The Revolution in Brazil

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Introduction

The Revolution in Brazil by Agnes Stewart Waddell with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

INTRODUCTION

BRAZIL was a colony of Portugal from the date of its discovery in 1500 until 1822, when an independent monarchy was established under Dom Pedro, son of the King of Portugal, who ruled until 1831. He was succeeded by Dom Pedro II, who was overthrown by revolution in 1889. On February 24, 1891 a new constitution was proclaimed, establishing a republican and federal form of government, with a President elected for a four-year term. At present the United States of Brazil consists of twenty states and two federal districts. In 1926 an amendment was adopted prohibiting federal intervention in matters peculiar to the states, except to repel invasion, and to insure the integrity of the nation and respect for constitutional principles, such as a republican form of government, the autonomy of the municipalities, the right to vote and the non-re-eligibility of Presidents and Governors.

For a correct understanding of the problems confronting any government in Brazil several points must be made clear. Brazil is a country larger than the continental United States, excluding Alaska, and has a population of approximately 40,000,000. A glance at the map on page 491 reveals that over half this population is located in two main districts—around Pernambuco in the north, and around Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in the south. Of the remainder, all but 7 per cent are settled in the coastal belt, thus leaving an area of about 2,000,000 square miles in the interior inhabited by about 3,000,000 persons.

Five main products attracted settlers to Brazil and created prosperity. The southern area is by far the most prosperous section of the country. The excellent harbor facilities in Santos and Rio de Janeiro, the rich agricultural and cattle-raising lands of Minas Geraes, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul, and the industrial centers of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro form a very prosperous block. As can be seen from Table I, these six states, with the exception of Santa Catharina, are important contributors to the national treasury. Of these, São Paulo is by far the most important. While the Federal District, with the port and great city of Rio de Janeiro, contributes over 43 per cent of the funds in the national-treasury, it expends 48 per cent, or 5 per cent more than it contributes. On the other hand, São Paulo contributes 32.8 per cent and expends only 4.5 per cent in the state. The two next highest contributors, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco pay in 5.6 per cent and 3.2 per cent, and spend 3.1 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. While federal expenses and receipts roughly balance in the rest of the republic, the excess of receipts in São Paulo is the only sum available for the service of the foreign debt and similar expenses.

Of the eleven states along the coast north of Rio de Janeiro, only six contribute more to the national treasury than they draw from it. These are Espirito Santo, Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco and Pará. The remaining coast states, Parahyba, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará, Piauhy and Maranhão, and the three interior states, Goyaz, Matto Grosso and Amazonas, constitute a definite drain on the national treasury. This situation is summarized below:

TABLE I FEDERAL EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS BY STATES IN 1928 (In contos of réis—$120)

COMMUNICATIONS IN BRAZIL

Communication between the various parts of Brazil and even between adjoining states, except in the south, is difficult and slow. It is carried on largely and sometimes exclusively by water. From Rio de Janeiro there are road and railroad systems connecting with Victoria, the capital of Espirito Santo, to the north, with Bello Horizonte, the capital of Minas Geraes, to the northwest and with São Paulo to the west. From São Paulo railroads run as far west as the Paraguay River, the Bolivia-Brazil boundary, and south to the southern border of Rio Grande

do Sul, connecting with the Uruguayan railroad system. In the north, however, roads and railroads run for only a short distance into the interior from the principal ports along the coast. For the rest, all communication was by water or on horseback until the development of auto roads in recent years. These, while for the most part comparable only to the dirt roads of the rural United States, immensely improve the situation.

From the above conditions there arise:

1. The preponderance of the southern states, and especially São Paulo, in national affairs.

2. The dependence of the northeastern and interior states upon the prosperity of the south, and especially São Paulo.

3. The apathy of such states as Amazonas, Matto Grosso and Goyaz with regard to national affairs.

4. The difficulty and delay in extending any sort of aid, whether political or social, to the interior and far northern states.

