Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic War

Front matter

CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC WAR

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Preface

The rough draft of the following translation was made many years ago both as a labour of love and as an aid to the composition of the narrative of my Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul; but the publication was deferred, partly because I had other work to do, partly in order that I might be able to elucidate not only the chapters which treat of the Gallic War, but also those which are devoted to the invasions of Britain.

A translator cannot but fail unless he is in sympathy with his author; and, however gifted he may be, I doubt whether he can do justice to more than one writer, for his own style will remain the same. Jowett’s Thucydides is a great intellectual achievement and a noble example of English prose; but, compared with his Plato, it is a failure. Moreover, even though each age may demand its own version of a classic, there is a time for translation as for everything else. The Authorized Version of the Bible was made at the right time: supposing that the work had been deferred until, say, the latter part of the nineteenth century, would not the gain in scholarship have been bought too dear? What would have become of David’s lamentation on the death of Absalom? What should we have had instead of “Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace”? A much later stage in the development of our language would have fitted Caesar, but I fear that it has gone: would not Swift, our great master of unadorned prose, or even Southey, less powerful, but unsurpassed in clearness and taste, have caught his spirit?

The sympathetic translator, while avoiding the error of imitating style, will strive, after he has completely seized the author’s meaning, to forget that he is a translator, and simply to express in his own tongue every detail, every nuance of thought which the author expressed in his. Of course he will be making an attempt which, at the best, can only approximate to success; he will be forced again and again to compromise; but, given the needful ability, his work will go far to suggest, without the least sacrifice of accuracy, the effect of the original. I hope that even this attempt, with all its defects, will here and there reflect, however faintly, the dignity, the terseness, the directness, the lucidity, the restraint, the masculine energy of Caesar’s style. To reflect its occasional roughness and carelessness is less difficult. The effect of the Commentaries was not due to toil in revision, for which Caesar had no time, but to his personality; and it is in the last three books, after he has done with Britain, that the subject gives full scope to his narrative power.

A translation of a modern work may read like an original composition; but not one of Greek or of Latin. Every sentence may be idiomatic English, but the whole must needs have a certain flavour of antiquity, because not only matter but also standpoint and treatment were of an old world. If we forget that our Bible is a translation, the reason is obvious. It is a mistake to try to modernize the antique by translating words denoting concepts that are no longer real by familiar modern terms that are not equivalent. Where the translators of the Bible neglected accuracy in order to avoid what was strange the error was unimportant.

The text from which this version is made is not absolutely identical with that of any extant edition, but generally agrees with that of H. Meusel. Wherever I have followed a reading different from his I have noted the variation if it was of any importance.

No modern reader can fully understand Caesar’s writings without a commentary. I therefore suggest that readers of this translation should consult Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul and Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar, which are fully equipped with maps and plans. I would also recommend M. Camille Jullian’s Vercingétorix and the first two volumes of his great work, L’Histoire de la Gaule. The earlier part of the third, which, I believe, will appear before long, will contain an account of the conquest. M. Jullian is not only a scholar of the first rank and a sane and acute critic, but also a real historian and an admirable writer. I have given references to his work as well as to my own, and wherever it was possible to write explanatory notes without entering into the discussions which were necessary in my other books, but would have been out of place in this, I have done so. I have also taken account of the relevant books and articles which have appeared since the publication of the smaller edition of Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul.

The map is virtually identical with that which illustrated Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, and which represented the results of my researches; and the references in the explanatory note are to the original edition of that volume. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Mr. John Bolton, F.R.G.S., the well-known geographer, to whom so many of us are indebted, for the patient kindness with which, from time to time during the last twenty-five years, he has directed for me the execution of maps, some of which were unusually complicated and demanded great care.

May I plead once more for the adoption of the Commentaries—the Gallic or, as an alternative, the Civil War—as a set book for candidates for Woolwich and Sandhurst? Many years ago this suggestion was made on my behalf to a Royal Commission; and one of the members, a distinguished classical scholar, sarcastically asked whether a knowledge of Caesar was likely to benefit a British officer in South Africa. But might it not be worth while to consider the opinions of Turenne, Napoleon, and Lord Wolseley? Would it not be better to read Caesar than to read about Publilius Syrus, better to study the one writer of the first rank who is a really original authority for Roman military history, and whose work boys of ordinary ability, if they are properly taught, will read with keen interest, than to be crammed with cut-and-dried criticisms of Plautus, Statius, Florus, Manilius, and the rest,—writers whom the pupil has no time to read, and of whom a lad who is going into the army can afford to remain ignorant? Since he has only time to read a little Latin, let him read the best and read it thoroughly.

