A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty

Front matter

A

Concerning

The third Edition corrected.

Preface

E.

Too much care cannot be taken, to prevent being misunderstood and prejudg'd, in handling questions of such nice speculation as those of Liberty and Necessity: and therefore, tho' I might in justice expect to be read before any judgment be pass'd on me, I think it proper to premise the following observations.

1. First, tho' I deny liberty in a certain meaning of that word; yet I contend for iberty, as it signifies, a power in man, to do as he wills, or pleases; which is the notion of liberty maintain'd by Aristotle, Cicero, Mr. Locke, and several other Philosophers, antient and modern. And indeed after a careful examination of the best authors who have treated of liberty, I may affirm, that however opposite they appear in words to one another, and how much soever some of them seem to maintain another notion of liberty; yet at the bottom, there is an almost universal agreement in the notion defended by me, and all that they say, when examin’d, will be found to amount to no more.

2. Secondly, when I affirm necessity; I contend only for what is call’d moral necessity, meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determin’d by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity. And here also I have the concurrence of almost all the greatest Asserters of liberty, who either expressly maintain moral necessity, or the thing signified by those words.

3. Thirdly, I have undertaken to shew, that the notions I advance, are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundations of morality and laws, and of rewards and punishments in society; and that the notions, I explode, are subversive of them. This I judg’d necessary to make out, in treating a subject that has relation to morality; because nothing can be true which subverts those things; and all discourse must be defective, wherein the Reader perceives any disagreement to moral truth; which is as evident as any speculative truth, and much more necessary to be render’d clear to the Reader’s mind, than truth in all other sciences.

4. Fourthly, I have intituled my discourse, a Philosophical Inquiry, &c; because I propose only to prove my point by experience and by reason, omitting all considerations strictly theological. By this method I have reduc’d the matter to a short compass: and hope, I shall give no less satisfaction, than if I had consider’d it also Theologically; for all but Enthusiasts, must think true Theology consistent with reason, and with experience.

5. Fifthly, if any should ask, Of what use such a Discourse is? I might offer to their consideration, first, the usefulness of truth in general: and secondly, the usefulness of the truths I maintain towards establishing laws and morality, rewards and punishments in society; but shall content myself with observing, that it may be of use to all those who desire to know the truth in the questions I handle, and that think examination the proper means to arrive at that knowledge. As for those, who either make no Inquiries at all, and concern not themselves about any speculations; or who take up with speculations; without any examination; or who read only books to confirm themselves in the speculations they have received; I allow my book to be of no use to them: but yet think they may allow others to enjoy a taste different from their own.

Chapter 1

A

Concerning

Y.

To Lucius.

“I Here send you in writing my thoughts concerning Liberty and Necessity, which you have so often desired of me: and in drawing them up, have had regard to your penetration, by being as short as is consistent with being understood, and to your love of truth, by saying nothing but what I think true, and also all the truth that I apprehend relates to the subject, with the sincerity belonging to the conversation of friends. If you think me either too short in any respect, or to have omitted the consideration of any objection, by its not occurring to me, or, that you think of importance to be consider'd: be pleased to acquaint me therewith, and I will give you all the satisfaction I can.”

'Tis a common observation, even among the learned, that there are certain matters of speculation, about which it is impossible, from the nature of the subjects themselves, to speak clearly and distinctly. Upon which account, men are very indulgent to, and pardon the unintelligible discourses of Theologers and Philosophers, which treat of the sublime points in theology and philosophy. And there is no question in the whole compass of speculation, of which men have written more obscurely, and of which it is thought more impossible to discourse clearly, and concerning which men more expect, and pardon obscure discourse, than upon the subjects of Liberty and Necessity. But this common observation, is both a common and a learned error. For whoever employs his thoughts either about God or the Trinity in Unity, or any other pro- found subject, ought to have some Ideas, to be the objects of his thoughts in the same manner as he has in thinking on the most common subjects: for where Ideas fail us in any matter, our thoughts must also fail us. And it is plain, whenever we have Ideas, we are able to communicate them to others by words: for words being arbitrary marks of our ideas, we can never want them to signify our Ideas, as long as we have so many in use among us, and a power to make as many more as we have occasion for. Since then we can think of nothing any farther than we have Ideas, and can signify all the Ideas we have by words to one another; why should we not be able to put one Idea into a Proposition as well as another? Why not to compare ideas together about one subject as well as another? And why not to range one sort of Propositions into order and method, as well as another? When we use the term God, the Idea signify'd thereby, ought to be as distinct and determinate in us, as the Idea of a triangle or a square is, when we discourse of either of them; otherwise, the term God is an empty sound. What hinders us then from putting the Idea signify’d by the term God into a Proposition, any more than the Idea of a triangle or a square? And why cannot we compare that Idea with another Idea, as well as any two other ideas together: since comparison of Ideas consists in observing wherein Ideas differ, and wherein they agree: to which nothing is requisite in any Ideas, but their being distinct and determinate in our Minds? And since we ought to have a distinct and determinate Idea to the term God, whenever we use it, and as distinct and determinate as that of a triangle or a square: since we can put it into a Proposition: since we can compare it with other Ideas on account of its distinctness and determinateness; why should we not be able to range our thoughts about God in as clear a method, and with as great perspicuity as about figure and quantity.