The Political Organization of Brazil

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF BRAZIL

The student of Brazilian affairs must understand that the political system of Brazil cannot be comprehended in the terms of the American party system. Since its colonization, Brazil has been ruled by governments imposed from above. The majority of the people, illiterate and consequently uninterested, have no thought of choosing their state and national leaders. The Republic was the achievement of a thinking minority, and ever since its proclamation the country has been ruled by one party—the Republican. Monarchists exist, but have never presented candidates at any election.

Any opposition that appears is grouped about the personality of some candidate, and disappears after the election for which it was organized. Individual "outs" remain out, and the municipalities which may have joined the opposition return to the support of the party in power. There have been a few exceptions, but they have been considered anomalies.

One of the few contested presidential elections occurred in 1920. President-elect Rodrigues Alves was prevented by illness from taking office on November 15, 1918, and the Vice President-elect became ad interim President. He called a new election, according to Brazilian law, on the death of the President-elect in January 1919. A most popular Brazilian orator and writer, Ruy Barbosa, ran in opposition to Epitacio Pessoa, the candidate of the Republican party, but after his defeat the political organization set up by his supporters disappeared.

Lately a new group, the Democratic party, has been growing in opposition to the Republicans. It was organized by, and includes among its members, many advanced political thinkers and idealists, but it is largely composed of "outs." Its main strength is in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, although organizations have been created in almost every state of the Union. The organization of neither the Democratic nor the Republican party is national in the American sense. There is a Minas Republican party, a Rio Grande Republican party, a São Paulo Republican party, and so on through the states. In some states conventions with representation of the municipalities are held, by which an Executive Committee is elected to carry on the business of the party ad interim. Some of the state executive committees are practically self-perpetuating. Before a presidential election, the representatives of these state organizations choose the candidates. The initiative is generally taken by the leaders of the more important states; i. e., São Paulo, Minas Geraes and Rio Grande do Sul, and the other states are consulted as to their support. When a name is found that meets with the approval of a good majority of the states, the nomination is announced. The minority can then either fall in line or be left out. Generally the former is the case.

IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY IN BRAZILIAN POLITICS

This system is made possible by the essentially feudal condition of the greater part of Brazil. Starting with the family, Brazilian life is organized in a series of ever enlarged units looking for advice and protection to some one person whose decisions on political, legal and social matters are eagerly respected.

Materially and spiritually the family is a close-knit unit. Its members seldom settle far from their paternal home, and usually remain under the influence of the family chief. In a given neighborhood (vizinhança) these family groups looks for advice and protection to the head of the most powerful family; and among these, the most powerful or most respected chefe in the district, township or parish (freguezia) is chefe of the larger community. These relationships are purely personal and remain practically unchanged whatever political changes may take place in the upper structure of the state. The will of the chefe is law, in most cases because he is shrewd enough correctly to estimate and voice the general opinion of the community.

Among the local chefes there is generally a struggle for supremacy and the one who can secure the greatest support—whether because of wealth or political influence—governs the municipality or county, and, although he has no official federal standing, controls local affairs.

The post of municipal chefe, the lowest rung in the state political ladder, is subject to appointment by the political authorities of the party dominant in the state. Their recognition of a contestant carries with it the assistance of the police and all political patronage. If a municipal chefe not of the most strongly entrenched type offends his political superiors, it is generally easy to stir up a rival whose recognition by the Executive Committee is a complete punishment of the offense. By this method political discipline is maintained.

Advancement to greater political authority as agent or member of the Executive Committee depends on brains, heredity or wealth, and unflinching "regularity," and since in most cases there is only one organized party in the state, it controls all elections and appointments.

THE BRAZILIAN ELECTORATE

Suffrage in Brazil is limited to citizens who can read and write. This last qualification automatically eliminates some 75 per cent of the population, and of the remainder many prefer not to register rather than to put themselves in a position which only gives them trouble. The voter, after he has proved his qualifications, is given a certificate which must be presented at the polls on election day. In many places the chefe keeps the electoral certificates himself and gives them on election day only to those who he knows will vote as he wishes. The rest can be presented without much difficulty by others than their owners, and the death of a voter does not always prevent the presentation of his certificate at succeeding elections. Some local bosses hold no election and the election form sheets are returned filled in by the chefe or in blank for those better qualified to fill in as they see fit. As in many other countries, elections in Brazil, therefore, are rather one-sided and have been criticized of late.

