Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning

Front matter

REFLECTIONS

UPON

Ancient and Modern

Epistle

TO THE

Right Honourable

DANIEL

Earl of Nottingham,

Baron Finch of Daventry.

May it please Your Lordship,

SInce I am, upon many Accounts, obliged to lay the Studies and Labours of my Life at Your Lordship's Feet, it will not, I hope, be thought Presumption in me to make this following Address, which, on my Part, is an Act of Duty. I could not omit so fair an Opportunity of declaring how sensible I am of the Honour of being under Your Lordship's Patronage. The Pleasure of telling the World that one is raised by Men who are truly Great and Good, works too powerfully to be smothered in the Breast of him that feels it; especially since a Man is rarely censured for shewing it, but is rather commended for gratifying such an Inclination, when he thankfully publishes to whom he is indebted for all the Comforts and Felicities of his Life.

But Your Lordship has another Right to these Papers, which is equal to that of their being mine: The Matter it self directs me to Your Lordship as the proper Patron of the Cause, as well as of its Advocate. Those that enquire whether there is such a Spirit now in the World as animated the greatest Examples of Antiquity, must seek for living Instances, as well as abstracted Arguments; and those they must take care to produce to the best Advantage, if they expect to convince the World that they have found what they sought for.

This therefore being the Subject of this following Enquiry, it seemed necessary to urge the strongest Arguments first, and to prepossess the World in favour of my Cause, by this Dedication. For those that consider that the Vertues which make up a great Character, such as Magnanimity, Capacity for the highest Employments, Depth of Judgment, Sagacity, Elocution, and Fidelity, are united in as eminent a Degree in Your Lordship, as they are found asunder in the true Characters of the Ancient Worthies; that all this is rendred yet more Illustrious by Your Exemplary Piety and Concern for the Church of England, and Your Zeal for the Rights and Honour of the English Monarchy; and last of all, that these Vertues do so constantly descend from Father to Son in Your Lordship's Family, that its Collateral Branches are esteemed Publick Blessings to their Age and Country; will readily confess that the World does still improve, and will go no further than Your Lordship, to silence all that shall be so hardy as to dispute it.

Justice therefore, as well as Gratitude, oblige me to present these Papers to Your Lordship: Though, since I have taken the Freedom, in several Particulars, to dissent from a Gentleman, whose Writings have been very kindly received in the World, I am bound to declare, that the chief Reason of this Address was, to let the World see, that I have a Right to subscribe my self,

May it please Your Lordship,

Your Lordship's

Most Obliged,

And Most Dutiful

Servant and Chaplain,

William Wotton.

Preface

PREFACE.

T Argument of these following Papers seems, in a great Measure, to be so very remote from that holy Profession, and from those Studies, to which I am, in a more particular Manner, obliged to dedicate my self, that it may, perhaps, be expected that I should give some Account of the Reasons which engaged me to set about it.

In the first Place therefore, I imagined, that if the several Boundaries of Ancient and Modern Learning were once impartially stated, Men would better know what were still unfinished, and what were, in a manner, perfect; and consequently, what deserved the greatest Application, upon the Score of its being imperfect: Which might be a good Inducement to set those Men, who, having a great Genius, find also in themselves an Inclination to promote Learning, upon Subjects wherein they might, probably, meet with Success answerable to their Endeavours: By which Means, Knowledge, in all its Parts, might at last be compleated. I believed likewise, that this might insensibly lead Men to follow such, and only such, for their Guides, as they could confide in for the ablest and best in those several Kinds of Learning to which they intended to apply their Thoughts. He that believes the Ancient Greeks and Romans to have been the greatest Masters of the Art of Writing that have ever yet appeared, will read them as his Instructors, will copy after them, will strive to imitate their Beauties, and form his Stile after their Models, if he proposes to himself to be excellent in that Art himself: All which Things will be neglected, and he will content himself to read them in their Translations, to furnish his Mind with Topicks of Discourse, and to have a general Notion of what these Ancient Authors say, if he thinks he may be equally excellent a nearer Way. To read Greek and Latin with Ease, is a Thing not soon learnt: The Languages are too much out of the common Road; and the Turn which the Greeks and Latins gave to all their Thoughts, cannot be resembled by what we ordinarily meet with in Modern Languages; which makes them tedious, till mastered by Use. So that constant Reading of the most perfect Modern Books, which does not go jointly on with the Ancients, in their Turns, will, by bringing the Ancients into Dis-use, cause the Learning of the next Generation to sink; by reason that they, not drawing from those Springs from whence these excellent Moderns drew, whom they only propose to follow, nor taking those Measures which these Men took, must, for want of that Foundation which these their Modern Guides first carefully laid, fail in no long Compass of Time.