I would not hereby be thought to suppose that the Idea of God is an adequate Idea, and exhausts the subject it refers to, like the Idea of a triangle or a square; or that it is as easy to form in our Minds as the Idea of a triangle or a square; or that it does not require a great comprehension of Mind to bring together the various Ideas that relate to God, and so compare them together; or that there are not several Propositions concerning him that are doubtful, and of which we can arrive at no certainty; or that there are not many Propositions concerning him subject to very great Difficulties or objections. All these I grant: but I say, they are no Reasons to justify Obscurity. For, first, an inadequate Idea is no less distinct, as such, than an adequate Idea, and no less true, as far as it goes; and therefore may be discours’d of with equal clearness and truth. Secondly, Tho’ the Idea of God be not so easy to form in our Minds as the Idea of a triangle or a square, and it requires a great comprehension of Mind to bring together the various Ideas that relate to him, and compare them together; yet these are only reasons, for using a greater application, or for not writing at all. Third- ly, if a writer has in relation to his subject any doubts or objections in his mind, which he cannot resolve to his satisfaction, he may express those conceptions or thoughts no less clearly, than any other conceptions or thoughts. He should only take care not to exceed the bounds of those conceptions, nor endeavor to make his reader understand what he does not understand himself: for when he exceeds those bounds, his discourse must be dark, and his pains useless. To express what a man conceives is the end of writing; and every reader ought to be satisfy’d when he sees an author speak of a subject according to the light he has about it, so far as to think him a clear writer.

When therefore any writer speaks obscurely, either about God, or any other Idea of his mind, the defect is in him. For why did he write before he had a meaning; or before he was able to express to others what he meant? Is it not unpardonable for a man to cant, who pretends to teach?

These general reflections may be confirm’d by matter of fact from the writings of the most celebrated dogmatical authors.

When such great men as Gassendus, Cartesius, Cudworth, Locke, Bayle, Sir Isaac Newton and Mr. De Fontenelle treat of the most profound questions in metaphysicks, mathematicks, and other parts of philosophy; they by handling them as far as their clear and distinct Ideas reach’d, have written with no less perspicuity to their proper readers, than other authors have done about historical matters, and upon the plainest and most common subjects.

On the other side, when authors, who in other respects are equal to the foregoing, treat of any subjects further than they have clear and distinct Ideas; they do and cannot but write to as little purpose, and take as absurd pains, as the most ignorant authors do, who treat of any subject under a total ignorance, or a confus’d knowledge of it. There are so many examples of these latter occurring to every reader; and there are such frequent complaints of mens venturing beyond their ability in several questions; that I need not name particular Authors, and may fairly avoid the odium of censuring any one. But having met with a passage concerning the ingenious Father Malebranche in the Letters of Mr. Bayle, who was an able Judge, a friend to him, and a defender of him in other respects, I hope I may, without being liable to exception, produce Father Malebranche as an example. He has in several books treated of and vindicated the opinion of seeing all things in God; and yet so acute a person as Mr. Bayle, after having read them all, declares, that he less comprehends his notion from his last book than ever. Which plainly shows a defect in F. Malebranche to write upon a subject he understood not, and therefore could not make others understand.

You see, I bespeak no favor in the question before me, and take the whole fault to myself, if I do not write clearly to you on it, and prove what I propose.

And that I may inform you, in what I think clear to myself, I will begin with explaining the sense of the Question.

Man is a necessary Agent, if all his actions are so determined by the causes preceding each action, that not one past action could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it hath been; nor one future action can possibly not come to pass, or be otherwise than it shall be. He is a free Agent, if he is able, at any time under the circumstances and causes he then is, to do different things: or, in other words, if he is not unavoidably determin’d in every point of time by the circumstances he is in, and causes he is under, to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other.