Another point should be emphasized. The Republican party has no definite program, and therefore as each President or state Governor takes office, he is not held to any line of action. He may, but more often he does not, continue the policies of his predecessor, even in regard to half-finished public improvements, and he knows that when his term is finished his own policies probably will not be continued. This leads to irresponsibility in office, especially with regard to financial matters, and prevents the continuity of any policy of reform.

To this are added three differences from our system:

The President is elected by direct popular vote, thus magnifying the effect of local election frauds.

Nearly all appointed office-holders have a life guarantee of their posts, or a pension.

The Federal District is represented in Congress. As a result, the permanent employees have Congressional spokesmen and this, along with their control of social life in Rio de Janeiro, makes them very powerful.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION BEFORE THE 1930 ELECTION

The revolution of 1930 had its antecedents in the electoral campaign for that year. In 1929 President Washington Luis asked that no move be made to begin the presidential campaign until September, six months before the elections on March 1, 1930.

Several Roman Catholic associations, without waiting for the formal opening of the campaign, decided, however, to support the nomination of the Governor of Minas Geraes, Antonio Carlos de Andrade. His nomination was opposed by various state Governors. Believing that Washington Luis was dictating this opposition, Antonio Carlos looked around for another candidate, finally approaching Getulio Vargas, Governor of the powerful state of Rio Grande do Sul, who had been Minister of Finance for a short time under the Washington Luis administration.

In June 1929 Getulio Vargas wrote Washington Luis of his candidacy, apparently hoping to receive presidential support. But on July 25 the President replied that since seventeen states had agreed to support the candidacy of the Governor of São Paulo, Julio Prestes, he saw no reason for refusing to support this candidacy. While expressing surprise, Getulio Vargas agreed to accept any solution satisfactory to the Minas Republican party. On August 1, however, Governor Antonio Carlos stated that he could not accept the Prestes candidacy.

The opposition group now proceeded to organize the Alliança Liberal. This group, on August 2, 1929, announced a ticket consisting of Getulio Vargas for President and João Pessoa, Governor of the state of Parahyba, for Vice President. The following month, on September 12, the government ticket, headed by Julio Prestes and Vital Soares, was launched as a "guarantee of the continuation of policies which during the present four-year administration have contributed to the greatness and glory of Brazil…"

The Alliança Liberal

At its national convention in Rio on September 20, 1929, the Alliança Liberal was defined by Governor Antonio Carlos as not a party but an "alliance of parties." He issued an invitation to all who might wish to join. "Any party may become a member if it accepts the essential principles of the Constitution of February 24, [1891] if it accepts the present system of government and if it does not lean to a radical modification in substance and form of our institutions."

The following were the principal parties which joined the Alliance: the Minas, the Parahyba and the Rio Grande Republican parties; the Partido Libertador, a party in the state of Rio Grande do Sul heretofore in opposition to the Republican party; and the Democratic party of São Paulo. The Alliança also counted upon the support of opposition parties in other states.

There were, then, these three groups: the parties in power in Minas Geraes, Rio Grande do Sul and Parahyba; the opposition parties where any existed; and the "outs" throughout the whole country. Moreover, the Alliança Liberal platform made bids for the support of four other groups. First, by promising amnesty to the revolutionists of 1922 and 1924, their aid was assured. Second, a bid was made for Labor support. Third, the support of the Army was sought by one point of the platform, which provided for rehabilitation of the military service. Fourth, by promising to resume the irrigation projects in the northeast which Washington Luis had discontinued for reasons of economy, an effort was made to enlist the sympathies of that section.

In some important cases the parties united in the Alliança were sworn enemies under other circumstances, but in the great endeavor to elect a President all differences were forgotten. A striking example of this was the alliance of the two rival parties in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

The Platform of the Alliança Liberal

The platform of the Alliança Liberal, which later formed the basis of the program outlined by Getulio Vargas when he attained the Presidency, contained the following items: 1. A general amnesty to include all persons exiled for participation in the revolutions of 1922 and 1924.

