Secretary Root's Record:"Marked Severities" in Philippine Warfare

Front matter

Secretary Root's Record:"Marked Severities" in Philippine Warfare

An Analysis of the Law and Facts bearing on the Action and Utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root

By Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman, legal counsel for the Philippine Investigating Committee

Introduction

ADAMS BUILDING, 23 Court St., Boston. August 29, 1902.

Messrs. Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman, Boston, Mass. Gentlemen:

In the course of a speech delivered yesterday at Weirs, N.H., President Roosevelt is reported as having used the following language:

"The army, which has done its work so well in the Philippine Islands, has ... been cruelly maligned even by some who should have known better.... The temptation to retaliate for the fearful cruelties of a savage foe is very great, and now and then it has been yielded to. There have been a few, and only a few, such instances in the Philippines; and punishment has been meted out with unflinching justice to the offenders."

In an official communication of the Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, under date of February 17 last, is the following:

"The war in the Philippines has been conducted by the American army with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare, with careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and the non-combatant, with self-restraint, and with humanity never surpassed."

In his speech at Arlington on Decoration Day, so called, in May last, President Roosevelt said, :"Determined and unswerving effort must be made to find out every instance of barbarity on the part of our troops, to punish those guilty of it, and to take, if possible, even stronger measures than have already been taken to minimize or prevent the occurrence of all such instances in the future."

As a Committee, we submit the foregoing statements to you, with a view to ascertaining whether they will bear examination so far as the rules of warfare, as generally accepted, are concerned, or are in conformity with the facts as they have been elicited by investigation or appear of record.

Furthermore, we would ask you to advise us, in so far as can be ascertained, whether satisfactory or complete revelations could have been elicited by any investigations conducted under the conditions imposed thereon by the orders issued from the War Department and the instructions therein contained.

We have the honor to be, etc.,

Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Edwin Burritt Smith, Herbert Welsh, Committee.

September 20, 1902. Messrs. Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, E. Burritt Smith, and Herbert Welsh, Committee.

Gentlemen:

Your communication of the 29th ult. has been received, and considered carefully.

To answer satisfactorily the questions which you ask, it is necessary to review an extensive and complicated record, bearing constantly in mind the relations of the high officials concerned, civil and military, to each other and to the national government. It will, in the first place, be noticed that the duty of prosecuting any investigation such as that promised by President Roosevelt in the Arlington speech rests primarily on the Secretary of War. Under the conditions existing in the Philippines, it would devolve upon him to make, in the language of the President, a "determined and unswerving effort to find out every instance of barbarity, and to punish those guilty of it."

The entire record of the Secretary of War in connection with the Philippine Islands and the recent transactions therein must therefore be examined, so far as it is known, in order to determine how much confidence can be reposed on any statements relating thereto which have emanated or may emanate from him.

What is that record?

Secretary Root's Responsibility

Mr. Root has been the Secretary of War since August, 1899. The officers in command of our forces have received their orders from or through him, and have made their reports to him. Better than any other man in the United States he has been able to learn the truth about our military operations; and it has been his duty to know the exact facts.

His duty was thus defined by President McKinley in written instructions to the Secretary of War, bearing date December 21, 1898:

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them, in every possible way, that full measure of individual rights which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.

The practical effect of these instructions was thus stated in field orders issued by General MacArthur on April 22, 1899, at Malolos:

The purpose of the United States in these islands is beneficent. It is, therefore, one of the most important duties of American soldiers to assist in establishing friendly relations with the natives by kind and considerate treatment in all matters arising from personal contact. To exasperate individuals or to burn or loot unprotected or abandoned houses or property is not only criminal in itself, but tends to impede the policy of the United States and to defeat the very purpose which the army is here to accomplish....

When in hostile contact with the enemy, an adversary, with arms in his hands, must be killed, if possible; but a wounded or surrendered opponent, who is incapable of doing any injury, is entitled to the most cordial courtesy and kindness. Any departure from the well-established amenities of the battlefield or the laws of war must be and will be punished, according to the nature of the case, to the extent of the law.

No one can doubt that these orders laid down the rules prescribed alike by the laws of war, by considerations of policy as well as humanity, and by the instructions of the President. It would be gross discourtesy to assume that Mr. Root, a trained lawyer and statesman, did not understand this as well as General MacArthur.

