Can Germany Invade England?

Front matter

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

CAN GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

BY

Chapter I.

Can Germany Invade England?

CHAPTER I

GREAT BRITAIN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION AND SOURCES OF DEFENSIVE STRENGTH

"This precious stone set in the silver sea, Which serves it in the office of a wall, Or as a moat defensive to a house, Against the envy of less happier lands; This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England!"

Shakespeare.

"Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself."

Sir Walter Raleigh.

"Without a well-appointed and commanding Navy, the British Army and the lofty spirit of Britons would be confined to their own shores at home, and become powerless and unknown abroad ; their commerce would fall into decay and pass into other hands, and we should be once more reproached as the Britain toto ab or be exclusa, instead of as now respected in every part of the world."—Life of Admiral Lord Howe.

Set in the heart of stormy seas, often difficult to navigate, often enshrouded in mist, the United Kingdom lies athwart the principal water-routes of the world, not only those which connect Europe with Canada, the United States, and the West Indies, but equally those which bring to the Northern European States the products of Africa, South America, India, China, Australia, and Japan; and, so long as she commands the English Channel and the North Sea, it will be in her power to seal up the navies and mercantile fleets of any of her neighbours—Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Northern Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and those of Northern France.

And if Great Britain's geographical position is unique, her resources for defence surpass those of her most powerful competitors. Small in extent, she is yet one of the strongest countries in the world: strong in the industry and ingenuity of her inhabitants; in her immense coal and ironfields; in her numerous navigable rivers; in her many fine harbours; in her great fishing industry, which, whilst giving employment to thousands and food to millions of her people, provides skilled and hardy sailors for her national and mercantile marine; strong in her splendid dockyards, in which, thanks to Free Trade, she builds more quickly and cheaply than all other States, with the natural consequence that she builds not only for herself but for the world. In her private dockyards, foreign men-of-war are always on the stocks, ships which on the breaking out of hostilities would go, at once, to swell the British Navy; in her public dockyards, Dreadnoughts and cruisers, destroyers and submarines, are ever under construction or repair; and well-stocked arsenals, in positions carefully selected and fortified against attack from the sea, stand ready to equip and victual new marine monsters, or renew the equipment and supplies of old ones. And because Free-Trade Britain has become the rendezvous of the world's shipping, the distributing centre of the world's wealth, she is strong in the self-interest of all other countries, for which among them can desire the dislocation or even temporary interruption of this inflow and outflow of the world's trade? Certainly not Germany, the volume of whose yearly exchanges with her amounts to over a hundred millions sterling.

Still, since history presents many instances of Governments acting in opposition to the true interests of their subjects, and others, hardly less numerous, of individuals or classes working on the passions and fears of the bulk of the people to bring about a war by which they hope to profit, it is incumbent on Great Britain not to trust too confidently to the enlightened self-interest of other nations, and, therefore, necessary that she should possess and maintain, in the highest possible state of efficiency, the Navy by which she can take full advantage of her incomparable natural position, necessary, too, that that Navy should be scientifically distributed, i.e. in accord with the principles of strategy.

In the next chapter it will be shown that Great Britain does possess such a Navy, and that it is judiciously distributed. In order, however, that the lay reader may be able to follow the facts and figures that will be laid before him, and to understand the conclusions drawn from them, he should know in what the principles of strategy consist, and be acquainted with a concrete example of their application to naval warfare.

No better definition of strategy can be given than that contained in a single sentence of a letter written by Napoleon to his brother Joseph: "There is a great difference between operations conducted on a well-considered system from an organised centre, and proceeding at haphazard without such centre, and risking the loss of one's communications."

In these few words the great master of the science and art of war described both the true strategy and the false; and the long, fierce struggle between the English and the Dutch in the seventeenth century affords a perfect demonstration of both. So long as England conducted that war *' on a well-considered system from an organised centre " in the English Channel, thus severing Holland's communications with the outer world, including her own colonies, she paralysed the action of the Dutch Fleet, and maintained her own supremacy on the sea but when, against the warnings of her Admirals, she laid up her battleships and "proceeded at haphazard, without such a centre," thus "risking the loss of her communications," to disperse her frigates to prey upon the enemy's merchant shipping, she lost that supremacy with consequences disastrous and disgraceful to herself. A Dutch fleet under de Ruyter appeared in the Nore, advanced unopposed up the Thames to Gravesend, forced the boom which protected the Medway, and captured sixteen British vessels, including the famous Royal Charles, the pick of the English Fleet, and towed her to Holland.

