World Wide Soviet Plots

Front matter

World Wide Soviet Plots

BY N. MITAREVSKY

As disclosed by hitherto unpublished documents seized at the U. S. S. R. Embassy in Peking.

Chapter 1

In examining the documents seized at the office of the Military Attaché of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in Peking, the Commission that had been formed to this purpose was struck by the extraordinary secrecy with which things were being done by the agents and the offices of that Power.

If instead of the records of the Military Attaché of the U.S.S.R. the Chinese police had obtained possession of documents of any other country covering a period of two and a half years, it would of course have been very easy to identify the authors of the correspondence. Government offices of all countries usually have printed forms on which letters and reports are written, and when one office writes to the other the title of the office or the name of the person to whom the particular message is addressed is usually indicated. Finally, the documents are mostly signed, besides by the Chief of the issuing office, by one or several other officials who have taken part in the drafting of the document, e.g. the secretary, or the chief of some particular department or section. Such is the custom in most countries. Government offices never think of concealing their identity, but, on the contrary, strive by all means to impress upon the addressee that the particular document comes from them and has been signed by the competent authorities.

Secret correspondence is handled in the same way. It would certainly never occur to a Minister of Foreign Affairs who writes to an Ambassador to call the latter by a conventional or assumed name or to use such a signature instead of his own. Government offices have no need of concealing their identity, as it maybe presumed that they are not guilty of criminal actions. It is the contrary with the Soviet institutions: they do their utmost to conceal the offices which are dealing with each other.

The Commission which is examining the documents has not seen a single printed form. All correspondence was done on plain paper, and there are hardly any signatures.

Yet a circular exists among the records according to which some documents ought to have been written on printed forms. This circular reads as follows:

Circular.

To Comrade Pekarski, Peking,

In order to avoid possible misunderstandings the following rules are established for the correspondence of the Military Attaché with the Centre (i.e. Moscow):

1. All current reports, all inquiries addressed to the Revolutionary Military Council and to the Staff of the Revolutionary Workmen and Peasants’ Army and all correspondence of a legal character of the Military Attaché are forwarded through the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the usual manner to the address of the IV-th Section of the office of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R.

2. All especially secret correspondence and inquiries which the Military Agent finds necessary to segregate from official correspondence of a routine nature must be handed over to the “Resident” who will forward it to us.

3. The correspondence in §1 shall be typed on official forms of the Military Attaché who signs such correspondence with his official signature.

As for the correspondence mentioned in §2, it shall be signed by a conventional name and typed on paper bearing no stamp of official evidence whatever.

With a Comrade’s greeting

(no signature).

(Note):–A copy has been given to Mr. Soulatsky.

As no messages whatever written on official forms have been found, it may be concluded that the whole of the correspondence of the Military Attaché was of an “especially secret” or “illegal” character.

On several documents some names appear typewritten, but no mention is made of the post the particular person is occupying. It has been found that these typed names are mostly assumed ones for individual persons as well as for offices. In one of the documents the Intelligence Department in Moscow writes to its agent in Peking:

Esteemed Comrade Palmin,

Since the 1st of October, 1925 the conventional names for our correspondence with you have been changed. We shall henceforth address our letters to you by the name of Pekman. This name you shall also use in your letters to us. Our letters will be signed Blinoff and by this name you must address your letters to us. But letters to us of the institutions of the Commissariat for foreign Affairs shall be addressed by the name of Sredneff.

With a Comrade’s greeting

A year later, on the 30th of September, 1926, the following instruction was sent to the same person:

Circular.

Esteemed Comrade Pekman,

Beginning with the 1st of October of this year the following new assumed names will be used in our correspondence with you:

1. Pekarski. To this name we shall address our letters to you, and you will employ it in your letters to us.

2. Vorontzoff. By this name we will sign our letters to you.

3. Volodin. To this name you shall address all mail matters to us through the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

With a Comrade’s greeting

(Signed) BLINOFF.