Yet, on the other Hand, if Men who are unacquainted with these Things, should find every Thing to be commended because it is oldest, not because it is best; and afterwards should perceive that in many material and very curious Parts of Learning, the Ancients were, comparatively speaking, grosly ignorant, it would make them suspect that in all other Things also they were equally deficient; grounding their general Conclusion upon this very common, though erroneous, Principle, that because a Man is in an Errour in those Things whereof we can judge, therefore he must be equally mistaken in those Things where we cannot. Now, this Extream can be no Way more easily avoided, than by stating the due Limits of Ancient and Modern Learning; and shewing, in every Particular, to which we ought to give the Pre-eminence.

But I had another, and a more powerful Reason, to move me to consider this Subject; and that was, that I did believe it might be some way subservient to Religion it self. Among all the Hypotheses of those who would destroy our most holy Faith, none is so plausible as that of the Eternity of the World. The fabulous Histories of the Egyptians, Chaldeans and Chineses seem to countenance that Assertion. The seeming Easiness of solving all Difficulties that occurr, by pretending that sweeping Floods, or general and successive Invasions of Barbarous Enemies, may have, by Turns, destroyed all the Records of the World, till within these last Five or Six Thousand Years, makes it very amiable to those whose Interest it is, that the Christian Religion should be but an empty Form of Words, and yet cannot swallow the Epicurean Whimfies of Chance and Accident. Now the Notion of the Eternity of Mankind, through infinite successive Generations of Men, cannot be at once more effectually and more popularly confuted, than by shewing how the World has gone on, from Age to Age, improving; and consequently, that it is at present much more knowing than it ever was since the earliest Times to which History can carry us.

But upon Examination of this Question, several Difficulties ap- peared, which were carefully to be removed. The greatest was, That some Sciences and Arts, of a very compounded Nature, seem really to have been more perfect anciently than they are at present; which did, as it were, directly overthrow my Position. Therefore I was obliged, first, to enquire whether the Thing were true in Fact, or not: Next, If true, whether it proceeded from a particular Force of Genius, or from the Concurrence of some accidental Circumstances; and also, whether, in Case such Circumstances did concurr, in other Things, where those Accidents could have no Place, the Moderns did not out-do the Ancients so much, as, allowing the World to be no older than the Mosaical Account, it was reasonably to be expected that they should. For then, if all these Questions could be satisfactorily resolved, the Objection would be no Objection at all; and Mankind might still be supposed to improve, even though in some Particulars they should go back, and fall short of the Perfection which once they had.

There is no Question but these Excellencies of the Ancients might be accounted for, without hurting the Account given by Moses, by resolving them into a particular Force of Genius, evidently discernable in former Ages, but extinct long since. But this seemed to be of very ill Consequence, since it did, as it were, suppose that Nature were now worn out, and spent; and so mi↗ght tempt a Libertine to think that Men, like Mushrooms, sprung out of the Earth when it was fresh and vigorous, impregnated with proper Seminal Atoms, now, of many Ages, no longer seen.

When nothing therefore seemed so likely to take off the Force of the main Objection, as the finding of particular Circumstances which might suit with those Ages that did exceed ours, and with those Things wherein they did exceed them, and with no other Age nor Thing besides; I did at last please my self, that I had found these Circumstances; and in setting them down, I took Care, neither to be deceived my self, nor (as I hope) to deceive any Body else.

