Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International

Front matter

THE REPORT

OF THE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Report of the Executive Committee of the Comintern

REPORT

OF THE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMINTERN.

Comrades, our Communist International has now been in existence for three years. The Executive Committee, however, as an international institution, has actually been in operation only one year, since the Second Congress. Between the First and Second Congresses ,our leading body consisted, in general merely of a group of Russian comrades. It was not an easy matter to get the parties at the end of the Second Congress to delegate their representatives to the Executive Committee for the entire year. The comrades who participated at the Second Congress will recall that the representatives of the German party, for example, and of other parties as well, opposed the appointment in Moscow of delegates of the various parties to the Executive Committee, and to have these delegates work here for an entire year. They preferred to leave the leadership, as it had been, in the hands of the Russian comrades. It was only when we protested and absolutely insisted on our demand that the Congress accepted our proposal, and then affiliated parties appointed their delegates to the Executive Committee. But we are compelled to declare that even during this one year not all the parties fulfilled their duty towards the International. Some of them did so only to a slight degree, and for that reason the connections were rather unsatisfactory. In this respect, no one is less satisfied with the work of the Executive Committee than that body itself. We demand that measures be taken at this Third Congress to establish a real Executive Committee, international in its make-up, an Executive Committee which would deal with all the current daily affairs and organise the political leadership on a really international scale. We must discuss the activities of the Executive Committee with perfect frankness. These activities have been very faulty. Mistakes have been made, and we are looking forward with interest to the discussions and the proposals to be made by the various parties.

In the matter of organisation we can say right at the start that our work was imperfect, at times even bad. Nevertheless, comrades, I believe we may state with some degree of satisfaction that in spite of everything we had, during this year, a really international leadership for the first time in the history of the modern labour movement.

As you probably recall, the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International was neither a leading body politically nor an institution attending to practical, daily affairs. It used to meet once every three months, mostly on dress parade, as it were. The leadership of the Communist International during the first two years was not yet entirely international, to be sure, and only during the past year—we can say this with satisfaction—did we succeed in laying the foundations for an institution, composed of representatives of at least ten or twelve parties, and which has, at any rate, attempted to conduct the Communist labour movement along international lines also with regard to its leadership. I believe, comrades, that this is of great advantage for the International labour movement. And if we all agree that our International shall continue to develop in the same direction, if we are all determined to spare no pains and co-operate with all our power, we shall soon possess a real and efficient International leadership.

We called this Congress together somewhat earlier than required by our statutes. We were led to do so by the consciousness of the great responsi- bility which the first really International Executive body had assumed at a time when highly important processes of development were going on in many countries, in countries of great significance for the modern labour movement. We take it for granted that between Congresses the International Executive Committee possesses decisive power. But we also felt that, whenever important questions arise, and if there are any possibilities of doing so, it is the duty of the Executive Committee to appeal to the Congress as the source of all our decisions. And in view of the fact that we have problems of prime importance to solve in a number of countries, we were of the opinion that, since the possibility existed, it was our duty to assemble the World Congress at the earliest possible moment, and have it decide on these momentous questions.

I shall now submit, comrades, a number of statistics concerning the activities of our Executive Committee. Hardly 11 months have passed since our Second Congress. During this period the Executive Committee held 31 sessions and discussed 196 questions; 128 of these were purely political, the remainder were of an organisational nature. Our best connections were with Germany, and it was just in that country that the development within the labour movement was of greatest significance. Germany appeared on the agenda of the Executive Committee 21 times during the period mentioned, Italy 12 times, America 12, England 9, Roumania 12, Checho-Slovakia 10, France 7, Bulgaria 7, and the Near and Far East 10. Then there were other countries which appeared 2, 3, or 4 times on the agenda. I also desire to point out that, as most of you know, we had a Small Bureau besides the Executive, consisting of 7 comrades, which met even more frequently than the Executive—about twice as often. We received a great number of visitors from various countries during this year. In this respect we have less to com- plain of than during the previous year. The possibilities of journeying to Russia were much more favourable, and a number of parties took ample advantage of these possibilities. What was the political substance of our work during the past year? Of course, this political work was determined by the decision of the Second Congress. What was, in general, the work accomplished by the Second Congress? We already said that the Second Congress was as a matter of fact the First Congress, the constituent Congress of the Communist International. For the Congress which we usually refer to as the first was merely a meeting of very small number of representatives of various groups. For that reason the Second Congress was the actual constituent Congress. It drew up for the first time the statutes of the Communist International. It adopted the basic resolutions concerning the roles of the parties, and in general outlines defined the policies of the Communist International. In what directions did the Second Congress operate? There was a struggle in two directions at that Congress. On the one hand, we had to combat the ideas of some of our comrades, such as some of the English, Italian, and American delegates, who considered themselves as a "left" opposition to us. For example, the question of the participation of the English comrades in the Labour Party. The Second Congress had to discuss this matter for two days.

