so bravely and persistently, was to remain in the hands of Great Britain.

“General Elliott was made a knight of the Bath, the Parliament settled a handsome pension on him for life, and on his return home in 1787, he was raised to the British peerage by the title of Baron Heathfield, of Gibraltar. The gallant and humane Brigadier Curtis received the most appropriate honour of knighthood, as a reward for his truly chivalric conduct. General Boyd was created a knight of the Bath, and General Green distinguished by a baronetcy. The thanks of both houses of Parliament were voted to the generals, officers, and privates who had served on this glorious occasion.”

In our account of this most remarkable siege of modern times, we have unhesitatingly made free with Captain Drinkwater’s admirable narrative. Whilst compiling this work, the reading of that book has been the most pleasing part of our labours, and on closing it we exclaimed, “This is almost as fully entitled to a place in every military student’s library, as Dibdin’s Songs in that of every sailor.”

SERINGAPATAM.

A.D. 1799.

It is not our business here to discuss the means by which the English empire in India has been obtained, nor have we even space to detail the circumstances which led to the subjugation of Mysore, under Tippoo Saib, the last of its kings: our affair is with sieges only.

Two English armies directed their course towards Seringapatam, the capital of the kingdom of Mysore. General Harris crossed the Cauvery on the 31st of March, and established himself at two miles from the south-west of that city; he there waited for General Stuart, who joined him seven days after with a body of troops detached from the army of Madras. Confident in the strength of the works which surround the island in which Seringapatam is situated, Tippoo Saib made no effort to oppose this junction. The works were furnished with four hundred pieces of cannon, and constructed with the greatest care. For some time he satisfied himself with defending his outworks. The resistance of the sultan, on this point, was as short as it was useless. General Stuart made the Indian troops fall back to within eight hundred toises of the western angle of the place, and carried an intrenchment which separated him from General Harris, so that Seringapatam was completely invested, and the first parallel was immediately opened. Battery in breach was commenced on the 1st of May; by the 4th it was deemed practicable. Four regiments were selected to mount to the breach. General Harris, the more to surprise the sultan, deferred giving the signal till the moment of the greatest heat, in the middle of the day. The English troops and the sepoy grenadiers marched out of the trenches, crossed the pebbly bed of the Cauvery under a murderous fire, and mounted to the breaches effected in the fausse-braie and the rampart. The combat was bloody and obstinate. Tippoo Saib, taken by surprise, and rendered desperate by the fear of loss of empire and life, faced death wherever the greatest peril threatened: he perished in the mêlée, together with his principal officers. All the fortifications were carried, but the children of the sultan still defended themselves in the palace, which contained his family, his wives, and his treasures. General Harris promised safety and protection to the inhabitants of the palace, and they surrendered immediately. The body of Tippoo was sought for, and found beneath a heap of slain, near one of the gates; he was recognised by his family, and deposited in the tomb of his father, Hyder Ali. The treasures of his palace were distributed among the victorious army. After the taking of Seringapatam, Tippoo’s children, his relations, and the princes engaged in alliance with him, submitted. This brilliant operation rendered the English absolute masters of the peninsula of India.

SARAGOSSA.

A.D. 1809.

Although, like the most trivial accident of life, every small siege which occurred in the memorable Peninsular war had, doubtless, its bearing upon the general result, we can afford room only for the most prominent. The siege of every place remains, to all time, an interesting epoch in its own annals, but the student of history only pauses at such conflicts of the kind as have been distinguished by the presence of great captains, have been brought about by remarkable circumstances or revolutions, or have led to consequences important to nations or to mankind in general. We have another cause, likewise, for not dwelling upon the Spanish sieges; they have been laid before the public so admirably, that to go into their details after Sir William Napier, would not only be a work of supererogation, but would lead to a comparison in which we could but suffer.

After glancing over the vast number of sieges that have been the subjects of our attention, we cannot but consider that of Saragossa to be one of the most anomalous. A strongly-fortified city, admirably placed, was filled to overflowing with a population enthusiastic in the cause, and with thirty thousand cannoniers, and a body of peasants, sappers, miners, and navigators from the canal-works, contained a mass of fifty thousand combatants. In addition to this, many, if not most of the houses were fire-proof; and there were innumerable large buildings, such as convents and churches, that were all capable of being fortified, and supplying defences in detail against an enemy who might penetrate into the interior. They had abundance of provisions, and all the munitions of war,--even its sinews, money,--that could be required in a long protracted siege. But above all this was the cause; every man might be said to be a volunteer, fighting for all he held dearest in life. “Doors and windows were built up, house-fronts loop-holed, internal communication opened, streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building was a fortification: there was no weak point, there could be none, in a city which was all fortress, where the space covered by houses was the measure of the ramparts.” So, and admirably, says Sir William Napier; but in one so well read in the history of sieges as he must be, this is saying a great deal. For our part, we think there is no fortification in which genius equal to that of the constructor, backed by courage, vigilance, and enterprise, cannot find a weak point. Look back at the impregnable Valenciennes, taken by a coup-de-main in a few hours, from the discovery of an imprudently-constructed door.

But what marks the siege of Saragossa so distinctly from all others, is the small number of the besieging army. To invest a large city, so garrisoned and provided, the French had but thirty-five thousand men, and were only able to complete their investment in a thin indefensible manner. In addition to the siege, they were compelled to be perpetually on the watch, as the whole country around was against them, and Palafox’s brother, Lazan, hovered about with a body of troops, to throw in when occasion offered.

In reading the details of the siege, we meet with little or no defection, because defection was punished with the utmost severity; the garrison having only the “choice of the enemy in front of their dwellings, and the gibbet behind them.” The public enthusiasm was kept up by processions, sham miracles, false manifestoes, indeed everything that could work upon a superstitious, excited people; and yet from the beginning the progress of the French was steady, and almost unbroken. They had certainly vicissitudes; in such a conflict how could it be otherwise? They even became dispirited for a moment, by fatigue and the prospect of the obstacles before them; but we do not think that Lasnes had ever a doubt of ultimately obeying Napoleon’s commands, by taking the city. It certainly was a great triumph of seasoned disciplined soldiery, conducted by courage and skill in their commanders, over a much superior force, surrounded by all the defences art and nature could furnish. As soldiers, we think the taking of Saragossa highly to the honour of the French.

Napoleon was very desirous of the capture of Saragossa, which is looked upon as the bulwark of the eastern provinces of Spain; and his preparations for effecting it were those of a general and a politician. But Lasnes, to whom he had assigned the command, fell sick; Moncey and Ney committed strategic errors, and his purpose was at least delayed. This gave the Spanish leaders time to prepare likewise, and they did not neglect it. In the sieges of cities, when people are earnest in their defence, they do not confine themselves to the operations of art, or even the weapons of war; they think everything a legitimate instrument that can protect themselves or annoy the enemy: thus we see in one the citizens hurling their beehives, with their swarms of stinging insects, upon their invaders; and in another, one of the greatest, but at the same time the most senseless of the world’s disturbers, killed by a tile thrown by an old woman. So with the inhabitants of Saragossa: while paying due attention to their military works, they took advantage of everything that could be converted to the one great purpose in hand.

The only unpardonable error was that of Palafox; although zealous in all ways at the commencement of the contest, when the French had made serious way into the heart of the city, he seems to have abandoned his post, and to have passed his time in intemperance and debauchery.

Like men made wise by practice in their cruel trade, the French generals did not move till they were quite prepared with not only magazines but hospitals; they knew such a game could not be played without losses and accidents; and there is no greater encouragement to the soldier marching into battle than an undoubting conviction that if wounded he shall be taken care of;--the sight of the hospital is as cheering to him as that of the provision-store.

On the 20th of December they advanced, and on the 21st attacked Monte Terrore, deluding the besieged by the show of one column, while another crossed the canal, under the aqueduct, and passing beneath the city and the fort, entered the latter in the rear. With a third column they attacked the grand sluice. The Spaniards were forced to retreat; which so exasperated the populace and their leaders, that the captain, who had been thus the first to retreat, was with difficulty saved from the effects of their indignation.

While this assault was being made, General Gazan made a simultaneous attempt upon the suburb, in which he put from three to four hundred men hors de combat. He, however, did not do all he might have done, which cheered the Spaniards.

By the 24th the city was invested, and every French general was at his post; Lacoste directing the operations, as chief engineer. He instituted one false and two real attacks; and on the 29th the trenches were opened. According to custom, the place was summoned, and the terms previously offered by Napoleon were repeated; it being added that Madrid had surrendered. To this Palafox haughtily replied, “If Madrid has surrendered, Madrid has been sold. Saragossa will neither be sold nor surrender.” This was accepting the challenge, and the French ordered three attacks to be made.

On the 31st the besieged made a sally, which would have been a complete failure but for a small advantage gained by a body of their cavalry. Palafox, perhaps justifiably, magnified this into a victory in his manifesto: he had not only to lead his compatriots, but to keep up their enthusiasm: his great opponent, Buonaparte, was a past master in this part of his craft.

On the 1st of January the besieged made a serious assault upon Gazan, whom they seemed to consider weak, and, to mask their design, sent out skirmishing parties: the great affair was a failure, while the skirmishers gathered a few laurels.

A change took place in the French generals; Moncey went to Madrid, and Junot succeeded him. The very thin investment was completed by a line of circumvallation, to supply the want of numbers.

The Spaniards had looked for the destruction of their enemies to the diseases usually produced by the wet period; but it this year proved a very dry season, and the French were enabled to proceed with their works in comparative secrecy, by the prevalence of dense morning fogs. On the 10th the city was bombarded with so much effect that the Spaniards withdrew their guns from the convent of San Joseph. The latter attempted a sally at midnight, but, though bravely executed, it proved unsuccessful: they lost one hundred men out of two hundred engaged.

The batteries having made a practicable breach, the French resolved upon an attack on the 11th. After much hard fighting, the convent of San Joseph was stormed, and some of the élite, as in the door at Valenciennes, finding a bridge, entered by the rear, while their comrades were storming the front. The French lost but few men, and made a considerable advance.

The operations on the 15th were still in favour of the French; the Spaniards cut the bridge of Santa Engracia, and sprung a mine, but it proved harmless. The progress of the French was steady and scientific, and the inhabitants were confined to the city.

In this aspect of affairs the Spanish leaders published a flaming account of the emperor being defeated; and, amidst music and shouts, named the marshals who had fallen in the battle. They likewise asserted that Palafox’s brother was devastating France: “but,” says Sir William Napier, “however improbable, this all met with credence; the invention of the leaders being scarcely able to keep pace with the credulity of their followers.” The French were not without their difficulties; all the country was in a state of insurrection against the king they wished to impose upon the Spanish nation, and they began to be sensible of the want of provisions. The generals were also said not to accord in their views; discipline was relaxed, and the soldiers were reported to feel their zeal diminished. But we can scarcely imagine that there were any serious obstacles, when we look to the result.

Another strange circumstance is, that while the Spaniards obtained supplies of troops, the French could not bring up a division without its being harassed by the insurgents. Lazan, Palafox’s brother, was very active in his annoyances.

Lasnes, now recovered from his illness, resumed the command, and soon made it appear that the French had a captain at their head. In an attempt to silence a battery, Mariano Galendo gained much honour but no advantage, for he missed his object, lost his men, and was himself taken prisoner.

The operations continued to be all gradually in favour of the French; the walls began to fall, and the breaches were many and wide. On the 29th, a formidable body marched from the trenches to the walls; and though driven back by a heavy fire from the inner intrenchments, they kept their lodgment and connected it with the trenches.

A division of Poles in the French army now made a most successful assault, which stimulated the men in the trenches to make a wild effort to get into the city; but they were stopped by grape and a severe fire from the houses. The French lost six hundred men; but they never seemed to move without advance.

Thus the walls of Saragossa were brought to the ground; “but,” as Sir William Napier eloquently says, “Saragossa remained erect, and as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at the aspect of her naked strength.” The defences of art had failed and were gone, but the people and the spirit that animated them were still in full vitality. As if to denote that science was not the principle to be now relied on, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously slain.

When we revert to the manner in which the town was internally fortified, we may suppose the nature of the warfare carried on, when besieged and besiegers were mingled in the desperate conflicts of house and street fighting: all the confusion and all the horrors that the most powerful imagination can conceive, were to be found in this doomed city; and, as yet, neither side blenched; the Spaniards fought as desperately for their hearths and their homes, as the French contended bravely for victory and honour.

The people seemed animated by the very frenzy of despair; and Lasnes, convinced that his comparatively small army could not expect success against such numbers, and so excited, resolved to depend upon the slow but certain process of the mine.

Each day now is nothing but a repetition of fighting for every house, and sweeping the great thoroughfares with artillery. We endeavour to follow the contests, and account for the results, but we cannot; all seem struggling, and that bravely: the French are little more than half the number of the Spaniards; the latter are in their own place, of which they know every nook and corner; they are seconded by their women, and are stimulated by everything that can act upon the generous part of the nature of man;--and yet, at every nightfall, the French have made progress.

The French found that by the usual allowance of powder for their mines they destroyed the buildings, and left no walls to shelter their own soldiers; they therefore lessened the quantity. Their adversaries perceiving this, saturated the timbers of their buildings with resin and pitch, and setting fire to those that could not be maintained, raised a burning barrier to their progress.

And now came on the horrors of devastation; the city was crumbling before the French fire and above their mines in all parts; the noises of artillery, crashing houses, shouts, shrieks, and groans of anguish, were mingled in awful sublimity. The Cosso, or great public walk, was the principal object of attack and defence for several days; by immense mines and constant firing, the French at length succeeded in obtaining this; and they then continued their underground ramifications in the most surprising manner. It was at this point of the siege the spirit of the French began to flag: fifty days’ incessant labour and fighting had exhausted, for a moment, their boiling courage; they were dying ingloriously, like rats, in subterraneous trenches. This is not the scene for the French soldier:--he likes broad day, the eyes of man upon him, and an obstacle that can be overcome by one brave effort. They began to reflect upon the disparity of numbers, and to ask each other who ever heard of thirty-five thousand men besieging fifty thousand?

But Lasnes knew the stimulant that was wanted. A harvest of glory in promise was sufficient; and whilst excited by the prospect, he led them on the 18th of February to a grand assault.

During this assault, mines containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and amidst the crash of falling buildings, fifty guns thundered upon the suburb and the bridge over the Ebro, and made a large practicable breach in the convent of St. Lazar. This was taken, the passage of the bridge was intercepted, and awful havoc was made among the troops. Gazan forced two thousand men to surrender, and took possession of the Spanish works.

This being followed by another attack and by the devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the besieged began to tremble. Palafox sent an aide-de-camp to demand, in addition to certain terms before offered by the French commander, that the garrison should be allowed to join the Spanish armies, with a fixed number of covered carriages. As might have been expected, Lasnes rejected these proposals, and the firing continued; but the hour of surrender was come. A little more sharp firing and the explosion of another mine or two, together with the dread of others, completed the consternation.

But to increase the horrors of the situation of the people, pestilence of a fearful kind arose from the manner in which the women, children, and aged inhabitants were crowded into cellars lighted by oil. The closeness of the atmosphere, with bad and unusual diet, produced diseases that assailed both the strong and the weak; the daily deaths were from four to five hundred. Sixteen thousand shells were thrown during the siege, and forty-five thousand pounds of powder had been exploded in the mines; forty thousand persons had perished!

Palafox was sick, and most of the other leaders were either dead or disabled. According to French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; but the Spanish authors assert that Lasnes granted the following terms, the name of Ferdinand VII. being omitted from the instrument:--“The garrison to march out with the honours of war, to be considered prisoners, and sent to France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks. Persons of either class willing to serve under Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in the ranks; the peasants to be sent to their homes; property and religion to be guaranteed.”

There was much dissension in the city about these terms; but the Junta took prompt measures to give up the walls near the castle, and, in the words of Sir William Napier, “on the 21st of February, from twelve to fifteen thousand sickly beings, having laid down their arms, which they could now scarcely handle, this cruel and memorable siege terminated.”