But what shall be said to those numerous Deluges, which, no Body knows how many Ages before that of Noah, or before one another, are said to have carried away all Mankind, except here and there a Couple of ignorant Salvages, who got to some high Mountain, and from thence afterwards replenished the Earth? This Hypothesis (as these Men call it) is so very precarious, that there needs nothing to be replied, but only that it is as easily dis-proved by denying, as affirmed by asserting, since no Records nor Traditions of the Memory of the Facts are pretended; and something easier, because it may be demonstrably proved, that a general Flood cannot be effected without a Miracle. Now, partial Deluges are not sufficient: If one Country be destroyed, another is preserved; and if the People of that Country have Learning among them, they will also have a Tradition, that it once was in the other Countries too, which are now dis-peopled.

Upwards of the Age of Hippocrates, Knowledge may be traced to its several Sources: But of any great Matters done before Moses, there are no sort of Foot-steps remaining, which do not, by their Contradictions, betray their Falshood; setting those aside which Moses himself has preserved. There is Reason to suppose that Invasions of Barbarous Enemies were anciently of the same Nature, as they have been since; that is, they might possibly make entire Conquests of the Countries which were so invaded; but we cannot suppose that any of these pretended Ante-Mosaical Conquests, of which we are now speaking, made a greater Alteration than that which the Goths and Vandals made in the Roman Empire; that which the Saracens first, and the Turks afterwards made in the Greek; or that of the Tartars in China. The Goths and Vandals had no Learning of their own; and if we consider Politeness of Manners, and nothing else, they seem truly to have deserved the Name of Barbarous: They therefore took some of the Roman Learning, as much as they thought was for their Turn, the Memory whereof can never be said to have been quite extinct during the whole Course of those ignorant Ages, which succeeded, and were the Effects of their Conquests. The Saxons in England, being taught by the British Refugees, who planted themselves in Ireland, and from thence, by the Way of Scotland, came by degrees back again into their own Country, had as much, if not more Learning than any of their Europæan Neighbours. The Saracens applied themselves to Learning in earnest, as soon as the Rage of their first Wars was over; and resolving to make theirs a compleat Conquest, robbed the Greeks of their Knowledge as soon as they had possessed themselves of the most valuable Parts of their Empire. The Turks learnt enough, not to be thought illiterate, though less proportionably than any of the forementioned Conquerors: They can write and read; they preserve some rude Annals of their own Exploits, and general Memorials, it matters not how imperfect, of precedent Times: And they lose none of the Mechanical Arts which they found in the Countries where they came, since they either work themselves, or employ others that shall; which, to the present Purpose, is all a case. The Tartars have, since their Conquest, incorporated themselves with the Chineses, and are now become one People, only preserving the Authority still in their own Hands.

