Jainism in Western Garb, as a Solution to Life's Great Problems

Front matter

The Library of Jaina Literature. Vol. VI.

IN WESTERN GARB, AS A SOLUTION TO LIFE'S GREAT PROBLEMS

HERBERT WARREN

Preface

PREFACE.

The religion which is prevalent in the country of one's birth is naturally the first to be heard. In my case it was Church of England Christianity. It was adopted without criticism, without much concern, and without any doubt as to its truth and efficacy. In early manhood, however, new views were met with, the intellect began to work, questions arose, and after a period of search and cogitation extending over some fifteen years, satisfactory conclusions were drawn from Jainism as it was first presented to me by the late Jain philosopher, Virchand R. Gandhi, B.A., Bar-at-Law. My understanding has been helped by the perusal of the works of Prof. Geo. T. Ladd, of Yale University; these, in the opinion of Mr. Gandhi, being, apart from their views of God and their accompanying ramifications, the nearest to the Jain psychology and metaphysics that he had found in Western literature.

Much supplementary information has been given me by Mr. J. L. Jaini, M.A., Bar.-at-Law, Pandit F. K. Lalan, Pandit H. L. Jhaveri, M.R.A.S., Mr. K. P. Mody, B.A., LL.B., and Mr. Maneckchand Hirachand, J.P., to all of whom my deepest gratitude is due and extended.

I have been asked to write a manual of Jain doctrine; this I am not competent to do, but I make the request a very welcome opportunity for trying to present to the world that which Mr. Gandhi gave me, and which I hold in the very highest esteem as being of priceless value.

I have especially to thank Mr. K. P. Mody, B.A., LL.B., Prof. Hermann Jacobi, Mr. G. M. Mehpani, B.A., LL.B., and M. G. Kapadia, B.A., LL.B., Solicitor, Bombay High Court, for having read through the manuscript and for having made suggestions for improvements and additions. Every aspect of Jainism of course is not set forth in this rough sketch, and corrections will be welcomed where my representations of the Jain doctrines are seen to be at fault.

I crave the reader's indulgence for any mistakes I may have made.

84, Shelgate Road, London, S. W. September, 1912.

HERBERT WARREN.

Opinions

OPINIONS.

Bonn, 9th July 1911.

… "The impression it (your book) made on me is a very favourable one. It gives an aspect of Jainism from the layman's point of view, and is an attempt to bring it closer to our mode of thinking. In this respect it will be very useful to the student of Jainism as a complement to the usual descriptions of the Jain religion contained in quite a number of works by 'Yatis' from which he, as a rule, gets his notions about Jainism. Your book brings it home to the reader that Jainism is an ethical religion which is calculated to morally improve those who earnestly and intelligently obey its commands, and how it fulfils this task."

(Signed) H. JACOBI.

Ahmedabad, July 28th, 1911.

"I have gone over your manuscript on Jainism sent to me for perusal. I believe almost all the principles enumerated therein are, as far as they go, correct and acceptable to all the sub-sects of Jains in India. I am strongly of opinion that they could be supported by authorities respected by all Jains. Such a book in English was a long-felt want and I am positive your book will supply that want."

(Signed) K. P. MODY.

As far as my present knowledge of my own religion goes, and as far as my humble practice of its noble and convincing principles is concerned, I venture to say that I have never come across in the whole range of my English reading on Jainism such a faithful and correct representation of it and of its principles as I have in this book of Mr. H. Warren's. One can feel while perusing it, page after page, and statement after statement, how the writer perceives the truth of Jainism and how it is assimilated in the book. The writer of the book is a seeker of truth and finds it in Jainism after his long and faithful search for it. The problems of life which confront the best minds of the world get their satisfactory solutions in the Jain philosophy, as he recognizes. The reader will find the truths of Jainism put into western garb without any change or even slight modification of the Jain princi- ples as they were presented to the writer by the late Mr. Virchand R. Gandhi, an erudite and eloquent exponent of Jainism at the World's Parliament of Religions held at Chicago in 1893. While in India I went through the book and then took it to one of the well-known Jain priests, who read it in instalments, also to a Jain graduate well-known among the western students of Jainism. Both of them confirmed the statements which, they said, could be amply verified by verses in the Jain scriptures. The book is written, as far as I can see, with an impartial and unprejudiced mind, and with a sympathetic and scrupulous soul. I wish I could purchase all the copies and distribute them among the learned people of the world and thus be able to show Jainism in its true light,—Jainism which has hitherto been frequently misrepresented and much misunderstood. I consider that every man, or woman, who desires to see Jainism as it really is, can do no better than to read this book carefully and then reflect and see whether it satisfies them or not.

