Rationalized and Extended Democracy

Front matter

TU

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue PRESSO

W Rationalized and Extended Democracy

Table of Contents

Preface 11 Gilberto Corbellini Summary 17 Preliminary caveat 21 A concise introduction 23 1.1 Form and substance in Constitutions 23 1.2 Basic principles and ordinary laws 28 1.3 Inadequate institutional structure 29 Part 1. Analysis and criticism (pars destruens) 33 1.1 The seven flaws of democracies 33 1.2 Assumption confirmed 67 Part 2. Our meta-reform proposal (pars construens) 69 2.1 «Rationalization» and «Extension» of democracy 70 2.2 Graphic explanations 73 2.3 Some hints to procedural matters 76 2.4 Public experts on politics 79 2.5 Constitutionally oriented instrumentalism 89 2.6 «Epist-» misunderstandings and inadequacies 90 2.7 Citizens: equals in power, not in capability; or, against the sortition of lawmakers 102 2.8 No technocracy, no Platonism 109

FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice)

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, Rationalized and Extended Democracy. Inserting Public Scientists into the Legislative/Executive Framework, Reinforcing Citizens’ Participation, © 2023 Author(s), CC BY-SA 4.0, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0161-2, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0161-2

Conclusion

Avery short coda

Acknowledgments

Addendum. Further papers on the reform project, and ona roadmap to implement it

List of Figures

References

Index of names

113 115 118 129 130 131

143 162

167 183 186

191 193 195

197 199 201 233

Preface Gilberto Corbellini

These are uncertain times for democracies. Or rather, while some democracies maintain or improve on Freedom House standards, others are in decline. Illiberal democracies are on the rise, and various autocracies are taking hold. It is not too far-fetched to think that among the factors that have expanded the spread of democracies and economic prosperity in alternating phases over time has been the ability of liberal systems to value their scientific and technical heritage filtered through the scientific method. In such an uncertain context, it makes sense to ask what reforms democracies would need to introduce to make themselves more reliable in terms of decision-making, i.e. ways in which democratic systems can function well.

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue’s (GMT) book is part of an ongoing theoretical discussion in some Western academic ecosystems that is rooted in historically relevant issues for the evolution of modern political thought: in particular, how to recruit the use of the best expertise into decisions involving technical problems, and at the same time to avoid the prejudices or incompetence of citizen-voters jeopardising the ability of the democratic experiment to find and use scientifically validated information and advances to innovate or change practices, i.e. to amplify the economic-social conditions necessary to exercise individual freedoms. The author is currently interested in the relationship between democratic decision-making logic and science or innovation’s role in this framework. Perhaps the book neglects a broader historical perspective. Still, it compensates with an almost exhaustive survey of the discussion that has been ongoing for several decades in the Western world on ensuring that technical knowledge and skills are used appropriately or effectively and without overriding the principle of representation.

FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice)

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, Rationalized and Extended Democracy. Inserting Public Scientists into the Legislative/Executive Framework, Reinforcing Citizens’ Participation, © 2023 Author(s), CC BY-SA 4.0, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0161-2, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0161-2

The bookanalytically examines, mainly on a theoretical level, the main flaws of liberal democracies. These stand out in the difficulty or inability of these political systems, at least after the 1960s, to make rational use of the best scientific knowledge in decision-making processes, an inability that paradoxically has increased with the rising socio-economic complexity of these systems, i.e. the fact that there is a tendency to take decisions ona political-populist basis or by applying ideological prejudices or under the sway of corruption, etc. Italy is a school case, with dysfunctional events that can affect liberal democracy. For instance, quite a few Italian politicians have endorsed the quack ‘Di Bella’ and ‘Stamina’ pseudo-cures for serious illnesses; or they have followed the dogmatic and arbitrary rejection of certain agri-food biotech advances (the ‘GMO’ bugbear); or they have too long hesitated in following the scientific evidence regarding the Xylella bacterial epidemic which is destroying olive tree plantations in Apulia; etcetera. The author’s reasoning, both in the pars destruens, and in the pars construes, is strongly influenced by the Italian situation.