Our English comrades were practically unanimous in their objection to such participation. They considered such a policy as opportunistic. Our American comrades, the late John Reed and his friends, supported them in this matter. We opposed them on this point. We were of the opinion that especially in England, a country in which the mass movement was growing so splendidly, but in which the influence of the Communist Party was increasing only very gradually, that in such a country it was our un- doubted duty to join every mass organisation embracing hundreds of thousands and millions of. proletarians, to organise ourselves within these bodies, and to build Communist nuclei, in order to gain influence in the organisations. In this respect, therefore, the instructions we received from the Second Congress was quite distinct: to join these mass organisations, and to require all our young Communist groups to join such organisations as the Labour Party and the Trade Unions. We said to them: "You must organise yourselves there; you must combat the trade union bureaucracy, and reformist-socialist policies within the trade unions; you must succeed in permeating these organisations with the spirit of Communism."

On the other hand, we were also compelled to oppose the "left" elements at the Second Congress on the question of parliamentarism. You will recall that Comrade Bordiga, whom we can now consider as one of our best comrades in Italy and in the Communist International, one of the most upright revolutionaries in our ranks, that he and his group threw down the gauntlet to us in this very hall in a battle on principle against parliamentarism. They were supported by a number of Swiss and Belgian comrades. We opposed such a policy, and we succeeded in moving the Second Congress to decide that Communists must not leave unutilised the weapon of revolutionary parliamentarism. Our viewpoint was the same as that which proved decisive in the question of joining the Labour Party and participating in the Trade Unions. That was one decision taken by the Congress. The second decision found expression in the famous 21 points. This decision, which was much more decisive than the first in its influence on our activities of the past year, was directed against opportunism and the centrists as well as semi-centrist elements.

Whereas our comrades of the "left" opposition were no enemies of ours, but merely friends with sectarian conceptions, who had not yet fully grasped many of the concrete conditions, we found a great number of enemies to the "right." You will recall that, at the time of the session of the Second Congress, the general situation in Europe and America was such that it was growing to be the fashion to belong to the Communist International. Every half-way clever centrist wanted to belong to the Communist International. America sent us a delegation of the Hillquit party, the tendency of which was just about the same as that of the right Independent Socialist Party or the Scheidemannists in Germany.

This delegation was quite surprised that we did not receive it any too hospitably. You remember that Dittmann and Crispien, who are now unofficially participating in the bourgeois government, were here and declared their desire of joining the Communist International. You also recall that the Italian reformists, d'Aragona among them, who have now proved to be open saboteurs of the proletarians, were here, too, and deemed it quite obvious that they belonged to the Third International.

On the other hand, the situation was so indefinite and our relations so insufficient that we here in Russia, on account of the blockade, were very badly informed. We were so naive as to receive such gentlemen as d'Aragona very fraternally in the beginning. And even now I feel ashamed when I recall that I am partly to blame for the fact that thousands of splendid Petrograd proletarians literally carried those persons on their shoulders through the revolutionary streets of Petrograd. We thought that real brothers had come to us.

It was during that very Second Congress that the situation began to grow rather clear. The Congress as you know had taken a sharp stand against the "right" elements. Our real enemies were to the "right." We were very well aware that these shrewd people would swallow everything, if they could only get into the Communist International and sabotage it from within. For that reason we drew up the 21 points. These decisions influenced all our activities. After the Second Congress the situation in Germany was such that only the Spartacus Bund belonged to the Communist International, an organisation with a glorious past, but which, at that time, had not yet become a mass party. Then there was the U.S.P. (Independent Socialist Party of Germany) with its left wing. The task imposed upon us by the Second Congress was to draw in the best, really Communist elements of the U.S.P. and unite them with the Spartacists.

We had a similar task imposed upon us with regard to other countries.