Holland owed her temporary triumph entirely to Great Britain's blunders, her final and permanent discomfiture to the latter country's natural strategic superiority; nothing therefore but a repetition of the same blunders on a magnified scale, under conditions which render them practically unthinkable, can assure to Germany so much as the chance of emerging victorious from a struggle with this country, for is not her strategical position worse than Holland's, her coast-line shorter, her harbourage more limited, her communications with the outer world longer and more open to attack ; and is not the disparity between her fleet and ours to-day far greater than the disparity between the Dutch and the English Fleets two hundred and fifty years ago?

Chapter II.

CHAPTER II

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION IN EUROPEAN WATERS OF THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

"The recent activity of the invasion-monger, in spite of the fact that, relatively and absolutely, the Royal Navy is now stronger than at any period of its wonderful history, is an unhealthy symptom."—Sir George Sydenham Clarke, G.C.M.G., Governor of Bombay, late Secretary of the Defence Committee.

"As to the present position of the British Fleet, there is no possibility of cavil. It is extremely easy to produce sophisticated statistics to prove almost anything, but it will be impossible for any alarmist to paint a picture of naval peril at present from the materials at command."—Archibald Hurd.

"As about 42,000 men are required to man the active fle<it, and about 7,000 of the nominal personnel are not available for purposes of war, it follows that Germany, having to exchange 15,000 men under training for trained men, could not mobilise her fleet without calling out the reserve—an important point when we are asked to believe in the possibility of a surprise attack."—Gerard Fiennes.

"For this, at least, I thank Heaven devoutly; the hegemony of the wider seas is vested, as always, in ships-of-the-Line, and when I note our position to-day (a greater ratio of superiority as against other nations than ever known before!), and review our position in the future—why, I sleep right soundly in my bed."—Alan H, Burgoyne, M.P., Editor of the "Navy League Annual."

I Shall now lay before my readers a number of facts and figures which will, I think, convince them that so far from Germany's being in a position to invade England, her fleet, should there ever be war between the two countries, would scarcely dare to weigh anchor and venture out into the open sea.

So recently as six years ago dissemination, as opposed to concentration, was Great Britain's Naval policy. Her ships-of-war were "scattered here and there as with a pepper-box" ; but, in 1906, Lord Fisher put an end to this haphazard state of things, and to-day we are literally in a position to talk with the enemy in our gates.

TABLE I

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

4th Squadron of the 1st Fleet :

Battleships | |6 | No German Fleet.

|Armoured Cruisers | |4 | 8

|Protected Cruisers | |4

Destroyers | |10

A new squadron, consisting of four cruiser-battleships and two armoured cruisers, is eventually to be based on Malta, a great place d' armes, in whose well-protected harbour all requisites for docking, repairing, and refitting the largest men-of-war are provided. The Torpedo-boat Destroyer Flotilla is to be increased next winter to thirty destroyers, a new base for small craft is to be formed at Alexandria, and a squadron of six battleships is to be based on Gibraltar, which is also a first-class naval harbour. This squadron is, in time, to be increased to eight battleships. The criticisms levelled against these changes are undeserved. A great naval base at Gibraltar will ensure our communications with India in the event of the route through the Suez Canal being interrupted; and a battle squadron permanently located at the entrance to the Mediterranean, a "fertile area," where "trade tends to be crowded," will be well placed either for the purpose of reinforcing the Cruiser Squadron at Malta or the British Fleets in the Home waters, which, in their turn, can at any moment spare ample vessels to make the Mediterranean Fleet superior to any possible combination against it.

TABLE II

ATLANTIC OCEAN (IRISH WATERS)

3rd Squadron of the 1st Fleet: | No German Fleet.

Battleships | |6

|Armoured Cruisers | |4 | 7

|Protected Cruisers | |3

The Atlantic Fleet is in future to be based on home ports instead of Gibraltar, and is to be brought up during the year from six to eight battleships.

