XXII. TEUTON versus SLAV (1908-13)…

XXII. TEUTON versus SLAV (1908-13)

"To tell the truth, the Slav seems to us a born slave."--TREITSCHKE, June 1876.

On October 7, 1908, Austria-Hungary exploded a political bomb-shell by declaring her resolve to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, she had provisionally occupied and administered those provinces as mandatory of Europe (see p. 238). But now, without consulting Europe, she appropriated her charge. On the other hand, she consented to withdraw from the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar which she had occupied by virtue of a secret agreement with Russia of July 1878. Even so, her annexation of a great province caused a sharp crisis for the following reasons: (1) It violated the international law of Europe without any excuse whatever. (2) It exasperated Servia, which hoped ultimately to possess Bosnia, a land peopled by her kindred and necessary to her expansion seawards. (3) It no less deeply offended the Young Turks, who were resolved to revivify the Turkish people and assert their authority over all parts of the Ottoman dominions. (4) It came at the same time as the assumption by Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria of the title of Tsar of the Bulgarians. This change of title, which implied a prospect of sovereignty over the Bulgars of Macedonia, had been arranged during a recent visit to Buda-Pest, and foreshadowed the supremacy of Austrian influence not only in the new kingdom of Bulgaria but eventually in the Bulgar districts of Macedonia[523].

[Footnote 523: H.W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 52, 214.]

Thus, Austria's action constituted a serious challenge to the Powers in general, especially to Russia, Servia, and to regenerated Turkey[524]. So daring a coup had not been dealt by Austria since 1848, when Francis Joseph ascended the throne; it is believed that he desired to have the provinces as a jubilee gift, a set off to the loss of Lombardy and Venetia in 1859 and 1866. Certainly Austria had carried out great improvements in Bosnia; but an occupier who improves a farm does not gain the right to possess it except by agreement with others who have joint claims. Moreover, the Young Turks, in power since July 1908, boasted their ability to civilise Bosnia and all parts of their Empire. Servia also longed to include it in the large Servo-Croat kingdom of the future.

[Footnote 524: The constitutional regime which the Young Turks imposed on the reactionary Abdul Hamid II., in July 1908, was hailed as a victory for British influence. The change in April 1909 favoured German influence. I have no space for an account of these complex events.]

The Bosnian Question sprang out of a conflict of racial claims, which two masterful men, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, were resolved to decide in favour of Austria. The Archduke disliked, and was disliked by, the Germans and Magyars on account of his pro-Slav tendencies. In 1900 he contracted with a Slav lady, the Countess Chotek, a morganatic marriage, which brought him into strained relations with the Emperor and Court. A silent, resolute man, he determined to lessen German and Magyar influence in the Empire by favouring the law for universal suffrage (1906), and by the appointment as Foreign Minister of Aehrenthal, who harboured ambitiously expansive schemes. The Archduke also furthered a policy known as Trialism, that of federalising the Dual Monarchy by constituting the Slav provinces as the third of its component groups. The annexation of Bosnia would serve to advance this programme by depressing the hitherto dominant races, the Germans and Magyars, besides rescuing the monarchy from the position of "brilliant second" to Germany. Kaiser William was taken aback by this bold stroke, especially as it wounded Turkey; but he soon saw the advantage of having a vigorous rather than a passive Ally; and, in a visit which he paid to the Archduke in November 1908, their intercourse, which had hitherto been coldly courteous, ripened into friendship, which became enthusiastic admiration when the Archduke advocated the building of Austrian Dreadnoughts.

The annexation of Bosnia was a defiance to Europe, because, at the Conference of the Powers held at London in 1871, they all (Austria included) solemnly agreed not to depart from their treaty engagements without a previous understanding with the co-signatories. Austria's conduct in 1908, therefore, dealt a severe blow to the regime of international law. But it was especially resented by the Russians, because for ages they had lavished blood and treasure in effecting the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Besides, in 1897, the Tsar had framed an agreement with the Court of Vienna for the purpose of exercising conjointly some measure of control over Balkan affairs; and he then vetoed Austria's suggestion for the acquisition of Bosnia. In 1903, when the two Empires drew up the "February" and "Mürzsteg" Programmes for more effectually dealing with the racial disputes in Macedonia, the Hapsburg Court did not renew the suggestion about Bosnia, yet in 1908 Austria annexed that province. Obviously, she would not have thus defied the public law of Europe and Russian, Servian, and Turkish interests, but for the recent humiliation of Russia in the Far East, which explains both the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier against Russia's ally, France, and the sudden apparition of Austria as an aggressive Power. In his speech to the Austro-Hungarian Delegations Aehrenthal declared that he intended to continue "an active foreign policy," which would enable Austria-Hungary to "occupy to the full her place in the world." She had to act because otherwise "affairs might have developed against her."

Thus the Eastern Question once more became a matter of acute controversy. The Austro-Russian agreements of 1897 and 1903 had huddled up and cloaked over those racial and religious disputes, so that there was little chance of a general war arising out of them. But since 1908 the Eastern Question has threatened to produce a general conflict unless Austria moderated her pretensions. She did not do so; for, as we have seen, Germany favoured them in order to assure uninterrupted communications between Central Europe and her Bagdad Railway. Already Hapsburg influence was supreme at Bukharest, Sofia, and in Macedonian affairs. If it could dominate Servia (anti-Austrian since the accession of King Peter in 1903) the whole of the Peninsula would be subject to Austro-German control. True, the influence of Germany at Constantinople at first suffered a shock from the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908; and those eager nationalists deeply resented the annexation of Bosnia, which they ascribed to the Austro-German alliance. The men of Berlin, however, so far from furthering that act, disapproved of it as endangering their control of Turkey and exploitation of its resources. In fact, Germany's task in inducing her prospective vassals, the Turks, to submit to spoliation at the hands of her ally, Austria, was exceedingly difficult; and in the tension thus created, the third partner of the Triple Alliance, Italy, very nearly parted company, from disgust at Austrian encroachments in a quarter where she cherished aspirations. As we have seen, Victor Emmanuel III., early in his reign, favoured friendly relations with Russia; and these ripened quickly during the "Annexation Crisis" of 1908-9, as both Powers desired to maintain the status quo against Austria[525]. On December 24, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, declared that, with that aim in view, he was acting in close concert with France, Great Britain, and Italy. He urged Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro to hold closely together for the defence of their common interests: "Our aim must be to bring them together and to combine them with Turkey in a common ideal of defence of their national and economic development." A cordial union between the Slav States and Turkey now seems a fantastic notion; but it was possible then, under pressure of the Austro-German menace, which the Young Turks were actively resisting.

[Footnote 525: Tittoni, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy (English translation, p. 128). Tittoni denied that the Triple Alliance empowered Italy to demand "compensation" if Austria expanded in the Balkans. But the Triple Alliance Treaty, as renewed in 1912, included such a clause, No. VII.]

During the early part of 1909 a general war seemed imminent; for Slavonic feeling was violently excited in Russia and Servia. But, hostilities being impossible in winter, passions had time to cool. It soon became evident that those States could not make head against Austria and Germany. Moreover, the Franco-Russian alliance did not bind France to act with Russia unless the latter were definitely attacked; and France was weakened by the widespread strikes of 1907-8 and the vehement anti-militarist agitation already described. Further, Italy was distracted by the earthquake at Messina, and armed intervention was not to be expected from the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry. Bulgaria and Roumania were pro-Austrian. Turkey alone could not hope to reconquer Bosnia, and a Turco-Serb-Russian league was beyond the range of practical politics. These material considerations decided the issue of events. Towards the close of March, Kaiser William, the hitherto silent backer of Austria, ended the crisis by sending to his ambassador at Petrograd an autograph letter, the effect of which upon the Tsar was decisive. Russia gave way, and dissociated herself from France, England, and Italy. In consideration of an indemnity of £2,200,000 from Austria, Turkey recognised the annexation. Consequently no Conference of the Powers met even to register the fait accompli in Bosnia. The Germanic Empires had coerced Russia and Servia, despoiled Turkey, and imposed their will on Europe. Kaiser William characteristically asserted that it was his apparition "in shining armour" by the side of Austria which decided the issue of events. Equally decisive, perhaps, was Germany's formidable shipbuilding in 1908-9, namely, four Dreadnoughts to England's two, a fact which explains this statement of Bülow: "When at last, during the Bosnian crisis, the sky of international politics cleared, when German power on the Continent burst its encompassing bonds, we had already got beyond the stage of preparation in the construction of our fleet[526]."

[Footnote 526: Bülow, Imperial Germany, p. 99.]

The crisis of 1908-9 revealed in a startling manner the weakness of international law in a case where the stronger States were determined to have their way. It therefore tended to discourage the peace propaganda and the social movement in Great Britain and France. The increased speed of German naval construction alarmed the British people, who demanded precautionary measures[527]. France and Russia also improved their armaments, for it was clear that Austria, as well as Germany, intended to pursue an active foreign policy which would inflict other rebuffs on neighbours who were unprepared. Further, the Triple Entente had proved far too weak for the occasion. True, France and England loyally supported Russia in a matter which chiefly concerned her and Servia, and her sudden retreat before the Kaiser's menace left them in the lurch. Consequently, the relations between the Western Powers and Russia were decidedly cool during the years 1909-10, especially in and after November 1910, when the Tsar met Kaiser William at Potsdam, and framed an agreement, both as to their general relations and the railways then under construction towards Persia. On the other hand, the rapid advance of Germany and Austria alarmed Italy, who, in order to safeguard her interests in the Balkans (especially Albania), came to an understanding with Russia for the support of their claims. The details are not known, neither are the agreements of Austria with Bulgaria and Roumania, though it seems probable that they were framed with the two kings rather than with the Governments of Sofia and Bukharest. Those sovereigns were German princes, and the events of 1908-9 naturally attracted them towards the Central Powers.

[Footnote 527: Annoyance had been caused by the Kaiser's letter of Feb. 18, 1908, to Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, advising (though in friendly terms) the cessation of suspicion towards Germany's naval construction. It was held to be an attempt to put us off our guard.]

In 1909-10 France and England also lost ground in Turkey. There the Young Turks, who seized power in July 1908, were overthrown in April 1909, when Abdul Hamid II. was deposed. He was succeeded by his weakly complaisant brother, Mohammed V. This change, however, did not promote the cause of reform. The Turkish Parliament became a bear-garden, and the reformers the tools of reaction. In the four years 1908-12 there were seven Ministries and countless ministerial crises, and the Young Turks, copying the forms and killing the spirit of English Liberalism, soon became the most intolerant oppressors of their non-Moslem subjects. In administrative matters they acted on the old Turkish proverb--"The Sultan's treasure is a sea, and he who does not draw from it is a pig." Germany found means to satisfy these dominating and acquisitive instincts, and thus regained power at the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman Empire therefore remained the despair of patriotic reformers, a hunting-ground for Teutonic concessionnaires, a Hell for its Christian subjects, and the chief storm-centre of Europe[528].

[Footnote 528: Lack of space precludes an account of the Cretan Question, also of the Agram and Friedjung trials which threw lurid light on Austria's treatment of her South-Slav subjects, for which see Seton-Watson, Corruption and Reform in Hungary. Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 172, explains the success of German efforts at the Porte by the belief of the Young Turks that Germany was the only Power that wished them well--Germany who helped Austria to secure Bosnia; Germany, whose Bagdad Railway scheme mercilessly exploited Turkish resources! (See D. Fraser, The Short Cut to India, chs. iii. iv.)]

The death of King Edward VII. on May 6, 1910, was a misfortune for the cause of peace. His tact and discernment had on several occasions allayed animosity and paved the way for friendly understandings. True, the German Press sought to represent those efforts as directed towards the "encircling" (Einkreisung) of Germany. But here we may note that (1) King Edward never transgressed the constitutional usage, which prescribed that no important agreement be arrived at apart from the responsible Ministers of the Crown[529]. (2) The agreements with Spain, Italy, France, Germany, and Portugal (in 1903-4) were for the purposes of arbitration. (3) The alliance with Japan and the Ententes with France and Russia were designed to end the perilous state of isolation which existed at the time of his accession. (4) At that time Germany was allied to Austria, Italy, and (probably) Roumania, not to speak of her secret arrangements with Turkey. She had no right to complain of the ending of our isolation. (5) The marriage of King Alfonso of Spain with Princess Ena of Battenberg (May 1906), was a love-match, and was not the result of King Edward's efforts to detach Spain from Germany. It had no political significance. (6) The Kaiser's sister was Crown Princess (now Queen) of Greece; the King of Roumania was a Hohenzollern; and the King of Bulgaria and the Prince Consort of Holland were German Princes. (7) On several occasions King Edward testified his friendship with Germany, notably during his visit to Berlin in February 1909, which Germans admit to have helped on the friendly Franco-German agreement of that month on Morocco; also in his letter of January 1910, on the occasion of the Kaiser's birthday, when he expressed the hope that the United Kingdom and Germany might always work together for the maintenance of peace[530].