Alongside with such pseudonyms of offices there are also pseudonyms of individuals. Among the lists of persons who were working in the Soviet institutions the Commission has found some instances in which the pseudonyms and real names of these individuals were given side by side (a sample of such lists is given at the end of this pamphlet).

There are almost no documents bearing the address of the individuals to whom they were sent. Hardly ten per cent of the documents bear the inscription “To the Military Attaché.” Most of them are addressed simply “To Comrade Michael” (the assumed name of the agent of the Intelligence Department in Peking in his correspondence with Soviet institutions in China). All letters that were sent to the Military Attaché from Moscow in 1925 were addressed “To Comrade Sustchefsky,” but no such name has ever existed on the list of the Military Attaché’s office and the Attachés themselves have been repeatedly changed within that period. The ordinary form of a Soviet letter is as follows:

“To Comrade Soustchefsky, or Comrade Michael” “Dear Comrade”……

At the end of the letter appears: “with a Communist’s greeting”.

Beside it the assumed name “Yavorsky” or some other name is typed.

Reports are not signed at all; however in the left upper corner of the front-sheet the town, less often the person to whom the report is sent is marked.

In a word, contrary to other countries, the Soviet offices do their best to conceal the persons and offices which are doing the work. The impression gained from the records of the Military Attaché’s office is that one has to do not with a governmental institution, but with a gang of international crooks whose activity is criminal and who therefore strive by all means to conceal what each one is doing.

But in spite of all this secrecy the examined materials show sufficiently clearly which organisations and organs are directing the Communistic movement in China.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is directing the world revolution.

The Communistic movement throughout the whole world is directed by three motive powers: 1. The Council of the People’s Commissars, as the Government of the U.S.S.R., directs the Communistic movement in Soviet Russia; 2. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., as the organ that supervises and inspires the Council of the People’s Commissars, and 3. The Executive Committee of the Communist International, as the organ that directs the whole Communist movement outside of Russia.

Properly speaking the Executive Committee of the Communist International, being an organ composed of the Communist parties of all countries, ought to be the supreme organ which directs the movement in the whole world. But in reality it is not so.

Only in Russia have the Communists succeeded in getting the power into their hands. Having become the masters of the country, they have possessed themselves also of its huge resources. The position of the Russian Communist Party has therefore become much stronger than that of the Communist Parties of other countries. This circumstance has made the Communist International completely dependent on the Russian Communist Party and, as a consequence, the Executive Committee of the Communist International has fallen completely under the control of the Russian Communist Party.

Its Organs:

The Executive Committee of the Communist International and the Soviet Government.

It follows in effect that the Russian Communist Party directs the Communistic movement in foreign countries through the Executive Committee of the Communist International and rules over the immense Russian State through the Council of the People’s Commissars. It is evident that in consequence of this centralisation of the whole Communistic movement in the hands of one body the Central Committee of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R. employs extensively for the world-wide Communistic movement the resources and the organisations of the Soviet Government.

It is however very important to the Communist Party to conceal this participation of the Soviet government in the world-wide Communistic movement. Treaties with other countries are concluded by the government of the U.S.S.R. which, as the government of a friendly power, can not openly foment a revolution and a communist coup d’état in countries with which it has entered into treaty relations. Quite different is the situation of the Communist International: its activities are unrestricted as it represents the Communist parties of different countries and is struggling in each country separately, relying on the local Communist Party, which is free to receive help and support in its work from Communist parties of other countries. Therefore, when conflicts or misunderstandings arise in connection with propaganda and agitation in countries which were so heedless as to recognise the Soviet Government and to open their doors to diplomatic and commercial representatives of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government, with its usual aplomb, declares that neither itself, nor its institutions can be held responsible for these facts. Neither can it be made responsible for the activity of the Communist International, because the latter is a completely separate and independent organisation.

The documents seized at the Military Attaché’s office clearly prove that the Communist International and the Soviet Government are practically one.