The author thinks these defects can be corrected with institutional grafts and injections of direct participation. The REDemo model, which, he suggests, would serve to overcome the current limitations of democratic decision-making processes by endowing them with features that facilitate the embedding and evaluation of scientific expertise and openness to proposals from civil society, is speculative. His idea is that it is possible to rationalise the functioning of democracy through the support of a chamber composed of scientists/experts and an extension of the democratic model by providing a direct role for the electorate and social partners through petitions, referendums, etc.

He compares the characteristics and potential ofhis model with proposals to adapt the epistemology of democracy to the challenges of research and innovation. The measures he proposes are relevant, and he discusses or defends them with a falsificationist approach. As I mentioned in my online review, the book is an academic exercise, but in a good way. I have been following the topics covered by GMT for years. I have read few essays on the relationship between democracy and science or knowledge that are as well-documented and inclusive. In the abstract, the author’s thesis makes sense and, like all models, contains simplifications that force him to perform somersaults to counter the positions of those who, starting from analyses of the limits of liberal democracies, arrive at different conclusions. The theories that already address the problems of the inefficiency of the democracies discussed are considered by him to be unworkable in principle or fact. His model of democracy is always suggestive in the abstract and somewhat idealistic. However, the arguments used by GMT to show that his thesis resolves the limitations of different ideas and models are logically adequate. The author is a healthy enthusiast. And he derives from his enthusiasm the best that can be produced in research when he focusses on a comprehensive collection of critical reading in the bibliography, which then provides stimuli for reflections beyond the arguments developed in the text.

Western democracies, i.e. open societies implementing the principle of representation, universal suffrage expressed through free elections and the rule of law, do not function in optimal ways. Some democracies suffer more than others from the seven flaws illustrated in GMT’s essay, and each in forms that, given the boundary conditions and public ethics at work, can fluctuate over time. The solutions GMT suggests are, in theory, relevant measures.

The essay reminded me, at some junctures, of Federalist Paper 51, published in 1788. Not so much for its ‘angels’ and ambition, where James Madison wrote: ‘ambition must be made to counteract ambition’. Above all, human imperfection is recurrently recalled in the Federalist Papers regarding how to build, through the Constitution, a republican institutional architecture capable ofrecruiting social diversity and transforming it into welfare and civil and individual freedom. That paper, and the subsequent ones in the series, reasoned on how to imagine a transformation of the rules of representation and the balance of powers from defects into even positive qualities, creating institutional relations that, through the competition of interests, spontaneously bring about a better social order for all, which is difficult or impossible to see emerge from intentions and planning.

GMT’s academic exercise — much more educational, ina positive sense, than many essays written by actual academics, but with some lack of clarity due to the vastness of topics/viewpoints covered, which waters down the taste for novelty — is striking in the quantity and quality of erudition. Other scholars maintain that citizens should undergo an aptitude test or argue that some votes may weigh more than others for more competent citizens. Among other reasons, it is also because humans are still closer to their primate relatives than to imaginary angels, including scientists and experts, as seen all too clearly during the recent pandemic. Yet, according to GMT, «if elected scientists were actual decision-makers — although constantly in the public eye and balanced by party-political counterparts — they would feel much less compelled to scream, looking for attention from politicians who are frequently biased».

