The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952 (part 3 of 8)

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952 (part 3 of 8)

Congress is given power to regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes." Faced in 1886 with a Congressional enactment which prescribed a system of criminal laws for Indians living on their reservations, the Court rejected the government's argument which sought to base the act on the commerce clause. It sustained the act, however, on the following grounds: "From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this Court, whenever the question has arisen. * * * The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes." Moreover, such power was operative within the States.[1034]

Obviously, this line of reasoning renders the commerce clause superfluous as a source of power over the Indian tribes; and some years earlier, in 1871, Congress had forbidden the further making of treaties with them.[1035] However, by a characteristic judicial device the effort has been made at times to absorb the doctrine of the Kagama case into the commerce clause,[1036] although more commonly the Court, in sustaining Congressional legislation, prefers to treat the commerce clause and "the recognized relations of tribal Indians," as joint sources of Congress's power.[1037] Most of the cases have arisen, in fact, in connection with efforts by Congress to ban the traffic in "fire water" with tribal Indians. In this connection it has been held that even though an Indian has become a citizen, yet so long as he remains a member of his tribe, under the charge of an Indian agent, and so long as the United States holds in trust the title to land which has been allotted him, Congress can forbid the sale of intoxicants to him.[1038] Also Congress can prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquors into land occupied by a tribe of uncivilized Indians within territory admitted to statehood.[1039] Nor can a State withdraw Indians within its borders from the operation of acts of Congress regulating trade with them by conferring on them rights of citizenship and suffrage, whether by its constitution or its statutes.[1040] And when a State is admitted into the Union Congress may, in the enabling act, reserve authority to legislate in the future respecting the Indians residing within the new State, and may declare that existing acts of Congress relating to traffic and intercourse with them shall remain in force.[1041]

Clause 4. The Congress shall have Power * * * To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.

Naturalization and Citizenship

CATEGORIES OF NATURALIZED PERSONS

Naturalization has been defined by the Supreme Court as "the act of adopting a foreigner, and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen, * * *"[1042] In the Dred Scott Case,[1043] the Court asserted that the power of Congress under this clause applies only to "persons born in a foreign country, under a foreign government."[1044] These dicta are much too narrow to sustain the power which Congress has actually exercised on the subject. The competence of Congress in this field merges, in fact, with its indefinite, inherent powers in the field of foreign relations. In the words of the Court: "As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries."[1045] By the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952,[1046] which codifies much previous legislation, it is enacted that the following shall be citizens of the United States at birth:

"(1) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;

"(2) a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of citizenship under this subsection shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of such person to tribal or other property;

"(3) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one of whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior to the birth of such person;

"(4) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year prior to the birth of such person, and the other of whom is a national, but not a citizen of the United States;

"(5) a person born in an outlying possession of the United States of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year at any time prior to the birth of such person;

"(6) a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States;

"(7) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph."[1047] By the same act, "persons born in the Canal Zone and Panama after February 26, 1904, one or both of whose parents were at the time of birth of such person citizens of the United States, are declared to be citizens of the United States; as likewise are of certain categories of persons born in Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands and Guam on or after certain stated dates."[1048]

WHO ARE ELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION

Naturalization is a privilege to be given, qualified, or withheld as Congress may determine, which an alien may claim only upon compliance with the terms which Congress imposes. Earlier the privilege was confined to white persons and persons of African descent, but was extended by the Act of December 17, 1943, to descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere and Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent;[1049] and by the Act of June 27, 1952, "the rights of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because the person is married."[1050] But, any person "who advocates or teaches or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches * * *" opposition to all organized government, or "who advocates or teaches or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches the overthrow by force or violence or other unconstitutional means of the Government of the United States" may not be naturalized as a citizen of the United States.[1051] These restrictive provisions are, moreover, "applicable to any applicant for naturalization who at any time within a period of ten years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for naturalization or after such filing and before taking the final oath of citizenship is, or has been found to be within any of the classes enumerated within this section, notwithstanding that at the time the petition is filed he may not be included within such classes."[1052]

THE PROCEDURE OF NATURALIZATION

This involves as its principal and culminating event the taking in open court by the applicant of an oath: "(1) to support the Constitution of the United States; (2) to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the petitioner was before a subject or citizen; (3) to support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) to bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and (5)(A) to bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law, or (B) to perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law, or (C) to perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by law."[1053] Any naturalized person who takes this oath with mental reservations or conceals beliefs and affiliations which under the statute disqualify one for naturalization, is subject, upon these facts being shown in a proceeding brought for the purpose, to have his certificate of naturalization cancelled.[1054] Furthermore, if a naturalized person shall within five years "following his naturalization become a member of or affiliated with any organization, membership in or affiliation with which at the time of naturalization would have precluded such person from naturalization under the provisions of section 313, it shall be considered prima facie evidence that such person was not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and was not well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States at the time of naturalization, and, in the absence of countervailing evidence, it shall be sufficient in the proper proceeding to authorize the revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization as having been obtained by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. * * *" [1055]

RIGHTS OF NATURALIZED PERSONS

Chief Justice Marshall early stated the dictum that "a naturalized citizen * * * become[s] a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the Constitution, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national legislature is, to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual."[1056] A similar idea was expressed in 1946 in Knauer v. United States:[1057] "Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship. * * * [It] carries with it the privilege of full participation in the affairs of our society, including the right to speak freely, to criticize officials and administrators, and to promote changes in our laws including the very Charter of our Government."[1058] But, as shown above, a naturalized citizen is subject at any time to have his good faith in taking the oath of allegiance to the United States inquired into, and to lose his citizenship if lack of such faith is shown in proper proceedings.[1059] Also, "a person who has become a national by naturalization" may lose his nationality by "having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is situated," or by "having a continuous residence for five years in any other foreign state or states."[1060] However, in the absence of treaty or statute to the contrary effect, a child born in the United States who is taken during minority to the country of his parents' origin, where his parents resume their former allegiance, does not thereby lose his American citizenship provided that on attaining his majority he elects to retain it and returns to the United States to assume its duties.[1061]

CONGRESS' POWER EXCLUSIVE

Congress' power over naturalization is an exclusive power. A State cannot denationalize a foreign subject who has not complied with federal naturalization law and constitute him a citizen of the United States, or of the State, so as to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over a controversy between him and a citizen of a State.[1062] But power to naturalize aliens may be, and early was, devolved by Congress upon state courts having a common law jurisdiction.[1063] Also States may confer the right of suffrage upon resident aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens, and have frequently done so.[1064]

RIGHT OF EXPATRIATION: LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP

Notwithstanding evidence in early court decisions[1065] and in the Commentaries of Chancellor Kent of a brief acceptance of the ancient English doctrine of perpetual and unchangeable allegiance to the government of one's birth, whereby a citizen is precluded from renouncing his allegiance without permission of that government, the United States, since enactment of the act of 1868,[1066] if indeed not earlier, has expressly recognized the right of everyone to expatriate himself and choose another country. Retention of citizenship is not dependent entirely, however, upon the desires of the individual; for, although it has been "conceded that a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen," the United States, by virtue of the powers which inhere in it as a sovereign nation, has been deemed competent to provide that an individual voluntarily entering into certain designated conditions shall, as a consequence thereof, suffer the loss of citizenship.[1067]

Exclusion of Aliens

The power of Congress "to exclude aliens from the United States and to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they come in" is absolute, being an attribute of the United States as a sovereign nation. In the words of the Court: "That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power. * * * The United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory."[1068] By the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, some thirty-one categories of aliens are excluded from the United States[1069] including "aliens who are, or at any time have been, members * * * of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches * * * the overthrow by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means of the Government of the United States * * *"[1070]

With this power of exclusion goes also the power to assert a considerable degree of control over aliens after their admission to the country. By the Alien Registration Act of 1940[1071] it was provided that all aliens in the United States, fourteen years of age and over, should submit to registration and finger printing, and wilful failure to do so was made a criminal offense against the United States. This Act, taken in conjunction with other laws regulating immigration and naturalization, has constituted a comprehensive and uniform system for the regulation of all aliens and precludes enforcement of a State registration act. Said the Court, speaking by Justice Black: "With a view to limiting prospective residents from foreign lands to those possessing the qualities deemed essential to good and useful citizenship in America, carefully defined qualifications are required to be met before aliens may enter our country. These qualifications include rigid requirements as to health, education, integrity, character, and adaptability to our institutions. Nor is the alien left free from the application of federal laws after entry and before naturalization. If during the time he is residing here he should be found guilty of conduct contrary to the rules and regulations laid down by Congress, he can be deported. At the time he enters the country, at the time he applies for permission to acquire the full status of citizenship, and during the intervening years, he can be subjected to searching investigations as to conduct and suitability for citizenship."[1072] The Act of June 27, 1952, repeats these requirements of the Act of 1940.[1073]

Recent cases underscore the sweeping nature of the powers of the National Government to exclude aliens from the United States and to deport by administrative process members of excluded classes. In Knauff v. Shaughnessy,[1074] decided early in 1950, an order of the Attorney General excluding, on the basis of confidential information, a wartime bride who was prima facie entitled to enter the United States under The War Brides Act of 1945,[1075] was held to be not reviewable by the courts; nor were regulations on which the order was based invalid as representing an undue delegation of legislative power. Said the Court: "Normally Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States. But because the power of exclusion of aliens is also inherent in the executive department of the sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise the power, e.g., as was done here, for the best interests of the country during a time of national emergency. Executive officers may be entrusted with the duty of specifying the procedures for carrying out the congressional intent."[1076]

In cases decided in March and April, 1952, comparable results were reached: The Internal Security Act of 1950, section 23, in authorizing the Attorney General to hold in custody, without bail, aliens who are members of the Communist Party of the United States, pending determination as to their deportability, is not unconstitutional.[1077] Nor was it unconstitutional to deport under the Alien Registration Act of 1940[1078] a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist Party, although such membership ended before the enactment of the Act. Such application of the Act did not make it ex post facto, being but an exercise of the power of the United States to terminate its hospitality ad libitum.[1079] And a statutory provision[1080] which makes it a felony for an alien against whom a specified order of deportation is outstanding "to willfully fail or refuse to make timely application for travel or other documents necessary to his departure" is not on its face void for "vagueness."[1081]

The power of Congress to legislate with respect to the conduct of alien residents is, however, a concomitant of its power to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may enter the United States; to establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as have entered in violation of law; and to commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive officers. It is not a power to lay down a special code of conduct for alien residents or to govern private relations with them. Purporting to enforce the above distinction, the Court, in 1909, held void a statutory provision which, in prohibiting the importation of "any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution," provided further that whoever should keep for the purpose of prostitution "any alien woman or girl within three years after she shall have entered the United States" should be deemed guilty of a felony and punished therefor.[1082] Three Justices, however, thought the measure justifiable on the principle that "for the purpose of excluding those who unlawfully enter this country Congress has power to retain control over aliens long enough to make sure of the facts. * * * To this end it may make their admission conditional for three years. * * *" [And] "if Congress can forbid the entry * * *, it can punish those who cooperate in their fraudulent entry."[1083]

Bankruptcy

PERSONS WHO MAY BE RELEASED FROM DEBT

In an early case on circuit Justice Livingston suggested that inasmuch as the English statutes on the subject of bankruptcy from the time of Henry VIII down had applied only to traders it might "well be doubted, whether an act of Congress subjecting to such a law every description of persons within the United States, would comport with the spirit of the powers vested in them in relation to this subject."[1084] Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever accepted this limited view. The first bankruptcy law, passed in 1800, departed from the English practice to the extent of including bankers, brokers, factors and underwriters as well as traders.[1085] Asserting that the narrow scope of the English statutes was a mere matter of policy, which by no means entered into the nature of such laws, Justice Story defined a law on the subject of bankruptcies in the sense of the Constitution as a law making provisions for cases of persons failing to pay their debts.[1086] This interpretation has been ratified by the Supreme Court. In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,[1087] it held valid the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 which provided that persons other than traders might become bankrupts and that this might be done on voluntary petition. The Court has given tacit approval to the extension of the bankruptcy laws to cover practically all classes of persons and corporations,[1088] including even municipal corporations.[1089]

LIBERALIZATION OF RELIEF GRANTED

As the coverage of the bankruptcy laws has been expanded, the scope of the relief afforded to debtors has been correspondingly enlarged. The act of 1800, like its English antecedents, was designed primarily for the benefit of creditors. Beginning with the act of 1841, which opened the door to voluntary petitions, rehabilitation of the debtor has become an object of increasing concern to Congress. An adjudication in bankruptcy is no longer requisite to the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction. In 1867 the debtor for the first time was permitted, either before or after adjudication of bankruptcy, to propose terms of composition which would become binding upon acceptance by a designated majority of his creditors and confirmation by a bankruptcy court. This measure was held constitutional,[1090] as were later acts which provided for the reorganization of corporations which are insolvent or unable to meet their debts as they mature,[1091] and for the composition and extension of debts in proceedings for the relief of individual farmer-debtors.[1092] Nor is the power of Congress limited to adjustment of the rights of creditors. The Supreme Court has also ruled that the rights of a purchaser at a judicial sale of the debtor's property are within reach of the bankruptcy power, and may be modified by a reasonable extension of the period for redemption from such sale.[1093] The sympathetic attitude with which the Court has viewed these developments is reflected in the opinion in Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. and P.R. Co.,[1094] where Justice Sutherland wrote, on behalf of a unanimous court: "* * * these acts, far-reaching though they may be, have not gone beyond the limit of Congressional power; but rather have constituted extensions into a field whose boundaries may not yet be fully revealed."[1095]

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER

In the exercise of its bankruptcy powers Congress must not transgress the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. It may not take from a creditor specific property previously acquired from a debtor nor circumscribe the creditor's right to such an unreasonable extent as to deny him due process of law;[1096] neither may it subject the fiscal affairs of a political subdivision of a State to the control of a federal bankruptcy court.[1097] Since Congress may not supersede the power of a State to determine how a corporation shall be formed, supervised and dissolved, a corporation which has been dissolved by a decree of a State court may not file a petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Acts.[1098] But Congress may impair the obligation of a contract and may extend the provisions of the bankruptcy laws to contracts already entered into at the time of their passage.[1099] It may also empower courts of bankruptcy to entertain petitions by taxing agencies or instrumentalities for a composition of their indebtedness where the State has consented to the proceeding and the federal court is not authorized to interfere with the fiscal or governmental affairs of the petitioner.[1100] Also bankruptcy legislation must be uniform, but the uniformity required is geographic, not personal. Congress may recognize the laws of the States relating to dower, exemption, the validity of mortgages, priorities of payment and similar matters, even though such recognition leads to different results from State to State.[1101]

THE POWER NOT EXCLUSIVE

Prior to 1898 Congress exercised the power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies" only very intermittently. The first national bankruptcy law was not enacted until 1800 to be repealed in 1803; the second was passed in 1841 and repealed two years later; the third was enacted in 1867 and repealed in 1878.[1102] Thus during the first 89 years under the Constitution a national bankruptcy law was in existence only sixteen years altogether. Consequently the most important problems of interpretation which arose during that period concerned the effect of this clause on State law. The Supreme Court ruled at an early date that in the absence of Congressional action the States may enact insolvency laws since it is not the mere existence of the power but rather its exercise which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the States.[1103] Later cases were to settle further that the enactment of a national bankruptcy law does not invalidate State laws in conflict therewith but serves only to relegate them to a state of suspended animation with the result that upon repeal of the national statute they again come into operation without reenactment.[1104]

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF STATE INSOLVENCY LAWS

A State is, of course, without power to enforce any law governing bankruptcies which impairs the obligation of contracts,[1105] extends to persons or property outside its jurisdiction,[1106] or conflicts with the national bankruptcy laws.[1107] Giving effect to the policy of the federal statute, the Supreme Court has held that a State statute regulating the distribution of property of an insolvent was suspended by that law,[1108] and that a State court was without power to proceed with pending foreclosure proceedings after a farmer-debtor had filed a petition in the federal bankruptcy court for a composition or extension of time to pay his debts.[1109] A State law governing fraudulent transfers was found to be compatible with the act of Congress,[1110] as was a statute which provided that a discharge in bankruptcy should be unavailing to terminate the suspension of the driver's license of a person who failed to pay a judgment rendered against him for damages resulting from his negligent operation of a motor vehicle.[1111] If a State desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt it must submit to the appropriate requirements of the Bankruptcy Court with respect to the filing of claims by a designated date; it cannot assert a claim for taxes by filing a demand therefor at a later date.[1112]

Clauses 5 and 6. The Congress shall have Power * * * To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.

* * * To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States.

Fiscal and Monetary Powers of Congress

COINAGE, WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

The power "to coin money" and "regulate the value thereof" has been broadly construed to authorize regulation of every phase of the subject of currency. Congress may charter banks and endow them with the right to issue circulating notes,[1113] and may restrain the circulation of notes not issued under its own authority.[1114] To this end it may impose a prohibitive tax upon the circulation of the notes of State banks[1115] or of municipal corporations.[1116] It may require the surrender of gold coin and of gold certificates in exchange for other currency not redeemable in gold. A plaintiff who sought payment for the gold coin and certificates thus surrendered in an amount measured by the higher market value of gold, was denied recovery on the ground that he had not proved that he would suffer any actual loss by being compelled to accept an equivalent amount of other currency.[1117] Inasmuch as "every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that power,"[1118] the Supreme Court sustained the power of Congress to make Treasury notes legal tender in satisfaction of antecedent debts,[1119] and, many years later, to abrogate the clauses in private contracts calling for payment in gold coin, even though such contracts were executed before the legislation was passed.[1120] The power to coin money also imports authority to maintain such coinage as a medium of exchange at home, and to forbid its diversion to other uses by defacement, melting or exportation.[1121]

THE PUNISHMENTS OF COUNTERFEITING

In its affirmative aspect this clause has been given a narrow interpretation; it has been held not to cover the circulation of counterfeit coin or the possession of equipment susceptible of use for making counterfeit coin.[1122] At the same time the Supreme Court has rebuffed attempts to read into this provision a limitation upon either the power of the States or upon the powers of Congress under the preceding clause. It has ruled that a State may punish the utterance of forged coins.[1123] On the ground that the power of Congress to coin money imports "the correspondent and necessary power and obligation to protect and to preserve in its purity this constitutional currency for the benefit of the nation,"[1124] it has sustained federal statutes penalizing the importation or circulation of counterfeit coin,[1125] or the willing and conscious possession of dies in the likeness of those used for making coins of the United States.[1126] In short, the above clause is entirely superfluous. Congress would have had the power which it purports to confer under the necessary and proper clause; and the same is the case with the other enumerated crimes which it is authorized to punish. The enumeration was unnecessary and is not exclusive.[1127]

THE BORROWING POWER VERSUS THE FISCAL POWER

Usually the aggregate of the fiscal and monetary powers of the National Government--to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money and to coin money and regulate the value thereof--have reinforced each other, and, cemented by the necessary and proper clause, have provided a secure foundation for acts of Congress chartering banks and other financial institutions,[1128] or making its treasury notes legal tender in the payment of antecedent debts.[1129] But in 1935 the opposite situation arose--one in which the power to regulate the value of money collided with the obligation incurred in the exercise of the power to borrow money. By a vote of eight-to-one the Supreme Court held that the obligation assumed by the exercise of the latter was paramount, and could not be repudiated to effectuate the monetary policies of Congress.[1130] In a concurring opinion Justice Stone declined to join with the majority in suggesting that "the exercise of the sovereign power to borrow money on credit, which does not override the sovereign immunity from suit, may nevertheless preclude or impede the exercise of another sovereign power, to regulate the value of money; or to suggest that although there is and can be no present cause of action upon the repudiated gold clause, its obligation is nevertheless, in some manner and to some extent, not stated, superior to the power to regulate the currency which we now hold to be superior to the obligation of the bonds."[1131]

Clause 7. The Congress shall have Power * * * To establish Post Offices and post Roads.

The Postal Power

"ESTABLISH"

The great question raised in the early days with reference to the postal clause concerned the meaning to be given to the word "establish"--did it confer upon Congress the power to construct post offices and post roads, or only the power to designate from existing places and routes those that should serve as post offices and post roads? As late as 1855 Justice McLean stated that this power "has generally been considered as exhausted in the designation of roads on which the mails are to be transported," and concluded that neither under the commerce power nor the power to establish post roads could Congress construct a bridge over a navigable water.[1132] A decade earlier, however, the Court, without passing upon the validity of the original construction of the Cumberland Road, held that being "charged, * * *, with the transportation of the mails," Congress could enter a valid compact with the State of Pennsylvania regarding the use and upkeep of the portion of the road lying in that State.[1133] The debate on the question was terminated in 1876 by the decision in Kohl v. United States[1134] sustaining a proceeding by the United States to appropriate a parcel of land in Cincinnati as a site for a post office and courthouse.

POWER TO PROTECT THE MAILS

The postal powers of Congress embrace all measures necessary to insure the safe and speedy transit and prompt delivery of the mails.[1135] And not only are the mails under the protection of the National Government, they are in contemplation of law its property. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1845 in holding that wagons carrying United States mail were not subject to a State toll tax imposed for use of the Cumberland Road pursuant to a compact with the United States.[1136] Half a century later it was availed of as one of the grounds on which the national executive was conceded the right to enter the national courts and demand an injunction against the authors of any wide-spread disorder interfering with interstate commerce and the transmission of the mails.[1137]

ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE MAILS

Prompted by the efforts of Northern anti-slavery elements to disseminate their propaganda in the Southern States through the mails, President Jackson, in his annual message to Congress in 1835, suggested "the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection."[1138] In the Senate John C. Calhoun resisted this recommendation, taking the position that it belonged to the States and not to Congress to determine what is and what is not calculated to disturb their security. He expressed the fear that if Congress might determine what papers were incendiary, and as such prohibit their circulation through the mail, it might also determine what were not incendiary and enforce their circulation.[1139]

POWER TO PREVENT HARMFUL USE OF THE POSTAL FACILITIES

Some thirty years later Congress passed the first of a series of acts to exclude from the mails publications designed to defraud the public or corrupt its morals. In the pioneer case of Ex parte Jackson,[1140] the Court sustained the exclusion of circulars relating to lotteries on the general ground that "the right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded."[1141] The leading fraud order case, decided in 1904, holds to the same effect.[1142] Pointing out that it is "an indispensable adjunct to a civil government," to supply postal facilities, the Court restated its premise that the "legislative body in thus establishing a postal service, may annex such conditions to it as it chooses."[1143] Later cases appear to have qualified these sweeping declarations. In upholding requirements that publishers of newspapers and periodicals seeking second-class mailing privileges file complete information regarding ownership, indebtedness and circulation and that all paid advertisements in such publications be marked as such, the Court emphasized that these provisions were reasonably designed to safeguard the second-class privilege from exploitation by mere advertising publications. Chief Justice White warned that the Court by no means intended to imply that it endorsed the government's "broad contentions concerning the existence of arbitrary power through the classification of the mails, or by way of condition * * *"[1144] Again, in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,[1145] where the Court sustained an order of the Postmaster General excluding from the second-class privilege a newspaper which he found to have systematically published matter banned by the Espionage Act of 1917, the claim of absolute power in Congress to withhold this privilege was sedulously avoided. More recently, when reversing an order denying the second-class privilege to a mailable publication because of the poor taste and vulgarity of its contents, on the ground that the Postmaster General exceeding his statutory authority, Justice Douglas assumed, in the opinion of the Court, "that Congress has a broad power of classification and need not open second-class mail to publications of all types."[1146]

THE EXCLUSION POWER AS AN ADJUNCT TO OTHER POWERS

In the cases just reviewed the mails were closed to particular types of communication which were deemed to be harmful. A much broader power of exclusion was asserted in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.[1147] To induce compliance with the regulatory requirements of that act, Congress denied the privilege of using the mails for any purpose to holding companies which failed to obey that law, irrespective of the character of the material to be carried. Viewing the matter realistically, the Supreme Court treated this provision as a penalty. While it held this statute constitutional because the regulations whose infractions were thus penalized were themselves valid,[1148] it declared that "Congress may not exercise its control over the mails to enforce a requirement which lies outside its constitutional province, * * *."[1149]

STATE REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE MAILS

In determining the extent to which State laws may impinge upon persons or corporations whose services are utilized by Congress in executing its postal powers, the task of the Supreme Court has been to determine whether particular measures are consistent with the general policies indicated by Congress. Broadly speaking, the Court has approved regulations which have a trivial or remote relation to the operation of the postal service, while disallowing those which constitute a serious impediment to it. Thus a State statute which granted to one company an exclusive right to operate a telegraph business in the State was found to be incompatible with a federal law which, in granting to any telegraph company the right to construct its lines upon post roads, was interpreted as a prohibition of State monopolies in a field which Congress was entitled to regulate in the exercise of its combined power over commerce and post roads.[1150] An Illinois statute which, as construed by the State courts, required an interstate mail train to make a detour of seven miles in order to stop at a designated station, also was held to be an unconstitutional interference with the power of Congress under this clause.[1151] But a Minnesota statute which required intrastate trains to stop at county seats was found to be unobjectionable.[1152] Local laws classifying postal workers with railroad employees for the purpose of determining a railroad's liability for personal injuries,[1153] or subjecting a union of railway mail clerks to a general law forbidding any "labor organization" to deny any person membership because of his race, color or creed,[1154] have been held not to conflict with national legislation or policy in this field. Despite the interference pro tanto with the performance of a federal function, a State may arrest a postal employee charged with murder while he is engaged in carrying out his official duties,[1155] but it cannot punish a person for operating a mail truck over its highways without procuring a driver's license from State authorities.[1156]

Clause 8. The Congress shall have Power * * * To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

Copyrights and Patents

SCOPE OF THE POWER

This clause is the foundation upon which the national patent and copyright laws rest, although it uses neither of those terms. So far as patents are concerned, modern legislation harks back to the Statute of Monopolies of 1624, whereby Parliament endowed inventors with the sole right to their inventions for fourteen years.[1157] Copyright law, in turn, traces back to the statute of 1710 which secured to authors of books the sole right of publishing them for designated periods.[1158] Congress was not, however, by this provision, vested with anything akin to the royal prerogative in the creation and bestowal of monopolistic privileges. Its power is limited as to subject matter, and as to the purpose and duration of the rights granted. Only the writings and discoveries of authors and inventors may be protected, and then only to the end of promoting science and the useful arts.[1159] While Congress may grant exclusive rights only for a limited period, it may extend the term upon the expiration of the period originally specified, and in so doing may protect the rights of purchasers and assignees.[1160] The copyright and patent laws do not have, of their own force, any extraterritorial operation.[1161]

PATENTABLE DISCOVERIES

The protection afforded by acts of Congress under this clause is limited to new and useful inventions,[1162] and while a patentable invention is a mental achievement,[1163] yet for an idea to be patentable it must have first taken physical form.[1164] Despite the fact that the Constitution uses the term "discovery" rather than "invention," a patent may not issue for the discovery of a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature; "if there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end."[1165] Conversely, the mental processes which are thus applied must display "more ingenuity * * * than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art";[1166] and while combination patents have been at times sustained,[1167] the accumulation of old devices is patentable "only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts."[1168] The Court's insistence on the presence of "inventive genius" as the test of patentability goes far back and has been reiterated again and again in slightly varying language,[1169] although it seems to have had little effect on the point of view of the Patent Office.[1170]

PROCEDURE IN ISSUING PATENTS

The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard, and the question of the validity of a patent is a question of law.[1171] Congress may authorize the issuance of a patent for an invention by a special, as well as by general law, provided the question as to whether the patentees device is in truth an invention is left open to investigation under the general law.[1172] The function of the Commissioner of Patents in issuing letters patent is deemed to be quasi-judicial in character. Hence an act granting a right of appeal from the Commission to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is not unconstitutional as conferring executive power upon a judicial body.[1173]

NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT SECURED

The leading case bearing on the nature of the rights which Congress is authorized to secure is that of Wheaton v. Peters. Wheaton charged Peters with having infringed his copyright on the twelve volumes of "Wheaton's Reports" wherein are reported the decisions of the United States Supreme Court for the years from 1816 to 1827 inclusive. Peters's defense turned on the proposition that inasmuch as Wheaton had not complied with all of the requirements of the act of Congress, his alleged copyright was void. Wheaton, while denying this assertion of fact, further contended that the statute was only intended to secure him in his pre-existent rights at common law. These at least, he claimed, the Court should protect. A divided Court held in favor of Peters on the legal question. It denied, in the first place, that there was any principle of the common law which protected an author in the sole right to continue to publish a work once published. It denied, in the second place, that there is any principle of law, common or otherwise, which pervades the Union except such as are embodied in the Constitution and the acts of Congress. Nor, in the third place, it held, did the word "securing" in the Constitution recognize the alleged common law principle which Wheaton invoked. The exclusive right which Congress is authorized to secure to authors and inventors owes its existence solely to the acts of Congress securing it,[1174] from which it follows that the rights granted by a patent or copyright are subject to such qualifications and limitations as Congress, in its unhampered consultation of the public interest, sees fit to impose.[1175]

In giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works, Congress did not exceed its powers under this clause. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed.[1176] But the copyright of the description of an art in a book was held not to lay a foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The latter can be protected, if at all, only by letters patent.[1177] Since copyright is a species of property distinct from the ownership of the equipment used in making copies of the matter copyrighted, the sale of a copperplate under execution did not pass any right to print and publish the map which the copperplate was designed to produce.[1178] A patent right may, however, be subjected, by bill in equity, to payment of a judgment debt of the patentee.[1179]

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER PATENT RIGHTS

Letters patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts confer upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the Government without just compensation.[1180] Congress may, however, modify rights under an existing patent, provided vested property rights are not thereby impaired,[1181] but it does not follow that it may authorize an inventor to recall rights which he has granted to others or reinvest in him rights of property which he had previously conveyed for a valuable and fair consideration.[1182] Furthermore, the rights which the present statutes confer are subject to the Anti-Trust Acts, though it can be hardly said that the cases in which the Court has endeavored to draw the line between the rights claimable by patentees and the kind of monopolistic privileges which are forbidden by those acts exhibit entire consistency in their holdings.[1183]

STATE POWER AFFECTING PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS

Nor do the patent laws displace the police or taxing powers of the States. Whatever rights are secured to inventors must be enjoyed in subordination to the general authority of the State over all property within its limits. A statute of Kentucky requiring the condemnation of illuminating oils which were inflammable at less than 130 degrees Fahrenheit, was held not to interfere with any right secured by the patent laws, although the oil for which the patent was issued could not be made to comply with State specifications.[1184] In the absence of federal legislation, a State may prescribe reasonable regulations for the transfer of patent rights so as to protect its citizens from fraud. Hence a requirement of State law that the words "given for a patent right" appear on the face of notes given in payment for such right is not unconstitutional.[1185] Royalties received from patents or copyrights are subject to a nondiscriminating State income tax, a holding to the contrary in 1928 having been subsequently overruled.[1186]

TRADE-MARKS AND ADVERTISEMENTS

In the famous Trade-Mark Cases,[1187] decided in 1879, the Supreme Court held void acts of Congress which, in apparent reliance upon this clause, extended the protection of the law to trade-marks registered in the Patent Office. "The ordinary trade-mark" said Justice Miller for the Court, "has no necessary relation to invention or discovery"; nor is it to be classified "under the head of writings of authors." It does not "depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain."[1188] Not many years later the Court, again speaking through Justice Miller, ruled that a photograph may be constitutionally copyright,[1189] while still more recently a circus poster was held to be entitled to the same protection. In answer to the objection of the Circuit Court that a lithograph which "has no other use than that of a mere advertisement * * * (would not be within) the meaning of the Constitution," Justice Holmes summoned forth the shades of Velasquez, Whistler, Rembrandt, Ruskin, Degas, and others in support of the proposition that it is not for the courts to attempt to judge the worth of pictorial illustrations outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.[1190]

Clause 9. The Congress shall have Power * * * To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; See article III, p. 528.

Clause 10. The Congress shall have Power * * * To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.

Piracies, Felonies, and Offenses Against the Law of Nations

ORIGIN OF THE CLAUSE

"When the United States ceased to be a part of the British empire, and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and custom had established among civilized nations of Europe, as their public law. * * * The faithful observance of this law is essential to national character, * * *"[1191] These words of Chancellor Kent expressed the view of the binding character of International Law which was generally accepted at the time the Constitution was adopted. During the Revolutionary War, Congress took cognizance of all matters arising under the law of nations and professed obedience to that law.[1192] Under the Articles of Confederation, it was given exclusive power to appoint courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, but no provision was made for dealing with offenses against the law of nations.[1193] The draft of the Constitution submitted to the Convention of 1787 by its Committee of Detail empowered Congress "to declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations."[1194] In the debate on the floor of the Convention the discussion turned on the question as to whether the terms, "felonies" and the "law of nations," were sufficiently precise to be generally understood. The view that these terms were often so vague and indefinite as to require definition eventually prevailed and Congress was authorized to define as well as punish piracies, felonies and offenses against the law of nations.[1195]

DEFINITION OF OFFENSES

The fact that the Constitutional Convention considered it necessary to give Congress authority to define offenses against the law of nations does not mean that in every case Congress must undertake to codify that law or mark its precise boundaries before prescribing punishments for infractions thereof. An act punishing "the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations" was held to be an appropriate exercise of the constitutional authority to "define and punish" the offense, since it adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of International Law.[1196] Similarly, in Ex parte Quirin,[1197] the Court found that by the reference in the Fifteenth Article of War to "offenders or offenses that * * * by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions * * *," Congress had "exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals."[1198] Where, conversely, Congress defines with particularity a crime which is "an offense against the law of nations," the law is valid, even if it contains no recital disclosing that it was enacted pursuant to this clause. Thus the duty which the law of nations casts upon every government to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof, was found to furnish a sufficient justification for the punishment of the counterfeiting within the United States, of notes, bonds and other securities of foreign governments.[1199]

EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE POWER

Since this clause contains the only specific grant of power to be found in the Constitution for the punishment of offenses outside the territorial limits of the United States, a lower federal court held in 1932[1200] that the general grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by article III, section 2, could not be construed as extending either the legislative or judicial power of the United States to cover offenses committed on vessels outside the United States but not on the high seas. Reversing that decision, the Supreme Court held that this provision "cannot be deemed to be a limitation on the powers, either legislative or judicial, conferred on the National Government by article III, Sec. 2. The two clauses are the result of separate steps independently taken in the Convention, by which the jurisdiction in admiralty, previously divided between the Confederation and the States, was transferred to the National Government. It would be a surprising result, and one plainly not anticipated by the framers or justified by principles which ought to govern the interpretation of a constitution devoted to the redistribution of governmental powers, if part of them were lost in the process of transfer. To construe the one clause as limiting rather than supplementing the other would be to ignore their history, and without effecting any discernible purpose of their enactment, to deny to both the States and the National Government powers which were common attributes of sovereignty before the adoption of the Constitution. The result would be to deny to both the power to define and punish crimes of less gravity than felonies committed on vessels of the United States while on the high seas, and crimes of every grade committed on them while in foreign territorial waters."[1201] Within the meaning of this section an offense is committed on the high seas even where the vessel on which it occurs is lying at anchor on the road in the territorial waters of another country.[1202]

Clauses 11, 12, 13, and 14. The Congress shall have power * * *:

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.

To provide and maintain a Navy.

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.

The War Power

SOURCE AND SCOPE

Three different views regarding the source of the war power found expression in the early years of the Constitution and continued to vie for supremacy for nearly a century and a half. Writing in The Federalist,[1203] Hamilton elaborated the theory that the war power is an aggregate of the particular powers granted by article I, section 8. Not many years later, in 1795, the argument was advanced that the war power of the National Government is an attribute of sovereignty and hence not dependent upon the affirmative grants of the written Constitution.[1204] Chief Justice Marshall appears to have taken a still different view, namely that the power to wage war is implied from the power to declare it. In McCulloch v. Maryland[1205] he listed the power "to declare and conduct a war"[1206] as one of the "enumerated powers" from which the authority to charter the Bank of the United States was deduced. During the era of the Civil War the two latter theories were both given countenance by the Supreme Court. Speaking for four Justices in Ex Parte Milligan, Chief Justice Chase described the power to declare war as "necessarily" extending "to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of the forces and conduct of campaigns."[1207] In another case, adopting the terminology used by Lincoln in his Message to Congress on July 4, 1861,[1208] the Court referred to "the war power" as a single unified power.[1209]

AN INHERENT POWER

Thereafter we find the phrase, "the war power," being used by both Chief Justice White[1210] and Chief Justice Hughes,[1211] the former declaring the power to be "complete and undivided."[1212] Not until 1936 however did the Court explain the logical basis for imputing such an inherent power to the Federal Government. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,[1213] the reasons for this conclusion were stated by Justice Sutherland as follows: "As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency--namely the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the Declaration of Independence. * * * It results that the investment of the Federal Government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The power to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the Federal Government as necessary concomitants of nationality."[1214]

A COMPLEXUS OF GRANTED POWERS

In the more recent case of Lichter v. United States,[1215] on the other hand, the Court speaks of the "war powers" of Congress. Upholding the Renegotiation Act, it declared that: "In view of this power 'To raise and support Armies, * * *' and the power granted in the same Article of the Constitution 'to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, * * *' the only question remaining is whether the Renegotiation Act was a law 'necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' the war powers of Congress and especially its power to support armies."[1216] In a footnote it listed the Preamble, the necessary and proper clause, the provisions authorizing Congress to lay taxes and provide for the common defense, to declare war, and to provide and maintain a navy, together with the clause designating the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, as being "among the many other provisions implementing the Congress and the President with powers to meet the varied demands of war, * * *"[1217]

A DECLARATION OF WAR, WHEN REQUIRED

In the first draft of the Constitution presented to the Convention of 1787 by its Committee of Detail Congress was empowered "to make war."[1218] On the floor of the Convention according to Madison's Journal "Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry, moved to insert 'declare' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks"[1219] and their motion was adopted. When the Bey of Tripoli declared war upon the United States in 1801 a sharp debate was precipitated as to whether a formal declaration of war by Congress was requisite to create the legal status of war. Jefferson sent a squadron of frigates to the Mediterranean to protect our commerce but its mission was limited to defense in the narrowest sense of the term. After one of the vessels in this squadron had been engaged by, and had defeated, a Tripolitan cruiser, the latter was permitted to return home. Jefferson defended this course in a message to Congress saying, "Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defence, the vessel being disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew."[1220] Hamilton promptly espoused a different interpretation of the power given to Congress to declare war. "It is the peculiar and exclusive province of Congress," he declared "when the nation is at peace to change that state into a state of war; whether from calculations of policy, or from provocations, or injuries received; in other words, it belongs to Congress only to go to War. But when a foreign nation declares or openly and avowedly makes war upon the United States, they are then by the very fact already at war, and any declaration on the part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary."[1221] Apparently Congress shared the view that a formal declaration of war was unnecessary. It enacted a statute which authorized the President to instruct the commanders of armed vessels of the United States to "seize and make prize of all vessels, goods and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, * * *; and also to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify, * * *"[1222]

THE PRIZE CASES, 1863

Sixty years later the Supreme Court, in sustaining the blockade of the Southern ports which Lincoln had instituted in April 1861, at a time when Congress was not in session, adopted virtually the same line of reasoning as Hamilton had advanced. "This greatest of civil wars" said the Court "was not gradually developed * * * it * * * sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact."[1223] This doctrine was sharply challenged by a powerful minority of the Court on the ground that while the President could unquestionably adopt such measures as the statutes permitted for the enforcement of the laws against insurgents, Congress alone could stamp an insurrection with the character of war and thereby authorize the legal consequences which ensue a state of war.[1224] Inasmuch as the Court finally conceded that the blockade had been retroactively sanctioned by Congress, that part of its opinion dealing with the power of the President, acting alone, was really obiter. But a similar opinion was voiced by Chief Justice Chase on behalf of a unanimous Court, after the war was over. In Freeborn v. The "Protector,"[1225] it became necessary to ascertain the exact dates on which the war began and ended in order to determine whether the statute of limitation had run against the asserted claim. To answer this question the Chief Justice said that "it is necessary, therefore, to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons, those of the executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must be taken. The proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed, as marking the second."[1226]

The Power To Raise and Maintain Armed Forces

PURPOSE OF SPECIFIC GRANTS

The clauses of the Constitution which give Congress authority "to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy" and so forth, were not inserted for the purpose of endowing the National Government with power to do these things, but rather to designate the department of government which should exercise such powers. Moreover, they permit Congress to take measures essential to the national defense in time of peace as well as during a period of actual conflict. That these provisions grew out of the conviction that the Executive should be deprived of the "sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies" which Blackstone attributed to the King under the British Constitution,[1227] was emphasized by Story in his Commentaries. He wrote: "Our notions, indeed, of the dangers of standing armies, in time of peace, are derived in a great measure from the principles and examples of our English ancestors. In England, the King possessed the power of raising armies in the time of peace according to his own good pleasure. And this prerogative was justly esteemed dangerous to the public liberties. Upon the revolution of 1688, Parliament wisely insisted upon a bill of rights, which should furnish an adequate security for the future. But how was this done? Not by prohibiting standing armies altogether in time of peace; but (as has been already seen) by prohibiting them without the consent of Parliament. This is the very proposition contained in the Constitution; for Congress can alone raise armies; and may put them down, whenever they choose."[1228]

THE TIME LIMIT ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE ARMY

Prompted by the fear of standing armies to which Story alluded, the framers inserted the limitation that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years." In 1904 the question arose whether this provision would be violated if the Government contracted to pay a royalty for use of a patent in constructing guns and other equipment where the payments were likely to continue for more than two years. Solicitor-General Hoyt ruled that such a contract would be lawful; that the appropriations limited by the Constitution "are those only which are to raise and support armies in the strict sense of the word 'support,' and that the inhibition of that clause does not extend to appropriations for the various means which an army may use in military operations, or which are deemed necessary for the common defense, * * *"[1229] Relying on this earlier opinion, Attorney General Clark ruled in 1948 that there was "no legal objection to a request to the Congress to appropriate funds to the Air Force for the procurement of aircraft and aeronautical equipment to remain available until expended."[1230]

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

By the National Security Act of 1947[1231] there was established within the National Military Establishment "an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force" which was made coordinate with the Departments of the Army and the Navy. Shortly after the passage of this Act a Joint Resolution was offered in the House of Representatives, proposing an amendment to the Constitution whereby Congress would be authorized to "provide and maintain an Air Force and to make rules for the government and regulation thereof," and the President would be designated as Commander in Chief of the Air Force.[1232] Apparently in the belief that the broad sweep of the war power warranted the creation of the Air Force, without a constitutional amendment, Congress took no action on this proposal.