[Footnote 529: I have been assured of this on high authority.]

[Footnote 530: Viscount Esher, the Influence of King Edward: and Other Essays, p. 56. The "encircling" myth is worked up by Rachfahl, Kaiser und Reich, p, 228; Reventlow, op, cit. pp. 254, 279, 298, etc.; and by Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (ch. vi.), where he says that King Edward's chief idea from the outset was to cripple Germany. He therefore won over Japan, France, Spain, and Russia, his aim being to secure all Africa from the Cape to Cairo, and all Asia from the Sinaitic Peninsula to Burmah.]

The chief danger to public tranquillity arises from the vigorous expansion of some peoples and the decay of others. Nearly all the great nations of Europe are expansive; but on their fringe lie other peoples, notably the Turks, Persians, Koreans, and the peoples of North Africa, who are in a state of decline or semi-anarchy. In such a state of things friction is inevitable and war difficult to avoid, unless in the councils of the nations goodwill and generosity prevail over the suspicion and greed which are too often the dominant motives. Scarcely was the Bosnian-Turkish crisis over before Morocco once more became a danger to the peace of the world.

There the anarchy continued, with results that strained the relations between France and Germany. Nevertheless, on February 8, 1909 (probably owing to the friendly offices of Great Britain[531]), the two rivals came to an agreement that France should respect the independence of Morocco and not oppose German trade in that quarter, while Germany declared that her sole interests there were commercial, and that she would not oppose "the special political interests of France in that country[532]." But, as trade depended on the maintenance of order, this vague compact involved difficulties. Clearly, if disorders continued, the task of France would be onerous and relatively unprofitable, for she would be working largely for the benefit of British and German traders. Indeed, the new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, admitted to the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, that thenceforth Morocco was a fruit destined to fall into the lap of France; only she must humour public opinion in Germany. Unfortunately, the "Consortium," for joint commercial enterprises of French and Germans in Morocco and the French Congo, broke down on points of detail; and this produced a very sore feeling in Germany in the spring of 1911. Further, as the Moorish rebels pushed their raids up to the very gates of Fez, French troops in those same months proceeded to march to that capital (April 1911). The Kaiser saw in that move, and a corresponding advance of Spanish troops in the North, a design to partition Morocco. Failing to secure what he considered satisfactory assurances, he decided to send to Agadir a corvette, the Panther (July 1, 1911), replaced by a cruiser, the Berlin.

[Footnote 531: Rachfahl, p. 310.]

[Footnote 532: Morel, App. XIV.]

Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to compass world-predominance for Germany. The Pan-German, Colonial, and Navy Leagues had gained enormous influence since 1905, when they induced the Kaiser to visit Tangiers; and early in 1911 they issued pamphlets urging the annexation of part of Morocco. The chief, termed West-Marokko deutsch, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Kiderlen-Wächter, who thereafter urged officially that the Government must take into account public opinion--which he himself had manipulated.

Again, as at Tangiers in 1905, Germany's procedure was needlessly provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 declared, her interests in Morocco were solely commercial. If this were so, why send a war-ship, when diplomatic insistence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs of the case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than half that of French firms and less than one-third that of British firms? Obviously, Germany was bent on something more than the maintenance of her trade (which, indeed, the French were furthering by suppressing anarchy); otherwise she would not have risked the chance of a collision which might at any time result from the presence of a German cruiser alongside French war-ships in a small harbour.

It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at Berlin sought to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities. The occasion was favourable. In the spring of 1911 France was a prey to formidable riots of vine-growers. On June 28 occurred an embarrassing change of Ministry. Besides, the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the Socialist régime of previous years. The remodelling of the Russian army was also very far from complete. Moreover, the Tsar and Kaiser had come to a friendly understanding at Potsdam in November 1910, respecting Persia and their attitude towards other questions, so that it was doubtful whether Russia would assist France if French action in Morocco could be made to appear irregular. As for Great Britain, her ability to afford sufficiently large and timely succour to the French was open to question. In the throes of a sharp constitutional crisis, and beset by acute Labour troubles, she was ill-fitted even to defend herself. By the close of 1911 the Navy would include only fourteen first-class ships as against Germany's nine; while Austria was also becoming a Naval Power. The weakness of France and England had appeared in the spring when they gave way before Germany's claims in Asia Minor. On March 18, 1911, by a convention with Turkey she acquired the right to construct from the Bagdad Railway a branch line to Alexandretta, together with large privileges over that port which made it practically German, and the natural outlet for Mesopotamia and North Syria, heretofore in the sphere of Great Britain and France. True, she waived conditionally her claim to push the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf; but her recent bargain with the Tsar at Potsdam gave her the lion's share of the trade of Western Persia.

After taking these strides in the Levant, Germany ought not to have shown jealousy of French progress in Morocco, where her commerce was small. As in 1905, she was clearly using the occasion to test the validity of the Anglo-French Entente and the effectiveness of British support to France. Probably, too, she desired either a territorial acquisition in South Morocco, for which the colonial party and most of the Press were clamouring; or she intended, in lieu of it, to acquire the French Congo. At present it is not clear at which of these objects she aimed. Kiderlen-Wächter declared privately that Germany must have the Agadir district, and would never merely accept in exchange Congolese territory[533].

[Footnote 533: The following facts are significant. On November 9, 1911, the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, assured the Reichstag that Germany had never intended to annex Moroccan territory, an assertion confirmed by Kiderlen-Wächter on Nov. 17. But during the libel action brought against the Berlin Post it was positively affirmed that the Government and Kiderlen-Wächter had intended to annex South-West Morocco. A high official, Dr. Heilbronn, telephoned so to the Post, urging it to demand that step.]

Whatever were the real aims of the Kaiser, they ran counter to French and British interests. Moreover, the warning of Sir Edward Grey, on July 4, that we must be consulted as to any new developments, was completely ignored; and even on July 21 the German ambassador in London could give no assurance as to the policy of his Government. Consequently, on that evening Mr. Lloyd George, during a speech at the Mansion House, apprised Germany that any attempt to treat us as a negligible factor in the Cabinet of Nations "would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." The tension must have been far more severe than appeared in the published documents to induce so peace-loving a Minister to speak in those terms. They aroused a storm of passion in the German Press; and, somewhat later, a German admiral, Stiege, declared that they would have justified an immediate declaration of war by Germany[534]. Certainly they were more menacing than is usual in diplomatic parlance; but our cavalier treatment by Germany (possibly due to Bethmann-Hollweg's belief in blunt Bismarckian ways) justified a protest, which, after all, was less questionable than Germany's despatching a cruiser to Agadir, owing to the reserve of the French Foreign Office. Up to July 27 the crisis remained acute; but on that day the German ambassador gave assurances as to a probable agreement with France.

[Footnote 534: Rear-Admiral Stiege in Überall for March 1912.]

What caused the change of front at Berlin? Probably it was due to a sharp financial crisis (an unexpected result of the political crisis), which would have produced a general crash in German finance, then in an insecure position; and prudence may have counselled the adoption of the less ambitious course, namely a friendly negotiation with the French for territorial expansion in their Congo territory in return for the recognition of their protectorate of Morocco. Such a compromise (which, as we shall see, was finally arrived at) involved no loss for Germany. On the contrary, she gained fertile districts in the tropics and left the French committed to the Morocco venture, which, at great cost to them, would tend finally to benefit commerce in general, and therefore that of Germany.

Also, before the end of these discussions there occurred two events which might well dispose the Kaiser to a compromise with France. Firstly, as a result of his negotiations with Russia (then beset by severe dearth) he secured larger railway and trading concessions in Persia, the compact of August 19 opening the door for further German enterprises in the Levant. Secondly, on September 29, Italy declared war on Turkey, partly (it is said) because recent German activity in Tripoli menaced the ascendancy which she was resolved to acquire in that land. This event greatly deranged the Kaiser's schemes. He had hoped to keep the Triple Alliance intact, and yet add to it the immense potential fighting force of Turkey and the Moslem World. Now, however he might "hedge," he could hardly avoid offending either Rome or Constantinople; and even if he succeeded, his friends would exhaust each other and be useless for the near future. Consequently, the Italo-Turkish War (with its sequel, the Balkan War of 1912) dealt him a severe blow. The Triple Alliance was at once strained nearly to breaking-point by Austria forbidding Italy to undertake naval operations in the Adriatic (probably also in the Aegean). Equally serious was the hostility of Moslems to Europeans in general which compromised the Kaiser's schemes for utilising Islam. Accordingly, for the present, his policy assumed a more peaceful guise.

Here, doubtless, are the decisive reasons for the Franco-German accord of November 4, 1911, whereby the Berlin Government recognised a French protectorate over Morocco and agreed not to interfere in the Franco-Spanish negotiation still pending. France opened certain "closed" ports (among them Agadir), and guaranteed equality of trading rights to all nations. She also ceded to Germany about 100,000 square miles of fertile land in the north-west of her Congo territory, which afforded access to the rivers Congo and Ubangi. The explosion of Teutonic wrath produced by these far from unfavourable conditions revealed the magnitude of the designs that prompted the coup of Agadir. The Colonial Minister at once resigned; and scornful laughter greeted the Chancellor when he announced to the Reichstag that the Berlin would be withdrawn from that port, the protection of German subjects being no longer necessary. He added that Germany would neither fight for Southern Morocco nor dissipate her strength in distant expeditions. In fact, he would "avoid any war which was not required by German honour." Far different was the tone of the Conservative leader, Herr Heydebrand, who declared Mr. Lloyd George's "challenge" to be one which the German people would not tolerate; England had sought to involve them in a war with France, but they now saw "where the real enemy was to be found." The Crown Prince, who was present, loudly applauded these Anglophobe outbursts. The German Press showed no less bitterness. Besides criticising the Chancellor's blustering beginning and huckstering conclusion, they manifested a resolve that Germany should always and everywhere succeed. The Berlin journal, the Post, went so far as to call the Kaiser ce poltron misérable for giving up South Morocco; and it was clear that a large section of the German people ardently desired war with the Western Powers.

Many Frenchmen and Belgians credited the German colonial party with the design of acquiring the whole of the French Congo, as a first step towards annexing the Belgian Congo[535]. Belgium became alarmed, and in 1913 greatly extended the principle of compulsory military service. On the other hand, the German Chauvinists certainly desired the acquisition of a naval base in Morocco which would help to link up their naval stations and facilitate the conquest of a World Empire. This was the policy set forth by Bernhardi in the closing parts of his work, Germany and the next War, where he protested against the Chancellor's surrender of Morocco as degrading to the nation and damaging to its future. Following the lead of Treitschke, he depreciated colonies rich merely in products; for Germany needed homes for her children in future generations, and she must fight for them with all her might at the first favourable opportunity. This is the burden of Bernhardi's message, which bristles with rage at the loss of Morocco. He regarded that land as more important than the Congo; for, in addition to the strategic value of its coasts, it offered a fulcrum in the west whereby to raise the Moslems against the Triple Entente. In the Epilogue he writes: "Our relations with Islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. . . . We have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance for us."

[Footnote 535: Hanotaux, La Politique de l'Équilibre, p. 417.]

The logical conclusion of Bernhardi's thesis was that Germany and Austria should boldly side with the Moors and Turks against France and Italy, summoning Islam to arms, if need be, against Christendom. Perhaps if Turkey had possessed the 1,500,000 troops whom her War Minister, Chevket Pacha, was hopefully striving to raise, this might have been the outcome of events. As it was, Realpolitik counselled prudence, and the observance of the forms of Christianity.

