The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint)

Front matter

For Private Circulation.

THE NEW EUROPE.

(The Slav Standpoint.)

Foreword

FOREWORD.

T. G. M.

Washington, October, 1918.

Chapter I

I.—THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR.

1. The War a World War.

1. The most striking feature when you ponder upon the war is its worldwide extent. Literally, the entire world has now for four years borne the sufferings of a war caused by an attack upon Serbia by Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany. The entire world has been divided into two camps. Austria and Germany have with them merely Turkey, Bulgaria and the Papal Curia; all the other states are on the side of the Allies. Only some of the small States have remained neutral, and in them the majority of the people are on the side of the Allies. Thus practically all mankind has taken a stand against Germany and Austria. If the consensus gentium was once accepted as an argument for the existence of God, this consensus of mankind surely has as great a moral significance—vox populorum, vox Dei.

Statisticians tell us that the total of killed, wounded, prisoners and missing amounts to 25 millions; those that survive the horrors of the war, the millions of soldiers and their families, and therefore whole nations and all humanity, will reflect on the war and its causes; millions and millions are pondering at this moment, while I write this, upon the war and the situation of nations and of mankind, as I am doing. It is not possible that this gigantic sacrifice of lives, health and fortune should have been offered in vain; it is not possible that the present organisation of states and nations from which the war has sprung should remain unchanged, that the responsible statesmen, politicians, leaders of parties, individuals, the nations and all humanity should not comprehend the necessity of radical political reorganisation. The war and its significance have knitted mankind closer together; humanity is to-day an organised unit, internationalism is much more intimate than it ever was; it has been created and renewed by this war and at the same time democratic views of society are everywhere strengthened—the fall of Tzarism is but one of the unexpected results of the war.

The unified organisation of all the nations of the world, of all humanity is the beginning of a new era, an era in which nations and all mankind will consciously control their development.

2. The Pangerman Plan of World-Domination: Berlin–Bagdad.

2. The modern historian, it is claimed, should narrate the history of the future, and the modern statesman should foretell the development of events—foresight being the measure of scientific exactness. During the war I gathered the books of several authors who in the form of stories or political essays foretold the war; but all these so-called prophecies foretold what actually has come to pass very vaguely. In a similar way I, too, foresaw the war. Since the Russian Revolution of 1905 I reviewed my studies of Russia and endeavoured to lay hold of the problem of Russia in its significance for Europe. To what extent I have succeeded may be seen from my book on Russia. In connection with this work I endeavoured to grasp the Jugoslav and Balkan problems—it was over these problems that I expected that the war would come, although I expected it later than it actually came and not to be so gigantic. In the spring of 1914, before the Sarajevo assassinations, I took steps to conciliate the Serbians and Bulgars, because I feared the hostility of the Bulgars to Serbia in the future war. My mediation met with a good reception on the part of Serbia—the fact is an interesting proof that the responsible Serbian statesmen were ready for a reasonable compromise, as, for that matter, was demonstrated during the tension with Austria in the Balkan war. (I have in mind my mediation between Minister Pashich and Count Berchthold.)

My forevision, or rather expectation, of the war, was based on a careful observation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and on a study of the Pangerman movement and its historical and political literature.

Pangermanism means etymologically the unification of all Germans, or, in a wider sense, of all the Germanic races; in a similar way were used the terms Panslavism, Panscandinavianism, and some others. To-day Pangermanism is mainly a philosophy of history, the history of the German nation and of all mankind; it is an attempt, through a systematic study of the historical development and conditions of Germany and other lands, to determine the place of the German nation among the nations in their historical development. Under Pangermanism we also include the political effort and the resultant movement based on Pangerman theory.

The Great French Revolution, with the reaction and restoration following it, likewise the smaller revolutions which were the continuation of the Great Revolution, drew the attention of wide circles to the contrast and the conflict between the old and new régimes, and engendered the theories and experiments towards a better, and, as far as possible, permanent, organisation of states, nations, Europe and humanity; this period witnesses the rise of conscious socialism. Theoretically the period finds its expression in the new scientific historiography. Philosophy of history is cultivated by all nations; history, economics, and all social sciences flourish; sociology is crystallised as a resultant of all these specialised attempts and seeks to become the general science of human society and its development. Simultaneously the study of politics receives scientific treatment.

