The Doctrine of Plato delivered by Alcinous

I. Of and how a Philosopher must be Qualified

Such a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of Plato. Philosophy is the desire of Wisdom, or solution of the Soul from the Body, and a Conversion to those things, which are true and perceptible by intellect. Wisdom σοφια, is the Science of things Divine and Humane. A Philosopher is he who takes denomination from Philosophy, as a Musician from Musick. He who is to be a Philosopher, must be thus qualified; First, he must have a Natural Capacity of all such Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the knowledge of that Essence which is perceptible by Intellect, not of that which is in continual fluxion or mutation. Then he must have a natural Affection to Truth, and an aversion from receiving Falshood, and besides this, Temperate in a manner by Nature; for those parts which use to be transported with Passions, he must have reduced to Obedience by Nature. For whosoever hath once embraced those Disciplines which are conversant in consideration of such things as truly exist, and hath addicted all his study thereunto, little valueth corporeal pleasure. Moreover, a Philosopher must have a Liberal Mind, for the estimation of mean things is contrary to a Man who intended to contemplate the truth of things. Likewise he must naturally love Justice, for he must be studious of Truth, Temperance and Liberality. He must also have an acute Apprehension, and a good Memory, for these inform a Philosopher, those gifts of Nature, if improved by Discipline and Education, make a man perfect in Vertue, but neglected are the cause of the worst ills. These Plato used to call by the same names with the Vertues, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice.

II. That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action

WHereas Life is twofold, Contemplative and Active, the chief Office of the Contemplative consisteth in the knowledge of truth, as of the Active, in the practice of those things which are dictated by Reason. Hence the contemplative Life is first, after which as necessary followeth the Active. That it is so, may easily be proved thus. Contemplation is an Office of the Intellect in the understanding of Intelligibles: Action is an operation of the rational Soul, performed by meditation and service of the Body. For the Soul, when it contemplateth the Divinity and the notions thereof, is said to be best affected. This affection is called φρόνησις, Wisdom, which is nothing else but an assimilation to the Deity. This therefore ought to be esteemed the first and principal, as being most expetible and proper to Man; for there are no impediments that can hinder it from being within our power, and it is cause of our proposed end. But Active Life, and the practise thereof, chiefly making use of the mediation of the Body, are many times obstructed; Wherefore those things which the contemplative Life considers in order to the Reformation of the Manners of Men, a Philosopher, as often as necessity requireth, shall transfer to action. Then shall a good Man apply himself to the administration of Civil Affairs, when he seeth them ill managed by others. He must look upon the Leading of an Army, Administration of Justice and Embassies, as things necessary. The Institution of Laws, ordering the Common-wealth, the compressure of Seditions, Education of Youth in Discipline, are the chiefest, and, among those things which relate to Action, of greatest consequence. Hence is it manifest, that a Philosopher must not onely be perseverant in Contemplation, but also cherish and increase it, sometimes giving himself to Action as an Attendant upon Contemplation.

III. The three parts of Philosophy

THe study of a Philosopher seemeth according to Plato to be conversant chiefly in three things, in the Contemplation and Knowledge of things, in the Practice of Vertue, and in Disputation. The Science of things that are, is called Theoretick; of those which pertain to Action, Practick; the disputative part Dialectick.

Dialectick is divided into Division, Definition, Induction and Syllogism; Syllogism into the Apodeictick, which concerneth necessary ratiocination; and Rhetorical, which concerneth Enthymeme, called an imperfect ratiocination; and lastly into Sophisms. This the Philosopher must look upon, not as the chiefest but a necessary part.

Of Practick Philosophy, one part is conversant about Manners, another orders Families, the last takes care of a Common-wealth. The first called Ethick, the second, Oeconomick, the third, Politick.

Of Theoretick Philosophy, one part enquires into things Immutable and Divine, and the first causes of things; this is called Theology; another the Motion of the Stars, the Revolution and Restitution of Cœlestial Bodies, and the Constitution of the World. This is called Physick. That whereby we enquire Geometrically, and those other disciplines which are called μαθήματα, is termed Mathematick.

Philosophy being thus divided, we must first according to Plato, speak of the Dialectick part, and in that, first of the Judiciary.