In this siege we have had recourse principally to Sir William Napier; indeed, to what other source could we look with so much confidence? We only regret that we did not feel at liberty to copy his account literally. His is the graphic description of a man who not only conscientiously relates the history of the events, but proves that he professionally understands all he speaks of. He is like Xenophon describing the immortal retreat of the ten thousand. There is only one thing in which we cannot agree with him. Being a soldier, he perhaps has a leaning to all who have distinguished themselves in his profession, and on that account, gives frequent and strong praise to Buonaparte. Now we cannot join him to anything like the extent of his admiration for that extraordinary adventurer. When the wings of victory fanned his standard, he was glorious and triumphant; but in reverses, he showed himself deficient in what has been the pride of the greatest generals. Condé’s retreat from Arras was one of the proudest feats of his military career. As a piece of generalship, Moreau’s famous retreat is equal to any one of Buonaparte’s victories.

BADAJOS.

A.D. 1811.

The Peninsular sieges in which the English were concerned are principally useful as lessons to statesmen, and consequently to the people who support these statesmen. The siege of Badajos failed, although a Wellington superintended it; but, as Sir William Napier justly says, “it was not strange that it did fail; for the British government sent an engineer corps into the field so ill-provided, that all the officers’ bravery and zeal could not render it efficient. The very tools used, especially those from the storekeeper-general’s department, were unfit for work; the captured French cutting instruments were eagerly sought for in preference; and when the soldiers’ lives and the honour of England’s arms were at stake, English cutlery would not bear comparison with French.” This account has been published many years; all whose business it was to read it and profit by the lesson have had ample time; and yet, in what respect does it differ from the same culpable error--we were going to say, but must substitute criminal jobbery--with regard to the war munitions of the Crimea?

Though ardently wishing for the capture of Badajos, Wellington knew he had not that great necessary in all sieges, time, to effect it regularly. If he laid siege to it in form, the French would be able to bring assistance that would render his endeavours nugatory; he could not command more than twenty days; with bad guns, deficient stores, and no regular corps of sappers and miners; as General Picton wittily and keenly observed, “Lord Wellington sued Badajos in formâ pauperis.” Reckoning all the deficiencies, regular approaches could not be ventured upon, and attacks upon the castle and Fort Cristoval were adopted instead; and these were to take place at the same time. A battering-train was very quickly got ready, consisting of thirty twenty-four-pounders, four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten-inch howitzers converted into mortars by being placed on trucks; these, with six iron Portuguese guns, made fifty-two pieces; and of British and Portuguese gunners there were collected six hundred. But even these were inefficient; for many of the guns were nearly useless from age; the gunners were inexperienced, and there was no time to teach them their craft.

On the 24th of May, Haston’s division, consisting of five thousand men, invested San Cristoval.

Phillipon, who, under the direction of Soult, governed in the town, took every precaution necessary; and the townsmen joined their efforts to those of the garrison to forward the works of defence.

Ground being broken for a false attack upon Pardileras on the 29th, the next night a parallel of eleven hundred yards was sunk against the castle, without the workmen being observed by the enemy; the same night another parallel, of four hundred and fifty yards from San Cristoval, and seven hundred from the bridge-head, was opened; one breaching and two counter mines were raised on this line, to prevent sallies by the bridge from the fort.

The attack against the castle proceeded favourably, but the soil and the situation rendered that of Cristoval slow and attended with loss: it was not finished before the night of the 1st of June. It was much impeded by some well-directed mortars from the garrison, which, strange to say, were stopped by Phillipon, from the mistaken idea that he was throwing their fire away.

On the night of the 2nd, however, the battery against San Cristoval began, and after the guns and men had got into practice, much mischief was done to the castle. On the 4th, the garrison added the fire of several guns to their artillery, and some of the besiegers’ were silenced.

The contest was kept up with tolerable spirit till two breaches were made in San Cristoval; and one of them appearing practicable, an assault was ordered, assisted by a diversion in another quarter.

The stormers reached the glacis and descended the ditch without being discovered; but they found the obstacles insurmountable, and the forlorn hope was about to retire before committing themselves to serious injury, when the main body, annoyed by a flank fire from the town, followed them into the ditch with their ladders. But the ladders proved too short, and the defence from within was so firm, that immediate retreat was necessary, and that attended with considerable loss.

The errors in this attack are subjects of military discussion; but we have not space to enter into them. The French acted with great skill and activity in clearing away ruins, presenting every obstacle that could be thought of, natural as well as scientific, and by the judicious disposition of well-armed men. Succours being at hand, a second attack was thought advisable, if any hopes could be entertained of the capture of the place. This time, things were better managed; but on the other side, Phillipon made adequate preparations to meet them.

But this attack proved no more fortunate than the former. It was led with infinite spirit by Major M’Geechy, who fell early. The French seem to have laughed at the affair, as they jeeringly called to the men in the ditch to come on. But barrels of powder rolled down among them, with the addition of shells and musketry, proved worse than their jeers. All went wrong: the troops quarrelled for the ladders, though not many of them could be reared; confusion ensued; and the enemy naturally took advantage of it: those who ascended the ladders were met with the bayonet; the ladders themselves were overturned; and a murderous fire was poured upon the unfortunate mass in the ditch. Soult’s approach rendered further attempts impossible; and the siege was converted into a blockade.

Sir William Napier’s remarks are very severe upon this siege. In addition to what we have before quoted, he says: “This siege, in which four hundred men and officers fell, violated all rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores too few, the points of attack ill-chosen; the defences were untouched by counter-fire, and the breaching-batteries were too distant for the bad guns; howitzers on trucks were poor substitutes for mortars, and the sap was not practised. Lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been crowned and a musketry-fire established against the breach.”

SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE, A.D. 1812.

Lord Wellington having collected his troops in the Alentejo, marched against Badajos, and commenced the siege on the 16th of March, 1812.

On the 29th, previous to the opening of the breaching-batteries, the enemy made a sortie upon the Portuguese troops under General Hamilton, who invested the place on the right of the Guadiana; but they were immediately repulsed with some loss.

On the 31st, the English began to fire upon the face of the bastion to the south-west of the angle of the fort of Trinidad, and upon the flank of the bastion Santa Maria, with twenty-six pieces of artillery formed in two batteries in the second parallel. The fire of the batteries was constant and tremendous from the 31st to the evening of April 3rd, not less than sixty-four shots per minute being thrown. On the 4th of April, a battery of six pieces was opened upon the ravelin of St. Roque.

On the evening of the 5th, the breaches were declared practicable; but as the enemy appeared to be making most formidable preparations to repel any assault, Lord Wellington determined to wait till the third breach was also practicable. This being deemed to be so by the evening of the 6th, it was resolved to storm the place without an hour’s delay.

The arrangements made for this purpose were as follows: The third division under General Picton was directed to attack the castle by escalade, while the guards in the trenches, which were furnished from the fourth division, should attack the ravelin of St. Roque, on the left of the castle. The fourth division, under Major-General Colville, and the light division, under Colonel Bernard, were ordered to attack the breaches in the bastions of Trinidad and Santa Maria. Major-General Walker, with his brigade, was to make a false attack upon the fort of Pardileras and other works on the banks of the Guadiana; and General Power, with the Portuguese troops under his command, had orders to attack the tête-du-pont and fort of San Cristoval on the right of that river.

The attack commenced exactly at ten o’clock at night. The breaches were attacked in the most gallant manner by the fourth and light divisions, who got almost to the covered way before they were perceived by the enemy. But General Phillipon had brought the bravest of his troops to that point, and every obstacle that the shortness of the time would admit of was opposed to their advance; and notwithstanding the most determined and almost desperate efforts which were made by the British to overcome these obstacles, they were three times repulsed, and were unable to effect an entry by the breaches. Many a gallant man fell a victim to his bravery, and success had almost become hopeless, when the commander was informed that General Picton was in possession of the castle.

This cheering information soon spread through the ranks, and the allied troops returned to the charge with an impetuosity that nothing could oppose, and in ten minutes more they were in possession of the place. General Walker succeeded in his attack upon the Pardileras, which was taken possession of by the 15th Portuguese infantry, under Colonel de Regoa, and the 8th Caçadores, under Major Hill. General Walker also forced the barrier on the Olevença road, and entering the covered way on the left of the bastion of St. Vincent, he descended into the ditch, and scaled the face of the bastion. Phillipon fled with a few troops to the fort of San Cristoval, but at the break of the following day he surrendered the fort and garrison.

We have here set down the prominent facts of this siege with the brevity our space commands; but if we had the opportunity for going into the details enjoyed by the elegant historian of the Peninsular war, what a world of stirring instances of devotion, bravery, and suffering we should have to relate!

Although we are bound to hold the work of a contemporary sacred, we cannot resist offering a picture of the horrors of war, given by one evidently, on other occasions, fond and proud of his profession. At the close of this siege, Sir William Napier says:--

“Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnishes the lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All indeed were not alike; hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders, here all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fire bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled: the wounded men were then looked to, and the dead disposed of!

“Five thousand men fell in this short siege--three thousand five hundred in the assault--in a space of less than a hundred square yards!

“When the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.”

CIUDAD RODRIGO.

A.D. 1812.

The allied army under Lord Wellington remained in cantonments till the 7th of January, waiting for the arrival of the artillery; the light divisions being advanced in front, observing the enemy’s movements.

The battering-train having reached Almeida on the 8th, Lord Wellington commenced the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo. Before this place could be even approached, it was necessary to take or destroy a palisadoed redoubt, which had been erected on the hill of St. Francisco, as also three fortified convents connected with that work. This operation was given to Major-General Crawford, who, as soon as it was dark, sent Colonel Colborne, of the 52nd, with a detachment of the light division, to take the fort. The attack was ably conducted by Colonel Colborne; it was stormed in gallant style, two captains and forty-seven men being made prisoners. Captain Mein, of the 52nd, who led the storming party, was severely wounded, but the British loss was trifling. In consequence of this success, the army broke ground the same night, within six hundred yards of the city, notwithstanding that the enemy held the fortified convents.

On the 14th of January, Lord Wellington opened his fire from twenty-two pieces of ordnance, which formed three batteries in the first parallel. On the night of that day, likewise, the approach was opened with the second parallel, and the besiegers were established in it, within a hundred and fifty yards of the walls of the place. This operation was rendered secure on the right, by General Sir Thomas Graham having surprised the enemy’s detachment in the convent of Santa Cruz, and General Colville equally secured it on the left by getting possession of the convent of St. Francisco.

January 15th, 16th, and 17th were spent in completing the second parallel and the approaches to it, and in erecting a battery in the neighbourhood of the convent of St. Francisco, which opened on the 18th. By the 19th the breaches in the fausse-braie wall, and in the body of the place, effected by the batteries in the first parallel, were considered practicable, as was also a breach in the suburbs of St. Francisco, which had been made by the batteries opened on the 15th. Marmont was now, to all appearance, advancing with a powerful force from Salamanca, for the purpose of raising the siege; Lord Wellington therefore saw that no time was to be lost, and accordingly determined to make an instant attempt on the city by storm.

The third and light divisions were fixed upon for this important service, as they happened to be the troops on duty that day, the army taking the duties of the trenches by divisions during the siege. They were formed into five columns. The two right, conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Toole, of the 2nd Portuguese Caçadores, and Major Ridge, of the 5th regiment, were destined to protect the advance of the third column, which was composed of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, to the top of the breach in the fausse-braie wall. The fourth column was composed of the 43rd and 52nd, and part of the 95th regiments, and was directed by General Crawford. This was destined to attack the breach on the left, in the suburbs of St. Francisco, and to cover the left of the attack at the principal breach by the troops of the third division, under General Picton. General Pack’s Portuguese brigade, which formed the fifth column, was directed to make a false attack upon the south face of the fort. Besides these columns, the 94th regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, was ordered to descend into the ditch on the right of General M’Kinnon’s column, for the purpose of protecting it against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose its progress to the principal breach in the fausse-braie wall.

The assault was made according to these arrangements. Major Ridge with his column escaladed the fausse-braie wall, and stormed the principal breach in the main body of the place, together with the 94th regiment, which had moved along the ditch, and had stormed the breach of the fausse-braie wall in the front of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, so that it not only covered the advance of that brigade, but even preceded it in the attack. Generals Crawford and Vandeleur, with the troops on the left, were equally forward in their movements, and in less than half an hour from the commencement of the attack, the city was in possession of the allies. General Pack converted his false attack into a real one. The Portuguese troops scaled the walls in every direction; and the advanced-guard, under Major Lynch, followed the enemy’s troops from the advanced works into the fausse-braie, where they made prisoners of all that opposed them.

Major-General M’Kinnon was blown up by the explosion of one of the enemy’s mines near the breach. General Crawford received a mortal wound while leading on his division; and Major Napier, one of the bravest men in the army, lost an arm. M’Kinnon had been a schoolfellow of Buonaparte.

The value of this capture of Ciudad Rodrigo was very great. 1st. It erected a wall, and a very strong one, against any new invasion of the Portuguese frontier. 2nd. It was so much gained towards clearing the country between the Douro and the Tagus. 3rd. It intercepted the communication of the enemy between the north and south of Spain, and thereby rendered the operations of their armies in the north, and their army in the south, two distinct lines, having the allied army between them. 4th. It paved the way for the siege of Badajos. 5th. It greatly raised the credit and popularity of the allied cause.

This siege only lasted twelve days. The allies lost twelve hundred men and ninety officers; among the latter of whom was one who appears to have been a general favourite, for it was said, “Three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman:” he was a captain of the 45th.

It is lamentable to hear the historian of the Peninsular war attach the same blame to the allied troops in this siege as we have mentioned in that of Badajos. “Disgraceful,” he says, “were the excesses of the allied troops: the Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, yet all these claims were disregarded. ‘The soldiers were not to be controlled.’ That excuse will not suffice. Colonel Macleod, of the 43rd, a young man of most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach, and constrained his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorder commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.” This is a severe but just censure upon “the higher authorities.” We know that the British common soldier is taken from the lowest ranks of society, but we cannot agree that cold-blooded cruelty is a distinguishing characteristic even of these classes; we believe the British people to be averse to cruel triumph over a fallen enemy, and we should rather attribute the excesses complained of to the partisan portion of the army: civil warfare is generally the most inveterate. The Spaniards were most likely to be cruel towards their compatriots; few people are more inveterate when their passions are roused.

For this achievement Lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese.

THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

A.D. 1812.

This is a small fortress, but an important siege, filled with incident and instruction.

On the morning of the 18th of September, the army was in front of Burgos, and may be said to have commenced a siege, in which the historians of the different nations, without any just imputation upon their truth, may each claim for their country the palm of active courage and patient firmness. The town was as bravely defended as it was bravely assailed, and the ardent and persevering enterprise of the attack was met by corresponding vigour and vigilance in the defence.

Burgos is the capital of Old Castile, and was the cradle of the Castilian kings and monarchy. It is memorable for the noble stand which it repeatedly made against the Saracens. After the retreat of Massena, it was considered a critical and dangerous point, and its fortifications were repaired. The ruins of the castle were very strong, being stone, and of deep foundation, situated, besides, on the brow of a hill, commanding the river Arlanzon, on which the town stands, and the roads on both sides of it. These ruins were repaired, and strengthened by additional earthworks. Beyond the hill on which the castle is situated is another eminence, called St. Michael’s Hill, on which a hornwork was erected. Adjoining the castle was a church, which was converted into a fort. The above works were included within three distinct lines of circumvallation, which were so carried and connected as to form an oblong square, and each to defend and support without endangering (in the event of being itself lost) the others. The garrison consisted of more than two thousand men.