TABLE IIIA

IN HOME WATERS British Fleet

In the English Channel

7th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in commission with nucleus crews)

Battleships | |11

Armoured Cruisers | |9 | 19

Protected Cruisers | |10

8th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in reserve with skeleton, or maintenance, crews)

Battleships | |4

Protected Cruisers | |11

In the North Sea

1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons of 1st fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet (Fully manned)

Battleships | |25 | 30

Battle Cruisers | |5

Armoured Cruisers | |13 | 29

Protected Cruisers | |16

Scouts | |8

Eventually the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet will each consist of eight battleships with full complements of active service ratings. The 7th Squadron, 3rd Fleet, will be manned by a nucleus crew, and on mobilisation brought up to full strength by a new force to be called the "Immediate Reserve." The 8th Squadron will only be a reserve manned by skeleton, or maintenance, crews. Destroyer flotillas in support of 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons, 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons, 2nd Fleet, based on:

|Rosyth | |(1st) | |20

|„ | |(2nd) | |16

|„ | |(8th) | |24

|Harwich | |(3rd) | |16

|Harwich | |(5th) | |26

|Portsmouth | |(6th) | |23

|Portland | |(4th) | |16

|Devonport | |(7th) | |24 | —165

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Flotillas are driven by turbines, and not one has been launched more than five years.

In full Commission | |68

In reserve with nucleus crews | |97 | —165

(Continued on page 16)

TABLE IIIb

IN GERMAN WATERS German Fleet

In Baltic Sea

In Reserve

Battleships | |4

Protected Cruisers | |2

Destroyers | |12

In North Sea

1st and 2nd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet

Battleships | |17 | 19

Battle Cruisers | |2

Armoured Cruisers | |1 | 6

Protected Cruisers | |5

Destroyers | |24

In Reserve

Battleships | |4

Destroyer Flotilla in support of the High Sea Fleet:

Based | on | Wilhelmshaven | |24

|„ | |„ | Kiel in Baltic (in reserve) | |12 | —36

Note.—Of the 30 English Battleships and Battle Cruisers in the North Sea, three are armed with 13*5-inch guns, the remainder with 12-inch; whereas of Germany's 19, three are armed with 12-inch guns, the remainder with only ii-inch, which gives to Great Britain a great superiority in weight of metal.

(Continued on page 17)

Abstract of British Fleets in the Home and Irish Waters (see Tables II and IIIa):

Battleships, including Battle Cruisers | |51

Armoured Cruisers | |26

Protected Cruisers | |40

Scouts | |8

Destroyers | |165

| | Total number of vessels in Home and Irish Waters when all are mobilised | |290

A little over 18,000 men are sufficient at present to complete the crews of the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet to full commission. These vessels are fully provisioned, and ammunition, stores, and coal laid in. The crews who are on shore ready to embark, can be shipped in a few hours.

A "nucleus crew consists of everything required to manage a ship, and to fight a ship, excepting only what maybe described as the unskilled maritime labour required for the purpose. These nucleus crews take out their ship. They practise the guns of their ship; they are not liable to those inevitable breakdowns which people changing to new machinery for the first time always experience."

A skeleton, or maintenance, crew consists of everything necessary to keep the ship, machinery, and guns in perfect order.

Two cruisers of exceptionally high speed are attached to the Destroyer Flotilla. The eight scouts (small fast cruisers) act as "mother" or depot ships to the destroyers.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 1st Fleet and 5th and 6th Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet are at present based on Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet on Dover. When completed, Rosyth will form another base for the Fleet in the North Sea.