3. The Germans stood well in the forefront of this theoretical and practical movement; philosophy of history beginning with Herder, and with it history, become directly national departments; German philosophy after Kant is substantially historical (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc.). Socialism, and particularly Marxism, were distinctly historical with a fixed philosophy of history; evolutionism (Darwinism) strengthened this special historicism. The Germans excel also in all specialized social science, economics, and chiefly in the political science of the State and jurisprudence.

Not only social science but even natural science was devoted to the study of the conditions of the German nation. Biology, for instance, speculates as to the proper and cheap sustenance of the individual and the masses; chemistry serves the same purpose and aims at the improvement of the material basis of the entire national existence. On this broad scientific and philosophical foundation Pangermanism organised itself in recent days as the philosophical and political science of the German nation; Lagarde is its leading philosophical and theological representative; Treitschke is its historian, and Kaiser William is its statesman. A complete system, not only of theoretical but also of practical Pangermanism, has been organised—societies and associations, spreading the doctrine by the publication of treatises, maps, newspapers and reviews, pamphlets, etc.

I followed this movement carefully; I came into personal contact and correspondence with several prominent Pangermanists, with Constantine Frantz and Lagarde himself; acquaintance with the Pangerman movements and literature led me to expect this war. I wondered that the English and the French paid so little attention to Pangermanism; my own countrymen I warned by articles and lectures against the danger threatening us. I proposed to write a summary of Pangermanism and similar movements and tendencies in other nations, but the war got the start of me. During the war, having been deprived of my library and manuscripts, confiscated by the Austrian police, I could draw attention to this subject only roughly and more from memory.

4. Pangermanism from the very beginning was not a mere theory and political ideal, but also the expression of the political development of the German nation. In the 18th century, the Germans, like other nations of Europe, already possessed strong national feelings; the endeavour to unify the numerous German states and principalities was a legitimate endeavour, just like the desire of the Italians and other nations for unification. The problem became more difficult when the question arose of how to unite the various parts of the nation living in non-German states. Here, it was above all the difficult problem of the relation towards Austria of Germany, led by Prussia; the regularizing of this relation was demanded by a century-long development, especially from the days of the Reformation and the anti-Reformation, when Prussia became the representative of the Protestants, Austria of the Catholics and of the anti-Reformation. Outside of Austria and Hungary, Germans live also in Switzerland; in Russia there have been German colonies in the Baltic provinces from the days of the Knightly Orders and the Hansa; in more recent times, emigration gave rise to German colonies in Russian Poland and Eastern Russia, in the United States, in South America and in Africa. After the unification of Germany in 1870, Bismarck commenced (in 1884) a colonial policy, reaching into Africa, Asia and Australasia.

The energetic industrialisation of Germany after 1870, brought Germany into connection not only with its own colonies but also with other countries. The United States, Russia, England, India, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Brazil and Argentina came into close commercial relations with Germany, the German penetration pacifique, as it is now called, has been everywhere very effective. The Germans found plentiful markets for their industry and were able to obtain the necessary raw and partly manufactured materials from foreign lands; Emperor William gave an expression to the actual state of things when he referred the Germans to the seas.

Successful penetration into industries and markets all over the world suggested world-domination, and thus strengthened the traditional idea of the German imperialism of the German Roman Empire. After defeating Napoleon III., Prussia renewed the mediæval empire abrogated by Austria (1806); the Zollverein and Bund were a transition to industrialism and imperialism.

Even during the war I found quite a number of practical men who shrugged their shoulders at Pangermanism, calling it “utopian, academic and doctrinaire politics.”

Bismarck regulated, after 1866, the relations with Austria. He managed things so that Austria, after her defeat, was put out of Germany without loss of territory and with only a trifling indemnity; he was thus considerate of the personal ambitions of Francis Joseph and secured Austria for a devoted ally. The Magyars, accepted by the weakened Hapsburgs and won over by the remodelling of Austria into the dualistic Austria-Hungary (1867), became Germany’s staunch supporters, and Prussia thus had an empire of fifty millions at her disposal; Lagarde simply called Austria Germany’s colony. The Germans of Austria became the most radical Pangermanists, breaking away even from the Rome movement; Bismarck was clever enough to repudiate them officially (Herbstzeitlose), but he admonished a delegation of Pangermanist students from Austria to study the Slavic languages, if they wanted to dominate the Slav nations.