IV. Of the Judiciary part

WHereas there is something that judgeth, something which is judged, it is necessary also that there be something which is made of both these, properly called Judgment. This Judgment may not unfitly be termed Judiciary, but more commonly that which Judgeth. This is twofold; one, from which; another by which judgment is made. That is Intellect; this the natural Organ accommodated for Judgment; primarily of true things; secondarily of false; neither is it any thing but natural reason. To explain this more fully, of things which are, a Philosopher who judgeth the things themselves, may be called a Judge; reason likewise is a Judge, by which Truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

Reason is twofold, one incomprehensible and true; the other is never deceived in the knowledge of those things which are. The first is in the power of God, not of Man, the second in that of Man also. This likewise is twofold, the first Science, and Scientifick reason; the second Opinion. The first hath Certitude, and Stability, as being conversant in things certain and stable. The second, similitude of truth and opinion, as being conversant in things subject to mutation. Of Science in Intelligibles, and Opinion in sensibles, the Principles are Intellection and Sense.

Sense is a passion of the soul by the mediation of the body, first, declaring a passive faculty; when through the Organs of Sense, the Species of things are impress'd in the Soul, so, as they are not defaced by time, but remain firm and lasting, the conservation thereof is called Memory.

Opinion is the Conjunction of Memory and Sense; for, when some object occurreth, which can first move the Sense, thereby Sense is effected in us, and by Sense, the Memory. Then again is the same thing objected to our Sense, we joyn the precedent with the consequent Sense, and now say within our selves, Socrates, a Horse, Fire, and the like: This is termed opinion, when we joyne the precedent Memory with the late Sense; when these agree within themselves, it is a true opinion, if they disagree, a false; for, if a man, having the species of Socrates in his memory, meet with Plato, and think, by reason of some likeness be- twixt them, he hath met Socrates again, and afterwards joyn the sense of Plato, which he took, as it were, from Socrates, with the memory which he preserved of Socrates, there will arise a false Opinion.

That wherein sense and memory are formed, Plato compareth to a Tablet of Wax, but when the soul by cogitation reforming these things, which are conceived in Opinion by Memory and Sense, looketh upon these as things from which the other are derived: Plato sometimes calleth this a Picture and Phantasie. Cogitation he calleth the Souls discourse within her self: Speech, that which floweth from the Cogitation through the Mouth by Voice. Intellection is an operation of the Intellect, contemplating first Intelligibles. It is two-fold, one of the Soul, beholding Intelligibles before she cometh into the Body; the other of the same, after she is immers'd in the body: The first is properly called Intellection; the other, whilst she is in the body, is termed Natural Knowledge, which is nothing but an Intellection of the Soul confined to the Body. When we say, intellection is the principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competible to the Soul in her separate State, and, as we said, is then called Intellection, now Natural Knowledge. The same Plato termeth simple Knowledge, the wing of the soul; sometimes Reminiscence.

Of these simple Sciences consisteth Reason; which is born with us, the efficient of natural Science; and as reason is twofold, Scientifick, and opinionative, so Intellection and Sense. It is likewise necessary that they have their objects, which are Intelligibles and Sensibles: And forasmuch as of Intelligibles, some are Primary, as Idaeas, others Secondary, as the Species, that are in matter, and cannot be separated from it. Intellection likewise, must be two-fold, one of Primaries, the other of Secondaries. Again, forasmuch as in Sensibles, some are Primary, as qualities, colour, whiteness, others by accident, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as fire: in the same manner is Sense, first, of Primaries, second, of Secondaries. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not without Scientifick knowledge, by a certain comprehension without Discourse. Secondaries the same Scientifick reason judgeth, but not without Intellection. Sensibles, as well Primary as Secondary Sense, judgeth, but not without opinionative reason. That which is concrete, the same reason judgeth, but not without sense. And since the Intelligible World is the primary Intelligible, the sensible something concrete, the first Intellection judgeth with Reason, that is, not without Reason: The other Opinionative reason not without sense, whereas there is both Contemplation and Action; right Reason discerneth not in the same manner those which are subject to Contemplation, and those which are subject to Action: In contemplation it considereth what is true, what false; in things that belong to Action, what is proper, what improper, what that is which is done. For having an innate knowledge of that which is good and honest, by using reason, and applying it to those natural notions, as to certain rules, we judge whether every thing be good or bad.