I. This being a question of fact concerning what we ourselves do; we will first consider our own Experience; which if we can know, as sure we may, will certainly determine this matter. And because experience is urg’d with great triumph, by the patrons of Liberty, we will begin with a few general reflections concerning the argument of experience: and then we will proceed to our experience itself.

1. The vulgar, who are bred up to believe Liberty or Freedom, think themselves secure of success, constantly appealing to Experience for a proof of their

freedom, and being persuad’d that they feel themselves free on a thousand occasions. And the source of their mistake, seems to be as follows. They either attend not to, or see not the causes of their actions, especially in matters of little moment, and thence conclude, they are free, or not mov’d by causes, to do what they do.

They also frequently do actions whereof they repent: and because in the repenting humour, they find no present motive to do those actions, they conclude, that they might not have done them at the time they did them, and that they were free from necessity (as they were from outward impediments) in the doing them.

They also find, that they can do as they will, and forbear as they will, without any external impediment to hinder them from doing as they will; let them will either doing or forbearing. They likewise see, that they often change their minds; that they can, and do chuse differently every successive moment; and that they frequently deliberate, and thereby are sometimes at a near ballance, and in a state of indifference with respect to judging about some propositions, and willing or chusing with respect to some objects. And experiencing these things, they mistake them for the exercise of Freedom, or Liberty from Necessity. For ask them, whether they think themselves free? and they will immediately answer, Yes: and say some one or other of these foregoing things, and particularly think they prove themselves free, when they affirm, they can do as they will.

Nay, celebrat’d Philosophers and Theologers, both ancient and modern, who have meditated much on this matter, talk after the same manner, giving definitions of Liberty, that are consistent with Fate or Necessity; tho’ at the same time they would be thought to exempt some of the actions of man from the power of Fate, or to assert Liberty from Necessity. Cicero defines Liberty to be, a power to do as we will. And therein several moderns follow him. One defines Liberty to be, a power to act, or not to act, as we will. Another defines it in more words thus: a power to do what we will, and because we will; so that if we did not will it, we should not do it; we should even do the contrary if we will’d it. And another, a power to do or forbear an action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either is preferr’d to the other. On all which definitions, if the Reader will be pleas’d to reflect, he will see ’em to be only definitions of liberty or freedom from outward impediments of action, and not a Freedom or Liberty from Necessity; as I also will shew them to be in the sequel of this Discourse, wherein I shall contend equally with them for such a power as they describe, tho’ I affirm, That there is no Liberty from Necessity.

Alexander the Aphrodisæan, (a most acute philosopher of the IId Century, and the earliest commentator now extant upon Aristotle, and esteemed his best Defender and Interpreter) defines Liberty to be, a power to chuse what to do after deliberation and consultation, and to chuse and do what is most eligible to our reason; whereas otherwise, we should follow our fancy. Now a choice after deliberation, is a no less necessary choice, than a choice by fancy. For tho’ a choice by fancy, or without deliberation, may be one way, and a choice with delibe- may be another way, or different; yet each choice being founded on what is judged best, the one for one reason, and the other for another, is equally necessary; and good or bad reasons, hasty or deliberate thoughts, fancy or deliberation, make no difference.

In the same manner, Bishop Bramhall, who has written several books for Liberty, and pretends to assert the Liberty taught by Aristotle, defines Liberty thus: He says, That act which makes a Man’s actions to be truly free, is election; which is the deliberate chusing or refusing of this or that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where divers are represented by the understanding. And that this definition places Liberty wholly in chusing the seeming best means, and not in chusing the seeming worst means, equally with the best; will appear from the following passages. He says, actions done in sudden and violent passions, are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election.—To say the will is determined by motives, that is, by reasons or discourses, is as much as to say that the Agent is determin’d by himself, or is free. Because motives determine not naturally, but moral

which kind of determination is consistent with true Liberty—Admitting that the will follows necessarily the last dictate of the understanding, this is not destructive of the liberty of the will; this is only an hypothetical necessity. So that Liberty, with him, consists in chusing, or refusing necessarily after deliberation; which chusing or refusing is morally and hypothetically determined, or necessary by virtue of the said deliberation.

Lastly, a great Armenian Theologer, who has writ a course of Philosophy, and enter’d into several controversies on the subject of Liberty, makes Liberty to consist in an indifferency of mind while a thing is under deliberation. For, says he, while the mind deliberates, it is free till the moment of action; because nothing determines it necessarily to act or not to act. Whereas when the mind ballances or compares Ideas or motives together, it is then no less necessarily determin’d to a state of Indifferency by the appearances of those Ideas and motives, than it is necessarily determin’d in the very moment of action. Were a man to be at liberty in this state of indifferency, he ought to have it in his power to be not indifferent, at the same time that he is indifferent.