Now, comrades, when, after a year of activity, we look back to the decisions of the Second Congress, we ask ourselves: Who was right in the disputes with our "left" friends and our "right" enemies? Let us take for example the question of the participation of the English Communists in the Labour Party. As you know, the Labour Party, at the behest of Henderson and Macdonald, decided, of its own accord, to refuse our comrades admission. I believe that that is the best evidence that we were right, and not our English comrades, who feared that they would lose their Communist innocence in joining the Labour Party. The opportunists felt this danger immediately, they realised immediately that, if the Communists organised within the Labour Party and attempted to exercise influence from within, it would mean a great danger to the Labour Party.

Serati, about whom we will have more to say later on, supported the "lefts" in this question. He asked, "How is it possible to join a Labour Party?" He wrote an article: "Behold the inconsistency of the Communist International! In Italy it demands the exclusion of Turati, whereas, in England, it demands the participation of the Communists in the Labour Party!" Serati is not such an ignorant child that he does not really understand, that there is just a little difference between these two cases. He attempted with premeditation intentionally to mislead the Italian proletarians. I believe our English comrades will admit to-day, that not they, but rather the Second Congress was right in this matter, when it declared: "Not out of the Labour Party, but into it, in order to fight for Communism from within, and to brand the treacherous leaders from within." (Applause.)

As regards Parliamentarism we have as yet no big success to record for the current year. This must be admitted. After all the splits it has been revealed that the parliamentary factions comprise the most hesitating, the most moderate and the most inferior elements. This has been the case in France, as in Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. In fact, wherever we had any splits this year.

One other point. If you ask me, which of the 21 conditions have been most imperfectly fulfilled during. this year, I must answer: the one which demands complete subordination of the parliamentary factions to the Party and the carrying on of real revolutionary parliamentarism. But, comrades, I believe that although we have as yet achieved very little in this respect, it is nevertheless, clear that in this question also the majority of the Second Congress was right. In several countries we may already record our initial successes, and we will urge the Third Congress to do everything necessary to have our Party advance forward in this respect.

Now, comrades, what was the mandate, what was the watchword given to the Executive by the Second Congress? The watchword was, as regards England, America, and other countries where Communism is a feeble movement as yet, but where there is a numerous working class and a great Labour movement, to urge our comrades there into close contact with the masses, that they should not hold aloof, that they should not become a sect, but throw themselves into the movement of the masses.

The second task was this: Wherever it was fashionable to belong to the Third International, the Executive had to do everything possible to unmask all those over-wise diplomats of the Centrist camp, to whip them in front of the masses to detach from them their best elements and draw the. latter into the Communist fold. These were the great political tasks and also very important problems of organisation. These were the tasks given to us by the Second Congress, and it is for us here to-day to judge as to how far we have fulfilled these tasks under the given circumstances.

To take events in their chronological order, the Party conference of the German Independents at Halle has marked the most important mile stone in the development during the past year. But politically the German situation was not quite so trying to the Communist International as was the Italian situation with regard to the difficulties, which we experienced during this year, as also with regard to the indications of a certain crisis in the Communist International. I will, therefore, deal at greater length with the Italian question.

THE ITALIAN QUESTION.

I have already explained that when the Italian Delegation came to Moscow the means of communication were so imperfect that we didn't know that reformists had come with the Delegation. We had complete confidence in Serati and also in the men that he had brought along with him. We had a notion, to be sure, that these were not quite clear-cut elements, but we thought that they were honestly for the Proletarian Revolution. And it was in this respect that we have met with a shocking disappoint- ment. The printed record of the proceedings of the Second Congress has appeared in German translation only during the last few days. I hope that the technical apparatus will work more efficiently this time, so that perhaps we may have the record of the Third Congress within a month. The German comrades will at least be able to read the record of the Second Congress, Now, while perusing the record and scrutinising the attitude of Serati and the Italian comrades, one cannot help asking the question: How could we ever entertain any illusions, how could we hope that Serati would belong to us?

The Record contains a table showing how frequently the various speakers had spoken. Serati had spoken four times on questions of principle, the national question, the agrarian question, the question of the 21 conditions, and on the question of the principal tasks of the Communist International. As you see, all these comprise the most important questions discussed at the Congress. Serati made declarations upon all these questions, stating every time that he would vote against or abstain. He would then continue for another ten minutes reciting anecdotes, but the trend of his remarks upon these four very decisive questions was directed against the Congress. We had thought at the time that these were merely misunderstandings, and did everything possible to convince him. Later events have shown the error of our judgment. We even had to publish a special book upon the question of the relations of the Socialist Party of Italy to the Communist International.