I wish every success to this book on my religion, and I believe that those already acquainted with the Jain principles and those who are not acquainted with them will certainly be benefited by a careful reading of the book.

(Signed) F. K. LALAN.

Chapter 1

JAINISM

IN WESTERN GARB, AS A SOLUTION TO LIFE'S GREAT PROBLEMS.

PART I

Life is dear to all, even though it may contain misery as well as happiness. Man's desire for an explanation of the existence of misery, for its relief to extinction, and for a consequent increase of happiness, is the ground of religion. The work of relieving misery, explaining its existence, and of increasing the happiness of life, is the function of religion.

The means that religions generally enjoin for the relief of misery and the increase of happiness are to live and let live, be truthful, honest, chaste, content, respectful to parents, reverent to the spiritual teacher, and obeisant to the Deity. But to follow these injunctions is not the line of least resistance, and requires some positive belief as to the necessity for such a course of conduct.

The religions of the world differ very widely in their beliefs, faiths, and theories regarding good and evil, happiness and misery, and account with different degrees of satisfaction for the existence of the evil and the misery. An alternative to the doctrine of a kind and almighty Creator governing the universe, is the theory of soulless materialistic atheism which affirms that life and consciousness are the outcome of the massing and activity of material atoms, to be dissipated at death; but for those who find neither of these theories satisfactory there is the theory roughly outlined in this book, a theory which neither denies the existence of the soul, nor starts with the presupposition of a Creator; but makes each individual the master of his own destiny, holds out immortality for every living being, and insists upon the very highest rectitude of life, up to final perfection, as a necessary means to permanent happiness now and hereafter.

The belief into which we happen to be born is the one which is generally adopted until, through questioning, criticism, and reconstruction it is replaced by the development of a better understanding. At the first disturbance of one's unquestioned beliefs there arises the enquiry,—Whom are we to believe? Of all the possible living beings, visible or invisible, whose word can we trust to be the truth? If we answer, God's word, it raises the question: What are the characteristics possessed by the Deity by which we know or believe that his word is the truth? If we do not know these characteristics we may believe the words of an arbitrary and tyrannical law giver. The only possible source of teaching, whether spoken, written, or inspired, is knowledge. And whoever the authority may be, if he has not true knowledge he cannot give true teaching. It is the opinion of Jainism that only that knowledge is true which is purged of the infatuating elements of anger, hatred, or other passion; that only he who is all-knowing is able to map out the path of rectitude which shall lead to final beatitude in life everlasting; and that omniscience is impossible in any in whom the infatuating elements are found to exist.

It is claimed of the Jain spiritual leaders that they were omniscient, and free from every weakness and passion. The Jain scriptures are claimed to be the historical records of the lives and teachings of those omniscient, spiritual leaders; and it is from these scriptures that the Jain doctrines are taken. The Jain spiritual leaders lived in the flesh on earth as men. Thus we have the source from which the following views are taken.

