On the Power and Limits of Empathy

Front matter

On the Power | and Limits of Empathy

Manuel Camassa p as aans mwe n > ee Maa

Dalgrave acmillan

Preface

That empathy is in some way intrinsically connected with morality (and especially with moral behaviour) is such a widespread and common conviction nowadays, that to deny it seems prima facie either a joke or a provocation. How could it be? Empathy seems to be at the base of altruism and, as the lifelong research of Batson and colleagues appears to demonstrate, it is an essential part of the sociality and solidarity present in primates and other animals.* For some, empathy has the potential to change economic and social relationships ona global scale.* Empathy’s irresistible charm has even managed to infect important politicians, heads of state, religious authorities.* There is no denying that empathy in the last 20 to 30 years has been viewed increasingly as a miraculous

? See, for example, De Waal (2009).

3See Rifkin (2009).

*These are, for example, the words of the ex-president of the USA, Barack Obama, after a meeting in 2014 with Pope Francis: ‘I think the theme that stitched our conversation together was a belief that in politics and in life the quality of empathy [...] is critical. It’s the lack of empathy that makes it very easy for us to plunge into wars. It’s the lack of empathy that allows us to ignore the homeless on the streets.” Obama in particular has always talked about empathy since his early speeches and sees in it a kind of antidote to the egoism, which appears to be for him the primary cause of all the evils in the world, as it instigates hatred, lust for money, disregard for the environment, the weak, the future generations: “The world doesn’t just revolve around you. — Says Obama in a speech of the year 2006 — There’s a lot of talk in this country about the federal deficit. But I think we should talk more about our empathy deficit.” These two quotes and many others on the subject of empathy can be found on: http://cultureofempathy.com/Obama/Quotes.htm vi PREFACE panacea for all of the world’s evils: it has been considered a cure for war, poverty, exploitation, and viewed as fundamental for an increase of social solidarity.

But predictably, all this excitement about the infinite potentialities of empathy could not last forever, and from the start of 2010, the first anti-empathists (as I label the critics of empathy) began to appear. Today, the most famous among these, with regard to criticisms of empathy’s moral dimension, are undoubtedly the philosopher Jesse Prinz and the psychologist Paul Bloom. Now, if these (and other) critics of empathy had limited themselves to highlighting some of empathy’s notable shortcomings concerning the moral sphere, this move might have been welcomed as astute, even necessary. Indeed, in this respect I regard myself as an ‘anti-empathist’: I am similarly convinced that the enthusiasm for empathy is to a large extent unwarranted and that empathy has, especially in the moral domain, many flaws that should not be too easily overlooked. If, in fact, this had been the position sustained by the anti-empathists, this particular book would have no reason to exist. However, the writing of such a work became necessary, in my eyes, due to the reflections of anti-empathists who, probably in an attempt to react to what they perceived as extreme pro-empathist positions, finished on the opposite side of the spectrum. Empathy, for thinkers like Bloom and Prinz, is dangerous at the moral level, biased at the epistemological one, and ultimately to be avoided in favour of rational considerations, as well as of other emotions seen as more adequate to guide moral behaviour. To use Bloom’s trenchant and paradigmatic words: ‘On balance, empathy is negative in human affairs. It’s cholesterol. It’s sugary soda, tempting and delicious and bad for us.” I think that charging empathy with these accusations is misguided and that the rift that emerged between convinced supporters and harsh critics of empathy has tended to polarise the discussion into two extreme camps, ultimately frustrating each endeavour to reach a neutral conclusion about the moral potential of empathy.

This work is born from the intention of finding a middle ground. I do not think that empathy is (or ought to be) at the base of morals. Morality is not to be founded entirely on empathy. Nevertheless, I do believe that

PREFACE vii empathy has a central role to play in morality and that a morality without empathy is a mutilated morality. In the following chapters we are going to see why. However, first, let us consider some epistemological clarifications.

Lucerne, Switzerland Manuel Camassa

REFERENCES

Batson, C. D. (1991). The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Batson, C. D., Lishner, D. A., Carpenter, A., Dulin, L., Harjusola-Webb, S., Stocks, E. L., Gale, S., Hassan, O., & Sampat, B. (2003). As You Would Have Them Do Unto You: Does Imagining Yourself in the Other’s Place Stimulate Moral Action? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(9), 1190-1201.

Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., Lishner, D. A., & Tsang, J. (2005). Empathy and Altruism. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology (pp. 485-498). Oxford University Press.

De Waal, F. B. M. (2009). The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society. Crown Publishing Group.

Rifkin, J. (2009). The Empathic Civilization. TarcherPerigee.