Introduction

The first chapter of Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul contains a general sketch of Gallic history anterior to the conquest; while in Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar an attempt is made to tell the story of man’s life in our island from the earliest times in detail. The following introduction is a bare outline, intended to help readers who desire only to understand the translation.

The Gauls whom Caesar encountered, and also the Britons, were a medley of divers races; for both Britain and Gaul had been inhabited from the Palaeolithic Age, and had since been invaded by successive hordes belonging to various stocks. The latest, who began to arrive probably about the eighth century before our era, were the Celts or Gauls properly so called, whose great stature and fair hair were so often noticed by ancient writers, who imposed the Celtic language upon the existing inhabitants, and of whom the Belgae were the rearguard. Many of them crossed the Channel and spread into Scotland and even into Ireland. The questions, originally raised by Caesar’s opening words, relating to the Goidels and the Brythons—the two main branches of the Celtic stock—are fully discussed in the books to which I have referred.

The Gauls who became known to the Romans about the beginning of the fourth century before Christ were an offshoot of this people, and entered Lombardy through the northern passes of the Alps. They had already been settled there for a considerable time when, in 388 B.C., a detachment marched southward, defeated the Romans in the battle of the Allia, and sacked Rome. Renewed incursions, made from time to time during the next century, were repelled: in 282 B.C. the Republic was finally released from the fear of Gallic invasion by a victory near the Lake of Vadimo; and before the second Punic War the Romans, assuming the offensive, had fought their way to the Po. In the decade which followed the overthrow of Hannibal their dominion in the plain was consolidated; and Italian settlers mingled with the surviving Gauls.

About the middle of the second century before Christ the Greek colony of Massilia (Marseilles) asked the Romans to help them against the Ligurian tribes between the Maritime Alps and the Rhône; and the republic seized the opportunity of gaining a footing in Transalpine Gaul and thus securing communication by land with Spain. Thirty years later the Aedui, who inhabited the Nivernais and Western Burgundy, made a treaty with Rome, whose support they desired against their rivals; and soon afterwards a crisis in Gallic politics gave the Romans an opening for attacking the Arverni, who possessed what is now Auvergne, and the Allobroges, whose territory was between the Lake of Geneva, the Rhône, and the Isère. A victory at the confluence of these streams assured thenceforward the Roman command of the lower Rhône; and the province which was now formed was gradually extended along the Cevennes and the Tarn till its northern frontier reached the centre of the Pyrenees. Italian brokers and money-lenders settled in the provincial towns and even in independent Gaul; and by the time when Caesar became Governor Roman civilization had taken root in the Province and was already influencing the Aedui and other tribes.

Caesar's memoirs, the evidence of which is confirmed and supplemented by archaeology, show that the Gauls, even in the remotest parts, had risen far above the condition of barbarism, that they practised agriculture, were enriched by trade, had constructed a system of roads, and, notwithstanding constant internecine war, had developed political, military, and fiscal institutions. They were exposed, however, to attacks from the east, which not only menaced their own independence, but were a source of danger to Rome. The devastating incursions of the Cimbri and Teutoni at the end of the second century before Christ were followed, after an interval of thirty years, by the invasion of the German chieftain, Ariovistus, and, a few years later, by the appearance of marauders from Switzerland on the right bank of the Rhône. Thus when Caesar was appointed Governor of Illyricum and Gaul his tenure of office was likely to be eventful, especially as his commission apparently gave him the right to include the whole of independent Gaul north of the Province within his sphere of action.

His appointment carried with it the command of an army consisting of four legions, perhaps about twenty thousand men. One of them was quartered in Transalpine Gaul: the other three were at Aquileia, near the site of the modern Trieste. He could also command the services of slingers from the Balearic Isles, of archers from Numidia and Crete, and of cavalry from Spain. Various military reforms had been introduced by Marius; and the legions of Caesar were in many respects different from those which had fought against Hannibal. They were no longer a militia, but an army of professional soldiers. Each legion consisted of ten cohorts; and the cohort, formed of three maniples or six centuries, had replaced the maniple as the tactical unit of the legion. From the earliest times the legion had been commanded by an officer called a military tribune. Six were assigned to each legion; and each one of the number held command in turn. But they now owed their appointments to interest rather than to merit; and apparently no tribune in Caesar’s army was ever placed at the head of a legion. They still had administrative duties to perform, and exercised subordinate commands. But the principal officers were the legati, who might loosely be called generals of division. Their powers were not strictly defined, but varied according to circumstances and to the confidence which they deserved. A legatus might be entrusted with the command of a legion or of an army corps; he might even, in the absence of his chief, be entrusted with the command of the entire army. But he was not yet, as such, the permanent commander of a legion. The officers upon whom the efficiency of the troops mainly depended were the centurions. They were chosen from the ranks, and their position has been roughly compared with that of our own non-commissioned officers. But their duties were, in some respects, at least as responsible as those of a captain. The centurions of the first cohort were regularly summoned to councils of war; and the chief centurion of a legion was actually in a position to offer respectful suggestions to the legate himself. Every legion included in its ranks a number of skilled artisans, called fabri, who have been likened to the engineers in a modern army; but they were not permanently enrolled in a separate corps. They fought in the ranks like other soldiers; but, when their special services were required, they were directed by staff-officers called praefecti fabrum. It was their duty to execute repairs of every kind, to superintend the construction of permanent camps, and to plan fortifications and bridges; and it should seem that they also had charge of the artillery,—the ballistae and catapults, which hurled heavy stones and shot arrows against a besieged town or the assailants of a post.