V. The Elements and Office of Dialectick

OF Dialectick, the first and chiefest Element according to Plato, is, first, to consider the Essence of every thing; next, the Accidents thereof. What a thing is, it considers, either from its Superiors, by division and definition, or contrariwise by Analysis. Accidents which adhere to substances, are considered, either from those things which are contained by induction, or from those which do contain by Syllogism.

Hence the parts of Dialectick are these, Division, Definition, Analysis, Induction, Syllogism.

Of Divisions, one is a distribution of the Genus into Species, and of the whole into parts; as when we divide the Soul into the rational part, and the irrational; and the latter, into the concupiscible and the irascible. Another is of a world into divers significations, when the same may be taken several ways. A third of accidents, according to their subjects; as when we say of Good, some belong to the Soul, some to the Body, some are external. The fourth of subjects, according to their Accidents; as of Men, some are good, some ill, some indifferent. Division of the Genus into its Species, is first to be used, when we examine the essence of a thing, this cannot be done but by definitions.

Definition is made by Division in this manner, we must take the Genus of the thing to be defined, as that of Man, living Creature; that we must divide by the next differences, descending to its species, as rational, and irrational, mortal, and immortal. Thus by adding the first difference to the Genus, is made the definition of Man.

Of Analysis there are three kinds, one by which we ascend from Sensibles to primary Intelligibles, another whereby we ascend by demonstrates and subdemonstrates, to indemonstrable immediate propositions. The last, which from supposition proceedeth to those principles which are taken without supposition.

The first kind is thus, as if from that Beauty which is in the Body, we should proceed to that of the Mind, from that to another conversant in the Offices of Life, thence to that of Laws, and so at last to the vast Ocean of Beauty, that by these steps, as it were, we may arrive at the sight of the supream Beauty.

The second kind of Analysis is thus; We must suppose that which we seek, and consider those which are precedent, demonstrating them by progression, from inferiours to superiours, untill we arrive at that which is first and generally granted: From which, beginning anew, we return synthetically to that which was sought. As for example, I enquire whether the Soul be Immortal, and supposing it to be so, I enquire whether it be always moved. This being demonstrated, I again enquire, whether that which is always moved, is moved by it self, which being again demonstrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by its self, be the principal of Motion. Lastly, whether a Principal is ingenerate; this, as most certain, is admitted by all. That which is ingenerate, is also incorruptible; whence, as from a thing most certain, we collect this demonstration. If a Principle be ingenerate and incorruptible, that which is moved by it self is the principle of Motion; but the Soul is moved by it self, therefore the Soul is Incorruptible, Ingenerate, and Immortal.

The third kind of Analysis upon supposition is this; He who enquireth after a thing, first, supposeth that thing, then observes what will follow upon that supposition. If a reason for the supposition be required, assuming another supposition, he enquireth, whether that which was first supposed, follow again upon another supposition: This he always observeth; untill he come at last to that Principle, which is not taken upon supposition.

Induction is every method by reason, which proceedeth either from like to like, or from Singulars to Universal: It is of great efficacy to excite natural notions.

VI. Of Propositions and Argumentations

OF that speech which we call a Proposition, there are two kinds, Affirmation and Negation; Affirmation, as Socrates walketh; Negation, as Socrates walketh not.

Of Affirmative and Negative Propositions, some are Universal, others Particular: A particular affirmative is thus, Some Pleasure is good; a particular negative is, Some Pleasure is not good. An Universal Affirmative, all dishonest things are ill; an Universal Negative, no dishonest thing is good.

Of Propositions, some are Categorical, some Hypothetical: the Categorical are simple, as every just thing is good: Hypothetical import consequence or repugnance.

Syllogisms are used by Plato, either to confute or demonstrate; to confute, what is false by interrogation, to demonstrate, what is true by declaration. Syllogism is a speech, wherein somethings being laid down, another thing besides those which are laid down, is necessarily inferred from them.

Of Syllogisms some are Categorical, some Hypothetical, some Mixt: Categorical are those whose sumptions and conclusions are simple propositions. Hypothetical are those which consist of Hypothetical Propositions: Mixt, which conclude both.