2. The right of the people to select their own Chief Executive without interference from the President and politicians in power.

3. A recommendation in favor of the compulsory vote.

4. The necessity for a secret ballot and other methods of eliminating fraud, and the establishment of severe penalties for infractions.

5. That the Chief Executive of the nation be not allowed to accept the leadership of a political party.

6. That public instruction should be more widespread.

7. That hygiene should be carefully promoted.

8. That social legislation be studied and labor be allowed to organize in trade unions. "In the ten years that the International Bureau of Labor at Geneva has functioned, Brazil has spent about $290,000 in representation there. Nevertheless, of the thirty-one or thirty-two conventions approved by that body and to be presented to the Brazilian Congress for final approval, only six reached Congress and of these none was voted upon. We will study these conventions carefully in order to apply them to the necessities of Brazil…"

9. That federal justice be reorganized to insure less delay and to guarantee the independence of the magistrates.

10. That new statutes be drawn up for the governing of public officials, especially with a view to preventing nepotism.

In the realm of political economy the program promised:

11. Aid to agriculture, not only to coffee.

12. Cheap transportation, whether by road, railroad or water.

13. Protection to industries and other production in order to increase the favorable merchandise balance, "as it is estimated that the international balance of payments shows a deficit of at least one hundred million dollars annually."

14. Revision of the tariff downward, and its re-classification into three categories for the purpose of international commercial treaties.

15. To carry on the financial policy of the Washington Luis administration: stabilization of the currency, balancing of the budget, and increase of domestic production in an attempt to increase the surplus in the balance of trade.

16. Severe fiscalization of public expenditures, and absolute condemnation of secret bookkeeping practices.

17. Condemnation of indirect taxes, such as the consumption tax, as they weigh disproportionately on the needier classes.

18. That autonomy be granted the Federal District so that it may choose its own administrators.

19. That new equipment and units for the army and navy be purchased.

20. That the irrigation projects in the northeast be taken up again.

During the last two weeks of December 1929 the government majority refused to form a quorum in Congress, absenting itself from the sessions. The Alliança Liberal demanded a quorum to discuss the coming election and formally to lodge charges of interfering with state governments against the administration. On December 19, when there was no session due to no quorum, the Liberal deputies delivered their speeches from the steps of the government building. The following day Flores da Cunha, active in the opposition, stated publicly: "If the government goes to extremes, we shall have no alternative but to take up the sword."

Baptista Luzardo, Congressional representative from Rio Grande do Sul, who was sent through the northern states organizing the opposition, was frequently reported to have preached revolution rather than election. On January 2, at a luncheon given in Rio de Janeiro by the Alliança Liberal to its candidates, João Pessoa, candidate for Vice President said:

"No Brazilian should weaken … whatever the obstacles … not hesitating as a last resort to take up arms in defense of the rights and prerogatives of the nation."

In line with this violence of speech was the attempt made on the Vice President's life in Montes Claros, Minas Geraes.

The Elections of 1930

THE ELECTIONS OF 1930

Elections were held on March 1, 1930, but it was not until May 20, nearly two months after the electoral investigating boards had started their work, that Congress declared the Prestes-Soares ticket elected. The following figures show the vote as returned by the municipalities and as finally approved by the examining board:

Municipal | Approved

Julio Prestes | 1,113,617 | 1,089,949

Vital Soares | 1,101,397 | 1,077,398

Getulio Vargas | 778,874 | 735,032

João Pessoa | 755,731 | 725,561

Minas and Rio Grande furnished 82 per cent of the minority vote, with 307,000 and 300,000 votes respectively.