CONSCRIPTION

The constitutions adopted during the Revolutionary War by at least nine of the States sanctioned compulsory military service.[1233] Towards the end of the War of 1812, conscription of men for the army was proposed by James Monroe, then Secretary of War, but opposition developed and peace came before the bill could be enacted.[1234] In 1863 a compulsory draft law was adopted and put into operation without being challenged in the federal courts.[1235] Not so the Selective Service Act of 1917. This measure was attacked on the grounds that it tended to deprive the States of the right to "a well-regulated militia," that the only power of Congress to exact compulsory service was the power to provide for calling forth the militia for the three purposes specified in the Constitution, which did not comprehend service abroad, and finally that the compulsory draft imposed involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected all of these contentions. It held that the powers of the States with respect to the militia were exercised in subordination to the paramount power of the National Government to raise and support armies, and that the power of Congress to mobilize an army was distinct from its authority to provide for calling the militia and was not qualified or in any wise limited thereby.[1236] Before the United States entered the first World War, the Court had anticipated the objection that compulsory military service would violate the Thirteenth Amendment and had answered it in the following words: "It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc. The great purpose in view was liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers."[1237] Accordingly, in the Selective Draft Law Cases[1238] it dismissed the objection under that amendment as a contention that was "refuted by its mere statement."[1239]

CARE OF ARMED FORCES

Congress has a plenary and exclusive power to determine the age at which a soldier or seaman shall be received, the compensation he shall be allowed and the service to which he shall be assigned. This power may be exerted to supersede parents' control of minor sons who are needed for military service. Where the statute which required the consent of parents for enlistment of a minor son did not permit such consent to be qualified, their attempt to impose a condition that the son carry war risk insurance for the benefit of his mother was not binding on the Government.[1240] Since the possession of government insurance payable to the person of his choice, is calculated to enhance the morale of the serviceman, Congress may permit him to designate any beneficiary he desires, irrespective of State law, and may exempt the proceeds from the claims of creditors.[1241] To safeguard the health and welfare of the armed forces, Congress may authorize the suppression of houses of ill fame in the vicinity of the places where such forces are stationed.[1242]

TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENSES

Under its power to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces, Congress may provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner practiced by civilized nations. This authority is independent of the judicial power conferred by article III.[1243] "Cases arising in the land and naval forces" are expressly excepted from the provision of the Fifth Amendment requiring presentment by a grand jury for capital or infamous and by implication they are also excepted from Amendment VI,[1244] which relates to the trial of criminal offenses. Also the Fifth Amendment's provision against double-jeopardy apparently does not apply to military courts.[1245] A statute which provided that offenses not specifically mentioned therein should be punished "according to the laws and customs of such cases at sea" was held sufficient to give a naval court-martial jurisdiction to try a seaman of the United States Navy for the unspecified offense of attempted desertion.[1246] In habeas corpus proceedings a court can consider only whether the military tribunal had jurisdiction to act in the case under consideration.[1247] The acts of a court-martial, within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in the civil courts, by a writ of prohibition or otherwise.[1248]

War Legislation

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR LEGISLATION

The American Revolution affords many precedents for extensive and detailed regulation of the nation's economy in time of war. But since the resolves of Congress under the Articles of Confederation were in practical effect mere recommendations to the State legislatures, it was the action of the latter which made these policies effective. On November 22, 1777, for example, Congress recommended to the States that they take steps "to regulate and ascertain the price of labour, manufactures, [and] internal produce."[1249] A month later the same body further recommended "to the respective legislatures of the United States, forthwith to enact laws, appointing suitable persons to seize and take, for the use of the continental army of the said States, all woolen cloths, blankets, linens, shoes, stockings, hats, and other necessary articles of clothing, * * *"[1250] Responding to such appeals, or acting on their own initiative, the State legislatures enacted measure after measure which entrenched upon the normal life of the community very drastically. Laws were passed forbidding the distillation of whiskey and other spirits in order to conserve grain supplies;[1251] fixing prices of labor and commodities, sometimes in greatest detail;[1252] levying requisitions upon the inhabitants for supplies needed by the army;[1253] and so on. In one instance a statute authorized the erection of an arms manufactory for the United States;[1254] in another, Negro Slaves were impressed for labor on fortifications.[1255] The fact that all this legislation came from the State legislatures whereas the war power was attributed to the "United States in Congress assembled" served to obscure the fact that the former was really an outgrowth of the latter.

CIVIL WAR LEGISLATION

The most pressing economic problem of the Civil War was that of finance. When Congress found itself unable to raise money to pay the soldiers in the field, it authorized the issuance of Treasury notes which, although not redeemable in specie, were made legal tender in payment of private debts. Upon its first consideration of this measure, the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional. It concluded that even if the circulation of such notes was facilitated by giving them the quality of legal tender, that result did not suffice to make the expedient an appropriate and plainly adapted means for the execution of the power to declare and carry on war.[1256] Three of the seven Justices then constituting the Court dissented from this decision,[1257] and it was reversed within a little more than a year, after two vacancies in the membership of the Court had been filled. One of the grounds relied upon by the new majority to sustain the statute was that the exigencies of war justified its enactment under the necessary and proper clause.[1258]

WORLD WAR I LEGISLATION

In meeting the strain which World War I put on our national resources of men and material, the economic activities of the people were directed or restricted by the Government on a scale previously unparalleled. The most sweeping measure of control was the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act,[1259] which authorized the President to regulate by license the importation, manufacture, storage, mining or distribution of necessaries; to requisition foods, feeds, and fuels; to take over and operate factories, packinghouses, pipelines, mines or other plants; to fix a minimum price for wheat; to limit, regulate or prohibit the use of food materials in the production of alcoholic beverages; and to fix the price of coal and coke and to regulate the production, sale and distribution thereof. Other statutes clothed him with power to determine priority in car service,[1260] to license trade with the enemy and his allies,[1261] and to take over and operate the rail and water transportation system,[1262] and the telephonic and telegraphic communication systems,[1263] of the country.

WORLD WAR II LEGISLATION

Several of these World War I measures were still on the statute books when World War II broke out. Moreover, in the period of preparation preceding the latter, Congress had enacted the Priorities Act of May 31, 1941[1264] which gave the President power to allocate any material where necessary to facilitate the defense effort. By the Second War Powers Act,[1265] passed early in 1942, the authority to allocate materials was extended to facilities. These two acts furnished the statutory foundation for the extensive system of consumer rationing administered by the Office of Price Administration, as well as for the comprehensive control of industrial materials and output which was exercised by the War Production Board. Under the Emergency Price Control Act[1266] the Office of Price Administration regulated the price of almost all commodities, as well as the rentals for housing accommodations in scores of defense rental areas. The War Labor Disputes Act[1267] permitted the President to commandeer plants which were closed by strikes.

MOBILIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES

While the validity of several of the measures just reviewed was assailed on one constitutional ground or another, the general power of Congress to regulate their subject matter in time of war was not disputed. Not until the Government sought to recover excessive profits realized on war contracts did the Supreme Court have occasion to affirm the broad authority of the National Government to mobilize the industrial resources of the nation in time of war. Using the power of Congress to conscript men for the armed forces as a measure of its power to regulate industry, the Court sustained the legislation, saying: "The Renegotiation Act was developed as a major wartime policy of Congress comparable to that of the Selective Service Act. The authority of Congress to authorize each of them sprang from its war powers. * * * With the advent of * * * [global] warfare, mobilized property in the form of equipment and supplies became as essential as mobilized manpower. Mobilization of effort extended not only to the uniformed armed services but to the entire population. Both Acts were a form of mobilization. The language of the Constitution authorizing such measures is broad rather than restrictive. * * * [It] * * * places emphasis upon the supporting as well as upon the raising of armies. The power of Congress as to both is inescapably express, not merely implied."[1268]

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN WARTIME

While insisting that, "in peace or in war it is essential that the Constitution be scrupulously obeyed, and particularly that the respective branches of the Government keep within the powers assigned to each,"[1269] the Supreme Court has recognized that in the conduct of a war delegations of power may be valid which would not be admissible in other circumstances. The cases in which this issue has been raised have been few in number. In one, the Selective Draft Law cases,[1270] the objection was dismissed without discussion. In a second, the price-fixing authority exercised by the Office of Price Administration during the second world war, was, on the issue of delegation of power, sustained by reference to peace time precedents.[1271] Where the war power has been the basis of decision, two different theories concerning its significance can be recognized. The first is that since the war power is an inherent power shared by the legislative and executive departments rather than an enumerated power granted to the former, Congress does not delegate legislative power when it authorizes the President to exercise the war power in a prescribed manner. Opposed to this is the view that the right of Congress to delegate power to the President is limited in this as in other cases but that where the validity of the delegation depends upon whether or not too great a latitude of discretion has been conferred upon the Executive, the existence of a state of war is a factor to be considered in determining whether the delegation in the particular case is necessary and hence permissible.

The idea that a delegation of discretion in the exercise of the war power stands on a different footing than delegation of authority to levy a tax is implicit in Justice Bradley's opinion in Hamilton v. Dillin.[1272] The plaintiffs in that case contended that the sum they were required to pay for the privileges of buying cotton in the South was a tax, which, since it was imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury, was invalid because the taxing power was not susceptible of delegation to the Executive Department. To this argument the Court replied: "It is hardly necessary, under the view we have taken of the character of the regulations in question, * * *, to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the act of July 13th, 1861, regarded as authorizing such regulations. * * *, the power of the Government to impose such conditions upon commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war * * * does not belong to the same category as the power to levy and collect taxes, duties, and excises. It belongs to the war powers of the Government * * *."[1273]

The Mergence of Legislative and Executive in Wartime

Both theories receive countenance in different passages in the opinion of Chief Justice Stone in Hirabayashi v. United States.[1274] In disposing of the contention that the curfew imposed upon a citizen of Japanese descent involved an invalid delegation of legislative power, the Chief Justice said: "The question then is not one of Congressional power to delegate to the President the promulgation of the Executive Order, but whether, acting in cooperation, Congress and the Executive have constitutional authority to impose the curfew restriction here complained of. * * *, we conclude that it was within the constitutional power of Congress and the executive arm of the Government to prescribe this curfew order for the period under consideration and that its promulgation by the military commander involved no unlawful delegation of legislative power. * * * Where, as in the present case, the standard set up for the guidance of the military commander, and the action taken and the reasons for it, are in fact recorded in the military orders, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that the orders, in the judgment of the commander, conform to the standards approved by the President and Congress, there is no failure in the performance of the legislative function."[1275] He went on to say, however, that: "The essentials of [the legislative] * * * function are the determination by Congress of the legislative policy and its approval of a rule of conduct to carry that policy into execution. The very necessities which attend the conduct of military operations in time of war in this instance as in many others preclude Congress from holding committee meetings to determine whether there is danger, before it enacts legislation to combat the danger."[1276]

Doctrine of Lichter v. United States

A similar ambiguity is found in Lichter v. United States,[1277] but on the whole the opinion seems to espouse the second theory, as the following excerpts indicate: "A constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes.--This power is especially significant in connection with constitutional war powers under which the exercise of broad discretion as to methods to be employed may be essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress. The degree to which Congress must specify its policies and standards in order that the administrative authority granted may not be an unconstitutional delegation of its own legislative power is not capable of precise definition.[1278] * * * Thus, while the constitutional structure and controls of our Government are our guides equally in war and in peace, they must be read with the realistic purposes of the entire instrument fully in mind. In 1942, in the early stages of total global warfare, the exercise of a war power such as the power 'To raise and support Armies, * * *' and 'To provide and maintain a Navy; * * *,' called for the production by us of war goods in unprecedented volume with the utmost speed, combined with flexibility of control over the product and with a high degree of initiative on the part of the producers. Faced with the need to exercise that power, the question was whether it was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to delegate to the high officials named therein the discretion contained in the Original Renegotiation Act of April 28, 1942, and the amendments of October 21, 1942. We believe that the administrative authority there granted was well within the constitutional war powers then being put to their predestined uses."[1279]

WAR POWERS IN TIME OF PEACE

To some indeterminate extent the power to wage war embraces the power to prepare for it and the further power to deal with the problem of adjustment after hostilities have ceased. In his Commentaries, Justice Story wrote as follows with specific reference to the question of preparation for war: "'It is important also to consider, that the surest means of avoiding war is to be prepared for it in peace. * * * How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could in like manner prohibit the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can be only regulated by the means and the danger of attack. * * * It will be in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.'"[1280] Authoritative judicial recognition of the power is found in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,[1281] where, in sustaining the power of the Government to construct and operate Wilson Dam and the power plant connected with it, pursuant to the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916,[1282] the Court said: "While the District Court found that there is no intention to use the nitrate plants or the hydroelectric units installed at Wilson Dam for the production of war materials in time of peace, 'the maintenance of said properties in operating condition and the assurance of an abundant supply of electric energy in the event of war, constitute national defense assets.' This finding has ample support."[1283]

Atomic Energy Act

By far the most significant example of legislation adopted at a time when no actual "shooting war" was in progress, with the object of providing for the national defense, is the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.[1284] That law establishes an Atomic Energy Commission of five members which is empowered to conduct through its own facilities, or by contracts with, or loans to private persons, research and developmental activity relating to nuclear processes, the theory and production of atomic energy and the utilization of fissionable and radioactive materials for medical, industrial and other purposes. The act further provides that the Commission shall be the exclusive owner of all facilities (with minor exceptions) for the production of fissionable materials; that all fissionable material produced shall become its property; that it shall allocate such materials for research and developmental activities, and shall license all transfer of source materials. The Commission is charged with the duty of producing atomic bombs, bomb parts, and other atomic military weapons at the direction of the President. Patents relating to fissionable materials must be filed with the Commission, the "just compensation" payable to the owners to be determined by a Patent Compensation Board designated by the Commission from among its employees.

POSTWAR LEGISLATION

The war power "is not limited to victories in the field. * * * It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress."[1285] Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in 1871 that it was within the competence of Congress to deduct from the period limited by statute for the bringing of an action the time during which plaintiff had been unable to prosecute his suit in consequence of the Civil War. This principle was given a much broader application after the first world war in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Wine Co.,[1286] where the War Time Prohibition Act adopted after the signing of the Armistice was upheld as an appropriate measure for increasing war efficiency. It was conceded that the measure was valid when enacted, since the mere cessation of hostilities did not end the war or terminate the war powers of Congress. The plaintiff contended however that in October 1919, when the suit was brought, the war emergency had in fact passed, and that the law was therefore obsolete. Inasmuch as the treaty of peace had not yet been concluded and other war activities had not been brought to a close, the Court said it was "unable to conclude" that the act had ceased to be valid. But in 1924 it held upon the facts that we judicially know that the rent control law for the District of Columbia, which had previously been upheld,[1287] had ceased to operate because the emergency which justified it had come to an end.[1288] A similar issue was present after World War II in Woods v. Miller,[1289] where the Supreme Court reversed a decision of a lower court to the effect that the authority of Congress to regulate rents by virtue of the war power ended with the Presidential proclamation terminating hostilities on December 31, 1946. This decision was coupled with a warning that: "We recognize the force of the argument that the effects of war under modern conditions may be felt in the economy for years and years, and that if the war power can be used in days of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society, it may not only swallow up all other powers of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments as well. There are no such implications in today's decision."[1290] In 1948, a sharply divided Court further ruled that the power which Congress has conferred upon the President to deport enemy aliens in time of a declared war was not exhausted when the shooting war stopped. Speaking for the majority of five, Justice Frankfurter declared: "It is not for us to question a belief by the President that enemy aliens who were justifiably deemed fit subjects for internment during active hostilites [sic] do not lose their potency for mischief during the period of confusion and conflict which is characteristic of a state of war even when the guns are silent but the peace of Peace has not come."[1291]

Private Rights in Wartime

ENEMY COUNTRY

Although, broadly speaking, the constitutional provisions designed for the protection of individual rights are operative in war as well as in peace, the incidents of war repeatedly give rise to situations in which judicially enforceable constitutional restraints are inapplicable. In the first place persons in enemy territory are entirely beyond the reach of constitutional limitations. They are subject, in relation to the war powers of the National Government, to the laws of war as interpreted and applied by Congress and by the President as Commander in Chief. To the question: "What is the law which governs an army invading an enemy's country?" the Court gave the following answer in Dow v. Johnson:[1292] "It is not the civil law of the invaded country; it is not the civil law of the conquering country: it is military law,--the law of war,--and its supremacy for the protection of the officers and soldiers of the army, when in service in the field in the enemy's country, is as essential to the efficiency of the army as the supremacy of the civil law at home, and, in time of peace, is essential to the preservation of liberty."[1293]

THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

That substantially the same rule, resting on the same considerations, applies in the field of active military operations, was assumed by all members of the Court in Ex parte Milligan.[1294] There the Court held that the trial by a military commission of a civilian charged with acts of disloyalty committed in a part of the country which was remote from the theatre of military operations, and in which the civil courts were open and functioning, was invalid under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Although unanimous in holding that the military tribunal lacked jurisdiction to try the case, the Court divided, five-to-four, as to the grounds of the decision. The point on which the Justices differed was which department of the Government had authority to say with finality what regions lie within the theatre of military operation. Claiming this as a function of the courts, the majority held that the theatre of war did not embrace an area in which the civil courts were open and functioning.[1295] The minority argued that this was a question to be determined by Congress.[1296] All rejected the argument of the government that the President's determination was conclusive in the absence of restraining legislation. A similar result was reached in Duncan v. Kahanamoku[1297] where, upon an examination of the circumstances existing in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor, a divided Court found that the authority which Congress had granted to the Territorial Governor to declare martial law "in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof," did not warrant the trial of civilians by military tribunals.

ENEMY PROPERTY

The position of enemy property was dealt with by Chief Justice Marshall in the early case of Brown v. United States.[1298] Here it was held that the mere declaration of war by Congress does not effect a confiscation of enemy property situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, but the right of Congress by further enactment to subject such property to confiscation was asserted in the most positive terms. Being an exercise of the war powers of the Government, such confiscation is not affected by the restrictions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Since it has no relation to the personal guilt of the owner, it is immaterial whether the property belongs to an alien, a neutral, or even to a citizen of the United States. The whole doctrine of confiscation is built upon the foundation that it is an instrument of coercion, which, by depriving an enemy of property within the reach of his power, whether within his territory or without it, impairs his ability to resist the confiscating government, while at the same time it furnishes to that government means for carrying on the war. Any property which the enemy can use, either by actual appropriation, or by the exercise of control over the owner, no matter what his nationality, is a proper subject of confiscation. Congress may provide for immediate seizure of property which the President or his agent determines to be enemy property, leaving the question of enemy ownership to be settled later at the suit of a claimant. For these reasons the Confiscation Act of 1862,[1299] and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and amendments thereto, were held to be within the power of Congress to "make rules concerning captures on land and water."[1300]

PRIZES OF WAR

The power of Congress with respect to prizes is plenary; no one can have any interest in prizes captured except by permission of Congress.[1301] Nevertheless, since International Law is a part of our law, the Court will administer it so long as it has not been modified by treaty or by legislative or executive action. Thus, during the Civil War, the Court found that the Confiscation Act of 1861, and the Supplementary Act of 1863, which, in authorizing the condemnation of vessels, made provision for the protection of interests of loyal citizens, merely created a municipal forfeiture and did not override or displace the law of prize. It decided, therefore, that when a vessel was liable to condemnation under either law, the government was at liberty to proceed under the more stringent rules of International Law, with the result that the citizen would be deprived of the benefit of the protective provisions of the statute.[1302] Similarly, when Cuban ports were blockaded during the Spanish-American War, the Court held, over the vigorous dissent of three of its members, that the rule of International Law exempting unarmed fishing vessels from capture was applicable in the absence of any treaty provision, or other public act of the Government in relation to the subject.[1303]

POLICE REGULATIONS; RENT CONTROL

In enforcing the requirement of due process of law in its modern expanded sense of "reasonable law" the Court has recognized that a war emergency may justify legislation which would otherwise be an unconstitutional invasion of private rights. Shortly after the first world war, it sustained, by a narrow margin, a rent control law for the District of Columbia, which not merely limited the rents which might be charged but which also gave the existing tenants the right to continue in occupancy of their dwellings at their own option, provided they paid rent and performed other stipulated conditions. The Court, while conceding that ordinarily such legislation would transcend constitutional limitations, declared that "a public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land to a certain extent without compensation. * * * A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change."[1304] During World War II an apartment house owner who complained that the rentals allowed by the Office of Price Administration did not afford a "fair return" on the property was told by the Court that, "a nation which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging of * * * war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control * * * which will assure each landlord a 'fair return' on his property."[1305] Moreover, such rentals may be established without a prior hearing because "national security might not be able to afford the luxuries of litigation and the long delays which preliminary hearings traditionally have entailed. * * * Where Congress has provided for judicial review after the regulations or orders have been made effective it has done all that due process under the war emergency requires."[1306] The more specific clauses of the Bill of Rights yield less readily, however, to the impact of a war emergency. In United States v. Cohen Grocery Company,[1307] the Court held that a statute which penalized the making of "'any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling * * * any necessaries,'" was void on the ground that it set up no "ascertainable standard of guilt" and so was "repugnant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments * * * which require due process of law and that persons accused of crime shall be adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation."[1308]

PERSONAL LIBERTY IN WARTIME

That the power of Congress to punish seditious utterances in time of war is limited by the First Amendment was assumed by the Supreme Court in the series of cases[1309] in which it affirmed convictions for violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.[1310] But in the famous opinion of Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,[1311] it held that: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."[1312] A State also has power to make it unlawful to advocate that citizens of the State should not assist in prosecuting a war against public enemies of the United States.[1313] The most drastic restraint of personal liberty imposed during World War II was the detention and relocation of the Japanese residents of the Western States, including those who were native-born citizens of the United States. When various phases of this program were challenged, the Court held that in order to prevent espionage and sabotage, the freedom of movement of such persons could be restricted by a curfew order,[1314] even by a regulation excluding them from a defined area,[1315] but that a citizen of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty was concerned could not be detained against her will in a relocation camp.[1316]

ALIEN ENEMIES

The status of alien enemies was first considered in connection with the passage of the Alien Act of 1798,[1317] whereby the President was authorized to deport any alien or to license him to reside within the United States at any place to be designated by the President. Critics of the measure conceded its constitutionality so far as enemy aliens were concerned, because, as Madison wrote, "The Constitution having expressly delegated to Congress the power to declare war against any nation, and, of course, to treat it and all its members as enemies."[1318] The substance of this early law was reenacted during the first world war. Under it the President is authorized, in time of war, to prescribe "the manner and degree of the restraint to which [alien enemies] shall be subject and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted," or to provide for their removal from the United States.[1319] This measure was held valid in Ludecke v. Watkins.[1320]

EMINENT DOMAIN

An often-cited dictum uttered shortly after the Mexican War asserted the right of an owner to compensation for property destroyed to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, or for that taken for public use.[1321] In United States v. Russell,[1322] decided following the Civil War, a similar conclusion was based squarely on the Fifth Amendment, although the case did not necessarily involve the point. Finally, in United States v. Pacific Railroad,[1323] also a Civil War case, the Court held that the United States was not responsible for the injury or destruction of private property by military operations, but added that it did not have in mind claims for property of loyal citizens which was taken for the use of the national forces. "In such cases," the Court said, "it has been the practice of the government to make compensation for the property taken. * * *, although the seizure and appropriation of private property under such circumstances by the military authorities may not be within the terms of the constitutional clauses."[1324] Meantime, however, in 1874, a committee of the House of Representatives, in an elaborate report on war claims growing out of the Civil War, had voiced the opinion that the Fifth Amendment embodied the distinction between a taking of property in the course of military operations or other urgent military necessity, and other takings for war purposes, and required compensation of owners in the latter class of cases.[1325] In determining what constitutes just compensation for property requisitioned for war purposes during World War II, the Court has assumed that the Fifth Amendment is applicable to such takings.[1326]

Clause 15. The Congress shall have Power * * * To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.

Clause 16. The Congress shall have Power * * * To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The Militia Clauses

CALLING OUT THE MILITIA

The States as well as Congress may prescribe penalties for failure to obey the President's call of the militia. They also have a concurrent power to aid the National Government by calls under their own authority, and in emergencies may use the militia to put down armed insurrection.[1327] The Federal Government may call out the militia in case of civil war; its authority to suppress rebellion is found in the power to suppress insurrection and to carry on war.[1328] The act of February 28, 1795,[1329] which delegated to the President the power to call out the militia, was held constitutional.[1330] A militiaman who refused to obey such a call was not "employed in the service of the United States so as to be subject to the article of war," but was liable to be tried for disobedience of the act of 1795.[1331]

REGULATION OF THE MILITIA

The power of Congress over the militia "being unlimited, except in the two particulars of officering and training them, * * *, it may be exercised to any extent that may be deemed necessary by Congress. * * * The power of the State government to legislate on the same subjects, having existed prior to the formation of the Constitution, and not having been prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the States, subordinate nevertheless to the paramount law of the General Government, * * *"[1332] Under the National Defense Act of 1916,[1333] the militia, which hitherto had been an almost purely State institution, was brought under the control of the National Government. The term "militia of the United States" was defined to comprehend "all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have * * * declared their intention to become citizens of the United States," between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The act reorganized the National Guard, determined its size in proportion to the population of the several States, required that all enlistments be for "three years in service and three years in reserve," limited the appointment of officers to those who "shall have successfully passed such tests as to * * * physical, moral and professional fitness as the President shall prescribe," and authorized the President in certain emergencies to "draft into the military service of the United States to serve therein for the period of the war unless sooner discharged, any and all members of the National Guard and National Guard Reserve," who thereupon should "stand discharged from the militia."

Clause 17. Congress shall have power * * * To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

The Seat of Government

The jurisdiction of the United States over the District of Columbia vested on the first Monday of December, 1800.[1334] By the act of February 27, 1801,[1335] the District was divided into two counties and in the following year the city of Washington was erected into a municipality.[1336] The present form of government dates from 1876; all legislative powers with respect to District affairs are retained by Congress, while an executive board of three commissioners vested with ordinance powers is appointed by the President.[1337] As a municipal corporation, the District has the legal capacity to sue and be sued.[1338] But the District Commissioners are merely administrative officers, having only the ministerial powers given them by statute; accordingly they were found to have no power to submit a claim against the District to arbitration.[1339]

NATURE AND EXTENT OF RIGHTS CEDED TO UNITED STATES

In ceding the territory which became the District of Columbia, both Maryland and Virginia provided that the United States should not acquire any right of property in the soil except by transfer by the individual owner. This proviso was held not to prevent the Federal Government from exercising the power of eminent domain within the District.[1340] Under the agreement made between the original proprietors of the land on which the city of Washington was laid out, and the Commissioners appointed by the President to survey, define and locate the district for the seat of government, the United States became the owner in fee of the streets of the city although the trustees never carried out their agreement to convey them.[1341] Both the right of dominion and of property of navigable waters and of the soil under them in the District, which originally had been granted by Charles I, King of England to the Lord Proprietary of Maryland, and to which Maryland succeeded upon the American Revolution, became vested in the United States by the cession from Maryland.[1342]

RETROCESSION OF ALEXANDRIA COUNTY

Originally the District of Columbia embraced the maximum area permitted by the Constitution. In 1846, however, Congress authorized a referendum on the question of retroceding Alexandria County to Virginia, and declared that jurisdiction should be relinquished to that State if a majority of the voters in the county voted in favor of the change. The proposal was approved, whereupon, without any further action by Congress, Virginia declared the county annexed and resumed full jurisdiction over it. Thirty years later, in a suit to recover taxes paid to the State, the Supreme Court called the retrocession "a violation of the Constitution" but held that since Congress had recognized the transfer as a settled fact, a resident of the county was estopped from challenging it.[1343]

CONTINUANCE OF STATE LAWS

Under the act of July 16, 1790,[1344] which provided for the establishment of the seat of government, State laws were continued in operation until Congress created a government for the District. The Supreme Court intimated that this was "perhaps, only declaratory of a principle which would have been in full operation without such declaration."[1345] In 1801 Congress declared that the laws of Virginia and Maryland "as they now exist, shall be and continue in force" in the respective portions of the District ceded by those States.[1346] The only effect of the cession upon individuals was to terminate their State citizenship and the jurisdiction of the State governments over them;[1347] contract obligations were not affected,[1348] and liens on property for debt were continued.[1349]

STATUS OF THE DISTRICT TODAY

Chief Justice Marshall ruled in the early case of Hepburn v. Ellzey[1350] that the District of Columbia is not a State within the meaning of the diversity of citizenship clause of article III. This view was consistently adhered to for nearly a century and a half in the interpretation of later acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts.[1351] In 1940, however, Congress expressly authorized those courts to take jurisdiction of nonfederal controversies between residents of the District of Columbia and citizens of a State. By a five-to-four decision that statute was held constitutional, but the Justices who voted to sustain it were not in agreement as to the grounds of the decision.[1352] Three found it to be an appropriate exercise of the power of Congress to legislate for the District of Columbia without reference to article III.[1353] Six members of the Court rejected this theory, but two of the six joined in upholding the act on another ground which seven of their brethren considered untenable,--namely, that Hepburn v. Ellzey was erroneously decided and that the District of Columbia should be deemed to be a "State" within the meaning of article III, section 2.[1354]

It is not disputed that the District is a part of "the United States," and that its residents are entitled to the privilege of trial by jury, whether in civil or criminal cases,[1355] and of presentment by a grand jury.[1356] Legislation which is restrictive of the rights of liberty and property in the District must find justification in facts adequate to support like legislation by a State in the exercise of its police power.[1357]

LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Congress possesses over the District of Columbia the blended powers of a local and national legislature.[1358] Even when legislating for the District, Congress remains the legislature of the Union, with the result that it may give its enactments nation-wide operations so far as is "necessary and proper" in order to make them locally effective. As was pointed out in Cohens v. Virginia,[1359] if a felon escapes from the State in which the crime was committed, the government of such State cannot pursue him into another State and there apprehend him, "but must demand him from the executive power of that other State." On the other hand, a felon escaping from the District of Columbia or any other place subject to the exclusive power of Congress, may be apprehended by the National Government anywhere in the United States. "And the reason," declared Chief Justice Marshall, "is, that Congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, [of exclusive legislation], like all its other powers, in its high character, as the legislature of the Union."[1360]

TAXATION IN THE DISTRICT

Persons and property within the District of Columbia are subject to taxation by Congress under both the first and seventeenth clauses of this section. A general tax levied throughout the United States may be applied to the District of Columbia upon the same conditions as elsewhere;--e.g., if a direct tax, it must be levied in proportion to the census.[1361] But in laying taxes for District purposes only, "Congress, like any State legislature unrestricted by constitutional provisions, may its discretion wholly exempt certain classes of property from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than other property."[1362] It is no impediment to the exercise of either power that residents of the District lack the suffrage and have politically no voice in the expenditure of the money raised by taxation.[1363]

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MUNICIPAL OFFICERS

Congress may delegate to municipal authorities legislative functions which are strictly local in character.[1364] It may confer upon them the power to improve or repair streets, to assess adjacent property therefor,[1365] and to regulate public markets.[1366] It may confirm assessments previously made by the District government without authority of law.[1367] But in Stoutenburgh v. Hennick,[1368] the Court held that Congress would not, and did not intend to, delegate to the District the power to impose a license tax on commercial agents who offered merchandise for sale by sample, since such a license amounted to a regulation of interstate commerce.

COURTS OF THE DISTRICT

In its capacity as a local legislature Congress may create courts for the District of Columbia and may confer upon them powers and duties which lie outside the judicial power vested in "constitutional" courts. On appeal from an order of the District Public Utilities Commission, a court for the District of Columbia may be empowered to modify valuations, rates and regulations established by the Commission and to make such orders as in its judgment the Commission should have made. But inasmuch as the issuance of such orders is a legislative as distinguished from a judicial function, the provision for an appeal from them to the Supreme Court was held unconstitutional.[1369]

Despite the fact that Congress, acting under this clause, imposed nonjudicial duties upon the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, those tribunals were held to be constitutional courts, established under article III, with the result that the compensation of the judges thereof may not be diminished during their continuance in office.[1370] Since the courts established for the District are courts of the United States, their judgments stand upon the same footing, so far as concerns the obligations created by them, as domestic judgments of the States, wherever rendered and wherever sought to be enforced.[1371]

Authority Over Places Purchased

"PLACES"

This clause has been broadly construed to cover all structures necessary for carrying on the business of the National Government.[1372] It includes post offices,[1373] a hospital and a hotel located in a national park,[1374] and locks and dams for the improvement of navigation.[1375] But it does not cover lands acquired for forests, parks, ranges, wild life sanctuaries or flood control.[1376] Nevertheless the Supreme Court has held that a State may convey, and that Congress may accept, either exclusive or qualified jurisdiction over property acquired within the geographical limits of a State, for purposes other than those enumerated in Clause 17.[1377]

After exclusive jurisdiction over lands within a State has been ceded to the United States, Congress alone has the power to punish crimes committed within the ceded territory.[1378] Private property located thereon is not subject to taxation by the State,[1379] nor can State statutes enacted subsequent to the transfer have any operation therein.[1380] But the local laws in force at the date of cession which are protective of private rights continue in force until abrogated by Congress.[1381]

DURATION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

A State may qualify its cession of territory by a condition that jurisdiction shall be retained by the United States only so long as the place is used for specified purposes.[1382] Such a provision operates prospectively and does not except from the grant that portion of a described tract which is then used as a railroad right of way.[1383] In 1892, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the United States to try a person charged with murder on a military reservation, over the objection that the State had ceded jurisdiction only over such portions of the area as were used for military purposes, and that the particular place on which the murder was committed was used solely for farming. The Court held that the character and purpose of the occupation having been officially established by the political department of the government, it was not open to the Court to inquire into the actual uses to which any portion of the area was temporarily put.[1384] A few years later, however, it ruled that the lease to a city, for use as a market, of a portion of an area which had been ceded to the United States for a particular purpose, suspended the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.[1385]

Recently the question arose whether the United States retains jurisdiction over a place which was ceded to it unconditionally after it has abandoned the use of the property for governmental purposes and entered into a contract for the sale thereof to private persons. Minnesota asserted the right to tax the equitable interest of the purchaser in such land, and the Supreme Court upheld its right to do so. The majority assumed that "the Government's unrestricted transfer of property to nonfederal hands is a relinquishment of the exclusive legislative power."[1386] In separate concurring opinions Chief Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter reserved judgment on the question of territorial jurisdiction.[1387]

RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION BY STATES

For more than a century the Supreme Court kept alive, by repeated dicta,[1388] the doubt expressed by Justice Story "whether Congress are by the terms of the Constitution, at liberty to purchase lands for forts, dockyards, etc., with the consent of a State legislature, where such consent is so qualified that it will not justify the 'exclusive legislation' of Congress there. It may well be doubted if such consent be not utterly void."[1389] But when the issue was squarely presented in 1937, the Court ruled that where the United States purchases property within a State with the consent of the latter, it is valid for the State to convey, and for the United States to accept, "concurrent jurisdiction" over such land, the State reserving to itself the right to execute process "and such other jurisdiction and authority over the same as is not inconsistent with the jurisdiction ceded to the United States."[1390] The holding logically renders the second half of Clause 17 superfluous. In a companion case, the Court ruled further that even if a general State statute purports to cede exclusive jurisdiction, such jurisdiction does not pass unless the United States accepts it.[1391]

Clause 18. The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

The Coefficient or Elastic Clause

SCOPE OF INCIDENTAL POWERS

That this clause is an enlargement, not a constriction, of the powers expressly granted to Congress, that it enables the lawmakers to select any means reasonably adapted to effectuate those powers, was established by Marshall's classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.[1392] "Let the end be legitimate," he wrote, "let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."[1393] Moreover, this provision gives Congress a share in the responsibilities lodged in other departments, by virtue of its right to enact legislation necessary to carry into execution all powers vested in the National Government. Conversely, where necessary for the efficient execution of its own powers, Congress may delegate some measure of legislative power to other departments.[1394]

OPERATION OF COEFFICIENT CLAUSE

Practically every power of the National Government has been expanded in some degree by the coefficient clause. Under its authority Congress has adopted measures requisite to discharge the treaty obligations of the nation;[1395] it has organized the federal judicial system and has enacted a large body of law defining and punishing crimes. Effective control of the national economy has been made possible by the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State to the extent necessary to protect and promote interstate commerce.[1396] Likewise the right of Congress to utilize all known and appropriate means for collecting the revenue, including the distraint of property for Federal taxes,[1397] and its power to acquire property needed for the operation of the government by the exercise of the power of eminent domain,[1398] have greatly extended the range of national power. But the widest application of the necessary and proper clause has occurred in the field of monetary and fiscal controls. Inasmuch as the various specific powers granted by article I, section 8, do not add up to a general legislative power over such matters, the Court has relied heavily upon this clause in sustaining the comprehensive control which Congress has asserted over this subject.[1399]

DEFINITION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES

Although the only crimes which Congress is expressly authorized to punish are piracies, felonies on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations, treason and counterfeiting of the securities and current coin of the United States, its power to create, define and punish crimes and offenses whenever necessary to effectuate the objects of the Federal Government is universally conceded.[1400] Illustrative of the offenses which have been punished under this power are the alteration of registered bonds;[1401] the bringing of counterfeit bonds into the country;[1402] conspiracy to injure prisoners in custody of a United States marshal;[1403] impersonation of a federal officer with intent to defraud;[1404] conspiracy to injure a citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States;[1405] the receipt by government officials of contributions from government employees for political purposes;[1406] advocating, etc., the overthrow of the Government by force.[1407] Part I of Title 18 of the United States Code comprises more than 500 sections defining penal offenses against the United States.

CHARTERING OF BANKS

As an appropriate means for executing "the great powers, to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies * * *" Congress may incorporate banks and kindred institutions.[1408] Moreover, it may confer upon them private powers which, standing alone, have no relation to the functions of the Federal Government, if those privileges are essential to the effective operation of such corporations.[1409] Where necessary to meet the competition of State banks, Congress may authorize national banks to perform fiduciary functions, even though, apart from the competitive situation, federal instrumentalities might not be permitted to engage in such business.[1410] The Court will not undertake to assess the relative importance of the public and private functions of a financial institution which Congress has seen fit to create. It sustained the act setting up the Federal Farm Loan Banks to provide funds for mortgage loans on agricultural land against the contention that the right of the Secretary of the Treasury, which he had not exercised, to use these banks as depositaries of public funds, was merely a pretext for chartering these banks for private purposes.[1411]

CURRENCY REGULATIONS

Reinforced by the necessary and proper clause, the powers "'to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,' and 'to borrow money on the credit of the United States and to coin money and regulate the value thereof * * *'";[1412] have been held to give Congress virtually complete control over money and currency. A prohibitive tax on the notes of State banks;[1413] the issuance of treasury notes impressed with the quality of legal tender in payment of private debts[1414] and the abrogation of clauses in private contracts which called for payment in gold coin,[1415] were sustained as appropriate measures for carrying into effect some or all of the foregoing powers.

POWER TO CHARTER CORPORATIONS

In addition to the creation of banks, Congress has been held to have authority to charter a railroad corporation,[1416] or a corporation to construct an interstate bridge,[1417] as instrumentalities for promoting commerce among the States, and to create corporations to manufacture aircraft[1418] or merchant vessels[1419] as incidental to the war power.

COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Inasmuch as the Constitution "delineated only the great outlines of the judicial power * * *, leaving the details to Congress, * * * The distribution and appropriate exercise of the judicial power must * * * be made by laws passed by Congress, * * *"[1420] As a necessary and proper provision for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by article III, section 2 Congress may direct the removal from a State to a federal court of a criminal prosecution against a federal officer for acts done under color of federal law,[1421] and may authorize the removal before trial of civil cases arising under the laws of the United States.[1422] It may prescribe the effect to be given to judicial proceedings of the federal courts,[1423] and may make all laws necessary for carrying into execution the judgments of federal courts.[1424] When a territory is admitted as a State, Congress may designate the Court to which the records of the territorial courts shall be transferred, and may prescribe the mode for enforcement and review of judgments rendered by those courts.[1425] In the exercise of other powers conferred by the Constitution, apart from article III, Congress may create legislative courts and "clothe them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers into execution."[1426]

SPECIAL ACTS CONCERNING CLAIMS

This clause enables Congress to pass special laws to require other departments of the Government to prosecute or adjudicate particular claims, whether asserted by the Government itself or by private persons. In 1924,[1427] Congress adopted a Joint Resolution directing the President to cause suit to be instituted for the cancellation of certain oil leases alleged to have been obtained from the Government by fraud, and to prosecute such other actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, as were warranted by the facts. This resolution also authorized the appointment of special counsel to have charge of such litigation. Private acts providing for a review of an order for compensation under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,[1428] or conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine certain claims of a contractor against the Government, in conformity with directions given by Congress, after that court had denied recovery on such claims, have been held constitutional.[1429]

MARITIME LAW

Congress may implement the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by revising and amending the maritime law which existed at the time the Constitution was adopted, but in so doing, it cannot go beyond the reach of that jurisdiction.[1430] This power cannot be delegated to the States; hence acts of Congress which purported to make State Workmen's Compensation laws applicable to maritime cases were held unconstitutional.[1431]

Section 9. Clause 1. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

Powers Denied to Congress

GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE SECTION

This section of the Constitution (containing eight clauses restricting or prohibiting legislation affecting the importation of slaves, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the enactment of bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, the levying of taxes on exports, the granting of preference to ports of one State over another, the granting of titles of nobility, etc.,) is devoted to restraints upon the power of Congress and of the National Government,[1432] and in no respect affects the States in the regulation of their domestic affairs.[1433]

The above clause, which sanctioned the importation of slaves by the States for twenty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when considered with the section requiring escaped slaves to be returned to their masters (art. IV, Sec. 1, cl. 3), was held by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sanford,[1434] to show conclusively that such persons and their descendants were not embraced within the term "citizen" as used in the Constitution. Today is interesting only as an historical curiosity.