As the representative of the civil authority, and under the President, the head of the army, Mr. Root has been charged with especial responsibility in this matter. Removed from the scene of conflict, and unaffected by the fierce passions aroused in the soldier by actual battle, it has been his duty to watch the progress of the contest, and to see that its objects were kept in view, that the rules of war were observed, and that all unnecessary brutality and destruction were prevented or punished. It was for him, as the representative of the civil power, to moderate and control the wrath of officers and men, to the end that the war might result in a real peace, and not merely in outward submission concealing undying hatred.

Finally, it has been his duty, if he spoke at all, to tell his countrymen nothing but the truth.

One of Mr. Root's Statements Tested

On the 25th of October, 1900, after he had been in office more than a year, and more than twenty months after the Philippine War began, when all the facts connected with its outbreak were familiar to him, Mr. Root made a speech at Youngstown, Ohio, in which he said:

And again:

The day was not then, but it came on the 4th of February, when a body of Filipino troops marched under cover of night, swiftly and silently, through our lines, regardless of the sentry's challenge; and, when he fired, volleys of musketry and roar of cannon upon every side commenced the proposed destruction of our army.

This speech, from which other passages will be quoted, was made to the people when the policy of the administration was on trial before them, and was intended to influence their votes. The language just quoted was skillfully devised to arouse their passions by making it appear that the Filipino army, led by Aguinaldo himself, began the war by making a deliberate and unprovoked attack on out forces.

The official report of General Otis thus states the facts:

An insurgent approaching the picket [of a Nebraska regiment] refused to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece [killing the Filipino], when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.... During the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between opposing lines for a distance of about two miles.... It is not believed that the chief insurgents wished to open hostilities at this time.

After daybreak General Otis attacked the Philippine forces, and a battle ensued, lasting till 5 P.M., of which he says in his report:

The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces.

The later official report, dated February 28, 1899, of General MacArthur, who commanded the American forces engaged, first gives a correspondence between him and the officer in command of the Filipino outposts, in which General MacArthur complains that some of the Filipinos have passed the line of demarcation fixed by agreement between the commanders; and the Filipino officer replies:

This is foreign to my wishes, and I shall give immediate orders in the premises that they retire,

which orders were given and obeyed on February 3, as the report states.

The report then proceeds:

About half-past eight P.M., on February 4, an insurgent patrol, consisting of four armed soldiers, entered our territory at Blockhouse No. 7, and advanced to the little village of Santol, which was occupied from the pipe-line outpost of the Nebraska regiment.... The American sentinel challenged twice; and then, as the insurgent patrol continued to advance, he fired (killing two of the Filipinos), whereupon the patrol retired to Blockhouse No. 7, from whence fire was immediately opened by the entire insurgent outpost at that point."

Must we assume that the Secretary of War was ignorant of the official records when this unlucky patrol becomes in his mouth "an army of Tagalogs ... under the leadership of Aguinaldo," attacking, "in vastly superior numbers, our little army in possession of Manila"? Or could they properly be described "as a body of Filipino troops" marching

under cover of night, swiftly and silently, through our lines, regardless of the sentry's challenge?

His charge that this attack was "under the leadership of Aguinaldo" is met by the simple words of General Otis:

It is not believed that the chief insurgents wished to open hostilities at this time.

The official report contradicts Mr. Root’s statement at every point.

Another of Mr. Root’s Statements

Again, in the same speech, Mr. Root said that, within three months from the arrival of our army in the fall of 1899,

the insurgent army and the insurgent government ceased to exist, and we hold all the islands which were subject to Spanish rule without opposition, save from fugitive bands, half guerilla and half bandit, who are shooting our men from ambush, and blackmailing and pillaging and murdering their own countrymen.

Of the Philippine government he spoke thus:

Mr. Root thus assured his countrymen that early in 1900 there was no opposition to the rule of the United States "save from fugitive bands, half guerilla and half bandit," and that our troops must remain there to protect "patient and unconsenting millions" of Filipinos, including the Visayans, from the outrages of these Tagalog bandits.

He also describes "blackmailing," "pillaging," and "murdering" as crimes, when committed by these bandits.

Believing these statements, as we must of course assume that he did, it was his duty as Secretary, while pursuing the bandits, to protect the "patient and unconsenting millions," not only against their own countrymen, but against our soldiers. It will hardly be contended that we had a right to pillage and murder them in order to anticipate like action by "the bandits."

Nay, more, in the same speech he insisted that the Filipinos were protected against such abuses by constitutional safeguards. He said:

Let me show you what kind of government exists today in the Philippine Islands. I read from the instructions of the President to the present commission, which entered upon legislative power in these islands on the 1st of September last [1900].