By the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary was irretrievably embroiled in the Balkans, and Emperor William inaugurated an active Turkophile policy, following in the footsteps of Frederick the Great; afterwards Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, even Montenegro, were furnished with German dynasties and princesses. The Turkish armies received German instructors, etc. Austria-Hungary became Germany’s bridge to the Balkans, Western Asia and Africa. The Triple Alliance coupled together not merely Austria-Hungary and Germany, but disarmed also the Italian Irredenta. Lagarde and the Pangermanists very forcibly claimed Trieste and the Adriatic for Germany. German capitalists at the same time, in a skilful manner and without much investment of capital, secured the control of many Italian banks; German professors, school teachers and a great number of less important tourists were effective agitators for Germany in Italy. The older English influences were to a large extent paralysed.

The actual development of Germany and of her political influence in Europe and in the whole world constituted thus an approach to the ideals of Pangerman imperialism; it tended to establish especially the idea of Central Europe under German leadership—Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey. This Central Europe, having Turkey for one of its elements, naturally extended into Asia and Africa, in which continent important colonies were secured; Pangerman authors therefore spoke of rounding out Central Europe by Central Africa. An Austrian Pangermanist expressed the programme in the motto “Berlin–Bagdad,” which motto might just as well be replaced by the motto “Berlin–Cairo.” The road from Berlin to Bagdad leads through Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople; the same road leads to Cairo, as well as a shorter one viâ Prague, Vienna, Trieste, Saloniki, then by the sea to the Suez Canal, and to the English and Italian coasts of Africa.

In the main continental body of Central Europe the Pangermans include also Holland, Belgium (Antwerp), Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries; these countries the less radical and outspoken Pangerman would unite to the Empire in the more loose form of a federation or even in an economic union. More strongly they claim the Slav and other frontier districts in Russia, the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, Russian Poland, and, above all, the Ukraine. One may go from Berlin to Bagdad also viâ Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Trebizond. The Pangermans recall the ancient Teutonic Varyags and their expeditions against Constantinople, and remember the example of the German Hansa.

The Pangerman slogan frequently points to the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf; or the plan is described by the rivers Rhine, Danube, Vistula, Dwina, Dnieper, and by the canals connecting these rivers and enabling German ships to bring goods from the North and the Baltic Seas to the Black and Ægean Seas. During the war discussions were going on about the necessary connections by canals, and many local ambitions and needs were emphasised, such as Munich–Bagdad, Hamburg–Bagdad, etc.

5. The political push of the Pangerman movement is directed at three points of the compass: West, South, and East; against France and England, against Italy and the Balkans, and against Russia. The thrust against Italy, especially since the formation of the Triple Alliance, was disguised in friendship; the Pangermanists were satisfied to have the alliance with Italy hold secure for them Trieste and the Adriatic. Against France, too, after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, more moderate claims were made, and the bitterness was due more to the French revanche politics; yet many Pangermanists threatened to break France for good and all. Others looked upon France as a quantité négligeable, believing that she now was small (40 millions against 68), and that she in the near feature would be relatively still smaller and that, like all Romance nations, she had degenerated and played out her rôle. In this connection the Pangermanists were always pointing to Belgium and Holland (East India Colonies); their plans covered the Belgian coasts of the English Channel, for it is nearer to Germany than the coast of Northern France, and, in addition, the Flemings as well as the Dutch are claimed as Teutonic peoples. There is an extensive Pangermanist literature about Antwerp and its economic significance for the Germans.