No one has ever claimed that Brazilian elections are free except to the parties controlling the polls in each state, and the 1930 election was no exception. Borges Medeiros, leader of the opposition in Rio Grande, when asked by a representative of A Noite, a Rio de Janeiro paper, what he thought of the results of the election, said:

"In accordance with last data we find that Dr. Julio Prestes has over a million votes and Dr. Getulio Vargas a little less than seven hundred thousand. We must therefore recognize frankly and loyally that Dr. Julio Prestes is elected. There may be and there are many votes to besubtracted from these totals in view of frauds which the electoral examining boards will find. These deductions, however, will be proportionate, as there were frauds in every state in the Union including our own. The electoral law, unfortunately, cannot prevent these things, and in view of our faulty civic education, there is no means of totally preventing such shameful practices."

When the reporter pointed out that in Rio Grande and many other states it was insistently reported that Rio Grande would not accept the solution presented and might even bring about a revolution, Borges Medeiros answered:

"I affirm that Rio Grande will keep order andpeace, faithful to its traditions of respect to the constituted powers. I absolutely do not see that it would remedy existing evils, if they do exist, to apply an even greater evil, such as a revolution"

Other opposition leaders, notably Getulio Vargas and Senator Paim Filho from Rio Grande, publicly expressed similar views. The majority, however, were dissatisfied with the elections. The fiery speaker Baptista Luzardo, five days after his return to Rio de Janeiro from the northern campaign, said:

"I declare so that everyone may hear, even those who do not wish to hear … That the revolution will take place. …"

FRAUD AND INTERVENTION CHARGED BY OPPOSITION

Meanwhile political fraud was charged in the seating of Congressional members from both Parahyba and Minas Geraes, and subsequently charges of "intervention" in the state of Parahyba were made against the federal government.

In Parahyba, after the electoral examining board (made up of two federal officials and one state representative) had finished its task, not a single opposition candidate was declared elected, despite the fact that the Vargas-Pessoa ticket had polled 26,000 votes as against 10,000 for the PrestesSoares ticket. In Minas the board did not have time to look into the election of delegates to the federal Congress. The delegates from that state were not officially recognized, therefore, and the question was thrown into Congress, in which the opposition was in a minority. As a result, although the opposition had polled 307,000 votes as against 46,000 votes for the government party in the presidential elections, it was given a representation of only twenty-three members as against fourteen for the government party.

A dramatic turn was given to these and other political events when on July 26 João Pessoa, Governor of the state of Parahyba, who had been the vice presidential candidate of the Alliança Liberal, was assassinated by a personal and political rival, João Dantas, formerly a deputy, who it was charged was supported by Washington Luis. First of all, the President refused João Pessoa permission to import arms and ammunition into his state to combat João Dantas, who was declared to be in rebellion. Subsequently it was charged that Washington Luis ordered federal troops to Parahyba over the protest of the governor, thus violating the constitutional guarantee of the state against intervention. After the governor's assassination it was regarded as significant that the rebels ceased their opposition and handed their arms over to the federal troops.

That sentiment against the Washington Luis government was growing was indicated by the fact that in one week in the House of Representatives the following speeches were made:

On July 24 Mauricio Lacerda, a member of the Democratic party, after protesting against a long list of acts of the federal government and of the police of São Paulo, concluded: "Revolution is not an idea. It is involved in economic factors and social injustices. The revolution is like a scientific fact—inevitable."

On July 28, in a speech deploring the assassination of João Pessoa, a representative from Rio Grande do Sul finished his speech as follows: "This is the dilemma of the nation: slavery or revolution."

On the following day Oswaldo Aranha, leader of Rio Grande bloc and later "civilian chief" of the revolution in Rio Grande, said: "…At this instant there isn't a single man in all of Rio Grande do Sul who can doubt the nature of the future which awaits us The hour is near when the people of Rio Grande will redeem itself of the insults with which the central power has sought to subjugate us"

THREE ACCUSATIONS MADE AGAINST WASHINGTON LUIS

In all, three important accusations were made against the President. First, it was charged that he desired to impose his successor upon the country and that it was this desire which led him to disregard the autonomy of the states of Parahyba and Minas Geraes and to inspire congressional action which refused to recognize all of the legal representatives from the former state and fourteen from the latter. These political charges were made dramatic by the assassination of João Pessoa, for which the President was also held responsible. Second, Washington Luis was charged with the failure to grant amnesty to the revolutionists of 1922 and 1924. Many observers also felt that one of the principal causes of the revolution was what was described as the desopotic, intolerant and stubborn attitude assumed by Washington Luis as head of the Republican party. Even friendly critics have declared that the revolution could have been avoided had the President followed the counsels of his political advisers and adopted a more compromising attitude in political matters.