"The commission shall bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands; and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.

"Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines must be imposed these inviolable rules.

"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,... that excessive bail shall not be required,... nor cruel nor unusual punishment inflicted,... that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."

And he continued:

Is that imperialism? Will giving that kind of government to these poor people who have suffered so long under Spanish tyranny degrade the character of this republic?

There can be no question that Secretary Root has understood fully how his great powers should be used. It is proposed to show how he has, in fact, used them.

The First Reports of Cruelty

As soon as the mails from the army reached this country after the beginning of hostilities, the newspapers began to publish statements from soldiers and officers that the war against the Filipinos was being prosecuted with great barbarity; and it became apparent that there was at least a considerable element in the army who despised the native inhabitants, and were willing to kill prisoners, to burn villages, and to rob and murder non-combatants upon little or no provocation. Thus L. F. Adams, of Ozark, Mo., a soldier in the Washington regiment, describing the scene after the battle of February 4-5, 1899, said:

In the path of the Washington Regiment and Battery D of the Sixth Artillery there were 1,008 dead niggers, and a great many wounded. We burned all their houses. I don't know how many men, women, and children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any prisoners.

Howard McFarland, sergeant, Company B, Forty-third Infantry, wrote to the Fairfield Journal of Maine:

I am now stationed in a small town in charge of twenty-five men, and have a territory of twenty miles to patrol.... At the best, this is a very rich country; and we want it. My way of getting it would be to put a regiment into a skirmish line, and blow every nigger into a nigger heaven. On Thursday, March 29, eighteen of my company killed seventy-five nigger bolomen and ten of the nigger gunners.... When we find one that is not dead, we have bayonets.

It would be possible to fill columns with similar extracts, always met by statements that soldiers are liars, and that these stories could not be believed.

On July 17, 1899, the staff correspondents of American newspapers stationed at Manila telegraphed to this country their joint protest against the censorship of the press, alleging that the American people had been deceived as to conditions in the Philippines, and that they had been compelled to participate in this misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of facts on the plea, as General Otis stated, that "they would alarm the people at home."

This was signed by men of entire responsibility, and led to an inquiry by the general manager of the Associated Press.

He received a reply from Robert M. Collins, one of the correspondents of the Associated Press, which contained a statement of a conversation between the correspondents and General Otis, from which the following passages are quoted:

(No one could possibly tell stronger stories of the looting and blackmailing by our soldiers than Otis has told, although he charges it all to the volunteers.)

This was no anonymous slander, but the statement of men well known, like all of these correspondents. Davis and Bass themselves saw wounded men bayoneted; and the knowledge of looting, blackmail, and just such barbarous practices on the part of our soldiers as Mr. Root attributed to the Filipinos, was brought home to the whole country. While this letter was fresh in the public mind, Secretary Root took office. The war was only five months old. The attitude of the army toward the Filipinos was clearly questionable. The witnesses were ready. Then was the time to investigate. Compare the President's direction to the Secretary of War and General MacArthur's order at Malolos with the statement of Mr. Collins, and the need for a searching investigation and for instant reform is apparent.

How Charges Were Investigated

How were these matters investigated, and what was the attitude of the Department towards these crimes? Take first the killing of prisoners and wounded.

The battle of Caloocan was fought on February 10, 1899, five days after the war began. Of this one Charles Brenner, a private in a Kansas regiment, wrote:

It was fine shooting, as it was open ground, and we picked them off like quail.

And then went on:

Company I. had taken a few prisoners, and stopped. The colonel ordered them up into line time after time, and finally sent Captain Bishop back to start them. Then occurred the hardest sight I ever saw. They had four prisoners, and didn't know what to do with them. They asked Captain Bishop what to do; and he said, "You know the orders," and four natives fell dead.

This was denounced as a soldier's lie, but what does the official record show? On June 10, 1899, this letter of Brenner was referred by General MacArthur's order to the inspector-general of the division for investigation. On June 28 it was returned to the assistant adjutant-general of the division with the report of the investigation, which gives the testimony of several witnesses that Captain Bishop had admitted giving the orders, and of several others that they heard the order given by some one, while one witness testified that he, with others, did the shooting. Captain Flanders testified that he ordered the prisoners to the rear, and heard some one give the order to shoot them, but did not investigate. A lieutenant heard some one -- he thought at the time Bishop -- say, "Kill them! damn it, kill them!" One witness testified that on the day of the battle "word was passed along the line that the orders were to take no prisoners."