Apart from any question as to whence the doctrines have come, however, they stand on their own merits and are in themselves comforting and satisfactory. They protect the soul from evil, they fulfil the requirements of the heart, will bear the severest scrutiny of the intellect, and they give freedom to the individual,—there are no commands to obey. Religion is the act of bringing one's own life up to an accepted standard of excellence morally and spiritually, and these doctrines offer such a standard; they are a serious concern for man in his relations with his fellow beings, and in relation to his own future state of life in eternity; and they show him how to relieve others and himself of misery, and how to increase happiness in himself and in others. Thus the doctrines are not only a philosophy but emphatically a religion. And first and foremost they are a religion of the heart, their motto or golden rule being "non-injury (ahinsā)"; and the whole structure is built upon love (dayā); and "religion is the only thing that can afford true consolation and peace of mind in the season of affliction and the hour of death." The truth of a religion is still true whether there are any who follow it or not.

The subject of this book is the solution afforded by Jainism to the problem of life; and, to make a

we may say we and all other beings living on this earth are from one point of view unereate, self-existent, immortal, individual souls, alive with feeling and consciousness, and never to lose our own identity (jīva). We are each of us responsible to others for our conduct towards them. We are responsible to ourselves for our own condition. In whatever degree we are ignorant, in pain, unhappy, unkind, cruel, or weak, it is because, since birth and ever previously in the infinite past, we are and have been acquiring and incorporating into ourselves (āśrava, bandha),— by the attraction and assimilation of subtle, unseen, though real physical matter (pudgala),—energies (karma) which clog the natural wisdom, knowledge, blissfulness, love, compassion, and strength of the soul, and which excite us to unnatural action.

Until we leave off (samvara, nirjarā) this unnatural kind of life, by refusing to obey impulses and promptings which by our own conscience and understanding we believe to be wrong, and which are only the blind automatic operation of those unnatural though sometimes powerful energies in us (karmas), the peace of mind which is said to be inseparable from a life of rectitude, and the final pure natural state of existence in everlasting blissfulness (moksha) must remain nothing more than matters of faith and hearsay.

This is the teaching of the Jain Arhats, according to the present understanding of the writer; and in any case it is a rational theory of good, evil, and immortality.

The idea that we have fallen from a state of purity is not held; for if it is possible to fall from a final state of purity there is no guarantee that the mental and moral discipline, austerity, and rectitude of life will result in everlasting happiness; and, further, in a pure state there are no impurities, and nothing else would move us to fall into a state where we hurt and injure others.

This, then, is the presentation of the subject in a vague general statement. We may now pass on to the analysis of the subject into parts. The subject falls naturally into four parts, namely:—

The Universe,

Man as he actually is,

Man as he may become,

Means to that end,

each of which is considered in some detail in the following pages.

Chapter 2

PART II

The Universe is the only reality. The word "reality" has many meanings, but as meant here that which is real is called substance (dravya). The universe is a universe of substance; and by universe we mean every thing and being that there is, visible or invisible, tangible or intangible, sentient or insentient.

If the universe be regarded as one whole, in the past, present, and future, then there is but one example of it, there is no other reality. That which is other than real is not real, but is false or fanciful, and impossible of existence except as a false idea.

The following paragraph is of interest only to the logical mind:—

Now, as the universe is all that is, it becomes necessary to understand what is meant by nothing or all that is not. Given a universe of real substance, the absolute non-existence of any part of it, large or small, is impossible, as is the absolute non-existence of the whole of it, to leave an empty nothing. Outside away beyond all the worlds, heavens, hells, or other abode of living beings, there is empty space, but space is real and something. Empty nothing is a false idea or ignorance of what is. Nothing is not real when it means absence of all reality. Regarding the universe as one whole, we must include ourselves in it. In thinking of ourselves we exclude the remainder; and in the remainder we ourselves are excluded. Thus, immediately, the universe, regarded as one whole, consists of two mutually exclusive parts,—oneself, and the rest. Directly we get two mutually exclusive things, there is non-existence of one in the other beyond it Knowledge is final ground, and no one can know or truly feel, believe, or maintain that the rest of the universe is himself, or that he is the rest of the universe. He knows and can truly believe and maintain that he is related to the rest of the universe, also that the rest is related to him. Thus, to think of one's own non-existence is simply to think of the part of the universe which lies beyond oneself; there, non-existence of oneself is to be found, while he himself exists where he is. Hence non-existence of oneself is a false idea if it is thought to mean absolute non-existence anywhere, complete annihilation or ceasing to be. So, in a universe of inter-related but mutually exclusive units, regarded as one whole, (though not as one individual whole), while it is a universe of everything that is (itself), it is also a universe of everything that is not (something else). The universe is always the one universe with its same contents of mutually exclusive units. Thus the words existence and non-existence of the universe produce in the mind the self-same mental picture of the actual positive omnipresent universe. "Hegel's Logic" is said to show that existence and non-existence are the same if the universe be regarded as one whole. The idea which prevents us from conceiving this is the fixed false idea that non-existence of the universe means absolute non-existence or empty nothing.