Certainly there was no sufficient pretext for war. France and Russia had humoured Germany. As to "the real enemy," light was thrown on her attitude during the debate of November 27, 1911, at Westminster. Sir Edward Grey then stated that we had consistently helped on, and not impeded, the Franco-German negotiations. Never had we played the dog-in-the-manger to Germany. In fact, the Berlin Government would greatly have eased the tension if she had declared earlier that she did not intend to take part of Morocco. Further, the Entente with France (made public on November 24) contained no secret articles; nor were there any in any compact made by the British Government. On December 6, Mr. Asquith declared that we had no secret engagement with any Power obliging us to take up arms. "We do not desire to stand in the light of any Power which wants to find its place in the sun. The first of British interests is, as it always has been, the peace of the world; and to its attainment British diplomacy and policy will be directed." The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, also said in the Reichstag, "We also, sirs, sincerely desire to live in peace and friendship with England"--an announcement received with complete silence. Some applause greeted his statement that he would welcome any definite proof that England desired friendlier relations with Germany.

Thus ended the year 1911. Frenchmen were sore at discovering that the Entente entailed no obligation on our part to help them by force of arms[536]; and Germans, far from rejoicing at their easy acquisition of a new colony, harboured resentment against both the Western Powers. Britons had been aroused from party strifes and Labour quarrels by finding new proofs of the savage enmity with which Junkers, Colonials, and Pan-Germans regarded them; and the problem was--Should England seek to regain Germany's friendship, meanwhile remaining aloof from close connections with France and Russia; or should she recognise that her uncertain attitude possessed all the disadvantages and few of the advantages of a definite alliance?

[Footnote 536: Hanotaux, La Politique de l'Équilibre, p. 419.]

Early in 1912 light was thrown on the situation, and the Berlin Government thenceforth could not plead ignorance as to our intentions; for efforts, both public and private, were made to improve Anglo-German relations. Mr. Churchill advocated a friendly understanding in naval affairs. Lord Haldane also visited Berlin on an official invitation. He declared to that Government that "we would in no circumstances be a party to any sort of aggression upon Germany." But we must oppose a violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and, if the naval competition continued, we should lay down two keels to Germany's one. As a sequel to these discussions the two Governments discussed the basis of an Entente. It soon appeared that Germany sought to bind us almost unconditionally to neutrality in all cases. To this the British Cabinet demurred, but suggested the following formula:

The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Further than this it refused to go; and Mr. Asquith in his speech of October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the reason:

They [the Germans] wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They asked us (to put it quite plainly) for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the European World. To such a demand, but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave[537].

[Footnote 537: See Times of October 3, 1914, and July 20, 1915 (with quotations from the North German Gazette). Bethmann-Hollweg declared to the Reichstag, on August 19, 1915, that Asquith's statement was false; but in a letter published on August 26, and an official statement of September 1, 1915, Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him.]

Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany broke down owing to the exacting demands of German diplomacy for our neutrality in all circumstances (including, of course, a German invasion of Belgium). Thereupon she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen years) for a large increase in construction[538].

[Footnote 538: Castle and Hurd, German Naval Power, pp. 142-152.]

Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if she had foreseen the events of the following autumn. As has already appeared, Italy's attack upon the Turks (coinciding with difficulties which their rigour raised up) furnished the opportunity--for which the Balkan States had been longing--to shake off the Turkish yoke. On March 13, 1912, Servia and Bulgaria framed a secret treaty of alliance against Turkey, which contained conditions as to joint action against Austria or Roumania, if they attacked, and a general understanding as to the partition of Macedonia. Greece came into the agreement later[539]. No time was fixed for action against Turkey; but in view of her obstinacy and intolerance action was inevitable. She precipitated matters by massacring Christians in and on the borders of Macedonia. Thereupon the three States and Montenegro demanded the enforcement of the reforms and toleration guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin (see p. 242). The Turks having as usual temporised (though they were still at war with Italy[540]), the four States demanded complete autonomy and the reconstruction of frontiers according to racial needs. Both sides rejected the joint offers of Austria and Russia for friendly intervention; whereupon Turkey declared war upon Bulgaria and Servia (October 17). On the morrow Greece declared war upon her. Montenegro had already opened hostilities. In view of these facts, the later assertions of the German Powers, that the Balkan League was a Russian plot for overthrowing Turkey and weakening Teutonic influence, is palpably false. Turkey had treated her Christian subjects (including the once faithful Albanians) worse than ever. Their union against Turkey had long been foretold. It was helped on by Ottoman misrule, and finally cemented by massacre. Further, Russia and Austria acted together in seeking to avert an attack on Turkey; and the Powers collectively warned the Balkan States that no changes of boundary would be tolerated. Those States refused to accept the European fiat; for the present misrule was intolerable, and the inability of the Turks to cope with either the Italians or the Albanian rebels opened a vista of hope. The German accusations levelled at Russia were obviously part of the general scheme adopted at Berlin and Vienna for exasperating public opinion against the Slav cause.

[Footnote 539: The claim that the Greek statesman, Venizelos, founded the league seems incorrect. So, too, is the rumour that Russia, through her minister, Hartvig, at Belgrade, framed it (but see N. Jorga, Hist. des États balcaniques, p. 436). Miliukoff, in a "Report to the Carnegie Foundation," denies this. The plan occurred to many men so soon as Turkish Reform proved a sham. Venizelos is said to have mooted it to Mr. James Bourchier in May 1911. (R. Rankin, Inner History of the Balkan War, p. 13.)]

[Footnote 540: Italy made peace on October 15, gaining possession of Tripoli and agreeing to evacuate the Aegean Isles, but on various pretexts kept her troops there. A little later she renewed the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria for five years. This may have resulted from the Balkan crisis then beginning, and from the visits of the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, to Paris and London, whereupon it was officially stated that Russia adhered both to her treaty with France and her Entente with England. He added that the grouping of the great States was necessary in the interests of the Balance of Power.]

The Balkan States, though waging war with no combined aim, speedily overthrew the Turks in the most dramatic and decisive conflict of our age. The Greeks entered Salonica on November 8 (a Bulgarian force a few days later); on November 18 the Servians occupied Monastir, and the Albanian seaport, Durazzo, at the end of the month. The Bulgar army meanwhile drove the Turks southwards in headlong rout until in the third week of November the fortified Tchataldja Lines opposed an invincible obstacle. There, on December 3, all the belligerents, except Greece, concluded an armistice, and negotiations for peace were begun at London on December 16. Up to January 22, 1913, Turkey seemed inclined towards peace; but on the morrow a revolution took place at Constantinople, the Ministry of Kiamil Pacha being ousted by the warlike faction of Enver Bey. He, one of the contrivers of the revolution of July 1908, had since been attached to the Turkish Embassy at Berlin; and his successful coup was a triumph of German influence. The Peace Conference at London broke up on February 1. In March the Greeks and Bulgars captured Janina and Adrianople respectively, while Scutari fell to the Montenegrins (April 22). The Powers (Russia included) demanded the evacuation of this town by Montenegro; for they had decided to constitute Albania (the most turbulent part of the Peninsula) an independent State, including Scutari.

In Albania, as elsewhere, the feuds of rival races had drenched the Balkan lands with blood; Greek and Bulgar forces had fought near Salonica, and there seemed slight chance of a peaceful settlement in Central Macedonia. That chance disappeared when the Powers in the resumed Peace Conference at London persisted in ruling the Serbs and Montenegrins out of Albania, a decision obviously dictated by the longings of Austria and Italy to gain that land at a convenient opportunity. This blow to Servia's aspirations aroused passionate resentment both there and in Russia. Finally the Serbs gave way, and claimed a far larger part of Macedonia than had been mapped out in their agreement with Bulgaria prior to the war. Hence arose strifes between their forces, in which the Greeks also sided against the Bulgars. Meanwhile, the London Conference of the Powers and the Balkan States framed terms of peace, which were largely due to the influence of Sir Edward Grey[541].

[Footnote 541: See Times of May 30, 1913; Rankin, op. cit. p. 517.]

They may be disregarded here; for they were soon disregarded by all the Balkan States. Seeking to steal a march upon their rivals, the Bulgar forces (it is said on the instigation of their King and his unofficial advisers) made a sudden and treacherous attack. Now, the dour, pushing Bulgars are the most unpopular race in the Peninsula. Therefore not only Serbs and Greeks, but also Roumanians and Turks turned savagely upon them[542]. Overwhelmed on all sides, Bulgaria sued for peace; and again the Great Powers had to revise terms that they had declared to be final. Ultimately, on August 10, 1913, the Peace of Bukharest was signed. It imposed the present boundaries of the Balkan States, and left them furious but helpless to resist a policy known to have been dictated largely from Vienna and Berlin. In May 1914 a warm friend of the Balkan peoples thus described its effects: "No permanent solution of the Balkan Question has been arrived at. The ethnographical questions have been ignored. A portion of each race has been handed over to be ruled by another which it detests. Servia has acquired a population which is mostly Bulgar and Albanian, though of the latter she has massacred and expelled many thousands. Bulgars have been captured by Greeks, Greeks by Bulgars, Albanians by Greeks, and not one of these races has as yet shown signs of being capable to rule another justly. The seeds have been sown of hatreds that will grow and bear fruit[543]." Especially lamentable were the recovery of the Adrianople district by the Turks and the unprovoked seizure of the purely Bulgar district south of Silistria by Roumania. On the other hand, Kaiser William thus congratulated her king, Charles (a Hohenzollern), on the peace, a "splendid result, for which not only your own people but all the belligerent States and the whole of Europe have to thank your wise and truly statesmanlike policy. At the same time your mentioning that I have been able to contribute to what has been achieved is a great satisfaction to me. I rejoice at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace."

[Footnote 542: Roumania's sudden intervention annoyed Austria, who had hoped for a longer and more exhausting war in the Balkans.]

[Footnote 543: Edith Durham, The Struggle for Scutari, p. 315.]

This telegram, following the trend of Austro-German policy, sought to win back Roumania to the Central Powers, from which she had of late sheered off. In other respects the Peace of Bukharest was a notable triumph for Austria and Germany. Not only had they rendered impossible a speedy revival of the Balkan League which had barred their expansion towards the Levant, but they bolstered up the Ottoman Power when its extrusion from Europe seemed imminent. They also exhausted Servia, reduced Bulgaria to ruin, and imposed on Albania a German prince, William of Wied, an officer in the Prussian army, who was destined to view his principality from the quarter-deck of his yacht. Such was the Treaty of Bukharest. Besides dealing a severe blow to the Slav cause, it perpetuated the recent infamous spoliations and challenged every one concerned to further conflicts. Within a year the whole of the Continent was in flames.

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Chapter XXIII

THE CRISIS OF 1914

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether this country would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history and thus become participators in the sin."--GLADSTONE:

Speech of August 1870.

The Prussian and German Army Bills of 1860 and onwards have tended to make military preparedness a weighty factor in the recent development of nations; and the issue of events has too often been determined, not by the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength at the back of it. We must therefore glance at the military and naval preparations which enabled the Central Powers to win their perilous triumph over Russia and the Slavs of the Balkans. In April 1912 the German Chancellor introduced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (passed on May 21) providing for great increases in the navy, also forces amounting to two new army corps, and that, too, though Germany's financial position was admitted to be "very serious," and the proposed measures merely precautionary. Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians voted against them. But the events of the first Balkan War were cited as menacing Germany with a conflict in which she "might have to protect, against several enemies, frontiers which are extended and by nature to a large extent open." A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March 1913 (passed in June), which increased the total of the forces by 145,000, and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more than 870,000 men. The Chancellor referred gratefully to "the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation" of Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at London, and admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was not inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, too, at a time when Russia and Austria agreed to place their forces again on a peace footing. Germany, far from relaxing her efforts after the sharp rebuff to the Slavonic cause in the summer of 1913, continued her military policy. It caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic taxes (estimated to produce £50,000,000) were loudly declared a burden that could not long be borne. As to the naval proposals, the Chancellor commended Mr. Churchill's suggestion (on March 26) of a "naval holiday," but said there were many difficulties in the way.