The theorists of liberal democracy can roughly be divided into two groups. On the one hand, some defend an ‘epistemic’ conception of it, whereby the government of the many would always be superior to that of the few in finding the correct solution to problems, in the general interest and without damaging individual freedom; this happens only if democratic institutions manage to make the most of the cognitive diversity distributed among the population, relying on deliberative processes. Conversely, some think that cognitive and moral biases prevail in voters’ choices, which are more likely to lead them to make the wrong decisions, so measures are needed to reduce the impact of epistemic deficits. GMT’s proposals aim to enrich the political system’s decision-making architecture. He correctly explains that one has to abandon Condorcet’s theorem and the postulate of the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ when trying to imagine empirically how the preconception that the greater the number of participants, the closer one gets to correct judgement would work. The phenomenon of the crowd’s wisdom has been studied extensively and been seen to work only when estimating quantitative values or geographical information.

Regarding more complex issues, bias tends to prevail, and the decision is more likely to be wrong than if experts had made it. In complex societies, the relevant or appropriate use ofknowledge would require processes that are less dispersed and disturbed by innate social inclinations in the context ofthe dysfunctional post-industrial world. However, it is difficult to believe that the grafting of achamber of expertise could ever take root at this stage of the development of democratic systems, especially in the face of a political culture refractory to scientific rationality.

Since historical times, technical figures have been present on decision-making levels in human communities. Still, technocracies, i.e. communities where decisions in the collective interest are taken based on technical expertise, do not express the same dynamism as liberal democracies, where free and independent scientific research renews knowledge, encourages the improvement of technical expertise and allows or expands the room for self-determination of the people as a better condition for civil coexistence. Science and the scientific community have been contributing to the solution of political problems for centuries, and without the scientific and technological revolutions that have taken place since the 17th century, the level of political and economic freedom would have remained at the low level allowed in autocracies; in recent decades some Western governments have even created offices to support decision-making on issues that call for scientific knowledge. But GMT correctly believes these are not institutionally structural measures.

Would the REDemo model be able to cure democracies in crisis? We do not know. Where democracies are more solid and transparent, there is no need to rationalise and extend democracy. At the same time, technical knowledge and a variety of innovative ideas have more difficulty circulating; it must be something other than an idea that comes to the mind of political elites. GMT underestimates the weight of functional illiteracy, and in countries where this prevails, citizens could send poor scientists/experts and even several pseudo-scientists to parliament. Yet, according to GMT, «if many academics run for office in scientific legislative bodies, the small percentage of pseudo-scientists, unfortunately present in university and research institutions, will be skimmed off, or at any rate will be a minority among their elected colleagues».

No liberal democracy was born like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. Every democratic country has historically evolved defined relationships between the politically elected institutions, where selection is based on intuition and self-deception, and the system of institutions where scientists and experts work. They are co-opted through competitions that screen competencies. Several vital ideas underpinning democratic architecture derive from the writings of authors with an in-depth knowledge of science, particularly Newtonian science. The political elites of the democratic world, for a long time, saw science and technology as the basis of innovation and thus of the prosperity that made that world appreciable. Moreover, until the Second World War, overall, in the Western World, political elites and theoretical discussions on the foundations of liberalism and democracy recognised science and scientific thought as constitutive elements for well-functioning democratic societies, or ‘open’ as Popper called them. In the last half-century, science has increasingly been taken for granted as if it were an integral part ofthe socio-cultural landscape or grew spontaneously and luxuriantly in any socio-political context. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

As societies became more complex and innovations more pervasive, governing democratically and at the same time efficiently increasingly required the use of science and technology to enhance the results. In the meantime, science and technology were compulsorily learnt in schools for extended periods. In this way, the socio-cultural fabric became more receptive to considered and rational, rather than impulsive, decisions. Nonetheless, science and politics ceased to interact, seeking to improve society and culture’s ethical values and from the 1960s onwards entered into conflict, as in the case of culture wars, and thus with the widespread affirmation in political doctrines of constructivist instances and theories critical of liberal democracies which see science as a form of culture like any other, with the scientific community engaged in a competition to gain power.