The universe is one reality but it is not one homogeneous substance. In that part of the universe which is not ourselves we find insentient matter as well as other beings sentient like ourselves; also space, time and something to account for movement and for stationariness.

As religious doctrine concerns only living beings we may make the simple division of the universe into:—

Substance not alive may for the moment be left without sub-division.

The particular substance in organised beings which makes thein alive, in the sense of having feeling, awareness, and self-conscious activity is not generally acknowledged by science to exist, and some proof of its existence is, therefore, necessary.

All proof starts from some known fact which does not itself need to be proved. The fact upon which the proof of the existence of conscious substance is built is the fact that motion of matter (pudgala) is not consciousness, whether the motion be in the shape of nerve tremor or in the shape of brain molecules vibrating. Consciousness is different in kind and not only in degree from vibration of matter or any other activity of matter.

If this fact is not known it can be learned by comparing in thought an example of consciousness with an example of movement of physical matter. Take, for instance, the consciousness of the swinging of a pendulum, as an example of awareness; and the swinging of the pendulum as an example of movement of physical matter. If these two examples are compared in thought it will be seen or learned that the one is a different kind of fact from the other. Or, if we had sufficient insight to see the molecules in the brain vibrating as they are said to be, the perception would be a different kind of event from the vibration of the molecules. The vibration is one kind of activity, the co-existing consciousness is another kind of activity. The swinging and the vibrating are the behaviour of the pendulum and of the molecules respectively; our consciousness or knowledge of these events is not in the pendulum or in the molecules.

Consciousness is a quality. Qualities do not exist apart from substance. Thus some substance different from the matter which moves is proved to exist. This conscious substance, which also feels, and is self-active, is invisible and intangible; but the signs of its existence are seen in others, and each being experiences his own feeling, consciousness, and self-activity.

Visibility, tangibility, and movement; self-activity, feeling, and consciousness are found or are conceivable in men, animals, cells, devils, and angels, all of which are living beings. Here are two different sets of qualities:—

Visibility, tangibility, movement;

Self-activity, feeling, consciousness.

The last set is never manifested by pure physical matter; the first set is manifested by physical matter. These living beings are thus proved to be compounds of two different kinds of substance, namely, soul and body.

The body is only temporarily a unit, being a vast multitude of cells which come and go; while the soul is one homogeneous irresolvable substance not composed of separable factors; its qualities (guṇa) do not come and go; it is also permanently itself, never becoming or merging into another soul. Each set of feeling, self-activity, and consciousness with all their changing modifications (paryāya) forms a separate, different, individual soul from every other changing set. These qualities (guṇa) are an irresolvable complexity; they (guṇa) never part company, become scattered, or float away from or change their point of attachment; though in their modifications (paryāya) they are ceaselessly changing.

The above named examples of this substance (jīva), men, angels, etc., are examples of it in an impure state. In them the naturally invisible soul is compounded in a very subtle way with visible, tangible matter, and is in a sense thereby rendered visible, as water is coloured by the addition of colouring matter. In its pure state the soul is invisible just as in itself water is colourless.

Thus is the existence of the first kind of substance, soul, established. And it is not one individual universal great big soul, but a mass of mutually exclusive, individual souls. We may now sub-divide substance not-alive.