The British Naval Budget of 1912 had provided for a six years' programme of 25 Dreadnoughts against Germany's 14; and for every extra German ship two British would be added. In March 1913 this was continued, with the offer of a "holiday" for 1914 if Germany would soon accept. No acceptance came. The peace strength of the British Regular Army was reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with about 250,000 effective Territorials.

The increases in the German army induced the French Chambers, in July 1913, to recur to three years' military service, that of two years being considered inadequate in face of the new menace from beyond the Rhine[544]. Jaurès and the Socialists, who advocated a national militia on the Swiss system, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon some of them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the measure was carried with some difficulty on July 8. The General Confederation of Labour and the Anarchist Congress both announced their resolve to keep up the agitation in the army against the three years' service. Mutinous symptoms had already appeared. The military equipment of the French army was officially admitted to be in an unsatisfactory state during the debate of July 13, 1914, when it appeared that France was far from ready for a campaign. The peace strength of the army was then reckoned at 645,000 men.

[Footnote 544: The Temps of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000 French, unless France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat, Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix.]

In Russia in 1912 the chief efforts were concentrated on the navy. As regards the army, it was proposed in the Budget of July 1913 to retain 300,000 men on active service for six months longer than before, thus strengthening the forces, especially during the winter months. Apart from this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important development took place in 1912-14. The peace strength of the Russian army for Europe in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000[545]. That of Austria-Hungary exceeded 460,000 men, that of Italy 300,000 men. Consequently the Triple Entente had on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against 1,590,000 for the Triple Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well-prepared block, while the Triple Entente were separate units; and the Russian and British forces could not be speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the Continent. Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the central position, if vigorously and skilfully used.

[Footnote 545: G. Alexinsky, La Russie et la guerre, pp. 83-88.]

In these considerations lies the key to the European situation in the summer of 1914. The simmering of fiscal discontent and unsated military pride in Germany caused general alarm, especially when the memories of the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14 were systematically used to excite bellicose ardour against France. Against England it needed no official stimulus, for professors and teachers had long taught that "England was the foe." In particular preparations had been made in South-West Africa for stirring up a revolt of the Boers as a preliminary to the expulsion of the British from South Africa. Relations had been established with De Wet and Maritz. In 1913 the latter sent an agent to the German colony asking what aid the Kaiser would give and how far he would guarantee the independence of South Africa. The reply came: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately[546]." The reason for the delay is not known. Probably on further inquiry it was found that the situation was not ready either in Europe or in South Africa. But as to German preparations for a war with England both in South-West Africa and Egypt there can be no doubt. India and probably Ireland also were not neglected.

[Footnote 546: General Botha's speech at Cape Town, July 25, 1915.]

In fact a considerable part of the German people looked forward to a war with Great Britain as equally inevitable and desirable. She was rich and pleasure-loving; her Government was apt to wait till public opinion had been decisively pronounced; her sons, too selfish to defend her, paid "mercenaries" to do it. Her scattered possessions would therefore fall an easy prey to a well-organised, warlike, and thoroughly patriotic nation. Let the world belong to the ablest race, the Germanic. Such had been the teachings of Treitschke and his disciples long before the Boer War or the Anglo-French Entente. Those events and the Morocco Question in 1905 and 1911 sharpened the rivalry; but it is a superficial reading of events to suppose that Morocco caused the rivalry, which clearly originated in the resolve of the Germans to possess a World-Empire. So soon as their influential classes distinctly framed that resolve a conflict was inevitable with Great Britain, which blocked their way to the Ocean and possessed in every sea valuable colonies which she seemed little able to defend. The Morocco affair annoyed them because, firstly, they wanted that strategic position, and secondly, they desired to sunder the Anglo-French Entente. But Morocco was settled in 1911, and still the friction continued unabated. There remained the Eastern Question, a far more serious affair; for on it hung the hopes of Germany in the Orient and of Austria in the Balkans.

The difficulty for Germany was, how to equate her world-wide ambitions with the restricted and diverse aims of Austria and Italy. The interests of the two Central Empires harmonised only respecting the Eastern Question. Weltpolitik in general and Morocco in particular did not in the least concern Austria. Further, the designs of Vienna and Rome on Albania clashed hopelessly. An effort was made in the Triple Alliance, as renewed in 1912, to safeguard Italian interests by insisting that, if Austria gained ground in the Balkans, Italy should have "compensation." The effort to lure the Government of Rome into Balkan adventures prompted the Austrian offer of August 9, 1913, for joint action against Servia. Italy refused, alleging that, as Servia was not guilty of aggression, the Austro-Italian Alliance did not hold good for such a venture. Germany also refused the Austrian offer--why is not clear. Austria was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukharest, for which Kaiser William was largely responsible. Probably, then, they differed as to some of the details of the Balkan settlement. But it is far more probable that Germany checked the Austrians because she was not yet fully ready for vigorous action. The doctrine of complete preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed writer, Rohrbach, who, in 1912, urged his countrymen to be patient. In 1911 they had been wrong to worry France and England about Morocco, where German interests were not vital. Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways had neared their goals, Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would be weak. Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea Canal was not ready, and Heligoland and other coast defences were not sufficiently advanced for Germany confidently to face a war with England. Thanks to the Kaiser, the fleet would soon be in a splendid condition, and then Germany could launch out boldly in the world. The same course was urged by Count Reventlow early in 1914. Germany must continue to arm, though fully conscious that she was "constructing for her foreign politics and diplomacy, a Calvary which nolens volens she would have to climb[547]."

[Footnote 547: Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year); Reventlow, Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, p. 251.]

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, and the works of the Pan-German and Navy Leagues, might be quoted in proof of Germany's design to begin war when she was fully prepared. Now, the immense sums voted in the War Budget of 1913 had not as yet provided the stores of artillery and ammunition that were to astonish the world. Nor had Turkey recovered from the wounds of 1912. Nor was the enlarged Kiel-North Sea Canal ready. Its opening at Midsummer 1914 created a naval situation far more favourable to Germany. A year earlier a French naval officer had prophesied that she would await the opening of the canal before declaring war[548].

[Footnote 548: Revue des questions diplomatiques (1913), pp. 417-18.]

At Midsummer 1914 the general position was as follows. Germany had reached the pitch of perfection in armaments, and the Kiel Canal was open. France was unready, though the three years' service promised to improve her army. The Russian forces were slowly improving in number and cohesion. Belgium also, alarmed by the German menace both in Europe and on the Congo, had in 1912-13 greatly extended the principle of compulsory service, so that in 1914 she would have more than 200,000 men available, and by 1926 as many as 340,000. In naval strength it was unlikely that Germany would catch up Great Britain. But the submarine promised to make even the most powerful ironclads of doubtful value.

Consequently, Germany and her friends (except perhaps Turkey) could never hope to have a longer lead over the Entente Powers than in 1914, at least as regards efficiency and preparedness. Therefore in the eyes of the military party at Berlin the problem resembled that of 1756, which Frederick the Great thus stated: "The war was equally certain and inevitable. It only remained to calculate whether there was more advantage in deferring it a few months or beginning at once." We know what followed in 1756--the invasion of neutral Saxony, because she had not completed her armaments[549]. For William II. in 1914 the case of Belgium was very similar. She afforded him the shortest way of striking at his enemy and the richest land for feeding the German forces. That Prussia had guaranteed Belgian neutrality counted as naught; that in 1912 Lord Haldane had warned him of the hostility of England if he invaded Belgium was scarcely more important. William, like his ancestor, acted solely on military considerations. He despised England: for was she not distracted by fierce party feuds, by Labour troubles, by wild women, and by what seemed to be the beginnings of civil war in Ireland? All the able rulers of the House of Hohenzollern have discerned when to strike and to strike hard. In July 1914 William II.'s action was typically Hohenzollern; and by this time his engaging personality and fiery speeches, aided by professorial and Press propaganda, had thoroughly Prussianised Germany. In regard to moral as well as matériel, "the day" had come by Midsummer 1914.

[Footnote 549: Frédéric, Hist. de la guerre de sept Ans, i. p. 37.]

Moreover, her generally passive partner, Austria, was then excited to frenzy by the murder of the heir to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The criminals were Austrian Serbs; but no proof was then or has since been forthcoming as to the complicity of the Servian Government. Nevertheless, in the state of acute tension long existing between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the affair seemed the climax of a series of efforts at wrecking the Dual Monarchy and setting up a Serbo-Croatian Kingdom. Therefore German and Magyar sentiment caught flame, and war with Servia was loudly demanded. Dr. Dillon, while minimising the question of the murder, prophesied that the quarrel would develop into a gigantic struggle between Teuton and Slav[550]. In this connection we must remember that the Central Empires had twice dictated to the rest of Europe: first, in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9; secondly, in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Bukharest (August 1913). On other occasions Kaiser William had bent the will of Tsar Nicholas II., notably in the Potsdam interview of November 1910. It is therefore possible that Berlin reckoned once more on the complaisance of Russia; and in that event Austria would have dragooned Servia and refashioned the Balkan lands at her will, Germany meanwhile "keeping the ring." This explanation of the crisis is, however, open to the objection that the questions at issue more vitally affected Russia than did those of 1908-10, and she had nearly recovered normal strength. Unless the politicians of Berlin and Vienna were blind, they must have foreseen that Russia would aid Servia in resisting the outrageous demands sent from Vienna to Belgrade on July 23. Those demands were incompatible with Servia's independence; and though she, within the stipulated forty-eight hours, acquiesced in all save two of them, the Austrian Government declared war (July 28). In so doing it relied on the assurances of the German Ambassador, von Tchirsky, that Russia would not fight. But by way of retort to the Austrian order for complete mobilisation (July 31, 1 A.M.), Russia quite early on that same day ordered a similar measure[551].

[Footnote 550: Daily Telegraph, July 25, 1914.]

[Footnote 551: J'accuse, pp. 134-5 (German edition). The partial mobilisations of Austria and Russia earlier were intended to threaten and protect Servia. The time of Austria's order for complete mobilisation is shown in French Yellow Book, No. 115. That of Russia in Austrian "Rotbuch," No. 52, and Russian Orange Book, No. 77.]

The procedure of Austria and Germany now claims our attention. The policy of Count Berchtold, Austria's Foreign Minister, had generally been pacific. On July 28 he yielded to popular clamour for war against Servia, but only, it appears, because of his belief that "Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement." On July 30 and 31 he consented to continue friendly discussions with Russia. Even on August 1 the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd expressed to the Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, the hope that things had not gone too far[552]. There was then still a hope that Sir Edward Grey's offer of friendly mediation might be accepted by Germany, Austria, and Russia. But on August 1 Germany declared war on Russia.

[Footnote 552: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 50-56; British White Papers, Miscellaneous (1914), No. 6 (No. 137), and No. 10, p. 3; French Yellow Book, No. 120.]

It is well to remember that by her action in August 1913 she held back Austria from a warlike policy. In July 1914 some of Germany's officials knew of the tenor of the Austrian demands on the Court of Belgrade; and her Ambassador at Vienna stated on July 26 that Germany knew what she was doing in backing up Austria. Kaiser William, who had been on a yachting cruise, hurriedly returned to Berlin on the night of July 26-27. He must have approved of Austria's declaration of war against Servia on July 28, for on that day his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, finally rejected Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a Peace Conference to settle that dispute. The Chancellor then also expressed to our Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, the belief that Russia had no right to intervene in the Austro-Serb affair. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also opined that "Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war." This belief was widely expressed in diplomatic circles at Berlin. Military men probably viewed matters from that standpoint; and in all probability there was a struggle between the civilians and the soldiers, which seems to have ended in a victory for the latter in an important Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29. Immediately afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen and made to him the "infamous proposals" for the neutrality of Great Britain in case of a European War, provided that Germany (1) would engage to take no territory from the mainland of France (he would make no promise respecting the French colonies); (2) would respect the neutrality of Holland; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case the French menace compelled her to invade that country.