Bloom, P. (2016). Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion. The Bodley Head.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is the result of my PhD project at the University of Lucerne, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, which I hereby wish to thank for its support of the project and the Open Access publication. This book has required years of intensive work and research, as well as many personal sacrifices, in all areas, and I know that it would never have been possible without the people who have chosen, more or less consciously, to accompany me on this journey. Some of them abandoned me along the way, while others empathically remained. To the former goes my understanding, despite everything; to the latter all my gratitude and affection. I want to thank my supervisor, Professor Martin Hartmann, who has always believed in me, from the very beginning, even in moments of bewilderment or ‘creative blockage’, not thinking for a second that I would not make it. A heartfelt thank you also goes to Professor Jan Slaby, my second supervisor, who, although he did not know me personally at the beginning of the project, became immediately interested in my work, with whom I had the opportunity to have fruitful conversations during my months in Berlin and who kept in touch afterwards. A special thank you goes also to Professor Arne Johan Vetlesen and Doctor Susi Ferrarello: their kind words and warm support have been of great help for the finalization and publishing of this book. I would also like to thank my friends, because the time spent with them has always allowed me to recharge my energy and find joy and positive vibes to accompany me, even at the most difficult and delicate stages.

ix xX ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks from the depth of my heart also to my family and relatives, who have always been there, even if physically distant and whose affection I have always tried to repay by not disappointing them and by making them proud of me. And, finally, a special thanks to my girlfriend, whose love and devotion have instilled in me an unexpected, as much as desired, serenity and self-confidence, and whose example of empathy— the most constant and clearest I have ever seen—has inspired me more than any other work on the subject, making it impossible not to notice how fundamental empathy is in achieving a truly moral character. This work is for all of you.

Part I What Is Empathy? 1 A Brief Historical Reconstruction Bibliography

2 The Way to a Definition 2.1 A Phenomenological View on Empathy 2.2 Our Working Definition Bibliography

3 A Taxonomy of Empathy 3.1 Low-Level Empathy 3.2 High-Level Empathy 3.2.1 A Special Case of High-Level Empathy: Narrative Empathy Bibliography

Part II Morals Without Empathy?

4 Anti-empathism: Jesse Prinz 4.1 Unnecessity of Empathy for Moral Judgement 4.2 Unnecessity of Empathy for Moral Development xi xii

CONTENTS

4.3 Unnecessity of Empathy for Moral Motivation and Conduct 4.4 Other Intrinsic Shortcomings of Empathy Bibliography

Anti-empathism: Paul Bloom 5.1 Empathy as a Spotlight

5.2 Empathy as Biased

5.3 Empathy as Corrosive

5.4 Rational Compassion Bibliography

Part II Moral Judgement

6.1 The Epistemic Role of Empathy

6.2 The Effects of (Empathic) Lingering 6.3 The Moralising Power’ of Empathy Bibliography

Empathy and Moral Perception 7.1 Moral Perception in Lawrence Blum Bibliography

8.1 Intergroup Bias

8.2 A Literary Case

8.3 Empathy, Receptivity, and the Disclosure of Values 8.4 The Beneficial Effect of Empathy on Moral Judgement 8.5 Empathy and Representative Thinking

8.6 Is Empathy Intrinsically Biased?

105 111 112

113 119 131

CONTENTS

Part IV Moral Development 9.1 Empathy and Imitation

9.2 Learning Moral Rules Thanks to Empathy

9.3 The Case of the Golden Rule and the Importance of the ‘Receptivity’

10.1 The Anti-egocentric Power of Empathy

10.2 Empathy and Psychopathy

10.3 Empathy and Autism

Empathy and the Acquiring of a Caring Perspective 11.1 Empathy and Receptivity

11.2 The ‘Circularity’ of Empathy

11.3 Developing a Moral Character by Means of Empathy 11.4 Conclusions

Part V Moral Conduct and Motivation

12.1 How the Shortcomings of Empathy Are Also Its Strengths 12.2 Generalising Empathy

12.3 Is Empathy Necessarily Biased?

13.1 Empathy and Phronesis

13.2 Empathy with Positive Emotions 13.3 Empathy as a Virtue xiii

159 163 164

170 176

179 186 192 198 207

211 217 221 226 231 232

237 239 246 252 256

259 266 268 271 xiv

CONTENTS

13.4 The Importance of Feeling With

13.5 Empathy’s Role Within a Rationalist Ethics 13.6 Empathy and Moral Perfection Bibliography

14.1 Empathy and Emotional Perceiving

14.2 The Case of Death Penalty: How Empathy Can Change Our Mentality

14.3 Empathy and Import

15.1 The Distancing Method

15.2 Shame and Empathy

15.3 To See and to Be Seen

15.4 Being-with Others

15.5 Empathy and Being in the Presence of the Other

15.6 Lack of Empathy and the Case of Cruelty and Brutality 15.7 The Dangers of (Moral) Indifference

CHAPTER 1 A Brief Historical Reconstruction

Few concepts have received the same immense amount of attention as that obtained by empathy in the last four or five decades. Empathy was literally everywhere to be found: in the popular press,! in the mouth of worldleaders,’ and of course in the research on different topics and disciplines such as psychopathy,* autism spectrum disorders, medical care,° ethics

'See, i.a., articles in the Time (Nash, 2007); New York Times (Blakeslee, 2006); Scientific American (Giacomo et al., 2006).