It appears from the documents that in its activity the third International uses the representatives of the Soviet Government in foreign countries. Moreover, it has been proved that in order to further the development of the revolutionary movement, the Soviet Government and the Executive Committee of the Communist International have created one common organisation which, on one hand, afforded to the representatives of the Soviet Government the use of the instruments of the Communist International, e.g. the Chinese Communist party, and, on the other hand, made it possible for the Communist International to avail itself of the right of extraterritoriality enjoyed by the diplomatical institutions of the Soviets and of the means and resources of the Soviet Government.

The following documents are a proof of the aforesaid.

I. The Executive Committee of the Communist International supplies the Military Attaché in China with funds for political work.

Comrade Yavorsky writes to Comrade Soustchefsky (i.e. to the Military Attaché) as follows:

Very secret.

To Comrade Souschefsky

Esteemed Comrade,

Your budget and your plan of supplying goods will be soon examined by the competent authorities. I shall inform you later of their decisions, and shall dwell now only on the points which have been put forth by the Commission:

1. The number of men projected in your budget has not been altered and even some reserve has been added.

2. The expenses for the party–and military–party work have been excluded, as they must be defrayed from the budget of the E.C.C.I. (Executive Committee of the Communist International).

3. The purely operative expenses have been curtailed: for the Peking Centre $17,330, for the Northern group $25,100, for the central group $22,400 and for Canton $25,700. For assisting the schools and formations at Canton $75,000 and in other places $34,000.

……

With a communist’s greeting

(Signed) YANOFSKY.

II. A supreme organ consisting of representatives of the Soviet Government and of the Chinese Communist Party has been created to direct the military-political work in China.

STATUTE OF THE PEKING MILITARY CENTRE.

In order to study the military-political situation and to direct our military work in China, the Peking Military Centre is instituted with the Military Attaché at its head.

The Peking Military Centre consists of:

1. The Military Attaché and his staff.

2. The Section for intelligence and information (Intelligence Department).

3. A representative of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

III. The organs of the Chinese Communist party apply directly for assistance to the Soviet Government.

The following is an extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Military Section of the Chinese Communist Party on the 3rd of March 1927 re the abortive insurrection at Shanghai.

Members present: Comrades Chou, Zvetkoff, Wên, Cherviak, Cheli, Arno and Molodoi.

The hearing: The report of Cho-En-Wai (in shorthand).

(The first 14 pages of the report contain the story of the first Shanghai strike. Then Zotikoff, Zvetkoff and Wên propose a series of measures for the organisation of a new armed insurrection in connection with the approach of the southern army towards Shanghai).

Wên says: “Now about arms. We Russian Comrades yesterday had a consultation. It was moved that Moscow should be requested to have at least 3,000 men armed. We request that arms should be sent for this number, but how to unload these arms is a very complicated question. This must be devised. Besides, if we obtain the money, something might be bought here”.

Thus the Military Section of the Chinese Communist Party asks the Soviet Government for arms.

The next document proves that the Soviet Government supplied the Chinese communist organisations with arms. The following passage is extracted from the report of one named Korde, a collaborator of the Military Attaché, on the quantity of munitions supplied up to the 10th of February 1926 to different revolutionary armies and organisations:

Statement of the quantity of arms and munitions supplied to the Peking Communist organisation.

Rifle cartridges: German: 500,000 Japanese: 1,000,000

The three above cited documents clearly show the connection which exists between the representatives of the Soviet institutions and the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.).

Being economically much less powerful than the Soviet Government, the Communist International extensively uses the means and the organisations of the Soviet Government. In the first document it is stated that the sums necessary for the political and military political work will be supplied from the budget of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Yet the Commission did not find among the examined estimates and accounts any documents showing that the particular sum had been received directly from the Communist International. All sums received by the Military Attaché came from one source–the Soviet Government. Moreover the Statute of the Peking Military Centre just cited shows that one of the members of this Centre was the representative of the military section of the Chinese Communist party, and from the payroll of the Military Attaché’s office it appears that the salary of this representative, as well as his office expenses, was paid by the Soviet Government.