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded war as imminent[553]. But why? Even in the East matters did not as yet threaten such a conflict. Russia had declared that Servia was not to be made a vassal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration, she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. But neither Russia nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554]. Austria seems to have expected a limited war, i.e. only with the Serbs. She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long as she did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to vassalage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia's intervention, as in 1909[555]. The German proposals of July 29 are the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved while Holland would be left alone. In the course of his remarks the Chancellor said that "he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany"--a reference to the German offers of 1912 described in this chapter. As at that time the Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so, too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both Goschen and Grey must have seen the snare. The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553: M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to England's attitude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized. All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]

[Footnote 554: Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 161. J'accuse (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey's actions which betokened tension with Germany. Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to be crowned with success. On July 20, that is three days before Austria precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to moderate her demands on Servia. The day after the Austrian Note he urged a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria who negatived this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey worked for peace, with the approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria. But on July 31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts. On July 31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia (a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier), sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours; also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust. Russia could not have assented without occupying an inferior position to Austria. If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same action for each of the disputants. Further, while blaming the Russians for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps, including what is called Kriegsgefahr, which made her army far better prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, if the Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to await the arrival (on August 1) of the special envoy, Tatisheff, whom, on the night of July 30, the Tsar had despatched to Berlin[556]? There is not a single sign that the Berlin Government really feared "the Eastern Colossus," though statements as to "the eastern peril" were very serviceable in frightening German Socialists into line.

[Footnote 556: German White Book, No. 23_a_; J'accuse, Section III. B, pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W. Headlam, History of Twelve Days, p. 183.)]

The German ultimatum failed to cow Russia; and as she returned no answer, the Kaiser declared war on August 1. He added by telegram that he had sought, in accord with England, to mediate between Russia and Austria, but the Russian mobilisation led to his present action. In reply to the German demand at Paris the French Premier, M. Viviani, declared on August 1 at 1 P.M. that France would do that "which her interests dictated"--an evasive reply designed to gain time and to see what course Russia would take. The Kaiser having declared war on Russia, France had no alternative but to come to the assistance of her Ally. But the Kaiser's declaration of war against France did not reach Paris until August 3 at 6.45 P.M.[557] His aim was to leave France and Belgium in doubt as to his intentions, and meanwhile to mass overwhelming forces on their borders, especially that of Belgium.

[Footnote 557: German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No. 147.]

Meanwhile, on August 1, German officials detained and confiscated the cargoes of a few British ships. On August 2 German troops violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. On the same day Sir Edward Grey assured the French ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, that if the German fleet attacked that of France or her coasts, the British fleet would afford protection. This assurance depended, however, on the sanction of Parliament. It is practically certain that Parliament would have sanctioned this proceeding; and, if so, war would have come about owing to the naval understanding with France[558], that is, if Germany chose to disregard it. But another incident brought matters to a clearer issue. On August 3, German troops entered Belgium, though on the previous day the German ambassador had assured the Government of King Albert that no such step would be taken. The pretext now was that the French were about to invade Belgium, as to which there was then, and has not been since, any proof whatever.

[Footnote 558: British White Paper, No. 105 and Enclosures, also No. 116.]

Here we must go back in order to understand the action of the British, French, and German Governments. They and all the Powers had signed the treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the independence of Belgium; and nothing had occurred since to end their engagement. The German proposals of July 29, 1914, having alarmed Sir Edward Grey, he required both from Paris and Berlin assurances that neither Power would invade Belgium. That of France on August 1 was clear and satisfactory. On July 31 the German Secretary of State, von Jagow, declined to give a reply, because "any reply they [the Emperor and Chancellor] might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." As on August 2 the official assurances of the German ambassador at Brussels were satisfactory, the British Foreign Office seems to have felt no great alarm on this topic. But at 7 P.M. of that evening the same ambassador presented a note from his Government demanding the right to march its troops into Belgium in order to prevent a similar measure by the French. On the morrow Belgium protested against this act, and denied the rumour as to French action. King Albert also telegraphed to King George asking for the help of the United Kingdom. The tidings reached the British Cabinet after it had been carefully considering whether German aggression on Belgium would not constitute a casus belli[559].

[Footnote 559: British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 20-25. For a full and convincing refutation of the German charges that our military attachés at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had bound us by conventions(!) to land an army in Belgium, see second Belgian Grey Book, pp. 103-6; Headlam, op. cit., ch. xvi., also p. 377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium.]

The news of the German demand and the King's appeal reached Westminster just before the first debate on August 3. Sir Edward Grey stated that we were not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance, of which we did not know the exact terms; and there was no binding compact with France; but the conversations on naval affairs pledged us to consult her with a view to preventing an unprovoked attack by the German navy. He explained his conditional promise to M. Cambon. Thereupon Mr. Redmond promised the enthusiastic support of all Irishmen. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, though demurring to the policy of Sir Edward Grey, said, "If the Right Honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us that he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him." Now, the Cabinet had by this time resolved that the independence of Belgium should be a test question, as it was in 1870. Therefore, there seemed the hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party would give united support to the Government. By the evening debate official information had arrived; and, apart from some cavilling criticisms, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of decided action on behalf of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum demanding the due recognition of Belgian neutrality by Germany. No answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany entered on a state of war shortly before midnight of August 4.

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears the aggressive character of German policy. Some of her Ministers doubted the advisability of war, and hoped to compass their ends by threats as in 1909 and 1913; but they were overborne by the bellicose party on or shortly before July 29. Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but German diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having been forced on by military men. Bethmann-Hollweg was never remarkable for breadth of view and clearness of insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated the follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of the civilised world in order to gain a few days' start over France and stab her unguarded side. It is a clumsy imitation of the policy of Frederick in 1756.

As to the forbearance of Great Britain at the crisis, few words are needed. In earlier times the seizure of British ships and their cargoes (August 1) would have led to a rupture. Clearly, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues clung to peace as long as possible. The wisdom of his procedure at one or two points has been sharply impugned. Critics have said that early in the crisis he should have empowered Sir George Buchanan, our ambassador at Petrograd, to join Russia and France in a declaration of our resolve to join them in case of war[560]. But (1) no British Minister is justified in committing his country to such a course of action. (2) The terms of the Ententes did not warrant it. (3) A menace to Germany and Austria would, by the terms of the Triple Alliance, have compelled Italy to join them, and it was clearly the aim of the British Government to avert such a disaster. (4) On July 30 and 31 Grey declared plainly to Germany that she must not count on our neutrality in all cases, and that a Franco-German War (quite apart from the question of Belgium) would probably draw us in[561].

[Footnote 560: British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book, No. 17.]

[Footnote 561: British White Paper, Nos. 101, 102, 111, 114, 119. I dissent from Mr. F.S. Oliver (Ordeal by Battle, pp. 30-34) on the question discussed above. For other arguments, see my Origins of the War, pp. 167-9. The ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were looser; but anything of the nature of a general threat to the Central Powers would probably have ranged her too on their side.]

Sir Edward is also charged with not making our intentions clear as to what would happen in case of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. But he demanded, both from France and Germany, assurances that they would respect that neutrality; and on August 1 he informed the German ambassador in London of our "very great regret" at the ambiguity of the German reply. Also, on August 2 the German ambassador at Brussels protested that Belgium was quite safe so far as concerned Germany[562]. When a great Power gives those assurances, it does not improve matters to threaten her with war if she breaks them. She broke them on August 3; whereupon Grey took the decided action which Haldane had declared in 1912 that we would take. The clamour raised in Germany as to our intervention being unexpected is probably the result of blind adherence to a preconceived theory and of rage at a "decadent" nation daring to oppose an "invincible" nation. The German Government of course knew the truth, but its education of public opinion through the Press had become a fine art. Therefore, at the beginning of the war all Germans believed that France was about to invade Belgium, whereupon they stepped in to save her; that the Eastern Colossus had precipitated the war by its causeless mobilisation (a falsehood which ranged nearly all German Socialists on the side of the Government); that Russia and Servia had planned the dismemberment of Austria; that, consequently, Teutons (and Turks) must fight desperately for national existence in a conflict forced upon them by Russia, Servia, and France, England perfidiously appearing as a renegade to her race and creed.

[Footnote 562: British White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, 125; Belgian Grey Book, No. 19.]

By these falsehoods, dinned into a singularly well-drilled and docile people, the Germans were worked up to a state of frenzy for an enterprise for which their rulers had been preparing during more than a decade. The colossal stores of war material, amassed especially in 1913-14 (some of them certain soon to deteriorate), the exquisitely careful preparations at all points of the national life, including the colonies, refute the fiction that war was forced upon Germany. The course of the negotiations preceding the war, the assiduous efforts of Germany to foment Labour troubles in Russia before the crisis, the unpreparedness of the Allies for the fierce and sustained energy of the Teutonic assault,--all these symptoms prove the guilt of Germany[563]. The crowning proof is that up to the present (August 1915) she has not issued a complete set of diplomatic documents, and not one despatch which bears out the Chancellor's statement that he used his influence at Vienna for peace. The twenty-nine despatches published in her White Book are a mere fragment of her immense diplomatic correspondence which she has found it desirable to keep secret, and, as we have seen, her officials suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 urging that the Austro-Serb dispute be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

[Footnote 563: See the damning indictment by a German in J'accuse, Section III., also the thorough and judicial examination by J.W. Headlam, The History of Twelve Days.]

The sets of despatches published by the Allies show conclusively that each of them worked for peace and was surprised by the war. Their unpreparedness and the absolute preparedness of Germany have appeared so clearly during the course of hostilities as to give the lie to the German pamphleteers who have striven to prove that in the last resort the war was "a preventive war," that is, designed to avert a future conflict at a time unfavourable to Germany. There is not a sign that any one of the Powers of the Entente was making more than strictly defensive preparations; and, as has been shown, the Entente themselves were formed in order to give mutual protection in case of aggression from her. The desperate nature of that aggression appeared in her unscrupulous but successful efforts to force Turkey into war (Oct.-Nov. 1914). No crime against Christendom has equalled that whereby the champions of Kultur sought to stir up the fanatical passions of the Moslem World against Europe. Fortunately, that design has failed; and incidentally it added to the motives which have led Italy to break loose from the Central Powers and assist the Allies in assuring the future of the oppressed nationalities of Europe.

INDEX.

Abdul, Aziz 168-9 Abdul Hamid II., 169-70, 174, 177-9, 185-6, 204, 223-4, 238, 245-9, 259, 266-9, 274-5, 277, 285, 328, 436, 447-8, 453, 457, 591-2, 618 Abdul Kerim, 194-6, 200, 204, 206 Abdur Rahman, 389, 400, 404-5, 407, 417, 418-19, 428-31, 433 Abeken, Herr, 44 Abu Klea, Battle of, 480 Abyssinia, 335, 487, 504 Adam, Mme, 333 Adrianople, 221, 223, 229, 251, 270 Aehrenthal, Count, 613-4 Afghanistan, 334, 345-6, 366, 378-9, 386-91, 472, 527 War in (1878-9), chap. xiv. 394 passim Africa, Partition of, chap. xviii, passim, 586 Africa, South-West, 635-6 Agadir, Coup d', 621, 623, 625 Albania, 158, 229 Albania, autonomy of, 630-1 Albert, King of Belgium, 644-5 Albrecht, Archduke, 33-6 Alexander I., 31, 160-1, 297, 364 Alexander II., 145, 167, 173-5, 180-83, 192, 204-5, 209-10, 215, 222-8, 234, 254-6, 289, 293, 295-8, 306, 308, 313, 318, 322, 325, 355, 398-9 Alexander III., 255-65, 272-86, 298-9, 301-4, 309-11, 331, 337, 340, 343-6, 423-4, 428-9 Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria, 254, 260-82, 286, 339, 428 Alexandretta, 622 Alexandria, bombardment of, 450-52 Alfonso, King of Spain, 619 Algeciras, Conference of, 604, 606-8, 610 Act of, 607 Alikhanoff, M., 424 Alsace, 94, 105, 132, 133-4 Alvensleben, General von, 61, 65-7, 77 Amur, river, 571, 572, 580 Andrassy, Count, 164, 232, 599 André, General, 600 Anglo-French Entente (1904), 601-4, 606, 607, 609, 622, 626, 636 Anglo-German Agreement (1890), 520-523,525, 532 Anglo-Japanese Compact, 597-8, 602 Anglo-Russian Conventions, 608-10 Angra Pequeña, 523, 524 Antonelli, Cardinal, 89 Arabi Pasha, 266, 444, 447-9, 452, 453-7 Archinard, M., 539 Argyll, Duke of, 371-2, 376, 417 Armenia, 220, 229, 242, 244, 250, 307 Army Bill, French (1875), 119, 121-2 Arnim, Count von, 123, 318 Artomoroff, Colonel, 504 Asquith, H.H., 626-8 Atbara, Battle of the, 490-91 Augustenburg, Duke of, 16 Aumale, Duc d', 117 Austria, 4-23, 32-7, 55, 63, 137, 148, 164, 177, 180-81, 184-6, 194, 227-8, 231, 232, 238, 242, 246, 257-8, 259, 271, 282, 284, 318, 320, 323-7, 331-3, 350-51, 485, 585, 592-3, 601, 604, 607, 609, 612-17, 622, 629-32, 634, 637, 639, 644, 647, 649 Army of, 635 Austro-German Alliance, 324-7 Austro-Prussian War (1866), 17-21 Austro-Russian Agreements (1897 and 1903), 615 Austro-Russian Treaty (1877), 179-180 Ayub Khan, 407, 415, 418-9