Plato useth demonstrative Arguments in those Dialogues, wherein he explaineth his own Doctrine; Probable against Sophists and young Men; Litigious against those who are properly called Eristick, as Euthydemus and Hippias.

Of Categorical Syllogisms there are three Figures; the first is, that wherein the common extream is first the prædicate, then the subject. The second, when the common extream is prædicate in both: the third, wherein the common extream is subject in both. Extreams are the parts of a Proposition, as in this, A Man is a living Creature, Man and living Creature are the extreams. Plato often argueth in the first, second, and third Figures; in the first, as in Alcibiades;

Just things are honest, Honest things are good, Therefore just things are good.

In the second, as in Parmenides; as,

That which hath no parts is neither straight nor crooked, But whatsoever hath figure is either straight or crooked, Therefore, whatsoever hath not parts, hath not figure.

In the third thus, in the same book,

Whatsoever hath figure is qualitative, Whatsoever hath figure is finite, Therefore whatsoever is qualitative is finite.

Likewise by Hypothetical Syllogism Plato often disputeth, chiefly in Parmenide thus,

If one hath not parts, it hath neither beginning, end, nor middle, But if it have neither beginning, end, nor middle, it hath no bound, and if no bound, no figure, Therefore if one hath no parts, it hath no figure.

In the second Hypothetical figure, ordinarily called the third, wherein the common extream is subject in both, he argueth thus,

If one hath not parts, it is neither straight nor crooked, If it hath a figure, it is either straight or crooked, Therefore if it hath no parts, it hath no figure.

In the Third figure by some called the second, wherein the common extream twice precedes the other two, he thus argues, in Phædone,

If having the Knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but if we forget it, we have recourse to Reminiscence, &c.

Mixt Syllogisms which conclude by consequence, he useth thus;

If one is whole and finite, that is, having beginning, middle and end; it hath figure also; But the Antecedent is true, Therefore the Consequent.

Of those also which overthrow by Consequence, the differences may be gathered out of Plato.

Thus when a Man hath diligently understood the faculties of the Mind, the various differences of Men, the several kinds of Reasoning which may be accommodated to this or that, and to what persons such and such reasons are to be used, he, meeting with an opportunity suiting with his purpose, will become a perfect Orator.

The reasons of Sophisms and captious arguments are, if we observe narrowly, expressed by Plato in Euthydemo, for there is declared which are in words, which in things, and how they are to be solved.

The ten Prædicaments are touched by Plato in Parmenide, and in his other Dialogues; the place of Etymologies is fully set down in Cratylo. To conclude, he was singularly admirable for division and definition, wherein the greatest force of Dialectick consisteth.

The Summ of that which he saith in Cratylo, is this; he enquireth whether Names are by the power and reason of Nature, or by Imposition. He concludeth that the rectitude of names is by a certain imposition, not temerarious or casual, but seeming to follow the nature of the things themselves; for rectitude of names is nothing but an imposition consonant to the nature of the thing: Hence every imposition of names is not sufficient for rectitude, neither the nature nor first found of the voice, but that which is composed of both; so as every name is conveniently and properly applyed to the thing. For any name applyed to any thing will not signifie rightly, as if wee should impose the name of Horse upon Man. To speak is a kind of Action: Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly, but he who speaketh so as the nature of the thing requireth. And for as much as expression of Names is a part of speaking, as Noun is a part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any imposition of names, but by a natural affinity of the name with the thing it self. So that he is a right imposer of names, who can express the Nature of the things in their names; for a Name is an Instrument of the thing, not every inconsiderate name, but that which agreeth with its Nature. By this benefit we communicate things to one another, whence it followeth, that it is nothing else but an instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a thing, as a Weavers shuttle to his Webb. It belongeth therefore to a Dialectick to use Names aright; for as a Weaver useth a Shuttle rightly, knowing the proper use thereof after it hath been made by the Carpenter; so the Dialectick rightly useth that name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the Office of a Ship-wright, but to use it rightly of a Pilot; so he who frameth names, shall impose them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialectick were present, who understandeth the nature of those things which are signified by the names. Thus much for Dialectick.