Clause 2. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

HABEAS CORPUS

Purpose of the Writ

This section, which restricts only the Federal Government and not the States,[1435] is the only place in the Constitution where the writ of habeas corpus is mentioned. The framers took for granted that the courts of the United States would be given jurisdiction to issue this, the greatest of the safeguards of personal liberty embodied in the common law, and the Judiciary Act of 1789[1436] provided for the issuance of the writ according to "the usages and principles of law." At common law the purpose of such a proceeding was to obtain the liberation of persons who were imprisoned without just cause.[1437] While the Supreme Court conceded at an early date that the authority of the federal courts to entertain petitions for habeas corpus derived solely from acts of Congress,[1438] a narrow majority recently asserted the right to expand the scope of the writ by judicial interpretation and to sanction its use for a purpose unknown to the common law, i.e., to bring a prisoner into court to argue his own appeal. Speaking for the majority Justice Murphy declared that: "However, we do not conceive that a circuit court of appeals, in issuing a writ of habeas corpus under Sec. 262 of the Judicial Code, is necessarily confined to the precise forms of that writ in vogue at the common law or in the English judicial system. Section 262 says that the writ must be agreeable to the usages and principles of 'law,' a term which is unlimited by the common law or the English law. And since 'law' is not a static concept, but expands and develops as new problems arise, we do not believe that the forms of the habeas corpus writ authorized by Sec. 262 are only those recognized in this country in 1789, when the original Judiciary Act containing the substance of this section came into existence."[1439]

Errors Which May Be Corrected on Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus provides a remedy for jurisdictional and constitutional errors at the trial without limit as to time.[1440] It may be used to correct errors of that order made by military as well as by civil courts.[1441] Under the common law and the Act 31 Car. II c. 2 (1679), where a person was detained pursuant to a conviction by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, habeas corpus was available only if a want of jurisdiction appeared on the face of the record of the Court which convicted him. A showing in a return to a writ that the prisoner was held under final process based upon a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction closed the inquiry.[1442] Under the Judiciary Act of 1789[1443] the same rule obtained.[1444] But by the act of February 5, 1867,[1445] Congress extended the writ to all persons restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, and required the Court to ascertain the facts and to "dispose of the party as law and justice require." This gave the prisoner a right to have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention. The Supreme Court has said that there is "no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus * * *" .[1446]

Habeas Corpus Not a Substitute for Appeal

Since the writ of habeas corpus is appellate in nature, Congress may confer jurisdiction to issue it upon the Supreme Court as well as upon the inferior federal courts.[1447] The proceeding may not, however, be used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error.[1448] But if special circumstances make it advantageous to use this writ in aid of a just disposition of a cause pending on appeal it may be used for that purpose.[1449] Where facts dehors the record, which are not open to consideration upon appeal, are alleged to show a denial of constitutional rights, a judicial hearing must be granted to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations.[1450]

Issuance of the Writ

On application for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court may either issue the writ, and, on the return, dispose of the case, or it may waive the issuing of the writ and consider whether, upon the facts presented in the petition, the prisoner, if brought before it, could be discharged.[1451] The proceeding may not be used to secure an adjudication of a question which, if determined in the prisoner's favor, could not result in his immediate release.[1452] A discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus is granted only in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.[1453] While the strict doctrine of res judicata does not apply to this proceeding,[1454] the Court may, in its discretion, dismiss a petition for habeas corpus where the ground on which it is sought had been alleged in a prior application, but the evidence to support it had been unjustifiably withheld for use on a second attempt if the first failed.[1455] Where the Government did not deny the allegation in a prisoner's fourth petition for habeas corpus, but sought dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that the prisoner had abused the writ, the prisoner was held to be entitled to a hearing to determine whether the charge of abusive use of the writ was well founded.[1456]

Suspension of the Privilege

A critical question under this section is who determines with finality whether the circumstances warrant suspension of the privilege of the writ. In England the writ may be suspended only by Act of Parliament,[1457] and in an early case Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the decision as to when public safety calls for this drastic action depends "on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide."[1458] At the beginning of the Civil War Lincoln authorized the Commanding General of the Army of the United States to suspend the writ along any military line between Philadelphia and Washington.[1459] In Ex parte Merryman,[1460] Chief Justice Taney strongly denounced the President's action and reasserted the proposition that only Congress could suspend the writ. Attorney General Bates promptly challenged Taney's opinion. Noting that in Ex parte Bollman, Marshall did "not speak of suspending the privilege of the writ, but of suspending the powers vested in the Court by the act," he took the position that the constitutional provision was itself the equivalent of an Act of Parliament.[1461] Thereafter, by an express provision of the act of March 3, 1863, Congress declared, "That, during the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof."[1462] The validity of this statute was assumed in Ex parte Milligan,[1463] but a narrow majority of the Court declared that the suspension of the writ did not authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denied to one arrested the privilege of the writ in order to obtain his liberty.[1464]

Clause 3. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

BILLS OF ATTAINDER

Historically, the term "bills of attainder" was applied to "such special acts of the legislature as inflict capital punishment upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." An act which inflicted a milder degree of punishment was called a bill of pains and penalties.[1465] Within the meaning of the Constitution, however, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.[1466] As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this clause prohibits all legislative acts, "no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial * * *"[1467] Two acts of Congress--one which required attorneys practicing in the federal courts to take an oath that they had never given aid to persons engaged in hostility to the United States,[1468] and another which prohibited the payment of compensation to certain named government employees who have been charged with subversive activity,[1469]--have been held unconstitutional on the ground that they amounted to bills of attainder.

EX POST FACTO LAWS

Definition

At the time the Constitution was adopted, many persons understood the terms ex post facto laws, to "embrace all retrospective laws, or laws governing or controlling past transactions, whether * * * of a civil or a criminal nature."[1470] But in the early case of Calder v. Bull,[1471] the Supreme Court decided that the phrase, as used in the Constitution, applies only to penal and criminal statutes. But although it is inapplicable to retroactive legislation of any other kind,[1472] the constitutional prohibition may not be evaded by giving a civil form to a measure which is essentially criminal.[1473] Every law which makes criminal an act which was innocent when done, or which inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed, is an ex post facto law within the prohibition of the Constitution.[1474] A prosecution under a temporary statute which was extended before the date originally set for its expiration does not offend this provision even though it is instituted subsequent to the extension of the statute's duration for a violation committed prior thereto.[1475] Since this provision has no application to crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country, it is immaterial in extradition proceedings whether the foreign law is ex post facto or not.[1476]

What Constitutes Punishment

An act of Congress which prescribed as a qualification for practice before the federal courts an oath that the attorney had not participated in the Rebellion was found unconstitutional since it operated as a punishment for past acts.[1477] But a statute which denied to polygamists the right to vote in a territorial election, was upheld even as applied to a person who had not practiced polygamy since the act was passed, because the law did not operate as an additional penalty for the offense of polygamy but merely defined it as a disqualification of a voter.[1478] A deportation law authorizing the Secretary of Labor to expel aliens for criminal acts committed before its passage is not ex post facto since deportation is not a punishment.[1479] Likewise an act permitting the cancellation of naturalization certificates obtained by fraud prior to the passage of the law was held not to impose a punishment but simply to deprive the alien of his ill-gotten privileges.[1480]

Change in Place or Mode of Trial

A change of the place of trial of an alleged offense after its commission, is not an ex post facto law. If no place of trial was provided when the offense was committed, Congress may designate the place of trial thereafter.[1481] A law which alters the rule of evidence to permit a person to be convicted upon less or different evidence than was required when the offense was committed is invalid,[1482] but a statute which simply enlarges the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases is not ex post facto as applied to a prosecution for a crime committed prior to its passage.[1483]

Clause 4. No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

DIRECT TAXES

The Hylton Case

The crucial problem under this section is to distinguish "direct" from other taxes. In its opinion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., we find the Court declaring: "It is apparent * * * that the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of the Constitution and those who adopted it."[1484] Against this confident dictum may be set the following brief excerpt from Madison's Notes on the Convention: "Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one answered."[1485] The first case to come before the Court on this issue was Hylton v. United States,[1486] which was decided early in 1796. Congress had levied, according to the rule of uniformity, a specific tax upon all carriages, for the conveyance of persons, which shall be kept by, or for any person, for his own use, or to be let out for hire, or for the conveying of passengers. In a fictitious statement of facts, it was stipulated that the carriages involved in the case were kept exclusively for the personal use of the owner and not for hire. The principal argument for the constitutionality of the measure was made by Hamilton, who treated it as an "excise tax,"[1487] while Madison both on the floors of Congress and in correspondence attacked it as "direct" and so void, inasmuch as it was levied without apportionment.[1488] The Court, taking the position that the direct tax clause constituted in practical operation an exception to the general taxing powers of Congress, held that no tax ought to be classified as "direct" which could not be conveniently apportioned, and on this basis sustained the tax on carriages as one on their "use" and therefore an "excise." Moreover, each of the judges advanced the opinion that the direct tax clause should be restricted to capitation taxes and taxes on land, or that at most, it might cover a general tax on the aggregate or mass of things which generally pervade all the States, especially if an assessment should intervene; while Justice Paterson, who had been a member of the Federal Convention, testified to his recollection that the principal purpose of the provision had been to allay the fear of the Southern States lest their Negroes and lands should be subjected to a specific tax.[1489]

From the Hylton to the Pollock Case

The result of the Hylton case was not challenged until after the Civil War. A number of the taxes imposed to meet the demands of that war were assailed during the postwar period as direct taxes, but without result. The Court sustained successively as "excises" or "duties," a tax on an insurance company's receipts for premiums and assessments;[1490] a tax on the circulating notes of State banks,[1491] an inheritance tax on real estate,[1492] and finally a general tax on incomes.[1493] In the last case, the Court took pains to state that it regarded the term "direct taxes" as having acquired a definite and fixed meaning-to-wit, capitation taxes, and taxes on hand.[1494] Then, almost one hundred years after the Hylton case, the famous case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company[1495] arose under the Income Tax Act of 1894.[1496] Undertaking to correct "a century of error" the Court held, by a vote of five-to-four, that a tax on income from property was a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution and hence void because not apportioned according to the census.

Restriction of the Pollock Decision

The Pollock decision encouraged taxpayers to challenge the right of Congress to levy by the rule of uniformity numerous taxes which had always been reckoned to be excises. But the Court evinced a strong reluctance to extend the doctrine to such exactions. Purporting to distinguish taxes levied "because of ownership" or "upon property as such" from those laid upon "privileges,"[1497] it sustained as "excises" a tax on sales on business exchanges;[1498] a succession tax which was construed to fall on the recipients of the property transmitted, rather than on the estate of the decedent,[1499] and a tax on manufactured tobacco in the hands of a dealer, after an excise tax had been paid by the manufacturer.[1500] Again, in Thomas v. United States,[1501] the validity of a stamp tax on sales of stock certificates was sustained on the basis of a definition of "duties, imposts and excises." These terms, according to the Chief Justice, "were used comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture and sale of certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occupations and the like."[1502] On the same day it ruled, in Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain,[1503] that an exaction denominated a special excise tax imposed on the business of refining sugar and measured by the gross receipts thereof, was in truth an excise and hence properly levied by the rule of uniformity. The lesson of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.[1504] is the same. Here what was in form an income tax was sustained as a tax on the privilege of doing business as a corporation, the value of the privilege being measured by the income, including income from investments. Similarly, in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.[1505] a tax on the annual production of mines was held to be "independently of the effect of the operation of the Sixteenth Amendment * * * not a tax upon property as such because of its ownership, but a true excise levied on the results of the business of carrying on mining operations."[1506]

A convincing demonstration of the extent to which the Pollock decision had been whittled down by the time the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted is found in Billings v. United States.[1507] In challenging an annual tax assessed for the year 1909 on the use of foreign built yachts--a levy not distinguishable in substance from the carriage tax involved in the Hylton case as construed by the Supreme Court-counsel did not even suggest that the tax should be classed as a direct tax. Instead, he based his argument that the exaction constituted a taking of property without due process of law upon the premise that it was an excise, and the Supreme Court disposed of the case upon the same assumption.

In 1921 the Court cast aside the distinction drawn in Knowlton v. Moore between the right to transmit property on the one hand and the privilege of receiving it on the other, and sustained an estate tax as an excise. "Upon this point" wrote Justice Holmes for a unanimous court, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."[1508] This proposition being established, the Court has had no difficulty in deciding that the inclusion in the computation of the estate tax of property held as joint tenants,[1509] or as tenants by the entirety,[1510] or the entire value of community property owned by husband and wife,[1511] or the proceeds of insurance upon the life of the decedent,[1512] did not amount to direct taxation of such property. Similarly it upheld a graduated tax on gifts as an excise, saying that it was "a tax laid only upon the exercise of a single one of those powers incident to ownership, the power to give the property owned to another."[1513] In vain did Justice Sutherland, speaking for himself and two associates, urge that "the right to give away one's property is as fundamental as the right to sell it or, indeed, to possess it."[1514]

Miscellaneous

The power of Congress to levy direct taxes is not confined to the States which are represented in that body. Such a tax may be levied in proportion to population in the District of Columbia.[1515] A penalty imposed for nonpayment of a direct tax is not a part of the tax itself and hence is not subject to the rule of apportionment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court sustained the penalty of fifty percent which Congress exacted for default in the payment of the direct tax on land in the aggregate amount of twenty million dollars which was levied and apportioned among the States during the Civil War.[1516]

Clause 5. No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

TAXES ON EXPORTS

This prohibition applies only to the imposition of duties on goods by reason of exportation.[1517] The word "export" signifies goods exported to a foreign country, not to an unincorporated territory of the United States.[1518] A general tax laid on all property alike, including that intended for export, is not within the prohibition, if it is not levied on goods in course of exportation nor because of their intended exportation.[1519] Where the sale to a commission merchant for a foreign consignee was consummated by delivery of the goods to an exporting carrier, the sale was held to be a step in the exportation and hence exempt from a general tax on sales of such commodity.[1520] The giving of a bond for exportation of distilled liquor is not the commencement of exportation so as to exempt from an excise tax spirits which were not exported pursuant to such bond.[1521] A tax on the income of a corporation derived from its export trade is not a tax on "articles exported" within the meaning of the Constitution.[1522]

Stamp Taxes

A stamp tax imposed on foreign bills of lading,[1523] charter parties,[1524] or marine insurance policies,[1525] is in effect a tax or duty upon exports, and so void; but an act requiring the stamping of all packages of tobacco intended for export in order to prevent fraud was held not to be forbidden as a tax on exports.[1526]

Clause 6. No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

THE "NO PREFERENCE" CLAUSE

The limitations imposed by this section were designed to prevent preferences as between ports on account of their location in different States. They do not forbid such discriminations as between individual ports. Acting under the commerce clause, Congress may do many things which benefit particular ports and which incidentally result to the disadvantage of other ports in the same or neighboring States. It may establish ports of entry, erect and operate lighthouses, improve rivers and harbors, and provide structures for the convenient and economical handling of traffic.[1527] A rate order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which allowed an additional charge to be made for ferrying traffic across the Mississippi to cities on the east bank of the river was sustained over the objection that it gave an unconstitutional preference to ports in Texas.[1528] Although there were a few early intimations that this clause was applicable to the States as well as to Congress,[1529] the Supreme Court declared emphatically in 1886 that State legislation was unaffected by it.[1530] After more than a century the Court confirmed, over the objection that this clause was offended, the power which the First Congress had exercised[1531] in sanctioning the continued supervision and regulation of pilots by the States.[1532] Alaska is not deemed to be a State within the meaning of this clause.[1533]

Clause 7. No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

APPROPRIATIONS

This clause is a limitation upon the power of the executive department and does not restrict Congress in appropriating moneys in the Treasury.[1534] That body may recognize and pay a claim of an equitable, moral or honorary nature. Where it directs a specific sum to be paid to a certain person, neither the Secretary of the Treasury nor any court has discretion to determine whether the person is entitled to receive it.[1535] In making appropriations to pay claims arising out of the Civil War, the Court held that it was lawful to provide that certain persons, i.e., those who had aided the rebellion, should not be paid out of the funds made available by the general appropriation, but that such persons should seek relief from Congress.[1536] The Court has also recognized that Congress has a wide discretion as to the extent to which it shall prescribe details of expenditures for which it appropriates funds and has approved the frequent practice of making general appropriations of large amounts to be allotted and expended as directed by designated government agencies. Citing as an example the act of June 17, 1902[1537] where all moneys received from the sale and disposal of public lands in a large number of States and territories were set aside as a special fund to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior upon such projects as he determined to be practicable and advisable for the reclamation of arid and semi-arid lands within those States and territories, the Court declared: "The constitutionality of this delegation of authority has never been seriously questioned."[1538]

PAYMENT OF CLAIMS

No officer of the Federal Government is authorized to pay a debt due from the United States, whether reduced to judgment or not, without an appropriation for that purpose.[1539] After the Civil War, a number of controversies arose out of attempts by Congress to restrict the payment of the claims of persons who had aided the Rebellion, but had thereafter received a pardon from the President. The Supreme Court held that Congress could not prescribe the evidentiary effect of a pardon in a proceeding in the Court of Claims for property confiscated during the Civil War,[1540] but that where the confiscated property had been sold and the proceeds paid into the Treasury, a pardon did not of its own force authorize the restoration of such proceeds.[1541] It was within the competence of Congress to declare that the amounts due to persons thus pardoned should not be paid out of the Treasury and that no general appropriation should extend to their claims.[1542]

Clause 8. No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

In 1871 the Attorney General of the United States ruled that: "A minister of the United States abroad is not prohibited by the Constitution from rendering a friendly service to a foreign power, even that of negotiating a treaty for it, provided he does not become an officer of that power, but the acceptance of a formal commission, as minister plenipotentiary, creates an official relation between the individual thus commissioned and the government which in this way accredits him as its representative, which is prohibited by this clause of the Constitution."[1543]

Section 10. No State Shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

Powers Denied to the States

TREATIES, ALLIANCES OR CONFEDERATIONS

At the time of the Civil War this clause was one of the provisions upon which the Court relied in holding that the Confederation formed by the seceding States could not be recognized as having any legal existence.[1544] Today, its practical significance lies in the limitations which it implies upon the power of the States to deal with matters having a bearing upon international relations. In the early case of Holmes v. Jennison,[1545] Chief Justice Taney invoked it as a reason for holding that a State had no power to deliver up a fugitive from justice to a foreign State. Recently the kindred idea that the responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations rests exclusively with the Federal Government prompted the Court to hold that, since the oil under the three mile marginal belt along the California coast might well become the subject of international dispute and since the ocean, including this three mile belt, is of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world, the Federal Government has paramount rights in and power over that belt, including full dominion over the resources of the soil under the water area.[1546] In Skiriotes v. Florida,[1547] the Court, on the other hand, ruled that this clause did not disable Florida from regulating the manner in which its own citizens may engage in sponge fishing outside its territorial waters. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes declared: "When its action does not conflict with federal legislation, the sovereign authority of the State over the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas is analogous to the sovereign authority of the United States over its citizens in like circumstances."[1548]

BILLS OF CREDIT

Within the sense of the Constitution, bills of credit signify a paper medium of exchange, intended to circulate between individuals; and between the Government and individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society. It is immaterial whether the quality of legal tender is imparted to such paper. Interest bearing certificates, in denominations not exceeding ten dollars, which were issued by loan offices established by the State of Missouri, and made receivable in payment of taxes or other moneys due to the State, and in payment of the fees and salaries of State officers, were held to be bills of credit whose issuance was banned by this section.[1549] The States are not forbidden, however, to issue coupons receivable for taxes,[1550] nor to execute instruments binding themselves to pay money at a future day for services rendered or money borrowed.[1551] Bills issued by State banks are not bills of credit;[1552] it is immaterial that the State is the sole stockholder of the bank,[1553] that the officers of the bank were elected by the State legislature,[1554] or that the capital of the bank was raised by the sale of State bonds.[1555]

LEGAL TENDER

Relying on this clause, which applies only to the States and not to the Federal Government,[1556] the Supreme Court has held that where the marshal of a State court received State bank notes in payment and discharge of an execution, the creditor was entitled to demand payment in gold or silver.[1557] Since, however, there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits a bank depositor from consenting when he draws a check, that payment may be made by draft, a State law which provided that checks drawn on local banks should, at the option of the bank, be payable in exchange drafts was held valid.[1558]

BILLS OF ATTAINDER

Statutes passed after the Civil War with the intent and result of excluding persons who had aided the Confederacy from following certain callings, by the device of requiring them to take an oath that they had never given such aid, were held invalid as being bills of attainder, as well as ex post facto laws.[1559]

EX POST FACTO LAWS

Scope of Provision

This clause, like the cognate restriction imposed on the Federal Government by section 9, relates only to penal and criminal legislation and not to civil laws which affect private rights adversely.[1560] It is directed only against legislative action and does not touch erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts.[1561] Even though a law is ex post facto and invalid as to crimes committed prior to its enactment, it is nonetheless valid as to subsequent offenses.[1562] If it mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time the crime was committed,[1563] or if it merely penalizes the continuance of conduct which was lawfully begun before its passage, the statute is not ex post facto. Thus measures penalizing the failure of a railroad to cut drains through existing embankments,[1564] or making illegal the continued possession of intoxicating liquors which were lawfully acquired,[1565] have been held valid.

Denial of Future Privileges to Past Offenders

The right to practice a profession may be denied to one who was convicted of an offense before the statute was enacted if the offense may reasonably be regarded as a continuing disqualification for the profession. Without offending the Constitution, a statute making it a misdemeanor to practice medicine after conviction of a felony may be enforced against a person so convicted before the act was passed.[1566] But the test oath prescribed after the Civil War, whereby office holders, teachers, or preachers were required to swear that they had not participated in the Rebellion, were held invalid on the ground that it had no reasonable relation to fitness to perform official or professional duties, but rather was a punishment for past offenses.[1567] A similar oath required of suitors in the courts also was held void.[1568]

Changes in Punishment

Statutes which changed an indeterminate sentence law to require a judge to impose the maximum sentence, whereas formerly he could impose a sentence between the minimum and maximum;[1569] abolished a rule which prevented a subsequent conviction of first-degree murder after a jury had found the accused guilty in the second-degree by a verdict which had been set aside;[1570] required criminals sentenced to death to be kept thereafter in solitary confinement,[1571] or allowed a warden to fix, within limits of one week, and keep secret the time of execution,[1572] were held to be ex post facto as applied to offenses committed prior to their enactment. But laws providing heavier penalties for new crimes thereafter committed by habitual criminals;[1573] changing the punishment from hanging to electrocution, fixing the place therefor in the penitentiary, and permitting the presence of a greater number of invited witnesses;[1574] or providing for close confinement of six to nine months in the penitentiary, in lieu of three to six months in jail prior to execution, and substituting the warden for the sheriff as hangman, have been sustained.[1575]

Changes in Procedure

An accused person does not have a right to be tried in all respects in accordance with the law in force when the crime charged was committed.[1576] The mode of procedure may be changed so long as the substantial rights of the accused are not curtailed.[1577] Laws shifting the place of trial from one county to another,[1578] increasing the number of appellate judges and dividing the appellate court into divisions,[1579] granting a right of appeal to the State,[1580] changing the method of selecting and summoning jurors,[1581] making separate trials for persons jointly indicted a matter of discretion for the trial court rather than a matter of right,[1582] and allowing a comparison of handwriting experts[1583] have been sustained over the objection that they were ex post facto. The contrary conclusion was reached with respect to the application to felonies committed before a Territory was admitted to the Union, of the provision in the State constitution which permitted the trial of criminal cases by a jury of eight persons, instead of the common law jury of twelve which was guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment during the period of territorial government.[1584]

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS

Definition of Terms

"Law."--The term comprises statutes, constitutional provisions,[1585] municipal ordinances,[1586] and administrative regulations having the force and operation of statutes.[1587] How is it as to judicial decisions? Not only does the abstract principle of the separation of powers forbid the idea that the courts "make" law, but the word "pass" in the above clause seems to confine it to the formal and acknowledged methods of exercise of the law-making function. Accordingly, the Court has frequently said that the clause does not cover judicial decisions, however erroneous, or whatever their effect on existing contract rights.[1588] Nevertheless, there are important exceptions to this rule which are hereinafter set forth.

Status of Judicial Decisions.--Also, while the highest State court usually has final authority in determining the construction as well as the validity of contracts entered into under the laws of the State, and the national courts will be bound by their decision of such matters, nevertheless, for reasons which are fairly obvious, this rule does not hold when the contract is one whose obligation is alleged to have been impaired by State law.[1589] Otherwise, the challenged State authority could be vindicated through the simple device of a modification or outright nullification by the State court of the contract rights in issue. Likewise, the highest State court usually has final authority in construing State statutes and determining their validity in relation to the State constitution. But this rule too has had to bend to some extent to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the obligation of contracts clause.[1590]

Suppose the following situation: (1) a municipality, acting under authority conferred by a State statute, has issued bonds in aid of a railway company; (2) the validity of this statute has been sustained by the highest State court; (3) later the State legislature passes an act to repeal certain taxes to meet the bonds; (4) it is sustained in doing so by a decision of the highest State court holding that the statute authorizing the bonds was unconstitutional ab initio. In such a case the Supreme Court would take an appeal from the State court and would reverse the latter's decision of unconstitutionally because of its effect in rendering operative the act to repeal the tax.[1591]

Suppose further, however, that the State court has reversed itself on the question of the constitutionality of the bonds in a suit by a creditor for payment without there having been an act of repeal. In this situation, as the cases stand today, the Supreme Court will still afford relief if the case is one between citizens of different States, which reaches it via a lower federal court.[1592] This is because in cases of this nature the Court formerly felt free to determine questions of fundamental justice for itself. Indeed, in such a case, the Court has apparently in the past regarded itself as free to pass upon the constitutionality of the State law authorizing the bonds even though there has been no prior decision by the highest State court sustaining them, the idea being that contracts entered into simply on the faith of the presumed constitutionality of a State statute are entitled to this protection.[1593]

In other words, in cases of which it has jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship, the Court has held that the obligation of contracts is capable of impairment by subsequent judicial decisions no less than by subsequent statutes and that it is able to prevent such impairment. In cases, on the other hand, of which it obtains jurisdiction only on the constitutional ground, and by appeal from a State court, it has always adhered in terms to the doctrine that the word "laws" as used in article I, section 10, does not comprehend judicial decisions. Yet even in these cases, it will intervene to protect contracts entered into on the faith of existing decisions from an impairment which is the direct result of a reversal of such decisions, but there must be in the offing, as it were, a statute of some kind--one possibly many years older than the contract rights involved--on which to pin its decision.[1594]

In 1922 Congress, through an amendment to the Judicial Code, endeavored to extend the reviewing power of the Supreme Court to suits involving "'* * * the validity of a contract wherein it is claimed that a change in the rule of law or construction of statutes by the highest court of a State applicable to such contract would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States * * *'" This appeared to be an invitation to the Court to say frankly that the obligation of a contract can be impaired as well by a subsequent decision as by a subsequent statute. The Court, however, declined the invitation in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft which reviewed many of the cases covered in the preceding paragraphs. Dealing with the Gelpcke and adherent decisions, Chief Justice Taft said: "These cases were not writs of error to the Supreme Court of a State. They were appeals or writs of error to federal courts where recovery was sought upon municipal or county bonds or some other form of contracts, the validity of which had been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of a State prior to their execution, and had been denied by the same court after their issue or making. In such cases the federal courts exercising jurisdiction between citizens of different States held themselves free to decide what the State law was, and to enforce it as laid down by the State Supreme Court before the contracts were made rather than in later decisions. They did not base this conclusion on Article I, Sec. 10, of the Federal Constitution, but on the State law as they determined it, which, in diverse citizenship cases, under the third Article of the Federal Constitution they were empowered to do. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1883)."[1595] While doubtless this was an available explanation in 1924, the decision in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, so cuts down the power of the federal courts to decide diversity of citizenship cases according to their own notions of "general principles of common law" as to raise the question whether the Court will not be required eventually to put Gelpcke and its companions and descendants squarely on the obligation of contracts clause, or else abandon them.

"Obligation."--A contract is analyzable into two elements: the agreement, which comes from the parties, and the obligation which comes from the law and makes the agreement binding on the parties. The concept of obligation is an importation from the Civil Law and its appearance in the contracts clause is supposed to have been due to James Wilson, a graduate of Scottish universities and a Civilian. Actually the term as used in the contracts clause has been rendered more or less superfluous by the doctrine that the law in force when a contract is made enters into and comprises a part of the contract itself.[1596] Hence the Court sometimes recognizes the term in its decisions applying the clause, sometimes ignores it. In Sturges v. Crowninshield,[1597] decided in 1819, Marshall defines "obligation of contract" as "the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement"; but a little later the same year he sets forth the points presented for consideration in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward[1598] to be: "1. Is this contract protected by the Constitution of the United States? 2. Is it impaired by the acts under which the defendant holds?"[1599] The word "obligation" undoubtedly does carry the implication that the Constitution was intended to protect only executory contracts--i.e., contracts still awaiting performance; but as is indicated in a moment, this implication was early rejected for a certain class of contracts, with immensely important result for the clause.

"Impair."--"The obligations of a contract," says Chief Justice Hughes for the Court in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,[1600] "are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them * * * and impairment, * * *, has been predicated of laws which without destroying contracts derogate from substantial contractual rights."[1601] But he straight-away adds: "Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while,--a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of State power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court."[1602] In short, the law from which the obligation stems must be understood to include Constitutional Law and, moreover, a "progressive" Constitutional Law.[1603]

"Contracts," Extended to Cover Public Contracts.--Throughout the first century of government under the Constitution, according to Benjamin F. Wright, the contract clause had been considered in almost forty per cent of all cases involving the validity of State legislation, and of these the vast proportion involved legislative grants of one type or other, the most important category being charters of incorporation.[1604] Nor does this numerical prominence of such grants in the cases overrate their relative importance from the point of view of public interest. The question consequently arises whether the clause was intended to be applied solely in protection of private contracts, or in the protection also of public grants or, more broadly, in protection of public contracts, in short, those to which a State is party?

Writing late in life, Madison explained the clause by allusion to what had occurred "in the internal administration of the States," in the years immediately preceding the Constitutional Convention, in regard to private debts. "A violation of contracts," said he, "had become familiar in the form of depreciated paper made a legal tender, of property substituted for money, and installment laws, and the occlusions of the courts of justice."[1605] He had, in fact, written to the same effect in The Federalist, while the adoption of the Constitution was pending.[1606]

The broader view of the intended purpose of the clause is, nevertheless, not without considerable support. For one thing, the clause departs from the comparable provision in the Northwest Ordinance (1787) in two respects: First, in the presence of the word "obligation"; secondly, in the absence of the word "private"; and there is good reason for believing that Wilson may have been responsible for both alterations, inasmuch as two years earlier he had denounced a current proposal to repeal the Bank of North America's Pennsylvania charter, in the following words: "If the act for incorporating the subscribers to the Bank of North America shall be repealed in this manner, a precedent will be established for repealing, in the same manner, every other legislative charter in Pennsylvania. A pretence, as specious as any that can be alleged on this occasion, will never be wanting on any future occasion. Those acts of the State, which have hitherto been considered as the sure anchors of privilege and of property, will become the sport of every varying gust of politics, and will float wildly backwards and forwards on the irregular and impetuous tides of party and faction."[1607]

Furthermore, in its first important constitutional case, that of Chisholm v. Georgia,[1608] the Court ruled that its original jurisdiction extended to an action in assumpsit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia. This construction of the federal judicial power was, to be sure, promptly repealed by the Eleventh Amendment, but without affecting the implication that the contracts protected by the Constitution included public contracts.

One important source of this diversity of opinion is to be found in that ever welling spring of constitutional doctrine in early days, the prevalence of Natural Law notions and the resulting vague significance of the term "law." In Sturges v. Crowninshield, as we saw, Marshall defined the obligation of contracts as "the law which binds the parties to perform their undertaking." Whence, however, comes this law? If it comes from the State alone, which Marshall was later to deny even as to private contracts,[1609] then it is hardly possible to hold that the States' own contracts are covered by the clause, which manifestly does not create an obligation for contracts but only protects such obligation as already exists. But if, on the other hand, the law furnishing the obligation of contracts comprises Natural Law and kindred principles, as well as law which springs from State authority, then, inasmuch as the State itself is presumably bound by such principles, the State's own obligations, so far as harmonious with them, are covered by the clause.

Fletcher v. Peck

Fletcher v. Peck,[1610] which was decided in 1810, has the double claim to fame that it was the first case in which the Supreme Court held a State enactment to be in conflict with the Constitution,[1611] and also the first case to hold that the contracts clause protected public grants. By an act passed on January 7, 1795, the Georgia Legislature directed the sale to four land companies of public lands comprising most of what are now the States of Alabama and Mississippi. As soon became known, the passage of the measure had been secured by open and wholesale bribery. So when a new legislature took over in the winter of 1795-1796, almost its first act was to revoke the sale made the previous year.

Meantime, however, the land companies had disposed of several millions of acres of their holdings to speculators and prospective settlers, and following the rescinding act some of these took counsel with Alexander Hamilton as to their rights. In an opinion which was undoubtedly known to the Court when it decided Fletcher v. Peck, Hamilton characterized the repeal as contravening "the first principles of natural justice and social policy," especially so far as it was made, "to the prejudice * * * of third persons * * * innocent of the alleged fraud or corruption; * * * [Moreover, he added,] the Constitution of the United States, article first, section tenth, declares that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contract. This must be equivalent to saying no State shall pass a law revoking, invalidating, or altering a contract. Every grant from one to another, whether the grantor be a State or an individual, is virtually a contract that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing granted against the grantor, and his representatives. It, therefore, appears to me that taking the terms of the Constitution in their large sense, and giving them effect according to the general spirit and policy of the provisions, the revocation of the grant by the act of the legislature of Georgia may justly be considered as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore null. And that the courts of the United States, in cases within their jurisdiction, will be likely to pronounce it so."[1612] In the debate to which the "Yazoo Land Frauds," as they were contemporaneously known, gave rise in Congress, Hamilton's views were quoted frequently.

So far as it invokes the obligation of contracts clause, Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck performs two creative acts. He recognizes that an obligatory contract is one still to be performed--in other words, is an executory contract; also that a grant of land is an executed contract--a conveyance. But, he asserts, every grant is attended by "an implied contract" on the part of the grantor not to claim again the thing granted. Thus, grants are brought within the category of contracts having continuing obligation and so within article I, Sec. 10. But the question still remained of the nature of this obligation. Marshall's answer to this can only be inferred from his statement at the end of his opinion. The State of Georgia, he says, "was restrained" from the passing of the rescinding act "either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States."[1613]

New Jersey v. Wilson

The protection thus thrown about land grants was presently extended, in the case of New Jersey v. Wilson,[1614] to a grant of immunity from taxation which the State of New Jersey had accorded certain Indian lands; and several years after that, in the Dartmouth College Case,[1615] to the charter privileges of an eleemosynary corporation.

Corporate Charters, Different Ways of Regarding

There are three ways in which the charter of a corporation may be regarded. In the first place, it may be thought of simply as a license terminable at will by the State, like a liquor-seller's license or an auctioneer's license, but affording the incorporators, so long as it remains in force, the privileges and advantages of doing business in the form of a corporation. Nowadays, indeed, when corporate charters are usually issued to all legally qualified applicants by an administrative officer who acts under a general statute, this would probably seem to be the natural way of regarding them were it not for the Dartmouth College decision. But in 1819 charters were granted directly by the State legislatures in the form of special acts, and there were very few profit-taking corporations in the country.[1616] The later extension of the benefits of the Dartmouth College decision to corporations organized under general law took place without discussion.

Secondly, a corporate charter may be regarded as a franchise constituting a vested or property interest in the hands of the holders, and therefore as forfeitable only for abuse or in accordance with its own terms. This is the way in which some of the early State courts did regard them at the outset.[1617] It is also the way in which Blackstone regards them in relation to the royal prerogative, although not in relation to the sovereignty of Parliament; and the same point of view finds expression in Story's concurring opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, as it did also in Webster's argument in that case.[1618]

The Dartmouth College Case

The third view is the one formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in his controlling opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.[1619] This is that the charter of Dartmouth College, a purely private institution, was the outcome and partial record of a contract between the donors of the college, on the one hand, and the British Crown, on the other, which contract still continued in force between the State of New Hampshire, as the successor to the Crown and Government of Great Britain, and the trustees, as successors to the donors. The charter, in other words, was not simply a grant--rather it was the documentary record of a still existent agreement between still existent parties.[1620] Taking this view, which he developed with great ingenuity and persuasiveness, Marshall was able to appeal to the obligation of contracts clause directly, and without further use of his fiction in Fletcher v. Peck of an executory contract accompanying the grant.

A difficulty still remained, however, in the requirement that a contract must, before it can have obligation, import consideration, that is to say, must be shown not to have been entirely gratuitous on either side. Nor was the consideration which induced the Crown to grant a charter to Dartmouth College a merely speculative one. It consisted of the donations of the donors to the important public interest of education. Fortunately or unfortunately, in dealing with this phase of the case, Marshall used more sweeping terms than were needful. "The objects for which a corporation is created," he wrote, "are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant." In other words, the simple fact of the charter having been granted imports consideration from the point of view of the State.[1621] With this doctrine before it, the Court in Providence Bank v. Billings,[1622] and again in Charles River Bridge Company v. Warren Bridge Company,[1623] admitted, without discussion of the point, the applicability of the Dartmouth College decision to purely business concerns.

Classes of Cases Under the Clause

The cases just reviewed produce two principal lines of decisions stemming from the obligation of contracts clause: first, public grants; second, private executory contracts. The chief category of the first line of cases consists, in turn, of those involving corporate privileges, both those granted directly by the States and those granted by municipalities by virtue of authority conferred upon them by the State;[1624] while private debts, inclusive of municipal debts, exhaust for the most part the second line.

Public Grants

Municipal Corporations.--Not all grants by a State constitute "contracts" within the sense of article I, section 10. In his Dartmouth College decision Chief Justice Marshall conceded that "if the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it creates a civil institution, to be employed in the administration of the government, * * *, the subject is one in which the legislature of the State may act according to its own justment," unrestrained by the Constitution[1625]--thereby drawing a line between "public" and "private" corporations which remained undisturbed for more than half a century.[1626] It has been subsequently held many times that municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the State for the more convenient administration of local governments, whose powers may be enlarged, abridged, or entirely withdrawn at the pleasure of the legislature.[1627] The same principle applies, moreover, to the property rights which the municipality derives either directly or indirectly from the State. This was first held as to the grant of a franchise to a municipality to operate a ferry, and has since then been recognized as the universal rule.[1628] As was stated in a case decided in 1923: "The distinction between the municipality as an agent of the State for governmental purposes and as an organization to care for local needs in a private or proprietary capacity," while it limits the legal liability of municipalities for the negligent acts or omissions of its officers or agents, does not, on the other hand, furnish ground for the application of constitutional restraints against the State in favor of its own municipalities.[1629] Thus no contract rights are impaired by a statute removing a county seat, even though the former location was by law to be "permanent" when the citizens of the community had donated land and furnished bonds for the erection of public buildings.[1630] Likewise a statute changing the boundaries of a school district, giving to the new district the property within its limits which had belonged to the former district, and requiring the new district to assume the debts of the old district, does not impair the obligation of contracts.[1631] Nor was the contracts clause violated by State legislation authorizing State control over insolvent communities through a Municipal Finance Commission.[1632]

Public Offices.--On the same ground of public agency, neither appointment nor election to public office creates a contract in the sense of article I, section 10, whether as to tenure, or salary, or duties, all of which remain, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, subject to legislative modification or outright repeal.[1633] Indeed there can be no such thing in this country as property in office, although the common law sustained a different view which sometimes found reflection in early cases.[1634] When, however, services have once been rendered, there arises an implied contract that they shall be compensated at the rate which was in force at the time they were rendered.[1635] Also, an express contract between the State and an individual for the performance of specific services falls within the protection of the Constitution. Thus a contract made by the governor pursuant to a statute authorizing the appointment of a commissioner to conduct, over a period of years, a geological, mineralogical, and agricultural survey of the State, for which a definite sum had been authorized, was held to have been impaired by repeal of the statute.[1636] But a resolution of a New Jersey local board of education reducing teachers' salaries for the school year 1933-1934, pursuant to an act of the legislature authorizing such action, was held not to impair the contract of a teacher who, having served three years, was by earlier legislation exempt from having his salary reduced except for inefficiency or misconduct.[1637] Similarly, it was held that an Illinois statute which reduced the annuity payable to retire teachers under an earlier act did not violate the contracts clause, since it had not been the intention of the earlier act to propose a contract but only to put into effect a general policy.[1638] On the other hand, the right of one, who had become a "permanent teacher" under the Indiana Teachers Tenure Act of 1927, to continued employment was held to be contractual and to have been impaired by the repeal in 1933 of the earlier act.[1639]

Revocable Privileges Versus "Contracts": Tax Exemptions.--From a different point of view, the Court has sought to distinguish between grants of privileges, whether to individuals or to corporations, which are contracts and those which are mere revocable licenses, although on account of the doctrine of presumed consideration mentioned earlier, this has not always been easy to do. In pursuance of the precedent set in New Jersey v. Wilson,[1640] the legislature of a State "may exempt particular parcels of property or the property of particular persons or corporations from taxation, either for a specified period or perpetually, or may limit the amount or rate of taxation, to which such property shall be subjected," and such an exemption is frequently a contract within the sense of the Constitution. Indeed this is always so when the immunity is conferred upon a corporation by the clear terms of its charter.[1641] When, on the other hand, an immunity of this sort springs from general law, its precise nature is more open to doubt, as a comparison of decisions will serve to illustrate.

In Piqua Branch of the State Bank v. Knoop,[1642] a closely divided Court held that a general banking law of the State of Ohio which provided that companies complying therewith and their stockholders should be exempt from all but certain taxes, was, as to a bank organized under it and its stockholders, a contract within the meaning of article I, section 10. "The provision was not," the Court said, "a legislative command nor a rule of taxation until changed, but a contract stipulating against any change, from the nature of the language used and the circumstances under which it was adopted."[1643] When, however, the State of Michigan pledged itself, by a general legislative act, not to tax any corporation, company, or individual undertaking to manufacture salt in the State from water there obtained by boring on property used for this purpose and, furthermore, to pay a bounty on the salt so manufactured, it was held not to have engaged itself within the constitutional sense. "General encouragements," said the Court, "held out to all persons indiscriminately, to engage in a particular trade or manufacture, whether such encouragement be in the shape of bounties or drawbacks, or other advantage, are always under the legislative control, and may be discontinued at any time."[1644] So far as exemption from taxation is concerned the difference between these two cases is obviously slight; but the later one is unquestionable authority for the proposition that legislative bounties are repealable at will.