As Burgos is on the north side of the Arlanzon, whilst the allied army was on the south, and as the castle commanded both the river and the roads, Wellington had some difficulty in preparing the passage, and the remainder of the day of the 18th was employed in making the necessary arrangements. On the following day this operation was effected. The outworks of the hill of St. Michael were immediately seized, and the troops posted close to the hornwork. At night the hornwork was itself attacked and carried, and thus the whole of St. Michael’s Hill was obtained. This hill was, however, a mere outwork to the main fortress, inasmuch as the possession of it only brought the allies in front of the outermost of the three lines, behind which were the castle and body of the work.

The possession of this eminence afforded the allies a better knowledge of the defences of the fort, with a commanding view of some of the works. The besieged evinced neither tardiness nor want of skill; they had demolished, in an incredibly short time, the houses which interfered with their line of defence. They had raised ramparts of earth and biscuit-barrels, and constructed fleches and redans to cover the batteries and sally-gates. These works, considering the materials and the pressure of the time, were so solid and accurate as to command the general praise of the British engineers, whilst the Portuguese regarded them with astonishment: a proof of the value of the knowledge of field-work, as it then existed in the French army, when almost every soldier could assist the artillery, and take his share in the work of attack and defence in sieges. It is observed by a writer of the time, “We must confess that the patience of the English privates was more exemplary than their dexterity.”

From the 19th to the 22nd of September, the allies were employed in raising their own works upon St. Michael’s Hill, in front of the exterior line of the enemy, and more particularly in fortifying and completing the hornwork, of which they had possessed themselves. Everything being ready on the evening of the 22nd, it was resolved to give the first regular assault. Accordingly, at the hour of eleven at night, the storming body was moved forward in two columns: the one, consisting of Portuguese, to the south-west flank of the castle; and the other of British, under Major Laurie, to the front. The plan of the attack was, that the Portuguese should engage and occupy the eminence on the above-mentioned flank, while Major Laurie’s party should escalade the parapet in front.

The Portuguese, who were to begin the attack, commenced with much spirit. They were opposed to a deep ditch and a lofty parapet on the opposite side, and therefore had to descend into the one and fight their way up the other. It may be necessary to state to the uninitiated, that the shelving side of the ditch which adjoins the parapet is technically termed the scarp, and the opposite side of the ditch (the side nearest an advancing enemy) the counterscarp. They were stopped at the very edge of the descent into this ditch; their attack, therefore, as a diversion, became nugatory, and failed in the first instance.

In the meanwhile, the party in front, under Major Laurie, having seen the Portuguese commence, advanced with the most determined bravery to the escalade, and having the same works in opposition to them as the Portuguese, in an instant reached the head of the counterscarp, and in another instant descended it, cleared the palisades at the bottom, and planted their ladders to the parapet. The first assailants penetrated to the top of the parapet, and a fierce contest took place both there and in the bottom of the ditch. The assault was repelled with as much spirit as it was made and the ditch and scarp were covered with dead of both parties. Amongst these was the gallant leader himself, Major Laurie.

This gallantry, however, was rendered useless by the total failure of the Portuguese division. After much severe fighting, therefore, and a great consequent loss, the party was withdrawn,--an affair in itself of great peril and difficulty, as their ardour had carried them nearly into the lines. It was a matter of congratulation that the whole party had escaped being made prisoners. The total British and Portuguese loss on this occasion was not short of four hundred killed and wounded.

It would be of little professional instruction, and of less general interest, to follow the details of an irregular, and therefore inartificial siege, from day to day; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the attacks. Of those, during the whole siege, there were five; two we have already described.

After the failure of the storm on the 22nd, a mine was directed under the same exterior line. It was exploded in the midnight of the 29th, and a breach, erroneously deemed practicable, effected in the parapet. A storming party was immediately advanced, and at the same moment, for the purpose of diversion, a strong column was directed in front of the town. The storming party unluckily missed its way, and thereby the affair failed.

Between the following day and the 4th of October, another mine was conducted near to the same point, and the former breach was improved by fire from the batteries. This mine was exploded in the afternoon of the 4th, and the result was a second practicable breach. These two breaches were immediately stormed by the second battalion of the twenty-fourth, divided into two parties, under Captain Hedderwick and Lieutenants Holmes and Fraser. This assault was completely successful, and the allies were thus established within the exterior line of the castle. The loss was severe, but not beyond the value of the service.

The enemy, however, did not leave the allies in tranquil possession of this position: they made two vigorous sallies to interrupt the works against the second line, and continued their operations for the same purpose with very little intermission. A breach was effected, and a mine was in progress; but from want of siege materials, particularly of a battering-train, the advances were slow, and it became obvious that success was doubtful. There were only three eighteen-pounders, and no materials or instruments but what were made upon the spot. We must in candour admit that no blame could be justly attached to any one, as these privations were necessary circumstances of the enterprise. The siege of Burgos was an expeditionary operation, and at no point, either of the march of the army towards it or during the time occupied in the siege, could the marquis of Wellington have taken a train with him, or have sent for it and waited for its arrival. There were in fact two trains on the Spanish frontier,--the one at Ciudad Rodrigo, and another at Badajos; but the nature of the operations, the distance, and the roads, rendered them totally immoveable. A question has here been put--why, then, did the marquis undertake this siege; and did not the result disappoint his calculations? To this there are several answers. First. Upon the forward march and assembling of the enemy on the Douro, it became necessary for him to repel them; and his march and pursuit for this purpose brought him in front of Burgos. Second. There was nothing in the external character of the castle and works of Burgos to justify the expectation of a long defence: the body of the castle, as reported by the engineers, was a repaired ruin, and the outworks were fieldworks of earth. If the apparatus of attack was incomplete, so likewise was that of defence. In a word, both the attack and defence were of the same expeditionary character and means. Third. The language of the private correspondence of the army was substantially as follows, and contains a full answer to this and all similar objections:--That the value of the place and the army being there, rendered it indispensable to make an effort to acquire it; that the marquis had hopes of effecting this acquisition, but certainly no assured expectation; that the event might therefore disappoint his wishes, but not deceive him; that the very character of the defence, gallant as it was, was such as to encourage the continuance of the attack; such advantage being so nearly gained and so narrowly eluded, as if gained, would have been necessarily followed by the capture of the place. The garrison, moreover, were without water, and suffered great severities by having to bivouac in narrow quarters.[20]

On the morning of the 18th of October, a breach having been effected and a mine having been prepared under the church of St. Roman, it was resolved that the mine should be exploded the same evening, and that upon such explosion, the breach should be stormed and the line (the second line) escaladed. Accordingly, at the appointed time in the evening, the attacking party was divided into three columns: the one under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, composed of Spanish and Portuguese, were to attack the church; the second party, composed of a detachment of the German legion, under Major Wurmb, were to storm the breach; whilst the third party, composed of the guards, were to escalade the line. At this moment the mine blew up, and, being the appointed signal, the parties at once rushed forward to their assigned points.

The explosion of the mine carried away the whole of the wall which defended that point, and Lieutenant-Colonel Browne succeeded in lodging his party on the ruins and outworks. The enemy retreated to a second parapet behind the church, over the heads of the advancing assailants. This occasioned much loss and confusion; and a flank fire of the enemy coming in aid, compelled the lieutenant-colonel to suffer the retreat of his men, and to content himself with saving them from disorder.

In the mean time, Major Wurmb had directed his party against the breach. The distinguished gallantry of this assault merited a more successful result. The breach was carried in an instant, and a considerable number of the party in the same moment got into the body of the place. But here began the conflict. The enemy opened upon them such a destructive fire, both from the third line and the body of the castle, and brought down upon them such superior numbers, that, after the loss of their gallant leader and a great proportion of their force, they were compelled to retire, and almost in the moment of victory to evacuate what they had so bravely gained.

The third party, the guards, experienced a similar success in the commencement, and a similar disappointment in the result. They succeeded in escalading the line, but were compelled to retire before the superiority of numbers and the fire of the enemy. In his official despatch, dated Cabeçon, 26th of October, 1812, the marquis of Wellington thus writes:--

“It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the guards and German legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and even one of them was killed in one of the embrasures of the parapet.”

The army of Portugal and the army of the North, for they were so near each other as to constitute one army, had not suffered this siege to go on without some attempts to interrupt it; they had now, however, attained a strength and importance that demand our attention.

These two armies were stationed on the high road from Burgos to Miranda on the Ebro, a continuance of the great French road from Madrid, through Burgos to Bayonne. From Burgos to Miranda on the Ebro is forty English miles. Above the village of Monasterio, on that side of it furthest from Burgos, was a range of hills, which was the position of the British outposts. The army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of Bribiesca; and the army of the North, under General Cafferilli, had its head-quarters at Pancorvo.

The principal attempts of these armies were on the 13th and 18th of October. On the former of these days, General Macune, who was in command of the French at Bribiesca, moved forward a considerable body of infantry and cavalry against the posts of the allies at Monasterio, but was repulsed as well by the posts themselves as by a detachment of the German legion.

On the 18th, the army of Portugal, having been previously strongly reinforced by the arrival of levies from France, re-advanced against the said posts, and possessed themselves of the hills and town. It now, therefore, became necessary to lead the army against them, and accordingly, with the exception of that portion of it required for the siege, the marquis assembled the troops, and placed the allied army on some heights between Burgos and Quentana. This movement was made on the 19th of October. The enemy assembled their army at Monasterio on the same day. On the following evening, the 20th, they moved a force of nearly ten thousand men to drive in the outposts at Quentana, and which, according to order, withdrew as they approached. The marquis had now recourse to a flank movement; the result gave him an advantage; upon seeing which, the enemy again fell back upon Monasterio.

And this manœuvre, indeed, was the last operation of the siege of Burgos, for on the following day, the 21st, a letter from Sir R. Hill reported such a state of affairs upon the Tagus, that the marquis found it to be an act of necessity immediately to raise the siege, and to fall back upon the Douro. Accordingly, the siege was raised the same night, and the army was in march on the following morning.

ST. SEBASTIAN.

A.D. 1813.

On the retreat of the French army after its defeat at Vittoria, Marshal Jourdan threw a garrison into St. Sebastian of between three and four thousand men, and the place was immediately afterwards invested by the Spaniards. In the beginning of July, the fifth division of the army, with two Portuguese brigades, making a force of from 9,000 to 10,000 men, arrived before it to form the siege, which was intrusted to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham.

A proportion of artillery, consisting of twenty-four pounders, with 1,500 rounds of ammunition per gun, six eight-inch howitzers, with 1,000, and four ten-inch mortars, with 500 rounds, and four sixty-eight-pounders, with a proportion of shells, were in ships at Los Passages; and with the army there were six eighteen-pounders: this quantity of artillery was deemed adequate to the attack of the place.

The town of St. Sebastian is built on a peninsula running nearly east and west; the northern side being washed by the river Urumea, the southern by the sea. The front defences, which cross the isthmus towards the land, are a double line of works, with the usual counterscarp, covered way, and glacis; but the works running lengthwise of the peninsula are only a single line, and, trusting to the water in their front to render them inaccessible, they are built without any cover; and the northern line is quite exposed, from the top to the bottom, to a range of hills on the right bank of the river, at a distance of six or seven hundred yards from it. These walls being uncovered, appears an unaccountable oversight, as the Urumea, for some hours before and after low water, is fordable, and the tide recedes so much, that for the same period there is a considerable dry space along the left bank of the river, by which troops can march to the foot of the wall.

Marshal Berwick, when he attacked St. Sebastian in 1719, aware of this circumstance, threw up batteries on those hills to break the town wall, and, whilst that was being effected, he pushed on approaches along the isthmus, and established himself on the covered way of the land front: as is but too frequently the case, as soon as the breach was practicable, the governor capitulated for the town, and the duke obliged him and the garrison to retire into the castle. It was now proposed to follow the same mode of attack, and as a preliminary, the garrison were to be driven from a post they occupied about seven or eight hundred yards in advance of the town, formed by the convent of St. Bartolomeo and a redoubt then in progress; and from a small circular work, which they made with casks on the causeway, four eighteen-pounders and two howitzers were put in battery for that purpose.

The operations against the town were commenced by the erection of batteries on the hills to the north of the Urumea, for twenty twenty-four-pounders, four eight-inch howitzers, four ten-inch mortars, and four sixty-eight-pounder carronades; the guns to breach the sea-wall between the two towers, the carronades to be used with shells only, and the mortars to be directed against the land front and castle.

On the 14th of July, the first two batteries opened on the convent of St. Bartolomeo.

15th of July.--A false attack was made on the convent of St. Bartolomeo, to ascertain if the enemy intended obstinately to defend it, which the troops carrying farther than was ordered, they were obliged to retire with some loss.

17th of July.--The end of the convent having been entirely beaten down, the ninth regiment and a Portuguese brigade assaulted and carried it with little difficulty.

Two more batteries for the eighteen-pounders and the two howitzers were thrown up in the night, in a situation to enfilade and take in reverse the defences of the town.

On the night of the 18th of July the suburbs of St. Martin, which the enemy had burned, were occupied: they, however, continued to hold the circular redoubt.

Night between the 19th and 20th of July.--Approaches were struck out to the right and left of St. Martin.

On the 20th of July all the batteries opened.

In the night between the 20th and 21st of July, early in the evening, the enemy abandoned the circular redoubt: a working party of seven hundred men had been prepared to open a parallel across the isthmus, but the night proving extremely dark, tempestuous, and rainy, the men dispersed among the ruined buildings of St. Martin, and not more than two hundred could be collected together; therefore only about one-third of the parallel and the right approach to it were opened.

On the 21st of July, Sir Thomas Graham sent a flag of truce with a summons to the governor, but he would not receive it.

In the night between the 21st and 22nd of July, the left communication and the remainder of the parallel across the isthmus were opened; the parallel near its left crossed a drain level with the ground, four feet high and three feet wide, through which ran a pipe to convey water into the town. Lieutenant Reid ventured to explore it, and at the end of 230 yards, he found it closed by a door in the counterscarp, opposite to the face of the right demi-bastion of the hornwork; as the ditch was narrow, it was thought that by forming a mine at this extremity of the drain, the explosion would throw earth sufficient against the escarpe, only twenty-four feet high, to form a road over it; eight feet at the end of the aqueduct was therefore stopped with filled sand-bags, and thirty barrels of powder, of ninety pounds each, were lodged against it, and a saucisson led to the mouth of the drain.

On the 23rd of July the breach between the two towers, about one hundred feet in length, being considered practicable, the fire of all the guns was concentrated on a part of the wall to its left to effect a second breach, and by evening, that also was considered practicable on a front of thirty feet. At the same time, the four ten-inch mortars and the sixty-eight-pounder carronades were turned on the defences and on the houses in rear of the breach, to prevent the enemy working to form an obstacle to them.

The breaches were to have been stormed at daylight on the 24th, at which time the tide was out, and the troops were formed in readiness; but the houses at the back of the breach being on fire, it was supposed they would prevent the advance of the troops when they had gained the summit, and in consequence the order was countermanded.

The next night a trench was opened in advance of the parallel, to contain a firing party on the hornwork, during the assault.

The assault was ordered to take place at daylight on the 25th; the storming party, about 2,000 men, were to assemble in the trenches, and the explosion of the mine was to be the signal to advance.

The distance of the uncovered approach, from the trenches to the breach, was about three hundred yards, in face of an extensive front of works, over very difficult ground, consisting of rocks covered with sea-weed, and intermediate pools of water; the fire of the place was yet entire, and the breach was flanked by two towers, which, though considerably injured, were still occupied.

At five A.M. the mine was sprung, and destroyed a considerable length of the counterscarp and glacis, and created so much astonishment in the enemy posted on the works near to it, that they abandoned them for the moment, and the advance of the storming party reached the breach before any great fire was brought to bear on them: on their attempting to ascend the breach, the enemy opened so heavy a fire, and threw down such a number of shells, &c., from the towers on the flanks, and from the summit of the breaches, that the men began to waver, and in a short time the assaulting party had returned into the trenches, with the loss of nearly one hundred killed and four hundred wounded.