But in the forefront of the discussions and plans were England and Russia. The industrial expansion, the building of a great fleet to rule the oceans, colonial politics in Africa and latterly also in Australia and Asia, and the avowed plan of Berlin-Bagdad, directed Germany against England. With Russia up to the time of Bismarck, Prussia had had an advantageous friendship; but when Bismarck attached Austria, and consequently the Balkans, closely to Germany, and when William developed his Turkish and Asiatic policies, there was a growing estrangement from Russia. The result was that England came to an understanding with Russia and the four-fold Entente was born. The Pangermanists are divided; a part is looking upon Russia as the most dangerous enemy of the Germans, the others upon England; antagonism against Russia is found principally among the Baltic Germans, like Schiemann, Rohrbach, and others; the adversaries of England are Count Reventlow and his adherents. The Bismarckian policy toward Russia is advanced by Professor Hoetsch and many conservatives; Rohrbach offered a hand to the English against Russia.

The opponents of Russia point to Russia’s size and its tremendous population in the near future, drawing the conclusion that Russia is the true enemy of Germany. England, they argue, is separated from Germany by the sea, has no common frontier, is small in Europe, and its other parts are scattered throughout the world without practical centralization; its true strength is in the navy: it cannot therefore threaten Germany, for Germany will have a fleet to oppose that of England. Germany’s army, supplemented by the armies of Austria-Hungary, possibly of Italy, the Balkan States and Turkey, will be able to face Russia and France.

6. The rise and the course of the war were fully directed by the Pangerman policy. Austria-Hungary, as the German vanguard in the Balkans, attacked smaller Serbia and provoked thereby Russia; Germany was “obliged” to back its ally; Turkey and Bulgaria joined the two empires, and Pangerman Central Europe was organised in a military way. The defeat of Russia and Serbia was left to Austria; Germany planned to smash France with extreme rapidity, and before England could produce armies; that is the reason why the Germans invaded Belgium. The Germans did not expect the military participation of England, but there they were mistaken, just as they were mistaken about smashing France—they expected to be in Paris in a few weeks. They were also in error as to the military strength of Russia, they were ill-advised as to the Austrian army and its leadership, and they never expected that America would join the Allies. But in spite of that the Pangerman plan has been temporarily realised.

To-day, the German Central Europe has this shape:—Germany has 68 million people; it has under its control Austria-Hungary (51), Bulgaria (5½): and Turkey (21)—146 million. That figure alone is sufficient to enable Berlin to stand against Russia, which is the greatest state of Europe; Russia, to be sure, has 30 million more people, but its lack of railways, its paucity of population in tremendous territory, finally its backwardness in the economic, financial and cultural fields, gave German Central Europe a decided balance, not merely against Russia, but also against France. Germany occupied Belgium (6½), Northern France (6), Serbia (5), Montenegro (½); in Russia it holds the Baltic Provinces, Poland with Lithuania and the Ukraine, about 60 million. Germany therefore controls 224 million people; where it cannot employ their military strength, it exploits their economic and financial strength. In addition she exploits Finland and to a large extent Russia itself. Russia, being strategically weakened by the revolution, concluded a disgraceful and dishonourable peace—the Schiemanns and Rohrbachs reached temporarily their aim. Reventlow hopes with so much more reason that he, too, will reach his aim. Germany with its central Europe has had from the very beginning of the war the advantage of centralisation and unified organisation of all its powers; in addition to that, Germany was prepared strategically and politically (the plan and aim of the war), whereas the Allies were unprepared, unable to unite their scattered forces, and had no clear and common plan such as gave the initial strategical advantage to Germany-Austria. Austro-Germany had and has a definite plan, carefully and elaborately prepared in true Pangerman fashion; from William down to the officers and soldiers every combatant aims at the same thing, knows why he is fighting—and such a preparedness of programme is a great military force. It is true that the Germans had to change their strategical plans and methods; it is true that with all their foresight there was much they did not know, did not learn, could not do, but still Pangermanism was of great help to them. Against the Allies, separated from each other, they used with advantage the old plan of Horatius Cocles. After Occidental Russia has been weakened and eliminated, naval England will have her turn—this is plainly indicated by the German push toward the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, the Ægean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The Allies have at their disposal England (45), Canada (7), Australia (7), France (40), Algiers (2), Italy (36), a total of 137 millions. As far as military power is concerned, German Central Europe is stronger than the European Allies—the entrance of America since the elimination of Russia thus has a decisive significance, military and economic. The Pangermans are not in doubt about the United States’ strength and efficiency; their leading authors very often emphasise the American danger to Europe, and would make naïve Europeans believe that German Central Europe is the necessary counterbalance to the United States and the leader of the United States of Europe.