All the following real things have the common characteristic of being unconscious. There are five kinds of substance not alive, namely:—

Matter (pudgalāstikāya),

Space (ākāśastikāya),

An ether, the fulcrum of motion (dharmastikayā).

Another ether, the fulcrum of rest, in the sense of not moving (adharmastikāya).

Time, which is in only a figurative sense a substance (kāla).

In all these things there is no feeling or consciousness.

This is well understood in physics and chemistry. Here the real substance is the atom, the ultimate indivisible atom. Matter is made up of atoms, but the atom is not made up of other units. Atoms as at present understood by modern chemistry are far grosser than those contemplated by the Jains. Innumerable atoms as understood by the Jains make when combined the atom of modern chemistry, which is not an ultimate atom.

Ether, mentioned above, is not matter in the Jain view. Matter has various qualities and relations which these two ethers do not possess. It is only the Jain philosophy that believes in these two substances. They are the accompanying causes (hetu) respectively of the motion of moving things and beings, and of the stationary state of things and beings that are resting, in the sense of not moving. In each case it is the accompanying cause without which you cannot do.

Space is that which acts as a receptacle of all the other substances; and it is not a kind of thing that needs to be contained. It has not that nature of needing to be contained. It is a reality, but not matter (pudgala).

Time is not a collection of indivisible inseparable parts, as are the other five substances. Time is called a substance only as a matter of convenience. It is really the modification (paryāya) of a substance. It is the modification of a thing or being by which we know the anteriority or posteriority of it, the oldness or newness. And it is a modification which is common to all the other substances (dravyas). Time is really the duration of the states of substances.

Having mentioned the kinds of substance that there are in the universe, the next thing will be to give the definition of substance. The definition must be such that it shall include not only matter, visible and tangible to the senses, but also spiritual substance (soul) not cognizable by the senses.

Any substance can be looked upon in four different ways, and so it shall be defined from each of these four points of view. This is only possible in thought and not in actual fact.

Definition No. 1.—Substance is that in which the differences of time, space, and modifications inhere together. This definition is from the point of view of the permanent nature of the thing, (dravyārthika-naya). In spite of the differences in the units making up the mass of any substance, still there is the unity in the mass. Conscious individuals, for instance, are not identical with each other, but still there is the mass, soulness; it is one substance.

Definition No. 2.—Substance is the subject of qualities (guṇa) and modifications (paryāya). This definition is from the point of view of the state of a thing (paryāyārthika-naya), that is, of its changing nature or modification. The quality stays with the substance, and is constant; the modifications succeed each other. A particular piece of clay always has form, but not always the same form. It is never without form; form is a constant quality; it may be now round, then square; these are modifications.

Definition No. 3.—Substance is that in which there are origination, destruction, and permanence. This definition is from the two previous points of view taken together. With the origination of a new mode of existence there was the destruction of the old mode of existence, while the substance has remained permanent. With the destruction of a house there is the origination or coming into existence of a heap of débris, while the bricks, etc., are the same. The substance is neither destroyed nor originated, only the mode of existence; only the relations between the parts, in this case.

Definition No. 4.—Substance is that which performs a special action. This is from an ordinary point of view, and would hold good only of a special substance.

Substance has now been defined, and each definition is applicable not only to matter but also to spiritual substance or soul. The next thing to introduce is the natures of substance. What are its natures?

There are two kinds of natures found in all substance. Any substance, any real, concrete, existing thing or being can be looked upon in a general way or in a particular way; that is to say, it has natures in common with other things (sāmānya svabhāva), and at the same time it has natures peculiar to itself (viśesha svabhāva). For instance, this book is matter, in common with all other material things; and at the same time it is a particular matter, namely, paper.

According to Jainism there is no such thing as matter (pudgala) or any substance (dravya) only in general; wherever there is matter (pudgala) it is matter (pudgala) of a particular kind, paper for instance, not stone; or wherever there is substance (dravya) it is substance (dravya) of a particular kind, matter (pudgala) for instance, not space (ākāsā), space is substance (see page 14).