Furthermore, exemptions from taxation have in certain cases been treated as gratuities repealable at will, even when conferred by specific legislative enactments. This would seem always to be the case when the beneficiaries were already in existence when the exemption was created and did nothing of a more positive nature to qualify for it than to continue in existence.[1645] Yet the cases are not always easy to explain in relation to each other, except in light of the fact that the Court's wider point of view has altered from time to time.[1646]

Vested Rights.--Lastly, the term "contracts" is used in the contracts clause in its popular sense of an agreement of minds. The clause therefore does not protect vested rights that are not referable to such an agreement between the State and an individual, such as the right to recovery under a judgment. The individual in question may have a case under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not one under article I, section 10.[1647]

Reservation of the Right to Alter and Repeal

So much for the meaning of the word "contract" when public grants are meant. It is next in order to consider four principles or doctrines whereby the Court has itself broken down the force of the Dartmouth College decision in great measure in favor of State legislative power. By the logic of the Dartmouth College decision itself the State may reserve in a corporate charter the right to "amend, alter, and repeal" the same, and such reservation becomes a part of the contract between the State and the incorporators, the obligation of which is accordingly not impaired by the exercise of the right.[1648] Later decisions recognize that the State may reserve the right to amend, alter, and repeal by general law, with the result of incorporating the reservation in all charters of subsequent date.[1649] There is, however, a difference between a reservation by a statute and one by constitutional provision. While the former may be repealed as to a subsequent charter by the specific terms thereof, the latter may not.[1650]

The Right to Reserve: When Limited.--Is the right which is reserved by a State to "amend" or "alter" a charter without restriction? When it is accompanied, as it generally is, by the right to "repeal," one would suppose that the answer to this question was self-evident. None the less, there are a number of judicial dicta to the effect that this power is not without limit, that it must be exercised reasonably and in good faith, and that the alterations made must be consistent with the scope and object of the grant, etc.[1651] Such utterances amount, apparently, to little more than an anchor to windward, for while some of the State courts have applied tests of this nature to the disallowance of legislation, it does not appear that the Supreme Court of the United States has ever done so.[1652]

Quite different is it with the distinction pointed out in the cases between the franchises and privileges which a corporation derives from its charter and the rights of property and contract which accrue to it in the course of its existence. Even the outright repeal of the former does not wipe out the latter or cause them to escheat to the State. The primary heirs of the defunct organization are its creditors; but whatever of value remains after their valid claims are met goes to the former shareholders.[1653] By the earlier weight of authority, on the other hand, persons who contract with companies whose charters are subject to legislative amendment or repeal do so at their own risk: any "such contracts made between individuals and the corporation do not vary or in any manner change or modify the relation between the State and the corporation in respect to the right of the State to alter, modify, or amend such a charter, * * *"[1654] But later holdings becloud this rule.[1655]

Corporations As Persons Subject To The Law.--But suppose the State neglects to reserve the right to amend, alter, or repeal--is it, then, without power to control its corporate creatures? By no means. Private corporations, like other private persons, are always presumed to be subject to the legislative power of the State; from which it follows that immunities conferred by charter are to be treated as exceptions to an otherwise controlling rule. This principle was recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Providence Bank v. Billings,[1656] in which he held that in the absence of express stipulation or reasonable implication to the contrary in its charter, the bank was subject to the taxing power of the State, notwithstanding that the power to tax is the power to destroy.

Corporations and the Police Power.--And of course the same principle is equally applicable to the exercise by the State of its police powers. Thus, in what was perhaps the leading case before the Civil War, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the legislature of that State had the right, in furtherance of the public safety, to require chartered companies operating railways to fence in their tracks and provide cattle yards. In a matter of this nature, said the Court, corporations are on a level with individuals engaged in the same business, unless, from their charter, they can prove the contrary.[1657] Since then the rule has been applied many times in justification of State regulation of railroads,[1658] and even of the application of a State prohibition law to a company which had been chartered expressly to manufacture beer.[1659]

The Strict Construction of Public Grants

Long, however, before the cases last cited were decided, the principle which they illustrate had come to be powerfully reinforced by two others, the first of which is that all charter privileges and immunities are to be strictly construed as against the claims of the State; or as it is otherwise often phrased, "nothing passes by implication in a public grant."

The Charles River Bridge Case.--The leading case is that of the Charles River Bridge Company v. Warren Bridge Company,[1660] which was decided shortly after Chief Justice Marshall's death by a substantially new Court. The question at issue was whether the charter of the complaining company, which authorized it to operate a toll bridge, stood in the way of the State's permitting another company of later date to operate a free bridge in the immediate vicinity. Inasmuch as the first company could point to no clause in its charter which specifically vested it with an exclusive right, the Court held the charter of the second company to be valid on the principle just stated. Justice Story, who remained from the old Bench, presented a vigorous dissent, in which he argued cogently, but unavailingly, that the monopoly claimed by the Charles River Bridge Company was fully as reasonable an implication from the terms of its charter and the circumstances surrounding its concession as perpetuity had been from the terms of the Dartmouth College charter and the environing transaction.

The Court was in fact making new law, because it was looking at things from a new point of view. This was the period when judicial recognition of the Police Power began to take on a doctrinal character. It was also the period when the railroad business was just beginning. Chief Justice Taney's opinion evinces the influence of both these developments. The power of the State to provide for its own internal happiness and prosperity was not, he asserted, to be pared away by mere legal intendments; nor was its ability to avail itself of the lights of modern science to be frustrated by obsolete interests such as those of the old turnpike companies, the charter privileges of which, he apprehended, might easily become a bar to the development of transportation along new lines.[1661]

Applications of the Strict Construction Rule.--The rule of strict construction has been reiterated by the Court many times. A good illustration is afforded by the following passage from its opinion in Blair v. Chicago,[1662] decided nearly seventy years after the Charles River Bridge Case: "Legislative grants of this character should be in such unequivocal form of expression that the legislative mind may be distinctly impressed with their character and import, in order that the privileges may be intelligently granted or purposely withheld. It is a matter of common knowledge that grants of this character are usually prepared by those interested in them, and submitted to the legislature with a view to obtain from such bodies the most liberal grant of privileges which they are willing to give. This is one among many reasons why they are to be strictly construed. * * * 'The principle is this, that all rights which are asserted against the State must be clearly defined, and not raised by inference or presumption; and if the charter is silent about a power, it does not exist. If, on a fair reading of the instrument, reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given to it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the State; and where it is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other extending the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works the least harm to the State.'"[1663]

Strict Construction of Tax Exemptions.--An excellent illustration of the operation of the rule in relation to tax exemptions is furnished by the derivative doctrine that an immunity of this character must be deemed as intended solely for the benefit of the corporation receiving it and hence may not, in the absence of express permission by the State, be passed on to a successor.[1664] Thus, where two companies, each exempt from taxation, were permitted by the legislature to consolidate the new corporation was held to be subject to taxation.[1665] Again, a statute which granted a corporation all "the rights and privileges" of an earlier corporation was held not to confer the latter's "immunity" from taxation.[1666] Yet again, a legislative authorization of the transfer by one corporation to another of the former's "estate, property, right, privileges, and franchises" was held not to clothe the later company with the earlier one's exemption from taxation.[1667]

Furthermore, an exemption from taxation is to be strictly construed even in the hands of one clearly entitled to it. So the exemption conferred by its charter on a railway company was held not to extend to branch roads constructed by it under a later statute.[1668] Also, a general exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation was held to refer only to the property actually employed in its business.[1669] Also, the charter exemption of the capital stock of a railroad from taxation "for ten years after completion of the said road" was held not to become operative until the completion of the road.[1670] So also the exemption of the campus and endowment fund of a college was held to leave other lands of the college, though a part of its endowment, subject to taxation.[1671] Likewise, provisions in a statute that bonds of the State and its political subdivisions are not to be taxed and shall not be taxed were held not to exempt interest on them from taxation as income of the owners.[1672]

Strict Construction and the Police Power.--The police power, too, has frequently benefited from the doctrine of strict construction, although, for a reason pointed out below, this recourse is today seldom, if ever, necessary in this connection. Some of the more striking cases may be briefly summarized. The provision in the charter of a railway company permitting it to set reasonable charges still left the legislature free to determine what charges were reasonable.[1673] On the other hand, when a railway agreed to accept certain rates for a specified period, it thereby foreclosed the question of the reasonableness of such rates.[1674] The grant to a company of the right to supply a city with water for twenty-five years was held not to prevent a similar concession to another company by the same city.[1675] The promise by a city in the charter of a water company not to make a similar grant to any other person or corporation was held not to prevent the city itself from engaging in the business.[1676] A municipal concession to a water company which was to run for thirty years and which was accompanied by the provision that the "said company shall charge the following rates," was held not to prevent the city from reducing such rates.[1677] But more broadly, the grant to a municipality of the power to regulate the charges of public service companies was held not to bestow the right to contract away this power.[1678] Indeed, any claim by a private corporation that it received the rate-making power from a municipality must survive a two-fold challenge: first, as to the right of the municipality under its charter to make such a grant; secondly, as to whether it has actually done so; and in both respects an affirmative answer must be based on express words and not on implication.[1679]

The Doctrine of Inalienable State Powers

The second of the doctrines mentioned above whereby the principle of the subordination of all persons, corporate and individual alike, to the legislative power of the State has been fortified, is the doctrine that certain of the State's powers are inalienable, and that any attempt by a State to alienate them, upon any consideration whatsoever, is ipso facto void, and hence incapable of producing a "contract" within the meaning of article I, section 10. One of the earliest cases to assert this principle occurred in New York in 1826. The corporation of the City of New York, having conveyed certain lands for the purposes of a church and cemetery together with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, later passed a by-law forbidding their use as a cemetery. In denying an action against the city for breach of covenant, the State court said the defendants "had no power as a party, [to the covenant] to make a contract which should control or embarrass their legislative powers and duties."[1680]

The Eminent Domain Power Inalienable.--The Supreme Court first applied similar doctrine in 1848 in a case involving a grant of exclusive right to construct a bridge at a specified locality. Sustaining the right of the State of Vermont to make a new grant to a competing company, the Court held that the obligation of the earlier exclusive grant was sufficiently recognized in making just compensation for it; and that corporate franchises, like all other forms of property, are subject to the overruling power of eminent domain.[1681] This reasoning was reinforced by an appeal to the theory of State sovereignty, which was held to involve the corollary of the inalienability of all the principal powers of a State.

The subordination of all charter rights and privileges to the power of eminent domain has been maintained by the Court ever since; not even an explicit agreement by the State to forego the exercise of the power will avail against it.[1682] Conversely, the State may revoke an improvident grant of the public petitionary without recourse to the power of eminent domain, such a grant being inherently beyond the power of the State to make. So when the legislature of Illinois in 1869 devised to the Illinois Central Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, the State's right and title to nearly a thousand acres of submerged land under Lake Michigan along the harbor front of Chicago, and four years later sought to repeal the grant, the Court, in a four-to-three decision, sustained an action by the State to recover the lands in question. Said Justice Field, speaking for the majority: "Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of public. The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. * * * Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time."[1683] The case affords an interesting commentary on Fletcher v. Peck.[1684]

The Taxing Power Not Inalienable.--On the other hand, repeated endeavors to subject tax exemptions to the doctrine of inalienability though at times supported by powerful minorities on the Bench, have always failed.[1685] As recently as January, 1952, the Court ruled that the Georgia Railway Company was entitled to seek an injunction in the federal courts against an attempt by Georgia's Revenue Commission to compel it to pay ad valorem taxes contrary to the terms of its special charter issued in 1833. To the argument that this was a suit contrary to the Eleventh Amendment it returned the answer that the immunity from Federal jurisdiction created by the Amendment "does not extend to individuals who act as officers without constitutional authority."[1686]

The Police Power; When Inalienable.--The leading case involving the police power is Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, decided in 1880. In 1867 the legislature of Mississippi chartered a company to which it expressly granted the power to conduct a lottery. Two years later the State adopted a new Constitution which contained a provision forbidding lotteries; and a year later the legislature passed an act to put this provision into effect. In upholding this act and the constitutional provision on which it was based, the Court said: "The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights," and these agencies can neither give away nor sell their discretion. All that one can get by a charter permitting the business of conducting a lottery "is suspension of certain governmental rights in his favor, subject to withdrawal at will."[1687]

The Court shortly afterward applied the same reasoning in a case in which was challenged the right of Louisiana to invade the exclusive privilege of a corporation engaged in the slaughter of cattle in New Orleans by granting another company the right to engage in the same business. Although the State did not offer to compensate the older company for the lost monopoly, its action was sustained on the ground that it had been taken in the interest of the public health.[1688] When, however, the City of New Orleans, in reliance on this precedent, sought to repeal an exclusive franchise which it had granted a company for fifty years to supply gas to its inhabitants, the Court interposed its veto, explaining that in this instance neither the public health, the public morals, nor the public safety was involved.[1689]

Later decisions, nonetheless, apply the principle of inalienability broadly. To quote from one: "It is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power to the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise."[1690] Today, indeed, it scarcely pays a company to rely upon its charter privileges or upon special concessions from a State in resisting the application to it of measures claiming to have been enacted by the police power thereof. For if this claim is sustained by the Court, the obligation of the contract clause will not avail; while if it is not, the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will furnish a sufficient reliance. That is to say, the discrepancy which once existed between the Court's theory of an overriding police power in these two adjoining fields of Constitutional Law is today apparently at an end. Indeed, there is usually no sound reason why rights based on public grant should be regarded as more sacrosanct than rights which involve the same subject matter but are of different provenience.

Private Contracts

Scope of the Term.--The term "private contracts" is, naturally, not all-inclusive. A judgment, though granted in favor of a creditor, is not a contract in the sense of the Constitution;[1691] nor is marriage.[1692] And whether a particular agreement is a valid contract is a question for the courts, and finally for the Supreme Court, when the protection of the contract clause is invoked.[1693]

Source of the Obligation.--The question of the nature and source of the obligation of a contract, which went by default in Fletcher v. Peck and the Dartmouth College case, with such vastly important consequences, had eventually to be met and answered by the Court in connection with private contracts. The first case involving such a contract to reach the Supreme Court was Sturges v. Crowninshield[1694] in which a debtor sought escape behind a State insolvency act of later date than his note. The act was held inoperative; but whether this was because of its retroaction in this particular case or for the broader reason that it assumed to excuse debtors from their promises, was not at the time made clear. As noted earlier, Chief Justice Marshall's definition on this occasion of the obligation of a contract as the law which binds the parties to perform their undertakings was not free from ambiguity, owing to the uncertain connotation of the term law.

Ogden v. Saunders.--These obscurities were finally cleared up for most cases in Ogden v. Saunders,[1695] in which the temporal relation of the statute and the contract involved was exactly reversed--the former antedating the latter. Marshall contended, but unsuccessfully, that the statute was void, inasmuch as it purported to release the debtor from that original, intrinsic obligation which always attaches under natural law to the acts of free agents. "When," he wrote, "we advert to the course of reading generally pursued by American statesmen in early life, we must suppose that the framers of our Constitution were intimately acquainted with the writings of those wise and learned men whose treatises on the laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion on the subjects of obligation and contract," and that they took their views on these subjects from those sources. He also posed the question of what would happen to the obligation of contracts clause if States might pass acts declaring that all contracts made subsequently thereto should be subject to legislative control.[1696]

For the first and only time majority of the Court abandoned the Chief Justice's leadership. Speaking by Justice Washington it held that the obligation of private contracts is derived from the municipal law--State statutes and judicial decisions--and that the inhibition of article I, section 10, is confined to legislative acts made after the contracts affected by them, with one exception. For by a curiously complicated line of reasoning it was also held in this same case that when the creditor is a nonresident, then a State may not by an insolvent law rights under a contract, albeit one of later date.

With the proposition established that the obligation of a private contract comes from the municipal law in existence when the contract is made, a further question presents itself, namely, what part of the municipal law is referred to? No doubt, the law which determines the validity of the contract itself is a part of such law. Also, the law which interprets the terms used in the contract, or which supplies certain terms when others are used; as for instance, constitutional provisions or statutes which determine what is "legal tender" for the payment of debts; or judicial decisions which construe the term "for value received" as used in a promissory note, and so on. In short, any law which at the time of the making of a contract goes to measure the rights and duties of the parties to it in relation to each other enters into its obligation.

Remedy a Part of the Obligation

Suppose, however, that one of the parties to a contract fails to live up to his obligation as thus determined. The contract itself may now be regarded as at an end; but the injured party, nevertheless, has a new set of rights in its stead, those which are furnished him by the remedial law, including the law of procedure. In the case of a mortgage, he may foreclose; in the case of a promissory note, he may sue; in certain cases, he may demand specific performance. Hence the further question arises, whether this remedial law is to be considered a part of the law supplying the obligation of contracts. Originally, the predominating opinion was negative, since as we have just seen, this law does not really come into operation until the contract has been broken. Yet it is obvious that the sanction which this law lends to contracts is extremely important--indeed, indispensable. In due course it became the accepted doctrine that that part of the law which supplies one party to a contract with a remedy if the other party does not live up to his agreement, as authoritatively interpreted, entered into the "obligation of contracts" in the constitutional sense of this term, and so might not be altered to the material weakening of existing contracts. In the court's own words, "Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement. Without the remedy the contract may, indeed, in the sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its obligation to fall within the class of those moral and social duties which depend for their fulfillment wholly upon the will of the individual. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, * * *"[1697]

Establishment Of The Rules.--This rule was first definitely announced in 1843 in the case of Bronson v. Kinzie.[1698] Here an Illinois mortgage giving the mortgagee an unrestricted power of sale in case of the mortgagor's fault was involved, along with a later act of the legislature which required mortgaged premises to be sold for not less than two-thirds of the appraised value, and allowed the mortgagor a year after the sale to redeem them. It was held that the statute, in altering the preexisting remedies to such an extent, violated the constitutional prohibition, and hence was void. The year following a like ruling was made in the case of McCracken v. Hayward[1699] as to a statutory provision that personal property should not be sold under execution for less than two-thirds of its appraised value.

Qualifications Of The Rule.--But the rule illustrated by these cases does not signify that a State may make no changes in its remedial or procedural law which affect existing contracts. "Provided," the Court has said, "a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is given, by means of which a party can enforce his rights under the contract, the Legislature may modify or change existing remedies or prescribe new modes of procedure."[1700] Thus States are constantly remodelling their judicial systems and modes of practice unembarrassed by the obligation of contracts clause.[1701] The right of a State to abolish imprisonment for debt was early asserted.[1702] Again the right of a State to shorten the time for the bringing of actions has been affirmed even as to existing causes of action, but with the proviso added that a reasonable time must be left for the bringing of such actions.[1703] On the other hand, a statute which withdrew the judicial power to enforce satisfaction of a certain class of judgments by mandamus was held invalid.[1704] In the words of the Court: "Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances;"[1705] and it later added: "In all such cases the question becomes, * * *, one of reasonableness, and of that the legislature is primarily the judge."[1706]

The Municipal Bond Cases.--There is one class of cases resulting from the doctrine that the law of remedy constitutes a part of the obligation of a contract to which a special word is due. This comprises cases in which the contracts involved were municipal bonds. While a city is from one point of view but an emanation from the government's sovereignty and an agent thereof, when it borrows money it is held to be acting in a corporate or private capacity, and so to be suable on its contracts. Furthermore, as was held in the leading case of Von Hoffman v. Quincy,[1707] "where a State has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to exercise the power of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet its engagements, the power thus given cannot be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied." In this case the Court issued a mandamus compelling the city officials to levy taxes for the satisfaction of a judgment on its bonds in accordance with the law as it stood when the bonds were issued.[1708] Nor may a State by dividing an indebted municipality among others enable it to escape its obligations. In such a case the debt follows the territory, and the duty of assessing and collecting taxes to satisfy it devolves upon the succeeding corporations and their officers.[1709] But where a municipal organization has ceased practically to exist through the vacation of its offices, and the government's function is exercised once more by the State directly, the Court has thus far found itself powerless to frustrate a program of repudiation.[1710] However, there is no reason why the State should enact the role of particeps criminis in an attempt to relieve its municipalities of the obligation to meet their honest debts. Thus in 1931, during the Great Depression, New Jersey created a Municipal Finance Commission with power to assume control over its insolvent municipalities. To the complaint of certain bondholders that this legislation impaired the contract obligations of their debtors, the Court, speaking by Justice Frankfurter, pointed out that the practical value of an unsecured claim against a city is "the effectiveness of the city's taxing power," which the legislation under review was designed to conserve.[1711]

Private Contracts and the Police Power

The increasing subjection of public grants to the State's police power has been previously pointed out. That purely private contracts should be in any stronger situation in this respect would obviously be anomalous in the extreme. In point of fact, the ability of private parties to curtail governmental authority by the easy devise of contracting with one another is, with an exception to be noted, even less than that of the State to tie its own hands by contracting away its own powers. So, when it was contended in an early Pennsylvania case, than an act prohibiting the issuance of notes by unincorporated banking associations was violative of the obligation of contracts clause because of its effect upon certain existing contracts of members of such associations, the State Supreme Court answered: "But it is said, that the members had formed a contract between themselves, which would be dissolved by the stoppage of their business; and what then? Is that such a violation of contracts as is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States? Consider to what such a construction would lead. Let us suppose, that in one of the States there is no law against gaming, cock-fighting, horse-racing or public masquerades, and that companies should be formed for the purpose of carrying on these practices; * * *" Would the legislature then be powerless to prohibit them? The answer returned, of course, was no.[1712]

The prevailing doctrine is stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the following words: "It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. * * * In other words, that parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."[1713]

So, in an early case we find a State recording act upheld as applying to deeds dated before the passage of the act.[1714] Later cases have brought the police power in its more customary phases into contact with private, as well as with public contracts. Lottery tickets, valid when issued, were necessarily invalidated by legislation prohibiting the lottery business;[1715] contracts for the sale of beer, valid when entered into, were similarly nullified by a State prohibition law;[1716] and contracts of employment were modified by later laws regarding the liability of employers and workmen's compensation.[1717] Likewise a contract between plaintiff and defendant did not prevent the State from making the latter a concession which rendered the contract worthless;[1718] nor did a contract as to rates between two railway companies prevent the State from imposing different rates;[1719] nor did a contract between a public utility company and a customer protect the rates agreed upon from being superseded by those fixed by the State.[1720] Similarly, a contract for the conveyance of water beyond the limits of a State did not prevent the State from prohibiting such conveyance.[1721]

Emergency Legislation.--But the most striking exertions of the police power touching private contracts, as well as other private interests, within recent years have been evoked by war and economic depression. Thus in World War I the State of New York enacted a statute which, declaring that a public emergency existed, forbade the enforcement of covenants for the surrender of the possession of premises on the expiration of leases, and wholly deprived for a period owners of dwellings, including apartment and tenement houses, within the City of New York and contiguous counties of possessory remedies for the eviction from their premises of tenants in possession when the law took effect, providing the latter were able and willing to pay a reasonable rent. In answer to objections leveled against this legislation on the basis of the obligation of contracts clause, the Court said: "But contracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the State when otherwise justified, as we have held this to be."[1722] In a subsequent case, however, the Court added that, while the declaration by the legislature of a justifying emergency was entitled to great respect, it was not conclusive; that a law "depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change," and that whether they have changed was always open to judicial inquiry.[1723]

Individual Rights Versus Public Welfare.--Summing up the result of the cases above referred to, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,[1724] remarked in 1934: "It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of society in order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends. * * * The principle of this development is, * * * [he added] that the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the States is read into all contracts * * *."[1725]

Evaluation of the Clause Today

Yet it should not be inferred that the obligation of contracts clause is today totally moribund even in times of stress. As we have just seen it still furnishes the basis for some degree of judicial review as to the substantiality of the factual justification of a professed exercise by a State legislature of its police power; and in the case of legislation affecting the remedial rights of creditors, it still affords a solid and palpable barrier against legislative erosion. Nor is this surprising in view of the fact that, as we have seen, such rights were foremost in the minds of the framers of the clause. The court's attitude toward insolvency laws, redemption laws, exemption laws, appraisement laws and the like has always been that they may not be given retroactive operation;[1726] and the general lesson of these earlier cases is confirmed by the court's decisions between 1934 and 1945 in certain cases involving State moratorium statutes. In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,[1727] the leading case, a closely divided Court sustained the Minnesota Moratorium Act of April 18, 1933, which, reciting the existence of a severe financial and economic depression for several years and the frequent occurrence of mortgage foreclosure sales for inadequate prices, and asserting that these conditions had created an economic emergency calling for the exercise of the State's police power, authorized its courts to extend the period for redemption from foreclosure sales for such additional time as they might deem just and equitable, although in no event beyond May 1, 1935. The act also left the mortgagor in possession during the period of extension, subject to the requirement that he pay a reasonable rental for the property as fixed by the Court, at such time and in such manner as should be determined by the Court. Contemporaneously, however, less carefully drawn statutes from Missouri and Arkansas, acts which were less considerate of creditor's rights, were set aside as violative of the contracts clause.[1728] "A State is free to regulate the procedure in its courts even with reference to contracts already made," said Justice Cardozo for the Court, "and moderate extensions of the time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the power so reserved. A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow. * * * What controls our judgment at such times is the underlying reality rather than the form or label. The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral security."[1729] On the other hand, in the most recent of this category of cases, the Court gave its approval to an extension by the State of New York of its moratorium legislation. While recognizing that business conditions had improved, the Court was of the opinion that there was reason to believe that "'the sudden termination of the legislation which has damned up normal liquidation of these mortgages for more than eight years might well result in an emergency more acute than that which the original legislation was intended to alleviate.'"[1730]

And meantime the Court had sustained legislation of the State of New York under which a mortgagee of real property was denied a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure suit where the State court found that the value of the property purchased by the mortgagee at the foreclosure sale was equal to the debt secured by the mortgage.[1731] "Mortgagees," the Court said, "are constitutionally entitled to no more than payment in full. * * * To hold that mortgagees are entitled under the contract clause to retain the advantages of a forced sale would be to dignify into a constitutionally protected property right their chance to get more than the amount of their contracts. * * * The contract clause does not protect such a strategical, procedural advantage."[1732]

Statistical Data Pertinent to the Clause

The obligation of contracts clause attained the high point of its importance in our Constitutional Law in the years immediately following the Civil War.[1733] Between 1865 and 1873 there were twenty cases in which State acts were held invalid under the clause, of which twelve involved public contracts. During the next fifteen years, which was the period of Waite's chief justiceship, twenty-nine cases reached the Court in which State legislation was set aside under the clause. Twenty-four of these involved public contracts. The decline of the importance of the clause as a title in Constitutional Law began under Chief Justice Fuller (1888 to 1910). During this period less than 25% of the cases involving the validity of State legislation involved this rubric. In twenty-eight of these cases, of which only two involved private contracts, the statute involved was set aside. During Chief Justice White's term (1910 to 1921) the proportion of contract cases shrank to 15%, and in that of Chief Justice Taft, to 9%.[1734]

In recent years the clause has appeared to undergo something of a revival, not however as a protection of public grants, but as a protection of private credits. During the Depression, which began in 1929 and deepened in 1932, State legislatures enacted numerous moratorium statutes, and beginning with Home Loan Association v. Blaisdell, which was decided in 1934, the Court was required to pass upon several of these. At the same time the clause was, in effect, treated by the Court in two important cases as interpretive of the due process clause, Amendment V, and thus applied indirectly as a restriction on the power of Congress.[1735] But this emergence of the clause into prominence was a flash in the pan. During the last decade hardly a case a term involving the clause has reached the Court, counting even those in which it is treated as a tail to the due process of law kite.[1736] The reason for this declension has been twofold: first, the subordination of public grants to the police power; secondly, the expansion of the due process clause, which has largely rendered it a fifth wheel to the Constitutional Law coach.

Clause 2. No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

DUTIES ON EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Scope

Only articles imported from or exported to a foreign country, or "a place over which the Constitution has not extended its commands with respect to imports and their taxation," e.g., the Philippine Islands, are comprehended by the terms "imports" and "exports,"[1737] goods brought from another State are not affected by this section.[1738] To determine how long imported wares remain under the protection of this clause, the Supreme Court enunciated the original package doctrine in the leading case of Brown v. Maryland.[1739] "When the importer has so acted upon the thing imported," wrote Chief Justice Marshall, "that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports, to escape the prohibition in the Constitution."[1740] A box, case or bale in which separate parcels of goods have been placed by the foreign seller is regarded as the original package, and upon the opening of such container for the purpose of using the separate parcels, or of exposing them for sale, each parcel loses its character as an import and becomes subject to taxation as a part of the general mass of property in the State.[1741] Imports for manufacture cease to be such when the intended processing takes place,[1742] or when the original packages are broken.[1743] Where a manufacturer imports merchandise and stores it in his warehouse in the original packages, that merchandise does not lose its quality as an import, at least so long as it is not required to meet such immediate needs.[1744] The purchaser of imported goods is deemed to be the importer if he was the efficient cause of the importation, whether the title to the goods vested in him at the time of shipment, or after its arrival in this country.[1745] A State franchise tax measured by properly apportioned gross receipts may be imposed upon a railroad company in respect of the company's receipts for services in handling imports and exports at its marine terminal.[1746]

Privilege Taxes

A State law requiring importers to take out a license to sell imported goods amounts to an indirect tax on imports and hence is unconstitutional.[1747] Likewise, a franchise tax upon foreign corporations engaged in importing nitrate and selling it in the original packages,[1748] a tax on sales by brokers[1749] and auctioneers[1750] of imported merchandise in original packages, and a tax on the sale of goods in foreign commerce consisting of an annual license fee plus a percentage of gross sales,[1751] have been held invalid. On the other hand, pilotage fees,[1752] a tax upon the gross sales of a purchaser from the importer,[1753] a license tax upon dealing in fish which, through processing, handling, and sale, have lost their distinctive character as imports,[1754] an annual license fee imposed on persons engaged in buying and selling foreign bills of exchange,[1755] and a tax upon the right of an alien to receive property as heir, legatee, or donee of a deceased person[1756] have been held not to be duties on imports or exports.

Property Taxes

Property brought into the United States from without is immune from ad valorem taxation so long as it retains its character as an import,[1757] but the proceeds of the sale of imports, whether in the form of money or notes, may be taxed by a State.[1758] A property tax levied on warehouse receipts for whiskey exported to Germany was held unconstitutional as a tax on exports.[1759]

Inspection Laws

Inspection laws "are confined to such particulars as, in the estimation of the legislature and according to the customs of trade, are deemed necessary to fit the inspected article for the market, by giving the purchaser public assurance that the article is in that condition, and of that quality, which makes it merchantable and fit for use or consumption."[1760] In Turner v. Maryland[1761] the Supreme Court listed as recognized elements of inspection laws, the "quality of the article, form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds, * * *" .[1762] It sustained as an inspection law a charge for storage and inspection imposed upon every hogshead of tobacco grown in the State and intended for export, which the law required to be brought to a State warehouse to be inspected and branded. The Court has cited this section as a recognition of a general right of the States to pass inspection laws, and to bring, within their reach articles of interstate, as well as of foreign, commerce.[1763] But on the ground that, "it has never been regarded as within the legitimate scope of inspection laws to forbid trade in respect to any known article of commerce, irrespective of its condition and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the injurious consequences of its use or abuse," it held that a State law forbidding the importation of intoxicating liquors into the State could not be sustained as an inspection law.[1764] Since the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment, such State legislation is valid whether classified as an inspection law or not.

Clause 3. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

TONNAGE DUTIES

The prohibition against tonnage duties embraces all taxes and duties, regardless of their name or form, whether measured by the tonnage of the vessel or not, which are in effect charges for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.[1765] But it does not extend to charges made by State authority, even if graduated according to tonnage,[1766] for services rendered to the vessel, such as pilotage, towage, charges for loading and unloading cargoes, wharfage, or storage.[1767] For the purpose of determining wharfage charges, it is immaterial whether the wharf was built by the State, a municipal corporation or an individual; where the wharf is owned by a city, the fact that the city realized a profit beyond the amount expended does not render the toll objectionable.[1768] The services of harbor masters for which fees are allowed must be actually rendered, and a law permitting harbor masters or port wardens to impose a fee in all cases is void.[1769] A State may not levy a tonnage duty to defray the expenses of its quarantine system,[1770] but it may exact a fixed fee for examination of all vessels passing quarantine.[1771] A State license fee for ferrying on a navigable river is not a tonnage tax, but rather is a proper exercise of the police power, and the fact that a vessel is enrolled under federal law does not exempt it.[1772] In the State Tonnage Tax Cases,[1773] an annual tax on steamboats measured by their registered tonnage was held invalid despite the contention that it was a valid tax on the steamboat as property.

KEEPING TROOPS

This provision contemplates the use of the State's military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by civil authority;[1774] and the organization and maintenance of an active State militia is not a keeping of troops in time of peace within the prohibition of this clause.[1775]

INTERSTATE COMPACTS

Background of Clause

Except for the single limitation that the consent of Congress must be obtained, the original inherent sovereign rights of the States to make compacts with each other was not surrendered under the Constitution.[1776] "The compact," as the Supreme Court has put it, "adapts to our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations."[1777] In American history the compact technique can be traced back to the numerous controversies which arose over the ill-defined boundaries of the original colonies. These disputes were usually resolved by negotiation, with the resulting agreement subject to approval by the Crown.[1778] When the political ties with Britain were broken the Articles of Confederation provided for appeal to Congress in all disputes between two or more States over boundaries or "any cause whatever"[1779] and required the approval of Congress for any "treaty confederation or alliance" to which a State should be a party.[1780] The framers of the Constitution went further. By the first clause of this section they laid down an unqualified prohibition against "any treaty, alliance or confederation"; and by the third clause they required the consent of Congress for "any agreement or compact." The significance of this distinction was pointed out by Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v. Jennison.[1781] "As these words ('agreement or compact') could not have been idly or superfluously used by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot be construed to mean the same thing with the word treaty. They evidently mean something more, and were designed to make the prohibition more comprehensive. * * * The word 'agreement,' does not necessarily import and direct any express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing. If there is a verbal understanding, to which both parties have assented, and upon which both are acting, it is an 'agreement.' And the use of all of these terms, 'treaty,' 'agreement,' 'compact,' show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word 'agreement' its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties."[1782] But in Virginia v. Tennessee,[1783] decided more than a half century later, the Court shifted position, holding that the unqualified prohibition of compacts and agreements between States without the consent of Congress did not apply to agreements concerning such minor matters as adjustments of boundaries, which have no tendency to increase the political powers of the contractant States or to encroach upon the just supremacy of the United States. This divergence of doctrine may conceivably have interesting consequences.[1784]

Subject Matter of Interstate Compacts

For many years after the Constitution was adopted, boundary disputes continued to predominate as the subject matter of agreements among the States. Since the turn of the twentieth century, however, the interstate compact has been used to an increasing extent as an instrument for State cooperation in carrying out affirmative programs for solving common problems. The execution of vast public undertakings, such as the development of the Port of New York by the Port Authority created by compact between New York and New Jersey, flood control, the prevention of pollution, and the conservation and allocation of water supplied by interstate streams, are among the objectives accomplished by this means.[1785] Another important use of this device was recognized by Congress in the act of June 6, 1934,[1786] whereby it consented in advance to agreements for the control of crime. The first response to this stimulus was the Crime Compact of 1934, providing for the supervision of parolees and probationers, to which forty-five States had given adherence by 1949.[1787] Subsequently Congress has authorized, on varying conditions, compacts touching the production of tobacco, the conservation of natural gas, the regulation of fishing in inland waters, the furtherance of flood and pollution control, and other matters. Moreover, since 1935 at least thirty-six States, beginning with New Jersey, have set up permanent commissions for interstate cooperation, which have led to the formation of a Council of State Governments ("Cosgo" for short), the creation of special commissions for the study of the crime problem, the problem of highway safety, the trailer problem, problems created by social security legislation, etc., and the framing of uniform State legislation for dealing with some of these.[1788]

Consent of Congress

The Constitution makes no provision as to the time when the consent of Congress shall be given or the mode or form by which it shall be signified.[1789] While the consent will usually precede the compact or agreement, it may be given subsequently where the agreement relates to a matter which could not be well considered until its nature is fully developed.[1790] The required consent is not necessarily an expressed consent; it may be inferred from circumstances.[1791] It is sufficiently indicated, when not necessary to be made in advance, by the approval of proceedings taken under it.[1792] The consent of Congress may be granted conditionally "upon terms appropriate to the subject and transgressing no constitutional limitations."[1793] And in a recent instance it has not been forthcoming at all. In Sipuel v. Board of Regents,[1794] decided in 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that the equal protection clause of Amendment XIV requires a State maintaining a law school for white students to provide legal education for a Negro applicant, and to do so as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. Shortly thereafter the governors of 12 Southern States convened to canvass methods for meeting the demands of the Court. There resulted a compact to which 13 State legislatures have consented and by which a Board of Control for Southern Regional Education is set up. Although some early steps were taken toward obtaining Congress's consent to the agreement, the effort was soon abandoned, but without affecting the cooperative educational program, which to date has not been extended to the question of racial segregation.[1795] Finally, Congress does not, by giving its consent to a compact, relinquish or restrict its own powers, as for example, its power to regulate interstate commerce.[1796]

Grants of Franchise to Corporation by Two States

It is competent for a railroad corporation organized under the laws of one State, when authorized so to do by the consent of the State which created it, to accept authority from another State to extend its railroad into such State and to receive a grant of powers to own and control, by lease or purchase, railroads therein, and to subject itself to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the second State. Such legislation on the part of two or more States is not, in the absence of inhibitory legislation by Congress, regarded as within the constitutional prohibition of agreements or compacts between States.[1797]

Legal Effect of Interstate Compacts

Whenever, by the agreement of the States concerned and the consent of Congress, an interstate compact comes into operation, it has the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers. Boundaries established by such compacts become binding upon all citizens of the signatory States and are conclusive as to their rights.[1798] Private rights may be affected by agreements for the equitable apportionment of the water of an interstate stream, without a judicial determination of existing rights.[1799] Valid interstate compacts are within the protection of the obligation of contracts clause and specific enforcement of them is within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[1800] Congress also has authority to compel compliance with such a compact.[1801]

ADDENDUM

Nor may a State read herself out of a compact which she has ratified and to which Congress has consented by pleading that under the State's constitution as interpreted by the highest State court she had lacked power to enter into such an agreement and was without power to meet certain obligations thereunder. The final construction of the State constitution in such a case rests with the Supreme Court.[1802]

Notes

[1] 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819).

[2] See pp. 378-379.

[3] 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907).

[4] 4 Wheat. at 407.

[5] Ibid. 411.

[6] Ibid. 421.

[7] 2 Story, Commentaries, Sec. 1256. See also ibid. Sec. 1286 and 1330.

[8] 1 Pet. 511 (1828).

[9] Ibid. at 542.

[10] Ibid. 543.

[11] Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 616, 618-619 (1842).

[12] Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449-450 (1884). See also Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, 565 (1871).

[13] United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883).

[14] United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

[15] Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

[16] Hines v. Davidowitz et al., 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

[17] 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

[18] Ibid. 315, 316-317, 318 passim. For anticipations of this conception of the powers of the National Government in the field of foreign relations, see Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54, 80, 81 (1795); also ibid. 74 and 76 (argument of counsel); also Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 575-576 (1840).

[19] Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Chapter XI Sec. 141 (1691).

[20] 276 U.S. 394 (1928).

[21] Ibid. 405, 406.

[22] Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825).

[23] The Brig Aurora, 7 Cr. 382 (1813).

[24] Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42 (1825).

[25] Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939).

[26] United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533, 576 (1939).

[27] Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941); American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 329 U.S. 90, 107, 108 (1946). Cf. Wichita R. & L. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922).

[28] New York Cent. Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932).

[29] Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943); Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).

[30] Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783 (1948).

[31] Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1985).

[32] United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 514 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).

[33] Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).

[34] Ibid. 250.

[35] Ex parte Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897).

[36] Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).

[37] United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

[38] United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).

[39] Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).

[40] Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).

[41] United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).

[42] Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).

[43] Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).

[44] Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940).

[45] Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

[46] Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).

[47] Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).

[48] Interstate Commerce Comm'n. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 (1912).

[49] Although reversing the decision of the State supreme court that rates fixed by the commission were not subject to judicial review, the Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned the exercise of rate-making power by such bodies. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).

[50] Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408 (1928).

[51] State of Minnesota v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. 38 Minn. 281, 301 (1888).

[52] Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913); New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 340-350 (1947) and cases cited therein. See also New York et al. v. United States, 342 U.S. 882 (1951).

[53] Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).

[54] First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917).

[55] Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924).

[56] New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932).

[57] Federal Radio Comm'n. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).

[58] National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).

[59] 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq.

[60] Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952). Justice Black, with whom Justices Reed and Douglas concurred, dissented, saying: "In striking down these provisions of the Secretary's order, the Court has departed from many principles it has previously announced in connection with its supervision over administrative agents. Under these principles, the Court would refrain from setting aside administrative findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence; we would give weight to the interpretation of a statute by its administrators; when, administrators have interpreted broad statutory terms, such, as here involved, we would recognize that it is our duty to accept this interpretation even though it was not 'the only reasonable one' or the one 'we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.' Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)." Ibid. 484.

[61] Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440 (1883); Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527 (1885); Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905).

[62] St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 286 (1908).

[63] 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).

[64] 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).

[65] Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939).

[66] Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1939).

[67] 7 Cr. 382 (1813).

[68] Ibid. 388.

[69] 143 U.S. 649 (1892).

[70] Ibid. 691.

[71] Ibid. 692, 693.

[72] Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).

[73] 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936).

[74] Ibid. 319-322.--United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926) presented the anomalous situation of the United States suing to set aside a sale of alien property sold by one of its agents, the Alien Property Custodian, by authority of the President. The government contended that statute under which the sale was made was unconstitutional because, in giving the President full power of disposition of the property, it delegated legislative power to the President. Declaring that "It was peculiarly within the province of the Commander-in-Chief to know the facts and to determine what disposition should be made of enemy properties in order effectively to carry on the war," the Court affirmed a decree dismissing the suit. Ibid. 12.