?See footnote 4.

3Richell et al. (2003), Blair et al. (2005), King et al. (2006), Decety and Moriguchi (2007), Blair (2006, 2008), Shirtcliff et al. (2009).

*Baron-Cohen (2003, 2009), Iacoboni and Dapretto (2006), Gallese (2006), Clark et al. (2008), Blair (2008).

© The Author(s) 2024 3 M. Camassa, On the Power and Limits of Empathy, https: //doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37522-4_1 and moral development,° justice and the law,’ art and the media,’ clinical psychology,’ neurosciences," and the theory of mind.”

At the beginning of our inquiry on empathy, it will pay to spend some time trying to retrace the complex history of this concept. For those who are familiar with ancient Greek, the term ‘empathy’ reveals a clear etymology: it is the union of the Greek em ‘inside’ and pathos, which means ‘pain’, ‘suffering’, but also ‘feeling’. Therefore, the term can be translated as ‘feeling inside’ or ‘feeling into’. In spite of this clearly Greek etymology, the term ‘empathy’ was coined by a British psychologist and philosopher named Edward Titchener’? in order to convey the semantic load of a German word that had rapidly become very popular in psychological and philosophical discussions between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, namely, the term Einfiihlung. Many scholars think that the first appearance of this concept is to be found in the work of Theodor Lipps,'* a German philosopher and psychologist famous for his contributions in the field of psychology of aesthetics. Actually, it should be noted that at least the verb einfiihlen was already present in the work of Herder! and Novalis,!® as well as in that of Robert Vischer.!° However, Lipps was certainly the first to use this concept in a very systematic way, giving it considerable importance in his theory. In a few words,

7 Hoffman (1987, and the already cited Hoffman (2000, 2011).

? Kohut (1977, 1982, 1984), Gladstein and Brennan (1987), Orange (1995), Bohart and Greenberg (1997), Kahn and Rachman (2000), Clark (2007), Geist (2009).

10 Gallese and Goldman (1998), Iacoboni (2008, 2009), Keysers (2009), Keysers and Fadiga (2009).

12 See Titchener (1909).

13 See, for example, Lipps (1903, 1905).

Herder (1885). He understood empathy as a quasi-perceptual process, strictly distinguished from other inferential processes, such as syllogisms, or else, a peculiar capacity of humankind to ‘feel into everything’ and to recognize everything in analogy to oneself.

15 Novalis (1997). In his poetic vision, empathy had to be a phenomenon with the capability of freeing us from the cold, detached, analytic attitude of science and giving us the capacity to recognize a degree of friendly nature innate in human beings, as well as to grasp the spiritual unity that tied both men and nature in a unique absolute.

1 A BRIEF HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION 5

Lipps saw in empathy the basic mechanism for the understanding of expressive phenomena. He started from the presupposition that we do not have any experiential access to the minds of others, since the only mind we have direct access to is our own, and that only thanks to an imaginative enactment of other people’s experience (provided by empathy) is it possible to get to know something of the psychic lives of these people. Thus, Lipps harked back to what David Hume asserted 150 years before’” about sympathy, the conceptual ancestor of empathy.

However, whereas Hume was interested in both the ethical and the epistemic role of empathy, Lipps gave this phenomenon a fundamental role to play only at the epistemic level. In this regard, his contribution also managed to further develop considerations on the matter of another famous and extremely influential British philosopher, John Stuart Mill, particularly with reference to an argument which gradually became a classic in the circle of the philosophy of mind: the so-called Argument from Analogy.’ Irrespective of the fact that this argument, traditionally attributed to Mill, does not reflect Mill’s!? opinion and should with all probability be ascribed to Bertrand Russell,” the argument can be described as follows. If we take as prerequisite that human beings are in relevant aspects similar to each other, then it seems reasonable to suppose that others have thoughts and feelings, for the very good reason that I am aware, in my own case, of having them. Lipps, surely influenced from the phenomenological tradition (Husserl in particular), goes beyond the extent of this argument and sees in empathy the base for interpersonal understanding, describing it as an original, primordial, not further derivable act.” Is it enough to make of him a follower of the phenomenological views on empathy? The answer should be negative, as Lipps’ position diverged from that of the phenomenologists on one essential point: in Lipps’ opinion, in fact, we have an experiential access only to our own mental states and, as a consequence, we can get an idea of what others think or feel only thanks to a projective mechanism. In particular, Lipps thought that as we see a gesture, or an expression made by someone, we immediately have the tendency to reproduce it interiorly and this tendency evokes in us the feeling normally associated with this expression. On