Abstract of the German High Sea Fleet in the North Sea, including Reserves in that Sea and the Baltic (see Table IIIb):

Battleships, including Battle Cruisers | |27

Armoured Cruisers | |1

Protected Cruisers | |7

Destroyers | |36

| | Total number of vessels in North Sea and Baltic Sea when all are mobilised | |71

Germany's High Sea Fleet is based on Wilhelmshaven, and her ships in the Baltic on Kiel. The canal which connects the Baltic Sea with the River Elbe is about sixty-two miles long, and at the prescribed speed of 5.3 knots per hour it would take a ship thirteen hours to get through it. Its channel is, at present, too shallow to allow of the passage of ships of the Dreadnought type, but the work of deepening the canal is going on, and will probably be completed in 1915. The alternative route from the Baltic by the Little and Great Belts, the Kattegat and Skager Rak, is from 600 to 700 miles long; in winter often infested by ice, and at all seasons dangerous, owing to dense fogs which prevail in these shallow and contracted waters. The following table sets forth the total strength of the Navies of Great Britain and Germany:

TABLE IV

Comparative strength of the two Navies (omitting Battleships and Armoured Cruisers over 20 years old).

Great Britain | Germany

Battleships | |55 | 60 | Battleships | |33 | 55

Battle Cruisers | |5 | Battle Cruisers | |2

Armoured Cruisers | |34 | Armoured Cruisers | |9

|Protected | |Cruisers | |I. | |18 | 72 | |Protected | |Cruisers | |I. | |0 | 37

|„ | |„ | |II. | |38 | |„ | |„ | |II. | |26

|„ | |„ | |III. | |16 | |„ | |„ | |III. | |11

Unprotected Cruisers | |5 | Unprotected Cruisers | |6

Scouts | |8 | 387 | Destroyers | |109 | 202

Torpedo Vessels | |26 | Torpedo Boats | |80

Destroyers | |179 | Submarines | |13

Torpedo Boats | |109 |

Submarines | |109 |

Grand total | |558 | Grand total | |289

There are some battleships over twenty years old still appearing in England's and Germany's Naval Lists ; and in these so-called obsolete vessels Great Britain is also much stronger than Germany.

Referring to the obsolescence of men-of-war, Mahan, in his latest work on Naval Strategy, writes: " The last expression of foreign professional opinion, concerning these so-called obsolete ships, is that, in the later stages of a war, when the newest ships have undergone their wear and received their hammering, the nation which then can put forward the largest reserve of ships of the older types will win."

Tables I and II show that, whereas Great Britain has twenty-four big and little vessels in the Mediterranean and six battleships and seven cruisers in the Atlantic (Irish waters), Germany has not a single vessel in either; and Table III shows that, leaving the Channel Fleet out of account and Germany's small reserves in the North and Baltic Seas, Great Britain's North Sea Fleet is numerically much stronger than Germany's High Sea Fleet. These, in themselves, are reassuring facts; but their value is greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the British ships are much larger than the German ships, as will be seen in the following table:

TABLE V

DISPLACEMENT IN TONS OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS OF FLEETS IN NORTH SEA

|(See Table IIIA)

Great Britain's 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons of 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet | |539,450 | |tons.

|(See Table IIIb)

Germany's 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet | |313,600 | |,,

|In favour of Great Britain | |225,850 | |,,

AVERAGE TONNAGE OF SINGLE SHIPS

Great Britain | |17,982 | |,,

Germany | 16,506

|In favour of Great Britain | |1,476

As, however, a ship is merely a floating platform for the transport of men and guns to the scene of battle, and the displacement of this floating platform is the measure of its carrying capacity, it follows that the British Fleet in the North Sea can bring to the scene of battle a much more powerful armament than is carried by the German High Sea Fleet. Now, the broadside fire of their battle- ship armament is the true test of the fighting power of men-of-war, and, in this respect also, Great Britain's superiority to Germany is overwhelming, as shown in the table below:

TABLE VI

BROADSIDE FIRE OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS IN NORTH SEA

Great Britain | |230,726 | lb.

Germany | |131,700 | |,,

|Great Britain's superiority | |99,026 | |,,

AVERAGE BROADSIDE FIRE OF THE SHIPS TAKEN SINGLY

Great Britain | |7,690 | lb.

Germany | |6,935 | ,,

|Great Britain's superiority | |755 | ,,

Or, in a fleet of thirty battleships, practically equivalent to three extra men-of-war.

The preponderance in weight of the broadside fire of the British cruisers in the North Sea as compared with that of the German cruisers in the same sea is even more marked, as Great Britain has twenty-nine cruisers, thirteen of which are armoured, as against Germany's six, only one of which is armoured. Here again Germany is out-numbered and out-classed by Great Britain.