[75] 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

[76] 312 U.S. 126 (1941).

[77] Ibid. 144, 145.

[78] White House Digest of Provisions of Law Which Would Become Operative upon Proclamation of a National Emergency by the President. The Digest is dated December 11, 1950. It was released to the press on December 16th. 15 F.R. 9029.

[79] United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

[80] Steuart & Bros. Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398, 404 (1944).

[81] United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892).

[82] Steuart & Bros. Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944).

[83] Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946).

[84] Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harvard Law Review, 153, 159-166 (1926).

[85] 3 Annals of Congress, 493 (1792).

[86] In 1800, Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, Jr., addressed a letter to the House of Representatives advising them of his resignation from office and inviting an investigation of his office. Such an inquiry was made. 10 Annals of Congress 786-788 (1800).

[87] 8 Cong. Deb. 2160 (1832).

[88] 13 Cong. Deb. 1057 (1836).

[89] H.R. Rep. No. 194, 24th Cong., 2d sess., Ser. No. 307, 1, 12, 31 (1837).

[90] Cong. Globe, 36th Cong. 1st sess. 1100-1109 (1860).

[91] 103 U.S. 168 (1881).

[92] 273 U.S. 135, 177, 178 (1927).

[93] 4 Cong. Deb. 862, 868, 888, 889 (1827).

[94] 103 U.S. 168 (1881).

[95] 154 U.S. 447 (1894).

[96] Ibid. 478. See also Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U.S. 33 (1917).

[97] 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

[98] Ibid. 154, 175.

[99] 103 U.S. 168, 192-196 (1881).

[100] 166 U.S. 661 (1897).

[101] Ibid. 670.

[102] 273 U.S. 135, 178 (1927).

[103] 279 U.S. 263 (1929).

[104] Ibid. 295.

[105] In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).

[106] 279 U.S. 597 (1929).

[107] 6 Wheat. 204 (1821).

[108] 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

[109] Ibid. 542.

[110] 294 U.S. 125 (1935).

[111] Ibid. 147, 150.

[112] 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821).

[113] In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-672 (1897).

[114] United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330 (1950); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).

[115] Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89, 90 (1949).

[116] Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 171 (1875); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).

[117] Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

[118] United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).

[119] United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 387 (1944).

[120] United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

[121] United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).

[122] 35 Stat. 1092 (1909); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 51 (1946), superseded by 62 Stat. 696 (1948); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 241 (Supp. II, 1946 ed.).

[123] United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).

[124] United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).

[125] United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918). See also United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917).

[126] Sen. Rep. 904, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 9651-9653 (1935).

[127] No. LX.

[128] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: Sec. 443, 448-458 (1907).

[129] 202 U.S. 344 (1906).

[130] Ibid. 369-370.

[131] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: Sec. 474-477 (1907).

[132] 69 Cong. Rec. 1718 (1928).

[133] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: Sec. 414 (1907).

[134] Ibid. Sec. 415-417.

[135] The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of Representative among the several States, was changed by the Fourteenth Amendment, Sec. 2 (p. 1170) and as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the Sixteenth Amendment (p. 1191).

[136] Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 536 (1871).

[137] 46 Stat. 21 (1929). This same act penalizes refusal to cooperate properly with the census taker by answering his questions and in other ways. 13 U.S.C. 209.

[138] The Senate is a "continuing body"--McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181-182 (1927).

[139] 5 Stat. 491 (1842). This requirement was dropped in 1850 (9 Stat. 428, 432-433) but was renewed in 1862 (12 Stat. 572). See also Joel Francis Paschal, The House of Representatives "Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle", Spring 1952 Issue of Law and Contemporary Problems (Duke University School of Law), 276-289.

[140] 14 Stat. 243 (1866).

[141] 16 Stat. 144 (1870); 16 Stat. 254 (1870); 17 Stat. 347-349 (1872).

[142] 28 Stat. 36 (1894).

[143] United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).

[144] Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883).

[145] 241 U.S. 565 (1916).

[146] Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932).

[147] 46 Stat. 21 (1929).

[148] 37 Stat. 13, 14 (1911).

[149] Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).

[150] 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

[151] Ibid. 556, 566.

[152] Ibid. 570-571.

[153] Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).

[154] In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888).

[155] Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 309 (1880); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883).

[156] United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).

[157] Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).

[158] United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).

[159] Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929).

[160] In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890).

[161] Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, VI: Sec. 72-74, 180 (1936). Cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921).

[162] Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 614 (1929).

[163] Ibid. 615.

[164] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, IV: Sec. 2895-2905 (1907).

[165] 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

[166] Ibid. 5-6.

[167] Rule V.

[168] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, IV: Sec. 2910-2915 (1907); Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, VI: Sec. 645, 646 (1936).

[169] United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). It is, of course, by virtue of its power to determine "rules of its proceedings" that the Senate enables its members to prevent the transaction of business by what are termed "filibusters". The question has been raised whether the rules which support a filibuster are constitutionally compatible with the clause in the preceding section: "A majority of each [House] shall constitute a quorum to do business". See Franklin Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate (Princeton University Press, 1940), 6, 61, 111-112, 227-229, 232-233, 237-238. The Senate is "a continuing body". McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 139, 181-182 (1927). Hence its rules remain in force from Congress to Congress except as they are changed from time to time, whereas those of the House are readopted at the outset of each new Congress.

[170] 286 U.S. 6 (1932).

[171] 338 U.S. 84 (1949).

[172] Title 22, Sec. 2501.

[173] 338 U.S. at 93-95, citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-673 (1892); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892); and other cases.

[174] Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 356 (1906).

[175] In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669, 670 (1897).

[176] I Story, Constitution, Sec. 840, quoted with approval in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892).

[177] United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892).

[178] Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911). A parallel rule holds in the case of a duly authenticated official notice to the Secretary of State that a State legislature has ratified a proposed amendment to the Constitution. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949), a sharply divided Court ruled that, in a case brought under the Perjury Statute of the District of Columbia (Sec. 22-2501 of the D.C. Code) for alleged perjurious testimony before a Committee of the House of Representatives, the trial Court erred in charging the jury that it was free to ignore testimony that less than a quorum of the Committee was in attendance when the alleged perjury was committed. Four Justices dissented; and curiously enough only four of the majority were present when the opinion was delivered, the fifth being indisposed. Remarks Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in United States v. Bryan (339 U.S. 323 (1950)), in which the ruling in Christoffel was held to be inapplicable: "It is ironic that this interference with legislative procedures was promulgated by exercise within the Court of the very right of absentee participation denied to Congressmen." Ibid. 344. It seems unlikely that the Christoffel decision seriously undermines Field v. Clark.

[179] Page v. United States, 127 U.S. 67 (1888).

[180] Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).

[181] Ibid. 83.

[182] United States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 341 (1800).

[183] Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 446 (1908).

[184] Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).

[185] Ibid.

[186] 4 Mass. 1 (1808).

[187] Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203, 204 (1881).

[188] Ibid. 205.

[189] Justice Frankfurter for the Court in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). Justice Douglas dissented: "* * * I do not agree that all abuses of legislative committees are solely for the legislative body to police. We are dealing here with a right protected by the Constitution--the right of free speech. The charge * * * is that a legislative committee brought the weight of its authority down on respondent for exercising his right of free speech. Reprisal for speaking is as much an abridgment as a prior restraint. If a committee departs so far from its domain [as?] to deprive a citizen of a right protected by the Constitution, I can think of no reason why it should be immune". Ibid. 382. See also Barsky v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 241 (1948); certiorari denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).

[190] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: Sec. 493 (1907); Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, VI: Sec. 63, 64 (1936).

[191] Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, I: Sec. 496-499 (1907).

[192] 34 Stat. 948 (1907).

[193] 35 Stat. 626 (1909).

[194] The situation gave rise to the case of Ex parte Albert Levitt, Petitioner, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). This was the case in which the Court declined to pass upon the validity of Justice Black's appointment. It seems curious that the Court, in rejecting petitioner's application, did not point out that it was being asked to assume original jurisdiction contrary to the decision in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137 (1803).

[195] I Story, Constitution, Sec. 880.

[196] Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897).

[197] Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906).

[198] Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911).

[199] Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914).

[200] La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899).

[201] Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). On one occasion in 1936, delay in presentation of a bill enabled the President to sign it 23 days after the adjournment of Congress. Schmeckebier, Approval of Bills After Adjournment of Congress, 33 American Political Science Review 52 (1939).

[202] Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499 (1868).

[203] Ibid. 504. See also Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 383 (1878).

[204] Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. 164, 211 (1822).

[205] Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 198 (1873).

[206] Okanogan Indians v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).

[207] Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).

[208] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919).

[209] 20 Wall. 92, 112, 113 (1874).

[210] 12 Stat. 589 (1862).

[211] 54th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 1335; Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, IV: Sec. 3483 (1907).

[212] See e.g., Lend Lease Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31); First War Powers Act of December 18, 1941 (55 Stat. 838); Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942 (56 Stat. 23); Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942 (56 Stat. 765); War Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943 (57 Stat. 163).

[213] Reorganization Act of June 20, 1949 (63 Stat. 203).

[214] Reorganization Act of April 3, 1939 (53 Stat. 561).

[215] Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798).

[216] License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471 (1867).

[217] Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).

[218] Ibid. 12.

[219] 253 U.S. 245 (1920).

[220] 268 U.S. 501 (1925).

[221] 307 U.S. 277 (1939).

[222] 11 Wall. 113 (1871).

[223] Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).

[224] 304 U.S. 405, 414 (1938).

[225] Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869).

[226] United States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 17 Wall. 322 (1873).

[227] 157 U.S. 429 (1895).

[228] 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

[229] Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).

[230] 12 Wheat. 419, 444 (1827).

[231] Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U.S. 249, 254 (1903).

[232] South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). See also Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934).

[233] 220 U.S. 107 (1911).

[234] Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384 (1922).

[235] Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572 (1930).

[236] University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).

[237] Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).

[238] Wilmette Park District v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949).

[239] Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926).

[240] Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934).

[241] Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931).

[242] Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), overruling Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932).

[243] New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 584 (1946), (concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge).

[244] 304 U.S. 405 (1938).

[245] Ibid. 419-420.

[246] 326 U.S. 572 (1946).

[247] Ibid. 584.

[248] Ibid. 589-590.

[249] Ibid. 596.

[250] Wilmette Park District v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949).

[251] See also article I, section 9, clause 4.

[252] LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921); Brushaber v. Union P.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).

[253] Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).

[254] Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945); Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930).

[255] Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).

[256] Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).

[257] 194 U.S. 486 (1904). The Court recognized that Alaska was an incorporated territory but took the position that the situation in substance was the same as if the taxes had been directly imposed by a territorial legislature for the support of the local government.

[258] License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471 (1867).

[259] United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921).

[260] United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935).

[261] License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471 (1867).

[262] Felsenheld v. United States, 186 U.S. 126 (1902).

[263] In re Kollock, 105 U.S. 526 (1897).

[264] United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919). Cf. Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928).

[265] Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).

[266] McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).

[267] Justice Clark speaking for the Court in United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). See also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-514 (1937).

[268] Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 383 (1940). See also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 596 (1884).

[269] Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903).

[270] 296 U.S. 287 (1935).

[271] 1 Stat. 24 (1789).

[272] 276 U.S. 394 (1928).

[273] Ibid. 411-412.

[274] III Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 147-149 (Library Edition, 1904).

[275] James Francis Lawson, The General Welfare Clause (1926).

[276] The Federalist Nos. 30 and 34.

[277] Ibid. No. 41.

[278] 1 Stat. 229 (1792).

[279] 2 Stat. 357 (1806).

[280] In an advisory opinion which it rendered for President Monroe at his request on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for public improvements, the Court answered that such appropriations might be properly made under the war and postal powers. See E.F. Albertsworth, "Advisory Functions in the Supreme Court," 23 Georgetown L.J. 643, 644-647 (1935). Monroe himself ultimately adopted the broadest view of the spending power, from which, however, he carefully excluded any element of regulatory or police power. See his "Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements," of May 4, 1822, 2 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 713-752.

[281] The Council of State Governments, Federal Grants-in-Aid, 6-14 (1949).

[282] 127 U.S. 1 (1888).

[283] 255 U.S. 180 (1921).

[284] 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).

[285] 160 U.S. 668 (1896).

[286] Ibid. 681.

[287] 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945).

[288] 297 U.S. 1, 65, 66 (1936).

[289] Justice Stone, speaking for himself and two other Justices, dissented on the ground that Congress was entitled when spending the national revenues for the "general welfare" to see to it that the country got its money's worth thereof, and that the condemned provisions were "necessary and proper" to that end. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 84-86 (1936).

[290] 301 U.S. 548 (1937).

[291] Ibid. 591.

[292] Ibid. 590.

[293] Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937).

[294] 301 U.S. 619 (1937).

[295] 301 U.S. 548, 589, 590 (1937).

[296] 330 U.S. 127 (1947).

[297] 54 Stat. 767 (1940).

[298] 330 U.S. 127, 143.

[299] United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427 (1896); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 9 (1944).

[300] Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937).

[301] Cr. 358 (1805).

[302] Ibid. 396.

[303] 2 Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention, 81 (Hunt's ed. 1908).

[304] Ibid. 181.

[305] Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1870).

[306] Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935). See also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).

[307] Prentice and Egan, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution (1898) 14. The balance began inclining the other way with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887.

[308] 9 Wheat. 1, 189-192 (1824). Cf. Webster for the appellant: "Nothing was more complex than commerce; and in such an age as this, no words embraced a wider field than commercial regulation. Almost all the business and intercourse of life may be connected, incidently, more or less, with commercial regulations." (ibid. 9-10); also Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion: "Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations, become the objects of commercial regulation. Shipbuilding, the carrying trade, and propagation of seamen, are such vital agents of commercial prosperity, that the nation which could not legislate over these subjects, would not possess power to regulate commerce." (ibid. 229-230). "It is all but impossible in our own age to sense fully its eighteenth-century meaning (i.e., the meaning of commerce). The Eighteenth Century did not separate by artificial lines aspects of a culture which are inseparable. It had no lexicon of legalisms extracted from the law reports in which judicial usage lies in a world apart from the ordinary affairs of life. Commerce was then more than we imply now by business or industry. It was a name for the economic order, the domain of political economy, the realm of a comprehensive public policy. It is a word which makes trades, activities and interests an instrument in the culture of a people. If trust was to be reposed in parchment, it was the only word which could catch up into a single comprehensive term all activities directly affecting the wealth of the nation," Walton H. Hamilton and Douglass Adair, The Power to Govern, 62-63 (New York: 1937).

[309] Ibid. 191.

[310] 9 Wheat. 1, 193 (1824).

[311] See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (1856); Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1881); Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894); Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).

[312] Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1878); International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 106-107 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 (1918); Federal Radio Com. v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).

[313] Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-399 (1905); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290-291 (1921); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Federal Trade Com. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assoc., 273 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1927).

[314] Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).

[315] Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869). See also New York L. Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 (1900); Fire Assoc. of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Bothwell v. Buckbee-Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).

[316] Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).

[317] Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920).

[318] Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).

A contract entered into for the erection of a factory which was to be supervised and operated by the officers of a foreign corporation was held not a transaction of interstate commerce in the constitutional sense merely because of the fact that the products of the factory are largely to be sold and shipped to other factories. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 616 (1903). In Browning v. Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914), it was held that the installation of lightning rods sold by a foreign corporation was not interstate commerce, although provided for in the contract of purchase. Similarly in General Railway Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 500 (1918), where a foreign corporation installed signals in Virginia, bringing in materials, supplies, and machinery from without the State, the Court held that local business was involved, separate and distinct from interstate commerce, and subject to the licensing power of the State. However, in an interstate contract for the sale of a complicated ice-making plant, where it was stipulated that the parts should be shipped into the purchaser's State and the plant there assembled and tested under the supervision of an expert to be sent by the seller, it was held that services of the expert did not constitute the doing of a local business subjecting the seller to regulations of Texas concerning foreign corporations. York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21 (1918). See also Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148 (1925).

[319] Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).

[320] American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). Cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).

[321] United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The interstate character of the insurance business as today organized and carried on is stressed, although its intrastate elements are not overlooked. The Court's business is to determine in each case whether "the competing * * * State and national interests * * * can be accommodated." Ibid. 541 and 548.

[322] Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18.

[323] See infra CONGRESSIONAL REGULATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.

[324] 6 Wheat. 264, 413 (1821).

[325] 9 Wheat. 1, 195 (1824).

[326] New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (1837), overturned in Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); License Cases, 5 How. 504, 573-574, 588, 613 (1847); Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 399-400, 465-470 (1849); The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall. 782 (Appendix), 793 (1866); United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, 44 (1870); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503 (1879); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Illinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144-149 (1909); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See also infra.

[327] United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).

[328] Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196. Commerce "among the several States" does not comprise commerce of the District of Columbia nor the territories of the United States. Congress's power over their commerce is an incident of its general power over them. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); In re Bryant, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2067 (1865). Transportation between two points in the same State, when a large part of the route is a loop outside the State, is "commerce among the several States." Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 187 U.S. 617 (1903); followed in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920), as to a message sent from one point to another in North Carolina via a point in Virginia.

[329] 9 Wheat. 1, 196-197.

[330] Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 373-374.

[331] Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 222 (1915).

[332] Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 5 How. 504, 578 (1847).

[333] Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895).

[334] United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147-148 (1938). See also infra.

[335] The "Daniel Ball," 10 Wall. 557, 564 (1871).

[336] Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696, 697 (1881).

[337] Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 47, 53-54 (1912).

[338] The above case. And see infra.

[339] 9 Wheat. 1, 217, 221 (1824).

[340] Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878). See also Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882).

[341] Ibid. 9. "Commerce embraces appliances necessarily employed in carrying on transportation by land and water."--Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 568 (1873).

[342] "No question is presented as to the power of the Congress, in its regulation of interstate commerce, to regulate radio communications." Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Court in Federal Radio Com v. Nelson Bros. B. & M. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933). Said Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in 1936: "Appellant is thus engaged in the business of transmitting advertising programs from its stations in Washington to those persons in other States who 'listen in' through the use of receiving sets. In all essentials its procedure does not differ from that employed in sending telegraph or telephone messages across State lines, which is interstate commerce. Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920); New Jersey Bell Teleph. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessments, 280 U.S. 338 (1930); Cooney v. Mountain States Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935); Pacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 403 (1936). In each, transmission is effected by means of energy manifestations produced at the point of reception in one State which are generated and controlled at the sending point in another. Whether the transmission is effected by the aid of wires, or through a perhaps less well understood medium, 'the ether,' is immaterial, in the light of those practical considerations which have dictated the conclusion that the transmission of information interstate is a form of 'intercourse,' which is commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189." Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 650, 654-655 (1936).

[343] 13 How. 518.

[344] 10 Stat. 112 (1852).

[345] Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 430 (1856). "It is Congress, and not the Judicial Department, to which the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. The courts can never take the initiative on this subject." Parkersburg & O. River Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 701 (1883). See also Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); and Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946).

[346] 3 Wall. 713.

[347] Ibid. 724-725.

[348] Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907). See also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910); and Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). Of collateral interest are the following: South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 13 (1876); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913); United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1935).

[349] Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897). See also Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470 (1882); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Seattle v. Oregon & W.R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921); Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); United States v. River Rouge Improv. Co., 269 U.S. 411, 419 (1926); Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369 (1930); United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945).

[350] United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).

[351] United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).

[352] United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); and cf. below the discussion of United States v. Appalachian Electric P. Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).

[353] The "Daniel Ball" v. United States, 10 Wall. 557 (1871).

[354] Ibid. 560.

[355] Ibid. 565.

[356] Ibid. 566. "The regulation of commerce implies as much control, as far-reaching power, over an artificial as over a natural highway." Justice Brewer for the Court in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 342 (1893).

[357] Congress had the right to confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate interstate ferry rates. (New York C. & H.R.R. Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 227 U.S. 248 (1913)); and to authorize the Commission to govern the towing of vessels between points in the same State but partly through waters of an adjoining State (Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634 (1944)). Also Congress's power over navigation extends to persons furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, and other terminal facilities to a common carrier by water. Hence an order of the United States Maritime Commission banning certain allegedly "unreasonable practices" by terminals in the Port of San Francisco, and prescribing schedules of maximum free time periods and of minimum charges was constitutional. (California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944)). The same power also comprises regulation of the registry, enrollment, license, and nationality of ships and vessels; the method of recording bills of sale and mortgages thereon; the rights and duties of seamen; the limitations of the responsibility of shipowners for the negligence and misconduct of their captains and crews; and many other things of a character truly maritime. See Rodd v. Heartt (The "Lottawanna"), 21 Wall. 558, 577 (1875); Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 589 (1883); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). See also below article III, Sec. 2, (Admiralty and Maritime clause).

[358] Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). "The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the States respectively; and the new States have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original States." 3 How. 212, headnote 3.

[359] Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58, 80 (1898).

[360] 229 U.S. 53 (1913).

[361] Ibid. 72-73, citing Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254 (1891).

[362] 283 U.S. 423.

[363] 311 U.S. 377.

[364] 283 U.S. at 455, 456.

[365] 311 U.S. at 407, 409-410.

[366] 311 U.S. at 426.

[367] Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523-534 passim (1941).

[368] Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See infra.

[369] 12 Stat. 489 (1862).

[370] Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579, 589 (1870); California v. Central Pacific Railroad, 127 U.S. 1, 39 (1888); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 530 (1894).

[371] 14 Stat. 66 (1866). In his first annual message (December 4, 1865), President Johnson had asked Congress "to prevent any selfish impediment [by the States] to the free circulation of men and merchandise." 6 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 362.

[372] 14 Stat. 221; Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 3-4, 11 (1878).

[373] R.S. Secs. 4386-4390; replaced today by the Live Stock Transportation Act of 1906 (34 Stat. 607).

[374] 94 U.S. 113 (1877).

[375] 118 U.S. 557.

[376] 24 Stat. 379 (1887).

[377] 154 U.S. 447.

[378] Interstate Commerce Com. v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 176 (1897). See also Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184 (1896).

[379] 34 Stat. 584.

[380] 36 Stat. 539 (1910).

[381] By the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1081), this jurisdiction was handed over to the Federal Communications Commission, created by the act.

[382] 41 Stat. 474 Sec. 400; 488 Sec. 422. The act must today be read in conjunction with the Transportation Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 898), which "was intended, together with the old law, to provide a completely integrated interstate regulatory system over motor, railroad, and water carriers." United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.S. 612, 618-619 (1945).

[383] Houston E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914). Forty States, through their Attorneys General, intervened in the case against the Commission's order.

[384] Ibid. 351-352.

[385] Ibid. 353. See to the same effect American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617, 627 (1917); Pacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Tax Commission (Washington), 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947); and United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 438 (1947).

[386] 257 U.S. 563 (1922).

[387] In North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507 (1945), the Court disallowed as ultra vires an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, setting aside State-prescribed intrastate passenger rates, on the ground that it was unsupported by clear findings and evidence sufficient to show its necessity.

Among the various provisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act that have been sustained in specific decisions are the following: a provision penalizing shippers for obtaining transportation at less than published rates, Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); the so-called "commodities clause" of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, construed as prohibiting the hauling of commodities in which the carrier had at the time of haul a proprietary interest, United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909); a provision of the same act abrogating life passes, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911); a provision of the same act authorizing the Commission to regulate the entire system of bookkeeping of interstate carriers, including intrastate accounts, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912); the "long and short haul" clause of the Interstate Commerce Act, United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. (Intermountain Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 476 (1914); an order of the Commission establishing the so-called uniform zone or block system of express rates, American Express Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617 (1917); an order of the Commission directing the abandonment of an intrastate branch of an interstate railroad, Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926); an order of the Commission fixing rates of a transportation company operating solely in the District of Columbia, on the ground that its carriage of passengers constituted part of an interstate movement, United States v. Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. 286 (1949).

[388] United States v. Ohio Oil Co. (Pipe Line Cases), 234 U.S. 548 (1914).

[389] See also State Corp. Commission v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).

[390] Public Utilities Com. v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). See also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).

[391] 49 Stat. 838.

[392] The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821.

[393] 315 U.S. 575 (1942).

[394] Ibid. 582. Sales to distributors by a wholesaler of natural gas which is delivered to it from an out-of-State source are subject to the rate-making powers of the Federal Power Commission. Colorado-Wyoming Co. v. Comm'n., 324 U.S. 626 (1945). See also Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942); also Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, decided January 9, 1950, where it was held that a natural gas company which, while operating exclusively in one State, sold there directly to consumers gas transported into the State through the interstate lines of other companies, "a natural gas company" within the meaning of the act of 1938, and so could be required by the Commission to keep uniform accounts and submit reports.

[395] 48 Stat. 1064.

[396] 49 Stat. 543; since amended in some respects in 1938 (52 Stat. 973) and 1940 (54 Stat. 735).

[397] 52 Stat. 973.

[398] 27 Stat. 531. As early as 1838 laws were passed requiring the installation of safety devices on steam vessels. 5 Stat. 304 and 626. Along with the Safety Appliance Acts mention should also be made of acts requiring the use of ashpans on locomotives (35 Stat. 476 (1908)); the inspection of boilers (36 Stat. 913 (1911) and 38 Stat. 1192 (1915)); the use of ladders, drawbars, etc., on cars (36 Stat. 298 (1910)); etc.

[399] 32 Stat. 943.

[400] 222 U.S. 20 (1911).

[401] Ibid. 26-27. See also Texas & P.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In the latter case the intrastate railway involved was property of the State.

[402] 34 Stat. 1415.

[403] Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 221 U.S. 612, 618-619 (1911).

[404] 34 Stat. 232, disallowed in part in Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908); 35 Stat. 65, sustained in the Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.), 223 U.S. 1 (1912).

[405] See 223 U.S. at 19-22.

[406] Ibid. 48. Because the injured employee must, in order to benefit from the act, be employed at the time of his injury "in interstate commerce," the Court's application of it has given rise to some narrow distinctions. See Illinois Central R. Co. v. Peery, 242 U.S. 292 (1916); New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177 (1916); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 13 (1916); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473 (1914); St. Louis, S.F. & T.R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156 (1913); Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 229 U.S. 146 (1913); Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556 (1916); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Barlow, 244 U.S. 183 (1917); Southern R. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U.S. 571 (1917); Reed v. Director General of Railroads, 258 U.S. 92 (1922). That Congress might "legislate as to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employes and others on railway trains engaged in that [interstate] commerce," was stated by the Court in Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 99 (1888).

[407] 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

[408] 30 Stat. 424.

[409] 44. Stat. 577.

[410] Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). The provision of Railway Labor Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 577), preventing interference by either party with organization or designation of representatives by the other, is within the constitutional authority of Congress. Similarly, "back shop" employees of an interstate carrier, who engaged in making heavy repairs on locomotives and cars withdrawn from service for that purpose for long periods (an average of 105 days for locomotives and 109 days for cars), were held to be within the terms of the act as amended in 1934 (48 Stat. 1185). "The activities in which these employees are engaged have such a relation to the other confessedly interstate activities of the * * * [carrier] that they are to be regarded as a part of them. All taken together fall within the power of Congress over interstate commerce." Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 556 (1937).

By the Adamson Act of 1916 a temporary increase in wages was imposed upon the railways of the country in order to meet a sudden threat to strike by important groups of their employees. The act was assailed on the dual ground that it was not a regulation of commerce among the States and that it was violative of the carriers' rights under the Fifth Amendment. A closely divided Court, speaking through Chief Justice White, answered both objections by pointing to the magnitude of the emergency which had threatened the country with commercial paralysis and grave loss and suffering. To the familiar argument that "emergency may not create power" (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1806)), the Chief Justice answered that "it may afford a reason for exerting a power already enjoyed." A further answer to objections based on the rights of carriers under the Fifth Amendment, particularly the right of "freedom of contract," was that the situation met by the statute had arisen in consequence of a failure to exercise these rights--a far from satisfactory answer, as the dissent pointed out, since one element of a right is freedom of choice regarding its use or nonuse. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 387 (1917).

[411] 48 Stat. 1283.

[412] 295 U.S. 330 (1935).

[413] Ibid. 374.

[414] Ibid. 384.

[415] 326 U.S. 446 (1946). Indeed, in a case decided in June, 1948, Justice Rutledge, speaking for a majority of the Court, listed the Alton case as one "foredoomed to reversal," though the formal reversal has never taken place. See Mandeville Is. Farms v. American C.S. Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230 (1948).

[416] 250 U.S. 199 (1919).

[417] Ibid. 203-204.

[418] 26 Stat. 209 (1890).

[419] 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

[420] Ibid. 13.

[421] 156 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1895). "Slight reflection will show that if the national power extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries, whose ultimate result may effect external commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for State control."

[422] Ibid. 17. The doctrine of the case simmered down to the proposition that commerce was transportation only; a doctrine which Justice Harlan undertook to refute in his notable dissenting opinion: "Interstate commerce does not, therefore, consist in transportation simply. It includes the purchase and sale of articles that are intended to be transported from one State to another--every species of commercial intercourse among the States and with foreign nations." (p. 22). "Any combination, therefore, that disturbs or unreasonably obstructs freedom in buying and selling articles manufactured to be sold to persons in other States or to be carried to other States--a freedom that cannot exist if the right to buy and sell is fettered by unlawful restraints that crush out competition--affects, not incidentally, but directly, the people of all the States; and the remedy for such an evil is found only in the exercise of powers confided to a government which, this court has said, was the government of all, exercising powers delegated by all, representing all, acting for all. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405." (p. 33). "It is said that manufacture precedes commerce and is not a part of it. But it is equally true that when manufacture ends, that which has been manufactured becomes a subject of commerce; that buying and selling succeed manufacture, come into existence after the process of manufacture is completed, precede transportation, and are as much commercial intercourse, where articles are bought to be carried from one State to another, as is the manual transportation of such articles after they have been so purchased. The distinction was recognized by this court in Gibbons v. Ogden, where the principal question was whether commerce included navigation. Both the Court and counsel recognized buying and selling or barter as included in commerce. * * * The power of Congress covers and protects the absolute freedom of such intercourse and trade among the States as may or must succeed manufacture and precede transportation from the place of purchase." (p. 35-36). "When I speak of trade I mean the buying and selling of articles of every kind that are recognized articles of interstate commerce. Whatever improperly obstructs the free course of interstate intercourse and trade, as involved in the buying and selling of articles to be carried from one State to another, may be reached by Congress, under its authority to regulate commerce among the States." (p. 37). "If the national power is competent to repress State action in restraint of interstate trade as it may be involved in purchases of refined sugar to be transported from one State to another State, surely it ought to be deemed sufficient to prevent unlawful restraints attempted to be imposed by combinations of corporations or individuals upon those identical purchases; otherwise, illegal combinations of corporations or individuals may--so far as national power and interstate commerce are concerned--do, with impunity, what no State can do." (p. 38). "Whatever a State may do to protect its completely interior traffic or trade against unlawful restraints, the general government is empowered to do for the protection of the people of all the States--for this purpose one people--against unlawful restraints imposed upon interstate traffic or trade in articles that are to enter into commerce among the several States." (p. 42).

[423] 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

[424] 196 U.S. 375.--The Sherman Act was applied to break up combinations of interstate carriers in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint-Traffic Asso., 171 U.S. 505 (1898); and Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). In the first of these cases the Court was confronted with the contention that the act had been intended only for the industrial combinations, and hence was not designed to apply to the railroads, for whose governance the Interstate Commerce Act had been enacted three years prior. Justice Peckham answered the argument by saying that "to exclude agreements as to rates by competing railroads * * * would leave [very] little for the act to take effect upon," referring in this connection to the decision in the Sugar Trust Case, 166 U.S. at 313.

Alluding in his opinion for the Court in Mandeville Island Farms v. American C.S. Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) to the Sugar Trust Case, Justice Rutledge said: "Like this one, that case involved the refining and interstate distribution of sugar. But because the refining was done wholly within a single state, the case was held to be one involving 'primarily' only 'production' or 'manufacturing,' although the vast part of the sugar produced was sold and shipped interstate, and this was the main end of the enterprise. The interstate distributing phase, however, was regarded as being only 'incidentally,' 'indirectly,' or 'remotely' involved; and to be 'incidental,' 'indirect,' or 'remote' was to be, under the prevailing climate, beyond Congress' power to regulate, and hence outside the scope of the Sherman Act. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 119 et seq. (1942).

"The Knight decision made the statute a dead letter for more than a decade and, had its full force remained unmodified, the Act today would be a weak instrument, as would also the power of Congress, to reach evils in all the vast operations of our gigantic national industrial system antecedent to interstate sale and transportation of manufactured products. Indeed, it and succeeding decisions, embracing the same artificially drawn lines, produced a series of consequences for the exercise of national power over industry conducted on a national scale which the evolving nature of our industrialism foredoomed to reversal." Ibid. 229-230.

[425] Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).

[426] 196 U.S. at 398-399.

[427] Ibid. 399-401.

[428] Ibid. 400.

[429] Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United States v. Brime, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters Assn., 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).

[430] 42 Stat. 159.

[431] Ibid. 998 (1922).

[432] 258 U.S. 495 (1922).

[433] Ibid. 514.

[434] Ibid. 515-516. See also Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).

[435] 262 U.S. 1 (1923).

[436] Ibid. 35.

[437] Ibid. 40.

[438] 258 U.S. at 521; 262 U.S. at 37.

[439] 48 Stat. 881.

[440] 49 Stat. 803.

[441] Electric Bond Co. v. Comm'n., 303 U.S. 419 (1938); North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686 (1946); American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90 (1946).

[442] "The Bond and Share system, including American and Electric, possesses an undeniable interstate character which makes it properly subject, from the statutory standpoint, to the provisions of Sec. 11 (b) (2). This vast system embraces utility properties in no fewer than 32 States, from New Jersey to Oregon and from Minnesota to Florida, as well as in 12 foreign countries. Bond and Share dominates and controls this system from its headquarters in New York City. * * * the proper control and functioning of such an extensive multi-state network of corporations necessitates continuous and substantial use of the mails and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Only in that way can Bond and Share, or its subholding companies or service subsidiary, market and distribute securities, control and influence the various operating companies, negotiate inter-system loans, acquire or exchange property, perform service contracts, or reap the benefits of stock ownership. * * * Moreover, many of the operating companies on the lower echelon sell and transmit electric energy or gas in interstate commerce to an extent that cannot be described as spasmodic or insignificant. * * * Congress, of course, has undoubted power under the commerce clause to impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate commerce so that those channels will not be conduits for promoting or perpetuating economic evils. * * * Thus to the extent that corporate business is transacted through such channels, affecting commerce in more States than one, Congress may act directly with respect to that business to protect what it conceives to be the national welfare. * * * It may compel changes in the voting rights and other privileges of stockholders. It may order the divestment or rearrangement of properties. It may order the reorganization or dissolution of corporations. In short, Congress is completely uninhibited by the commerce clause in selecting the means considered necessary for bringing about the desired conditions in the channels of interstate commerce. Any limitations are to be found in other sections of the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196." American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 98-100 (1946).

[443] Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1933).

[444] 48 Stat. 195.

[445] 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

[446] Ibid. 548. See also Ibid. 546.

[447] In United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948), the Court interpreted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 as applying to the sale by a retailer of drugs purchased from his wholesaler within the State nine months after their interstate shipment had been completed. The Court, speaking by Justice Black, cited United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The last three of these cases are discussed below. See pp. 155, 159. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the basis of Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). It is apparent that the Schechter case has been thoroughly repudiated so far as the distinction "direct" and "indirect" effects is concerned. See also McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), which preceded the Schechter decision by more than two decades.

The N.I.R.A., however, was found to have several other constitutional infirmities besides its disregard, as illustrated by the Live Poultry Code, of the "fundamental" distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects, namely, the delegation of uncanalized legislative power; the absence of any administrative procedural safeguards; the absence of judicial review; and the dominant role played by private groups in the general scheme of regulation. These objections are dealt with elsewhere in this volume. Supra, pp. 75, 78, 80.

[448] 48 Stat 31 (1933).

[449] United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64, 68 (1936).

[450] 49 Stat. 991.

[451] Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

[452] Ibid. 308-309.

[453] United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

[454] 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

[455] 49 Stat. 449.

[456] 301 U.S. at 38, 41-42 (1937).

[457] National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937).

[458] National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).

[459] See Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U.S. 453, 465 (1938).

[460] 52 Stat. 1060.

[461] United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).

[462] See ibid. 113, 114, 118.

[463] Ibid. 123-124.

[464] Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures 1951, (Harvard University Press 1951), 56.

[465] The Act provided originally that "for the purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed * * * in any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any State." By 63 Stat. 910 (1949), "necessary to the production thereof" becomes "directly essential to the production thereof." The effect of this change, which has not yet registered itself in judicial decision, seems likely to be slight, in view of the power, which the act gives the Administrator to lay down "such terms and conditions" as he "finds necessary to carry out the purposes of" his orders to prevent their evasion or circumvention. See Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945). The employees involved in the following cases have been held to be covered by the act:

(1) Operating and maintenance employees of the owner of a loft building, space in which is rented to persons producing goods principally for interstate commerce (Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942));

(2) an employee of an interstate motor transportation company, who acted as rate clerk and performed other incidental duties (Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942));

(3) members of a rotary drilling crew, engaged within a State, as employees of an independent contractor, in partially drilling oil wells, a portion of the products from which later moved in interstate commerce (Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942));

(4) employees of a wholesale paper company who are engaged in the delivery, from company warehouse within a State to customers within that State, after a temporary pause at such warehouses, of goods procured outside of the State upon prior orders from, or pursuant to contracts with, such customers (Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943));

(5) employees of a private corporation who are engaged in the operation and maintenance of a drawbridge which is part of a toll road used extensively by persons and vehicles traveling in interstate commerce, and which spans an intercoastal waterway used in interstate commerce (Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943));

(6) a night watchman employed in a plant in which veneer was manufactured from logs and from which a substantial portion of the manufactured product was shipped in interstate commerce (Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944));

(7) employees putting in stand-by time in the auxiliary fire-fighting service of an employer engaged in interstate commerce (Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944));

(8) warehouse and central office employees of an interstate retail chain store system (Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945));

(9) employees of an independent contractor engaged in repairing abutments and substructures of bridges which were part of the line of an interstate railroad (Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U.S. 720 (1945));

(10) maintenance employees of an office building which was owned and operated by a manufacturing corporation and in which 58 per cent of the rental space was used for its central offices, where its production of goods for interstate commerce was administered, managed and controlled, although the goods were actually produced at plants located elsewhere (Borden Company v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945));

(11) the employees of an electrical contractor, locally engaged in commercial and industrial wiring and dealing in electrical motors and generators for commercial and industrial uses, whose customers are engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce (Roland Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657-678 (1946));

(12) employees of a window-cleaning company, the greater part of whose work is done on the windows of industrial plants of producers of goods for interstate commerce (Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Company, 327 U.S. 173-178 (1946));

(13) mechanics engaged in servicing and maintaining equipment of a motor transportation company which is engaged in interstate commerce (Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463 (1946)). Nor does the maxim "de minimis" apply to the act. Hence the publishers of a daily newspaper only about one half of one per cent of whose circulation is outside the State of publication are not by that fact excluded from the operation of the act. (Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946)). On the other hand, an employee whose work it is to prepare meals and serve them to maintenance-of-way employees of an interstate railroad in pursuance of a contract between his employer and the railroad company is not "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of Sec. 6 and 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943)); nor are maintenance employees of a typical metropolitan office building operated as an independent enterprise, which is used and is to be used for offices by every variety of tenants, including some producers of goods for commerce (10 East 40th St. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945)); nor are maintenance employees of a building corporation which furnishes loft space to tenants engaged in production for interstate commerce "unless an adequate proportion of such tenants are so engaged." (Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946)). Also Section 12 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provides that "no producer, * * * shall ship or deliver for shipment in commerce any goods produced in an establishment * * * in or about which * * * any oppressive child labor has been employed * * *" was held inapplicable to a company engaged in the transmission in interstate commerce of telegraph messages, (Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945)). The decision was a five-to-four one. It should be added that the Court has not always been unanimous in favoring coverage by the act. In the Borden case above, Chief Justice Stone, speaking for himself and Justice Roberts, protested, as follows: "No doubt there are philosophers who would argue, what is implicit in the decision now rendered, that in a complex modern society there is such interdependence of its members that the activities of most of them are necessary to the activities of most others. But I think that Congress did not make that philosophy the basis of the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It did not, by a 'house-that-Jack-built' chain of causation, bring within the sweep of the statute the ultimate causa causarum which result in the production of goods for commerce. Instead it defined production as a physical process. It said in Sec. 3 (j) 'Produced means produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on' and declared that those who participate in any of these processes 'or in any process or occupation necessary to' them are engaged in production and subject to the Act." 325 U.S. 679, 685. On the other hand, the holding in 10 East 40th St., above, was a five-to-four decision, and Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court took pains to explain that Congress in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act, "did not see fit, * * *, to exhaust its constitutional power over commerce." 325 U.S. 578-579. See 87 Law Ed. pp. 87-105 for a note reviewing both Supreme Court, lower Federal Court, and State court cases defining "engaged in commerce" as that term is used in the Fair Labor Standards Act.

[466] 50 Stat. 246.

[467] 315 U.S. 110 (1942).

[468] Ibid. 118-119.

[469] 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

[470] 52 Stat. 31.

[471] 317 U.S. at 128-129.

[472] Ibid. 120-124 passim. In United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939), the Court sustained an order under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (50 Stat. 752) regulating the price of milk in certain instances. Said Justice Reed for the majority of the Court: "The challenge is to the regulation 'of the price to be paid upon the sale by a dairy farmer who delivers his milk to some country plant.' It is urged that the sale, a local transaction, is fully completed before any interstate commerce begins and that the attempt to fix the price or other elements of that incident violates the Tenth Amendment. But where commodities are bought for use beyond State lines, the sale is a part of interstate commerce. We have likewise held that where sales for interstate transportation were commingled with intrastate transactions, the existence of the local activity did not interfere with the federal power to regulate inspection of the whole. Activities conducted within the State lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the Commerce Clause. Interstate commerce may be dependent upon them. Power to establish quotas for interstate marketing gives power to name quotas for that which is to be left within the State of production. Where local and foreign milk alike are drawn into a general plan for protecting the interstate commerce in the commodity from the interferences, burdens and obstructions, arising from excessive surplus and the social and sanitary evils of low values, the power of the Congress extends also to the local sales."' Ibid. 568-569. See also H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939), another milk case; and Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), in which certain restrictions on the sale of tobacco, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 31), were sustained in an opinion by Justice Roberts, who spoke for the Court in the latter case.