It follows that, although according to Comrade Yanovsky’s letter the Communist International had its own budget for the expenses of the Military Attaché, all sums for the payment of these expenses were supplied from the chest of the Soviets.

The chief part in the creation of the revolutionary movement in China is played by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government being the stronger of the two, it is natural that it took a much greater part in the organisation of the Chinese Communist movement than the Communist International. This movement is latent in China. Its chief activity is carried out under the slogan of the Liberation of the Chinese people from its dependence on foreigners. A particular political party–the Kuomintang–has been created to this end. Communism and the Chinese Communist party, which are not popular with the mass of the Chinese people, are concealed under the flag of the Kuomintang and strive to occupy a predominant position in that party as well as among its troops.

In this connection the Soviet Government organises in China a network of its institutions which must direct the whole revolutionary movement of the Kuomintang and assist the Chinese Communist party to obtain a predominant position in the party and among the troops.

Having created such a huge organisation the Soviet Government is anxious to have it controlled directly from Moscow. It has therefore organised in Moscow a special organ composed of representatives of different departments which directs the activity of the Soviet organisations and the revolutionary and communistic movement in China in its entirety.

In the files of the Military Attaché a very interesting document on a meeting of a special “Commission for Chinese affairs” in Moscow has been found. It reads as follows:

Very Confidential.

Sitting of the Commission on Chinese Affairs,

August 4th, 1926.

Members present: Comrades Unschlicht, Chicherin, Bubnoff, Trilisser, Radek, Kopp, Solovyeff, Melnikoff …eizin, Longva, Ouzar and Gailis.

Subject discussed 1. News about the situation.

Resolution 1. Ad Notum.

Subject discussed 2. The problems of the People’s Army (Kuominchün).

Resolution 2. The Commission is of the opinion that the situation in China dictates the following basic military and political tasks to the People’s army.

to hold the province of Chahar.

to recommence negotiation with Mukden in order to have a respite and the possibility of taking up again the active struggle against Chihli, in particular against Yen Hsi-shan; at the same time to negotiate with wavering Generals of the group of Wu P’ei-fu.

Subject discussed 3. The relations between the People’s Army and Outer Mongolia.

Resolution 3. To decline positively Feng Yü-hsiang’s proposal to have an alliance concluded between the People’s Army and Outer Mongolia and to organise a support to the People’s Army in men and military supplies on the part of Outer Mongolia. Mongolia shall continue to assist the People’s Army in the same way as it has done so far (transit of supplies, etc.)

Subject discussed 4. The creation of a North-Western Bureau of the Kuomintang (A Revolutionary Committee).

Resolution 4. (a) (the greater part of the resolution has been burned, it ends with the words:) the controlling of the political work in the people’s armies and groups which are connected with them, however without limiting the independence and the rights of Fêng, as the Commander of the People’s Army.

To consider the formation of a North-Western Government as purposeless.

Subject discussed 6. The personnel.

Resolution 6. (a) To declare as expedient to have the number of our military and political workers with Fêng’s army increased to 25 men.

To instruct Comrades Petroff and Gailis to pick out 10-20 Chinese Comrades well-trained in political matters for political work in Fêng’s army.

Subject discussed 9. The so-called Northern Expedition.

Resolution 9. (a) To put off the question of the so-called Northern Expedition to the next sitting of the Commission, in view of the lack of sufficient information.

The Commission once more points out the danger of the help extended by Canton to Hunan becoming a great military operation and positively objects to the overstepping of the borders of Hunan by the Canton troops. The Commission insists that the troops should not be moved out of Kwangtung.

(Signed) The Chairman, UNSCHLICHT.

The Secretary, GAILIS.

Let us analyse this document.

The Commission on Chinese Affairs is an interdepartmental council, to which representatives of the Department of Public Safety, of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of War and a number of specialists, diplomats and military officials lately arrived from China and Japan have been invited.

This Commission rules over the fate of revolutionary China as a supreme power. The second paragraph of the minutes discusses the military operations of Fêng Yü-hsiang. It appears from some documents of the Military Attaché’s office that the question whether Fêng, after abandoning Peking, will be able to make a stand in Chahar or whether he should retreat to the western provinces of China, in order to spare his forces, had been discussed and worked out at the Military Centre in Peking. In the files a report was found entitled “Two alternatives of the further retreat of the armies of Fêng Yü-hsiang”, in which the possibility of fortifying the position of Fêng’s troops in Chahar was discussed in detail. However neither the Soviet Military Attaché nor Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang decided this question. The decision came from Moscow: “Fêng shall remain in Chahar”.

Not less interesting are §§ 3 and 4. The third paragraph treats of the relations between Outer Mongolia and Fêng, and without consulting the government of the so-called “independent” state of Mongolia, the Soviet Government decides for that government to refuse an alliance with Fêng and any increased assistance to him.

In § 4 Fêng humbly asks the permission of the Soviet Government to form a separate North-Western Government and the Moscow Commission refuses to grant it.

Is it possible after this to speak of the independence of Fêng from Moscow? No better is the situation with respect to Canton, to which § 9 is dedicated. Here too the Soviet Government interferes with the question as to whether the Canton Government can start an expedition against Hankow and, having postponed this question till its next meeting, it categorically forbids Canton to withdraw its troops from the province of Kwangtung.

We should think that this single document would suffice to show the part played by the Soviet Government in the revolutionary movement in China.

After the perusal of the documents of the Military Attaché in Peking any pretence that the Soviet Government is not connected with the revolutionary movement in other countries must be dismissed as false. It is not the weaker Communist International, but precisely the Soviet Government which directs the work of creating a world revolution, availing itself for this purpose of the huge resources of Russia and of the governmental organisation which it has established.

Let us now consider what the Soviet Government is doing in China for the promotion of the world revolution.

Chapter 2

The Peking Military Centre.

At the head of all Soviet organisations in China stands, of course, the Ambassador (in the peculiar Bolshevik slang called “Polpred”–a contraction of the words “Politicheski Predstavitel”–Political Representative). His nearest collaborator in matters concerning the army and the revolutionizing of the latter is the Military Attaché.

Owing to the seizure of the documents of the Military Attaché’s office we know exactly how this very important branch was organised by the Soviet Ambassador.

As may be seen from the documents, the Military Attaché was not working singlehanded. A special Peking Military Centre had been formed which consisted of three organisations:

1. the Military Attaché and his staff;

2. the Intelligence Department; and

3. a representative of the Military Section of the Central Committed of the Chinese Communist Party.

Each of these organisations was subordinated to the Military Attaché as the head of the Peking Military Centre, but each of them had its own apparatus and enjoyed a certain freedom of action.

Both, the Military Attaché and the Intelligence Department, are organs of the Soviet Government. It is not so with the Military Section of the Central Committee which is an organ of the Chinese Communist Party and is under the Executive Committee of the Communist International. This Section was subordinated to the Military Attaché in order to afford to the latter the possibility of developing to a full extent his activity in the promotion of the revolutionary movement among the troops and of forming regular detachments of revolutionistic elements of the population.

On the other hand, the fact that an organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was included in an organisation of the U.S.S.R. made it possible for that organ to use the establishments and resources of the Soviet Government, an example of which has been given in the preceding chapter.

As to the relations between the Military Attaché and Intelligence Department, the latter is subordinated to the Military Attaché, but has its separate organisation and receives instructions directly from Moscow. The Statute of the Centre says in this regard:

In general the relations between the Military Attaché and the Chief of the Intelligence Department are the same as those between a Commander in Chief of a military district and the local Intelligence Department (the latter being subordinate in functional matters).