The legionary wore a sleeveless woollen shirt, a leathern tunic protected across breast and back by bands of metal, and, in cold or wet weather, a kind of blanket or military cloak. His defensive armour consisted of helmet, shield, and greaves: his weapons were a short, two-edged, cut-and-thrust sword and a javelin, the blade of which, behind the hardened point, was made of soft iron, so that, when it struck home, it might bend and not be available for return. These, however, formed only a part of the load which he carried on the march. Over his left shoulder he bore a pole, to which were fastened in a bundle his ration of grain, his cooking-vessel, saw, basket, hatchet, and spade. For it was necessary that he should be a woodman and navvy as well as a soldier. No Roman army ever halted for the night without constructing a camp fortified with trench, rampart, and palisade.

The column was of course accompanied by a host of non-combatants. Each legion required at least five or six hundred horses and mules to carry its baggage; and the drivers, with the slaves who waited on the officers, formed a numerous body. Among the camp-followers were also dealers, who supplied the wants of the army, and were ready to buy booty of every kind.

What policy Caesar intended to follow he has not told us. While he was going forth to govern a distant land, the government of his own was lapsing into anarchy. He must have seen that the Germans would soon overrun Gaul unless the Romans prevented them, and that their presence would revive the peril from which Marius had delivered Rome. We may feel sure that he had determined to teach them, by a rough lesson if necessary, that they must advance no further into Gaul, nor venture to cross the boundaries of the Province or of Italy. It can hardly be doubted that he dreamed of adding a new province to the empire, which should round off its frontier and add to its wealth. But whether he had definitely resolves to attempt a conquest of such magnitude, or merely intended to follow, as they appeared, the indications of Fortune, it would be idle to conjecture. Ambitious though he was, he only courted, he never tempted her. The greatest statesman is, in a sense, an opportunist. When Caesar should find himself in Gaul, he would know best how to shape his ends.

Book I

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HELVETII AND ARIOVISTUS

1. Gaul, taken as a whole, is divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and the third by a people who call themselves Celts and whom we call Gauls. These peoples differ from one another in language, institutions, and laws. The Gauls are separated from the Aquitani by the river Garonne, from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. Of all these peoples the bravest are the Belgae; for they are furthest removed from the civilization and refinement of the Province, traders very rarely visit them with the wares which tend to produce moral enervation, and they are nearest to the Germans, who dwell on the further side of the Rhine, and are constantly at war with them. For the same reason the Helvetii also are braver than the other Gauls; they are fighting almost daily with the Germans, either trying to keep them out of their own country or making raids into theirs. That part of the whole country which, as we have said, is occupied by the Gauls, begins at the river Rhône, and is bounded by the Garonne, the Ocean, and the country of the Belgae. It extends, moreover, in the region occupied by the Sequani and the Helvetii, to the Rhine; and its trend is towards the north. The territory of the Belgae, commencing from the most distant frontier of Gaul, extends to the lower Rhine, and has a northerly and easterly aspect. Aquitania extends from the Garonne to the Pyrenees and that part of the Ocean which is off the coast of Spain; and its outlook is towards the north-west.

2. Pre-eminent among the Helvetii in rank and wealth was Orgetorix. In the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso he organized a conspiracy among the nobles in the hope of making himself king, and persuaded the community to undertake a national emigration, as, being the most warlike of all the Gallic peoples, they could easily achieve dominion over the whole of Gaul. He had no difficulty in convincing them, because their country is limited everywhere by natural features,—on one side by the Rhine, a broad deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on another by the lofty range of the Jura, between the Helvetii and the Sequani; on a third by the Lake of Geneva and the Rhône, which separates our Province from the Helvetii. These limits restricted their movements and made it comparatively difficult for them to attack their neighbours; and, being a warlike people, they chafed under this restraint. Moreover, considering their numbers and their renown as valiant warriors, they felt that their territories—only two hundred and forty miles long by one hundred and eighty broad—were too small.

