Poland and the Origins of the Second World War

Front matter

POLISH STUDIES - PRANSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 35

Marek Kornat

Poland and the Origins of the Second World War

Chapter 1. The Policy of Balance—Realities and Dilemmas

(1934-1938) cioe aee a 15 Non-Aggression Pacts with the Soviet Union and Germany ...ssssesseseseeersrssrererrereresrereeses 16 Two European Projects: the Four-Power Pact and the Eastern Pact ....sssssesssssssessersrrsrsreseee 24 The Alliance with France—Crisis and Attempts to Re-evaluate ....s.sseseseeseeesseeesrerreresrereesee 43 Confronting German Diplomacy: smossesianenra sana ireas nR AA E aaar EEE 62 A “Religious War in Europe siririna ner AE EEE 69 The Policy. Of Appeasement arera E E T aes ees 76 Policy Ideas and Reality sissies aea a a aa aa 83

Chapter 2. The Międzymorze (Intermarium) Idea—A Polish

Political Plan iñi 1938 ssisscsieresissoeniassess 91 A Rational but Unrealistic: Concept. jcs:cccisesdvesseaevwsistessavacvassessyeveveednaebeebesbennnesteaavaasaee’ 148

Chapter 3. Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union in September 1938 (facts, hypotheses and interpretations) ccc. ee 155 The Soviet Threat: Reality or Mystification? 0... ceescesesecensesceeeesseseesaeeseseeaeeeeeseeeaeeees 181

Historical Interpretations: cninn ann EE R 193

6 Table of Contents

Chapter 4. Hitler’s Demands and Poland’s Rejection

(1938-1939) „sn 221 The Polish: Non Possumus Leccsnvecoucevecedesissueteseteneevisrsdescessevessupsonsbvaeensoseuseaevosugsuesaveenaes’s 262

Chapter 5. The Alliance with Great Britain: Decisions and CONSEQUENCES « srissicsininininerannioninasimennens 275 Beck's Talks: tm London im April 1939) ..cs.ceuscisiecisnasescetes dea icises Secdsnesttetelettansitessstiee tls. 304 The "Seoririg” of 7 April 1939 o-er eere ieaiai aeaea aaia aa S Eai 311 Could the Soviets. Be Counted On? sssnesonninns rrei innnan a a E 320

Chapter 6. Berlin-Moscow Rapprochement and Soviet

Confronted by the Pact-of 23 August 1939 ....scscscssscsecscessesseecssgsssasecsceseesseceossseseseceeseees 372 ‘The Lack of Alternative Political Options’.i:.:.:..ssscssesecessssadeeceserdecescetess esedesdecusonsesevsedeces 395

Table of Contents 7

Introduction

This book covers the last phase of the Polish “policy of balance” and the final months of the Second Polish Republic’s existence, during which a great international crisis happened. The crisis began in March 1939 and ended on 1 September 1939, when German armed forces invaded Poland. The dilemmas of the Polish foreign policy of the reborn Poland included issues that Polish historians have discussed for many years: in fact, they have discussed them from the 1939 defeat until today. The discussion ranges from radical criticism to affirmation. The more time passes from the realities of the interwar period, the clearer the understanding of the period’s circumstances becomes. Perhaps the discussion will never definitely conclude because the past always has a way of making us see it in a different light. This book is another attempt to analyse the main issues of the Polish foreign policy, from the perspective of the 70 years that have passed since the Second World War began.

A historian is not supposed to judge, defend, or accuse. The historian is supposed to gather arguments “for and against”, consider past dilemmas, and recreate the atmosphere of the period he or she studies. The historian is a translator of the past, not a judge. We will never see a conclusive synthesis of such a complex problem as Poland’s international situation in 1938 and 1939. In historical studies, nothing is definitive or ultimate. As the Polish historian Henryk Wereszycki writes: “A judgment concerning the past is always a relative value”. We would like our considerations to become “a matter for reflection”, as the Polish political writer Juliusz Mieroszewski would say. This book will fulfil its purpose if it motivates the reader to ask further questions.

The book covers the questions concerning Poland’s situation in international relations in the last two landmark years that preceded the outbreak of the Second World War. My purpose is not to create a new monography. Instead, I want to enrich studies on this topic. Historians devote studies concerning the international relations’ situation of Poland in 1938 and 1939 to problems, which, in my opinion, required a new approach. Moreover, these problems require a new approach despite the presence of the enormous number of multilingual works on the topic of the Second Polish Republic diplomacy and the 1938-1939 international crisis.