The advanced guard, with Lieutenant Jones, who led them, were made prisoners on the breach; of the other engineers, Captain Lewis was severely wounded, and Lieutenant Machell was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. Fletcher was wounded at the same time in the trenches.

This assault does not appear to have failed from want of exertion, but from the fire of the place being left entire, and from the great distance at which the covered approaches were from the breach; the troops were stated in the Gazette to have done their duty, but that it was beyond the power of gallantry to overcome the difficulties opposed to them.

On this failure being reported to Lord Wellington, he came over from Lesaca, and decided upon renewing the same mode of attack, but on a much more extended scale, as soon as sufficient guns and ammunition should arrive from England; the augmentation to the attack was to extend the breach on the left to the salient angle of the demi-bastion of the main front, and from batteries to be established on the left of the attack, to continue it round the whole of its face, and to the end of the high curtain above it.

On the 27th of July, at seven A.M., the enemy made a sortie, to feel the guard of the trenches; they surprised it, and entering the parallel at the left, swept it to the right, carrying into the place two hundred prisoners. In consequence of this loss, the guard was concentrated in a small portion of the left of the parallel, and the right of the trenches was only occasionally patrolled.

On the 28th of July, Marshal Soult attacked Lord Wellington, in the hope of relieving Pampeluna, and the result of the action not being known to Sir Thomas Graham, he, on the 29th, embarked all the artillery and stores at Los Passages, and sent the transports to sea; the siege was therefore converted into a blockade, the guard continuing to hold the trenches.

August 3rd, the enemy surprised a patrol in the parallel, and made it prisoners.

On the 6th the guns and stores were re-landed at Los Passages, and on the 18th the additional artillery and ammunition arrived from England.

On the 24th the entire of the trenches was again occupied, and the siege recommenced.

On the left, two additional batteries for thirteen guns, to breach the face of the left demi-bastion and the curtain above it, at seven hundred yards’ distance, were commenced, and on the right, cover was begun for seven additional howitzers, four sixty-eight-pounder carronades, twenty-one twenty-four-pounders, and sixteen mortars, being forty-eight pieces of ordnance, in addition to the thirty-two put in battery for the previous operation.

At midnight the enemy made a sortie, entered the advanced part of the trenches, and carried confusion into the parallel; in attempting, however, to sweep along its right, they were checked by a part of the guard of the trenches, and obliged to retire, carrying off with them about twelve prisoners.

At eight A.M. of the 26th of August, the batteries opened. On the isthmus, the thirteen guns were directed to breach the left demi-bastion of the main front, and the end of the curtain in continuation of the old breach, and the face of the left demi-bastion of the hornwork, which were all seen in a line, one above the other.

The fire of the batteries on the right was directed to breach the two towers, one on each flank of the old breach, and to continue that breach to the salient angle of the demi-bastion, and to breach the end of the curtain above it.

Two shafts were sunk to form galleries, to prevent the enemy mining under the advanced part of the trenches. In the night between the 26th and the 27th, the two last-erected batteries being at a long distance to breach, and not seeing the foot of the escarpes, cover was made for four of the guns in a preferable situation.

A party of two hundred men was landed this night on the high rocky island of Sta Clara, and made prisoners of the enemy’s guard on it, consisting of an officer and twenty-four men.

In the night between the 27th and 28th of August, the enemy made a sortie; but, profiting by past experience, such precautions had been taken of posting sentinels, &c., and the men were so prepared to stand to their arms, that they were immediately repulsed, without effecting the slightest mischief.

On the 29th of August a battery opened on the face of the demi-bastion of the main front; the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers were turned on the enemy’s batteries, and several mortars and the carronades at the right attack were directed to the same object, and in the course of the day the enemy’s fire was nearly subdued. It was afterwards ascertained that they lost many men, particularly by the spherical case-shot, which they endeavoured to imitate, by firing common shells filled with small balls, and bursting them over the heads of the troops, but without any effect.

The breaches appearing good and practicable on the 30th, it was deemed time to prepare the necessary debouches for the troops: at the advanced sap on the right, to break through the sea-wall, which was of masonry, four feet thick and ten feet above the level of high water, three shafts were commenced, the first close at the back of the wall, the second twenty-five feet from the wall, and the third forty feet from the second: they were sunk eight feet below the surface of the ground, and a small return made to contain the powder; they were then each loaded with five hundred and forty pounds of powder.

At two A.M. the next morning, the three mines were sprung, and blew the wall completely down. The diameters of the entonnoirs were about thirty feet; they were immediately connected, and by ten A.M. formed a good passage out for troops, and accomplished the original object of securing all the works in their rear from the effects of any galleries the enemy might have run out to form mines in that direction. At the time of low water, about eleven A.M., the columns for the assault moved out of the trenches by the openings in front of the battery, and in a few minutes after the advance of the forlorn hope, the enemy exploded two mines, which blew down part of the sea-line wall; but as the troops were not in very close order, nor very near the wall, their loss was not great.

From the Mirador and Battery del Principe, on the castle, a fire of grape and shells was opened on the column, and continued during the time they were disputing the breach. The main curtain, even to the end breached, was strongly occupied by grenadiers, and the left branch of the hornwork was well manned, and from thence a heavy fire was maintained on the breach, a great part of which was exposed to it; but the tower of Amozquita, on the left of the breach, fortunately for the besieged, was not manned.

Up the end of the curtain, the breach was accessible quite to the terreplein; but the enemy’s situation there was commanding, and the ascent was much exposed to the fire of the hornwork.

At the back of the whole of the rest of the breach was a perpendicular fall, from fifteen to twenty-five feet in depth, under which were the ruins of the houses which joined on to the back of the breach; and here and there was left an end wall of the houses, by which alone it was possible to descend. A line of retrenchment carried along the nearest standing parallel walls, was strongly occupied by the enemy, and which entirely swept the confined summit of the breach.

The storming parties advanced to the breach, and there remained on the side of it without being able to crown the top, from the heavy fire from the intrenched ruins within. Many desperate efforts were made to gain it, without effect, particularly up to the curtain; but the enemy maintained that post firmly. Fresh troops were sent on successively, as fast as they could be filed out of the trenches, with laudable perseverance; and the Portuguese, in two detachments, forded the river Urumea, near its mouth, in a very handsome style, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry.

The breach was now covered with troops remaining in the same unfavourable situation, and unable to gain the summit. Upwards of two hours of continued exertion had elapsed, when, by a happy chance, a quantity of combustibles exploded within the breach, and the French began to waver; the assailants made fresh efforts; the ravelin and left branch of the hornwork were abandoned by the enemy; the retrenchment within the breach was soon after deserted by them; and the men by degrees got over the ruins and gained the curtain.

The troops, being now assembled in great numbers on the breach, pushed into the town; the garrison, dispirited at its great loss, and intimidated at the perseverance shown in sending fresh men, was quickly driven from all its entrenchments, except the convent of St. Teresa, into the castle.

From the superior height of the curtain, the artillery in the batteries on the right of the Urumea were able to keep up a fire on that part during the assault, without injury to the troops at the foot of the breach, and being extremely well served, it occasioned a severe loss to the enemy, and probably caused the explosion which led to the final success of the assault.

The assailants had upwards of five hundred killed and fifteen hundred wounded; of the garrison, besides the actual killed and wounded during the assault, seven hundred were made prisoners in the town. Of the engineers, Lieutenant-colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Captains Rhodes and Collyer, were killed; and Lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenants Barry and Marshall, were wounded.

As soon as the town was carried, a communication was made from the left of the parallel to the salient angle of the ditch of the ravelin, through the counterscarp, which was blown in, and so into the town by the great gate; and preparations were made to reduce the castle.

The plan for the attack was to erect batteries on the works of the town, and breach some of the main points of the castle defences, as the battery de la Reyna, the Mirador, and the keep, as well as the thin loop-holed walls connecting them.

On the 2nd of September, a new battery for seventeen guns was commenced, occupying the whole terreplein of the hornwork, and another for three guns on the left of the cask redoubt.

A discussion for surrender was entered into with General Rey, but he broke it off.

By the 4th of September, the town, which caught fire soon after the assault, from the quantity of ammunition and combustibles of all sorts scattered about, was nearly consumed, and the fire became a great impediment to carrying the approaches forward.

Up to the 7th, the enemy had fired but very little since the assault; and by this evening, the roofs of the unburnt houses and steeples had been prepared for musketry, to open at the time of the assault on the castle.

On the 8th, at ten A.M., all the batteries opened on the castle; viz.,--from the left of the attack:--No. 7, with three twenty-four pounders, against the Mirador; No. 8, with three eighteen-pounders, against the lower defences; No. 9, with seventeen twenty-four pounders, against the Mirador and battery de la Reyna; island, with two twenty-four pounders and one eight-inch howitzer, to sweep the back of the castle. From the right of the attack, thirty-three pieces of ordnance against the castle generally. The fire was extremely powerful and well-directed, ploughing up every part of the confined space of the castle. The enemy kept concealed chiefly in little narrow trenches, which they had made along the front of the heights, but they evidently lost many men. About twelve, a white flag was hoisted, and the garrison surrendered prisoners of war. Their numbers had been reduced to 80 officers and 1,756 men, of whom, 23 officers and 512 men were in the hospital.

The loss of the besiegers during the attack was,--53 officers and 898 men killed; 150 officers and 2,340 men wounded; 7 officers and 332 men missing.

There were used at this siege 2,726 gabions, 1,476 eighteen-feet fascines, and 20,000 sand-bags.

The expenditure of ammunition during the siege was,--

Round shot { 24-pounders 43,367 } 52,670 { 18-pounders 9,303 }

Grape shot 24-pounders 2,094 2,094

{ 24-pounders 1,930 } Spherical shells { 18-pounders 150 } 4,278 { 8-inch 2,198 }

Common shells { 10-inch 3,755 } 11,521 { 8-inch 7,766 } ------ Total shot and shells 70,563

Powder, whole barrels, 90 lbs. each 5,579[21]

SIEGE OF ANTWERP.

A.D. 1830.

This siege, although it took place at a distance of fifteen years from its cause, was the result of one of the many political errors of the treaty of Vienna. Nothing could be more unwise and short-sighted than to expect a peaceful union between Belgium and Holland, and particularly of so strict a nature as that union in some of its features was composed. Although near neighbours, the Belgians and the Dutch are widely different: different in language, institutions, blood, and traditions. The union likewise, instead of being cemented by conciliation, was rendered galling by oppressive enactments; the monarch reigning over both countries was the king of Holland, and the proceedings of the courts of law were commanded to be carried on in the language of that country, so that Belgium appeared more like a conquered province than a willing partner in a union brought about for the benefit of both. If the union of England with Scotland had been carried on upon the principle of the one we are speaking of, the animosities and heart-burnings would never have subsided; we have had two invasions or rebellions, as it is, in which that country has taken part against us, although we form part of the same island. The Belgians have more of the character of the French or the Germans than of the Dutch; they are as industrious, ingenious, and mercantile as the Dutch; but they are more chivalric in their traditions; which feeling is kept alive by their splendid mediæval monuments, by their noble history, and by the Catholic religion; and, however science, and the progress of general knowledge, may soften down the asperities which separate neighbouring peoples, no nation, capable of good, willingly parts from its traditions. In short, the Belgians were not a people to sink willingly into a secondary state, particularly under the Dutch, with whom they felt themselves perfectly able to dispute the question, and were ripe for insurrection, if so it can be called, when the French revolution of 1830 set the minds of all Europeans labouring under real or fancied wrong in a state of ferment. The Belgians rose en masse; one place after another fell into the hands of the provisional government; Prince Frederick was shamefully and unaccountably repulsed from Brussels; and little remained to the house of Nassau, except the splendidly fortified city of Antwerp.

Disheartened and disgusted by the failure of his brother, the prince of Orange--who acted for his father, King William--hastened to Antwerp. He threw himself with honest energy into the cause, in the hope of maintaining the sway of his house over Belgium, and, at the same time, of serving the Belgians and responding to their views. He affected to act for himself, and offered to become their independent ruler; but it was evident that he was governed by orders from the Hague, and that the command of the army was still in the hands of his brother Frederick and General Chassé. An ill-timed royal proclamation and summons of the Dutch to arms, which designated the southern provinces rebels, completed the want of confidence in the prince, and rendered all his efforts nugatory--even his proclamation to place himself at the head of the movement. The provisional government contemptuously rejected all acknowledgment of authority in the Dutch--they, the people, were, they said, at the head of their own movement, and they wanted no other. Treated with scorn by the Belgians, crossed in his views of conciliation by his father, and his authority disputed by General Chassé, the prince, with a bleeding heart, was compelled to abandon all hope, and bade adieu to the Belgian provinces in a short but affecting address. Chassé placed Antwerp in a state of siege on the 24th of October.

On the 22nd of October, the patriots, forming an irregular body of about five thousand men, with sixteen guns, had commenced a simultaneous movement upon the line occupied by the royal troops, who were about seven thousand strong, with forty pieces of artillery. On the 25th the insurgent army arrived under the walls of Antwerp, and some hard fighting took place in the suburbs. The strength of the place would, however, have set them at defiance; but, on the following day, the populace, by a sudden movement within the city, overpowered and disarmed some of the Dutch posts. On the 27th this internal contest was renewed: the populace succeeded in carrying one of the gates; it was immediately thrown open, and the insurgent army poured into the city, accompanied by a commissioner of the provisional government, who had been sent from Brussels to instal the new authorities. General Chassé, instead of risking his diminished garrison in street-warfare, retired into the citadel, the guns of which gave him the command of the town. The insurgents were not ignorant of this, and a convention was agreed to, by which both parties bound themselves to remain quiet. Scarcely, however, had the convention been signed, when the insurgents, in open violation of it, attacked the important post of the arsenal, forcing one of its gates by cannon-shot. This act of treachery left General Chassé no alternative; he was bound to do his duty, and defend his men. The citadel and the frigates in the harbour opened a cannonade upon the town. “An awful and simultaneous roar of artillery now fell on the ears of the affrighted inhabitants. In an instant the citadel, forts, and fleet hurled forth their converging thunder. An iron deluge rained upon the city-walls, and clattered among the buildings. Showers of shells, bombs, and carcases were heard, cracking, bursting, and bellowing around the venerable towers of St. Michael; the uproar of their explosion being multiplied by the echoes of the cathedral. Walls, roofs, and floors fell, crushed beneath the resistless weight of projectiles, which sought their victims in the very cellars, confounding mangled bodies and ruined edifices in one mutilated and confused heap. Ere long, dark columns of smoke and jets of flame were seen to rise. The arsenal and entrepôt were fired. The obscurity of the night soon gave way to a red and glaring lustre, that converted the dark vault of heaven into a fiery canopy, whose lurid reflection announced the fearful catastrophe to the distance of many leagues.

“The terror and stupefaction of the inhabitants baffles description. Some concealed themselves in their vaults and cellars; others rushed wildly through the streets, shrieking and bewildered. Such as had horses or vehicles, no matter of what kind, gathered together their valuables, and hastily fled into the country. Others, intent only on saving life, darted through the gates on foot, and sought refuge in the neighbouring fields. Old men, fair women, and young children,--rich and poor, the hale and the sick, were seen flying in frantic disorder. The flames having gained the prison, there was no time to remove its inmates. The doors were therefore thrown open, and nearly two hundred convicts were let loose; but none had the heart to plunder. Terror, confusion, and despair reigned paramount. Weeping women and children clung for succour to men who could afford them no relief or consolation. Some died of fright, others lost their senses. Groans, screams, and prayers were heard between the pauses of the thunder, intermingled with maledictions on the destroyer, and curses on the revolution. In a few hours, however, all that had power to move, or were not transfixed with terror, had fled into the country. The roads were covered with fugitives of all ages and sexes, who, with tearful eyes, turned to gaze on their devoted homes. The darkness of the night, awfully relieved by the red glare of the flames, the hissing and roaring of the destructive element, the thunder of the cannon, the rattling of shot and falling of timbers, the frantic screams of women and children, and the groans of the wounded and dying,--all united to fix an impression of horror on the mind, not to be effaced by time or space.”[22]

The siege of Antwerp being such an event as was happily rare, during the last forty years, it has excited much attention, and we have given the above extract to meet the expectations of our readers; but we cannot help suspecting that the historian has sacrificed something to a little fine writing (in itself not good). We have reason to think the damage did not amount to near so much as such a portentous account would imply. The bombarding produced its horrors, no doubt; but we must not forget that this scene fell far short of others of the same kind; man’s brutal passions did not disfigure it--the soldier’s murderous sword, guided by revenge, lust, or cupidity, was not there.