Since ships-of-war cannot be always at sea and are liable to accident and deterioration, the next point to be considered and compared is the docking accommodation possessed by each nation.

TABLE VII

DOCKYARDS FOR DREADNOUGHTS AND KINDRED CLASSES

In Use

| Great Britain | Germany

In Home Waters | | |29 | | |11

Abroad | | |15 | | |0

|Total | | |44 | | |11

Building and Projected in Home Waters

Building | | |8 | | |2

Projected | | |3 | | |1

|Total | | |11 | | |3

Abroad

Building | | |3 | | |0

|Projected | | |2 | | |0

|Total | | |5 | | |0

Grand Total

Great Britan | |60 | Germany | |14

This is a very satisfactory state of things, and our position in regard to docks capable of taking ships of ever-increasing size is no less satisfactory. Two floating docks suitable for the largest vessels that at present exist will be completed in a few months—one for the Medway and the other for Portsmouth. Early in 191 3 a new dock will be available at Portsmouth, another in January 1914; and three docks and the lock at Rosyth in 191 6. There are also five private docks which could be used for the largest vessels, and two more are building.

Mercantile Auxiliaries

The difference between the size, speed, and number of the British merchant-men that could be used as cruisers or scouts in time of war and the German merchant ships that might be similarly employed is as great, and as much to the advantage of the former marine, as the difference which has been shown to exist between the British and the German Navies.

TABLE VIII

| |Great Britain | |Germany

Tonnage | |Number of Ships | |Number of Ships

|2,000 | and | under | |3,000 | |830 | |140

|3,000 | ,, | ,, | |4,000 | |1,198 | |140

|4,000 | ,, | ,, | |5,000 | |773 | |59

|5,000 | ,, | ,, | |7,000 | |420 | |109

|7,000 | ,, | ,, | |10,000 | |201 | |110

|10,000 | ,, | ,, | |12,000 | |57 | |40

|12,000 | ,, | ,, | |15,000 | |37 | |12

|15,000 | ,, | ,, | |20,000 | |6 | |10

|20,000 | ,, | ,, | |25,000 | |4 | |1

|25,000 | ,, | ,, | |30,000 | |— | |1

|30,000 | ,, | ,, | |40,000 | |2 | |—

40,000 and above | |1 | |—

Total | |3,529 | |489

So far, however, the Admiralty has refused to subsidise any merchant vessel with a speed of less than 22 knots, on the ground that, unless their speed is much above that of the enemy's fastest cruisers, they must, in course of time, suffer capture; and as only the Mauretania, Lusitania, and a few other vessels of the Cunard Company attain this speed, only steamers of that line have been accepted as auxiliaries to the Navy. It is possible, however, that the Admiralty may reconsider this decision, for, as Sir William White has pointed out, very few of the great cruiser-battleships recently built can maintain a sea-speed approaching 25 knots, in moderate weather, for any length of time.

Germany has also subsidised some of her swiftest merchant vessels; and it has been reported, but not confirmed, that they habitually carry their armaments in their holds, ready, at any moment, to exchange a peaceful for a warlike status. If true, this report need cause British shipowners little alarm, for, as Germany has no naval bases and only two coaling-stations outside her own waters, such transformed vessels would soon run short of fuel, and, with the English Channel shut against them, would fall a prey to the British cruisers which would be on their track. A similar fate must, in the end, overtake any of Germany's regular cruisers that might happen to be at large on the ocean routes when war was declared, though, for a time, they might cause some loss and a great deal of annoyance to our shippers and insurance companies.

The Soul of a Skip

Having dealt with the ships of the two Fleets under comparison, I come now to the crews, without whose hands, eyes, and intelligence to navigate the hulls, set and keep the machinery in motion, and load and fire the guns, the finest ship in the world is but so much dead matter, fit only for the scrap-heap; and here too Great Britain's numerical strength is far in excess of that of Germany or any other nation.