Science and technology evolve rapidly because of the relative efficiency of the procedures for selecting the best ideas. In countries lacking social mobility and traditionally ruled by older people, society and elites tend, due to slow political processes and an ageing population, and thus a more significant cultural weight of conservative instances, to restrain the utilisation of scientific skills and innovations because choices are influenced not by rationality but rather by intuition and self-deception. In short, more developed societies may become more risk-averse over time, more traditionalist and thus more suspicious of science and scientists. This divide differs everywhere and depends on countries’ sociocultural characteristics and economic-productive set-up. In countries where political institutions are more efficient or economic and civil liberties are more pronounced, parliaments and government access expertise and knowledge differently without recruiting a community of researchers and specialists at political level, i.e. without giving them legislative-governmental power. At the same time, citizens distrust political institutions and perceive of them as corrupt, and decisions and laws become more improvised.

Summary

The aim of this book is quite ambitious: we outline the REDemo Project (Rationalized and Extended Democracy), offering a possible solution to a complex problem, i.e. a better use that democratic societies can make of science (in the broadest sense) and expertise in realizing constitutionalized goals and objectives, without creating an oligarchy: on the contrary, while relying on the useful competence of public scientists, the collective has control of the political/policy processes from beginning to end.

Democracies suffer from intrinsic defects: their institutional design is inadequate to achieve the ethical-political aims as avowed in constitutions. The method of representation, almost entirely entrusted to bodies elected on a traditional party basis, has serious shortcomings: 1) Due to a deep-rooted mindset and behaviour, laws and government outcomes are often more dictated by evident but unconfessed electoral interests of individual politicians and parties than directed to the realization of their declared programmes. Consent-hunting encourages demagoguery and cronyism; 2) The confrontational majority-opposition mechanism is detrimental, implies dubious arrangements (logrolling) and distortions (pork-barrelling). The balance of powers is weak and inefficient; 3) The influence of lobbies on policy decisions is disproportionate, especially when economic powerhouses can legally bankroll candidates and parties. The weight of private money distorts democratic dynamics; 4) Often the laws show clear limits in terms of competence, but the available expertise is ignored or misused; 5) Politicians normally have a short-term view and fail to keep pace with changes in society — let alone anticipate

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, info@redemo. it, 0000-0001-7115-0936 Referee List (DOI 10.36253/fup_referee_list) FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice)

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, Rationalized and Extended Democracy. Inserting Public Scientists into the Legislative/Executive Framework, Reinforcing Citizens’ Participation, © 2023 Author(s), CC BY-SA 4.0, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0161-2, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0161-2 them: party-politics is often late; 6) The self-referencing of legislative-executive powers allows the use of public funds for personal gains: too often, corruption is not sufficiently fought; 7) Conflicts ofinterest are endemic.

In order to contain or correct such flaws, we propose a new framework, Rationalized and Extended Democracy (REDemo), to be implemented, in each country where the redesign is embraced, through two institutional changes that are needed as a meta-reform.

1. Rationalization: On the legislative side, groups of experts, elected by universal suffrage through lists of volunteer candidates prepared in universities and other public science bodies, composed of researchers and academics who declare their availability, form a branch of organisms (Scientific Assemblies) which are parallel to the existing party-political branch (Chambers and regional-local Councils), both at state and infra-state level. The members of scientific legislatures, on temporary leave from research and teaching, serve under a maximum of two medium-term mandates on an expiry and rotation basis with similarly specialised colleagues: they are legal scholars, political analysts, economists, sociologists, land/urban planners, industry/infrastructure designers, biotechnologists, agronomists, ecologists, educationists, specialists on public health, on cultural heritage, etc. Each expert candidate sets out her programme by drafting a list with specific and clearly identified objectives, linked to her skills, with mandatory reference to relevant articles of the national Constitution or Bill of Rights; mid-term and end-of-term reports, to be widely and publicly discussed, are issued by each elected expert (this provision becomes mandatory also for party politicians). The party-political arm and the scientific arm of the legislature formulate draft laws independently and pre-approve them on a majority basis within their own assemblies; then those proposals are put to the vote of the corresponding other wing, which may make amendments; once approved by both actors, the law comes into force, after civil society organisations have had time to propose possible changes. Should it prove impossible for the two divisions of the legislature to reach agreement ona bill, a decision-promoting referendum must be held.