7. The Germans vindicate the right to their aggressive Pangerman policy in several ways, in the main it is the right of the stronger which they advocate.

The Germans fear hunger. They point to the rapid growth of their population. Up to the year 1845 France had a larger population than Germany; since that time the Germans grew rapidly, whereas France remained almost stationary. Thus was done away automatically the French danger, but there arose the Russian danger. In 1789 France was the most populous state (France 26 million, Turkey 23, Austria 19, England 17, Prussia 6, Poland 9, Russia 20 and 5 in Asia), and that explains the great influence and strength of France. Germany is now much stronger than France, and the Western nations singly, but she has to face too many enemies; around the year 2000 the population of Europe will be somewhat like this: Austria-Hungary 84 (54 and 30), Italy 58, England 145, France 84, Russia 400 (with Asia 500), United States 1,195, Germany 165. If not all Europe, Germany at least might become Cossack, and therefore the real peril for the next future is Russia; and so Germany must weaken Russia, and, as far as possible, occupy Russian territory for its own increasing population. In the West, Germany needs Antwerp; she needs the district of Briey; in general she needs territory, bread, raw materials, ports. With a brutal naïveté the Pangermans forget that other nations also need bread. “Necessity knows no law,” declares Bethmann-Hollweg as the foundation of Pangermanistic jurisprudence.

The strategical argument is of the same quality: the geographical situation of Germany, enclosed by hostile nations on three sides, demands a rectification of the frontiers, and therefore again the annexation of non-German territory. Ratzel was the one who drew the attention of the Pangermanists to the political and strategical significance of a central location (the fighting impetus from the centre, as against fighting power from the periphery, etc.). In general not merely geography, but even geology and other sciences are used in Pangermany to decide questions of right; territory similar from the geographical point of view to German territory belongs to the Germans, and German geographers systematise a special science of geo-politics.

The Germans, so runs the Pangerman argument, are the best soldiers of the world, Prussian militarism is exemplary, the German is a born soldier—militarism and war, moreover, as has been proved by Moltke, are the God-given social order, and therefore the Germans are entitled to hegemony. Darwin’s natural law of the survival of the fittest justifies Prussian militarism; Nietzsche gave to the Germans the principal and the only commandment—the will to power, the will to strength, the will to victory.

The Teutons, according to the Pangermans, have the primacy in industrial and technical branches. In addition to military successes, they have success, and in fact primacy, in science, philosophy, music, art and education. The Germans by virtue of their Kultur have the right, nay even the duty, of ruling the world. The Germans are, in short, the Herrenvolk, the only and absolute Herrenvolk. Germany, so we read literally, will be the saviours of Europe and of mankind.

The Germans by their Pangermanistic plans utilise their historical development. Prussia in 1871, after uniting the Germans, proceeded with the erection of the German mediæval empire, the empire of Charlemagne, the continuation of the Roman empire; Prussia created the political concept of Central Europe. The Prussian-German imperialism and militarism are the culmination of the Roman world idea; Berlin is the fourth Rome, after Rome, Byzantium, Moscow…

The Pangermans, it is plain, believe in materialism, force and technique, neither Schiller nor Herder nor Kant, but Hegel, Feuerbach, Büchner (Kraft und Stoff), Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Hartmann become the spiritual leaders of Prussianised Germany. This materialism harmonised very easily with that national and racial mysticism which the Pangermans derived from the Frenchman Gobineau, from Nietzsche, Schophenhauer, Hartmann and others; Lagarde even prescribed for the Germans their higher religion, and William believes in his own and his grandfather’s Messiahship—the official founder of the Prussian Empire, the plaything of Bismarck, is to William God’s Ambassador… The Pangerman materialist receive this sacrilegious teaching with great content, and not even the Marxian materialists of Herr Scheidemann get excited over it.