Baden, 12, 21 Baden, Grand Duke of, 130 Baert, Captain, 564 Bagdad Railway, 591-4, 609, 615, 622, 637 Bahr-el-Ghazal, the, 504, 506, 552, 558-9 Bakunin, 292-5 Balfour, Mr. A., 431-2 Balkan League, the, 629, 632 Balkan Peninsula, 25, 332 Balkan Question, the, 631-2 Balkan States, 586, 592, 616, 628-9, 633 Balkan War (1912), 624, 629-31, 633 Balkh, 399, 433 Baluchistan, 367, 381, 384-6, 432 Baring, Sir E., 463, 466-473 Batak, 170, 171 Batoum, 205, 229, 234, 241, 276 Bavaria, 18, 20, 21, 131, 133-5 Bazaine, Marshall, 63-5, 67-73, 75-8, 97 Bazeilles, 79-82 Beaconsfield, Earl of, 29, 165-6, 171, 175, 181, 182, 187-8, 220, 231, 232-3, 234, 236-7, 240-41, 243-5, 287, 328, 380, 282-3, 391-3, 400, 405, 440, 516 Beaumont, Battle of, 78 Bebel, Herr, 589 Bechuanaland, 530-33 Beernaert, M., 556 Belfort, 98, 104, 105 Belgium, 5, 16, 26, 148, 550-52, 555-7, 567, 625, 627-8, 638-9, 641-2, 644-8 Bendereff, 271, 278-9 Benedek, General, 18 Benedetti, M., 40-43, 48 Bentley, Rev. W.H., 546 Berber, 473, 475, 478, 488, 490 Berchtold, Count, 640 Beresford, Lord Charles, 480 Berlin Conference (1885), 548-50, 552, 559, 562, 567 Congress of (1878), 228, 235-42, 247, 259, 323, 328, 345, 388, 513 Memorandum, the, 167-9, 181 Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 237-42, 253, 267-8, 275, 291, 332, 353, 612, 629 Bernhardi, General von, 625-6, 638 Besika Bay, 168, 171, 172, 177, 224 Bessarabia, 160, 205, 230, 234, 260 Bethman-Hollweg, Chancellor, 620, 623, 625, 627, 633-4, 641-2, 645-6, 648 Beust, Count von, 32, 36, 37 Biarritz, 16 Biddulph, General, 398 Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 8, 12-22, 27, 30, 31, 39, 41-49, 85, 86, 89, 94, 97, 103-5, 109, 114, 118, 123, 129-32, 137, 140, 141, 153, 164, 168, 173, 184, 228, 257, 261, 282, 317-27, 332, 335, 336-8, 342, 426, 446, 457, 513-15, 520-21, 527, 528, 534, 547, 548, 590, 599, 609 and "Protection," 141-150 Bismarck, Count Herbert, 523-4, 528 Blagovestchensk, 584 Blowitz, M. de, 321-2 Blumenthal, Count von, 72, 77, 85, 94 Boer War, 585-8, 590, 597-8, 610, 636 Bokhara, 365, 371 Bonnier, M., 539 Bordeaux, 98, 99, 103, 105, 106, 116, 118 Bosnia, 163, 168, 238, 242, 258, 332 Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation of, 612, seq. 640 Botha, General, 598 Boulanger, General, 126, 333, 337, 339, 341 Bourbaki, General, 98 Bourbon, House of, 3-6 Bourgas, 278 Bourgeois, M., 504 Boxer Movement, the, 583 Boxer Rising in China (1900), 588, 595 Brazza, M. de, 546 Bremen, 132, 142 Bright, Mr. J., 417, 452 British Central Africa Protectorate, 533 Broadwood, General, 487, 496, 498 Browne, General Sir Samuel, 394 Brussels, Conference at (1876), 545 Anti-Slavery Conference at, 534 Buchanan, Sir George, 647 Bukharest, Peace of (1913), 631-2, 637, 639 Bukharest, Treaty of (1886), 272 Bulgaria, 157-9, 163, 170-72, 176, 180, 225, 229-30, 234, 237-9, 251-288, 302, 333, 334 Campaigns in, 194-216 Bülow, Prince von, 588-9, 596, 603, 605, 607, 617 Bundesrath, the, 133-4, 138 Burmah, 527, 530 Annexation of, 432 Burnaby, Colonel, 480 Burrows, Brigadier-General, 407 Busa, 540 Busch, Dr., 22, 143

Cabul, 370, 381, 383, 387, 388, 390, 401-5, 412-413, 431 Cabul, Treaty of (1905), 435 Cairo, capture of, 455-6 Cairoli, Signor, 329 "Caisse de la Delte" (Egyptian), 442, 459 Cambon, Jules, 620 Paul, 644, 646 Cameroons, 528, 533-6 Candahar, 367, 381, 387, 398, 405, 407, 413-18, 432 Canning, Lord, 368 Canrobert, Marshal, 72 Caprivi, Count, 520 Carnarvon, Lord, 225, 525 Carnot, President Sadi, 127 Casement, Mr. Roger, 558, 560-62, 565, 566 Cassini, Count, 580 Catharine II., 361 Cattier, M., 552, 563, 564 Cavagnari, Sir Louis, 401 Cavour, Count, 8-11, 13, 90, 142, 161 Centralisation of Governments, 111-112, 315 Chad, Lake, 537 Châlons-sur-Marne, 68, 74, 75 Chamberlain, Mr., 417 Chambord, Comte de, 117, 122, 123 Charasia, Battle of (1878), 402-3 Charles, King of Roumania, 192, 206, 210, 215, 230, 262, 632 Charles Albert, King, 6-8 Chevket Pacha, 626 China, 568, 571-2, 576-82, 595-7 Chino-Japanese War, 576-7 Chitral, 386, 388, 433 Chotek, Countess, 613 Christian IX., 14 Churchill, Winston, 627, 634 Clement, Bishop, 280, 282 Cobden, Mr., 142 Colombey, Battle of, 63-5 Combes, M., 349, 600 Congo Free State, the, 502, 541, passim chap. xix. Congo, French, 622, 625 Constantinople, Conference of (1876), 174, 176-9 Constitution, French (1875), 124-5 German, 132-7 Turkish (1876), 177-9 Constitution of Finland, 308, 309 Cossacks, the, 360-62, 434, 435, 453 Coulmiers, Battle of, 97 Cranbrook, Lord, 387 Crete, 240, 248 Crimean War, 8, 13, 30, 31, 161-2, 345, 365, 425, 434 Crispi, Signor, 336, 337, 355, 600 Cromer, Lord. See Baring, Sir E. Cronstadt, 343, 346 Crown Prince of Saxony, 74, 130 Currie, Sir Donald, 524, 528 Curzon, Lord, 423, 431, 432, 576 Cyprus, 328 Convention, 234-5, 243-4, 250

Dahomey, 539 Dalmatia, 329 Dalny, 583 Dardanelles, the, 168, 222, 224, 225, 241 Decazes, Duc, 321-2, 440 Delagoa Bay, 525-6, 528, 534 Delcassé, M., 587, 601, 606, 607 Denghil Tepe, Battle of, 420-23, 500 Denmark, 4, 5, 13-16, 35 Depretis, Signor, 329, 335-6, 355 Derby, Lord, 166, 176, 178, 181, 222, 224, 225, 226, 231, 243, 440, 524, 530 De Wet, General, 598, 635 Dhanis, Commandant, 553 Dilke, Sir Charles, 465, 563 Dillon, Dr., 639 Disraeli. See Beaconsfield Dobrudscha, 197, 199, 229-30, 240 Dodds, Colonel, 539 Dolgorukoff, General, 280-81 Dongola, 474, 476, 479, 488, 489 Dost Mohammed, 368, 379 Dragomiroff, General, 197 Dreyfus, M., 600 Drouyn de Lhuys, 20 Drury Lowe, General Sir, 454-6 Dual Alliance, 342-50, 587-8, 590, 599, 609, 616, 644 Dual Control, the (in Egypt), 442, 443, 445, 457 Ducrot, General, 80, 81, 83 Dufaure, M., 126, 245, 246 Dufferin, Lord, 326, 424, 426-8, 429, 458, 461-2 Dulcigno, 246-7 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 433 Durbar at Delhi (1878), 383

East Africa (British), 520-21, 523 (German), 520-23 East Africa Company (British), 519-22 Eastern Question, the, 155-189, 222-250, 383, 615, 636-7 Eastern Roumelia, 238, 253, 259, 260, 263-4, 268, 275-6, 333 Eckardstein, Herr, 527 Edward VII., 601, 608, 618-9 Egypt, 166, 244, 266, 275, 602, 636-7, passim chaps. xv. xvi. xvii. Einwold, Herr, 527 Elgin, Lord, 368 Elliott, Sir Henry, 176, 177, 221 El Obeid, Battle of, 461, 462 El Teb, Battle of, 470 Ems, 42-5 Ena, Queen of Spain, 619 England. See Great Britain Enver Bey, 630 Epirus, 241, 248 Erzeroum, 194, 241 Eugénie, Empress, 19, 29, 38, 47, 75, 87, 97, 139

Faidherbe, M. 538 Fashoda, 349, 501-6, 594 Faure, President, 127, 346 Favre, M. Jules, 87, 88, 94, 98, 103, 114 Ferdinand, Prince, 285-6 Ferdinand, Tsar, of Bulgaria, 612, 631 Fergusson, Sir James, 336 Ferry, M., 266, 329 Finland, 304, 307-14 Flegel, Herr, 535 Floquet, M., 126 Flourens, M., 343 Forbach, Battle of, 62, 63 Formosa, Island of, 577 Fox Bourne, Mr., 563 France, 3-6, 9, 19, 20, 25-9, 32, 33, 35, 46-9, 52-6, 87-9, 112, 161, 228, 318, 320-24, 326, 333-6, 337-8, 341-5, 347-9, 350, 437-8, 442, 446, 448, 452-3, 457, 458-9, 485, 513-514, 529, 535, 537-41, 546-9, 558, 559, 577-9, 585-6, 591, 593-4, 597, 599-608, 614-6, 618, 620-2, 624, 626, 638, 641-8 and Morocco, 602, 604-7, 609-10, 620 seq., 636-7 Army of, 634-5 France and the Sudan, 501-6 France and Tunis, 328-30 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 613-4, 639 Francis Joseph, 6, 32, 36, 173, 232, 318, 613 Franco-German War, causes of, 36-49 Franco-Italian Entente, 601 Franco-Russian Alliance. (See Dual Alliance) Frankfurt, Treaty of, 105, 114 Frankfurt-on-Main, 11, 12, 21, 22 Frederick the Great, 594, 635, 638, 646 Frederick III., Crown Prince of Germany and Emperor, 18, 74, 76, 80, 130, 136, 151, 236 Frederick VII., 14 Frederick Charles, Prince, 66, 68 Frederick William IV., 11-13, 31, 593 Free Trade (in Germany), 141-3 (in France), 142 French Congoland, 506, 546, 622, 625 French Revolution of 1830, 5 Frere, Sir Bartle, 380-81, 524 Freycinet, M. de, 446, 447, 452, 456, 502, 503 Frobenius, Herr, 638 Frossard, General, 63-5