That book mainly consisted of articles, declarations and resolutions by Serati himself. We regret that we have to report to-day upon this question in the absence of representatives of the Italian Socialist Party. But we have done everything possible to get them here, we have informed them three months and a half in advance, inviting them and requesting them to arrive at the appointed time. Upon the arrival of the first group of Italian comrades a fortnight ago, we sent another telegram asking them to come in time. The members of the Party have so far failed to put in an appearance, although three weeks have already elapsed since the first of June, the originally appointed day for the opening of the Congress, and during this time about a thousand delegates from all countries have managed to arrive here. It means that the Italian comrades: do not wish to come. I am, therefore, compelled to try and explain the Italian Socialist Party.

The first article published, by Serati in the 'Avanti' immediately on his return home, contained nothing else than an attempt by Serati to discredit the Congress of the Communist: International. I shall have to quote extensively, and I ask the indulgence of the comrades beforehand. Personally I am of the opinion that the Italian question is a determining one for the political activity of the Executive during the past year. Now, here is what Serati wrote in his first article:

Firstly: "The Second Congress began under the following circumstances. The majority of the delegates had left for Russia before the 21 conditions had become known in their respective countries, and their mandates were consequently only of general and personal character."

The first Serati sentence, the first Serati truth. Then comes the following:

Secondly: "Various items on the agenda had not been discussed in the different countries, and consequently several not unimportant questions had not been made known to them at all."

I must declare that on comparing the preparations for the Second Congress and the Third, it must be admitted that the preparations for the Second Congress have been made much more carefully than for the Third. The Theses had been ready for weeks ahead, and upon all important questions we had had lengthy discussions with the Independent Socialist Party for a month previously.

Thus the second sentence, the second untruth.

Thirdly: "The far-away distance of the meeting-place of the Congress from the countries of the proletarian movement, the difficulties of communication, the blockade which had gone on for so long, the almost total absence of control on the part of the workers, who should have been admitted to the sessions, and on the part of the press, which should have beer given every facility for widespread publication—all this gave the sessions the character of a closed assembly, deprived of all contact with the outside world."

This was written by Serati a few days after the Congress, a few days after he had been sitting in the presidental chair. No control by the workers, no control by the press, forsooth. Just a secret conspiracy!

Fourthly: "The members of the Congress were poorly acquainted with one another—(this is quite true, for we were certainly poorly acquainted with the real Serati)—as well as with the respective movements, with the actual forces represented by the various delegates, and with the means and influences at their disposal to affect international policy."

This assertion of Serati is, of course, also far removed from the truth.

Fifthly: "The Congress conducted its conferences under the protection of a great revolutionary government—(perhaps, this was also not to Serati's liking)—at a time when its fighting forces were engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the forces of reaction, while the Communist government was compelled—as it is compelled even now—to conduct its own defensive and aggressive policy against international and national capitalism."

At this point begin the villainous insinuations of Serati. Here is what he says in his fifth point:

"… A policy which, while helping the Soviet Republic, at the same time, can be of undisputed benefit to the proletariat as a whole, yet it may not suit the tactical necessities of another country, which is still within the critical process of its own revolution."

I would like to ask the comrades of the Communist Labour Party of Germany (K.A.P.D.) to pay attention to this fifth point of Serati, because Serati has here in mind the Left-wingers of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, who are now making use of the articles of Hermann Gorter.

Sixthly: "There was a manifest disproportion between the qualities of the individual delegates, to an unprecedented extent, even for international congresses. This was a substantial cause of the many conceivable difficulties, pausings and waverings in the discussions."

This may be interpreted by everyone according to his taste. I, for one, am puzzled by the expression: "Different qualities at an International Communist Congress." I think he meant to say the same thing as Gilferding, when he laughed at the Mohamedan priest of Chiva. Fine Communists that they are!

Seventhly: "The allotment of votes to the individual countries did not correspond to the actual political and moral importance of the respective Parties, but rather to the capitalist importance of the countries represented. Thus, France received as many votes as Italy, although the French delegates represented only a very insignificant minority of the Party as well as of the Confederation."

Serati thus stops at nothing that might compromise the Second Congress.

Eighth: "The remoteness of the meeting place of the Congress and the difficulties of communication were an obstacle to the spreading of information about its decisions, in the same or even in a higher degree than during the preparations. Suffice it is to mention that some Parties did not obtain any reports of the Congress even two months after its conclusion while the final text of the decisions were received over a month after the Congress," etc.

We thus see that Serati, but few weeks after the closing of the Second Congress in September, 1920, already did everything possible and impossible to lower the Congress in the eyes of the Italian proletariat, to represent the Congress in such a way as though it had been neither Communist nor International. Unfortunately we ourselves at the time were lacking the requisite foresight, and we were still clinging to the hope that Serati would yet prove himself a man adhering to the Communist International idea.