[473] United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, 614, 620-623 passim (1808). Other parts of this opinion are considered below in connection with the prohibiting of interstate commerce. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 191 (1824); United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560 (1850).

[474] 289 U.S. 48 (1933).

[475] Ibid. 57, 58.

[476] 5 Stat. 566 Sec. 28.

[477] 9 Stat. 237 (1848).

[478] 24 Stat. 409.

[479] 35 Stat. 614; 38 Stat. 275.

[480] 29 Stat. 605.

[481] 192 U.S. 470 (1904).

[482] 223 U.S. 166 (1912); cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).

[483] 239 U.S. 325 (1915).

[484] Ibid. 329.

[485] 236 U.S. 216 (1915).

[486] Ibid. 222. See also Robert B. Cushman, National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause, 3 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, 62-79.

[487] Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449, 488-489 (1841).

The Issue

A little reflection will suffice to show that, as a matter of fact, any regulation at all of commerce implies some measure of power to prohibit it, since it is the very nature of regulation to lay down terms on which the activity regulated will be permitted and for noncompliance with which it will not be permitted. It is also evident that when occasion does arise for an outright prohibition of an activity, the power to enact the required prohibition ordinarily must belong to the body which is vested with authority to regulate it, which in this instance is Congress.

What, then, are the outstanding differences between such conditional prohibitions of commerce and that with which this resume deals? There seem to be three such differences. First, there is often a difference of modus operandi between the statutes already considered and those about to be considered. The former impinge upon persons or agencies engaged in interstate commerce and their activities in connection therewith, whereas the latter look primarily to things, or the subject matter, of the trade or commerce prohibited. Secondly, there is a difference in purpose between the two categories of Congressional statutes. The purpose of the acts already treated is to lay down the conditions on which a designated branch of commerce among the States may be carried on; that of the acts now to be treated is to eliminate outright a designated branch of trade among the States. In other words, whereas the former acts were, in general, preservative of the commerce which they regulated because of its value to society, the latter regard the commerce which they reach as detrimental to society. The third, and most important difference from the point of view of Constitutional Law, is the difference in relation of the two categories of acts respectively to the reserved powers of the States. The enactments of Congress already dealt with frequently intrude upon the ordinary field of jurisdiction of the States; but when they do so, it is because the acts or things which they thus bring under national control are regarded as "local incidents" of interstate commerce itself. The relation of the enactments about to be considered to the reserved powers of the States is precisely the inverse of this. Their very purpose is to reach and control matters ordinarily governed by the State's police power, sometimes in order to make State policy more effective, sometimes in order to supply a corrective to it.

The Argument Denying Congress' Power To Prohibit Interstate Commerce

The principal argument against the constitutionality of prohibitory Congressional legislation pivoted on the dual conception of the Federal System "The Federal Equilibrium". The Constitution, the argument ran, clearly contemplates two spheres of governmental activity, that of the States, that of the United States; and while the latter government is generally supreme when the two collide with one another in the exercise of their respective powers, yet collision is not contemplated as the rule of life of the system, but the contrary. And since there are these two spheres, the line to be drawn between them, in order to secure harmony instead of collision, should recognize that the objects which the National Government was established to promote are relatively few, while those which the States were retained to advance comprise the principal objectives of government, the protection of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. The power to promote these ends is, indeed, the very definition of the police power of the States--that power for which all other powers of the States exist. Seriously to impair the police power of the States, or to diminish their autonomy in its employment, would be, in fact to remove their reason for being, and so the reason for the Federal System itself.

So while the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations is in terms a single power, in the intention of the framers it comprised two very different powers. In the field of foreign relations, the National Government is completely sovereign, and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is but a branch of this sovereign power. The power to regulate commerce among the States is, on the other hand, not a sovereign power except for purposes of commercial advantage; in other respects it is confronted at every turn by the police power of the States, and hence requires to be defined in relation to the known and frequently reiterated objectives of that power.

Indeed, it was urged on the authority of Madison that the power to regulate commerce among the States was not bestowed upon the National Government "to be used for * * * positive purposes," but merely as "a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves." Madison IV, Letters and Other Writings, 15 (Philadelphia, 1865). Furthermore, it is a power which was designed for the promotion and advancement of commerce, not a power to strike commerce down in order to advance other purposes and programs. Grant that the power to regulate commerce among the States is the power to prohibit it at the discretion of Congress, and you at once endow Congress with power which it may use as a weapon to consolidate substantially all power in the hands of the National Government.

Thus, if Congress may prohibit ad libitum the carrying on of interstate commerce, it may make deprivation of the right to engage in interstate commerce in any of its phases, even the right to move from one State to another, a sanction of ever-increasing efficacy for whatever standards of conduct it may choose to lay down in any field of human action; and since laws passed by Congress in pursuance of its powers are generally supreme over conflicting State laws, these standards would supersede the conflicting standards imposed under the police powers of the States. Henceforth, in effect, the police power would exist solely by "leave and license" of Congress--as "the power to govern men and things" it would be at an end; and by the same token the Federal System, which is the outstanding feature of government under the Constitution, would be at an end. In the First Employers' Liability Cases, (Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908)), the majority of the Court, speaking through Justice White, gave special attention to the Government's argument that though the act, in terms, governed the liability of "every" interstate carrier to "any" of its employees, whether engaged in interstate commerce or not when the liability fell, it was none the less constitutional "because one who engaged in interstate commerce thereby submits all his business concerns to the regulating power of Congress." Justice White answered: "To state the proposition is to refute it. It assumes that because one engages in interstate commerce he thereby endows Congress with power not delegated to it by the Constitution; in other words, with the right to legislate concerning matters of purely State concern. It rests upon the conception that the Constitution destroyed that freedom of commerce which it was its purpose to preserve, since it treats the right to engage in interstate commerce as a privilege which cannot be availed of except upon such conditions as Congress may prescribe, even although the conditions would be otherwise beyond the power of Congress. It is apparent that if the contention were well founded it would extend the power of Congress to every conceivable subject, however inherently local, would obliterate all the limitations of power imposed by the Constitution, and would destroy the authority of the States as to all conceivable matters which from the beginning have been, and must continue to be, under their control so long as the Constitution endures." Ibid. 502-503. See also Justice White's dissenting opinion, for himself, Chief Justice Fuller, and Justices Peckham and Holmes, in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 396-397 (1904).

The Argument Asserting the Power

The thesis that the power to regulate commerce among the States comprises in general the power to prohibit it turns on the proposition stated by Marshall in his opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, that this power is vested "in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its Constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States. The wisdom and discretion of Congress," Marshall continued, "their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse." 9 Wheat. 1, 196-197 (1824).

That the National Government is a government of limited powers, the advocates of this view conceded; but the powers which it uncontrovertibly possesses, they urged, may be utilized to promote all good causes, of which fact, it was asserted, the Preamble of the Constitution itself was proof. There the objectives of the Constitution and so, presumably, of the Government created by it, are stated to be "more perfect union," "justice," "domestic tranquillity," "the common defense," "the general welfare," and "liberty." It was to forward these broad general purposes, then, that the commercial power, like its other powers, was bestowed upon the National Government. No doubt it was expected that the States, too, would use the powers still left them to assist the same purposes, which indeed are those of good government always. Yet that circumstance should not operate to withdraw the powers delegated to the National Government from the service of these same ends. The fact, in other words, that the power to govern commerce among the States was bestowed by the Constitution on the National Government should not imply that it thereby became available merely for the purpose of fostering such commerce. It ought, on the contrary, to be applicable, as would be the equivalent power in England or France for instance, to aid and support all recognized objectives of government. See Juilliard v. Greenman (Legal Tender Case), 110 U.S. 421, 447-448 (1884). As originally possessed by the several States, the power to regulate commerce with one another included the power to prohibit it at discretion; on what principle, then, it was asked, can it be contended that the power delegated to Congress is not as exhaustive and complete as the power it was designed to supersede? See especially Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277-281 (1918).

And, the protagonists of this view continued, if the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare must depend solely upon the police powers of the States, they must in modern conditions, often fail of realization in this country. With goods flowing over State lines in ever-increasing quantities, and people in ever-increasing numbers, how was it possible to regard the States as watertight compartments? At least, then, when local legislative programs break down on account of the division of the country into States, it becomes the clear duty of Congress to adopt supplementary legislation to remedy the situation. In doing so, it is not undermining the Federal System; it is supporting it, by making it viable in modern conditions. The assemblage of the States in one Union was never intended to put one State at the mercy of another. If, however, well considered programs of legislation are rendered abortive in a State in consequence of the flow of commerce into it from other States, then it becomes the duty--certainly it is within the discretion of Congress--which alone can govern commerce among the States, to supply the required relief. See especially Assistant Attorney General Maury's argument. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 127-129 (1892).

In this connection the advocates of this view cited discussion contemporaneous with Jefferson's Embargo, and under the embargo itself, as supporting their position. In the case of the Brigantine William the validity of the embargo was challenged before the United States District Court of Massachusetts on the ground that the power to regulate commerce did not embrace the power to prohibit it. Judge Davis answered: "It will be admitted that partial prohibitions are authorized by this expression; and how shall the degree, or extent, of the prohibition be adjusted, but by the discretion of the National Government, to whom the subject appears to have been committed? * * * The power to regulate commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of measures, exclusively beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its advancement; but, in our national system, as in all modern sovereignties, it is also to be considered as an instrument for other purposes of general policy and interest. * * * the national right, or power, under the Constitution, to adapt regulations of commerce to other purposes, than the mere advancement of commerce, appears to be unquestionable. * * * The situation of the United States, in ordinary times, might render legislative interferences, relative to commerce, less necessary; but the capacity and power of managing and directing it, for the advancement of great national purposes, seems an important ingredient of sovereignty." And in confirmation of this argument Judge Davis cited the clause of Sec. 9 of article I of the Constitution interdicting a prohibition of the slave trade till 1808. This clause clearly proves that those who framed the Constitution perceived that "under the power of regulating commerce, Congress would be authorized to abridge it, in favour of the great principles of humanity and justice." Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, 614, 621 (1808).

The embargo, to be sure, operated on foreign commerce; but that there is any difference between Congress's power in relation to foreign and to interstate commerce the advocates of the view under consideration denied. The power to "regulate" is the power which belongs to Congress as to the one as well as to the other; and if this comprehends the power to prohibit in the one case, it must equally, by acknowledged principles of statutory construction, comprehend it in the other case as well. Nor in fact, the argument continued, does it make any difference, by approved principles of statutory construction, what purposes the framers of the Constitution may have immediately in mind when they gave Congress power to regulate commerce among the States; the governing consideration is that they gave Congress the power, to be exercised in accordance with its judgment of what are proper occasions for its use. "The reasons which may have caused the framers of the Constitution to repose the power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress do not, however, affect or limit the extent of the power itself." Justice Peckham for the Court in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1899).

References

See especially the arguments of counsel In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); 3 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, 103, 138, 165, 295, 314, 336. Indeed, regulation of interstate commerce by Congress may take the form of a positive adoption by it of a regime of State regulation in the form of statutes (e.g., pilotage) or of administrative regulations in some degree (as in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935); or Congress may "regulate" through the device of divestment of a subject matter of its interstate character, thus indirectly causing State laws to apply, as was done by the Wilson Act of 1890 in respect to intoxicating liquors, or by the McCarran Act of 1945 following the United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), in respect to the insurance business. In a sense, Congress may delegate to the States its power to regulate interstate commerce.

[488] 23 Stat. 31.

[489] 32 Stat. 791.

[490] 33 Stat. 1264.

[491] 33 Stat. 1269.

[492] 37 Stat. 315.

[493] 39 Stat. 1165.

[494] Illinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906). See also United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41 (1870). Of the nature of a quarantine act is the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (52 Stat 1250).

[495] Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).

[496] 28 Stat 963.

[497] 143 U.S. 110 (1892).

[498] Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).

[499] 9 Wheat. 1, 227 (1824).

[500] 114 U.S. 622, 630 (1885).

[501] 26 Stat. 313 (1890); 37 Stat. 699 (1913), "The Webb-Kenyon Act."

[502] 31 Stat. 188 (1900).

[503] 45 Stat. 1084 (1929), "The Hawes-Cooper Act."

[504] 36 Stat. 825 (1910), "The Mann Act."

[505] 41 Stat. 324 (1919).

[506] 47 Stat. 326 (1932).

[507] 48 Stat. 794 (1934).

[508] 48 Stat. 979 (1934).

[509] 54 Stat. 686 (1940).

[510] Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913). In Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) the act was held to apply to the case of transportation of a woman for immoral purposes, although no commercial motive was present; and in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), to the transportation of a plural wife by the member of a religious sect a tenet of which is polygamy.

[511] United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425 (1919).

[512] 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

[513] 39 Stat. 675 (1916).

[514] 247 U.S. at 275.

[515] Ibid. 271-272.

[516] 267 U.S. 432 (1925).

[517] 41 Stat. 324 (1919).

[518] 267 U.S. at 436-439. See also Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois C.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).

[519] United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-117 (1941).

[520] Roland Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 669 (1946).

[521] Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944). Cf. the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson for the Court in Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).

[522] Federalist No. 32.

[523] 9 Wheat. 1, 11, 226 (1824).

[524] Madison, IV, Letters and Other Writings, 14-15 (Philadelphia, 1865).

[525] 9 Wheat. 1, 203.

[526] 9 Wheat. at 210-211.

[527] 9 Wheat. at 13-14; also ibid. 16.

[528] 9 Wheat. 17-18, 209.

[529] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[530] 12 How. 299 (1851).

[531] Congressional regulation of commerce, however, does not have to be uniform. The uniformity rule is a test of the invalidity of State legislation affecting commerce, not the validity of Congressional legislation regulating commerce. Clark Distilling Co. v. W.M.R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 327 (1917); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).

[532] Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).

[533] Ibid. 400-402.

[534] McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188-189 (1940). F.D.G. Ribble's State and National Power Over Commerce (Columbia University Press, 1937) is an excellent study both of the Court's formulas and of the arbitral character of its task in this field of Constitutional Law. On the latter point, see especially Chapters X and XII. The late Chief Justice Stone took repeated occasion to stress the "balancing" and "adjusting" role of the Court when applying the commerce clause in relation to State power. See his words in South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-192 (1938); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113-116 (1941); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-363 (1943); and Southern Pacific v. Arizona, 325. U.S. 761, 766-770 (1945). See also Justice Black for the Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533, 548-549 (1944).

[535] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[536] Compare, for example, May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900); and the recent case of Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945). In the latter case the benefits of the original package doctrine were extended to imports from the Philippine Islands title to which did not vest in the importer until their arrival in the United States.

[537] Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 (1946).

[538] Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (State Freight Tax Case), 15 Wall. 232 (1873).

[539] Headnotes. Said the Court: "The rule has been asserted with great clearness, that whenever the subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Surely transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, is of this nature. It is of national importance that over that subject there should be but one regulating power, for if one State can directly tax persons or property passing through it, or tax them indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation, every other may, and thus commercial intercourse between States remote from each other may be destroyed." 15 Wall. at 279-280, citing Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851); Gilman. v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 42 (1868).

[540] 116 U.S. 517 (1886).

[541] Ibid. 527.

[542] Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).

[543] 262 U.S. 172 (1923).

[544] Ibid. 178. See also Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon 188 U.S. 82 (1903).

[545] Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927). See also American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) in which there was imposed a license tax on manufacture of goods computed upon the amount of sales of the goods.

[546] 286 U.S. 165 (1932).

[547] Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938).

[548] Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

[549] Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921). Here a Tennessee corporation, in pursuance of its practice of purchasing grain in Kentucky to be transported to and used in its Tennessee mill, made a contract for the purchase of wheat, to be delivered in Kentucky on the cars of a public carrier, intending to forward it as soon as delivery was made. It was held that the transaction was in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the contract was made and to be performed in Kentucky; and that the possibility that the purchaser might change its mind after delivery and sell the grains in Kentucky or consign it to some other place in that State did not affect the essential character of the transaction. Interstate commerce, said the Court, "is not confined to transportation from one State to another, but comprehends all commercial intercourse between different States and all the component parts of that intercourse." Ibid. 290. Followed in Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); and Flanagan v. Federal Coal Co., 267 U.S. 222 (1925).

[550] Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).

[551] United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921).

[552] Ibid. 281. See also State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931) holding invalid a State privilege tax imposed on a foreign corporation selling to distributors in the State natural gas piped in from another State, whose only activity was the use of a thermometer and meter and reduction of pressure to permit vendee to draw off the gas. "The work done by the plaintiff is done upon the flowing gas to help the delivery and seems to us plainly to be an incident to the interstate commerce between Louisiana and Mississippi." Ibid. 44.

[553] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[554] Ibid. 449.

[555] 8 Wall. 123 (1860).

[556] Ibid. 140.

[557] 114 U.S. 622 (1885). See also Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577 (1895).

[558] 114 U.S. at 632-633.

[559] Ibid. 634.

[560] See Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919).

[561] Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891); Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U.S. 345 (1898); Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U.S. 380 (1912); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494 (1914).

[562] Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389 (1919); Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922).

[563] Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923). Reviewing cases. Cf. Phipps v. Cleveland Refining Co., 261 U.S. 449 (1923).

[564] See pp. 178, 238-239.

[565] Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n., 285 U.S. 147, 153 (1932).

[566] Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1916). See also Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916), and Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1916) upholding a Washington statute imposing a prohibitive license tax upon merchants using trading stamps or coupons redeemable in merchandise.

[567] Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U.S. 676 (1880); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914); Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919); Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941).

[568] 197 U.S. 60 (1905). See also Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226 (1906).

[569] 91 U.S. 275 (1876); see also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871).

[570] See Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880); Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U.S. 676 (1880); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886); Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908), where was held void a property tax on lumber which discriminated in favor of the local product: Bethlehem Motor Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921), where a license tax on distributors was held to be invalidated by the provision made for a rebate under conditions that could be met only by manufacturers within the taxing State.

[571] Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).

[572] Ibid. 525.

[573] General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).

[574] American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (1904); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913); Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665 (1913); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947).

[575] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).

[576] Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933). The Court also upheld a tax on the sale of gasoline for use by an air transport line in conducting interstate transportation across the State in Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 285 U.S. 147 (1932).

[577] Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939).

[578] Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939).

[579] Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939), as formulated in the headnotes; see also Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).

[580] Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940). In Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929), the Court held that gasoline purchased in Illinois and used in an Illinois-Kentucky ferry could not be taxed by Kentucky, being, as it were, a part of the ferry, an instrument of commerce between the two States. See also Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903); Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922); Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929).

[581] 120 U.S. 489 (1887).

[582] Corson v. Maryland, 120 U.S. 502 (1887); Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401 (1913); Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914); Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346 (1917); Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).

[583] Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903).

[584] Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441 (1903).

[585] Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906); Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U.S. 124 (1910); Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915).

[586] 203 U.S. at 512.

[587] Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925).

[588] Heyman v. Hays, 236 U.S. 178 (1915). See also Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922), holding that business done by a corporation through orders which were approved in a State where its tangible property and offices were located, but which were first taken by its salesmen in other States, was interstate, although the tax involved was sustained.

[589] Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U.S. 1, 21 (1892).

[590] New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907); Cf. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (1850).

[591] Ware v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405 (1908). See also Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285 (1911).

[592] 222 U.S. 210 (1911).

[593] 233 U.S. 16 (1914).

[594] Ibid. 23. See also Superior Oil v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390 (1930).

[595] Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934).

[596] Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169, 173 (1935); see also Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).

[597] 309 U.S. 33 (1940).

[598] Best & Co. v. Maxwell. 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940).

[599] 300 U.S. 577 (1937). Cf. Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 (1869). Here was involved a tax of fifty cents per gallon on all spiritous liquors brought into the State. Comparing the tax with a similar one imposed upon liquors manufactured in the State, the Court upheld the statute. "The taxes were complementary and were intended to effect equality."

[600] 300 U.S. at 583-584. Some subsequent use tax cases in the Henneford pattern are the following: Bacon & Sons v. Martin was decided in a unanimous per curiam opinion. It involved a Kentucky statute which imposed a tax "on the 'receipt' of cosmetics in the State by any Kentucky retailer" equal to twenty per cent of the invoice price plus transportation cost, if any to the Kentucky dealer. The Kentucky court held that "the imposition of the tax against the retailer is not on the act of receiving the cosmetics, but on the sale and use thereof, after the retailer has received them." On this interpretation the Supreme Court sustained the tax. Obviously, other things being equal, there is little difference between a tax on receiving and a tax on possession a moment later. 305 U.S. 380 (1939). In Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939), a California use tax was upheld applicable to a nonresident corporation which solicited orders from California purchasers through agents for whom it hired offices in the State and took orders subject to the vendor's approval. In Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Company and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 312 U.S. 359 and 373 (1941) it was held that a foreign corporation which maintained retail stores in Iowa could be validly required to collect an Iowa use tax in respect of mail orders sent by Iowa purchasers to out-of-state branches of the corporation and filled by direct shipment by mail or common carrier from those branches to the purchasers. In General Trading Company v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), also involving the Iowa tax, it was held that a company carrying on no operations in Iowa other than the solicitation of orders by traveling salesmen was liable for collection of the tax on goods sold to Iowa residents, even though the corporation was not licensed to do business in the State and the orders were forwarded for acceptance to Minnesota where they were filled by direct shipment to Iowa customers.

[601] 309 U.S. 33 (1940).

[602] Ibid. 53-54.

[603] Ibid. 57, citing Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U.S. 1 (1892); Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U.S. 676 (1880); and Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919). In the first it was held that the Robbins case did not apply to a firm of agents and brokers maintaining an office and samples throughout the year in the taxing district. The other two cases were totally irrelevant.

[604] 309 U.S. 70 and 430.

[605] Ibid. 414.

[606] 322 U.S. 327 (1944).

[607] Ibid. 330.

[608] Ibid. 332.

[609] 327 U.S. 416 (1946).

[610] Ibid. 417-418.

[611] Ibid. 435.

[612] Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).

[613] Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951), although decided by a closely divided Court, further confirms this impression.

[614] 9 Wheat. 1, 217-219 (1824).

[615] Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 7 How. 283 (1849).

[616] Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1883).

[617] 6 Wall. 35 (1868).

[618] Ibid. 49.

[619] 114 U.S. 196 (1885).

[620] Ibid. 203.

[621] See Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894); also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), the decision in which represents the exact inverse of that in the Crandall Case, being based by the majority on the commerce clause, while several of the Justices preferred to put it on the broader grounds invoked by Justice Miller in the Crandall Case.

[622] Western Union Telegraph Company v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882) State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232 (1873) and Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878) were the precedents principally relied on.

[623] 8 Wall. 168 (1869).

[624] Ibid. 181.

[625] Ibid. 182.

[626] 15 Wall. 232, 233-234, 278-279 (1873).

[627] 127 U.S. 640 (1888).

[628] Ibid. 645.

[629] Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).

[630] Ibid. 57.

[631] 266 U.S. 555 (1925).

[632] 268 U.S. 203 (1925); followed in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929). Cf., however, Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).

[633] Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933).

[634] Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935).

[635] Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 650, 656 (1936).

[636] Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).

[637] Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).

[638] McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940). See also the following cases in which the Court found a tax to be an unconstitutional interference with the interstate commerce privilege: Tax on maintenance of office in Pennsylvania for use of stockholders, officers, employees, and agents of railroad not operating in Pennsylvania but a link in a line operating therein, Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114 (1890); license tax on sale of liquor as applied to a sale out of State by mail, Heyman v. Hays, 236 U.S. 178 (1915); tax on pipe lines transporting oil or gas produced in State but which might pass out of State, Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Kentucky tax on gasoline purchased in Illinois and used in an Illinois-Kentucky ferry, Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); tax laid on privilege of operating a bus in interstate commerce because not imposed solely as compensation for use of highways or to defray expenses of regulating motor traffic, Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931); tax on gas pipe line whose only activity in State was the use of a thermometer and reduction of pressure to permit a vendee to draw off gas, State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931)--but see East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U.S. 465 (1931); gasoline tax imposed per gallon of gasoline imported by interstate carriers as fuel for use in their vehicles within the State as well as in their interstate travel, Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936). See also, for reiteration of the basic rule that the commerce clause forbids States to tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 438-439 (1939). In California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941), the Court, overruling Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), sustained, as not a "revenue measure," but "a measure to safeguard the traveling public by motor vehicle," who are "particularly unable" to protect themselves against overreaching by those "engaged in a business notoriously subject to abuses," a California statute requiring that agents for this type of transportation take out a license for both their interstate and their intrastate business.

[639] 216 U.S. 1 (1910). Cf. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U.S. 650 (1897), involving an express business; in Pullman Company v. Adams, 189 U.S. 420 (1903); and in Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U.S. 171 (1903). Here State taxes levied on the local business of companies engaged also in interstate commerce were sustained "on the assumption" that the companies in question were free to abandon their local business.

[640] See also Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56 (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 285 (1912).

[641] 245 U.S. 178 (1917). Cf. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68 (1914); Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 (1916); and Kansas City, M. & B.R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916). In each of these a tax like that involved in Looney v. Crane was sustained, in the first two because the statute set a maximum limit to the tax; in the third because the amount collected under the act was held to be "reasonable." The ideology of these decisions is clearly opposed to that of the cases treated in the text. The rule in Looney v. Crane Co. was held not applicable in the case of a West Virginia corporation doing business in Illinois and owning practically all of its property there. An Illinois tax on the local business, which was measured by the total capitalization of the company was sustained, it being shown further that the tax was little more than it would have been if levied at the same rate directly on the property of the company that was in Illinois. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922).

[642] 246 U.S. 135 (1918). See also Locomobile Co. of America v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 146 (1918); Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm., 248 U.S. 67 (1918).

[643] 246 U.S. at 141.

[644] 277 U.S. 163 (1928).

[645] Ibid. 171.

[646] 294 U.S. 384 (1935).

[647] 297 U.S. 403 (1936).

[648] Ibid. 415. Headnote 6.

[649] 8 Wall. 168, 181 (1869). See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (1839); and Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906).

[650] See Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 298 U.S. 553 (1936); Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Treasury of Indiana v. Wood Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949); Cf. however, James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1948).

[651] Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (State Freight Tax Case), 15 Wall. 232 (1873).

[652] Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418 (1946).

[653] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[654] Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 284 (1873).

[655] Philadelphia & S. Mail S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).

[656] Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1888).

[657] Ibid. 547.

[658] See Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 30-31 (1873).

[659] Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).

[660] Ibid. 26.

[661] 165 U.S. 194; upon rehearing 166 U.S. 185 (1897).

[662] 166 U.S. at 220.

[663] See Justice Holmes' language in Galveston, Harrisburg, & S.A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 225, 227 (1908). See also Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota 246 U.S. 450 (1918); and Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923); and Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934).

[664] Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).

[665] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894).

[666] Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U.S. 1 (1896). See also Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1888).

[667] Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897), upon rehearing 166 U.S. 185 (1897).

[668] Great Northern Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929).

[669] Nashville, C. & St. L. Railway v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1910).

[670] Ibid. 366, citing Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920); Southern R. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76 (1927).

[671] Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 298 U.S. 553 (1936). Cf. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).

[672] 142 U.S. 217 (1891).

[673] Ibid. 227-228.

[674] Citing Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); Philadelphia & S. Mail Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).

[675] Galveston, Harrisburg & S.A.R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).

[676] Ibid. 226.

[677] Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 697 (1895). See also Illinois Central R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940), in which was sustained a five percent gross earnings tax on all railroads operating in the State, payable in lieu of all other taxes and found to have "a fair relation to the property employed in the State."

[678] New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessments, 280 U.S. 338 (1930).

[679] Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Com., 266 U.S. 271 (1924).

[680] Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936). See also International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U.S. 429 (1929).

[681] Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939).

[682] International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947).

[683] Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).

[684] Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).

[685] See pp. 194, 202. See also Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949) for an extensive review and evaluation of cases.

[686] Illinois Central R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940). See also Wisconsin and Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903); United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912). See note 13 to Justice Rutledge's opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. at pp. 265-266.

[687] Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). See also United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912); Dept. of Treasury of Indiana v. Wood Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941); Dept. of Treasury of Indiana v. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252 (1941); Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).

[688] Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).

[689] Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912); also the following note.

[690] Philadelphia & S. Mail S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887); Ratterman v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888); Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Alabama Board of Assessment (Seay), 132 U.S. 472 (1889); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939). Cf. Fargo v. Michigan (Fargo v. Stevens), 121 U.S. 230 (1887), as explained in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).

[691] Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Communication, 57 Harvard L. Rev. 40, 65, 66 (1943); Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908); New Jersey Bell Teleph. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes and Assessments, 280 U.S. 338 (1930). But Cf. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940). In both the Galveston and New Jersey Telephone Company cases, although the taxable events all occurred within the taxing State, the possibility of multiple taxation was nevertheless present. See also Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 90 (1937), the decision in which might have been rested upon the clause of the Constitution forbidding the States to tax exports. See also Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).

[692] Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm., 297 U.S. 650 (1936); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).

[693] See p. 193.

[694] See pp. 150-160.

[695] See p. 189.

[696] 303 U.S. 250 (1938).

[697] Ibid. 254.

[698] Ibid. 255-256.

[699] 305 U.S. 434 (1939).

[700] Ibid. 439-440.

[701] 305 U.S. at 455 (1939).

[702] See McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-189 (1940).

[703] Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).

[704] 329 U.S. 249.

[705] The Court relied particularly on Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) in which the multiple taxation test had been used.

[706] Justice Black dissented without opinion. Justice Douglas, speaking also for Justice Murphy, contended that the sale had been local, and that the only interstate agency employed had been the mails, an argument which squares badly with the attitude of the same Justices in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

[707] 330 U.S. 422 (1947), reaffirming Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm., 302 U.S. 90 (1937).

[708] 330 U.S. at 433.

[709] Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge thought the decision correct as to receipts from foreign commerce. Speaking for them, Justice Douglas made an effort to resurrect Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U.S. 217 (1891). Justice Black dissented without opinion.

[710] 334 U.S. 653.

[711] Ibid. 663, citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); and Ratterman v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888).

[712] 335 U.S. 80.

[713] 337 U.S. 662, 666, 677-678, 680.

[714] See supra, pp. 196, 204-207.

[715] 247 U.S. 321 (1918).

[716] Ibid. 328-329.

[717] Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).

[718] Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).

[719] Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 132, 133 (1931). In this case a North Carolina tax was assessed on the income of a New York corporation, which bought leather, manufactured it in North Carolina, and sold its products at wholesale and retail in New York. The Court observed: "The difficulty of making an exact apportionment is apparent and hence, when the State has adopted a method not intrinsically arbitrary, it will be sustained until proof is offered of an unreasonable and arbitrary application in particular cases." The decisions in the Underwood and Bass cases, supra, "are not authority for the conclusion that where a corporation manufactures in one State and sells in another, the net profits of the entire transaction, as a unitary enterprise, may be attributed, regardless of evidence, to either State."

[720] Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923).

[721] Matson Nav. Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936). See also Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942), where the tax was sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment.

[722] Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942).

[723] Ibid. 656-657

[724] Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).

[725] 114 U.S. 196 (1885).

[726] Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1855).

[727] Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877); see also Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883).

[728] Ayer & L. Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906). For a resume of the rules for taxing vessels see Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 314-315 (1944), note 2.

[729] Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905): a vessel enrolled in New York at domicile of owner, but operating wholly in Virginia, was held taxable in Virginia.

[730] 336 U.S. 169 (1949).

[731] Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).

[732] He also invoked New York Central and H.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906), where although 12 to 64 per cent of the rolling stock of the railroad was outside of New York throughout the tax year, New York was nevertheless allowed to tax it all because no part was in any other State throughout the year. The case is atypical, a constitutional sport; cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).

[733] 322 U.S. at 301-302.

[734] "The apportionment theory is a mongrel one, a cross between desire not to interfere with State taxation and desire at the same time not utterly to crush out interstate commerce. It is a practical, but rather illogical, device to prevent duplication of tax burdens on vehicles in transit. It is established in our decisions and has been found more or less workable with more or less arbitrary formulae of apportionment. Nothing either in theory or in practice commends it for transfer to air commerce."--Ibid. 306.

[735] Ibid. 308.

[736] Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).

[737] 322 U.S. 309.

[738] 235 U.S. 610 (1915).

[739] Ibid. 622.

[740] Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).

[741] Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).

[742] Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936).

[743] Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937).

[744] Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927); Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 109 (1933).

[745] Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).

[746] Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 295 U.S. 285 (1935).

[747] Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931). Cf. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928).

[748] See Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Rev. Comm., 306 U.S. 72 (1939); also Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Commrs., 332 U.S. 495, 503-504 (1947). Here was sustained a State statute imposing a flat tax of $10 annually upon each vehicle operated by a motor carrier over the State's highways, and a fee of one half of one per cent of the carrier's gross operating revenue from its operations within the State, with an annual minimum of $15 per vehicle, in consideration of the use of the highways and in addition to all other motor vehicle license fees and taxes. This was held, as applied to a carrier engaged solely in interstate commerce, not to burden such commerce unconstitutionally, although the proceeds went into the State's general fund subject to appropriation for other than highway purposes. (Opinion by Rutledge, J., all concurring.) While a "State may not discriminate against or exclude such interstate traffic generally in the use of its highways, * * * [it is not] required to furnish those facilities to it free of charge or indeed on equal terms with other traffic not inflicting similar destructive effects. * * * Interstate traffic equally with intrastate may be required to pay a fair share of the cost and maintenance reasonably related to the use made of the highways." Ibid., headnote 6.

[749] 339 U.S. 542 (1950).

[750] Ibid. 561.

[751] Justice Roberts for the Court in Great Northern R. Co. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 159-161 (1937).

[752] Charlotte, C. & A.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892); New York ex rel. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Squire, 145 U.S. 175, 191 (1892).

[753] Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903); Mackay Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 99 (1919).

[754] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 425 (1903); Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 162 (1918).

[755] New Mexico ex rel. McLean v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 55 (1906). Cf. Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U.S. 380, 393 (1912); Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U.S. 419 (1903).

[756] Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83 (1891); Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904); Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 162 (1918).

[757] Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 164 (1903); Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U.S. 64, 69 (1904); Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 503, 504 (1914).

[758] Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 505 (1914); Lugo v. Suazo, 59 F. (2d) 386 (1932).

[759] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 425 (1903); Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 507 (1914).

[760] Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U.S. 55 (1904); Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 508 (1914).

[761] 10 Stat. 112. Sustained in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (1856).

[762] Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (1852).

[763] Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 701 (1883).

[764] 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

[765] 59 Stat. 33 (1945).

[766] 328 U.S. 408 (1946).

[767] Ibid. 429-430, 434-435.

[768] See pp. 163-172.

[769] 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).

[770] Ibid. 203.

[771] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[772] Ibid. 443-444.

[773] Cf. 12 Wheat. at 439-440.

[774] 11 Pet. 102 (1837).

[775] Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 7 How. 283 (1849).

[776] Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).

[777] Ibid. 272.

[778] Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).

[779] Compagnie Francaise de Navigation v. Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 398, (1902). See also Morgan's L. & T.R.S.S. Co. v. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 21 (1900).

[780] 211 U.S. 31, 36-37 (1908).

[781] As to concessions by the Court to the practical necessities of enforcement, see also Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); and Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).

[782] 325 U.S. 761, 766-767.

[783] Ibid. 767; citing: Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399, 400 (1913); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938), et seq.; California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113, 114 (1941) and cases cited; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359, 360 (1943).

[784] 325 U.S. at 767; citing: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. at 319 (1851); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 185; California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. at 113; Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 394 (1941); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 362, 363.

[785] 325 U.S. at 767; citing: South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 188 and cases cited; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S. 224, 238 (1938); Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346, 351 (1939); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 603 (1940); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 113, 114 and cases cited.

[786] 325 U.S. at 767, 768; citing: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. at 319 (1851); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108, 109 (1890); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 399, 400 (1913); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 176 (1941).

[787] 325 U.S. at 768; citing: Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 447 (1827); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 399, 400; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 185 (1938).

[788] 325 U.S. at 768; citing: Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490 (1878); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 631 (1885); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 481, 482 (1888); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. at 109; In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 559, 560 (1891); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 302 (1894); Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 212 (1894); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 (1939); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. Law Rev. 1 (1940).

[789] 325 U.S. at 769; citing: Parker v. Brown. 317 U.S. at 362 (1943); Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, 318 U.S. 1, 8 (1943); see Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (and compare California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941)); Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 504, 505 (1942).

[790] 325 U.S. at 769; citing: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851); Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley District, 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914); South Covington R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 546 (1915); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Texas, 245 U.S. 484, 488 (1918); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 254 U.S. 535, 537 (1921): Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441 (1939); McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940).

[791] 325 U.S. at 769; citing: In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 561, 562 (1891); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 198 (1915); Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U.S. 48, 50, 51 (1916); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325, 326 (1917); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 438-440 (1936); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 350, 351 (1937); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 679 (1945).

[792] 325 U.S. at 769, 770; citing: Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230 (1899); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911); Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617, 626 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 245 U.S. 493, 506 (1918); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 601 (1922); Louisiana Public Service Comm'n. v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 284 U.S. 125, 130 (1931); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 447, 459, (1936).

[793] 325 U.S. at 770; citing: Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441 (1939).

[794] 325 U.S. at 770; citing: Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, 318 U.S. 1, 8 (1943); Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910).

[795] Peik v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).

[796] Wabash, St. L. & P.R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).

[797] 24 Stat. 379 (1887).

[798] Wisconsin Railroad Com. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).

[799] Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897); followed in Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285 (1899), in which an Ohio statute requiring that "each company shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, * * * Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city or village, containing three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers; * * *" was sustained.

[800] Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 153 (1896).

[801] Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin R.R. Com., 237 U.S. 220, 226 (1915); St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Public Service Com., 254 U.S. 535, 536-537 (1921).

[802] St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Public Service Com., 261 U.S. 369, 371 (1923).

[803] Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific R.R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287 (1900).

[804] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612 (1909).

[805] McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U.S. 543 (1906).

[806] St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 136 (1910).

[807] See e.g. The Court's language in Hannibal & St. L.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470 (1878); New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631 (1897); Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 292 (1899); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896); Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 402-410 (1913).

[808] Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888); see also Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888); McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104 (1890); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Haber, 109 U.S. 613, 633 (1898).

[809] New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1807). See also Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 137 (1898).

[810] Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900).

[811] Erie R.R. Co. v. Public Utility Commrs., 254 U.S. 394 (1921).

[812] Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. R.R. Comm., 283 U.S. 380 (1931).

[813] Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).

[814] Ibid, 453, 466. See also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Missouri P.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).

[815] Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, 318 U.S. 1 (1943).

[816] 163 U.S. 299 (1896). In South Covington R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915), the Court sustained a municipal ordinance which prohibits the company from allowing passengers to ride on the rear or front platforms without suitable barriers, and requires that the cars be kept clean and ventilated and fumigated. However, provisions of the ordinance that cars shall never be permitted to fall below a certain temperature and regulating the number of passengers to be carried in the cars were held to be unreasonable and violative of the commerce clause. There was no unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce by a municipal ordinance which directed a railway company to remove its tracks from a busy street intersection. Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).

[817] Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133 (1898); Richmond & A.R. Co. v. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311 (1898).

[818] 325 U.S. 761, 779-780 (1945).

[819] Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914).

[820] 244 U.S. 310 (1917).

[821] Cf. Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910), where the crossings were fewer and the burden to interstate commerce was shown not to be unduly heavy.

[822] 302 U.S. 1, 15 (1937).

[823] 325 U.S. 761, 771-776.

[824] 328 U.S. 373, 380, 386 (1946).

[825] Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).

[826] Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932). See also Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135 (1927).

[827] South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).

[828] 289 U.S. 92 (1933).

[829] 309 U.S. 598 (1940).

[830] 306 U.S. 79 (1939).

[831] Eichholz v. Public Service Com. of Missouri, 306 U.S. 268 (1939), citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851).

[832] Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).

[833] Ibid. 111. For a more extreme application of this idea by a narrowly divided Court, in a quite special situation, see Buck et al. v. California, 342 U.S. 99 (1952).

[834] Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933).

[835] Michigan Pub. Utilities Com. v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925). See also Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); and Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).

[836] Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). See also, Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street R. Co., 273 U.S. 45 (1927).

[837] 273 U.S. 34 (1927). See also McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104 (1890). In the former case, agents soliciting patronage for steamship lines were involved; in the latter, an agent soliciting patronage for a particular railway line.

[838] California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 115-116 (1941).

[839] 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).

[840] 2 Pet. 245, 252 (1829).

[841] 12 How. 299 (1851).

[842] Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244 (1859); Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859). See also Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541 (1881).

[843] Foster v. Master & Wardens of Port of New Orleans, 94 U.S. 246 (1877).

[844] Ibid. 247.

[845] Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 643 (1879); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888); Illinois v. Economy Power Light Co., 234 U.S. 497 (1914).

[846] Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).

[847] Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396, 412 (1893).

[848] 302 U.S. 1 (1937).

[849] Ibid. 10.

[850] 333 U.S. 28 (1948).

[851] Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).

[852] 2 Pet. 245 (1829).

[853] Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459 (1878); Lindsay & Phelps Co. v. Mullen, 176 U.S. 126 (1900).

[854] 3 Wall. 713 (1866).

[855] Ibid. 729. See also, Escanaba & L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883); and Cardwell v. American River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205 (1885).

[856] 119 U.S. 543 (1886).

[857] Ibid. 548-549.

[858] Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877); Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887).

[859] Prosser v. Northern P.R. Co., 152 U.S. 59 (1894). See also Sands v. Manistee R. Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288 (1887); Gring v. Ives, 222 U.S. 365 (1912).

[860] Cases cited in note 7 above;[Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 858, above.] Parkersburg & O. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883).

[861] Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 215 (1885); Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black 603 (1862); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883).

[862] Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U.S. 676 (1927). See also Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 249 (1929).

[863] Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894).

[864] Port Richmond and Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317 (1914).

[865] New York Central & H.R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 227 U.S. 248 (1913).

[866] Wilmington Transp. Co. v. R.R. Com., 236 U.S. 151 (1915).

[867] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887).

[868] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 (1918).

[869] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364 (1911).

[870] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910).

[871] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).

[872] Essex v. New England Teleg. Co., 239 U.S. 313 (1915).

[873] Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).

[874] Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912). See also Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919).

[875] Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Nebraska State R. Com., 297 U.S. 471 (1936).

[876] Bell Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Com., 309 U.S. 30 (1940).

[877] Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).

[878] Public Utilities Com. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).

[879] Pennsylvania Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Public Utilities Com. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).

[880] Panhandle Eastern Pipe Lines Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 332 U.S. 507 (1947).

[881] Panhandle Co. v. Michigan Comm'n., 341 U.S. 329 (1951).