VII. Of Theoretick Philosophy

WE come next to Theoretick Philosophy, whereof one part is Theologick, another Physick, a third Metaphysick. The end of Theology is the knowledge of primary Causes: Of Physick, to understand the nature of the Universe, what kinde of Creature Man is, what place he holdeth in the World, whether there be a Divine Providence over all things, to which there are other Gods subordinate; how Men are in respect of them. The end of Mathematick is, to know the nature of a Superficies and a solid, and to consider the Motion and Revolution of Cœlestial Bodies, the contemplation whereof must first be proposed in brief. Thus Plato useth to confirm the acuteness of the Mind, for it sharpeneth the understanding, and rendreth it more ready towards the contemplation of Divine things. That which considereth Numbers, being likewise a part of Mathematicks, conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are; it frees us from the errour and ignorance which attend sensible things, and conduceth to the right knowledge of the essence of things: It likewise renders a Man expert in Military Affairs, especially towards the ordering of an Army by the science of Tacticks. Geometry also conferreth much towards the understanding of good it self, if a man pursue it not only for Mechanical dimension, but that he may by the helps thereof ascend to things which are not, busying himself about those which are in continual Generation and Motion. Stereometry likewise is exceeding useful, for after the second accretion followeth this contemplation, which holdeth the third room. Astronomy also is useful as a fourth Discipline, whereby we consider the Motions of Heaven and the Stars, and the Author of Night and Day, Months and Years. Thus by a familiar kind of way, finding out him who made all these, and by these Disciplines, as from certain rudiments or Elements proceeding to things more Sublime. Likewise Musick is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing; for, as the eyes are created for Astronomy, so are the ears for Harmony: and as when we apply our selves to Astronomy, we are led from visible things, to the Divine invisible Essence; so when we receive the Harmony of voice in at our ears, from audible things, we ascend by degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect, unless we pursue Mathematical Disciplines to this end, the contemplation thereof will be imperfect, unprofitable, and of no value. We must therefore presently proceed from those things which are perceived by the eyes and ears, to those which reason only discerneth; for, Mathematick is only a preface to divine things. They who addict themselves to Arithmetick and Geometry, desire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is, which knowledge they obtain no otherwise then as by a Dream, but really they cannot attain it, because they know not the principles themselves, nor those things which are compounded of the Principles: nevertheless, they conduce to those things which we mentioned; wherefore Plato will not have such disciplines to be called Sciences. Dialectick method proceeds in such manner, that by Geometrical Hypotheses, it ascendeth to first Principles, which are not taken upon Hypotheses. For this reason he calleth Dialect a Science; but, neither Mathematick, nor Opinion, because it is more perspicuous than sensible things; nor a Science, because it is more obscure then first Intelligibles: But, the Opinion of Bodies, the Science of Primaries, the Contemplation of Mathematicks.

He likewise asserteth Faith and Imagination: Faith, of things subject to Sense; Imagination of Images and Species.

Because Dialectick is more efficacious then Mathematick, as being conversant about Divine Eternal things, therefore it is put before all Mathematicks, as a Wall and Fortification of the rest.

VIII. Of first Matter

WE must next give a brief account of Principles, and those things which belong to Theology, beginning at the first, and from thence descending to the Creation of the World, and Contemplation thereof, whereby, at last we come to the Creation and Nature of Man.

To begin with Matter; this he calleth the Receptacle, Nurse, Mother, Place, and subject of all Images, affirming that it is touched without Sense, and comprehended by an Adulterate kind of Reason. The property thereof is to undergo the Generation of all things, and to cherish them like a Nurse, and to admit all Forms, being of her own Nature expert of all Form, Quality, and Species: These things are imprinted and form'd in her as in a Table, and she admitteth their Figures, not having of her self any Figure or Quality. For, she could not be fit to receive the impressions of several Forms, unless she were wholly void of all Quality, and of those Forms which she is about to receive. They who make sweet Unguents of Oyl, make choice of that Oyl which hath the least scent; they who would imprint any Figures in Wax, first smooth and polish the Matter, defacing all former Figures. It is requisite that matter capable of all things, if it must receive all Forms, must not have the nature of any one of them, but must be subjected to all forms; without any quality or figure: and being such, it is neither a Body nor incorporeal, but a Body potentially, as Brass is potentially a Statue, because then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the Form thereof.