The situation in Italy, however, was such that Serati had to "make a jolly face while playing a losing game." Take the 21 conditions as an instance. He declared himsel—as, indeed, he couldn't do otherwise—for the 21 conditions. In the article quoted he declares: "We accept the 21 conditions, which have been put to the Socialists of all countries in an excessively acute form, but we make two reservations:—

"(1) No excessive leniency should be shown to those who, contaminated by nationalistic drumbeating during the war, had betrayed the proletariat in shameful fashion, and who now, in the same light-minded manner, declare their submission to the strict discipline prescribed by Moscow, and who will betray us again to-morrow. We encounter by far too many Pauls on the way of the proletariat, which should cause us some misgivings as to whether they are all genuine; and although the moral judgment of the past record of people in the revolutionary struggle is by no means of great significance, there is at any rate a political criterion which determines the immorality of a certain kind of conversations, and this criterion must be unrelentingly applied by the proletariat in order to prevent the presence of traitors within its ranks.

"(2) The Parties affiliated to the Third International must be given the right—under their own responsibility—to undertake the necessary cleaning operation operation within their ranks in such a manner that the cohesion of the proletarian movement as well as the revolution itself, which is believed in Moscow to be so close at hand, should come to no harm."

Thus, at the outset, Serati cloaks himself in the mantle of a left-winger and a revolutionist, declaring that he would make it his first condition, that a strict attitude be maintained towards the "right," particularly towards the French comrades. Our French comrades seem to be the object of his particular hatred. I do not know what his reasons are. He attempted to play before the Italian workers the part of an orthodox who would apply the strictest severity against the right-wing. Then he put up a twenty-second condition. He said that a twenty-second condition had been adopted against the Freemasons, but that Zinoviev had tucked it away in his pocket, and that condition was no more. Serati went to Italy to peddle such wares in real earnest. But what was the real position as regards the Freemasons? It was a proposal made by the Italian comrades, which we found quite sensible to accept, but at the same time we declared it impossible for the Communist International to have it published. Yet, Serati went before the Italian working class and, in full earnest, represented the situation as though I was in all probability a Freemason, and that the majority had been on the side of Freemasonry. The Second condition proposed by Serati takes an altogether nebulous form: "The cleaning shall take place, but in such a manner that the cohesion of the proletarian movement should come to no harm." Later on he discovered other formulas, such as a combination of cleaning and autonomy, which means that the cleaning should be left entirely to the Party concerned.

This was followed by a discussion on the question at the Central Committee of the Italian Party, where two resolutions were proposed, one by Comrade Terracini and another by Comrade Baratano, a friend of Serati. Comrade Terracini demands unconditional acceptance of the 21 conditions. Comrade Baratano also demands acceptance, but that the Party shall leave to itself the interpretation of the conditions.

On a vote being taken by the Central Committee, Comrade Terracini obtained the majority, and Serati was defeated. Serati, to frighten the people, announced his resignation as editor of "Avanti." Our Italian comrades, instead of hailing this resignation with enthusiasm, declared that this wouldn't do, that Serati must stay. Our comrades have by this time found out their mistake, and we do not wish to throw salt upon their wounds. But they did commit a mistake in retaining Serati at his editorial post, oh the assumption that he would carry out the decisions of the Central Committee. Serati retained control of "Avanti," the great influential newspaper with its 200,000 circulation, using it for every purpose but the carrying out of the decisions of the Central Committee. He began an outrageous polemical campaign of mud-slinging against the Executive. Later on I will read to you some of the spiciest quotations. Then came the Reformist conference at Reggio Emilia. The Reformists at that conference organised themselves into a "concentration section." They certainly did concentrate. Truati and d'Aragona took part in the conference. These people are shrewd and know better than to come directly before the Italian workers and declare themselves against the Com- munist International. Therefore, they said in their resolution as follows: "The differences of opinion in the movement of the historical period through which we are passing, cannot serve as sufficient cause for splitting the Party. The various schools within the Socialist Party, which had always existed in the past, have by no means hindered its mighty growth; neither will they prove to be any hindrance to fraternal and common work in the future; and the fruit borne by this work will be in direct ratio to the amount of respect shown by the various factions within the Party towards one another and towards the common will, with liberty of opinion fully maintained with regard to every situation, and the strictest discipline in the manifold forms of development of the class struggle."