The Pangermans uphold and spread hostility and hatred against neighbouring nations, especially the Slavs; and the Czechs above all, because of their special world situation, are a thorn in the eyes of the Germans. In Pangermanistic literature the Czechs, equally with the Poles, are threatened with extermination and forcible Germanisation; people still remember the exhortation of Mommsen, that the Germans should break the hard skulls of the Czechs, and Lagarde and the other leaders of Pangermanism speak in an equally brutal manner. The Pangermanists turn history and sociology into zoology and mechanics—that is in harmony with their tactics of frightfulness, as practised in this war.

3. Plan of the Allies: Democratic Organization of Europe, and Mankind. Democracy versus Theocracy.

8a. The Allies, not being prepared for the Austro-German attack, were on the defensive both in the military and in the political sphere; it was a long time before they agreed on a common programme. At first individual statesmen and governments declared their views and plans; naturally, they emphasized the fact that they had been attacked, condemned Prussian militarism, defended democratic principles, demanded freedom for all nations, great or small, and promised the reorganisation of Europe.

On October 31st, 1916, Emperor William wrote a letter in which, speaking in his well-known manner about assurance in his God, he instructed Bethmann-Hollweg to draft peace conditions; the German Chancellor on December 12th, 1916, handed to the American Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin the German proposal stating that the Central Powers were ready to enter into peace negotiations. The proposal contained no definite plan; it was more like the orders of a haughty victor than a genuine peace proposal. Following that, President Wilson appeared on the scene. He had offered, as is well known, his mediation on August 3rd, 1914, but it was not accepted. After Bethmann-Hollweg made his proposal, Wilson addressed himself (December 20th, 1916) to the British Government, as he expressly says, of his own accord, not upon the German initiative. He asked all the warring nations to submit their peace conditions in a more concrete form, since general principles would not do; he himself emphasised the right of the smaller and weaker peoples and the small states.

The Allies replied (December 30th, 1916) to the note of the German Chancellor, rejecting it, as it deserved. On January 10th, 1917, they replied to President Wilson. In this answer they state that they defend Europe against Prussian militarism in the name of humanity and civilisation; they emphasise the right of small nations to self-determination, as was done previously by English and French Ministers and statesmen. The specific political demands are: Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro must be restored by Germany; the occupied territories of France, Russia and Roumania must be evacuated and given a just compensation. Territories and provinces that have been taken from the Allies in the past by violence and against the will of the population must be returned; this must be interpreted primarily as the solution of the Alsace-Lorraine problem, but it also applies to the Danes of Schleswig. In the East, Poland must be united and liberated; the nationalities of Austria-Hungary must also be liberated from foreign domination—the Italians, Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-Slovaks. Turkish rule in Europe must cease to exist, because it is foreign to Western civilisation; nations subjected to the bloody tyranny of the Turks shall be liberated.

The Allies thus insist on the re-organisation of Eastern Europe and Europe in general; nationalities must be respected and freedom of economic development fully secured to all nations, great and small. International treaties will guarantee territorial and seacoast boundaries against unjust attacks. The Allies adopt as a matter of principle the formation of a League of Nations.

8b. Soon after the receipt of the Allied Note, President Wilson in the name of the American people (April 5th, 1917) declared war against Germany. Since that day, as he has pointed out, he has pronounced and even before that, general conditions of peace.

President Wilson interprets very effectively the leading principles of the American democracy. The principles by which America was nurtured (Inaugural Address, March 5th, 1917) are the principles of liberated humanity; the chief basis of peace is the actual equality of nations as well as the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, or, as he states it in his message to Russia (June 9th, 1917), no people shall be forced under that sovereignty under which it does not wish to live.

In substance President Wilson thus reiterated the famous Gettysburg Speech of Lincoln (November 10th, 1863): “That these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, for the people and by the people shall not perish from the earth.” Both Lincoln and Wilson repeat the principles of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4th, 1776.

Mr. Wilson formulated the conditions of peace with more detail in an address before the Congress, January 8th, 1918, one year after the Note of the Allies; his proposal contains fourteen demands:—

I. Peace must be negotiated in the open, without secret international agreements; diplomacy must act in public.

II. Unconditioual freedom of navigation upon the seas beyond the territorial limits.

III. Removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers.