Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

Front matter

GEORGE BERKELEY. (1685-1753.) From an Engraving by T. Cooke.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

Editor's Preface

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

The bulk of the introductory matter requisite to an understanding of Berkeley's Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous has already been given in the Preface to his Principles of Human Knowledge (No. 48 of the Religion of Science Library), which is supposed to be in the hands of the reader, and to which he is referred. It remains for us in this place simply to supply a few general characterisations and to refer again to Berkeley's relations to Hume and to modern psychology.

Whitehall, Dean Berkeley's Residence in Rhode Island.

We also take advantage of this opportunity to reproduce two illustrations of Berkeley's Rhode Island home, which will impart a human interest to our work, and bring it nearer to our American readers. It was in Rhode Island that Alciphron was composed,—dialogues "better fitted than any in our language to enable the English reader to little realise the charm of Cicero and Plato. … In Rhode Island, Ber- keley was accustomed to study in an alcove among the rocks on that magnificent coast, in a region where he had exchanged the society of the philosophers and men of letters of London and Paris for a solitude occasionally broken by the unsophisticated missionaries of the New England plantations, who travelled great distances to converse with him."

Berkeley's Alcove, Hanging Rocks, Rhode Island. In this alcove parts of Alciphron are said to have been composed.

The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, which were first published in London, in 1713, have been styled by Professor Fraser "the gem of British metaphysical literature." He says: "Berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of Socratic dialogue rests, indeed, upon Alciphron, which surpasses the conversations between Hylas and Philonous in expression of individual character, and in general dramatic effect. Here the conversational form is adopted merely as a convenient way of treating the chief objections to the theory of Matter which is contained in the Principles of Human Knowledge. But the clearness of thought and language, the occasional coloring of fancy, and the glow of practical human sympathy and earnestness that pervade the subtle reasonings by which the fallacies of metaphysics are inexorably pursued through these discussions, place the following Dialogues almost alone in the modern metaphysical library. Among those who have employed the English language, except perhaps Hume and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art of uniting deep metaphysical thought and ingenious speculation with an easy, graceful, and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are increased when we recollect that this charming production of reason and imagination came from Ireland, at a time when that country was scarcely known in the world of letters and philosophy."

The contents of the three Dialogues, which are a popular presentation of the Principles, and were written in refutation of the objections that had been raised to the new doctrine of sensible as distinguished from absolute things, propounded in the earlier work, may be briefly summarised as follows:

The First Dialogue aims to show the repugnancy or contradictory nature of the philosophical dogma of the absolute existence of a material reality or world-in-itself, independent of a perceiving or conceiving mind; the argument being that under no circumstances can such a material world be perceived either immediately or mediately. The Second Dialogue seeks to show that the existence of this metaphysical, supersensible world of matter also can not be reached by inference, that is, cannot be demonstrated. The Third Dialogue is devoted to the refutation of objections; for example, that the new doctrine is skeptical; that, with absolute material substance, it also implicitly disproves the existence of absolute spiritual substance, that is to say, of the ego; etc., etc.

The last-named objection, the most important of all, was answered by Berkeley in a passage inserted in the third edition (see page 93 et seq.), considered by Professor Fraser the most remarkable in the Dialogues, but in our opinion one of the weakest, Professor Fraser says: "It is, by anticipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the objections to the reality and possibil- ity of Absolute or Unknown Matter, to the reality and possibility of the Ego or Self of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its ideas or successive states."

As a fact. Berkeley's system leads logically to the conclusion which he seeks to controvert in this passage. Hylas truly remarks: "Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in spiritual Substance than in material Substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the other." (Page 95.)

Berkeley answers: "How often must I repeat, that I know or am convinced of my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas," etc., p. 95.

Subjectively, the force of this answer depends entirely upon one's personal point of view. But the fact remains that both Hylas and Hume have been upheld by modern scientific psychology in their rejection of an ego-entity, and that Berkeley in his contention has not. Perhaps this is the only element lacking, to have made Berkeley's system a perfect spiritualistic theological monism. Nevertheless, its beauty and consistency reposed entirely on the arbitrary hypothesis of existence in God, on the intervention of a deus ex machina, and it stood in this respect on the same footing and met the same destiny, as Malebranche's Occasionalism and Leibnitz's Pre-established Harmony,

Thomas J. McCormack.

La Salle, Ill.

Epistle Dedicatory

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE

LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON,

MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

My Lord,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish your character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your sovereign, and the honours she has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any application from your lordship, but entirely to her majesty's own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged by the favour you have treated me with, to address these papers to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical Trea- tise could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of Philosophy.

I am, with the greatest respect, My Lord, Your lordship's most obedient and most humble servant, GEORGE BERKELEY.

Author's Preface

THE PREFACE.

THOUGH it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of nature and providence, that the end of speculation be Practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions; yet those who are most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of another mind. And, indeed, if we consider the pains that have been taken to perplex the plainest things—that distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the sciences; it will not seem strange that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the practical parts of life, or informing themselves in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge.

Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arises Scepticism and Paradoxės. It is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defec- tive. We spend our lives in doubting of those things which other men evidently know, and believing those things which they laugh at and despise.

In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches, it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities; and, if possible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them, together with their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in. Which with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of virtue.

This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning Principles of Human Knowledge, published in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and to place them in a new light. Which is the business of the following Dialogues.

In this treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader any knowledge of what was contained in the former, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar manner; especially because they carry with them a great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions of mankind.

If the principles which I here endeavour to propagate are admitted for true, the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence are, that Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intri- cate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense.

And, although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion to some that, when they have taken a circuit through so many refined and unvulgar notions, they should at last come to think like other men; yet, methinks, this return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wandered through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming home from a long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future.

As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels by reason, so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest that the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of Immortality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of thought—whatever may be the result of that loose, rambling way, not altogether improperly termed Free-thinking, by certain libertines in thought, who can no more endure the restraints of logic than those of religion or government.

It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so far as it tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless inquiries, it can affect only a few speculative persons; but, if by their speculations rightly placed, the study of morality and the law of nature were brought more into fashion among men of parts and genius, the discouragements that draw to Scepticism removed, the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the principles of Natural Religion reduced into regular systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected as those of some other sciences: there are grounds to think these effects would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the too much defaced sense of virtue in the world; but also, by showing that such parts of revelation as lie within the reach of human inquiry are most agreeable to right reason, would dispose all prudent, unprejudiced persons to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries which are above the comprehension of our faculties.

It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his censure of these Dialogues till he has read them through. Otherwise he may lay them aside, in a mistake of their design, or on account of difficulties or objections which he would find answered in the sequel. A treatise of this nature would require to be once read over coherently, in order to comprehend its design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading, this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain; especially if recourse be had to an Essay I wrote some years since upon Vision, and the Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge—wherein divers notions advanced in these Dialogues are farther pursued, or placed in different lights, and other points handled which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.