The inhabitants and insurgents, terrified at the unexpected severity of General Chassé, sent a deputation at dawn to treat with him, and it was agreed that affairs should remain exactly as they were, until the general question should be definitively settled. Chassé has been generally and deservedly blamed for having inflicted such a punishment upon a large, wealthy, commercial city like Antwerp, for the frantic extravagances of an excited populace: the bombardment, perhaps, did not in one case injure the parties who had provoked his anger.

The kingdom of the United Netherlands had been created by Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France, and when it was found that the parties could not cohere, they felt called upon to look after the work of their own hands. Belgium had nobly obtained its own independence; to have coerced a reunion would most likely have brought on a serious war, several of the powers having, too plainly, views of a self-interested nature. Belgium was, therefore, by general consent, erected into an independent kingdom, under Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg; the Dutch immediately withdrew their troops from that country, and the inhabitants of Antwerp were relieved from the presence of a foreign garrison in their citadel.

SEBASTOPOL.

A.D. 1854–1855.

We now come to the siege which, if not the most important it has been our task to describe, must be the most interesting to our readers. No siege has ever been conducted under similar circumstances. Such have been the facilities of communication, and so effective and intelligent the means employed for collecting information, that the siege of Sebastopol may be said to have been carried on in the presence of the whole civilized world. It has been a living and an exciting panorama. When our ancestors, the Crusaders, were before Antioch or Jerusalem, their relations at home had no opportunity for mourning losses or celebrating triumphs, till time, by throwing all into distance, had weakened the pain or the joy of the intelligence received; whereas, in this case, there is no half-forgotten friend, no changed or decayed interests: all is moving, associated with us, and affecting us, as if the events were passing within the boundaries of our own seas.

May we not, then, ask, without entertaining less commiseration for the sufferings, or admiration for the deeds of the parties engaged, whether this circumstance does not heighten, or even, in a degree, exaggerate the effect of the events? The siege of Sebastopol is extraordinary and important in all ways; but the readers of this volume will find instances of deeper and more protracted suffering, and greater sacrifice of human life, than have been experienced there. Soliman II. lost 40,000 men in four days before Vienna! The want of water before Jerusalem produced infinitely more misery than the excess of it in the Crimea; and the allies have never experienced anything like real scarcity of food. No siege has ever been placed before the world in such vivid, such affecting colours. As a poem, the “Iliad” is doubtless pre-eminent above all such histories; but divest it, or the “Jerusalem Delivered,” of their poetry and their superhuman agencies, and they will hear no comparison with Mr. Russell’s extraordinary (I was about to use a much stronger word) correspondence with the Times: physically and mentally, no man could have been better calculated for the task he undertook. Collected in a volume, his letters will pass down to posterity in company with “Drinkwater’s Gibraltar,” the only work we remember that is worthy of the association.

With his graphic pictures fresh in the minds of every one, it is discouraging to attempt an account of this noble struggle, but as the “Great Sieges of History” would be incomplete without it, we must do as we did with that of Gibraltar, sketch slightly the early scenes, dwell principally upon the great catastrophe, drawing largely and gratefully upon a better historian than ourselves; and asserting occasionally our privilege of commenting upon what passes.

The first thing in this great expedition that strikes a reflective mind, is the facility of transport. Thought naturally travels back to the days when an army from Western Europe, on its way to Constantinople, was diminished by hundreds of thousands in the mere transit. Compare the march of Peter the Hermit, Walter the Penniless, and their countless hosts, with the passage of the gallant allies to nearly the same scene of action--want, fatigue, harassing enemies, and death,--with privations and inconveniences only felt from habitual ease and indulgence. But, perhaps, this very circumstance enhances the cheerfulness and courage with which the armies have encountered and passed through dangers and difficulties to which their previous life had not at all broken them in. Never, we believe, did an army better preserve its spirits; a gleam of sunshine, a scintillation of success, could always restore the Englishman’s hearty laugh, the Irishman’s humorous joke, the Scotchman’s sly, sniggering jeer, whilst not even weather or enemies could silence the music or the gaiety of the French.

Next to the consideration of the troops and the voyage, our attention is drawn to the matériel with which they were to work. Although the expedition was long debated, and at last delayed till too late a period of the year, we are forced to the painful conviction that the authorities at home threw this great stake without due forethought or knowledge. Their acquaintance with what they had to contend with was very imperfect, and their inattention to the probable wants of the troops and the defectiveness of many of the arms and implements were disgraceful; but this was soon remedied by our noble fourth estate: without “our correspondent,” Sebastopol would have proved even worse than a Walcheren.

On the 14th of September, the English and French hosts had become “an army of occupation” in the Crimea; the English troops amounting to 27,000, of which number not more than 1,000 were horse. And here, within four-and-twenty hours, the defects of the commissariat and the deficiencies of the medical staff were painfully felt. The disembarkation was effected with comparative ease, only attended with the usual confusion of such affairs, seasoned with the fun and spirits of the sailors, accustomed to paddle in the surf. On the 18th the armies proceeded towards the great point of their destination, and then, for the first time for five hundred years, the peoples of the two most enlightened, and in all ways most conspicuous nations of the world, marched side by side against a common enemy. The result was worthy of the union--the battle of the Alma was won, with a loss of 3,000 men, notwithstanding the vast superiority in numbers of the Russian cavalry. But we must confine ourselves to the siege; and we are not sorry to shun the description of a battle, as we quite agree with Mr. Russell, that “the writer is not yet born who can describe with vividness and force, so as to bring the details before the reader, the events of even the slightest skirmish.” Amidst alerts and skirmishes, whilst being awfully thinned daily by cholera, the allies marched upon and took possession of Balaklava. From this place they had a good sight of Sebastopol; and here, like Richard I., who got within a short distance of Jerusalem, but was unable to enter it, Marshal St. Arnaud, who commanded the French army, was obliged, by sickness, to leave for France, his goal in view.

The armies then prepared for besieging Sebastopol in due form. An opinion, almost amounting to a general one, prevails, that the allies ought to have taken advantage of the panic created among the Russians by their defeat upon the Alma, and have immediately proceeded against Sebastopol. We will not presume to say they certainly ought to have done so, but the calamities of the winter proved greater than any losses they would have sustained by such a spirited attack; and when we glance back at the captains of whom it has been “our hint to speak,” we do not see one who would not have made the bold attempt. The allied generals seemed to forget that whilst they were making preparations, they were affording opportunities for the enemy to effect much greater, because the latter were at home.

On the night of the 10th of October the British troops broke ground before Sebastopol, fifteen days after they had by a brilliant and daring march on Balaklava obtained a magnificent position on the heights which envelope Sebastopol on the south side, from the sea to the Tchernaya. And here again the advantage of being at home was evident; the Russians immediately commenced a severe and destructive fire, whilst the allies were not in a state to respond by a single gun before the 17th. On that day, however, they began with spirit. The besiegers soon found that the city was a very different place from what they had expected, and that they had to deal with brave, active, and persevering enemies, always on the watch to take advantage, and evidently commanded by skilful and enterprising officers. All ideas of a coup de main were over: they had before them a siege which would test every quality they possessed, either as men or soldiers.

The usual routine of extensive sieges went on, sometimes one side having the advantage, sometimes the other; the scene being occasionally varied by splendid attacks of the shipping. But, although the works of the allies gradually advanced, no decisive advantage was gained: the Russians knew the vast superiority of earthworks over every species of fortification, and were indefatigable with the mattock and spade. Towards the end of the month a great diminution in the numbers of the troops began to be felt; there was a steady drain, in one way or another, of from forty to fifty men a day. And in this awful state they had great cause of complaint of want of most necessaries, and particularly of the badness of the fusees, so important for their projectiles.

Unless ours were a volume instead of a chapter, it would be impossible to follow the daily occurring interest of this struggle. In no siege have the opponents been better matched: failures, from accident, want of skill, or disparity of numbers, were frequent on both sides; but no instance of treachery, or deficiency of courage and endurance, disgraced either besieged or besiegers: the triumph will be the greater from being achieved over a brave, energetic, and indefatigable enemy. But, whilst viewing with heartfelt admiration and gratitude the almost superhuman exertions and exploits of the allied troops, a sad conviction creeps into the mind that these efforts were not always judiciously directed; that there was a deadening paucity of that military genius in the leaders, to which such gallant hearts would so nobly have responded if it had existed. A disciplined soldier is little more than a machine; in all battles his exertions are necessarily confined to his own immediate small sphere of action, and therefore all the courage, all the devotion that man is capable of, must lose their due effect if the general’s head do not well guide the soldier’s arm. Another chilling reflection likewise arises on reviewing the contest: the Russians have been, at least, quite as well commanded as the allies; and a despotic ruler has provided better for the comforts of his tools than a representative government has for those of the brave soldiers who were fighting for its principle.

By no instance, in the course of this siege, is the want of that indescribable something called genius more evident than in that glorious but lamentable day of the action of Balaklava. The firmness of the brave Scots, who stood “shoulder to shoulder,” unshaken by such a charge as infantry have seldom sustained--the charge of the heavy brigade, worthy of the guards who once received the command to “up and at ’em”--were eclipsed by the desperate onslaught of the light cavalry, which has secured immortality to the brave devotedness of British soldiers. But why were these invaluable lives sacrificed? Why, when every one of such men was worth a host, were these heroes “hounded” on to death, as a spectacle before two armies? The fault was not in the brave men, it was not in their officers; but, as fault there was, it must have been somewhere. We can fancy a Murat, the first sabreur in Europe, in the place of Lord Cardigan; we can believe that with the eye and judgment of a general, relying on his reputation, he might have refused to perform such a palpable and wanton sacrifice; but Lord Cardigan had not the reputation of a Murat to fall back upon; he is a rich nobleman, commanding a regiment for his amusement, and not a soldier of fortune who has gained his rank by his meritorious deeds. With the same spirit with which he would have accepted a personal challenge he led on his men to the charge; but that is not the spirit to which the fate of nations should be intrusted in the battle-field: great captains have not unfrequently obtained honour by remonstrance against rash orders, and sometimes by disobeying them altogether. But, whether the fault of the charge lies with Captain Nolan, Lord Lucan, or Lord Cardigan, we never can conceive how the order for it could have emanated from a general who was so placed as to have the position to be attacked, with its defences and defenders, all before his eyes as in a panorama! Whispers had permeated the armies that our light cavalry had not maintained the character it upon all occasions assumed; such feelings are common in large hosts, but no general should consent for the sake of jealous rumours to sacrifice one of the most efficient arms under his command.

Lamentable as was this affair, the day of Balaklava was, on the whole, advantageous to the besiegers; the purpose of the enemy to remove us from a most eligible position was defeated, and they had such “a taste of our quality” as taught them to respect, if not to fear us. The worst result was the awful diminution of a force in which we were before but too weak: of our brave cavalry, 387 were killed, wounded, or missing; and of horses, 520.

Very strangely, the Russians claimed as a great victory their taking of the guns of the redoubts from the poor terrified Turks; and, in their pride of heart, made, the next day, an attack, with 5,000 men, upon our right flank; but they were repulsed by the division under Sir De Lacy Evans, with the loss of 500 men.

The work in the trenches now became very trying to the men. From the first, the British army was deficient in numbers for such an undertaking. Severe labour, change of climate, unusual exposure exhausted them. The French, from their numbers, made more progress in the works, and our men were overtasked by an endeavour to keep pace with them. The guns, too, became shaky, from continual use. In this arm the Russians excelled us: their guns could bear much more frequent firing, from the excellence of the iron of which they are composed.

This is the first war in which the rifle has been employed to any extent, but its merits became so fully appreciated, that we have no doubt it will be generally adopted, and the soldier, instead of firing at random, will be trained so as to throw no ball away.

One feature of the Russian character has been very prominent in this great struggle--a brutal want of humanity. They partake of the attribute of their eastern origin, in the little value they attach to the lives of their own troops, provided they gain their end; and they have no particle of mercy for a fallen foe. In the mêlée, arising from the rash Balaklava charge, they hurled the bolts of their artillery, indiscriminately on friends and enemies; and, after all contests, it was their invariable habit to bayonet the wounded French and English.

By the 30th of October, the position of the allies was rendered very much worse by the closing in upon them of the Russians in their rear. They might be said to be as much besieged in their lines as their enemies were in Sebastopol. But the sea is the Englishman’s constant source of comfort and relief; the port of Balaklava was theirs, and the sea on that side was free to them. The Russians removed every combustible part from their houses and buildings, so that, with the exception of flesh and blood, the allies had nothing to fire against but stone walls and mounds of earth. The most keen and active deer-stalker or chamois-hunter could not be more cunningly and anxiously on the watch for a shot than were the whole bodies of riflemen in both armies during the long siege. Great skill was likewise acquired in gunnery; a shot, a shell, or a rocket seemed sometimes to drop, like magic, à point nommé.

But now, as winter approached, the troops became sensible of the miseries of their situation, and of the culpable neglect of those who ought to have provided for their comforts. Things, which in England would have been cast to the dunghill, became valuable, and were sold at absurd prices: a tattered rug, 50s.; a pot of meat, 15s.; a sponge, 25s.; a half worn-out currycomb and brush, 20s.!

With bad weather, sickness, of course, increased, affecting equally French, English, and Turks; and, until the matter was forced upon the authorities at home by the Press, was not duly attended to. But what is still more strange, men there, upon the spot, were deaf to this imperative duty, and the eloquent Times correspondent says: “The authorities generally treat the medical officers with cool disrespect and indifference.” There is no portion of this siege that will descend to posterity on the page of history with more honour to us as a people than that displaying the ready and earnest sympathy felt by most classes at home for our suffering compatriots: the public voice thundered in the ears of officials, and forced them to their duty; individual charity, individual exertion, were instantly put forth; and woman! constant to her character of “a ministering angel,” forsook the home of comfort, and the bed of down, for the contaminated atmosphere of a military hospital, and attendance by the wounded soldier’s couch. We care not what may be the high-sounding title of the general who shall achieve the conquest of the Crimea, it will pale beside that of Miss Nightingale, the leader of the Sisters of Mercy.

At this period of the siege, spies, of a bold and artful kind, occasionally made their appearance in the allied camps. If the commanders had read our siege of Antioch, they might have followed the example of Bohemond: he roasted the bodies of some dead prisoners, and made it understood that the Crusaders served all spies in that manner; he cleared his camp of that dangerous kind of vermin, against whom, we must say, the allies were not sufficiently watchful. How eloquently does a passage of Mr. Russell’s account of the 4th of November bear out our frequently-expressed conviction of the incapacity of the leaders! He says: “Whenever I look at the enemy’s outworks, I think of the Woolwich butt. What good have we done by all this powder? Very little. A few guns judiciously placed, when we first came here, might have saved us incredible toil and labour, because they would have rendered it all but impossible for the Russians to cast up such entrenchments and works as they have done before the open and perfectly unprotected entrance to Sebastopol. Here has been our great, our irremediable error.” And when we look at the bitter consequences of that error, what can we say of the commanders by whom it was committed? In all ethics there is nothing so fallacious and injurious as the constantly-quoted “De mortuis nil nisi bonum;” it is deceptive as to the dead, it is disheartening to the good, and encouraging to the bad of the living. Lord Raglan was an amiable gentleman, well-versed, we dare say, in the routine of office; but by no means fit to head such an enterprise against such an enemy. But was not all the English policy, at starting, of this do-nothing character?