3. Impelled by these motives and swayed by the influence of Orgetorix, they determined to make the necessary preparations for emigration, buying up all the draught cattle and wagons that they could obtain, bringing all available lands under cultivation, with the object of securing an abundance of grain for the journey, and establishing relations of peace and amity with the neighbouring tribes. They believed that two years would be sufficient to complete these preparations, and passed an enactment fixing their departure for the third year. Orgetorix was chosen as leader, and undertook a mission to the several tribes. In the course of his tour he persuaded a Sequanian named Casticus, whose father, Catamantaloedes, had for many years held sovereignty over the Sequani, and had been honoured by the Roman Senate with the title of Friend, to seize the royal power, which his father had held before him, over his own tribe; he also persuaded Dumnorix, an Aeduan, brother of Diviciacus, who at that time held the principal power in his own country, and was very popular with the masses, to make a similar attempt, and gave him his daughter in marriage. He convinced them that it would be quite easy to achieve their purpose, as he was going to seize sovereignty over his own tribe; the Helvetii were undoubtedly the strongest people in the whole of Gaul; and he affirmed that by his wealth and his armed force he would secure them the possession of their thrones. Enthralled by his eloquence, they swore mutual fidelity; and they hoped that, once they had secured their thrones, they would be able, backed by three powerful and stable peoples, to make themselves masters of the whole of Gaul.

4. The scheme was made known to the Helvetii by informers. In accordance with national custom, they insisted that Orgetorix should plead his cause in chains. If he were condemned, his inevitable punishment would be death at the stake. On the day fixed for the pleading he made all his slaves from all parts, numbering ten thousand, come to the trial, and marched thither at the head of all his retainers and debtors, who were very numerous. With their protection he escaped trial. Exasperated at this defiance, the community endeavoured to assert their rights by force, and the authorities summoned a posse from the districts, when Orgetorix died; and there is some reason to suspect (so the Helvetii believe) that he died by his own hand.

5. After his death the Helvetii in no way relaxed their efforts to carry out their intended emigration. As soon an they believed themselves ready for the enterprise, they set fire to all their strongholds, of which there were twelve, their villages, numbering four hundred, and the remaining buildings, which belonged to individuals; and burned the whole of their grain, except what they were going to take with them, that they might have no hope of returning home, and so be more ready to face every danger. Every man was directed to take a supply of flour from his house for three months for his own use. They induced their neighbours, the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, to join their enterprise, burn their strongholds and villages, and emigrate along with them; at the same time they formed a close alliance with the Boii, who had formerly dwelt on the further bank of the Rhine, and had migrated into Noricum and taken Noreia.

6. There were only two routes by which it was possible for them to leave their country. One, leading through the country of the Sequani, and passing between the Jura and the Rhône, was so narrow and difficult that carts could barely pass along it one at a time, while a lofty mountain overhung it, so that a handful of men could easily stop them; the other, leading through our Province, is much easier and more convenient, for the Rhône, which flows between the country of the Helvetii and that of the Allobroges, who had recently been subdued, is, at certain points, fordable. Geneva, the most remote town belonging to the Allobroges, is connected by a bridge with the country of the Helvetii, to which it is quite close. The Helvetii believed that they could either induce the Allobroges to let them pass through their country, as they were not yet apparently well disposed towards the Romans, or could compel them to do so. When everything was ready for their departure, they fixed the 28th of March, in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius, for the general muster on the banks of the Rhône.

7. As soon as Caesar was informed that they were attempting to march through the Province, he promptly quitted the capital, pushed on as fast as he could possibly travel into Further Gaul, and made his way to the neighbourhood of Geneva. As the entire force in Further Gaul amounted only to one legion, he ordered as many troops as possible to be raised throughout the Province, and directed that the bridge at Geneva should be broken down. The Helvetii, on being informed of his approach, sent an embassy to him, composed of their most illustrious citizens, headed by Nammeius and Verucloetius, to say that they purposed, with his consent, to march through the Province, as there was no other route open to them, but that they would do no harm. Caesar, remembering that Lucius Cassius, when consul, had been slain by the Helvetii, and his army defeated and forced to pass under the yoke, was not disposed to grant their request; and he was of opinion that if men of hostile temper were allowed to march through the Province, they were not likely to refrain from outrage and mischief. Still, in order to gain time for his levies to assemble, he told the envoys that he would take some days for consideration: if they had any favour to ask, they might return on the 13th of April.