Third, and perhaps most important, the President was charged with responsibility for the whole economic situation, which was caused mainly, it was alleged, by his policy with regard to coffee. Complaints were made that the state of São Paulo, the home of Washington Luis and the center of the coffee industry, had dominated the country to the neglect of other areas. Finally, financial maladministration and nepotism throughout the whole governmental structure were also denounced loudly, but responsibility for these was not laid directly at the door of Washington Luis.

The political charges have been treated already, and the economic situation, with special reference to coffee, will be dealt with in the section which follows.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE 1930 REVOLUTION

The factor which contributed most to the revolution was the widespread unrest brought about by the economic depression, which was aggravated by the habit of previous Brazilian administrations of spending large sums borrowed abroad without commensurate returns. Outstanding examples of these loans were the 1921 loan for the northeastern irrigation project and the 1922 loan for the partial electrification of the government-owned railroad (Central do Brazil) linking the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the proceeds of which were spent for other purposes. Furthermore, since Brazil has had to borrow abroad every year most of the gold necessary to meet its payments of interest and amortization, its federal foreign indebtedness alone has grown from about $215,000,000 in 1901 to $683,000,000 in 1930.

The Situation Confronting Washington Luis in 1926

President Washington Luis took office on November 15, 1926. At the end of that year, the national internal debt amounted to approximately $288,000,000. There was a total note circulation of $308,316,480 against a gold reserve of only $48,816,120, or a gold coverage of only 15.833 per cent. There also existed a floating debt of over $57,000,0000 for which no appropriations had been made.

Most important, however, was the federal foreign indebtedness, amounting at this time to approximately $700,000,000. In 1927 amortization payments, most of which had been suspended since 1898 by agreement, again fell due. There was also the state and municipal foreign indebtedness, which brought the total foreign debt to approximately $900,000,000. Assuming the average interest on these loans to be 6 1/2 per cent, the interest service alone would require an annual gold payment of $63,000,000. This, as well as dividends and other remittances on foreign capital invested in private enterprises in Brazil, both amounting to about $175,000,000 annually, could only be met internally by a favorable balance in Brazil's international trade. To meet the financial situation confronting him, Washington Luis attempted:

1. To stabilize the milréis by giving it a value more in accord with its quotation on the market in 1926, and by the creation of a stabilization fund.

2. To increase the gold reserve for the conversion of the note circulation.

3. To balance the budget with a surplus.

4. To consolidate the floating debt.

5. To increase the Brazilian export balance by "defending" coffee, which constitutes over 70 per cent of the country's total exports.

Stabilization

The currency law of 1923, suspending the government's power to issue treasury notes for ten years and transferring note issuance to the Bank of Brazil, did much to stabilize the milréis. The monetary reform law of December 18, 1926, and two supplementary laws of January 5, 1927, under Washington Luis, continued this policy. The monetary reform law proposed the stabilization of the milréis at about 12 cents, and created a stabilization bureau (Caixa de Estabilização), which was to insure convertibility of its notes into gold at the fixed rate of exchange pending a definite return to a gold standard.

The supplementary laws of 1927 authorized the Bank of Brazil to buy and sell foreign exchange to maintain the milréis at the fixed rate. The bank further was authorized to provide for the convertibility of both the treasury notes outstanding and its own notes at the fixed rate, pending the return to the treasury of the £10,000,000 stabilization fund turned over to the stabilization bureau in 1923. In the meantime, the treasury was to accumulate resources from actual gold reserves set aside according to law, budget surpluses, proceeds of credit operations and banking profits under the contract with the Bank of Brazil.