If experience therefore proves the liberty contended for by the foregoing asserters of liberty, it proves men to have no liberty from necessity.

2. As the foregoing asserters of liberty, give us definitions of Liberty, as grounded on experience, which are consistent with Necessity; so some of the greatest Patrons of liberty, do by their concessions in this matter, sufficiently destroy all argument from Experience.

Erasmus, in his treatise for Free-will, against Luther, says, That among the difficulties which have exercis’d the Theologers and Philosophers of all ages, there is none greater than the question of free-will. And Mr. Le Clerc, speaking of this Book of Erasmus, says, that the question of free-will, was too subtile for Erasmus, who was no Philosopher; which makes him often contradict himself.

The late Bishop of Sarum, tho’ he contends, Every Man experiences liberty; yet owns, that great difficulties attend the subject on all hands, and that therefore he pretends not to explain or answer them.

The famous Bernard Ochin, a great Italian Wit, has written a most subtile and ingenious book intituled, Labyrinths concerning Free-will and Predestination, &c. wherein he shews, that they who assert, that Man acts freely, are involv’d in four great difficulties; and that those who assert that Man acts necessarily, fall into four other difficulties. So that he forms eight Labyrinths, four against Liberty, and four against Necessity. He turns himself all manner of ways to get clear of them; but not being able to find any solution, he constantly concludes with a Prayer to God to deliver him from these Abysses. Indeed, in the progress of his work, he endeavors to furnish means to get out of this prison: but he concludes that the only way, is to say, with Socrates, Hoc unum scio quod nihil scio. We ought, says he, to rest contented, and conclude, that God requires neither the affirmative nor negative of us. This is the title of his last chapter, Qua via ex omnibus supradictis Labyrinthis cito exiri possit, quæ doctæ ignorantiæ via vocatur.

A famous author, who appeals to common experience, for a proof of liberty, confesses, that the question of liberty is the most obscure and difficult question in all Philosophy: that the learned are fuller of contradictions to themselves, and to one another, on this, than on any other subject: And that he writes against the common notion of liberty, and endeavors to establish another notion, which he allows to be intricate.

But how can all this happen in a plain matter of fact, suppos’d to be experienc’d by everybody? What difficulty can there be in stating a plain matter of fact, and describing what every body feels? What need of so much Philosophy? And why so many contradictions on the subject? And how can all men experience Liberty, when it is allow’d that the common notion of liberty is false, or not experienc’d; and a new notion of Liberty, not thought on before (or thought on but by few) is set up as matter of experience? This could not happen if matter of fact was clear for liberty.

3. Other Asserters of Liberty seem driven into it on account of suppos’d inconveniencies attending the doctrine of Necessity. The great Episcopius, in his Treatise of Free-will, acknowledges in effect, that the asserters of Necessity have seeming experience on their side, and are thereby very numerous; They, as he observes, allege one thing of moment in which they triumph, viz. “that the will is determin’d by the understanding: and assert, that unless it were so; the will would be a blind faculty, and might make evil, as evil, its object; and reject what is pleasant and agreeable: And by consequence, that all persuasions, promises, reasonings and threats, would be as useless to a Man as to a stock or a stone.” This, he allows to be very plausible, and to have the appearance of probability; to be the common sentiment of the schools; to be the rock on which the ablest defenders of liberty have split, without being able to answer it; and to be the reason, or argument (or rather the matter of experience) which has made men in all ages, and not a few in this age, fall into the opinion of the fatal necessity of all things. But because it makes all our actions necessary, and thereby, in his opinion, subverts all religion, laws, rewards and punishments; he concludes it to be most certainly false: and religion makes him quit this common and plausible opinion. Thus also many other strenuous Asserters of Liberty, as well as himself, are driven by these supposed difficulties, to deny manifest experience. I say, manifest experience, for are we not manifestly determin’d by pleasure or pain, and by what seems reasonable or unreasonable to us, to judge or will, or act? Whereas could they see that there are not grounds for laws and morality, rewards and punishments, but by supposing the doctrine of Necessity; and that there is no foundation for laws and morality, rewards and punishments, upon the supposition of a man’s being a free agent, (as shall evidently, and demonstratively appear) they would readily allow experience to be against Free-will, and deny Liberty, when they should see there was no need to assert it, in order to maintain those necessary things. And as a farther evidence thereof, let any man peruse the discourses written by the ablest authors for liberty, and he will see (as they confess of one another) that they frequently contradict themselves, write obscurely, and know not where to place Liberty; at least he will see that he is able to make nothing of their discourses, no more than Mr. Locke was of this treatise of Episcopius, who in all his other writings, shews himself to be a clear, strong and argumentative writer.