Of the same complexion was the disregard to Sir De Lacy Evans’ repeated representation of the insecurity of the position of the flank of the second division. But if the British general was deaf, the Russian commander was not blind, and this led to the attack which brought on the glorious battle of Inkermann--glorious to our brave troops, but certainly not creditable to the precaution of their commander. The Russian generals, on the contrary, seem to have exercised vast skill and discrimination. A great captain not only considers the battle itself in his plans, he provides for success by his preparations, and secures comparative safety in the event of defeat. Bonaparte’s tactics in that respect were his ruin: he said a general should think of nothing but conquering--so that whenever he was beaten, he never knew how to make a retreat. The Russian plans of attack were as perfect as possible, and nothing but the indomitable courage of our troops could have prevented their carrying into effect their threat of compelling us to raise the siege and driving us into the sea. Well-laid plans, brave men, in overwhelming numbers, immense artillery, superstition and brandy, with the presence of royalty, were all put in force against British strength, devotedness and courage,--and all failed. “The Battle of Inkermann,” says its historian, “admits of no description. It was a series of dreadful deeds of daring, of sanguinary hand-to-hand fights, of despairing rallies, of desperate assaults,--in glens and valleys, in brushwood glades and remote dells, hidden from all human eyes, and from which the conquerors, Russian or British, issued only to engage fresh foes, till our old supremacy in the use of the bayonet, so rudely assailed in this fight, was triumphantly asserted, and the battalions of the Czar gave way before our steady courage and the chivalrous fire of France.” The Russians fought with desperation, constantly bayonetting the wounded as they fell. They had orders, likewise, to aim at every mounted officer--thence the death of generals Cathcart and Strangways, and the number of killed and wounded officers of rank: Sir George Brown was among the latter.

The battle was won--but what again says the historian? “A heavy responsibility rests on those whose neglect enables the enemy to attack us where we were least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them to despise precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy, had they been bold enough to have assaulted us behind intrenchments. We have nothing to rejoice over, and almost everything to deplore, in the battle of Inkermann. We have defeated the enemy indeed, but have not advanced one step nearer towards the citadel of Sebastopol. We have abashed, humiliated, and utterly routed an enemy strong in numbers, in fanaticism, and in dogged resolute courage, and animated by the presence of a son of him whom they deem God’s vicegerent on earth; but we have suffered a fearful loss, and we are not in a position to part with one man.” In this grand struggle 45,000 Russians were engaged, and their artillery was relieved no less than four times. The Minié rifle performed wonders on this day.

Sir De Lacy Evans was very unwell on board ship, but revived at the din of battle. He got on shore, and rode up to the front. And there, when the fight was over, he stood lamenting for the loss sustained by his division. One of his aides-de-camp was killed, another wounded; of his two brigadiers, Pennefather had a narrow escape, and Adams was wounded:--“and there lay the spot, the weakness of which the general had so often represented! It was enough to make him sad!”

The siege of Sebastopol reminds us of the adventures of one of Dibdin’s sailors--

“By and bye came a hurricane, I didn’t much like that, Next a battle, which made many a poor sailor lie flat;”

only the events are reversed. While the glories and the misfortunes of the 5th of November were still tossing in the minds or grieving the hearts of the allies, they were visited by a terrific hurricane, which gave them a complete foretaste of what they were to undergo during the winter. We would fain give our readers an extract of the sufferings endured by the armies; but, alas! we condensers are obliged to be satisfied with serving up dry facts,--we are not allowed space for anything that is interesting. And yet, in this case, we have nothing but our own dull labour to regret, as the exciting story is familiar to every Englishman or woman. We take this opportunity of begging our readers to place our omission of the various incidents of the siege to the same account: they would fill a volume, as sorties, attacks, bombardments, shelling, and rocket-flying were constantly going on:--but we are confined to a few pages. The sufferings of the men overworked in the trenches were extreme; and, sorry are we to say, the neglect of the “authorities” still continued as reprehensible as ever. But the presents from their home friends began to arrive, and the relief from the “Times fund” was extensive.

At the end of September the siege was practically suspended. All the troops had to do was to defend the trenches at night, and return shot for shot whenever the enemy fired; the Russians, in the meanwhile, taking advantage of every temporary lull to increase their internal defences.

“Rain and misery everywhere--the fortifications of Sebastopol strengthened--privations of the army--scarcity of food--impassability of the roads--disasters the results of apathy and mismanagement--indescribable horrors of the town and hospitals of Balaklava--the camp a wilderness of mud--pictures of dirt and woe--the Slough of Despond--misery effaces the distinctions of rank--painful reflections--mortality among the Turks--mode of burial--attempted surprises and skirmishes--dismal prospects.” Such are the heads of two chapters of the historian we follow,--and what more can we add to them? Are they not sufficiently eloquent? Do they not tell the story completely? And among all this, winter set in with severity: they had no means of getting up the huts sent them; it was as much as every man could do to provide his food. Some of the warm clothing sent from England went down in the Prince, some was burnt in a ship at Constantinople, and lighters full of warm great-coats for the men were left to be saturated with wet in the port of Balaklava, because no one would receive them without orders. Such an army, and in such a situation, was to be left to die of misery from “etiquette” and “service regulations.” “No one would take responsibility upon himself, if it were to save the lives of hundreds.”

With Christmas came little Christmas cheer or Christmas merriment--neither Christmas-boxes nor New Year’s gifts. They went from England, but the army did not receive them at the appointed season or in the hour of need. Whilst friends were despatching more than warm wishes to the Crimea, the “ill-fated army was melting away--dissolved in rain. On the 2nd of January, there were 3,500 sick in the British army before Sebastopol, and it is not too much to say that their illness was, for the most part, caused by hard work in bad weather, and by exposure to wet without any adequate protection.” The Russians not only opened their new year on the 12th of January with the usual ringing of bells and other gaieties, but with a tremendous cannonade and a spirited sortie. They were, however, expected, and were vigorously repulsed and driven back close to the town; so close, indeed, that had the allies been in sufficient force upon the point, they might have entered with them.

At this inclement season the Cossacks, in sheepskin coats and fur caps, mounted on their rough, wiry ponies, with deal lances and coarse iron tips, were much better able to keep their piquet-watch than our cavalry. Though brilliant in their charges throughout the campaign, our cavalry certainly played a more subordinate part than was expected of them. Before the introduction of railway travelling, we used to think the English, as a nation, the best horsemen in the world, though we never thought our military seat comparable with a Yorkshire seat; but this is an irrelevant question--beyond the famous charges, our cavalry are certainly not prominent in this great year’s campaign.

On the 19th of January, the historian of the war makes this striking remark: “Except Lord Raglan, Lord Lucan, and Sir R. England, not one of our generals now remain of those who came out here originally: the changes among our brigadiers and colonels have been almost as great--all the rest have been removed from the army by wounds, sickness, or death--and so it is of the men.” What an eloquent and sorrowful comment is this upon the severity of the service! Would that we could say that was the only cause! Did we indulge in a description of the horrors of hospital and camp, we should leave no room for the glorious triumph.

The superior resources of the French, as regarded numbers, began now to be felt; ground was gradually relinquished to them, and the front, which it cost the British so much strength and health to maintain, was necessarily abandoned to the more numerous and less exhausted army. The French received reinforcements continually, whilst we, alas! were not dwindling, but being swept away: the grave and the hospital swallowed our brave men by thousands--between the 1st of December and the 20th of January 8,000 sick and wounded men were sent down from camp to Balaklava, and thence on shipboard!--from the battle of Inkermann to this period, 1,000 men of the brigade of guards had been “expended, absorbed, used up, and were no more seen!”

Every night was enlivened with a skirmish, and with sharp-shooting behind the parapets, and in the broken ground between the lines. The Russians, throughout, had plenty of men, with a superabundance of matériel--we have not space for a hundredth part of the cannonades, bombardments, fusillades, sharp-shooting, sorties, and all kinds of annoyances kept up by the enemy: in justice, it must be said, that no place was ever more earnestly, actively, and bravely defended. With the exception of a few instances of ferocious brutality, the Russians have proved an enemy worthy of our best and most valiant exertions.

Towards the middle of February, the earthworks on both sides had been so nearly perfected, that even the bombardment from mortars of great size produced but little apparent effect. The Russian force, in rear of the allies, was now estimated at 35,000 men: the allies were completely besieged; but “the sea, the sea” did not allow its brave rulers to perish.

At this time Lord Lucan was recalled; upon which circumstance we will not venture a comment, for fear of being seduced into a long discussion.

As soon as the 21st of February, the allies became aware of the immense labours being carried on by the Russians in the north division of the city, on the other side of the harbour. There were not less than 3,000 men employed in the works, and the correspondent of the Times then foretold the exact purpose for which they were preparing: they were securing themselves a place of retreat. They received almost boundless supplies, without the allies being apparently able to hinder them.

This siege was not unmarked by some of those occasional intercourses which teach men that, although opposed in deadly strife, they are human creatures. Now and then an hour’s truce, for the purpose of burying the dead, brought Russian officers out of the town, and civilities were exchanged. But there was certainly something rusé in the demeanour of these gentlemen, and doubtless the most observant were selected for the duty. There was nothing of that heartiness of mutual respect which has, upon similar occasions, distinguished French and English officers.

The railway, between Balaklava and the camp, now began to be in operation, and was a source of intense wonderment to the Cossack piquets.

The rifle-pits, which are no novelty in siege warfare, next became the objects of constant struggle. They were simple excavations in the ground, in front and to the right and left of the Malakoff tower, about six hundred yards from the works of the allies. They were faced round with sand-bags, loop-holed for rifles, and banked up with earth thrown from the pits. They were, in fact, little forts or redoubts, to act against the besiegers, armed with rifles instead of cannon. Each could contain ten men, and there were six of them. They were so well protected and covered by the nature of the ground, that neither English rifleman nor French sharp-shooter could touch them. Some of the severest fighting of the siege took place for the possession of these pits, which were peculiar objects of French interest, as being in front of their lines. On the 22nd of March our brave allies obtained three of these important holes, and immediately commenced a sharp fusilade against the Mamelon and Round Tower, from the sand-bags.

Towards the end of March, a happy change was effected for the besiegers: food became plentiful, and camp comforts were even superabundant; the officers were absolutely oppressed by the woolly kindnesses of their fair countrywomen, particularly as the ground was covered with crocusses and hyacinths, and the weather began to “wax warm.”

On the 9th of April, the long-expected second bombardment was opened simultaneously by the allies upon the defences of Sebastopol, amidst wind and torrents of rain, with an atmosphere so thick, that even the flashes of the guns were invisible. They were warmly responded to by the Russians.--Repeated complaints of the fusees of the British. By the 18th, however, the fire slackened on both sides: each seemed glad to avail themselves of a little respite.

On the 19th, a grande reconnaissance was made by the Turkish forces, assisted by the English and French. It was a picturesque march, answered all the intended purpose, and was a great relief to the monotony of the siege. Contests were daily and nightly taking place, each worthy of being made episodes in a great poem. “Deeds of derring-do,” of firm courage and devotion, were enacted in numbers by officers and men: the contest on both sides was truly “a strife of heroes;” but it must be left to the bards of future ages.

In these awful circumstances, the British army had again to complain of the authorities, whilst funds and individuals were sending stores of comforts they did not now want: the brave fellows were badly off for shells and fusees:--“there were no fusees for such shells as they had, and plenty of fusees for such shells as they had not.”

The French lines were now within a few hundred yards of the Mamelon, and our advanced parallel inclined towards the Round Tower. The progress was steady, but it was dearly bought: the Russians contested every inch of ground bravely.

The abortive Kertch expedition took place early in May, and was said to result in nothing, from orders unfortunately received from Paris. The chagrin of Sir Edmund Lyons was so great as to produce illness. When this great siege shall take its due place in the page of history, bright will be the renown of this noble specimen of a British sailor. But for Sir Edmund Lyons, we might look throughout this war in vain for the successors to our Blakes and Nelsons--for the commanders of the true arm of our nation. Jack,--immortal Jack! has well maintained his character for dauntless courage, kindness of heart, devotedness, and whimsicality; but what is become of the race that used to lead him through “the battle and the breeze?”--with the exception of Sir Edmund Lyons, echo answers, “Where?” All honour to him!--a grateful people’s honour!

The Russian night-attacks were more frequent, but they were, in all cases, repulsed with loss, although well planned and bravely carried out. The principal disadvantage to the British arose from the havoc made among their best soldiers; the bravest would go to the front, and were the first victims. Races and cricket matches were got up--but, after a few trials, died out. The gallant troops tried all they could to keep up their spirits; but the real game going on was too serious.

On the 16th of May the allies were delighted by a welcome reinforcement. The Sardinian troops began to arrive; and, in addition to the gratification derived from such a circumstance, they were surprised by their warlike and splendid appearance. It was something new to the weather-beaten warriors, to see troops so newly and handsomely equipped.

By the middle of this month the army became sensible of a deficiency which we, who are fresh from the study of Eastern sieges, had always dreaded: they were short of water, and that for an army of men and horses is a calamity a thousand times worse than a deluge of rain. They were put to some inconvenience; but Artesian wells, and supplies from the fleet, prevented the want from being severely felt.

On the 22nd of May started the second expedition to Kertch, which was attended with complete success. The command of the British contingent was intrusted to Sir George Brown, Sir Edmund Lyons leading the naval forces. All was glorious, all was easy, and all appeared well conducted. The forts were forced, the magazines were exploded by the Russians themselves; but all their guns, with a prodigious quantity of corn, grain, munitions of war, naval stores and military equipments, fell into the hands of the allies. This triumph was stained by great excesses, but these were attributed to Tartars, Turks, merchant-seamen, and others of the usual followers of such expeditions: the French and English regular troops claim to be exonerated from this stain,--we hope justly.

A squadron was sent into the Sea of Azoff, the success of which was signal. Within four days they destroyed 245 Russian vessels employed in carrying provisions to the Russian army in the Crimea, many of them large, and fully equipped and laden. Magazines were destroyed containing more than seven million rations. Arabat was bombarded, and the powder-magazine blown up. At Kertch the enemy destroyed upwards of 4,000,000 lbs. of corn and 500,000 lbs. of flour. These articles should be all remembered when we are summing up the immense sacrifices Russia has made in this war.

An expedition to Anapa was planned and prepared; but the Russians, very perplexingly, saved us the trouble. They, on most occasions, carry out the system they adopted in their war with Buonaparte: they prefer destroying their own cities and stores to allowing their enemies the honour of doing it. “We have inflicted great ruin on the enemy, but they have emulated our best efforts in destroying their own settlements.”

After these events there was a lull--the siege seemed to stand still. There was a little occasional fighting, but the French were constantly advancing their works. The Russians seemed particularly idle, as regarded us, and yet it could be seen that they were assiduously employed in strengthening and provisioning the fortress on the north side.

This quiet, however, was soon over. On the 6th of June, for the third time, the fire of the allies was opened along the whole range of positions; the thunders of 157 British guns and mortars, and above 300 on the side of the French awakened the echoes, and hurled their bolts against Sebastopol. “Like greyhounds in the slips,” the two armies, who felt their strength, were eager and anxious for the decisive struggle. The advantages gained by the fleet, wonderfully increased the confidence of the troops.