In all these Instances one may observe, that how barbarous soever these several Conquerors were when first they came into a Civilized Country, they, in Time, learnt so much at least of the Arts and Sciences of the People whom they had subdued, as served them for the necessary Uses of Life; and thought it not beneath them to be instructed by those to whom they gave Laws. Wherefore there is Reason to believe, that since Mankind has always been of the same Make, former Conquests would have produced the same Effects, as we see later ones have done. In short, We cannot say that ever any one Invention of Universal Use has been laid aside, unless some other of greater, and more general Use has come in the Room of it, or the Conquerors took it away, for some Political Reason, either letting it totally die, or supplying it with something else, which to them seemed a valuable Equivalent. Have any of these Conquerors, since Tubal-Cain's Time, once suffered the Use of Metals, Iron for Instance, or Gold, to be lost in the World? Have Letters been ever lost, since the Time of that first Cadmus, whoever he was, that found them out? Or was Mankind ever put to the Trouble of inventing them a second Time? Have the Arts of Planting, of Weaving, or of Building, been at any Time intermitted? Does any Man believe that the Use of the Load-Stone will ever be forgotten? Are the Turks so barbarous, or so spightful to themselves, that they will not use Gun-powder, because it was taught them by Christians? Does not Garçilasso de la Vega inform us, that the Peruvians would have worshipped the Spaniards as Gods, if their Cruelties had not soon led these harmless People to take them to be something else, because they taught them the Use of Iron and Looking-Glasses? (Whence we may be sure that this innocent and honest Nation never had Learning amongst them before.) Do not we find that they and the Mexicans, in a Compass of Four or Five Hundred Years, which is the utmost Period of the Duration of either of their Empires, went on still improving? As the whole New World would, probably, have done in not many Ages, if these two mighty Nations had extended their Conquests, or if new Empires had arisen, even though the Spaniards had never come among them; since those two Empires of Mexico and Peru, which were the only considerable Civilized Governments in America, got constant Ground of their Enemies; having the same Advantages over them, as formed Troops have over a loose Militia. Or can we think that they would again have relapsed to their old Barbarity of themselves, when once they had been weary of those Arts, and of that Learning (such as it was) which then they had? Mankind is not so stupid a Thing, but if they do at any Time find out what may do them great and eminent Service, they will learn it, and make use of it, without enquiring who it is they learn it of, or taking a Prejudice at the Thing, because, perhaps, they may be indebted to an Enemy for it. Barbarous and Polite are Words which rather referr to Matters of Breeding and Elegance, than of Sound Judgment, or Common Sense; which first shew themselves in making Provision for Things of Convenience, and evident Interest, wherein Men scarce ever commit palpable Mistakes. So that it seems unaccountable that the History of Learning and Arts should be of so confessedly late a Date, if the Things themselves had been very many Ages older; much more if the World had been Eternal.

Besides these, I had a Third Reason to engage me to this Undertaking; which was, the Pleasure and Usefulness of those Studies to which it necessarily led me: For Discoveries are most talked of in the Mechanical Philosophy, which has been but lately revived in the World. Its Professors had drawn in to it the whole Knowledge of Nature, which, in an Age wherein Natural Religion is denied by many, and Revealed Religion by very many more, seemed highly important to be so far known at least, as that the Invisible Things of the Godhead may be clearly proved by the Things that are seen in the World. Wherefore I thought it might be Labour exceeding well spent, if, whilst I enquired into what was anciently known, and what is a new Discovery, I should at the same Time furnish my Mind with new Occasions of admiring the boundless Wisdom and Bounty of that Almighty and Beneficent Essence, in and by whom alone this whole Universe, with all its Parts, live, and move, and have their Being.

I had also a fresh Inducement to this Search, when I found to how excellent purpose my most learned and worthy Friend, Mr. Bentley, has, in his late Discourses against Atheism, shewn what admirable Use may be made of an accurate Search into Nature, thereby to lead us directly up to its Author, so as to leave the unbelieving World without Excuse.

But, after all that I have alledged for my self, I must acknowledge, that I soon found that I did not enough consider . The Subject was too vast for any one Man, much more for me, to think to do it Justice; and therefore, as soon as I had drawn up a rude Scheme of the Work, I intended to have given it over, if the importunate Sollicitations of my very ingenious Friend, Anthony Hammond, Esq had not at last prevailed upon me to try what might be said upon it: And it was so difficult a Thing to me to refuse what was so earnestly pressed by a Person who was so very dear to me, and which in the present Case was a great deal more; one, for whose Sence and Judgment, all that know him have so very particular a Regard, that I resolved at last, rather to hazard my own Reputation, than to deny his Request; especially, since I hoped that it might, perhaps, give some Body else an Opportunity to compleat that, of which this Treatise is a very imperfect Essay.

I hope I need make no Apology, that a great Part of this Discourse may seem too Polemical for a Writing of this kind: But that could not be avoided, because the Argument it self has been so much debated. The ablest Men of the two opposite Parties are, Sir William Temple, and Monsieur Perrault: They are too great Men, and their Writings are too well known, and too much valued, to be over-looked. They cloath their Thoughts in so engaging a Dress, that a Man is tempted to receive all they say, without Examination; and therefore I was afraid that I might have been accused of betraying my Cause, if, whilst I endeavoured to act the Part of a Mediator, and to give to every Side its just due, I had omitted what these two elegant Advocates had severally alledged for their respective Hypotheses.