4. There are others, and those contenders for Liberty, as well as denyers of it, who report the persuasions of Men, as to the Matter of fact, very differently, and also judge very differently themselves about the fact, from what is vulgarly believed among those who mantain Free-will.

An ancient author speaks thus: Fate, says he, is sufficiently proved from the general receiv’d opinion and persuasion of Men thereof. For, in certain things, when Men all agree, except a few, who dissent from them on account of maintaining some doctrines before taken up, they cannot be mistaken. Wherefore Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, tho’ no contemptible Naturalist, ought not be judged to deserve any regard, when opposing the common persuasion of all Men he asserts, “That nothing is done by Fate; but that it is an empty name.” And according to all authors, recording the opinions of men in this matter, the belief of Fate, as to all Events, has continued to be the most com- mon persuasion, both of Philosophers and People; as it is at this day the persuasion of much the greatest part of mankind, according to the relations of Voyagers. And tho’ it has not equally prevail’d among Christians, as it has, and does, among all other religious parties; yet it is certain, the Fatalists have been, and are very numerous among Christians: and the free-will-Theologers themselves allow, That some Christians are as great Fatalists, as any of the ancient Philosophers were.

The acute and penetrating Mr. Bayle, reports the fact, as very differently understood by those who have thoroughly examin’d and consider’d the various actions of Man, from what is vulgarly suppos’d in this matter. Says he, They who examine not to the bottom what passes within them, easily persuade themselves, that they are free: but, they who have considered with care the foundation and circumstances of their actions, doubt of their freedom, and are even persuaded, that their reason and understandings are Slaves that cannot resist the force which carries them along. He says also, in a familiar Letter, That the best proofs al- leg’d for Liberty are, that without it, Man could not sin; and that God would be the author of evil as well as good thoughts.

And the celebrated Mr. Leibniz, that universal genius on occasion of Archbishop King’s appeal to experience, (in behalf of his notion of liberty, viz. A faculty, which, being indifferent to objects, and over-ruling our passions, appetites, sensations, and reason, chuses arbitrarily among objects; and renders the object chosen agreeable, only because it has chosen it) denies, that we experience such, or any other Liberty; but contends that we rather experience a determination in all our actions. Says he, We experience something in us which inclines us to a choice; and if it happens that we cannot give a reason of all our inclinations, a little attention will show us, that the constitution of our bodies, the bodies encompassing us, the present, or preceding state of our minds, and several little matters comprehended under these great causes, may contribute to make us chuse certain objects, without having recourse to a pure indifference, or to I know not what power of the Soul, which does upon objects, what they say colours do upon the Camelion. In fine, he is so far from thinking that there is the least foundation from Experience, for the said notion of Liberty, that he treats it as a chimera, and compares it to the magical power of the Fairies to transform things.

Lastly, The Journalists of Paris are very far from thinking Archbishop King’s notion of liberty to be matter of experience, when they say, That Dr. King, not satisfy’d with any of the former notions of Liberty, proposes a new notion; and carries indifference so far, as to maintain that pleasure is not the motive but the effect of the choice of the will; placet res quia eligitur, non eligitur quia placet, makes him frequently contradict himself.

So that upon the whole, the affair of experience, with relation to liberty, stands thus. Some give the name Liberty to actions, which when described, are plainly Actions that are necessary; Others, tho’ appealing to vulgar experience, yet inconsistently therewith, contradict the vulgar experience, by owning it to be an intricate matter, and treating it after an intricate manner; Others are driven into the defence of Liberty, by difficulties imagin’d to flow from the doctrine of Necessity, combating what they allow to be matter of seeming experience; Others, and those the most discerning, either think liberty cannot be prov’d by experience, or think Men may see by experience, that they are necessary Agents; and the bulk of Mankind have always been persuaded that they are necessary Agents.

Having thus pav’d the way by shewing that liberty is not a plain matter of experience, by arguments drawn from the asserters of liberty themselves, and by consequence subverted the argument from experience for liberty; we will now run over the various actions of Men which can be conceiv’d to concern this subject, and examine, whether we can know from experience, that Man is a free or a necessary Agent. I think those actions may be reduc’d to these four: 1. Perception of Ideas. 2. Judging of Propositions. 3. Willing. 4. Doing as we will.