On the 7th of June, our brave attack upon the Quarrries came off, and our heroic allies, the French, made their immortal capture of the Mamelon. The British succeeded in taking and retaining the Quarries, but had to sustain six attacks of the Russians, who fought not only bravely, but with desperation. We wish we could afford space for the details of the taking of the Mamelon by the French, as nothing but details can do it justice; but we must content ourselves with saying, that complete as the success was, never was success more richly deserved. We doubt whether history can furnish a more exciting scene than the conflict for this important post; great was the glory, but dear the price paid for it! Had we had a larger body in reserve, it was the general opinion that the Redan would have shared the fate of the Quarries. When we recollect what this fortress cost us on the memorable 8th of September, we have additional cause to lament the miserable want of generalship so often occurring in this siege. The men were equal to anything, but there was no military star of genius to lead them on. The loss, on all sides, was very great. The next day the Russians solicited a truce, to bury the dead. This truce disappointed the troops, as it was believed both the Redan and the Malakoff Tower might have been captured. It is not unlikely that there was more policy than humanity in the Russian request, for, before the truce of a few hours was ended, these posts were strongly reinforced. The French immediately made every exertion to fortify their acquisition; but the retention of the Mamelon and the Quarry, though exceedingly important, was not a very easy matter. The Russians were, perhaps, more aware of their value than we were. A flag of truce came out of the harbour to request the allied commanders not to fire on certain ships, as they were converted into hospitals. This, although complied with, was by many thought to be a ruse to save the ships.

On the 18th was made the unsuccessful attack upon the Malakoff and Redan. This was preceded by a hail of shot and shells to an amazing amount, beneath which the Russian fire grew weak and wild. The French obtained possession of the Malakoff, but were unable to hold it. This was a disastrous affair, producing heavy loss and depression of spirits. Let those who idly talk of war, and over their libations sing of its triumphs and victories, study the picture given by the wonderfully-graphic correspondent of the Times of the effects of this bravely-carried-out attempt--to think of them is sufficient to penetrate the hardest heart: we cannot dwell upon them.

This was followed by a kind of tacit suspension of hostilities--both sides were “supped full with horrors;” humanity resumed its empire, and mournful thoughts and bitter reflections displaced the madness of strife and visions of glory.

It has been our painful task, in the course of our short narrative, whilst with pride attempting to do justice to the bravery of our gallant troops, to comment severely upon the conduct of their leaders. There is an incident related which took place after the unsuccessful attack upon the Malakoff, that appears to us a perfect epitome of the whole conduct of the war, and which our national feeling would not allow us to repeat, if there were not mixed with it high honour, as well as imbecility. The taking of the Cemetery was the only trophy of the great attack, and that, if properly followed up, might have been of incalculable advantage; the cost of it was dear in brave hearts and strong arms. Mr. Russell does not hesitate to say: “And this we should have abandoned from the timidity of one of our generals. It was left to a general of division to say what should be done with the Cemetery, and he gave orders to abandon it. On the following morning, Lieutenant Donnelly, an officer of engineers, hears, to his extreme surprise, that the position for which we had paid so dearly was not in our possession. He appreciated its value; he saw that the Russians had not yet advanced to reoccupy it. With the utmost zeal and energy he set to work among the officers of the trenches, and begged and borrowed some thirty men, with whom he crept down into the Cemetery just before the flag of truce was hoisted. As soon as the armistice began, the Russians flocked down to the Cemetery, which they supposed to be undefended, but, to their great surprise, they found our thirty men posted there as sentries, who warned them back, and in the evening the party was strengthened, and we are now constructing most valuable works and batteries there.” Far, far be it from us to harbour a thought or utter a wish inimical to free institutions or representative governments, but there are times when the will of one strong mind will work more nobly than official routine: Mahomet II. would have reversed matters here--the general and the lieutenant would have changed places.

The apparent rest, but real secret activity of both parties, was at first painfully broken in the British camp by the death of General Estcourt, the Adjutant-general of the army, which was quickly followed by that of the Commander-in-chief. Lord Raglan was too old, and too little accustomed to field-work and anxiety of mind to sustain the post he was placed in. Forty years’ life of a British nobleman, in an official situation, could not have prepared him for a struggle which would have taxed the energies of his master in his prime. Kind-hearted, amiable and gentlemanly, we believe him to have been, but these were scarcely the qualities to be pitted against Russian ambition, artifices, energies, and dogged courage, or to enable him, at an advanced age, to contend with a climate, exposure, fatigue, and privations to which he had never been accustomed. Lord Raglan must have been more conscious than anybody else of his unfitness for the trying post he occupied: the better the man the more likely was he to suffer from this feeling. It was the failure at the Malakoff, more than disease, that terminated the career of one of whom we can speak with more pride as an English gentleman than as a great English general.

But the great end began to approach; it had been bought dearly, but it loomed above the horizon. Supplies of men and material were constantly arriving in the Allied camp, nor can it be said that their powerful enemy relaxed his efforts in these respects; but, however protected by earthworks, walls cannot endure battering for ever. With their hosts of sappers, the French made daily approaches to mining the principal fortifications, and in July, the Russian commander became so aware of the peril of his situation, that he informed his Government he could not hold the city much longer. The Court of St. Petersburgh appeared to be desperate rather than prudently firm, and ordered the rash assault to be made on the lines of the Tchernaya, in the hope of compelling the allies to raise the siege, and of once more regaining Balaklava. We have had cause to wonder, throughout the siege, at the number of guns and the abundance of all kinds of warlike munitions that were at the command of the Russians. But the capture of Sebastopol has greatly diminished this feeling; for that city may be thought to have been constantly receiving stores in order to carry out the project of taking Constantinople, ever since it was conceived by Peter, and cherished by Catherine II. Instead of a fortified city at the remote boundary of a great empire, it was like the metropolitan arsenal of that empire. The Russians then put forth their energies in one more desperate attack. But the position was too strong and too well defended. The battle of the Tchernaya was entirely in favour of the allies; not only physically but morally, for their prestige of victory was well supported; the Russians were forced to retire back to the heights on either side of Mackenzie’s farm.

The next fortnight Prince Gortschakoff may be said to have devoted to providing for the safety of his army. He had great reason to fear the next bombardment would be fatal; he established a means of communication between the battered ruins of the South side of Sebastopol and that North side upon which so much labour and time had been expended; he built a strong raft-bridge across the harbour, threw up earthworks along the cliff to protect it, and drew his army together in compact lines between the sea and the heights of Mackenzie.

On the 5th of September the awful catastrophe was entered upon. All was preparation with both besiegers and besieged; the former girding up their loins for the great struggle, the latter doing all that could be done to meet it manfully. General Pellissier had had a long interview with General Simpson the preceding day, in which, no doubt, the plan of attack was settled.

The French began by exploding three fougasses (small mines, shaped like wells), to blow in the counterscarp and serve as a signal to their men. “Instantly, from the sea to the Dockyard-creek there seemed to run a stream of fire, and fleecy, curling, rich, white smoke, as though the earth had been suddenly rent in the throes of an earthquake, and was vomiting forth the material of her volcanoes.” This iron storm made awful havoc on the works and in the city; in its terrible course it “swept the Russian flanks, and searched their centre to the core.” “Such a volley,” says the historian and eye-witness, “was probably never before uttered since the cannon found its voice.” It paralysed the Russians, and was well described by their General as un feu d’enfer (an infernal or hellish fire); the batteries were not prepared to respond to such a destructive and appalling attack. But it was no temporary spirt with the French; they kept to their guns with astonishing energy, rapidity, and strength, filling the very air with the murderous hail poured upon the enemy; there were more than 200 pieces of artillery of large calibre, admirably served and well-directed, playing incessantly on the hostile lines. The stone walls were like houses of card before this tempest, but the huge mounds of earth seemed quietly to ingulf all the missiles that could be hurled against them. For a short time the Russians were either so astonished or unprepared, that they made no reply; but at length recovering, their artillerymen went to work. Mr. Russell says, “They fired slowly and with precision, as if they could not afford to throw away an ounce of powder;” but the immense stores of the “villainous saltpetre” found in Sebastopol, prove that could not have been the cause of their slackness. As such a circumstance was sure to act upon generous natures, the Russian reply only animated the French to additional exertions; their shot flew along the lines of the defences and bounded among the houses with incredible rapidity. During this magnificently-awful scene the British, in their siege-train or in their famous Naval Brigade, were satisfied with pounding away, at their usual pace, at the Malakoff and Redan, but certainly rendered their brave allies some assistance by their shell practice from the Creek to the Redan. The want of unanimity in the attacks is unintelligible: in this last chapter of the great work in the carrying out of which we had been so energetic, and which had cost us so much, we seemed doomed not to have our share of honour; although we were fully prepared, in every way, to support it creditably. The French commander, with characteristic warmth, perhaps, confident in his numbers and means, thought best to begin alone; and yet this conclusion scarcely agrees with the excellent understanding and regard to each other’s reputation which had subsisted between the two armies. Unfortunately our General Jones, who directed the siege works, was laid up with a severe attack of rheumatism.

The Russian works began to display a most dilapidated appearance. They had been finished off in an almost ornamental style, but they now looked ragged; the parapets were pitted with shot and shell, and the sides of the embrasures were considerably injured. After two hours and a half of furious firing, the French suddenly ceased, to cool their guns and rest the men. This moment of peace the poor Russians employed in repairing, as fast as they could, their damaged works; but their gunners took “heart of grace,” and opened an attack upon our sailors’ battery and “the crow’s nest.” With another explosion of fougasses, the French resumed operations with a still fiercer fire than before, and continued it till twelve o’clock at noon, by which time the Russians had only a few guns to reply with. The English from their camp could see them, in great agitation, sending men across the bridge and back again, and at nine o’clock a powerful body of infantry crossed over, in expectation of the attack of the allies; other troops were afterwards brought back, evidently from the same fear. From twelve till five the firing was slack; but then it seemed to revive with greater fury from the comparative lull, and never ceased pouring in shot and shell till half-past seven, when all the mortars and heavy guns, English as well as French, with the darkness, opened with shell against the whole line of defences. We can fancy the sight now beheld can be compared to nothing but a tropical thunder-storm, or to one of those autumnal spectacles of aërolites, which astronomers and meteorologists describe so vividly. “There was not one instant in which the shells did not whistle through the air--not a moment in which the sky was not seamed by their fiery curves or illuminated with their explosion.” The British had gained great skill in their practice, and every shell seemed to fall exactly à point nommé. The Russians scarcely attempted a reply. At five o’clock, in the evening, a frigate in the second line, near the north side, was perceived to be on fire. These ships had been a great source of annoyance to the allies; and the rising flames were hailed with shouts and congratulations. The cause of this conflagration was doubtful. The burning vessel was not only an object of interest, it was a splendid spectacle.

All night a steady fire was kept up to prevent the Russians repairing their damages. Orders were sent to the English batteries to open next morning with dawn; but, alas! they were limited to fifty rounds each.--Why, oh! why was this?--At half-past five A.M. the whole of the batteries, from Quarantine to Inkermann, opened with one grand crash. As before, the Russians were comparatively silent. The cannonade was continued for about the same period as the preceding day. Several gallant officers had fallen on the 5th. The attention of the Russians seemed more than ever directed to the north side; but they kept large masses of men in the town. The bombardment continued all night.

With the rising of the sun the cannonade was resumed. A council of generals was held at head-quarters; the sick were cleared out of the field-hospitals; and it was confidently whispered that the assault would take place next day at twelve o’clock. The fire was kept up with the same intensity all day. About three o’clock a two-decker was set on fire, and burnt all night. Vessels near her were towed away by a steamer to the dock-yard harbour, but the lines of men-of-war remained untouched. Flames broke out behind the Redan in the afternoon. The bombardment was renewed at nightfall. A Sardinian corps was marched up to reinforce the French. About eleven P.M. a heavy explosion was heard in the town. The men intended for the assault were ordered to take forty-eight hours’ provision, cooked, with them into the trenches--all was preparation, and feverish anxiety prevailed, even in the stoutest hearts.

It has been observed that the Russians generally indulged in a siesta at twelve o’clock, and that hour was fixed upon for the assault; but the intended surprise was considerably lessened by the British general ordering the cavalry regiment up to the front. This injudicious movement evidently excited the suspicions of the Russians, who, besides, must have expected the extraordinary cannonade and bombardment were the precursors of a general assault.

General Pellissier during the night collected about 30,000 men in and about the Mamelon, who were reinforced by 5,000 Sardinians. It was arranged that the French were to attack the Malakoff and Little Redan about noon, and that the British were to attack the Redan at the same time. At half-past ten the second division and the light division of the English were moved down to the trenches, and placed in the advanced parallels as quietly as possible. About the same time, General Simpson moved down to the second parallel of the Green Hill Battery.

The French had brought their sap close to the Malakoff, and, at a few minutes before twelve, issued in masses from their place d’armes, swarmed up the face of the Malakoff, and passed through the embrasures like thought. From their proximity, they had but seven metres to cross to reach their enemy. Column after column poured through the embrasures, and scarcely had the head of their column cleared the ditch when their tricolor floated over the Korniloff Bastion. The French had evidently taken the Russians by surprise, but they soon recovered themselves, and fought manfully to expel the intruders. Glorious was the struggle made by the French to hold their prey; and, fortunately, they were commanded by a general who understood the importance of the acquisition, and did not desert them. While the main body of the French attacked the Malakoff, another division was to attack the Redan of Careening Bay, and a third was to march against the Curtain, which unites these extreme points. General Bosquet commanded a strong division, to support these. The English were to attack the Great Redan, by scaling it at its salient. General Salles, strengthened by a body of Sardinians, was to make a lodgment in the town, if circumstances permitted. Admirals Lyons and Bruat were likewise expected to make a powerful diversion, but the state of the sea prevented their leaving their anchorage. The English and French mortar-boats, however, did good service.

After a terrible hand-to-hand struggle, McMahon’s division succeeded in making a footing in front of the Malakoff, notwithstanding the storm of projectiles poured upon them by the Russians. The Redan of Careening Bay, after having been occupied, was obliged to be evacuated, in consequence of being exposed to a cross fire, and the fire of the steamers. But another French division held a portion of the Curtain, and McMahon’s division kept gaining ground in the Malakoff, General Bosquet pouring in reserves, by the order of General Pelissier.

The Malakoff being the principal object, when the French general perceived that it was safe, he gave the signal agreed upon to General Simpson to attack the Redan. Why General Simpson should thus have abandoned the British share in the great triumph, we are at a loss to guess. In every toil and danger of the war, the English had taken more than their part, because they had not sufficient numbers to keep pace with their brave allies in the works, and their men had been obliged to work double. From the closeness of their trenches to the Malakoff, from the immense numbers of men they poured in at once and continued to supply, the conquest of the Malakoff was not so severe and trying a task as the British attack upon the Redan, although, from the magnitude of the fort, the cost of life was enormous.

Convinced that the capture of the Malakoff was all that was to be wished, the French general would not allow a further waste of good men to be made, by persisting in the other attacks by his troops.

But the Malakoff was not yet safe: General Bosquet was struck by a large fragment of a shell, and was obliged to give his command to General Dulac. A powder-magazine in the curtain, near the Malakoff, blew up, and serious consequences were apprehended.

Hoping to profit by the accident, the Russians advanced in dense masses, and in three columns, and attacked the centre, left, and right of the Malakoff. But they were prepared for within the work. McMahon had troops he could depend on; and after, as their own general says, six desperate attempts, the Russians were compelled to beat a retreat. From that moment they relinquished any offensive attack: the Malakoff was taken, past fear of recapture. It was then four o’clock in the afternoon.--A few short sentences thus tell the result of the contest for this key of the fortifications; but the fact can only be duly appreciated by reflecting that seven thousand brave men were sacrificed in it on the part of the French, and as many, no doubt, on the part of the enemy. War and its horrors were never duly painted till they came under the eye of Mr. Russell; his picture of the hospital of St. Paul throws all the terrific scenes of Dante into shade.

We now proceed to a portion of our story in which Englishmen, we are grieved to the heart to say, can take no pride. Never did an army go through the fatigues and dangers of a campaign with more courage, more devotion, more firmness, or more patient endurance; and at the last to be cut off from partaking of the great honour of the closing triumph, is disheartening to their future endeavours, and a source of deep regret to their countrymen at home.