9 For an insightful analysis of this issue see Thomas (2001).

Lipps’ account, human beings have a general instinct of empathy, and this instinct has a twofold drive: a drive directed towards imitation and a drive directed towards expression.” Basically, when I see someone making a certain expression, I have a natural inclination to imitate this expression, which in turn evokes in me a feeling that I attribute to the other through projection. As it is presupposed that humans are under many aspects similar to each other, we can presume with a certain degree of probability that the feeling we are projecting is, if not identical, akin to the feeling the other (the target of our empathising) is experiencing. This is the fundamental mechanism allowing for the interpersonal understanding.”

Of course, one may wonder why we should resort to a mechanism of imitation plus projection in order to understand what other people feel or think. The answer is that for Lipps, as we have said, the only mind we have access to is our own, consequently, the mental states of other individuals can be inferred only in analogy with our own mental occurrences.

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Chapter 2

It is not the aim of this work to offer an in-depth analysis of the philosophy of Lipps, but it was important to start our investigation of empathy with a brief report of his view on the matter, primarily for the reason that he was the first to talk about empathy (not sympathy) and to use this concept in a systematic way central to his own theory and, secondly, because more than hundred years after Lipps’ book, there is still no agreement among the scholars both on the definition of empathy and on the precise role it can play. In other words, although Lipps’ desire was to clarify the concept and use it consistently, his objective is nowadays still far from being achieved. As a matter of fact, for the young academic approaching the subject area of empathy, the landscape can be quite disorienting and distressing: empathy is a ‘hot topic’ nowadays, and it has managed to enter the field of inquiry of disciplines ranging from philosophy to the neurosciences, from psychology to zoology, and from anthropology to economics. Of course, given the incredible amount of work made during the years by scholars with such different backgrounds and opinions on the matter, it cannot be surprising to see how blurred the definition of empathy is. Just to give two concrete examples of the terminological, semantical, and content-affecting chaos which exists in the literature, we can take into consideration the works of Coplan (2011) and Batson (2011). In the first, the philosopher Amy Coplan defines empathy as: ‘[A] complex imaginative process in which an observer simulates another person’s situated

© The Author(s) 2024 ll M. Camassa, On the Power and Limits of Empathy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37522-4_2 psychological states while maintaining clear self-other differentiation’,’ however, she also notes that the empathic phenomenon has been described as involving one or more of the following features:

Feeling what someone else feels;

Caring about someone else;

Being emotionally affected by someone else’s emotions and experiences, though not necessarily experiencing the same emotions; Imagining oneself in another’s situation;

Imagining being another in that other’s situation;

Making inferences about another’s mental states;

Some combination of the processes described in (A)-(F).?

The famous psychologist Daniel Batson refers to empathy using these words: ‘I shall use empathic concern and, as a shorthand, empathy to refer to other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need 2 Nevertheless, he then adds that there are at least seven other states which can be called (and have been called) empathy, which are the following:

Knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings;

Adopting the posture or matching the neural response of an observed other;

Coming to feel as another person feels;

Intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation; Imagining how another is thinking and feeling;

Imagining how one would think and feel in the other’s place; Feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering. *

It is quite easy to understand that this incredible range of different and competing conceptualisations in the literature has created (and still creates) countless difficulties for anyone willing to coherently investigate the phenomenon of empathy. Actually, we have reached the point in which a

3Batson (2011, p. 11), emphasis in original. *Batson (2011, pp. 12-19).

researcher using the name ‘empathy’ or the corresponding verb ‘to empathise’ is not communicating anything at all if they are unable to provide an unambiguous description of it. Therefore, any good work on empathy should start with a clear-cut definition and the fact that this definition will under some aspects be ‘stipulative’ should not be an issue. As the already cited researcher on empathy Daniel Batson once wrote: ‘In spite of frequent claims that one’s own use of these terms is best, I know no clear basis |... ] for favoring one labeling scheme over another. In such circumstances, I believe the best one can do is recognize the different phenomena, make clear the labeling scheme one is adopting, and use it consistently.’ This is in fact the strategy used by the vast majority of researchers on empathy and I will make no exception. However, I do not want my definition of empathy to be arbitrary, in fact, I would like the definition offered in this work of mine to be attractive and convincing for other scholars as well as for ‘normal’, laypeople. That is why I want my definition to maintain important insights stemming from traditional researchers on the subject (Adam Smith, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, etc.) and, at the same time, to be in line with both the latest characterisations of empathy and with the normal use people in general make of this concept. This will also help to highlight a coherent evolution of the discussion around this phenomenon that, despite becoming more and more problematised and problematic, revolves nonetheless around the same features.