One private, who was said to have helped to kill the prisoners, said Major Metcalf gave the orders.

Major Mallory, who made the investigation, reported that at least two prisoners were shot; that the prisoners, either because they did not understand what was said to them or were afraid or were wounded and unable to walk, were slow in going to the rear; and that the evidence as to Bishop's action was conflicting, since he denied the statements of the witnesses quoted, which directly implicated him. Finally, Major Mallory finds that Captain Charles S. Flanders,... having detailed two men to take the prisoners to the rear, and knowing that the prisoners were not taken to the rear, but, according to his own statement, were shot, was guilty of gross neglect of duty in not investigating the matter, or reporting it to higher authority, and in taking no steps whatever to bring the guilty parties to justice.

An investigation had now, at least, been had; and the facts were reported to the highest authority in the islands. It was shown that the crime had been committed; and Private Putnam, who admitted the shooting, said that he acted under orders. The evidence that Bishop gave the orders was very strong, and against it was substantially only his denial. It is worth while to observe that while the witnesses against Bishop were called before Major Mallory and examined under oath, Funston, Metcalf, and Bishop were not called, but sent statements not under oath.

What steps were taken to bring the guilty parties to justice?

On June 30, 1899, by command of General Otis, the papers were sent to judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Crowder, who has since been employed on several investigations, with the recommendation that Private Brenner should be court-martialled for writing and conniving at the publication of the article which brought out this investigation. The article contains a wilful falsehood concerning himself and a false charge against Captain Bishop.

In other words, General Otis proposed to punish the soldier whose statement led to the discovery of the crime, and not the criminal. He recommended also that Private Putnam, who admitted helping to kill, be tried by court-martial, but suggested no further steps, thus urging the punishment of a private for obeying orders but letting the man who gave the orders go free.

Lieutenant Colonel Crowder, in reply on July 3, 1899, said:

I am not convinced from a careful reading of this report that Private Brenner has made a false charge against Captain Bishop. It is certain that the evidence is far from conclusive that he did so.... The offence of Private Putnam -- if he has committed one -- is manslaughter. His only defence would be the lawful order of his superior officer. If put on trial, it is probable that facts would develop implicating many others. I doubt the propriety of his trial, and am of the opinion that considerations of public policy sufficiently grave to silence every other demand require that no further action be taken in this case.

Finally, on July 13, 1899, General Otis forwarded the papers to the adjutant-general of the army in Washington, with this endorsement by himself:

After mature deliberation, I doubt the wisdom of a court-martial in this case, as it would give the insurgent authorities a knowledge of what was taking place, and they would assert positively that our troops had practiced inhumanities, whether the charge should be proven or not, as they would use it as an excuse to defend their own barbarities; and it is not thought that this charge is very grievous under the circumstances then existing, as it was very early in the war, and the patience of our men was under great strain.

The War Department accepted this advice.

It has been claimed that the action of our soldiers and officers was justified by General Order No. 100, issued during the Civil War, with the approval of Abraham Lincoln. Let us see how it bears on this case. Section 3, paragraph 71, provides as follows:

Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the army of the United States or is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed.

Upon this record it is clear that the highest authorities declined to punish proved acts of barbarity, which subjected the guilty parties to the penalty of death, not because their guilt was in doubt, but because it was probable "that facts would develop implicating many others." They declined to investigate, not because there was no reason, but because there was too much reason; and the commander-in-chief actually proposed to punish the witness who had made the crime known, and to let the criminal go free. Nay, more. He allowed himself to say that it was not a "very grievous" crime to kill helpless prisoners, because it was very early in the war, and the patience of our men was under great strain, --as if men grow more patient with their enemies as war progresses.

This episode called forth no criticism or order from the War Department, and thus the record stands, that the military authorities at the very outset of the war let it be understood that the killing of prisoners was, on the whole, a venial offence, not likely to be punished; for it must have been generally known that this investigation had taken place, and that nothing had been done to punish the guilty parties. Is it not probable also that the spirit which led General Otis to advise the court-martial of the unhappy Brenner made itself felt throughout the army, and that the word was passed along the ranks, "Whatever you see, it is not safe to tell"?