What Censure the World will pass upon my Performance, I know not; only I am willing to think that those who shall not agree to what I say, will grant that I have represented the Opinions of other Men with Impartiality and Candour, and that I have not discovered any Bigottry or Inclination to any one particular Side; which will be a good Step to make them believe, that I shall not obstinately defend any one Position, which may hereafter be proved to be erroneous.

June 11. 1694.

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☞ THE Reader is desired to take Notice, that the Second Edition of Sir William Temple's Essay is quoted every where in this Book; but that all the Citations are also to be found in the Third Edition, which was Corrected and Enlarged by the Author.

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Chapter 1

REFLECTIONS

UPON

Ancient and Modern

LEARNING.

CHAP. 1.

General Reflections upon the State of the Question.

T present State of the Designs and Studies of Mankind is so very different from what it was 150 Years ago, that it is no Wonder if Men's Notions concerning them vary as much as the Things themselves. This great Difference arises from the Desire which every Man has, who believes that he can do greater Things than his Neighbours, of letting them see how much he does excel them: This will oblige him to omit no Opportunity that offers it self to do it, and afterwards to express his Satisfaction that he has done it. This is not only visible in particular Persons, but in the several Ages of Mankind, which are only Communities of particular Persons, living at the same time, as often as their Humours, or their Interests, lead them to pursue the same Methods. This Emulation equally shews it self, whatsoever the Subject be, about which it is employed; whether it be about Matters of Trade, or War, or Learning, it is all one: One Nation will strive to out-do another, and so will one Age too, when several Nations agree in the pursuit of the same Design; only the Jealousie is not so great in the Contest for Learning, as it is in that for Riches and Power; because these are Things which every several People strive to ingross all to themselves, so that it is impossible for bordering Nations to suffer with any Patience that their Neighbours should grow as great as they in either of them, to their own prejudice; though they will all agree in raising the Credit of the Age they live in upon that Account, that being the only Thing wherein their Interests do perfectly unite.

If this Way of Reasoning will bold, it may be asked how it comes to pass, that the Learned Men of the last Age did not pretend that they out-did the Ancients, as well as some do now? They would, without question, could they have had any Colour for it: It was the Work of one Age to remove the Rubbish, and to clear the Way for future Inventors. Men seldom strive for Mastery, where the Superiority is not in some sort disputable; then it is that they begin to strive; accordingly, as soon as there was a fair Pretence for such a Dispute, there were not wanting those who soon made the most of it, both by exalting their own Performances, and disparaging every Thing that had been done of that kind by their Predecessors: 'Till the new Philosophy had gotten Ground in the World, this was done very sparingly; which is but within the Compass of 40 or 50 Years. There were but few before, who would be thought to have exceeded the Ancients, unless it were some few Physicians, who set up Chymical Methods of Practice, and Theories of Diseases, founded upon Chymical Notions, in opposition to the Galenical: But these Men, for want of conversing much out of their own Laboratories, were unable to maintain their Cause to the general Conviction of Mankind: The Credit of the Cures which they wrought, not supporting them e- nough against the Reasonings of their Adversaries.

Soon after the Restauration of King Charles II. upon the Institution of the Royal Society, the Comparative Excellency of the Old and New Philosophy was eagerly debated in England. But the Disputes then managed between Stubbe and Glanvile, were rather Personal, relating to the Royal Society, than General, relating to Knowledge in its utmost extent. In France this Controversie has been taken up more at large: The French were not satisfied to argue the Point in Philosophy and Mathematicks, but even in Poetry and Oratory too; where the Ancients had the general Prejudice of the Learned on their Side. Monsieur de Fontenelle, the celebrated Author of a Book concerning the Plurality of Worlds, begun the Dispute about six Years ago, in a little Discourse annexed to his Pastorals. He is something shy in declaring his Mind; at least, in arraigning the Ancients, whose Reputations were already established; though it is plain he would be understood to give the Moderns the Preference in Poetry and Oratory, as well as in Philosophy and Mathematicks. His Book being received with great Applause, it was opposed in England by Sir William Temple, who, in the Second Part of his Miscellanea, has printed an Essay upon this very Subject. Had Monsieur de Fontenelles Discourse passed unquestioned, it would have been very strange, since there never was a new Notion started in the World, but some were found, who did as eagerly contradict it.