Galatz, 197 Galbraith, Colonel, 411 Gallieni, M., 539 Gallipoli, 222, 226 Gambetta, M., 87, 96-101, 110, 125, 318, 330, 446, 452, 538 Gandamak, Treaty of, 400, 418 Garde Mobile, the, 55, 94 Garde Nationale, the, 55, 94 Garibaldi, 6, 7, 9-11, 28, 90-91, 327 Gastein, Convention of, 16 Gatacre, General, 490, 492 Gavril, Pasha, 263 Geok Tepe. See Denghil Tepe George V., King of England, 645 George, David Lloyd, 623, 625 German Army, 135, 633-4 German Army, Kriegsgefahr, 643 Confederation (1815-66), 4-22 Constitution (1871), 132-7 Empire, 129. See Germany Navy, 587-9, 594, 609, 617, 628, 633, 638 Zollverein, the, 141-2 Germany, 3-6, 11-18, 20-23, 27, 34, 39, 45-9, 51-5, 129-154, 164-6, 223, 246, 275, 277, 282, 318-27, 329, 330, 337-9, 350, 447-8, 453, 457, 472, 485, 513-18, 520-22, 524-30, 533-7, 541, 547, 559, 577-9, 581, 585-9, 592, 595-7, 600-609, 615-18, 620-21, 623-8, 632, 634, 635-8, 640-49 Gervais, Admiral, 343 Ghaznee, Battle of, 405 Giers, M. de, 258, 263, 265, 276, 281, 285, 302, 332, 333-5, 337, 424, 427, 515 Gladstone, Mr., 29, 46, 172, 223, 244, 275, 356, 371, 372, 376, 380, 392, 405, 417, 427-9, 446, 448-9, 452, 458, 461, 465, 484-5, 502, 517, 524, 528, 530, 531 Glave, Mr., 562 Gold Coast, 539 Goldie, Sir George T., 535, 541 Gontaut-Biron, M. de, 421 Gordon, General, passim chaps. xvi. xvii. Gortchakoff, Prince, 164, 168, 190, 222, 226, 320, 322-3, 366 Goschen, Lord, 244, 246, 442 Goschen, Sir Edward, 641-2 Gough, General, 404 Gramont, Duc de, 32, 40, 42, 43, 47 Grant Duff, Sir Mountstuart, 322 Granville, Earl, 45, 389, 425-6, 447, 463, 465, 470, 473-4, 517, 523, 533, 547 Gravelotte, Battle of, 68-73 Great Britain, 14, 29, 30, 52, 95, 145, 147-9, 160-61, 168-77, 181, 187-8, 190, 231, 259, 266, 282, 284, 322-4, 328, 336, 337, 342, 364-6, 372-4, 382-4, 392-4, 400, 404-6, 417, 435, 513-14, 521, 523-30, 533-7, 541, 547, 578-9, 581-2, 585-7, 600, 604-9, 616, 618, 620, 622-3, 626-8, 636-9, 641-8 Army of, 634 Great Britain and Egypt, passim chaps. xv. xvi. xvii. Great Britain and Russia (1878), 222-8 Greco-Turkish War, 585 Greece, 5, 158, 160, 194, 227, 240-41, 245-8, 257, 267 Grenfell, Rev. G., 546 Grévy, M., 337, 355 Grey, Sir Edward, 503, 586, 623, 626, 631, 634, 641-7 Griffin, Sir Lepel, 405-6 Gurko, General, 201-3, 208, 219

Habibulla, Ameer of Afghanistan, 431, 435 Hague Conference, 608 Congress, the (1899), 583 Tribunal, 601, 649 Haldane, Lord, 627, 639, 647 Hamburg, 132, 142 Hanotaux, M., 504 Hanover, 11, 21, 23 Hartington, Lord, 417, 465, 476 Hayashi, Count, 596 Heligoland, 521, 637 Herat, 367, 368, 381, 387, 388, 405, 425 Héricourt, Battle of, 98 Herzegovina, 163-5, 170, 238, 332 Hesse-Cassel, 12, 21, 23 Hesse Darmstadt, 20 Heydebrand, Herr, 625 Hicks, Pasha, 461-2 Hinde, Captain S.L., 553 Hinterland, Question of the, 547, 550 Hohenlohe, Prince, 589 Hohenzollern, House of, 11, 39-41, 129; also see Germany Holland, 5, 554-5, 641-2 Holstein, 5, 26 Holy Alliance, the, 5, 319 Holy Roman Empire, the, 136 Hornby, Admiral, 224 Hoskier, M., 340 Hudson, Sir James, 274 Hungary, 32, 36, 159, 263, 277 Hunter, General, 487

Iddesleigh, Lord, 519 Ignatieff, General, 174, 177, 181, 229, 230, 232, 332 India, 165, 212, 365, 368, 592 "International Association of the Congo," 545, 547-9 "Internationale," the, 292 Isabella, Queen, 40 Ismail, Khedive, 438-40, 442 Istria, 329 Isvolsky, M., 615 "Italia irredenta," 329 Italo-Turkish War, the, 624, 628 Italy, 4-11, 16-23, 28, 30, 34, 37, 38, 55, 56, 63, 89-92, 148, 228, 266, 284, 319, 335, 350, 453, 485, 487, 540, 541, 567, 601, 603-5, 607, 615-17, 624, 628, 631, 636, 643, 646-7, 649 Italy and the Triple Alliance, 327-331, 600, 601, 615, 624, 637, 647

Jacob, General, 385 Jacobabad, Treaty of, 385 Jagow, Herr von, 645 Jameson, Dr. 587 Janssen, M., 552 Japan, 348, 572-4, 576-8, 581-4, 585, 597-9 Jaurés, M., 634 Jermak, 361, 569, 570 Jesuits, the, 138 Jews, persecution of the, 304, 305 Johnstone, Sir Harry, 519, 541

Kamchatka, 570, 571 Karaveloff, M., 256, 259, 280 Kars, 194, 229, 234 Kassala, 487, 488, 491 Katkoff, M., 259, 283, 324, 332, 333, 334, 337 Kaufmann, General, 366, 383, 398 Kaulbars, General, 255, 257-8, 283, 284 Khalifa, passim chap. xvii. Khama, 533 Khartum, 437, 439, 445, passim chaps. xvi. xvii. Khelat, Khan of, 384-5 Khiva, 365, 374, 377 Khokand, 383 Khyber Pass, 386, 390, 394, 401, 412 Kiamil Pacha, 630 Kiao-chau, 580-81 Kiderlen-Wächter, Herr, 621-2 Kiel, North Sea Canal, 587, 604, 637-8 Kirk, Sir John, 518, 541 Kitchener, Lord, 441, 479, 598, passim chap. xvii. Komaroff, General, 427, 428 Königgrätz, Battle of, 18-20 Kordofan, 461, 462, 470, 476 Korea, 568 Korsakoff, General, 254 Kossuth, 6 Krüdener, General, 200, 206-7 Krüger, President, 586-7 Kultur-Kampf, the, 139-41 Kuropatkin, General, 311-12, 314, 422-3 Kurram Valley, the, 394-7, 400

Labouchere, Mr., 336 Lado, 502, 558-9 Lagos, 539 Lamsdorff, Count, 575 Lansdowne, Lord, 433, 567, 597, 602, 606 Lavigerie, Cardinal, 534 Lawrence, Lord J., 365, 368-9, 371, 385, 387 Layard, Sir Henry, 221, 226, 245, 246 Leboeuf, Marshall, 47, 53, 64, 65 Lebrun, General, 34-6, 65 Leflô, General, 322 Le Mans, Battle of, 98 Leo XIII., 327, 331, 335 Leopold II. (King of the Belgians), 342, 465, 509, 514, 543, 550-52, 555-7, 558, 565 Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, 40, 42 Lessar, M., 424 Lesseps, M. de, 438, 441 Lewis, General, 487 Liaotung Peninsula, 577, 578, 581-2 Liberation, Wars of (1813-14), 635 Li-Hung Chang, 577, 578, 582 Lissa, Battle of, 17 Livingstone, D., 508-9, 543-4, 567 Lobánoff, Prince, 575 Local Government (French), 119, 120 Lomakin, General, 420 Lombardy, 5-11, 32 London, Conference of (1867), 15, 28 Congress of (1871), 95 London, Peace Conference at (1913), 630-31, 634 Lorraine, 94, 103, 105, 132, 133-4 Lothaire, Commandant, 553 Loubet, M., 127, 601 Louis Philippe, King, 6 Lovtcha, 210, 212 Lübeck, 132, 142 Lüderitz, Herr, 523 Lugard, Sir Frederick, 522, 537, 541 Lumsden, Sir Peter, 426 Luxemburg, 27, 28, 32, 39 Lyttleton, Colonel, 492 Lytton, Lord, 481-7, 490-92, 405-6, 417, 419

Macdonald, General, 402, 487, 491, 496-8 Macdonald, Ramsay, 646 Macedonia, 158, 230, 248, 250, 287-8, 391 Mackenzie, Rev. John, 530-31, 541 Mackinnon, Sir William, 516, 541 Maclaine, Lieutenant, 408, 415 MacMahon, Marshall, 59-61, 74-80, 123, 125-7, 322, 525-6 Mahdi, the, 266; chaps. xvi. xvii. passim Maiwand, Battle of, 407-11 Malet, Sir Edward, 548 Malmesbury, Lord, 47 Manchuria, 345-6, 349, 568, 578, 580, 584 Mancíní, Sígnor, 355 Manin, 7 Marchand, Colonel, 501-6, 540 Maritz, General, 635 Marschall, Baron von, 605 Mars-la-Tour, Battle of, 67-70 Maxwell, General, 487, 491, 497 "May Laws," the, 139-41, 319 Mayo, Lord, 372-3 Mazzini, 6, 7, 91, 92, 304, 327 Mecklenburg, 17, 142 Mehemet Ali, Pasha, 204, 209, 215-16 Melikoff, General Loris, 194, 296-8 Méline, M., 504 Mentana, Battle of, 28, 90 Mercantile System, the, 150 Merriman, Mr., 586 Merv, 345, 374, 387, 388, 423-5, 431, 518 Metternich, Prince, 7, 36 Metz, 55, 63-73, 97, 104 Mexico, 19, 26, 31 Midhat, Pasha, 178-9, 186 Milan, King, 167, 263, 269-72 Milner, Lord, 440, 448, 598 Milutin, General, 204, 215 Mir, the, 294, 307 Mohammed Ali, 437-8 Mohammed V., 618 Moltke, Count von, 18, 43, 65, 66, 78, 85, 104, 130, 193, 205, 320 Mombasa, 520, 523 Montenegro, 158, 163, 167, 173-4, 180, 194, 204, 225, 229, 232, 238, 242, 246-7, 263 Morier, Sir Robert, 187, 273, 286, 302, 428 Morley, Mr. John, 427 Morocco, 602, 604-7, 609-10, 620 seq., 636-7 Moslem Creed, the, and Christians, 156-8, 186-7 Mukden, 598, 606 Mukhtar, Pasha, 208 Münster, Count, 523 Murad V., 169 Muravieff, Count, 571-3, 575, 589

Nabokoff, Captain, 278 Nachtigall, Dr., 533-4 Napoleon I., 2-4, 12, 13, 15-17, 23, 25, 89, 100, 160, 325, 437, 537, 593, 608, 610 Napoleon III., 6, 7, 9-11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25-33, 37-40, 46-9, 52, 63-5, 75-8, 84-6, 88-9, 98, 99, 105, 123, 138, 142, 162, 538, 599 Napoleon, Prince Jerome, 20, 37 Natal, 527, 528, 529, 534 National African Company, the, 535 National Assembly, the French, 98-108, 115-26 Nationality, 2-12, 23, 25, 26-8, 36, 89, 586 Nelidoff, Count, 265, 274, 277 Nelson, 437, 441 Nesselrode, Count, 364 Netherlands, the, 586 Nice, 9, 30, 39 Nicholas, I., 160, 289, 292, 304, 308, 364 Nicholas II., 289, 311-14, 346, 349, 506, 575, 580, 584, 590, 594, 598, 610, 614, 617, 621-2, 640, 643, 649 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 192-3, 200-2, 206, 210, 215, 223, 229, 291, 292 Nicholas, Prince of Montenegro, 263 Nicopolis, 196, 200-1, 206, 217 Niger, river, 533-40, 548 Nigeria, 534-7 Nihilism, 112, 233, 266-7, 291-8, 300-4, 327 Nikolsburg, 19 Northbrook, Lord, 373-4, 376, 379, 381, 465 Northcote, Sir Stafford, 168, 224, 225, 243 North German Confederation, 22, 35, 51, 52, 136 Norway, 4, 5 Novi-Bazar, 332 Novi-Bazar, Sanjak of, 612 Nuttall, General, 411