But the record does not end here. It will be observed that the only persons implicated directly by the testimony taken by Major Mallory were two or three privates, who seem to have shot the prisoners, and Captain Bishop and Major Metcalf, who were said to have ordered the killing. Yet something else would seem to have been within the knowledge of Lieutenant Colonel Crowder, when he said that probably "facts would develop implicating many others." What those facts were may be guessed from the testimony of Corporal Bradley before Major Mallory:

Whence came this order?

Charges Renewed and Made Definite

There was a discussion in the newspapers which implicated Funston and Wilder S. Metcalf, and in which their statements were controverted by a number of officers and privates in their regiment, the Twentieth Kansas. This, according to the newspapers, led Adjutant-general Corbin to say that no charges had ever been made against either Funston or Metcalf, and that, while he knew nothing of the facts, the charges against them were groundless and malicious.

In consequence of this, on January 9, 1900, John F. Hall, of Lawrence, Kansas, a lieutenant in the regiment, in a letter addressed to the Adjutant-general, made direct charges against them, among which were:

Fifth. -- That on the tenth day of February, 1899, the said Wilder S. Metcalf did maliciously, wilfully, and without just cause, shoot and kill an unarmed prisoner of war on his knees before him, begging for life, in violation of the fifty-eighth article of war.

In support of these charges he offered as witnesses, giving their names, six captains, seven lieutenants, and seven privates, all of the Twentieth Kansas, "and other officers and men, whose names I will give when needed."

He gave the statements of officers and men testifying directly to facts of which they were eye-witnesses showing that Metcalf and Bishop both killed prisoners. He stated directly:

And again:

He quoted another witness, who said:

He quoted Funston's statement in an interview published in the San Francisco Examiner of November 23, 1899, as follows:

He further stated that Funston and Metcalf had claimed credit and received promotion for gallant actions which they had never performed, and made a series of charges which, if true, should have led to Funston's punishment and disgrace.

He pointed out also that two of the privates, whose affidavits against Metcalf and Funston had been printed, had re-enlisted and were now in the service, and that Funston in an interview had said that he would take advantage of this fact to have these witnesses dealt with for making their statements.

Here, certainly, were charges made by an officer and backed by evidence which should have led to a searching inquiry. What did happen?

How Secretary Root Investigated the Charge of Killing Prisoners

On January 19 Secretary Root ordered that Lieutenant Hall's communication be sent to the commanding general at Manila, with instructions to investigate only so much of the allegations as charged Wilder S. Metcalf ... with having killed an unarmed prisoner of war and Brigadier-general Frederick Funston, United States Army, with having used his influence to prevent a fair and impartial investigation of the shooting of such prisoner, and to convene a board of officers for the purpose.

Three things are conspicuous in this order:

The Secretary was willing to inquire whether one prisoner had been killed, but not whether the killing of many had been ordered. Did he think that an order to give no quarter was not an offence, or, like Lieutenant Colonel Crowder, that an investigation would implicate so many that it was undesirable? In either case a refusal to investigate, especially after the public notoriety which the charges had received, meant to the army that the Secretary of War did not propose to punish such barbarity, whether it was the fault of a single officer or a general practice.

3. No court-martial or court of inquiry is ordered, only an investigating board. The difference is important, as will appear.

On March 1, 1900, General Otis appointed "a board of officers" to investigate the charges specified in the Secretary's order, which met on March 5 at Angeles, Philippine Islands, at 2.15 P.M.

The next day this board asked for further instructions, pointing out that Metcalf was in the United States, that in Mr. Hall's communication the names of many witnesses, ex-officers, and ex-soldiers of volunteers are given who are in the United States, and asking:

1. Is the board to investigate these accusations without the said Metcalf being present, and without his having an opportunity to refute these accusations?

2. Is the board to confine its investigation to such witnesses as are in the Philippine Islands?

3. The essential difference between the powers and procedure of this board and those of a board of inquiry are not clear to the board.

On March 7 the board received this reply by command of General Otis from the Assistant Adjutant-general of the department:

From this letter it is clear the Secretary ordered a partial examination of two out of many charges by an unsworn board, where the complainant and his witnesses could not be present, where General Funston and his witnesses were to be heard personally, and where affidavits could be used instead of having witnesses personally examined. Secretary Root, a trained lawyer, knows well that cross-examination is needed to sift testimony, and that a witness on the stand, in the presence of judge or jury, is far more likely to be weighed correctly than if his affidavit only be read. A tribunal thus instructed to hear the defendant and unable to hear the witnesses against him is a tribunal which cannot do justice.