As for the executive side, in the national and local governments, experts designated by the scientific assemblies share the positions with traditional politicians; individuals to be appointed as ministers/secretaries are examined by evaluative commissions, composed of both politicians and experts who are competent to assess the sectoral skills of a candidate.

2. Extension: Broadening of the institutions of direct democracy and reinforcement of the electorate as decision-maker of last resort. Citizens, societal organisations, and stakeholders, beyond deliberating on officeholders’ periodical reports, can: independently formulate law proposals and submit them to the two legislative branches; indicate changes to the draft laws; call affirmative or repealing referenda; be called on to vote on bills if the two legislative actors cannot agree.

In the current system, the evidence-based and science-informed contributions of public scientists, as partial or debatable as they might be, if and when requested by decision-makers are filtered at the convenience of party politics, and therefore often manipulated or ignored; ifassemblies of elected experts become anintrinsic part ofthe legislative and executive structure, the theoretically shaky and barely effective ‘Science speaks to power’ paradigm is superseded, and society can much better exploit high-level expertise in public choices and policy decisions. Since the scientific assemblies are elected by the community, they retain full democratic legitimacy. More: the limited and slow ability of the current law- and decision-making structure of democracies to cope with urgent problems justifies the authorization of the REDemo reform with its improved timely and constructive achievement of constitutionalized ends.

The proposed apparatus is not a technocracy ora Platonist elite government: scientific assemblies are elected, and do not replace political-party bodies; nor are they insulated from the influence and will of the citizenry — just the opposite. The constant dialogue and exchange with the traditional legislative arm and with civil society enriches the dynamics of collective action in its pursuit of constitutional goals.

The reform can usefully counter the above-listed flaws of democratic institutions: 1) Candidates to the scientific assemblies are less prone to demagoguery and electoral concerns because, being ‘on loan’ to politics, they do not need to go vote-hunting: specific mechanisms are put in place to restrain opportunistic appeals to voters. The main dedication for elected experts can be the implementation of their programmes; 2) In the scientific assemblies, while decision by consensus is encouraged, resolutions will be taken on a majority basis: but there should not be factions which are systematically required to oppose and denigrate each other. The compulsion to negotiate opaque compromises (logrolling) and allocate resources for particularistic, electoral ends (pork-barrelling) is contained. An effective balance of powers is applied, inside the legislative-executive sphere itself; 3) A low ceiling is put on the financing and electoral expenses of candidates, both traditional and scientific, and the latter use only limited public funds. Candidates and elected experts have no need to struggle for financial contributions: therefore, the influence of economic lobbies over them is reduced; 4) Experts offer top-level competence in various fields in which collective choices are to be taken: yet, voters will decide among the proposed policy platforms; 5) The workings of scientific assemblies are likely to adopt a long-term vision; 6) The oversight of experts and the greater weight of civil society should result in better management of public spending and a reduction in waste and privileges. Corruption may be more effectively countered; 7) Conflicts ofinterest are minimised: experts who are involved in commercial businesses cannot be members of the scientific assemblies or of governments.

The fruitful introduction of public scientists into the core of the democratic legislative-executive structure may be welcomed by society: in these times of disenchantment with political institutions, extensive surveys prove that the majority of the population in many countries keep a persistent trust in experts and their positive role.

Last but not least: public research is paid for with taxpayers’ money; not exploiting that richness in collective action means underusing precious resources.

Democracies need a quantum leap.