I quote Jan Karski, who writes the following in his famous book The Great Powers and Poland 1918-1945. From Versailles to Yalta:'

It seems that from Poland’s resurrection at the end of World War I to its demise following World War II, only once were the Poles able to determine their own fate by themselves. That was during the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919—1920. Only once—at

1 J. Karski, The Great Powers and Poland 1918-1945. From Versailles to Yalta (London, 1985).

10 Introduction the Versailles Peace Conference—did a Great Power, the United States, throw its support on behalf of Poland for reasons other than its own interest. In all other instances, Poland was unable to play an independent and effective role in the international arena, regardless of the merits or demerits of its policies. Essentially, its fate depended on the Great Powers—their short- or long-range goals and their interrelations. The Poles were never strong enough to change that reality.

According to Karski’s understanding, Poland determined its fate only once in history, in 1920, as the country managed to defend its newly acquired independence thanks to its armed forces. In 1920, the Polish nation emerged victorious in the war with the Soviets, even though the situation seemed catastrophic. Therefore, never in the future did the reborn Poland decided for itself, although the country was eager to play a significant role in international relations. All contemporary Polish foreign ministers, especially Jozef Beck, often repeated the slogan “nothing about us without us”, which became the main motto of Polish foreign policy.

Nevertheless, was Jan Karski right? Our considerations are an attempt to answer that momentous question. The 70 years that have passed since the outbreak of the Second World War make us ask that question again and again. The time that has passed since the dramatic events of the 1930s and the end of the Second World War let us look at Polish foreign policy from a more distant perspective, in a more balanced and in-depth way than before.

When we speak of the Polish foreign policy of the interwar period, which happened between 1918 and 1939, we must remember about the previous historiography. Sadly, we do not often refer to this historiography’s findings, due to the small volume of studies. The experts in the considered field wrote so much on the topic that it seems almost impossible to add something new. When I approached these considerations, I decided not to write yet another monography on Polish foreign policy. Instead, I decided to discuss the most debatable issues. These issues include, for example, the “Intermarium” block idea, the Soviet threat in September 1938, German territorial claims, the Polish-British alliance, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and the abandonment of Poland by the allied powers.

Undoubtedly, we cannot undermine fundamental facts. First, Poland would inevitably fail in its 1938 attempts to create a Central European bloc. Second, the Polish government rejected the German territorial claim, as they thought that, if they accepted it, this would mean the end of the independent Poland. Finally, the acceptance of British guarantees of support was Poland’s deliberate choice, which meant that the country rejected the possibility of creating a bloc of countries that would defend the status quo. Such a bloc would also have included the Soviet Union. Obviously, we know that Poland could not prevent the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in August 1939, nor could Poland gain real help from the Western powers in September 1939. In May 1939, the latter decided not to attack Germany from the West if Germany invaded Poland. No one can challenge these facts.

Introduction 11

When we consider the actions of Polish diplomacy in 1938-1939, we must ask ourselves very different questions. Three seem particularly important. How did the government of the Second Republic perceive the course of ongoing events? Were its actions rationally motivated during the autumn of 1938 and in 1939? Or, perhaps, Poland merely reacted to external circumstances, as a passive subject of international policy without any plan of its own?

Therefore, we deliberately stress not the actions of Polish diplomacy but the understanding of the international situation in which Poland found itself: the perception of threats and the assessment of Poland’s capabilities. The historian’s ultimate goal involves the reconstruction of the way of thinking of those who took part in historical events. Of course, it is usually impossible to achieve the said reconstruction. Nevertheless, the objective remains worth the attempt to attain.

In 1939, Poland lost its independence for 50 years. Every country that losses its territory due to warfare ceases to be an entity in international relations and becomes a subject of these relations. In 1989, Poland regained its independence. As a result, the question arose once again. Poland had to decide whether its foreign policy would agree with the foreign policy of the West or whether Poland would pursue its own foreign policy. Such experiences as Poland’s situation in 1939 are a rarity in the history of nations. Nevertheless, the dilemmas and decisions of that time teach us a lesson that is relevant even today.

Today, history’s role in the formation of public awareness seems to diminish. For example, authorities remove history from school curricula. Hence, matters that moved historical imagination in the past lose importance. Nevertheless, the dispute concerning whether Poland was right in its rejection of German territorial claims in 1938 and 1939 remains in the Polish elites’ collective consciousness as discussions concerning the “policy of balance”. The question whether Poland should have made an agreement with Hitler in 1938 and 1939 arose because people look for possible alternatives for contemporary Polish foreign policy. However, this question will not be key to this book because, in my opinion, we do not and should not discuss the issue of possible alternatives. Everyone who claims that Poland could have acted differently achieves very little. The acceptance of Adolf Hitler’s one-time offer would have made Poland a subordinated ally of Germany. Moreover, that act would not have given Poland anything: either in the event of German failure or—unimaginable—victory. Deliberations on the German “overall solution” (Gesamtlésung) offer represent yet another attempt to find an answer to the question of possible Polish concessions.