TABLE IX

PERSONNEL OF THE TWO NAVIES

| |Men on Active Service | |Reserve | |Length of Service

Great Britain | |134,000 | |57,904 | |12 years

Germany | |60,805 | |110,000 | |3 years

British Bluejackets and Marines are drawn principally from a seafaring stock, and are enlisted, on a voluntary system, for twelve years, at the end of which they are eligible for re-engagement for a second term of ten years, completion of which entitles them to a pension. Two-thirds of Germany's sailors are conscripts enrolled for three years, the greater proportion of whom have never seen the sea, and are looked upon rather as "soldiers on board ship than seamen."

Germany's short-service system accounts for the large number of her reservists. If England adopted the same system, her Reserve would be immense; but she has no need to increase it, since her active service personnel, trained from boyhood to middle-age on the sea, is sufficient to man the whole of her war-Navy, whereas the German High Sea Fleet is under the necessity of changing one-third of its personnel every year, with the result that the sea-going fleet is always more or less of a training squadron; and when it goes to sea for its first cruise in May, it is hardly in condition to fight without returning to exchange its contingent of recruits for trained reservists. I have now shown: (1) That England has in her Home and Atlantic Fleets 51 line-of-battleships against Germany's 27 in the Baltic and North Sea; 66 cruisers as against 8, and 165 destroyers as against 36, besides having a very serviceable active fleet in the Mediterranean. (2) That the superiority of the broadside fire of the British line-of-battleships to the broadside fire of the German line is about 3 to 2, and the superiority of her active-service personnel is over 2 to i. (3) That the strategical position with which Nature has endowed her has been taken such full advantage of since 1906 that, in case of war breaking out between the two countries, not a single German man-of-war, not a single German merchant ship, not a single German fishing , could leave or enter a German port, and her ocean-borne trade would cease to exist.

This is no idle boast, and certainly it carries with it no desire on my part to see its fulfilment—the more peaceful German ships there are on the world's waters the better for the world, England included—but facts are facts, and it is well for the peoples of both countries to know them. There are only two ways out of the North Sea—one round the north of Scotland, the other through the English Channel. If the German Fleet tried to break through by the former, it would meet the British Atlantic Fleet, reinforced by the Channel Fleet, and be attacked in rear and in flank by the North Sea Fleet. Even if, by some ruse on their part or some negligence on ours, German men-of-war did reach the Atlantic, what could they do there, with no ports and only two coaling-stations to resort to, and the British Fleets that they had eluded in full chase? And, of course, an attempt to force a passage through the English Channel would be a still more hopeless undertaking, for that Channel is like unto a well-guarded, formidable mountain pass held by a superior force—a position which no prudent soldier would attempt to capture by direct attack, but would try to turn; and whereas there are few positions on land that cannot be outflanked, there is no possibility of turning the English Channel, and direct attack, in this case, would mean engaging the North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic Fleets, with the Mediterranean Fleet, called up by wireless telegraphy, hurrying north to pounce upon any vessel that might chance to reach the Bay of Biscay.

Again I repeat—Nature has given to Great Britain a position which carries with it supremacy of the sea; and it is of no use for Germany to try to wrest that supremacy from her, because it is rooted in a natural advantage of which she cannot be deprived. It was Great Britain's position which enabled her to reduce Holland from a first-class to a third-class Power, without once landing an army on her shores, though the Dutch ships were as numerous, as well manned, and as well fought as the English; and Great Britain's position would tell in exactly the same way, and with greater force, in her favour in a war with Germany—a war which for that very reason is never likely to be declared.

Chapter III.

CHAPTER III

THE INVASION SCARE

"I always said that whilst we had a Fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt."—Lord Torrington, First Lord of the Admiralty in 1727.

"We have endeavoured to picture to ourselves a clear issue which is very unfavourable to this country, and have shown, at least to our satisfaction, that on that hypothesis, unfavourable as it is, serious invasion of these islands is not an eventuality which we need seriously consider."—Mr. Balfour.

"Modern history does not afford a single instance of a successful invasion of this country, because our Navy has always stood directly in the path of the would-be invader."—Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton, G.C.B.

The facts and figures presented in the foregoing chapters ought to convince all thinking men of the baselessness of the expectation that, at some indefinite time, for some indefinite cause, the German Government will suddenly embark upon the most venturesome of enterprises—the invasion of this country.