Preliminary caveat

The subjects of this text are so dense that a much longer argumentation would be needed to discuss each of them — starting from the complex notion of democracy and the contentious relationship between science and (democratic) politics. The reader may therefore reasonably complain that crucial issues are treated in a few sentences. But here it is not possible to develop all the necessary analyses linked to our proposal; for the same reason, given an oceanic bibliography, the (long) list of references may be missing important texts and is quite miscellaneous. However, we hope that the necessarily condensed exposition of the outline will be considered sufficient to appreciate it as a theoretically sound basis for a pragmatic reform proposal.

Specific parts and facets of our view will be dealt with in subsequent papers, as foreseen in the Addendum.

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, info@redemo.it, 0000-0001-7115-0936 Referee List (DOI 10.36253/fup_referee_list) FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice)

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, Rationalized and Extended Democracy. Inserting Public Scientists into the Legislative/Executive Framework, Reinforcing Citizens’ Participation, © 2023 Author(s), CC BY-SA 4.0, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0161-2, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0161-2

A concise introduction

1.1 Form and substance in Constitutions

In the Constitutions! of democratic countries, two parts? can normally be distinguished:

1. One section outlines ethical-political principles, with variable exposition and organization ofthe content: an evident common denominator covers personal-political rights and duties. Just a few examples: Argentina: First Part: First Chapter: Declarations, rights and guarantees; Second Chapter: New rights and guarantees. Canada: Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 7, «guarantees the

Sometimes the word «constitution» is not used, but the reality is the same — e.g. the four Basic Laws of Sweden. A written foundational statute is not always present, e.g. Canada and Israel do not have a Constitution in the form of a complete document (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncodified_constitution). As for the New Zealand, it has a Constitution Act (1986) and a Bill of Rights Act (1990), but the prevalent scholarly opinion is that there are several other ‘constitutional’ laws (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of New_ Zealand). The UK is a somewhat peculiar case: scholars note that its constitution is not a unified text (Leyland 2016; Young 2021), but it «is to a large extent written [...], if you count the Bill of Rights of 1689, the Act of Union of 1707, the European Communities Act of 1971, the Human Rights Act of 1998, and the various Representation of the People Acts from 1918 to 2000. It is not concentrated in a single document» (Waldron 2010).

The excellent website Constitute (www.constituteproject.org) makes it possible to search and compare the content of any constitution (widely intended, i.e. also for the states where fundamental charters are not organically codified), of any regime, by topic and other filters.

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, info@redemo. it, 0000-0001-7115-0936 Referee List (DOI 10.36253/fup_referee_list) FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice)

Giovanni Molteni Tagliabue, Rationalized and Extended Democracy. Inserting Public Scientists into the Legislative/Executive Framework, Reinforcing Citizens’ Participation, © 2023 Author(s), CC BY-SA 4.0, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0161-2, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0161-2 right to life, liberty and security ofthe person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice». Estonia: the second chapter sets out the people's rights, liberties and duties. Iceland: Section VII, Art. 65-79: Human rights. India: Part III - Fundamental Rights. Italy: Part I - Rights and Duties of Citizens. South Africa: Chapter 1: Founding Provisions; Chapter 2: Bill of Rights.°

Moreover, substantial objectives, with a lower or greater emphasis on social-economic rights, are often outlined which are strictly linked to the democratic values:* promotion of education (universally present), improvement of citizens’ economic conditions, protection of the environment, care of public health (less widespread than would be desirable), freedom of enterprise,‘ etc.” In certain cases (e.g. South Africa and Ecuador), the constitution outlines the progressive implementation of substantive rights,* therefore envisaging the realisation of a transformative democracy — meaning that the drafters of such ba-

I choose certain examples of some topics from a number of countries’ constitutions rather than others. I quote the cases randomly — no comparative purposes — just to give some references indicating that, in the varied and composite panorama of today’s democratic constitutions, basic ethical-political principles are a strong, inescapable, and theoretically well-founded, common denominator: and it cannot be otherwise, since those aims and goals are necessarily — forgive the pun - constitutive of constitutions. In this introductory chapter, I need merely to hint at that subject. I will omit the discussion of some problems that are now central to constitutional law scholars, namely the alleged non-democratic nature of constitutionalism and the need to make constitutionalisation processes more democratic (the so-called constitutional crowdsourcing phenomenon and the constitutional reform mechanisms). These are issues of enormous importance: yet, while the pragmatic approach of my book is intended to rest on solid arguments, it must of necessity exclude broad treatment of theoretical themes.