[882] Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 270 U.S. 550 (1926).

[883] East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Com. of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465 (1931).

[884] Western Distributing Co. v. Public Serv. Com. of Kansas, 285 U.S. 119 (1932).

[885] Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 304 U.S. 61 (1938).

[886] Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S. 224 (1938).

[887] Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).

[888] Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944). See also International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560 (1916).

[889] 322 U.S. at 207-209.

[890] Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).

[891] International Milling Co. v. Columbia T. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934).

[892] Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937).

[893] Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 (1911).

[894] Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). See also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917).

[895] Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois ex rel. McLaughlin, 298 U.S. 155 (1936), citing Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452, 470 (1901); Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Case), 230 U.S. 352, 410 (1913); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557 (1917); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934).

[896] Davis v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Co., 217 U.S. 157 (1910).

[897] Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911).

[898] The "Winnebago," 205 U.S. 354, 362 (1907).

[899] Justice Hughes for the Court in Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 406 (1913).

[900] Ibid. 408.

[901] Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878).

[902] Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217 (1889).

[903] Smith v. St. Louis & S.W.R. Co., 181 U.S. 248 (1901).

[904] Ibid. 255. Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886) is cited.

[905] Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).

[906] Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925).

[907] Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).

[908] Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).

[909] Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).

[910] Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).

[911] Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937).

[912] Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939).

[913] Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939).

[914] Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U.S. 345 (1898).

[915] Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); followed in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).

[916] Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158 (1918).

[917] Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915).

[918] Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); see also Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891).

[919] 136 U.S. at 322. See also pp. 328-329.

[920] Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891).

[921] Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).

[922] Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).

[923] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[924] Ibid. 449.

[925] Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (1869). There were later some departures from the rule, apparently due to inattention, in cases involving oil. See Standard Oil v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389 (1919); Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921) and Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922). These cases were "qualified," and in fact disavowed in Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 520 (1923). Cf. the contemporary case of Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1912) where the true rule is followed.

[926] Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

[927] Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).

[928] 125 U.S. 465 (1888).

[929] Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).

[930] 26 Stat. 313 (1890); sustained in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).

[931] Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).

[932] 37 Stat. 699 (1913); sustained in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).

[933] Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900).

[934] 155 U.S. 461 (1894).

[935] 135 U.S. 100 (1890).

[936] 155 U.S. at 474.

[937] Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898).

[938] Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30 (1898).

[939] See note 1 above. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 933, above.]

[940] State Board v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n., 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).

[941] Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941); followed in Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944). Justice Jackson would have preferred to rest the decision on the Twenty-first Amendment instead of "what I regard as an unwise extension of State power over interstate commerce," 314 U.S. at 397; and appears to have converted Justice Frankfurter. See latter's opinion in 321 U.S. at 139-143.

[942] 297 U.S. 431 (1936).

[943] 45 Stat 1084 (1929).

[944] 297 U.S. at 440. See also Justice Cardozo's remarks in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 526-527 (1935).

[945] Cf. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).

[946] Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4366 (1823).

[947] For interesting particulars see 2 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 84-87.

[948] 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 659.

[949] 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 426.

[950] 11 Pet. 102 (1837).

[951] Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 7 How. 283 (1849).

[952] Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868).

[953] 314 U.S. 160 (1941).

[954] Ibid. 172.

[955] Ibid. 173. Justice Cardozo's words, quoted by Justice Byrnes, occur in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). Justice Byrnes' answer to another argument of the State, based on historical conceptions of the word "indigent," was, "poverty and immorality are not synonymous."

[956] See especially Justice Douglas' forceful opinion. 314 U.S. 177-181.

[957] 161 U.S. 519 (1896).

[958] Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).

[959] 221 U.S. 229 (1911).

[960] Ibid. 255-256.

[961] 262 U.S. 553 (1923).

[962] 237 U.S. 52 (1915).

[963] Ibid. 61.

[964] 258 U.S. 50, 61 (1922).

[965] 258 U.S. 50 (1922); 66 L. Ed. 458, Hd. 2.

[966] See pp. 193-195.

[967] 291 U.S. 502 (1934); followed in Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934).

[968] 294 U.S. 511 (1935).

[969] Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939).

[970] Ibid. 352.

[971] Hood v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).

[972] Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).

[973] Ibid. 13.

[974] Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Other features of the South Carolina act were found to violate article IV, section 2. See p. 690.

[975] Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).

[976] Ibid. 426, citing Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 39 (1908).

[977] 34 Stat. 584 (1906).

[978] Chicago, I. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 219 U.S. 486 (1911).

[979] Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912); Southern R. Co. v. Burlington Lumber Co., 225 U.S. 99 (1912).

[980] Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426 (1913).

[981] St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Edwards, 227 U.S. 265 (1913).

[982] Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U.S. 1 (1913). In this case the severity of the regulation furnished additional reason for its disallowance.

[983] 226 U.S. 491 (1913). For the Court's reiteration of the formula governing such cases, see ibid. 505-506. See also Barrett v. New York, 232 U.S. 14 (1914); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U.S. 490 (1914); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371 (1916); Missouri P.R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927). A year before the enactment of the Carmack Amendment the Court had held that the imposition by a State upon the initial or any connecting carrier of the duty of tracing the freight and informing the shipper in writing when, where, how, and by which carrier the freight was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official position, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the information could be established, was, when applied to interstate commerce, a violation of the commerce clause. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Murphey, 196 U.S. 194, 202 (1905). The Court's opinion definitely invited Congress to deal with the subject, as it does in the Carmack Amendment.

[984] 35 Stat. 65 (1908); 36 Stat. 291 (1910).

[985] 34 Stat. 1415 (1907).

[986] 27 Stat. 531 (1893); 32 Stat. 943 (1903).

[987] Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Com., 236 U.S. 439 (1915).

[988] Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).

[989] 26 Stat. 414 (1890).

[990] Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904).

[991] 34 Stat. 768 (1906); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912), citing Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613 (1898); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 442 (1912).

[992] McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).

[993] Ibid. 137.

[994] Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916).

[995] 37 Stat. 315 (1912); 39 Stat. 1165 (1917).

[996] Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).

[997] 44 Stat. 250 (1926).

[998] Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).

[999] 32 Stat. 791 (1903); 33 Stat. 1264 (1905).

[1000] Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).

[1001] 49 Stat. 731 (1935).

[1002] Allen-Bradley Local v. Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).

[1003] 49 Stat. 449 (1935).

[1004] Quoting Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926).

[1005] Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

[1006] 50 Stat. 246 (1937).

[1007] 317 U.S. at 368.

[1008] Ibid. 362.

[1009] Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).

[1010] Ibid. 211.

[1011] Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Com. of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507 (1947); Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).

[1012] 52 Stat. 821 (1938).

[1013] 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).

[1014] 49 Stat. 543 (1935); 54 Stat. 919-920 (1940).

[1015] California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).

[1016] 52 Stat. 821 (1938).

[1017] Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942).

[1018] 26 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2320-2327.

[1019] Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942). Four Justices, speaking by Chief Justice Stone dissented, on the basis of Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937); and Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939).

[1020] 39 Stat. 486 (1916); amended by 46 Stat. 1463 (1931).

[1021] Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).

[1022] See note 1 above. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 1016, above.]

[1023] Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com., 331 U.S. 682 (1947).

[1024] 49 U.S.C.A. 5.

[1025] Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948).

[1026] Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948).

[1027] Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).

[1028] 49 Stat. 449 (1935).

[1029] 325 U.S. at 542.

[1030] Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).

[1031] 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 61 Stat. 136 (1947).

[1032] Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).

[1033] Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).

[1034] United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886); Cf. United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407 (1866).

[1035] 16 Stat. 544, 566; R.S. 2079.

[1036] See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1914).

[1037] See Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422 (1914); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908).

[1038] United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), overruling Re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905).

[1039] United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1914).

[1040] United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 419 (1866).

[1041] Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912).

[1042] Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892).

[1043] 10 How. 393 (1857).

[1044] Ibid. 417, 419.

[1045] Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).

[1046] 66 Stat. 163; Public Law 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).

[1047] Ibid. tit. III, Sec. 301. The first category comprises, it should be noted, those who are citizens by the opening clause of Amendment XIV, which embodies Chief Justice Marshall's holding in Gassies v. Ballon, that a citizen of the United States, residing in any State of the Union, is a citizen of that State. 6 Pet. 761, 762 (1832).

[1048] 66 Stat. 163; tit. III, Sec. 302-307. These categories illustrate collective naturalization. "Instances of collective naturalization by treaty or by statute are numerous." Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892). See also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).

[1049] 57 Stat. 600.

[1050] 66 Stat. 163, tit. III, Sec. 311.

[1051] Ibid. Sec. 313 (a) (4-6).

[1052] Ibid. Sec. 313 (c).

[1053] 66 Stat. 163, Sec. 337 (a). In United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929); and United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) it was held, by a divided Court, that clauses (3) and (4) of the oath, as previously prescribed, required the candidate for naturalization to be ready and willing to bear arms for the United States, but these holdings were overruled in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).

[1054] 66 Stat. 163, Sec. 340 (a); see also Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).

[1055] Ibid. Sec. 340 (c). For cancellation proceedings under the Nationality Act of 1910 (54 Stat. 1158, Sec. 338); see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Baumgartner v. United States 322 U.S. 665 (1944), where district court decisions ordering cancellation were reversed on the ground that the Government had not discharged the burden of proof resting upon it. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) represents a less rigid view.

[1056] Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 827 (1824).

[1057] 328 U.S. 654 (1946).

[1058] Ibid. 658.

[1059] Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912) and Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 673 (1946).

[1060] 66 Stat. 163, tit. III, Sec. 352 (a).

[1061] Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329, 334 (1939). Naturalization has a retroactive effect and removes all liability to forfeiture of land held while an alien (Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 116, 122 (1867)); the subsequent naturalization of an alien who takes land by grant or by location on public land relates back and obviates every consequence of his alien disability (Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 511 (1894); Doe ex dem. Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 11 Wheat. 332, 350 (1826)). A certificate of naturalization, while conclusive as a judgment of citizenship, cannot be introduced in a distinct proceeding as evidence of residence, age or good character of the person naturalized (Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U.S. 238 (1876)).

[1062] Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 269 (1817).

[1063] Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910), where it was also held that Congress may provide for the punishment of false swearing in such proceedings in State court. Ibid. 520.

[1064] Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. 377 (1840); Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binney's (Pa.) 110 (1809).

[1065] Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 240 (1830).

[1066] 15 Stat. 223; 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 800.

[1067] MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 309, 311-312 (1915). In this case, a now obsolete statute (34 Stat. 1228), known as the Citizenship Act of 1907, which divested the citizenship of a woman marrying an alien, was upheld as constitutional. Under the Act of June 27, 1952, these conditions comprise the following: (1) Obtaining naturalization in a foreign State; (2) Taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign State; (3) Serving in the armed forces of a foreign State without authorization and with consequent acquisition of foreign nationality; (4) Assuming public office under the government of a foreign State, for which only nationals of that State are eligible; (5) Voting in an election or participating in a plebiscite in a foreign State; (6) Formal renunciation of citizenship before an American foreign service officer abroad; (7) Conviction and discharge from the armed services for desertion in time of war; (8) Conviction of treason or an attempt at forceful overthrow of the United States; (9) Formal renunciation of citizenship within the United States in time of war, subject to approval by the Attorney General; (10) Fleeing or remaining outside the United States in time of war or proclaimed emergency in order to evade military training; (11) Residence by a naturalized citizen, subject to certain exceptions, for two to three years in the country of his birth or in which he formerly was a national or for five years in any other foreign State, and (12) Minor children, of naturalized citizens losing citizenship by such foreign residence, also lose their United States citizenship if they acquire the nationality of a foreign State; but not until they attain the age of 25 without having acquired permanent residence in the United States. 66 Stat. 163; Tit. III Sec. 349-357.

[1068] Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603, 604 (1889); See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

[1069] 66 Stat. 163; Tit. II, Sec. 212.

[1070] Ibid. Sec. 212 (a) (28) (F).

[1071] 54 Stat. 670.

[1072] Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69-70.

[1073] 66 Stat. 163; Tit. II, Sec. 261-266.

[1074] 338 U.S. 537 (1950).

[1075] 59 Stat. 659.

[1076] 338 U.S. at 543.

[1077] Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).

[1078] 54 Stat. 670.

[1079] Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952).

[1080] 8 U.S.C, Sec. 156 C was the provision in question.

[1081] United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952).

[1082] Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909).

[1083] Ibid. 149-150. For the requirements of due process of law in the deportation of alien, see p. 852 (Amendment V).

[1084] Adams v. Storey, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 66 (1817).

[1085] 2 Stat. 19 (1800).

[1086] Story's Commentaries, II, 1113 (Cooley's ed. 1873).

[1087] 186 U.S. 181 (1902).

[1088] Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 670 (1935).

[1089] United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), distinguishing Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improv. Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).

[1090] In re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. 11,673 (1874), cited with approval in Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 672 (1935).

[1091] Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).

[1092] Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Adair v. Bank of America Assn., 303 U.S. 350 (1938).

[1093] Wright v. Union Central Insurance Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938).

[1094] 294 U.S. 648 (1935).

[1095] Ibid. 671.

[1096] Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589, 602 (1935).

[1097] Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). But see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).

[1098] Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 (1937).

[1099] Re Klein, 1 How. 277 (1843); Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).

[1100] United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).

[1101] Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918); Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).

[1102] Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 184 (1902).

[1103] Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 199 (1819); Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 212, 368 (1827).

[1104] Tua v. Carriere, 117 U.S. 201 (1886); Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S. 303, 314 (1892).

[1105] Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819).

[1106] Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 212, 358 (1827); Denny v. Bennett, 128 U.S. 489, 498 (1888); Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454 (1892).

[1107] Re Watts, 190 U.S. 1, 27 (1903); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 264 (1929).

[1108] International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).

[1109] Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).

[1110] Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 615 (1918).

[1111] Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).

[1112] New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329 (1933).

[1113] McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

[1114] Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869).

[1115] Ibid. 548.

[1116] Merchants Nat. Bank v. United States, 101 U.S. 1 (1880).

[1117] Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935).

[1118] Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 549 (1871); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449 (1884).

[1119] Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871).

[1120] Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).

[1121] Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302 (1910).

[1122] United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 568 (1850).

[1123] Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847).

[1124] United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 568 (1850).

[1125] Ibid.

[1126] Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921).

[1127] Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 12 Wall. 457, 536 (1871).

[1128] McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 861 (1824); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S.C. 29, 33 (1875); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 208 (1921).

[1129] Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 540-547 (1871).

[1130] Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

[1131] Ibid. 361.

[1132] United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., Fed. Cas. No. 16,114 (1855).

[1133] Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. 151, 166 (1845).

[1134] 91 U.S. 367 (1876).

[1135] Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878).

[1136] Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. 151, 169 (1845).

[1137] Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).

[1138] 2 Cong. Globe 4, 10 (1835).

[1139] Ibid. 298. On this point his reasoning would appear to be vindicated by such decisions, as Bowman v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) and Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) denying the right of the States to prevent the importation of alcoholic beverages from other States.

[1140] 96 U.S. 727 (1878).

[1141] Ibid. 732.

[1142] Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), followed in Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948).

[1143] 194 U.S. at 506.

[1144] Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 316 (1913).

[1145] 255 U.S. 407 (1921).

[1146] Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155 (1946).

[1147] 49 Stat. 803, 812, 813 (1935), 15 U.S.C. 79d, 79e (1946).

[1148] Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n., 303 U.S. 419 (1938).

[1149] Ibid. 442.

[1150] Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 90 U.S. 1 (1878).

[1151] Illinois C.R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Butler, 163 U.S. 142 (1896).

[1152] Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897).

[1153] Price v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 113 U.S. 218 (1885); Martin v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 203 U.S. 284 (1906).

[1154] Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).

[1155] United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482 (1869).

[1156] Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).

[1157] Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 17, 18 (1829).

[1158] Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 656, 658 (1834).

[1159] Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328 (1859); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).

[1160] Evans v. Jordan, 9 Cr. 199 (1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 548 (1852); Bloomer v. Millinger, 1 Wall. 340, 350 (1864); Eunson v. Dodge, 18 Wall. 414, 416 (1873).

[1161] Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195 (1857).

[1162] Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 549 (1871). Cf. Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 23 Wall. 530, 563 (1875); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 356 (1876).

[1163] Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, 118 (1875).

[1164] Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874); Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489 (1891).

[1165] Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). Cf. Dow Chemical Co. v. Halliburton Co., 324 U.S. 320 (1945); Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 89 (1941).

[1166] Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945); Marconi Wireless Teleg. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).

[1167] Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139 (1894); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 (1911).

[1168] Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). An interesting concurring opinion was filed by Justice Douglas for himself and Justice Black: "It is not enough," says Justice Douglas, "that an article is new and useful. The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end--the advancement of science. An invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance." Ibid. 154-155. He then quotes the following from an opinion of Justice Bradley's given 70 years ago:

"It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith. (Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882))." Ibid. 155.

The opinion concludes: "The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of patents than the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked with favor on the opportunity which the exercise of discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a host of gadgets under the armour of patents--gadgets that obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge. A few that have reached this Court show the pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of devices:

"Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (1850): Doorknob made of clay rather than metal or wood, where different shaped doorknobs had previously been made of clay.

"Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498 (1874): Rubber caps put on wood pencils to serve as erasers.

"Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 23 Wall. 530 (1875): Making collars of parchment paper where linen paper and linen had previously been used.

"Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37 (1875): A method for preserving fish by freezing them in a container operating in the same manner as an ice cream freezer.

"Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1876): Inserting a piece of rubber in a slot in the end of a wood pencil to serve as an eraser.

"Dalton v. Jennings, 93 U.S. 271 (1876): Fine thread placed across open squares in a regular hairnet to keep hair in place more effectively.

"Double-Pointed Tack Co. v. Two Rivers Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 117 (1883): Putting a metal washer on a wire staple.

"Miller v. Foree, 116 U.S. 22 (1885): A stamp for impressing initials in the side of a plug of tobacco.

"Preston v. Manard, 116 U.S. 661 (1886): A hose reel of large diameter so that water may flow through hose while it is wound on the reel.

"Hendy v. Miners' Iron Works, 127 U.S. 370 (1888): Putting rollers on a machine to make it moveable.

"St. Germain v. Brunswick, 135 U.S. 227 (1890): Revolving cue rack.

"Shenfield v. Nashawannuck Mfg. Co., 137 U.S. 56 (1890): Using flat cord instead of round cord for the loop at the end of suspenders.

"Florsheim v. Schilling, 137 U.S. 64 (1890): Putting elastic gussets in corsets.

"Cluett v. Claflin, 140 U.S. 180 (1891): A shirt bosom or dickie sewn onto the front of a shirt.

"Adams v. Bellaire Stamping Co., 141 U.S. 539 (1891): A lantern lid fastened to the lantern by a hinge on one side and a catch on the other.

"Patent Clothing Co. v. Glover, 141 U.S. 560 (1891): Bridging a strip of cloth across the fly of pantaloons to reinforce them against tearing.

"Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 238 (1892): Placing rubber hand grips on bicycle handlebars.

"Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221 (1893): Applying the principle of the umbrella to a skirt form.

"Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894): An oval rather than cylindrical toilet paper roll, to facilitate tearing off strips.

"Dunham v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 154 U.S. 103 (1894): An envelope flap which could be fastened to the envelope in such a fashion that the envelope could be opened without tearing.

"The patent involved in the present case belongs to this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are supposed to govern." Ibid. 156-158.

[1169] "Inventive genius"--Justice Hunt in Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357 (1875); "Genius or invention"--Chief Justice Fuller in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 681 (1893); "Intuitive genius"--Justice Brown in Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 607 (1895); "Inventive genius"--Justice Stone in Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185 (1925); "Inventive genius"--Justice Roberts in Mantle Lamp Co. v. Aluminum Co., 301 U.S. 544, 546 (1937); Justice Douglas in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941); "the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling." See also Note 2 above. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 1163, above.]

[1170] See Note 7 above. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 1168, above.]

[1171] Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884).

[1172] Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454, 512 (1818).

[1173] United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586-589 (1899). See also Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884).

[1174] Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 660 (1834); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899). Cf. E. Burke Inlow, The Patent Clause (1950) Chaps. III and IV, for evidence of a judicial recognition of an inventor's inchoate right to have his invention patented.

[1175] Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 662 (1834); Evans v. Jordan, 9 Cr. 199 (1815).

[1176] Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).

[1177] Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880).

[1178] Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 447 (1855).

[1179] Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1882).

[1180] James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882). See also United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 246, 252 (1871); Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1877); Hollister v. Benedict Manufacturing Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885); United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271 (1888); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 (1896).

[1181] McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, 206 (1843).

[1182] Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 553 (1852).

[1183] See Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); and United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952), where the Justices divide 6 to 3 as to the significance for the case of certain leading precedents. See also Inlow, The Patent Clause, Chap. V.

[1184] Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1879).

[1185] Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906): Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U.S. 358 (1906); Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U.S. 251 (1907).

[1186] Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 280 U.S. 123 (1932)--overruling Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).

[1187] 100 U.S. 82 (1879).

[1188] Ibid. 94.

[1189] Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).

[1190] Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).

[1191] Kent, Commentaries, 1-2, (12th ed. 1873).

[1192] XIX Journals of the Continental Congress 315, 361 (1912). XX Id. 762, XXI id. 1136-1137, 1158.

[1193] Article IX.

[1194] Madison, Journal of the Constitutional Convention, II, 82 (Hunt's ed. 1908).

[1195] Ibid. 185-186, 372.

[1196] United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 160, 162 (1820). See also The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 40-41 (1826); United States v. Brig Malek Abhel, 2 How. 210, 232 (1844).

[1197] 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942).

[1198] Ibid. 28.

[1199] United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, 488 (1887).

[1200] United States v. Flores, 3 F. Supp. 134 (1932).

[1201] 289 U.S. 137, 149-150 (1933).

[1202] United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184, 200 (1920).

[1203] The Federalist No. 23.

[1204] Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54 (1795).

[1205] 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

[1206] Ibid. 407. Emphasis supplied.

[1207] Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 139 (1866) (dissenting opinion); see also Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305 (1871); and United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931).

[1208] 58 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 1st sess., App. 1 (1861).

[1209] Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73, 86 (1875).

[1210] Northern P.R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135, 149 (1919).

[1211] Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

[1212] Northern P.R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135, 149 (1919).

[1213] 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

[1214] Ibid. 316, 318.

[1215] 334 U.S. 742 (1948).

[1216] Ibid. 757-758.

[1217] Ibid. 755.

[1218] II Madison Journal of the Constitutional Convention 82 (Hunt's ed. 1908).

[1219] Ibid. 188.

[1220] 11 Annals of Congress 11 (1801).

[1221] Works of Alexander Hamilton, VII, 746 (Hamilton's ed. 1851). Cf. Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. 37 (1800).

[1222] 2 Stat. 129, 130 (1802). Emphasis supplied.

[1223] The Prize Cases, 2 Bl. 635, 668 (1863).

[1224] Ibid. 683, 688.

[1225] 12 Wall. 700 (1872).

[1226] Ibid. 702.

[1227] I Blackstone, Commentaries 263, (Wendell's ed. 1857).

[1228] II Story, Commentaries, Sec. 1187 (4th ed. 1873).

[1229] 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 105, 108 (1904).

[1230] 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 555 (1948).

[1231] 61 Stat. 405 (1947).

[1232] H.J. Res. 298, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948).

[1233] Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 380 (1918); Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918).

[1234] 245 U.S. at 385.

[1235] Ibid. 386-388. The measure was upheld by a State court, Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863).

[1236] Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 381, 382 (1918)

[1237] Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916).

[1238] 245 U.S. 366 (1918).

[1239] Ibid. 390.

[1240] United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937). See also In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890).

[1241] Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 660 (1950).

[1242] McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919).

[1243] Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79 (1858).

[1244] Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123, 138-139 (1866). Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).

[1245] Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 687 (1949).

[1246] Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 82 (1858).

[1247] Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).

[1248] Mullan v. United States, 212 U.S. 516 (1909); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).

[1249] Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December 1917, 211 (1918).

[1250] Ibid. 214

[1251] Ibid. 250, 332, 380, 438, 497.

[1252] Ibid. 420, 466, 535, 595, 636, 823. Many of these were soon suspended or repealed. Ibid. 458, 553, 601, 733.

[1253] Ibid. 482, 543, 963, 969.

[1254] Ibid. 916.

[1255] Ibid. 280.

[1256] Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 617 (1870).

[1257] Ibid. 626.

[1258] Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 12 Wall. 457, 540 (1871).

[1259] 40 Stat. 276 (1917).

[1260] Ibid. 272.

[1261] Ibid. 411.

[1262] Ibid. 451 (1918).

[1263] Ibid. 904.

[1264] 55 Stat. 236 (1941).

[1265] 56 Stat. 176 (1942).

[1266] Ibid. 23.

[1267] 57 Stat. 163 (1943).

[1268] Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 754-756, 765, 766 (1948). See also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 305 (1942); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923); Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922).

[1269] Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 779 (1948).

[1270] 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918).

[1271] Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).

[1272] 21 Wall. 73 (1875).

[1273] Ibid. 96-97. Cf. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926).

[1274] 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

[1275] Ibid. 91-92, 104.

[1276] Ibid. 104.

[1277] 334 U.S. 742 (1948).

[1278] Ibid. 778-779.

[1279] Ibid. 782-783.

[1280] Story Commentaries on the Constitution, II, Sec. 1185 (4th ed., 1873).

[1281] 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

[1282] 39 Stat. 166 (1916).

[1283] 297 U.S. 288, 327-328 (1936).

[1284] 60 Stat. 755 (1946).

[1285] Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 507 (1871). See also Mayfield v. Richards, 115 U.S. 137 (1885).

[1286] 251 U.S. 146, 163 (1919). See also Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920).

[1287] Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).

[1288] Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).

[1289] 333 U.S. 138 (1948). See also Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947).

[1290] 333 U.S. 138, 143-144 (1948).

[1291] Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 170 (1948).

[1292] 100 U.S. 158 (1880).

[1293] Ibid. 170.

[1294] 4 Wall. 2 (1866).

[1295] Ibid. 127.

[1296] Ibid. 132, 138.

[1297] 327 U.S. 304 (1946).

[1298] 8 Cr. 110 (1814). See also Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279, 284 (1878).

[1299] Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 (1871).

[1300] Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926); Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947); Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).

[1301] The "Siren," 13 Wall. 389 (1871).

[1302] The "Hampton," 5 Wall. 372, 376 (1867).

[1303] The "Paquete Habana," 175 U.S. 677, 700, 711 (1900).

[1304] Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156, 157 (1921).

[1305] Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944).

[1306] Ibid. 521.

[1307] 255 U.S. 81 (1921).

[1308] Ibid. 89.

[1309] Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

[1310] 40 Stat. 217 (1917); amended by 40 Stat. 553 (1918).

[1311] 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

[1312] Ibid. 52.

[1313] Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).

[1314] Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

[1315] Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

[1316] Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).

[1317] 1 Stat. 577 (1798).

[1318] Writings of James Madison, VI, 360-361 (Hunt's ed., 1906).

[1319] 40 Stat. 531 (1918).

[1320] 335 U.S. 160 (1948).

[1321] Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134 (1852).

[1322] 13 Wall. 623, 627 (1871).

[1323] 120 U.S. 227 (1887).

[1324] Ibid. 239.

[1325] H.R. Rep. No. 262, 43d Cong., 1st sess., 39-40 (1874).

[1326] United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950); United States v. Toronto Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).

[1327] Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 169 (1817), affirmed in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (1820).

[1328] Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (1869); Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331 (1871).

[1329] 1 Stat. 424 (1795).

[1330] Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 32 (1827).

[1331] Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (1820); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827).

[1332] Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 16 (1820).

[1333] 39 Stat. 166, 197 (1916).--By the act of June 28, 1947 (61 Stat. 191, 192) the age of enlistment in the National Guard was lowered to 17 years.

[1334] United States v. Hammond, 1 Cr. C.C. 15 (1801).

[1335] 2 Stat. 103 (1801).

[1336] 2 Stat. 195 (1802).

[1337] 20 Stat. 102 (1878).

[1338] Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 9 (1889).

[1339] District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U.S. 161 (1898).

[1340] Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 299 (1893).

[1341] Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 (1899).

[1342] United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 354 (1933); Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, 283 U.S. 348 (1931); Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 577 (1910); Marine R. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 47 (1921); Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 (1899).

[1343] Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130 (1876).

[1344] 1 Stat. 139 (1790).

[1345] United States v. Simms, 1 Cr. 252, 256 (1803).

[1346] 2 Stat. 103, 104 (1801). See Tayloe v. Thomson, 5 Pet. 358, 368 (1831); Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568 (1833); Stelle v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 201, 205 (1838); Van Ness v. Bank of United States, 13 Pet. 17 (1839); United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 301 (1842).

[1347] Reily v. Lamar, 2 Cr. 344, 356 (1805).

[1348] Korn v. Mutual Assur. Soc., 6 Cr. 192, 199 (1810).

[1349] Mutual Assur. Soc. v. Watts, 1 Wheat. 279 (1816).

[1350] Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cr. 445, 452 (1805); see also Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cr. 332, 336 (1810); New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, 94 (1816). The District has been held to be a "State" within the terms of a treaty regulating the inheritance of property within the "States of the Union." De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).

[1351] Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280 (1868); Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395 (1897); Hooe v. Werner, 166 U.S. 399 (1897).

[1352] National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).

[1353] Ibid. 588-600 (opinion of Justice Jackson, with whom Justices Black and Burton concurred).

[1354] Ibid. 604 (opinion of Justice Rutledge, with whom Justice Murphy concurred).

[1355] Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).

[1356] United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).

[1357] Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901); Cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

[1358] Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 619 (1838); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300 (1893); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); O'Donoghue v. United States 289 U.S. 516, 518 (1933).

[1359] 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).

[1360] Ibid. 428.

[1361] Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317 (1820).

[1362] Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 408 (1886); Welch v. Cook, 97 U.S. 541 (1879).

[1363] Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 320 (1820); Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922).

[1364] Thompson v. Roe ex dem. Carroll, 22 How. 422, 435 (1860); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 147 (1889).

[1365] Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676, 680 (1870); Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U.S. 547 (1911).

[1366] Washington Market Co. v. District of Columbia, 172 U.S. 361, 367 (1899).

[1367] Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 690 (1878).

[1368] 129 U.S. 141, 148 (1889).

[1369] Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).

[1370] O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).

[1371] Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).

[1372] James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).

[1373] Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908).

[1374] Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).

[1375] James v. Dravo Contracting Co, 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).

[1376] Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938).

[1377] Ibid. 528.

[1378] Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939).

[1379] Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930).

[1380] Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929); Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agri., 318 U.S. 285 (1943).

[1381] Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 545 (1885); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).

[1382] Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399 (1896).

[1383] United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930).

[1384] Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 331 (1892).

[1385] Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399 (1896).

[1386] S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946).

[1387] Ibid. 570, 571.

[1388] Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532 (1885); United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 142 (1930); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930).

[1389] United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,867 (1819).

[1390] James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 145 (1937).

[1391] Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 186 (1937). See also Atkinson v. State Tax Commission, 303 U.S. 20 (1938).

[1392] 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

[1393] Ibid. 420. This decision had been clearly foreshadowed fourteen years earlier by Marshall's opinion in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358, 396 (1805). Upholding an act which gave priority to claims of the United States against the estate of a bankrupt he wrote: "The government is to pay the debt of the Union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has, consequently, a right to make remittances, by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe."

[1394] See pp. 74-82, supra.

[1395] Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

[1396] See p. 426, supra.

[1397] Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 281 (1856).

[1398] Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1876); United Slates v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1877).

[1399] See pp. 110-117, 266-267.

[1400] United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1878); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 357 (1879); United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, 394 (1790); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). That this power has been freely exercised is attested by the 180 pages of the United States Code (1950 ed.) devoted to Title 18, entitled "Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure." In addition numerous regulatory measures prescribe criminal penalties for infractions thereof.

[1401] Ex parte Carll, 106 U.S. 521 (1883).

[1402] United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 567 (1850).

[1403] Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).

[1404] United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74 (1915).

[1405] Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 537 (1895); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915). See also Rakes v. United States, 212 U.S. 55 (1909).

[1406] Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).

[1407] The Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2385.

[1408] McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).

[1409] Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 862 (1824). See also Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939).

[1410] First Nat. Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917); Burnes Nat. Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924).

[1411] Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).

[1412] Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449 (1884).

[1413] Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869).

[1414] Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). See also Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871).

[1415] Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935).

[1416] Pacific Railroad Removal Cases (Union P.R. Co. v. Myers), 115 U.S. 1, 18 (1885); California v. Central P.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 39 (1888).

[1417] Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894).

[1418] Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923).

[1419] Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922). In 1944, the Congressional Joint Committee on Nonessential Federal Expenditures reported that there were then in existence one hundred government corporations, including subsidiaries and quasi-private corporations in which the Government had some special contractual or proprietary interest. S. Doc. No. 227, 78th Cong., 2d sess. 2 (1944).

[1420] Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 721 (1838).

[1421] Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880).

[1422] Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 287 (1872).

[1423] Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).

[1424] Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 53 (1825).

[1425] United States Exp. Co. v. Kountze Bros., 8 Wall. 342, 350 (1860).

[1426] Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).

[1427] 43 Stat. 5 (1924). See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).

[1428] Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940).

[1429] Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944).

[1430] Detroit Trust Company v. The "Thomas Barium," 293 U.S. 21 (1934).

[1431] Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).

[1432] Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833); Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 467 (1886).

[1433] Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1877); Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 400 (1886).

[1434] 19 How. 393, 411 (1857).

[1435] Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367 (1917).

[1436] 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789).

[1437] Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830).

[1438] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 75, 101 (1807).

[1439] Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948).

[1440] United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947).

[1441] Gusik v. Schilder, 339 U.S. 977 (1950).

[1442] Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330 (1915).

[1443] 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789).

[1444] Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830); Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (1822).

[1445] 14 Stat. 385 (1867).

[1446] Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).

[1447] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 75 (1807).

[1448] Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274 (1942); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 428 (1912); Matter of Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 213 (1911).

[1449] Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274 (1942).

[1450] Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).

[1451] Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 110 (1866).

[1452] McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).

[1453] Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1924).

[1454] Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924).

[1455] Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924).

[1456] Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 294 (1948).

[1457] Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 178 (3d ed., 1948).

[1458] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 75, 101 (1807).

[1459] Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VII, 3219 (1897).

[1460] Fed. Cas. No. 9, 487 (1861).

[1461] 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 74, 89 (1861-1863).

[1462] 12 Stat. 755 (1863).

[1463] 4 Wall. 2 (1866).

[1464] Ibid. 114.

[1465] Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, II, Sec. 1344 (4th ed., 1873).

[1466] Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1867).

[1467] United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).

[1468] Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 377 (1867).

[1469] United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).

[1470] Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, II, Sec. 1345.

[1471] 3 Dall. 386, 393 (1798).

[1472] Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647, 652 (1923).

[1473] Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878).

[1474] Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 377 (1867); Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878).

[1475] United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214 (1939).

[1476] Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901). Cf. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 199 (1948) (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).

[1477] Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867).

[1478] Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).

[1479] Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).

[1480] Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).

[1481] Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 183 (1891).

[1482] Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798).

[1483] Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884).

[1484] 157 U.S. 429, 573 (1895).

[1485] 2 Madison, The Constitutional Convention, 208 (Hunt's ed., 1908).

[1486] 3 Dall. 171 (1796).

[1487] 7 Hamilton's Works, 845, 848 (Hamilton's ed., 1851). "If the meaning of the word excise is to be sought in the British statutes, it will be found to include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an excise, and then must necessarily be uniform and liable to apportionment; consequently, not a direct tax." Ibid.

[1488] 4 Annals of Congress, 730 (1794); 2 Madison's Writings, 14, (Library of Congress ed., 1865) (Letter to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 1794).

[1489] 3 Dall. 171, 177 (1796).

[1490] Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433 (1869).

[1491] Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869).

[1492] Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331 (1875).

[1493] Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881).

[1494] Ibid. 602.

[1495] 157 U.S. 429 (1895); 158 U.S. 601 (1895).

[1496] 28 Stat. 509 (1894).

[1497] Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 80 (1900).

[1498] Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899).

[1499] Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).

[1500] Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (1902).

[1501] 192 U.S. 363 (1904).

[1502] Ibid. 370.

[1503] 192 U.S. 397 (1904).

[1504] 220 U.S. 107 (1911).

[1505] 240 U.S. 103 (1916).

[1506] Ibid. 114.

[1507] 232 U.S. 261 (1914).

[1508] New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).

[1509] Phillips v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U.S. 160 (1931).

[1510] Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930).

[1511] Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).

[1512] Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).

[1513] Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929). See also Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938).

[1514] Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 140 (1929).

[1515] Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317 (1820).

[1516] De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517, 527 (1879).

[1517] Turpin & Bro. v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886). Cf. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 174 (1861).

[1518] Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 154 (1901).

[1519] Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 428 (1904); Turpin & Bro. v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886).

[1520] Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923).

[1521] Thompson v. United States, 142 U.S. 471 (1892).

[1522] Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918); National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373 (1924).

[1523] Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901).

[1524] United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915).

[1525] Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915).

[1526] Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876); Turpin & Bro. v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 505 (1886).

[1527] Louisiana Public Service Comm'n. v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 284 U.S. 125, 131 (1931); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 433 (1856); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876). In Williams v. United States, 255 U.S. 336 (1921) the argument that an act of Congress which prohibited interstate transportation of liquor into States whose laws prohibited manufacture or sale of liquor for beverage purposes was repugnant to this clause was rejected as plainly wanting in merit.

[1528] Louisiana Public Service Comm'n. v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 284 U.S. 125, 132 (1931).

[1529] Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 7 How. 283, 414 (1849) (opinion of Justice Wayne); cf. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 314 (1851).

[1530] Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 467 (1886). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1877); Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 400 (1886).

[1531] 1 Stat. 53, 54 (1789).

[1532] Thompson v. Darden, 198 U.S. 310 (1905).

[1533] Alaska v. Troy, 258 U.S. 101 (1922).

[1534] Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877).

[1535] United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 439 (1896); Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389, 393 (1899).

[1536] Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886).

[1537] 32 Stat. 388 (1902).

[1538] Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 322 (1937).

[1539] Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272 (1851).

[1540] United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872).

[1541] Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877); Austin v. United States, 155 U.S. 417, 427 (1894).

[1542] Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886).

[1543] 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 538 (1871).

[1544] Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183 (1878).

[1545] 14 Pet. 540 (1840).

[1546] United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).

[1547] 313 U.S. 69 (1941).

[1548] Ibid. 78-79.

[1549] Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, 425 (1830); Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40 (1834).

[1550] Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885); Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U.S. 567 (1886).

[1551] Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66 (1900).

[1552] Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257 (1837).

[1553] Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12, 15 (1851); Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304, 317 (1853).

[1554] Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257 (1837).

[1555] Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, 205 (1851).

[1556] Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 446 (1884).

[1557] Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 How. 29, 38 (1844). See also Griffin v. Thompson, 2 How. 244 (1844).

[1558] Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 659 (1923).

[1559] Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1867); Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257 (1872); Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234, 239 (1873). See p. 317, supra, and p. 327, post.

[1560] Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798); Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110 (1834); Baltimore & S.R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395, 401 (1850); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456, 463 (1855); Loche v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172 (1867); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278, 285 (1902); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140 (1911).

[1561] Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 300, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913).

[1562] Jaehne v. New York, 128 U.S. 189, 190 (1888).

[1563] Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905).

[1564] Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915).

[1565] Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).

[1566] Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 190 (1898). See also Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509 (1903); Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 263 U.S. 394 (1923).

[1567] Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 316 (1867).

[1568] Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234 (1873).

[1569] Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).

[1570] Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883).

[1571] Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491 (1890).

[1572] Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890).

[1573] Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).

[1574] Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915).

[1575] Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324 (1905).

[1576] Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896).

[1577] Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894).

[1578] Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 37 (1870).

[1579] Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894).

[1580] Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 593 (1901).

[1581] Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 588 (1896).

[1582] Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925).

[1583] Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 381 (1898).

[1584] Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).

[1585] Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (1856); Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 (1871); New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & Heat Producing & Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885); Bier v. McGehee, 148 U.S. 137, 140 (1893).

[1586] New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885); Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898); Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914); Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916).

[1587] The above; also Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 221 U.S. 400 (1911); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913); Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926).

[1588] Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895). See also New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U.S. 18 (1888); Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273 (1896); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913); Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916); Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272 (1916); McCoy v. Union Elev. Co., 247 U.S. 354 (1918); Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924).

[1589] Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436, 443 (1862); Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116, 145 (1863); Wright v. Nagle, 101 U.S. 791, 793 (1880); and McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 667 (1890); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 45 (1894); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 232-233 (1900); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441 (1932); Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 170 (1947).

[1590] McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898); Houston & Texas Central R.R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66, 76, 77 (1900); Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 175 (1909); Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362, 376 (1914); Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. v. New Orleans, 235 U.S. 164, 171 (1914).

[1591] State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (1854), and Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416 (1854) are the leading cases. See also Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436 (1862); Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1882); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890); Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894); Bacon v. Texas, 163 U.S. 207 (1896); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898).

[1592] Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 206 (1864); Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294 (1866); Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 (1866); Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477 (1870); Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 16 Wall. 678 (1873); Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 60 (1882); Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U.S. 356 (1886); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901).

[1593] Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 548 (1904).

[1594] Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907); Muhlker v. New York & H.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905).

[1595] Tidal Oil Company v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 450, 451-452 (1924).

[1596] Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314 (1873); Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 370 (1941).

[1597] 4 Wheat. 122, 197 (1819); see also Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304 (1853).

[1598] 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).

[1599] Ibid. 627.

[1600] 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

[1601] Ibid. 431.

[1602] Ibid. 435.

[1603] "The Blaisdell decision represented a realistic appreciation of the fact that ours is an evolving society and that the general words of the contract clause were not intended to reduce the legislative branch of government to helpless impotency." Justice Black, in Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 383 (1941).

[1604] Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution, 95 (Cambridge, 1938).

[1605] Farrand, Records, III, 548.

[1606] The Federalist, No. 44.

[1607] Works of James Wilson, I, 567, (Andrews, ed., 1896).

[1608] 2 Dall. 410 (1793).

[1609] Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 338 (1827).

[1610] 6 Cr. 87 (1810).

[1611] In Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (1797) the Court had earlier set aside an act of Virginia as being in conflict with the Treaty of Peace, of 1783, with Great Britain.

[1612] As given by Professor Wright in his treatise, The Contract Clause of the Constitution, 22. Professor Wright dates Hamilton's pamphlet, 1796.

[1613] 6 Cr. 87, 139 (1810). Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion, relied exclusively on general principles. "I do not hesitate to declare, that a State does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it, on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity." Ibid. 143. See also his words in Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 686 (1829); and those of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Barnes v. Barnes, 8 Jones L. 53 (N.C.) 366 (1861), quoted in Thomas Henry Calvert. The Constitution and the Courts, I, 948 (Northport, L.I., 1924). In both these opinions it is asseverated that the contracts clause has been made to do the work of "fundamental principles."