There is a large amount of correspondence in the files of the Military Attaché on the question of the subordination to him of the Resident of the Intelligence Department. In spite of repeated requests and complaints on the part of the Military Attaché, Moscow remained inflexible and reserved to the Resident his independence and his direct responsibility to Moscow. The special reasons for this appear from a letter of Comrade Yanofsky to Comrade Sustchefsky (i.e. to the Military Attaché).

You must not forget that the activity of the “Residency” applies not only to China, but also to regions beyond its frontier. Therefore the Residency has quite independent tasks to fulfil….

In fact, up to the end of November, 1926 the Peking Resident’s territory extended also over Korea, while that of the Military Attaché was limited to China. At the end of 1926 this condition was altered and in consequence of the alarming conditions in China and the general situation in the Far East, which was rather unfavourable for the Soviets, Moscow found it necessary to pay special attention to Manchuria and Korea and established a separate Residency for Manchuria and transferred Korea to the juridiction of the Residency in Japan. But even then the limits of the activity of the Military Attaché and of the Residency did not coincide, and with the difference in territory existed also a difference of their tasks.

According to the Statute, “the Intelligence Department executes, on one hand, the instructions issued from Moscow (especially with respect to the study of Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia) and, on the other hand, the instructions of the Military Attaché concerning our military activities in China.”

Thus a great part of the work of the Intelligence Department consists in the study of the possible seats of future military clashes, while the Military Attaché is concerned only with China and, as will be seen below, in military operations in China.

Each of the above mentioned organs has its separate apparatus. In the budget of the Military Attaché’s office are the specific items “apparatus of the Military Attaché,”apparatus of the Intelligence Departenmt” and “apparatus of the Military Section.” Each of them, has its own statute which will be quoted when their activities are treated.

The functions of the Military Attaché and of his apparatus are defined in the statute of the Military Centre as follows:

The Military Attaché controls all our military work in China. The duty of his staff is:

1. to study our military work in China and to work out plans regarding it.

2. to record the work done, to direct it and to exchange (?) suggestions drawn from experience.

3. to consider questions relating to the supplying of arms, and

4. to consider questions relating to the personnel.

Apropos of this statute it may be noted that the great number of non-Russians in the Soviet institutions produced a bad effect on the style of the Soviet documents. The greater part of them are written in very bad Russian and some sentences are hardly intelligible. For instance in § 2 of the statute the words “to exchange suggestions, etc.” are enigmatic. With whom is the experience drawn from the work done to be exchanged? If it means that the Soviet institutions must exchange their experience with each other then it would be superfluous to mention it in the statute. Evidently this “exchange” must be effected with someone else, i.e. the experience must be communicated to some other body and this body can only be the Chinese revolutionary army.

The organisation of revolutionary armies.

In fact the first and foremost task of the Military Attaché is the organisation of the armies of those generals and governments in China who were to carry out the revolutionary movement. This is quite natural, since from the summary of the activities of the Soviet Government in the first chapter it is evident that its principal object was the organisation of a revolutionary movement in China. Therefore the Military Attaché, following the instructions received from Moscow, pays the greatest attention to the organisation of the armed forces of the revolutionary groups.

There are many such groups in China, but the chief of them are the Canton government to which the socalled National-Revolutionary army (Kuomintang) belongs and the group formed by Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang, called the People’s Revolutionary Army (Kuominchün). The Military Attaché is working chiefly in these two groups.

In the opinion of the Soviet officers the Chinese army is very bad. Its commanding staff lacks instruction and the troops are badly equipped. In all their reports the officers state that in order to raise the efficiency of the army, its commanding staff, up to the highest grades, must first of all be instructed.

But the raising of standard of the revolutionary armies is not the only aim of the Soviet Government. It strives moreover to dominate or at least to exert an influence over the armies. To this end it was necessary, on the one hand, to acquire an influence over the high commanders, and on the other hand–to create in the lower ranks of the army a purely Communistic, or at least a left-Kuomintang political current. In the fulfilment of these two aims the work of the Peking Military Centre was directed.

The Means of the Soviet organs to penetrate into the Chinese revolutionary armies.