Such rights are frequently indicated also in non-democratic constitutions, and are either aspirational or justiciable, but are so scattered in the world’s basic laws as to compose a strongly variable scenario (Jung, Hirschl and Rosevear 2014).

On this point, see a detailed description and analysis: Heymann et al. 2013.

This right can be meaningfully split into various parts, in particular: Protection from expropriation, Provisions for intellectual property, Right to competitive marketplace, Right to establish a business, Right to own property, Right to transfer property (see www.constituteproject.org under the topic Rights and Duties - Economic Rights). Most constitutions cover these aspects; but, of course, one thing is theory, another actuality: for real-world situations, useful sources are the Index of Economic Freedom (www.heritage.org/index) and Economic Freedom (www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom), both updated yearly. Notably, the rankings see democratic countries outnumbering autocracies in the highest quartile. (Indeed, the relationship between economic growth and democracy is multifaceted and contentious: it cannot be discussed here.)

For a theoretical argument supporting the need to constitutionalise in any democracy «autonomy-protecting rights», that is, turning certain moral rights into legal rights, see Fabre 2000a; the same author calls for a constitutionalisation of four fundamental rights: minimum income, housing, healthcare, education. (Fabre 2000b)

The Ecuadorian Constitution goes so far as to guarantee rights for the ecosystem itself (Art. 10 and 71-74): «All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature» (Art. 71).

sic documents were conscious of a future path ahead: «a long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed [...] to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction» (Klare 1998, 157).

As for the USA, the Constitution does not contain an explicit clause of political equality (Waldron 2010): in fact, the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution) mostly deals with negative liberties, i.e. provisions that are paramount to the rule of law, without mentioning positive, affirmative rights. But a ‘positivist’ interpretation of the US Constitution has been vigorously argued for (Barber 2003): the welfare of the people has been a constitutional principle ever since the Founders drafted the document, and the Preamble states the aim to «promote the general Welfare». In 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the Constitution should be enriched with a (social and economic) Second Bill of Rights: employment, food, clothing and leisure with enough personal/family income to support them; farmers’ rights to a fair income; freedom from unfair competition and monopolies; housing; medical care; social security; education. The constitutional amendment was not drafted, but a number of federal laws (e.g. labour and agricultural acts, the Civil Rights Act, healthcare acts etc.) were inspired by that philosophy (see Sunstein 2004): there are some scholarly calls to enact such a major improvement of the American Constitution, incorporating socio-economic rights into the constitutional text (see e.g. Michelman 2015).

Making reference to the fact that the US Constitution was initially issued without the Bill of Rights, Sartori states that «a constitution without a declaration of rights is still a constitution, whereas a constitution whose core and centrepiece is not a frame of government is not a constitution» (1997, 196). Yet, we think that the prompt addition of the first ten amendments was not casual, but rather an inherent consequence of the framing of a liberal (not yet democratic in the contemporary sense) state — a Republic, in Franklin’s terms. Today, it is a fact that democracies have decided to add the “flesh” of affirmative rights to the necessary procedural “skeleton”. And this is the reason why, in constitutional texts, ethical/political principles are usually placed before the description of the state’s institutional structure. Therefore, Sartori’s fully formal conception («constitutions are required to be content-neutral>: 1997, 200, emphasis in the original) clashes with the spirit and the letter of existing (democratic) basic charters. As we will better see later on, this empirical reality has solid theoretical justifications, in that mere constitutional formalism is untenable.