8. Meantime, employing the legion which he had with him and the troops which had assembled from the Province, he constructed a rampart sixteen feet high and a trench from the Lake of Geneva, which overflows into the Rhône, to the Jura, which separates the territory of the Sequani from the Helvetii,—a distance of nineteen miles. When these works were finished he constructed redoubts and posted piquets, to enable him to repel the Helvetii, in case they attempted to force a passage. When the appointed day came round, and the envoys returned, he told them that he could not, consistently with the established usage of the Roman People, allow any one to march through the Province; and he warned them that, if they attempted to use force, he would stop them. The disappointed Helvetii lashed barges together and made a number of rafts, while others forded the Rhône at the shallowest parts, sometimes in the day, but oftener at night, and tried to break through; but, foiled by the entrenchments, the rapid concentration of the troops, and their volleys of missiles, they abandoned their attempt.

9. There remained only the route through the country of the Sequani; and it was so narrow that they could not advance if the Sequani objected. Being unable to win their consent by their own efforts, they sent envoys to the Aeduan, Dumnorix, hoping, by his intercession, to gain their object. Dumnorix had great influence with the Sequani from his personal popularity and lavish bribery, and was well disposed towards the Helvetii, having married a daughter of Orgetorix, who belonged to that tribe: moreover, his desire of royal power made him eager for revolution, and he wished to lay as many tribes as possible under obligations to himself. Accordingly he undertook the mission. He induced the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to pass through their territory, and effected an exchange of hostages between the two peoples, the Sequani undertaking not to obstruct the march of the Helvetii, the Helvetii to abstain from mischief and outrage.

10. Caesar was informed that the Helvetii intended to march through the territories of the Sequani and the Aedui and make for the country of the Santones, which is not far from that of the Tolosates, a Provincial tribe. He saw that, if this happened, it would be very dangerous to the Province to have a warlike population, hostile to the Roman People, close to its rich and defenceless corn-fields. For these reasons he placed Titus Labienus, one of his generals, in charge of the entrenchments which he had constructed; hastened to Italy by forced marches; raised two legions there; withdrew three from their winter quarters in the neighbourhood of Aquileia; and advanced rapidly with all five by the shortest road leading over the Alps into Further Gaul. The Ceutrones, Graioceli, and Caturiges seized the Alpine heights and tried to stop the advance of the army. Beating them off in several combats, he made his way in seven days from Ocelum, the extreme point of the Cisalpine Province, into the territory of the Vocontii in the Further Province: thence he led the army into the country of the Allobroges, and from their country into that of the Segusiavi, the first people outside the Province, beyond the Rhône.

11. The Helvetii had by this time threaded the pass, crossed the country of the Sequani, and reached that of the Aedui, whose lands they were ravaging. The Aedui, unable to defend themselves or their property against their attacks, sent a deputation to Caesar to ask for help, pleading that they had at all times deserved well of the Roman People, and it was not right that their lands should be ravaged, their children carried off into slavery, and their towns captured almost under the eyes of our army. At the same time the Ambarri, who were connected with the Aedui by friendship and blood, informed Caesar that their lands had been laid waste, and that it was more than they could do to repel the enemy's attacks upon their towns. The Allobroges also, who possessed villages and estates on the further side of the Rhône, fled to Caesar, alleging that they had nothing left except the bare soil. For these reasons Caesar decided that it would be unwise to wait till his allies had lost all that they possessed, and the Helvetii reached the country of the Santoni.

12. A river called the Saône flows through the territories of the Aedui and the Sequani, and discharges itself into the Rhône: its current is so incredibly sluggish that it is impossible to tell, by merely looking, in which direction it is flowing. The Helvetii were crossing it in rafts and small boats lashed together. Learning from his patrols that about one-fourth were still on the near side of the river, while three-fourths had passed over, he started from his camp in the third watch, with three legions, and came up with the division which had not yet crossed. Attacking them unexpectedly while their movements were impeded, he destroyed a great many: the rest took to flight and concealed themselves in the neighbouring woods. The clan in question was called the Tigurini, the entire Helvetian community being divided into four clans. This clan, acting independently, had emigrated within the memory of our fathers, and made the army of the consul, Lucius Cassius, who was himself killed, pass under the yoke. Thus, either by accident or divine providence, that section of the Helvetian community which had brought a signal disaster upon the Roman People was the first to pay the penalty. In this action Caesar avenged a family wrong as well as the wrongs of his country; for a general named Lucius Piso, the grandfather of his father-in-law, Lucius Piso, had perished in the same battle as Cassius at the hands of the Tigurini.