Obock, 504, 540 Obretchoff, General, 324, 326 O'Donovan, Mr., 424, 462 Ollivier, M., 28, 29, 34, 41, 46, 47, 55, 65 Olmütz, Convention of, 12, 18 Omdurman, Battle of, 441, 493-500 Orleans, 97 Osman Digna, 470, 486 Osman Pasha, 196, 200, 205, 214-19

Palikao, Count, 65, 75, 77, 79, 87 Palmerston, Lord, 30, 438, 441 Pan-German Movement, 593-4, 621 Pan-Islamic Movement, 592-3, 608 Panjdeh, 346, 426-9, 432 Papal States, the, 9, 10 Paris, 87, 88, 95, 97, 98, 105, 107-113, 120 Paris Commune, the (1871), 106-113, 116, 315 Paris, Comte de, 117, 122 Paris, Treaty of (1856), 161, 176 Peiwar, Kotal, Battle at, 396 Pekin, Capture of, 595 Persia, 367, 368, 374, 378, 380, 609, 624 Persian Gulf, the, 592 Peshawur, 394 Peter, King of Servia, 615 Peters, Dr. Karl, 517-19, 522 Phayre, General, 416 Philippopolis, 219, 260, 263-4, 270, 271, 281 Picard, M., 103 Piedmont, 7 Pishin, 400 Pius IX., 6, 7, 38, 89-91, 122, 138-9, 141, 327 Plevna, Battles at, 206-19 Pobyedonosteff, 299, 300 Poland, 4, 5, 25, 26, 31, 301 Pondoland, 529 Port Arthur, 346, 580 Porte, the. See Turkey Portsmouth, Treaty of, 598 Portugal, 520, 525, 526, 540, 541, 546-9 Posen, 141 Primrose, General, 407, 411 Prudhon, 292-5 Prussia (1815-66), 4-22, 26, 51-5, 95, 130, 140, 141. See Germany

Quadrilateral, the Turkish, 194-7, 199-200 Quetta, 381, 385, 398, 412, 416, 432

Rabinek, Herr, 565 Rachfahl, Herr, 605 Radetzky, General, 209, 220 Radowitz, Herr von, 321 Radziwill, Princess, 236-7, 291 Rauf Pasha, 460-61 Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 380 Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de, 188 Redmond, Mr., 646 Reichstag, the German, 133-4, 140, 141, 145-6 Reventlow, Count, 587, 595, 603, 637-8 Revolutions of 1848, 6-7, 11-12 Rezonville, Battle of, 67-70 Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, 530-32, 541 Rhodesia, 532 Riaz Pasha, 445 Ribot, M., 346 Ripon, Lord, 406, 412, 417 Roberts, Lord, 379, 389, 392-3, 395-8, 402-4, 535 Rohrbach, Herr, 637 Rome, 7, 10, 38, 89-92, 95, 138 Roon, Count von, 17, 43 Rosebery, Earl of, 275, 276, 503, 519, 528 Roumania, 26, 157, 158, 162, 192-3, 220, 222, 225, 229-30, 238-40, 257, 260-62, 269 Roumania, King of, 41 Rouvier, M., 607 Royal Niger Company, the, 526, 540 Rubber Tax, in Congo State, 565-7 Russell, Lord John, 14, 15 Russell, Lord Odo, 322 Russia, 5, 9, 12, 13, 26, 31, 32, 55, 95, 112, 145, 148, 161, 164-8, 172, 182, 190-92, 231, 234, 240, 289, 290, 318, 322-7, 331-5, 337, 341-5, 347-9, 371, 446, 447-8, 457, 458, 472, 485, 527, 586, 590-91, 593-5, 597, 603, 606-8, 612-13, 615-17, 621, 624, 626, 629-31, 633-4, 640-44, 647-8 and Bulgaria, 253-88 and Finland, 307-14 and Japan, 585, 592, 598-9 and the Jews, 304-5 and Turkey, 222-7, 229-42 army of, 635, 638 Russia in Central Asia, 359-66, 371-4, 376-80, 383, 387-91, 398-9, 403, 419-30 in the Far East, 595-6, 598, 614, chap. xx. passim Russo-Japanese War, 598-9, 602 Russo-Turkish War, 585 Rustchuk, 194, 199, 208, 265, 280-82, 285, 334

Saarbrücken, Battle of, 61, 62 Said, Khedive, 438 St. Hilaire, Barthélémy de, 328 St. Lucia Bay, 519, 525, 527, 528, 534 St. Privat, Battle of See Gravelotte St. Quentin, Battle of, 98 Saladin, 591 Salisbury, Marquis of, 176-7, 187, 232-4, 240, 243, 266-9, 272, 275, 283, 287, 328, 336, 380-81, 383, 387, 428, 505, 519, 522, 540, 554, 581 Salonica, 167, 229 Samarcand, 365-6, 371, 388-9, 604 Samoa, 588, 610 Samory, 539 San Stefano, Treaty of, 229-32, 233, 238, 253 Sandeman, Sir Robert, 384-5 Sardinia, Kingdom of, 8-11, 162 Saxony, 4, 5, 11, 18, 134-6 Sazonoff, M., 641 Schleswig-Holstein, 5, 12, 13-16, 21, 26, 142 Schnaebele, M., 334, 338 Sedan, Battle of, 77-88 Septennate, the (in France), 123 Serpa Pinto, 540 Servia, 158-9, 163, 167, 173-4, 180, 194, 225, 229, 232, 238, 242, 257, 258, 267, 612-13, 615-16, 631, 637, 639-43, 648-9 Seymour, Admiral, 449-50 Shan-tung, Province of, 580, 581 Shere Ali, 369-74, 376-7, 379-80, 384, 386-8, 390-92, 398-400 Sherpur, Engagements at (1878), 404 Shipka Pass, 197, 201-3, 208, 220 Shumla, 194, 208 Shutargardan Pass, the, 402 Shuvaloff, Count, 233, 235 Siberia, 361, 366, 570-72, 574 Sibi, 398, 400 Simon, Jules, 103 Sistova, 196, 197, 199, 208, 217 Skiernewice, 258, 266, 284, 302, 332-5, 426, 515-18 Skobeleff, General, 198-9, 203, 210, 211-15, 220, 259, 330, 388-9, 421-4, 431 Slave-trade, the, 558, 562 Slavophils, the, 310-12, 339 Slivnitza, Battle of, 270-71 Soboleff, General, 255, 257-8 Sofia, 210, 219, 271, 273, 278-9 Solferino, Battle of, 9 Somaliland, 540 South Africa Company, British, 533 South German Confederation, 21, 22, 35 South-West Africa (German), 523-7, 531-2 Spain, 40, 41, 42, 605 Spicheren, Battle of, 62, 63 Stambuloff, 256, 259, 264, 289, 283-6, 334 Stanley, Sir H.M., 465, 508-9, 543-4, 552, 553 State Socialism (in Germany), 150-53 Steinmetz, General, 71 Stephenson, General, 474 Stepniak, 294, 303 Stewart, Colonel, 466, 476 Stewart, Sir Donald, 398, 405 Stewart, Sit Herbert, 480 Stiege, Admiral, 623 Stoffel, Colonel, 53 Stokes, Mr., execution of, 565 Stolieteff, General, 388-90, 398 Stundists, the, 305-7 Suakim, 462, 473, 478, 486, 488, 518 Sudan, the, passim chaps. xvi. xvii. Suez Canal, the, 166, 190, 225, 438, 439, 457, 513 Suleiman Pasha, 204, 208-9, 215, 216, 219, 221 Swat Valley, the, 433 Sweden, 4, 5 Switzerland, 98, 148

Tamai, Battle of, 470 Tangier, 614 Tashkend, 365, 388, 433 Tatisheff, M., 643 Tchernayeff, General, 174 Tchirsky, Herr von, 640 Tel-el-Kebir, Battle of, 454-5 Tewfik, Khedive, 442-7, 452-3, 458, 461, 466-7, 487, 503, 507 Thessaly, 240-41, 248-9 Thiers, M., 26, 27, 47, 87, 94, 100-6, 108, 114-19, passim chaps. iv. v. Thomson, Joseph, 509-10, 535-6, 541 Thornton, Sir Edward, 427 Three Emperors' League, the, 179, 184, 319-23, 326, 332-4, 448, 515 Tilsit, Treaty of, 308 Timbuctu, 539 Tipu Tib, 553 Tirard, M., 341 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 589, 609 Tisza, M., 180, 283 Todleben, 216-17 Togo, Admiral, 598 Trans-Siberian Railway, the, 574-6, 580, 582-3, 599 Transvaal, the, 525, 527, 586 Treitschke, Herr, 626, 636 Trentino, 335 Triple Alliance, the, 21, 327-33, 335-9, 453, 515, 590-1, 599-601, 609, 615, 624, 635, 637, 647 Triple Entente, the, 593, 595, 609, 617, 635, 647, 649 Trochu, General, 101 Tsushima, Battle of, 598 Tunis, 328-30, 436, 448, 513-14, 600 Turgenieff, 294, 295 Turkestan, 361, 364, 366-7, 419-30 Turkey, 5, 155, 168-77, 181, 187-8, 190-221, 229-42, 332, 342, 348, 436-8, 446, 502, 567, 592, 613, 615-616, 618, 624, 628-30, 632, 638-9

Uganda, 502, 522-3 Umballa, Conference at, 372-3 Umberto I., King of Italy, 327, 329-31, 333, 335, 336 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Netherlands, Kingdom of, 5 United States, the, 30, 31, 547, 567, 578, 581, 596-8, 607

Vandervelde, M., 557 Venetia, 5-11, 17, 19, 21 Verdun, 65, 68 Versailles, 103, 106, 108, 109, 129 Victor Emmanuel II., King of Italy, 2-11, 37, 63, 90, 327 Victor Emmanuel III., 601, 615 Victoria, Queen, 14, 145, 165, 171, 223-4, 261, 322 proclaimed Empress of India, 382 Victoria, Crown Princess of Germany, 323 Vienna, Treaty of (1815), 4, 5 Vionville, Battle of, 67-70 Viviani, M., 644 Vladivostok, 572, 575, 580

Waddington, M., 240, 245, 246, 328 Wady Halfa, 439, 476, 478, 483, 484, 486, 489, 502 Waldeck-Rousseau, M., 600 Waldemar, Prince, 284 Walfisch Bay, 524 Wallachia, 160-62 Warren, Sir Charles, 531-2 Wei-hai-wei, 582 West Africa, 533-40 White, Major G., 402 White, Sir William, 177, 187, 265, 267-9, 273-4, 287, 302 Widdin, 194, 196, 200, 206, 270 William I. (King of Prussia, German Emperor), 11-22, 31, 32, 41-6, 73, 104, 129-30, 137, 152, 236, 321-2, 325, 335, 339, 517, 594 William II. (King of Prussia, German Emperor), 151-3, 339-40, 342, 522, 580, 582, 586-93, 598-9, 604, 606-611, 614, 616-7, 620-1, 623-4, 632, 636-7, 639-41, 643-6 William, Crown Prince of Germany, 625, 646 William of Weid, Prince, 632 Wilson, Sir Charles, 480 Wimpffen, General de, 79-86 Winton, Sir Francis de, 552 Wissmann, Lieutenant von, 546 Wolf, Dr., 546 Wolff, Sir H. Drummond, 485 Wolseley, Lord, 454-6, 466, 475, 476, 478, 481, 507 Wörth, Battle of, 59-62 Würtemberg, 21, 131, 133-5, 137

Yakub Khan, 379, 400-3 Young Turk Party, the, 612-3, 616, 618 Revolution (1908), 615

Zankoff, M., 280 Zanzibar, 516-21, 532, 553 Zazulich, Vera, 292 Zebehr, Pasha, 469-73 Zemstvo, the, 293, 296, 301 Zola, Emile, 600 Zulfikar Pass, the, 428

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