[1614] 7 Cr. 164 (1812). The exemption from taxation which was involved in this case was held in 1886 to have lapsed through the acquiescence for sixty years of the owners of the lands in the imposition of taxes upon these. Given v. Wright, 117 U.S. 648 (1886).

[1615] Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).

[1616] It was not until well along in the eighteenth century that the first American business corporation was created: "This was the New London Society United for Trade and Commerce, which was chartered in Connecticut in 1732. It had, however, an early demise. Following this was a second Connecticut charter, namely, for building 'Union Wharf,' on 'Long Wharf,' at New Haven. A similar company, 'The Proprietors of Boston Pier,' or 'The Long Wharf in the Town of Boston in New England,' was chartered by the Massachusetts General Court in 1772. In 1768 the Pennsylvania Assembly incorporated 'The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire.' Alone of the colonial business corporations it has had a continuous existence to the present day.

"Apparently the only other business corporations of the colonies were companies for supplying water. One was incorporated in Massachusetts in 1652, and three in Rhode Island in 1772 and 1773. Alongside of these corporations, and, indeed, preceding them, were a large number of unincorporated associations, partnerships, societies, groups of 'undertakers,' 'companies,' formed for a great variety of business purposes. In the eye of the law all of them were probably mere partnerships or tenancies in common. Whaling and fishing companies, so-called, were numerous. There were a number of mining companies, chiefly for producing iron or copper. There were some manufacturing companies, but they were not numerous. Banking institutions were represented notably by the 'Bank of Credit Lumbard,' promoted in Boston by John Blackwell and authorized by the General Court in 1686, and by the 'Land Bank or Manufacturing Scheme' in the same colony in 1739-41.

"In addition to these there were a few insurance companies, a number of companies formed for the Indian trade, numerous land companies, large and small, a number of associations for erecting bridges, building or repairing roads, and improving navigation of small streams or rivers. Besides these there were a few colonial corporations not easily classed, such as libraries, chambers of commerce, etc.

"During the Revolution few corporations of any sort were chartered. After the conclusion of peace the situation was materially altered. Capital had accumulated during the war. The disbanding of the army set free a labor supply, which was rapidly increased by throngs of immigrants. The day was one of bold experimentation, enthusiastic exploitation of new methods, eager exploration of new paths, confident undertaking of new enterprises. Everything conspired to bring about a considerable extension of corporate enterprise in the field of business before the end of the eighteenth century, notably after the critical period of disunion and Constitution-making has passed. Prior to 1801 over three hundred charters were granted for business corporations; 90 per cent. of them after 1789. Judged by twentieth-century standards these seem few, indeed, but neither in the colonies nor in the mother country was there precedent for such a development." 105 The Nation 512 (New York, Nov. 8, 1917), reviewing Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (2 vols., Harvard University Press, 1917).

[1617] In 1806 Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, without mentioning the contracts clause, declared that rights legally vested in a corporation cannot be "controuled or destroyed by a subsequent statute, unless a power be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation," Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143 (1806). See also Stoughton v. Baker et al., 4 Mass. 522 (1808) to like effect; cf. Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 360 (1812) in which it is said that the purpose of the contracts clause was to "provide against paper money and insolvent laws." Together these holdings add up to the conclusion that the reliance of the Massachusetts court was on "fundamental principles," rather than the contracts clause.

[1618] 4 Wheat., especially at 577-595 (Webster's argument); ibid. 666 (Story's opinion). See also Story's opinion for the Court in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cr. 43 (1815).

[1619] 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).

[1620] Ibid. 627.

[1621] 4 Wheat. at 637; see also Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 437 (1869).

[1622] 4 Pet. 514 (1830).

[1623] 11 Pet. 420 (1837).

[1624] Note the various cases to which municipalities are parties.

[1625] 4 Wheat. at 629.

[1626] In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) a category of "business affected with a public interest" and whose property is "impressed with a public use" was recognized. A corporation engaged in such a business becomes a "quasi-public" corporation, the power of the State to regulate which is larger than in the case of a purely private corporation. Inasmuch as most corporations receiving public franchises are of this character, the final result of Munn v. Illinois was to enlarge the police power of the State in the case of the most important beneficiaries of the Dartmouth College decision.

[1627] Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880); Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231 (1899); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

[1628] East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511 (1851); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

[1629] Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923).

[1630] Newton v. Mahoning County, 100 U.S. 548 (1880).

[1631] Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).

[1632] Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). In this case the contracts involved were municipal bonds, and hence "private" contracts; but the overruling power of the State in relation to its municipalities was one of the grounds invoked by the Court in sustaining the legislation. See Ibid. 509. "'A municipal corporation * * * is a representative not only of the State, but is a portion of its governmental power. * * * The State may withdraw these local powers of government at pleasure, and may, through its legislature or other appointed channels, govern the local territory as it governs the State at large. It may enlarge or contract its powers or destroy its existence.'" United States v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 17 Wall. 322, 329 (1873); and see Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

[1633] Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402 (1850); Fisk v. Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885); Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937); Mississippi Use of Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928).

[1634] Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 420 (1850). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137 (1803); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C., (4 Dev.) 1 (1833). See also United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883); United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146 (1883); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890).

[1635] Fisk v. Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885); Mississippi Use of Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928).

[1636] Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880). Cf. Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939).

[1637] Phelps v. Board of Education, 300 U.S. 319 (1937).

[1638] Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937).

[1639] Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand 303 U.S. 95 (1938).

[1640] 7 Cr. 164 (1812).

[1641] Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 225 (1874); Pacific R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36, 43 (1874); Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244, 249 (1873); Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 438 (1869).

[1642] 16 How. 369 (1854).

[1643] Ibid. 382-383.

[1644] Salt Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373, 379 (1872). See also Welch v. Cook, 97 U.S. 541 (1879); Grand Lodge, F. & A.M. v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 143 (1897); Wisconsin & M.R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903). Cf. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913), in which it was held that the repeal of a statute providing for consequential damages caused by changes of grades of streets could not constitutionally affect an already accrued right to compensation.

[1645] See Christ Church v. Philadelphia County, 24 How. 300, 302 (1861); Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 242 U.S. 100 (1916).

[1646] Compare the above case with Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 437 (1869); also Illinois Central R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190 (1893) with Wisconsin & M.R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903).

[1647] Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 145-146 (1922); Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 288 (1883); Morley v. Lakeshore & M.S.R. Co., 146 U.S. 162, 169 (1892). That the obligation of contracts clause did not protect vested rights merely as such was stated by the Court as early as Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 413 (1829); and again in the Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 11 Pet. 420, 539-540 (1837).

[1648] See Story's opinion. 4 Wheat. at 712.

[1649] Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 438 (1869); Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190, 213 (1872); Miller v. New York, 15 Wall. 478 (1873); Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1878); Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1882); Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U.S. 176 (1885); Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 1 (1892).

[1650] New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104, 111 (1877).

[1651] See Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 520 (1873), following Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446, 451 (1870); also Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Fair Haven & W.R. Co. v. New Haven, 203 U.S. 379 (1906); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). See also Lothrop v. Stedman, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,519 (1875), where the principles of natural justice are thought to set a limit to the power. Earlier is Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R. Co., 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (1867) where it is said that a new charter may not be substituted; also Allen v. McKean, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 229 (1833) in which a federal court set aside a Maine statute somewhat like the one involved in the Dartmouth College case, on the ground that it went beyond the power of mere alteration. In this case, however, only the right to alter had been reserved, in the charter itself, and not the right to repeal.

[1652] See in this connection the cases cited by Justice Sutherland in his opinion for the Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936).

[1653] Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304 (1853); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1882); Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335 (1900); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900); Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932).

[1654] Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190, 218 (1872). See also Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591 (1910).

[1655] Lakeshore & M.S.R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 690 (1899); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932). Both these decisions cite Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U.S. 13, 17 (1882), but without apparent justification.

[1656] 4 Pet. 514 (1830).

[1657] Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1854).

[1658] Thus a railroad may be required, at its own expense and irrespective of benefits to itself, to eliminate grade crossings in the interest of public safety, (New York & N.E.R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894)); to make highway crossings reasonably safe and convenient for public use, (Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 434 (1918)); to repair viaducts, (Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S. 583 (1908)); and to fence its right of way, (Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364 (1893)). Though a railroad company owns the right of way along a street, the city may require it to lay tracks to conform to the established grade; to fill in tracks at street intersections; and to remove tracks from a busy street intersection, when the attendant disadvantages and expense are small and the safety of the public appreciably enhanced, (Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919)).

Likewise the State, in the public interest, may require a railroad to reestablish an abandoned station, even though the railroad commission had previously authorized its abandonment on condition that another station be established elsewhere, a condition which had been complied with, (New Haven & N. Co. v. Hamersley, 104 U.S. 1 (1881)). It may impose upon a railroad liability for fire communicated by its locomotives, even though the State had previously authorized the company to use said type of locomotive power, (St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 5 (1897)); and it may penalize the failure to cut drains through embankments so as to prevent flooding of adjacent lands, (Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915)).

[1659] Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878). See also Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); and Hammond Packing v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 345 (1909).

[1660] 11 Pet. 420 (1837).

[1661] 11 Pet. at 548-553.

[1662] 201 U.S. 400 (1906).

[1663] Ibid. 471-472, citing The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, 75 (1865).

[1664] Memphis & L.R.R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U.S. 609, 617 (1884). See also Picard v. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia R. Co., 130 U.S. 637, 641 (1889); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U.S. 244, 251 (1883); Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217 (1876); Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U.S. 417 (1881); Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Pendleton, 156 U.S. 667, 673 (1895).

[1665] Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 359, 365 (1879).

[1666] Phoenix F. & M. Insurance Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174 (1896).

[1667] Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 236 (1907); followed in Wright v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co., 216 U.S. 420 (1910); and New York Rapid Transit Co. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938). Cf. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139 (1886) the authority of which is respected in the preceding case.

[1668] Chicago, B. & K.C.R. Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Guffey, 120 U.S. 569 (1887).

[1669] Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U.S. 662 (1897).

[1670] Vicksburg, S. & P.R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665 (1886).

[1671] Millsaps College v. Jackson, 275 U.S. 129 (1927).

[1672] Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment, 302 U.S. 95 (1937).

[1673] Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Railroad Commission Cases), 116 U.S. 307, 330 (1886) extended in Southern Pacific Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 537 (1913) to cases in which the word "reasonable" does not appear to qualify the company's right to prescribe tolls. See also American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Com. of California et al., 307 U.S. 486 (1939).

[1674] Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923). See also Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U.S. 539 (1921).

[1675] Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 15 (1898).

[1676] Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354 (1902); Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22 (1906); Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454 (1913).

[1677] Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 (1901).

[1678] Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908); Wyandotte Gas Co. v. Kansas, 231 U.S. 622 (1914).

[1679] See also Puget Sound Traction, Light & P. Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U.S. 574 (1917). "Before we can find impairment of a contract we must find an obligation of the contract which has been impaired. Since the contract here relied upon is one between a political subdivision of a state and private individuals, settled principles of construction require that the obligation alleged to have been impaired be clearly and unequivocally expressed." Justice Black for the Court in Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 396-397 (1944).

[1680] Corporation of Brick Church v. Mayor et al., 5 Cowen (N.Y.) 538, 540 (1826).

[1681] West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (1848). See also Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19 (1840); White River Turnpike Co. v. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590 (1849); and Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,617 (1830); cited in Calvert I, 960-961.

[1682] Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917).

[1683] Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455 (1892).

[1684] See pp. 335-336.

[1685] See especially Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430 (1869), and Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439 (1869).

[1686] Georgia Railway Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1952). The Court distinguishes In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) on the ground that the action there was barred "as one in substance directed against the State to obtain specific performance of a contract with the State". 342 U.S. 305.

[1687] Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880).

[1688] Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).

[1689] New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 630 (1885).

[1690] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). See also Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); also Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917), where the police power and eminent domain are treated on the same basis in respect of inalienability; also Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U.S. 88, 97 (1897); Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908); and Calvert I, 962.

[1691] Morley v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 146 U.S. 162 (1892); New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891); Missouri & A. Lumber & Min. Co. v. Greenwood Dist, 249 U.S. 170 (1919). But cf. Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 549 (1833); and Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196, 203 (1875), suggesting that a different view was earlier entertained in the case of judgments in actions of debt.

[1692] Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629 (1819). Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). The question whether a wife's rights in the community property under the laws of California were of a contractual nature was raised but not determined in Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400 (1910).

[1693] New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891); Zane v. Hamilton County, 189 U.S. 370, 381 (1903).

[1694] 4 Wheat. 122 (1819). For the first such case in a Federal Circuit Court, see Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, I, 67 (Boston, 1922).

[1695] 12 Wheat. 213 (1827).

[1696] Ibid. 353-354.

[1697] Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 552 (1867).

[1698] 1 How. 311 (1843).

[1699] 2 How. 608 (1844).

[1700] Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439 (1903); New Orleans & L.R. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U.S. 219 (1895).

[1701] Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769 (1883).

[1702] The right was unheld in Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370 (1827); and again in Vial v. Penniman (Penniman's Case), 103 U.S. 714 (1881). On early English and Colonial law touching the subject, see argument of counsel in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 140-145 (1819).

[1703] McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890).

[1704] Louisiana ex rel. Ranger v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880).

[1705] Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 554 (1867).

[1706] Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775.--Illustrations of changes in remedies, which have been sustained, may be seen in the following cases: Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280 (1830); Hawkins v. Barney, 5 Pet. 457 (1831); Crawford v. Branch Bank of Alabama, 7 How. 279 (1849); Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68 (1872); Cairo & F.R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168 (1877); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877); Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69 (1877); South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433 (1880); Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880); Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51 (1883); Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883); Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U.S. 401 (1883); Hill v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 134 U.S. 515 (1890); New Orleans City & Lake R. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U.S. 219 (1895); Red River Valley Nat. Bank v. Craig, 181 U.S. 548 (1901); Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U.S. 399 (1902); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 (1903); Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U.S. 595 (1903); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907); Henley v. Myers, 215 U.S. 373 (1910); Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U.S. 652 (1914); Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232 (1934).

Compare the following cases, where changes in remedies were deemed to be of such a character as to interfere with substantial rights: Wilmington & W.R. Co. v. King, 91 U.S. 3 (1875); Memphis v. United States, 97 U.S. 293 (1878); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 269, 270, 298, 299 (1885); Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U.S. 566 (1885); Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885); Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921).

[1707] Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 554-555 (1867).

[1708] See also Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U.S. 716 (1884).

[1709] Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).

[1710] Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655 (1874). Cf. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918).

[1711] Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 510 (1942). Alluding to the ineffectiveness of purely judicial remedies against defaulting municipalities, Justice Frankfurter says: "For there is no remedy when resort is had to 'devices and contrivances' to nullify the taxing power which can be carried out only through authorized officials. See Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 124 (1874). And so we have had the spectacle of taxing officials resigning from office in order to frustrate tax levies through mandamus, and officials running on a platform of willingness to go to jail rather than to enforce a tax levy (see Raymond, State and Municipal Bonds, 342-343), and evasion of service by tax collectors, thus making impotent a court's mandate. Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. 50, 57 (1915)." 316 U.S. at 511.

[1712] Myers v. Irwin, 2 Sergeant and Rawle's (Pa.), 367, 371 (1816); also, to same effect, Lindenmuller v. The People, 33 Barbour (N.Y.), 548 (1861). See also Brown v. Penobscot Bank, 8 Mass. 445 (1812).

[1713] Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).

[1714] Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280 (1830). See also Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163 (1850).

[1715] Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).

[1716] Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878).

[1717] New York C.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In this and the preceding two cases the legislative act involved did not except from its operation existing contracts.

[1718] Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).

[1719] Portland Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Oregon, 229 U.S. 397 (1913).

[1720] Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937).

[1721] Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).

[1722] Brown (Marcus) Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921); followed in Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).

[1723] Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-548 (1924).

[1724] 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

[1725] Ibid. 442, 444. See also Veix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan Assn. of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) in which was sustained a New Jersey statute, amending, in view of the Depression, the law governing building and loan associations. The authority of the State to safeguard the vital interests of the people, said Justice Reed, "is not limited to health, morals and safety. It extends to economic needs as well." Ibid. 38-39.

[1726] See especially Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1878); and Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1896).

[1727] 290 U.S. 398 (1934). As to conditions surrounding the enactment of moratorium statutes in 1933, see New York Times of January 22, 1933, sec. II, pp. 1-2.

[1728] Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).

[1729] 295 U.S. at 62.

[1730] East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 235 (1945).

[1731] Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939). See also Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941).

[1732] 313 U.S. at 233-234.

[1733] One reason for this is indicated in the following passage from Justice Field's opinion for the Court in Paul v. Virginia, decided in 1869: "At the present day corporations are multiplied to an almost indefinite extent. There is scarcely a business pursued requiring the expenditure of large capital, or the union of large numbers, that is not carried on by corporations. It is not too much to say that the wealth and business of the country are to a great extent controlled by them." 8 Wall. 168, 181-182.

[1734] Wright, The Contract Clause, 91-100.

[1735] Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). The Court has pointed out, what of course, is evident on a reading of the Constitution, that the contract clause is a limitation on the powers of the States and not of the United States. Central P.R. Co. v. Gallatin (Sinking Fund Cases), 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1879). See also Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 643 (1884); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 529 (1871); Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Board of Water Commissioners, 168 U.S. 349, 372 (1897); Dubuque, S.C.R. Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584 (1874); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922). Cf. however, Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 623 (1870); and Central Pacific R.R. Co. v. Gallatin (Sinking Fund Cases), 99 U.S. 700, 737 (1879).

[1736] See, e.g., Neblett et al. v. Carpenter, et al., 305 U.S. 297 (1938); Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945); Connecticut Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). For a notable case in which the obligations clause was mustered into service, by rather heroic logic, to do work that was afterwards put upon the due process clause, see State Tax On Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (1873).

[1737] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 673 (1945).

[1738] Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (1869).

[1739] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[1740] Ibid. 441.

[1741] May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 502 (1900).

[1742] Ibid. 501; Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928); McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940).

[1743] Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (1872); May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900).

[1744] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 667 (1945).

[1745] Ibid. 664.

[1746] Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951).

[1747] Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 447 (1827).

[1748] Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933).

[1749] Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, 33 (1872).

[1750] Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 573, (1878).

[1751] Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).

[1752] Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 313 (1851).

[1753] Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. 110, 122 (1869). See also Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475, 478 (1867); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 24 (1898).

[1754] Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928).

[1755] Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, 81 (1850).

[1756] Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490 (1850).

[1757] Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 441 (1827); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).

[1758] New York ex rel. Burke v. Wells, 208 U.S. 14 (1908).

[1759] Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U.S. 200 (1909); cf. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 174 (1861).

[1760] Bowman v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 488 (1888).

[1761] 107 U.S. 38 (1883).

[1762] Ibid. 55.

[1763] Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Agriculture, 171 U.S. 345, 301 (1898). For a discussion of the limitations on State power to pass inspection laws resulting from the commerce clause, see pp. 183, 237.

[1764] Bowman v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 488-489 (1888).

[1765] Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Commission, 296 U.S. 261, 265 (1935); Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577, 581 (1874); Wheeling, P. & C. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 283 (1879).

[1766] Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877); Parkersburg & Ohio River Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883); Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887).

[1767] Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 314 (1851); Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236 (1872); Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1877); Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423 (1880); Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U.S. 430 (1880); Cincinnati, P.B.S. & P. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559 (1882).

[1768] Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 549 (1886).

[1769] Southern S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31 (1867).

[1770] Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581 (1874).

[1771] Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 462 (1886).

[1772] Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883). See also Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 212 (1885); Philadelphia & S. Mail Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 338 (1887); Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479, 481 (1873).

[1773] Cox v. Lott (State Tonnage Tax Cases), 12 Wall. 204, 217 (1871).

[1774] Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 45 (1849).

[1775] Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).

[1776] Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet 185, 209 (1837).

[1777] Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938).

[1778] Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution--A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale Law Journal, 685, 691 (1925).

[1779] Article IX.

[1780] Article VI.

[1781] 14 Pet. 540 (1840).

[1782] Ibid. 570, 571, 572.

[1783] 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893). See also Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244 (1900); also reference in next note, at pp. 761-762.

[1784] See Leslie W. Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent, 36 Virginia Law Review, 753 (October, 1950).

[1785] Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution--A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale Law Journal, 685, 735 (1925); Frederick L. Zimmerman and Mitchell Wendell, Interstate Compacts Since 1925 (1951), 8 Book of States, 26 (1950-1951).

[1786] 48 Stat. 909 (1934).

[1787] 8 Book of the States, 45 (1950-1951).

[1788] 7 U.S.C. Sec. 515; 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717j; 16 U.S.C. Sec. 552, 667a; 33 U.S.C. Sec. 11, 567-567b.

[1789] Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 85 (1823).

[1790] Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).

[1791] Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39 (1871).

[1792] Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 173 (1894).

[1793] James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). See also Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 315 (1934).

[1794] 332 U.S. 631 (1948).

[1795] On the activities of the Board, in which representatives of both races participate and from which both races have benefited, see Remarks of Hon. Spessard L. Holland of Florida. Cong. Rec., 81st Cong., 2d sess., v. 96, p. 465-470.

[1796] Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 433 (1856).

[1797] St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562 (1896).

[1798] Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185, 209 (1837); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 725 (1838).

[1799] Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104, 106 (1938).

[1800] Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 13 (1823); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918). See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 566 (1852); Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260 (1922).

[1801] Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918).

[1802] Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). The case stemmed from mandamus proceedings brought to compel the auditor of West Virginia to pay out money to a commission which had been created by a compact between West Virginia and other States to control pollution of the Ohio River. The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denying mandamus was reversed by the Supreme Court, and the case remanded. The opinion of the Court, by Justice Frankfurter, reviews and revises the West Virginia Court's interpretation of the State constitution, thereby opening up, temporarily at least, a new field of power for judicial review. Justice Reed, challenging this extension of judicial review, thought the issue determined by the Supremacy Clause. Justice Jackson urged that the compact power was "inherent in sovereignty" and hence was limited only by the requirement of congressional consent. Justice Black concurred in the result without opinion.

ARTICLE II

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The President: Page Clause 1. Powers and term of the President 377 Nature and scope of Presidential power 377 Contemporary source of the Presidency 377 Presidency in the federal convention 378 Executive power; Hamilton's contribution 378 Myers case 379 Curtiss-Wright case 380 Theory of the Presidential office 380 Term of four years 382 Anti-third term tradition 382 Clauses 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Election, qualifications, succession, compensation, and oath of the President 383 Maintenance of the office of President 384 "Electoral college" 384 Constitutional status of electors 385 "Natural-born citizen" 386 Presidential succession 387 Act of 1792 387 Acts of 1886 and 1947 388 Compensation and emoluments 388 Oath of office 388 Effect of the oath 389 Section 2. Powers and duties of the President 389 Clause 1. Commander in chiefship; opinions from heads of departments; pardons 389 Commander in chiefship 389 Historical 389 Prize cases 390 Impact of the Prize cases on World Wars I and II 391 Presidential theory of the commander in chiefship in World War II 392 Presidential war agencies 393 Constitutional status of Presidential agencies 394 West Coast Japanese 394 Act of March 21, 1942 395 Presidential government of labor relations 395 "Sanctions" 397 Constitutional basis of sanctions 397 Martial law and constitutional limitations 398 Martial law in Hawaii 400 Case of the Nazi saboteurs 401 War crimes cases 402 President as commander of the forces 403 Commander in chief a civilian officer 404 Presidential advisers 405 The Cabinet 405 Pardons and reprieves 406 Legal nature of a pardon 406 Qualification of above theory 407 Scope of the power 408 "Offenses against the United States"; contempt of court 408 Effects of a pardon: Ex parte Garland 409 Limits to the efficacy of a pardon 410 Congress and Amnesty 411 Clauses 2 and 3. Treaties and appointment of officers 412 Treaty-making power 412 President and Senate 412 Negotiation a Presidential monopoly 412 Treaties as law of the land 413 Origin of the conception 414 Treaty rights versus State power 415 Recent cases 417 When is a treaty self-executing; when not 417 Constitutional freedom of Congress with respect to treaties 418 Treaty-making power and revenue laws 419 Congressional repeal of treaties 420 Treaties versus prior acts of Congress 421 Interpretation and termination of treaties as international compacts 423 Termination of treaties by notice 423 Determination whether a treaty has lapsed 425 Status of a treaty a political question 426 Treaties and the "necessary and proper" clause 426 Constitutional limits of the treaty-making power: Missouri v. Holland 428 Indian treaties 431 Present status of Indian treaties 432 International Agreements without Senate approval 433 Routine executive agreements 433 Law-making executive agreements 434 President McKinley's contribution 435 Executive agreements affecting Far Eastern Relations 436 International obligation of executive agreements 436 Litvinov agreement of 1933 437 United States v. Belmont 437 United States v. Pink; National supremacy 438 Hull-Lothian agreement, 1940 439 War-time agreements 440 Executive agreements by authorization of Congress 441 Reciprocal trade agreements 441 Constitutionality of trade agreements 442 Lend-Lease Act 443 President plus Congress versus Senate 443 Arbitration agreements 444 Agreements under the United Nations Charter 444 United Nations Participation Act 445 Executive establishment 445 "Office" 445 "Ambassadors and other public ministers" 445 Presidential diplomatic agents 447 Congressional regulation of offices 449 Conduct in office 450 The loyalty issue 451 Legislation increasing duties of an officer 452 "Inferior officers"; "employees" 452 Stages of appointment process 453 Nomination 453 Senate approval 453 When Senate consent is complete 453 Commissioning the officer 454 Recess appointments 455 Ad interim designations 455 Removal power; Myers case 455 "Nature of the office" concept 458 Humphrey case 458 Other phases of the removal power 459 Presidential aegis 460 Section 3. Legislative, diplomatic, and law enforcement duties of the President 462 Legislative role of the President 462 Right of Reception 463 Scope of the power 463 A Presidential monopoly 464 "The Logan Act" 464 A formal or a formative power 465 President's diplomatic role 465 Jefferson's real position 466 Power of recognition 467 The case of Cuba 468 Power of nonrecognition 469 President and Congress 470 Congressional implementation of Presidential policies 471 Doctrine of political questions 471 Recent statements of the doctrine 473 The President as law enforcer 475 Types of executive power 475 How the President's own powers are exercised 476 Power and duty of the President in relation to subordinate executive officers 478 Administrative Decentralization v. Jacksonian Centralism 478 Congressional Power v. Presidential Duty to the Law 479 Myers Case v. Humphrey Case 480 Power of the President to guide enforcement of the penal law 481 President as law interpreter 481 Military power in law enforcement: the posse comitatus 482 Suspension of Habeas Corpus by President 484 Preventive martial law 484 Debs case 484 Status of the Debs case, today 485 President's duty in cases of domestic violence 486 President as executive of the law of nations 486 Protection of American rights of person and property abroad 487 Presidential world policing 488 The Atlantic Pact 488 Presidential action in the domain of Congress: Steel Seizure Case 489 Presidential immunity from judicial direction 499 President's subordinates and the courts 500 Section 4. Impeachment 501 Impeachment 501 "Civil" officer 501 "High crimes and misdemeanors" 502 Chase impeachment 502 Johnson impeachment 503 Later impeachments 503

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Article II

Section 1: The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

The Nature and Scope of Presidential Power

CONTEMPORARY SOURCE OF THE PRESIDENCY

The immediate source of article II was the New York constitution of 1777,[1] of which the relevant provisions are the following: "Art. XVIII. * * * The governor * * * shall by virtue of his office, be general and commander in chief of all the militia, and admiral of the navy of this state; * * * he shall have power to convene the assembly and senate on extraordinary occasions; to prorogue them from time to time, provided such prorogations shall not exceed sixty days in the space of any one year; and, at his discretion, to grant reprieves and pardons to persons convicted of crimes, other than treason and murder, in which he may suspend the execution of the sentence, until it shall be reported to the legislature at their subsequent meeting; and they shall either pardon or direct the execution of the criminal, or grant a further reprieve.

"Art. XIX. * * * It shall be the duty of the governor to inform the legislature at every session of the condition of the State so far as may concern his department; to recommend such matters to their consideration as shall appear to him to concern its good government, welfare, and prosperity; to correspond with the Continental Congress and other States; to transact all necessary business with the officers of government, civil and military; to take care that the laws are executed to the best of his ability; and to expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by the legislature.

"To these, of course, are to be added the important powers of qualified appointment and qualified veto. It is to be observed also that there is no question of the interposition of the law of the land to regulate these powers. They are the governor's, by direct grant of the people, and his alone. Another distinguishing characteristic, equally important, is the fact that the governor was to be chosen by a constitutionally defined electorate, not by the legislature. He was also to have a three-year term, and there were to be no limitations on his re-eligibility to office. In short, all the isolated principles of executive strength in other constitutions were here brought into a new whole. Alone they were of slight importance; gathered together they gain new meaning. And, in addition, we have new elements of strength utilized for the first time on the American continent."[2] The appellation "President" appears to have been suggested to the Federal Convention by Charles Pinckney,[3] to whom it may have been suggested by the title at that date of the chief magistrate of Delaware.

THE PRESIDENCY IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

The relevant clause in the Report from the Committee of Detail of August 6, 1787 to the Federal Convention read as follows: "The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His stile shall be 'The President of the United States of America'; and his title shall be 'His Excellency.'"[4] This language recorded the decision of the Convention, sitting in committee of the whole, that the national executive power should be vested in a single person, not a body. For the rest, it is a simple designation of office. The final form of the clause came from the Committee of Style,[5] and was never separately acted on by the Convention.

"EXECUTIVE POWER"; HAMILTON'S CONTRIBUTION

Is this term a summary description merely of the powers which are granted in more specific terms in succeeding provisions of article II, or is it also a grant of powers; and if the latter, what powers specifically does it comprise? In the debate on the location of the removal power in the House of Representatives in 1789[6] Madison and others urged that this was "in its nature" an "executive power";[7] and their view prevailed so far as executive officers appointed without stated term by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, were concerned. Four years later Hamilton, in defending President Washington's course in issuing a Proclamation of Impartiality upon the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain, developed the following argument: "The second article of the Constitution of the United States, section first, establishes this general proposition, that 'the Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.' The same article, in a succeeding section, proceeds to delineate particular cases of executive power. It declares, among other things, that the president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; that he shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties; that it shall be his duty to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It would not consist with the rules of sound construction, to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or limitations; as in regard to the co-operation of the senate in the appointment of officers, and the making of treaties; which are plainly qualifications of the general executive powers of appointing officers and making treaties. The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive authority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would render it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was designed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The different mode of expression employed in the constitution, in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm this inference. In the article which gives the legislative powers of the government, the expressions are, 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States.' In that which grants the executive power, the expressions are, 'The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.' The enumeration ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution, and with the principles of free government. The general doctrine of our Constitution then is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which are expressed in the instrument."[8]

THE MYERS CASE

These enlarged conceptions of the executive power clause have been ratified by the Supreme Court within recent times. In the Myers case,[9] decided in 1926, not only was Madison's contention as to the location of the removal power adopted, and indeed extended, but Hamilton's general theory as to the proper mode of construing the clause was unqualifiedly endorsed. Said Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court: "The executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed, * * *"[10]

THE CURTISS-WRIGHT CASE

Ten years later Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation,[11] joined Hamilton's conception of the President's role in the foreign relations field to the conception that in this field the National Government is not one of enumerated but of inherent powers;[12] and the practical conclusion he drew was that the constitutional objection to delegation of legislative power does not apply to a delegation by Congress to the President of its "cognate" powers in this field; that, in short, the merged powers of the two departments may be put at the President's disposal whenever Congress so desires.[13]

Nor is it alone in the field of foreign relations that the opening clause of article II has promoted latitudinarian conceptions of Presidential power. Especially has his role as "Commander in Chief in wartime" drawn nourishment from the same source, in recent years. The matter is treated in later pages.[14]

THEORY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE

The looseness of the grants of power to the President has been more than once the subject of animadversion.[15] This and the unity of the office furnished a text for opponents of the Constitution while its ratification was pending. "Here," according to Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, "the writers against the Constitution, seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation."[16] Once the Constitution was adopted, however, the tables were turned, and some members of the first Congress, including certain former members of the Federal Convention, sought to elaborate the monarchical aspects of the office. They would fain give him a title, His Excellency (already applied in several States to the governors thereof), Highness, Elective Majesty, being suggestions. Ellsworth of Connecticut wished to see his name or place inserted in the enacting clause of statutes. They contrived to make a ceremony of the President's appearances before Congress, his annual address to which, given in person, was answered by a reply equally formal.[17] They sought to enact that "all writs and processes, issuing out of the Supreme or circuit courts shall be in the name of the President of the United States." Although the attempt failed, owing to opposition in the House, the idea was adopted by the Supreme Court itself in its first term, that of February 1790, when it "ordered, That (unless, and until, it shall be otherwise provided by law) all process of this court shall be in the name of 'the President of the United States,'"[18] and it has never been otherwise provided by law. Meantime, on October 3, 1789, President Washington had, at the request of a joint committee of "both Houses of Congress," issued the first Thanksgiving Proclamation.[19]

The "revolution of 1800" was, in the opinion of its principal author, a revolution against monarchical tendencies, and making a virtue of the fact that he was a bad public speaker, Jefferson, in a symbolic gesture, substituted the written message for the presidential address. But the claims of the presidential office to power Jefferson in no wise abated,[20] although Marshall had predicted that he would;[21] to the contrary he in some respects enlarged upon them. After his day, however, the office passed into temporary eclipse behind its own creature, the Cabinet,[22] an ignominy from which Andrew Jackson rescued it. As "the People's Choice," as all by himself "one of the three equal departments of government,"[23] as the leader of his party, as the embodiment of the unity of the country,[24] Jackson stamped upon the Presidency the outstanding features of its final character, thereby reviving, in the opinion of Henry Jones Ford, "the oldest political institution of the race, the elective Kingship."[25] The modern theory of Presidential power was the contribution primarily of Alexander Hamilton; the modern conception of the Presidential office was the contribution primarily of Andrew Jackson and his times.

"THE TERM OF FOUR YEARS"

Formerly the term of four years during which the President "shall hold office" was reckoned from March 4 of the alternate odd years beginning with 1789. This came about from the circumstance that under the act of September 13, 1788, of "the Old Congress," the first Wednesday in March, which was March 4, 1789, was fixed as the time for commencing proceedings under the said Constitution. Although as a matter of fact Washington was not inaugurated until April 30 of that year, by an act approved March 1, 1792, it was provided that the presidential term should be reckoned from the fourth day of March next succeeding the date of election. And so things stood until the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment by which the terms of the President and Vice President end at noon on the 20th of January.[26]

THE ANTI-THIRD TERM TRADITION

The prevailing sentiment of the Philadelphia Convention favored the indefinite eligibility of the President. It was Jefferson who raised the objection that indefinite eligibility would in fact be for life and degenerate into an inheritance. Prior to 1940 the idea that no President should hold for more than two terms was generally thought to be a fixed tradition, although some quibbles had been raised as to the meaning of the word "term". President Franklin D. Roosevelt's violation of the tradition led to the proposal by Congress on March 24, 1947, of an amendment to the Constitution to rescue the tradition by embodying it in the Constitutional Document. The proposal became a part of the Constitution on February 27, 1951, in consequence of its adoption by the necessary thirty-sixth State, which was Minnesota. See pp. 54, 1236.[Transcriber's Note: Page 1236 is blank.][27]

Clause 2. Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

Clause 3. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.

Clause 4. The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

Clause 5. No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

Clause 6. In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

Clause 7. The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Clause 8. Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:--"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Maintenance of the Office of President

"THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE"

The word "appoint" is used in clause 2 "as conveying the broadest power of determination."[28] This power has been used. "Therefore, on reference to contemporaneous and subsequent action under the clause, we should expect to find, as we do, that various modes of choosing the electors were pursued, as, by the legislature itself on joint ballot; by the legislature through a concurrent vote of the two houses; by vote of the people for a general ticket; by vote of the people in districts; by choice partly by the people voting in districts and partly by legislature; by choice by the legislature from candidates voted for by the people in districts; and in other ways, as, notably, by North Carolina in 1792, and Tennessee in 1796 and 1800. No question was raised as to the power of the State to appoint, in any mode its legislature saw fit to adopt, and none that a single method, applicable without exception, must be pursued in the absence of an amendment to the Constitution. The district system was largely considered the most equitable, and Madison wrote that it was that system which was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, although it was soon seen that its adoption by some States might place them at a disadvantage by a division of their strength, and that a uniform rule was preferable."[29] In the Federal Convention James Wilson had proposed that the Electors be "taken by lot from the national Legislature," but the suggestion failed to come to a vote.[30]

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ELECTORS

Dealing with the question of the constitutional status of the Electors, the Court said in 1890: "The sole function of the presidential electors is to cast, certify and transmit the vote of the State for President and Vice President of the nation. Although the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the State legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the States when acting as electors of representatives in Congress. * * * In accord with the provisions of the Constitution, Congress has determined the time as of which the number of electors shall be ascertained, and the days on which they shall be appointed and shall meet and vote in the States, and on which their votes shall be counted in Congress; has provided for the filling by each State, in such manner as its legislature may prescribe, of vacancies in its college of electors; and has regulated the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes to the seat of the national government, and the course of proceeding in their opening and counting them."[31] The truth of the matter is that the Electors are not "officers" at all, by the usual tests of office.[32] They have neither tenure nor salary, and having performed their single function they cease to exist as Electors. This function is, moreover, "a federal function,"[33] their capacity to perform which results from no power which was originally resident in the States, but springs directly from the Constitution of the United States.[34] In the face, therefore, of the proposition that Electors are State officers, the Court has upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a Presidential Elector;[35] and more recently its power to protect the choice of Electors from fraud or corruption.[36] "'If this government,' said the Court, 'is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption. If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption.'"[37] The conception of Electors as State officers is still, nevertheless, of some importance, as was shown in the recent case of Ray v. Blair,[38] which is dealt with in connection with Amendment XII.[39]

"NATURAL-BORN" CITIZEN

Clause 3 of this section, while requiring that the Electors each vote for two persons, did not require them to distinguish their choices for President and Vice President, the assumption being that the Vice President would be the runner-up of the successful candidate for President. As a result of this arrangement the election of 1800 produced a dangerous tie between Jefferson and Burr, the candidates of the Republican-Democrat Party for President and Vice President respectively. Amendment XII, which was adopted in 1803 and replaces clause 3, makes a recurrence of the 1800 contretemps impossible. See pp. 941-942. Clause 4 testifies still further to the national character of Presidential Electors. Clause 5 is today chiefly of historical interest, all Presidents since, and including Martin Van Buren, except his immediate successor, William Henry Harrison, having been born in the United States subsequently to the Declaration of Independence. The question, however, has been frequently mooted, whether a child born abroad of American parents is "a natural-born citizen" in the sense of this clause. The answer depends upon whether the definition of "citizens of the United States" in section I of Amendment XIV is to be given an exclusive or inclusive interpretation. See pp. 963-964.

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

Was it the thought of the Constitution that a Vice President, in succeeding to "the powers and duties" of the office of President, should succeed also to the title? In answering this question in the affirmative in 1841, John Tyler established a precedent which has been followed ever since; but inasmuch as all successions have taken place in consequence of the death in office of a President, the precedent would not necessarily hold in the case of a succession on account of the temporary inability of the incumbent President. Nor has any procedure been established for determining the question of inability, with the result that in the two instances of disability which have occurred, those of Presidents Garfield and Wilson, the former continued in office until his death and the other, after his partial recovery, till the end of his term.

The Act of 1792

In pursuance of its power to provide for the disappearance, whether permanently or temporarily, from the scene of both President and Vice President, Congress has passed three Presidential Succession Acts. A law enacted March 1, 1792[40] provided for the succession first of the President pro tempore of the Senate and then of the Speaker; but in the event that both of these offices were vacant, then the Secretary of State was to inform the executive of each State of the fact and at the same time give public notice that Electors will be appointed in each State to elect a President and Vice President, unless the regular time of such election was so near at hand as to render the step unnecessary. It is unlikely that Congress ever passed a more ill-considered law. As Madison pointed out at the time, it violated the principle of the Separation of Powers and flouted the probability that neither the President pro tempore nor the Speaker is an "officer" in the sense of this paragraph of the Constitution. It thus contemplated the possibility of there being nobody to exercise the powers of the President for an indefinite period, and at the same time set at naught, by the provision made for an interim presidential election, the synchrony evidently contemplated by the Constitution in the choice of a President with a new House of Representatives and a new one-third of the Senate. Yet this inadequate enactment remained on the statute book for nearly one hundred years, becoming all the time more and more unworkable from obsolescence. One provision of it, moreover, still survives, that which ordains that the only evidence of refusal to accept, or of resignation from the office of President or Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing declaring the same and subscribed by the person refusing to accept, or resigning, as the case may be, and delivered into the office of the Secretary of State.[41]

The Acts of 1886 and 1947

By the Presidential Succession Act of January 19, 1886,[42] recently repealed, Congress provided that, in case of the disqualification of both President and Vice President, the Secretary of State should act as President provided he possessed the qualifications laid down in clause 5, above; if not, then the Secretary of the Treasury, etc. The act apparently assumed that while a member of the Cabinet acted as President he would retain his Cabinet post. The Succession Act now in force was urged by President Truman, who argued that it was "undemocratic" for a Vice President who had succeeded to the Presidency to be able to appoint his own successor. By the act of July 18, 1947[43] the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate are put ahead of the members of the Cabinet in the order of succession, but when either succeeds he must resign both his post and his seat in Congress; and a member of the Cabinet must in the like situation resign his Cabinet post. The new act also implements Amendment XX by providing for vacancies due to failure to qualify of both a newly elected President and Vice President.

COMPENSATION AND EMOLUMENTS

Clause 7 may be advantageously considered in the light of what has been determined as to the application of the parallel provision regarding judicial salaries. See pp. 530-531.[44]

OATH OF OFFICE

What is the time relationship between a President's assumption of office and his taking the oath? Apparently the former comes first. This answer seems to be required by the language of the clause itself, and is further supported by the fact that, while the act of March 1, 1792 assumes that Washington became President March 4, 1789, he did not take the oath till April 30th. Also, in the parallel case of the coronation oath of the British Monarch, its taking has been at times postponed for years after the heir's succession.

Effect of the Oath

Does the oath add anything to the President's powers? Again to judge from its English-British antecedent, its informing purpose is to restrain rather than to aggrandize power. Jackson, it is true, appealed to the oath in his Bank Veto Message of July 10, 1832; and Lincoln did so in his Message of July 4, 1861; as did Johnson's counsel in his impeachment trial; but in each of these instances the Presidential exercise of power involved rested primarily on other grounds.

Section 2. Clause 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

The Commander in Chiefship

HISTORICAL