At a few minutes past twelve the British left the fifth parallel. The enemy’s musketry commenced at once, and in less than five minutes, during which they had to pass over two hundred yards, from the nearest approach to the parapet of the Redan, they had lost a large portion of their officers, and were deprived of the aid of their leaders, with the exception of acting Brigadier-general Windham, and Captains Fyers, Lewis, and Maude: the rest had been struck down by the volleys of grape and rifle balls which swept the flanks of the work towards the salient. As they came nearer, the enemy’s fire became less fatal. They crossed the abattis without much trouble: it was torn to pieces by our shot; the men stepped over and through it with ease. The light division made straight for the salient and projecting angle of the Redan, and came to the ditch, which is about fifteen feet deep. The escalade party proceeded to plant their ladders, but they were found too short!--had they not been so, they would not have been of much use, as there were but six or seven brought to the place. In ancient times, when men only fought hand to hand, seven ladders have achieved wonders; but where all who mounted could be swept off by musketry, such a number was useless. But the gallant officers set their men the example of leaping into the ditch, scrambling up the other side, and thence getting on to the parapet with little opposition; whilst the Russians who were in front ran back, and opened a fire upon them from behind the traverses and breastworks. When upon the parapet, strange and new it is to say, the soldiers seemed bewildered; their gallant officers cheered them on, coaxed them on, but instead of following them, they persisted in firing, loading and firing! The officers began to fall fast. The small party of the 90th, much diminished, went on gallantly towards the breastwork, but they were too weak to force it, and joined the men of other regiments, who were keeping up a brisk fire upon the Russians from behind the traverses. Colonel Windham had got into the Redan with the storming party of the light division, below the salient on the proper left face, but all his exertions were as futile as those of the gallant officers of the 90th, 91st, and the supporting regiments.

As the light division rushed out in the front, they were swept by the guns of the Barrack Battery, and other pieces on the proper right of the Redan, loaded heavily with grape, which thinned them grievously before they could reach the salient or apex of the work they were to assault. The columns of the second division issuing out of the fifth parallel, rushed up immediately after the light division, so as to come a little down on the slope of the proper left face of the Redan. The first embrasure was in flames, but running on to the next, the men leaped into the ditch, and, with the aid of ladders and of each others’ hands, scrambled up on the other side, climbed the parapet, or poured in through the embrasure which was undefended. Colonel Windham was one of the first men in on this side. As our men entered through the embrasures, the few Russians who were between the salient and the breastwork retreated behind the latter, and got from behind the traverses to its protection. From this place they poured in a thick fire on the parapet of the salient, which was crowded by the men of the light division, and on the gaps through the inner parapet of the Redan; and the British, with an infatuation which all officers deplore, began to return the fire of the enemy without advancing behind the traverses, loaded and fired as quickly as they could, producing little effect, as the Russians were all covered by the breastwork. Groups of riflemen likewise kept up a galling fire from behind the lower traverses, near the base of the Redan. As soon as the alarm of the attack was spread, the Russians came rushing up from the barracks, and increased the intensity of the fire, from which the English were dropping fast, and increasing the confidence of the enemy by their immobility. In vain their officers by word and deed encouraged them on; they were impressed with an idea that the Redan was mined, and that if they advanced they should be blown up: and yet many of them acted in a manner worthy of the men of the Alma and Inkermann. But what availed these few?--they were swept down by the enemy’s fire the moment they advanced to the front. In the same manner, the courage of the officers only made them a mark for the Russian fire, and they fell as soon as they advanced. All was confusion, regiments were confounded, and men refused to obey any but their own officers. We are at a loss to account for the conduct of Colonel Windham, it was that of a hero,--indeed, he is the British hero of the day; but he must have seen that with such a handful of men his efforts were unavailing: he gathered together one little band after another, only to have them swept down by the enemy’s guns: his own escape was miraculous. The men kept up a smart fire from behind the lower parts of the inner parapet, but no persuasion or commands could induce them to come out into the open space and charge the breastwork. Whilst our men were thus being terrifically thinned, the Russians gained reinforcements, not only from the town but from the Malakoff, which had now been abandoned to the French. But Colonel Windham did not blench; he sent three times to Sir E. Codrington, who was in the fifth parallel, to beg him to send up supports, in some order of formation; but none of his messengers reached the general in safety: all were wounded and disabled. Supports were sent, but they came in disorder from the fire they had to pass through, and they were in such small numbers, that they appeared only to be sent to feed the slaughter. Seemingly rendered careless of life, the colonel passed from one dangerous position to another, exposed to a close fire, and, wonderful to relate, untouched, but he found the same confusion everywhere--all firing away at the enemy from behind anything that could screen them, but all refusing to charge. He, at length, got some riflemen and a few men of the 88th together, but as they did not, as he appeared to do, “bear a charmed life,” they were no sooner out than they were swept away like chaff: the officers, as conspicuous by their courage as their dress, going down first. This carnage lasted an hour. The Russians were now in dense masses behind the breastwork, and Colonel Windham went once more back across the open space to the left, to make another attempt to retrieve the day. In his progress he had to pass through the fire of his own men and the incessant volleys of the Russians, but he still was safe. Within the inner parapet of the left, he found the men becoming thinner and thinner. A Russian officer stepped over the breastwork, and tore down a gabion, to make room for a fieldpiece. Colonel Windham exclaimed to the soldiers who were firing over the parapet, “As you are so fond of firing, why don’t you shoot that Russian?” They fired a volley, but all missed him; and soon the fieldpiece began to play on the salient with grape. Finding no time was to be lost, and seeing nothing of his messengers, Colonel Windham determined to go himself in quest of supports. “I must go to the general for supports,” said he to Captain Crealock, of the 90th, who happened to be near him. “But, mind that it be known why I went, in case I am killed.” He crossed the parapet and ditch, and succeeded in gaining the fifth parallel, through a storm of grape and rifle-bullets in safety. Sir Edward Codrington asked him, if he really thought he could do any good with such supports as he could afford him, and said he might take the Royals, who were then in the parallel. “Let the officers come out in front--let us advance in order, and if the men keep their formation, the Redan is ours,” was the ready reply of this truly British soldier; but the game was ended: as he spoke, the men were seen in full flight from the Redan, by every means of egress, followed by the Russians, who not only bayonetted them, and shot them down with musketry, but even threw stones and grape-shot at them. Large masses of Russians, supported by grape from several field-pieces, had poured upon the broken, confused parties of the British, and crushed them as if beneath an avalanche. When it came to this point, their native courage revived, and they had recourse to their national weapon. The struggle was desperate, but, from the numbers of the Russians, necessarily short. Officers, only armed with swords, had little chance in such a mêlée; they fell like heroes amidst the gallant part of their men. The pursuing Russians were soon forced to retire by the fire of the English batteries and riflemen, and, under the cover of that, many escaped to the approaches. General Pelissier, on becoming aware of the failure of the English attack, sent over to General Simpson to ask if he meant to renew it; but the British Commander-in-Chief is reported to have said that he did not feel in a condition to do so. The reserve was certainly strong enough to have returned to the attack, and General Simpson talked of making it the next morning; but the Russians saved him the trouble.

The French had a long and severe contest in the rear of the Malakoff, but, although they failed in the other two attacks, they nobly maintained their footing in their grand prize.

When the siege of Sebastopol becomes a subject of remote history, we have no doubt that it will be viewed in this light:--The Malakoff Tower was known to be the key to the place, and the capture of it was the principal object with the allies. The French being by far in greatest numbers, were alone able to undertake this capture, the British army not being in a condition to sustain such a drain as the attempt was sure to produce. But, “to make assurance doubly sure,” diversions were necessary, and it was agreed that the British should attack the Redan, whilst the French attacked the Little Redan and the Curtain. These last will all be supposed to be mere diversions, and that they fully answered their purpose.--Now, whether the allied generals had thus laid their plans, we will not presume to say; but such is a very fair assumption. But Englishmen will ask, Why were so many of our brave countrymen made enfans perdus in an attack that, from beginning to end, was so mismanaged as never to have a chance of success? To which the reply will be: Your loss has certainly been grievous; but remember, it was a common cause, and, in this attempt, which brought about such glorious results, where you had 2,447 men placed hors de combat, your brave allies had 7,000. There is another circumstance that gives countenance to this idea. In all Oriental warfare, it has been the practice to place the worst troops in the van; they were flogged up with whips, and pricked up with lances to meet the enemy, whom they were supposed to fatigue and exhaust before the élite of the army engaged. Now, though General Simpson sent in to the Redan regiments of nominally great experience and tried courage, he really sent in the rawest part of his army; for these regiments had been so thinned by the campaign as to contain very few of the men who came out in them: the Guards, the Highlanders, the third and fourth divisions were untouched. But whether they served as enfans perdus, or were lost in what was meant to be a successful attack, the friends of those who fell in this disastrous affair must console themselves in their grief by reflecting that no honour is lost--the means, and the method of employing those means, appear to have been quite inadequate to the object in view.

However great was the triumph of the French, they never dreamt that it would be so speedily followed by such important consequences.

At eight o’clock, the Russians began quietly to withdraw from the town, after having placed combustibles in every house, with a view of making a second Moscow of Sebastopol. With great art, the commander kept up a fire of musketry from his advanced posts, as if he meant to endeavour to regain the Malakoff. Before two o’clock in the morning the fleet had been scuttled and sunk. About two o’clock flames were observed to break out in different parts of the town, and to spread gradually over the principal buildings. At four, explosion followed upon explosion, and the Flagstaff and Garden Batteries blew up; the magnificence of the scene being heightened by the bursting of the numberless shells contained in the magazines. During all this time, the Russian infantry proceeded in a steady, uninterrupted march over the bridge to the north side, so that by six o’clock the last battalion had passed over: the south side of Sebastopol was thus evacuated, and left to its persevering and brave conquerors.

In his retreat, the Russian general, Prince Gortschakoff, maintained the character for generalship he had so fully earned in his defence of Sebastopol. As the place was no longer tenable against the troops and artillery brought against it, nothing could be better than his arrangements for the safety of his army. He fought till the place crumbled away beneath him, and then made a judicious retreat with a very small loss of men. The amount of stores found in the town, after such a contest, seems almost incredible,--the capture of 4,000 cannon is a thing unheard of in the history of war.

And so far has this important siege terminated: right and civilization have so far triumphed over wrong and barbarism; “vaulting ambition hath o’erleaped itself,” and the arrogant schemes of the Romanoff race have met with such a check as must, at least, retard them for half a century. Great has been the cost,--severe has been the struggle,--but, as the cause is holy, let us trust that Providence will make the end correspond with the beginning, and that the result of all will be PEACE.

FINIS.

COX (BROS.) AND WYMAN, PRINTERS, GREAT QUEEN STREET.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See the siege of Ismaïl.

[2] Michaud’s “Hist. des Crusades.”

[3] Gibbon.

[4] Rollin.

[5] The quintal was of several kinds: the least weighed 125 lbs., the largest more than 1,200 lbs.

[6] Scorpions were machines like cross-bows, for the discharge of darts and arrows.

[7] Rollin.

[8] Rollin.

[9] Following Hale and Holinshed, Shakespeare has made Fastolfe a coward, and, it is supposed, borrowed from him the name for his inimitable Falstaff. But the historical Fastolfe vindicated his good name, and was restored to his honours. Dr. Heylin, in his “St. George for England,” says, “without doubt, this Sir John Fastolfe was a valiant and wise captain.”

[10] All the world knows the famous quatrain composed by Francis I upon this action of the fair Agnes:--

“Gentille Agnès, plus d’honneur tu mérite, La cause étant de France recouvrer, Que ce que peut dedans un cloître ouvrer, Clause Nonnain, ou bien dévôt Hermite.”

[11] This circumstance seems to authorize the opinion of those who pretend that La Pucelle was nothing more than a shrewd, clever girl, whom Dunois employed to excite the wavering courage of the king’s followers, and detain the monarch himself. Shakespeare makes Dunois introduce her to the king.

[12] Memoirs of Sir Sidney Smith.

[13] This anecdote is evidently the foundation of an amusing scene in Dumas’ “Three Musketeers,” and proves the truth of the proverb, “that truth is even more strange than fiction.”

[14] A small work composed of two sides, which is raised opposite the salient angles or rentrants of the covered way, at the extremity of its glacis.

[15] We insert this for an opportunity of comparing the expenses in two ages: Turin, in 1706, and Sebastopol, in 1854–55.

[16] Holes dug in front of a circumvallation, or other intrenchment, as a trap for cavalry.

[17] Rendered too wide at the mouth.

[18] “This excellent manner of defending places is practised thus,” says Grotius in his description of this siege: “when a city which dreads a siege has many soldiers, the fortifications are carried outwards to a distance, to stop the progress of the enemy. By this means those who are shut up have a longer time to defend themselves, and still further, the internal parts of the place remain longer in safety. Thus then the prince of Orange gave orders that, before the boulevards of Bommel, others should be made, and then still others, which should be inclosed with a fosse of water, as well as the preceding ones, so that in the end, all that was capable of defence should be further surrounded by a parapet.”--Annals of Grotius. This, then, is the origin of the multiplication of the exterior works of places of war and of the covered way, to which Grotius gives the name of parapet. Engineers have since made it their study that all fortifications should sustain one another, and might be, at the same time, sustained by the body of the place.

[19] It had arrived some months before from England; but most of the men had been sick.

[20] The Royal Military Chronicle.

[21] Royal Military Chronicle.

[22] The Belgic Revolution, by Charles White, Esq.

List of the Novels and Tales

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SIR EDWARD BULWER LYTTON, BART.

Pelham.

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Devereux.

1s. 6d. (1855). Large Edition, cloth gilt, 3s. 6d.

The mystery that pervades the plot is admirably sustained, and is derived, not from the inferior sources of external incident, but the complicated secrets of the human heart.

Zanoni.

1s. 6d. (1855). Large edition, cloth gilt, 3s. 6d.

“ZANONI” is perhaps less liked by the many than the generality of its companions, but it has especial admirers, who rank it above them all. Independently of the depth and richness of its less visible poetry and wisdom, it contains passages of tenderness and power, of wild fancy and sombre grandeur, that irresistibly chain the more imaginative class of readers.

Leila; or, the Siege of Granada.

Calderon; or, the Courtier.

1s. (1855). Large edition, cloth gilt, 2s.

Both these must be regarded as bold and rapid sketches, by a master-hand, rather than elaborate and finished performances of careful art.

Harold.

1s. 6d. (1855). Large edition, cloth gilt, 4s.

So truly national is this work in its spirit, and so replete with interest and value is the information it contains, whether of manners, customs, the origin of various races that people our island, the causes of political events that, however remote, have bequeathed influences which rule us at this day, that the careful perusal of “HAROLD” becomes almost the duty of every well-instructed Englishman.

Lucretia.

1s. 6d. (1855). Large edition, cloth gilt, 4s.

“LUCRETIA; or, THE CHILDREN OF NIGHT,” rather errs from the over-exertion of strength. The vigour of its descriptions is not sufficiently restrained by art, and carries terror too far into the regions of pain.

The Caxtons.

(1855). Large edition, cloth gilt, 4s.

The moral bequeathed by the Caxton Family has received universal approbation. It runs broadly and healthfully along the whole composition, sporting with us by the way, and leaving us happier and better at the close.

My Novel.

(1855). 2 vols, large edition, cloth gilt, 8s.

It is from its immense breadth of comprehension, its mature repose of thought, its felicitous selection of the results of a most diversified experience, that “MY NOVEL” is indeed par emphasis entitled to the name it assumes; and if not the loftiest of Bulwer’s works is certainly his completest novel.

G. ROUTLEDGE & CO., 2, FARRINGDON STREET.

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.

Unusual grammatical constructions and ambiguous inconsistencies were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.

In the List of Sieges, the entry “Thebes, Palestine” does not correspond to anything the Transcriber could find in the rest of the text.

The List of Sieges references one set of sieges for Antwerp, but there are two chapters for that city. Transcriber modified the List so that it references both of them.

No “SECOND SIEGE” is listed for Tyre, but there is a “THIRD SIEGE”.

Page 93: “Skins and sails were then had recourse to screen them” was printed that way.

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