The Opinion which Sir William Temple appears for, is received by so great a Number of Learned Men, that those who oppose it ought to bring much more than a positive Affirmation; otherwise, they cannot expect that the World should give Judgment in their Favour. The Question now to be asked, has formerly been enquired into by few, besides those who have chiefly valued Oratory, Poesie, and all that which the French call the Belles Lettres; that is to say, all those Arts of Eloquence, wherein the Ancients are generally agreed to have been very excellent. So that Monsieur de Fontenelle took the wrong Course to have his Paradox be believed; for he asserts all, and proves little; he makes no Induction of Particulars, and rarely enters into the Merits of the Cause: He declares that he thinks Love of Ease to be the reigning Principle amongst Mankind; for which Reason perhaps he was loath to put himself to the trouble of being too minute. It was no wonder therefore if those to whom his Proposition appeared entirely new, condemned him of Sufficiency, the worst Composition out of the Pride and Ignorance of Mankind.

However, since his Reasonings are, generally speaking, very just, especially where he discourses of the Comparative Force of the Genius's of Men in the several Ages of the World, I resolved to make some Enquiry into the Particulars of those Things which are asserted by some to be Modern Discoveries, and vindicated to the Ancients by others.

The General Proposition which Sir William Temple endeavours to prove in this Essay, is this, "That if we reflect upon the Advantages which the ancient Greeks and Romans had, to improve themselves in Arts and Sciences, above what the Moderns can pretend to; and upon that natural Force of Genius, so discernable in the earliest Writers, whose Books are still extant, which has not been equalled in any Persons that have set up for Promoters of Knowledge in these latter Ages, and compare the Actual Performances of them both together, we ought in Justice to conclude, that the Learning of the pre- sent Age, is only a faint, imperfect Copy from the Knowledge of former Times, such as could be taken from those scattered Fragments which were saved out of the general Shipwreck."

The Question that arises from this Proposition will be fully understood, if we enquire, (1.) Into those Things which the Ancients may have been supposed to bring to Perfection, (in case they did so) not because they excelled those that came after them in Understanding, but because they got the Start by being born first. (2.) Whether there are any Arts or Sciences which were more perfectly practised by the Ancients, though all imaginable Care hath been since used to equal them. (3.) Whether there may not be others wherein they are exceeded by the Moderns, though we may reasonably suppose that both Sides did as well as they could.

When such Enquiries have once been made, it will be no hard matter to draw such Inferences afterwards, as will enable us to do Justice to both Sides.

It must be owned, that these Enquiries do not immediately resolve the Question which Sir William Temple put, for he confounds two very different Things together; namely, Who were the Greatest Men, the Ancients, or the Moderns? and, Who have carried their Enquiries furthest? The first is a very proper Question for a Declamation, though not so proper for a Discourse, wherein Men are supposed to reason severely, because, for want of Mediums whereon to found an Argument, it cannot easily be decided: For, though there be no surer Way of judging of the Comparative Force of the Genius's of several Men, than by examining the respective Beauty or Subtilty of their Performances; yet the good Fortune of appearing first, added to the Misfortune of wanting a Guide, gives the first Comers so great an Advantage, that though, for instance, the Fairy Queen, or Paradise Lost, may be thought by some to be better Poems than the Ilias; yet the same Persons will not say but that Homer was a greater Genius than either Spencer or Milton. And besides, when Men judge of the Greatness of an Inventor's Genius barely by the Subtilty and Curiosity of his Inventions, they may be very liable to Mistakes in their Judgments, unless they knew, and were able to judge of the Easiness or Difficulty of those Methods, or Ratiocinations, by which these Men arrived at, and perfected these their Inventions; which, with due Allowances, is equally applicable to any Per- formances in Matters of Learning of any sort.