A Polish historian must pay attention to an important issue when he or she analyses interwar Polish diplomacy. The problem lies in its extremely simplistic and unilateral image in Western historiography. Moreover, the image is eminently and unjustifiably negative. Sadly, I do not mean the older Western historiography, which dates to the Cold War period, but also the historiography of today.

The well-known journalist and historian William L. Shirer devotes a few remarks to Polish foreign policy on the eve of Second World War in his famous book The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in

12 Introduction

1940: “The Polish Government, dominated by a clique of politically inept generals and colonels who had served under the dictator Piłsudski, had begun to detach Poland from its traditional ally and protector, France, and approach Germany in belief that the Reich would better protect Polish lands against the encroachment of the hated Russians”.’ In 1992, one American historian claimed that Józef Beck, the foreign minister of contemporary Poland, was responsible for the fact that the Hitler-Stalin Pact became a reality. The historian states that Beck is responsible for the tragedy, as he jeopardised the possibility of creating a “great coalition” against the Third Reich. In the historian’s opinion, the coalition did not come into being because Jozef Beck refused to cooperate with the Soviets in the summer of 1939.° Similar annoying statements by Western historians concerning Jozef Pitsudski’s Poland and Jozef Beck’s diplomacy are a sad reality from which Western historiography fails to free itself.

We should not be astonished by the fact that the popularisation of knowledge concerning the criminal character of Stalin’s reign in the West did not change Western historians’ views on Polish diplomacy, even when a change could have been expected. Statements by Western authors often include theses that characterise Pilsudski’s and Beck’s Poland as an obstacle to the creation of a collective security system in Europe. Claims that Poland was a low-key ally of the Third Reich are also not uncommon. Some authors perceive the Poland of the 1930s as one of the sources of distress in Europe: they characterise Poland in this way not only in historical journals but also in monographs, rich in sources. Moreover, we find the pejorative perception of Jozef Beck’s actions in works of widely recognised historians, such as Donald Cameron Watt, a British author of the most important book concerning the genesis of the Second World War.*

An essay by the American historian Henry L. Roberts is the only reliable study concerning Jozef Beck in English. Roberts wrote and published it 50 years ago in The Diplomats, a volume that Princeton University Press published in 1953.° Let us note another example of work relevant until this day: the monograph by German historian Hans Ross entitled Poland and Europe: Studies in Polish Foreign Affairs 1931-1939 [Polen und Europa. Studien zur polnischen Aufsenpolitik 1931- 1939], published in 1957. Sadly, Polish historiography is practically absent at the international level, if we exclude the books and studies by Polish historians who lecture and write on the matter in the West. The group includes such authors as Piotr S. Wandycz, Anna M. Cienciala, Marian K. Dziewanowski, Roman Debicki,

2 William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 (New York, 1994), pp. 241-242.

3 P. Longworth, The Making of Eastern Europe (London, 1992), p. 88.

4 D.C. Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War 1938—1939 (London, 1989).

5 H.L. Roberts, “Ihe Diplomacy of Colonel Beck” in: The Diplomats 1919—1939, ed. G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 579-614.

Introduction 13 and Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski. I had to underline the abovementioned situation as that is the reality in which the image of interwar Poland functions in the realm of foreign historiography.

This book consists of seven chapters.

The first chapter most concisely considers the reality of the “policy of balance” in 1934-1938, in which I do not present the matter of particular cases but specify the contemporary political leitmotif. The second chapter deals with the most individual idea by Józef Beck; that is, his concept ofa “Third Europe” or “Intermarium”: a neutral zone between the two totalitarian powers. In the third chapter, I consider the possibility of a Polish-Soviet armed conflict breaking out in September 1938. It is evident that such a situation would have radically changed the course of subsequent events. Moreover, we cannot comprehend the importance of the possible consequences of such a scenario, as historians cannot use the “what if? type of statements in their argumentation. The fourth chapter considers the German “Gesamtlésung” offer to Poland. We should underline that the rejection of the offer happened due to the Polish idea of normalising relations with Germany. Additionally, this concept involved a specific offer to settle disputes. Notably, Poland did not plan to transfer the Free City of Danzig to the Third Reich nor to allow the Germans to build an extraterritorial highway through Polish Pomerania. Obviously, the Germans did not accept the Polish offer. The fifth chapter deals with the subject of the alliance with Great Britain in the context of Polish political thought and foreign policy. The sixth chapter reviews Poland’s international situation in the context of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In other words, it deals with the perception of Polish diplomacy in the light of imminent danger. The final, seventh chapter analyses the Polish experience of the outbreak of the Second World War, when the Allies left Poland behind, which shows Polish strategic assumptions and motivations of Polish diplomacy, but also the Allies’ actions: both the real and the virtual.

Krakow, autumn 2012