Of the general natures of substance, one is existence (astitva); another is knowableness (prameyatva). This latter differentiates Jainism from Kant's philosophy according to Jainism things are knowable.

The general natures are always everlasting; and are not analysable. Other natures common to all substance are the fact of being in one sense permanent, uncreate, and indestructible (nitya sāmānya svabhāva); and the fact of being in another sense perishable (anitya sāmānya svabhāva); gold may perish as a ring, but it is always something somewhere. Other common natures are the fact of being one or a unit (eka), the fact of being many (aneka), the fact of being separate (bheda), and the fact of being not separate (abheda). From the point of view of omniscience the general natures of a thing are infinite.

Of the particular natures of substance consciousness (chetanā) is one, and belongs only to live substance (jīva). Another particular nature is the fact of having form, and is peculiar to matter (pudgala). Another is the fact of containing, which is peculiar to space. From the point of view of omniscience the particular natures of a thing are, like the general natures, infinite.

Everything, then, has its natures, both those peculiar to itself, and those in common with other things. The next subject in connection with substance is the ways of knowing it, or the aspects it bas (nayas). One of the functions of philosophy is to advance from the known to the unknown. The Jain procedure is as follows. Synstatis, analysis, synthesis.

Synstatis comes first: it is the state of mind prior to analysis; it is the indefinite cognition of a thing or idea as an isolated object; that condition of things to which analysis is to be applied. "This is what is really meant by unity, or identity, of the universe with the real which many philosophers proclaim."

Analysis comes next: resolving, separating, or differencing the parts, elements, properties, or aspects of the object of cognition.

Synthesis comes last: it is the putting together of the first vague indefinite cognition with the subsequent analysis to form a relational unity of a variety of aspects. Thus the next subject, the consideration of aspects (naya-vāda), is introduced.

This subject and the following one are given in some detail in Pandit H. L. Jhaveri's "First Principles of the Jain Philosophy," Luzac & Co., 1910, 1s. 4d. or Jaina Publishing House, ARRAH.

In the analysis of an object or idea, consideration is given to the aspects, and in considering one of the innumerable qualities of a thing the rest must not be denied. There are two classes of aspects, namely, the aspects of a thing regarded as permanent, and the aspects of a thing regarded as perishable. For instance, this book, regarded as a book, is perishable; it has come into and will go out of existence; but looked upon as atoms of matter it is permanent, neither having come into existence nor being capable of going out of existence. From one point of view (the dravyārthikanaya) the universe is without beginning and without end; from the other point of view (the paryāyārthikanaya) we have creation and destruction at every moment. These two aspects are found in analysis. After analysis comes the synthesis mentioned above, and this introduces the next subject, modes of expression (syādvāda), or the doctrine of the inexpugnability of the inextricably combined properties and relations of things.

Synthesis is the putting together of aspects in thought to realize that the truth consists in the irresolvable combination of all the possible aspects; and to speak the truth correctly all the seven modes of expression must be accepted. The subject is now how we should express ourselves when we make a statement about a thing. It is an important subject and the doctrine is found only in the Jain philosophy. It is the doctrine of the non-isolation of the parts, elements, properties, or aspects of things; it is the method of knowing or speaking of a thing synthetically.

There are seven modes of expressing the is-ness or is-not-ness of a thing; and these modes are all interrelated, and each pre-supposes the others, each implies the others. In accepting all these seven modes and so speaking correctly we do not mislead the person spoken to. These modes are set out in detail in the book just mentioned "First Principles of the Jain Philosophy," but it may be said here that to speak correctly under this doctrine the statement is commenced with an adverb (syāt) to indicate that there are six other implied ways of speaking about the subject. For instance, the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example). And in addition to this one kind there are five more kinds of tacit expressions implied by the one positive statement. The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates one of the qualities of a thing.