IX. Of Ideas

WHereas matter is a Principle, Plato likewise introduceth other Principles besides Matter. One as an Exemplar, Ideas; another Paternal, God, the Father and Author of all things. Idea, as to God, is the Notion of God, as to us, the primary Intelligible, as to matter, a manner, as to this sensible World an Exemplar, as to it self, Essence. For whatsoever is made with understanding, must necessarily be referred to something, as if something be made from another, as my Picture from me, the exemplar thereof must be presupposed, and if there be nothing Eternal, every Artist conceiveth it first within himself, then transferreth the Forms thereof into Matter.

They define Idea an Eternal Exemplar of things which are according to Nature; for, the greater part of Platonists will not allow an Idea to be of things that are made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute, nor of things which are præternatural, as of a Fever, or unnatural Choler; nor of singulars, as of Socrates or Plato; nor of vile abject things, as of Filth or Straws; nor of relatives, as of greater and longer: For Idea's are the Eternal Notions of God, perfect in themselves.

That there are Idea's, they prove thus: whether God be Intellect or something Intelligent, he must have his Intelligibles, and those Eternal and Immoveable; if so, there are Idea's. For, if matter it self be in it self void of measure, it is necessary that it receive measure from some Superiour, that is wholly remote from matter: But the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent; and if so, there are Idea's, certain measures void of matter. Again, if the World were not made by Chance, it must only be made of something, but by something, and not only so, but after the likeness of, something; but, that after whose likeness it was made, what is it but an Idea? Whence it followeth, that there are Idea's. Again, if Intellect differ from true Opinion, that which is Intelligible differeth from that which is Opinionable; and if so, there are Intelligibles distinct from Opinionables, wherefore there are first Intelligibles, as well as first Sensibles, whence we conclude there are Idea's.

X. Of God

WE come next to speak of the third principle, which Plato, though he think it almost ineffable; conceiveth may be expressed in this manner. If there are intelligibles, and those neither sensibles, nor coherent with sensibles; but adherent to first Intelligibles, then are there first simple Intelligibles, as there are first sensibles; the Antecedent is true, therefore the consequent. But Men subject to perturbation of Sense, when they would contemplate somthing intelligible, presently fall upon the thought of somthing sensible, whereby at the same time they imagine Magnitude, or Figure, or Colour; and therefore cannot understand this sincerely: But the Gods being void of Corporeal mixion understand purely and sincerely. Now because the Intellect is better then the Soul, and that Intellect which is always in act, and at once understandeth all things, is better then that Intellect which is in power, and of these, that is most excellent which is the cause ef the other, and superiour to all; This can be nothing else but God, whom we call the first, as being the Cause that the Intellect of the Word always acteth. He, being himself immoveable, acteth upon the Intellect of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turneth towards him. And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite, it self remaining immoveable; so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven. Now this first Intellect being most fair, must have the most fair Intelligible; but nothing is fairer then it self, therefore it always understandeth it self, and its own notions, which Act is called Operation.

Moreover, God is first, eternal ineffable, perfect in himself; that is, needing none; and ever perfect, that is, absolute in all times, and every way perfect, that is, absolute in every part, Divinity, Essence, Truth, Harmony, Good. Neither do we so name these, to distinguish one from the other, but rather by them all to understand one. He is said to be Good, because he bestoweth his benefits upon all according to their several Capacities, and so is the cause of all good. Fair, because he is in his essence both more and equal. Truth because, he is the principle of all truth, as the Sun of all light. And Father, as being cause of all things, and adorning the mind of Heaven and Soul of the World after his own exemplar and notions. For according to his own Will he filled all things with himself, exciting the Soul of the World, and converting it to himself, for he is cause of that Intellect, which being adorned by the Father, adorneth also the Nature of all this World. He is likewise ineffable, and as we said, can only be perceived by the Mind, for he is neither Genus nor Species, nor difference, neither can any accident be applied to him. He is not ill, for that it were impiety to affirm; nor good, for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodness. Nor difference, for that cannot be made according to the notion of him. Nor qualited, for he is not made that which he is by quality, nor perfected thereby. Nor void of quality, for he is not deprived of any quality that appertaineth to him. Nor part of any thing, nor as a whole constituted of parts; nor as the same or divers, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others, Neither doth he move, or is he moved.