Upland Geopolitics

Front matter

UPLAND GEOPOLITICS

POSTWAR LAOS AND THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH

MICHAEL B. DWYER

Foreword

This historically grounded examination is situated in northwestern Laos, a region given recently to rubber plantations. Michael Dwyer argues that socialist and other successor states in postcolonial Southeast Asia played an active role in state consolidation of power over land. These activities across the latter part of the twentieth century have at times been discussed as “land grabs.” Such land deals, and the consequent repurposing or sequestration of land, are better understood as a land rush that may or may not result in the kind of predictable outcomes that is indicated by the language of land grabs. This rush goes on, however, to generate wealth for national and regional political elites, influence over land-based economic activity for foreign powers and capital, and acute forms of dispossession for the rural poor. Thus, Dwyer offers a welcome focus on historical processes and regional particularity to shed light on these land-control projects, which are sometimes uniformly characterized around the world in the dramatic accents of land-grab analysis.

The politics of land control has long been a favored topic of study in environmental anthropology. Earlier work often examined the emergence of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century colonial forms of exclusionary and monopolistic land zoning and use in parts of Asia, Africa, and South America, in the cases of forests, pastures, commercial agriculture, and floodplain development. Protected areas, biosphere reserves, and publicland designation became principal methods for nation-states to control vast stretches of land in the name of species conservation, natural heritage preservation, and promoting sustainable development in the later part of the twentieth century. However, the new land grabs of the twenty-first century, as they are referred to, seem to present a new configuration of both national and transnational forces, driven by land markets and food security scares, vii and they seem to have unleashed an intense wave of land dispossession for the rural poor and other marginalized communities in many parts of the world.

The initial spate of research on the global land rush, reported often in the pages of the Journal of Peasant Studies, focused most on the seizure of vast tracts of land and other natural resources by large corporations or sovereign wealth funds to provision a growing global extractive economy for minerals, metals, grain and fodder cultivation, and offshore industry.’ Some more ethnographic work has led to finely observed accounts of the uncertain, often fitful, and locally variegated forms, cultural and economic, that emerge in struggles over land in the shadow of more global land commercialization.’ Yet other studies have broadened the discussion to include land-control ventures responding to current environmental concerns, notably climate change. In that sense, the politics of land control remains entangled in projects of environmental governance.

Through his study in Laos, Dwyer elucidates what he calls the social and spatial unevenness of dispossession from contemporary land deals. He finds that processes of enclosure operate on multiple time scales, perpetuating different waves of land alienation toward locally unsuitable and disadvantageous purposes—an approach well used also by Liza Grandia in her research on Guatemala.* Dwyer, in this context, situates the outcomes in Laos in legacies of the Cold War and in the tense relations between the United States and China as actors in Laos’s economic development. Dwyer also pays attention to the role played by local government agents, illuminating the processes of population management and property formalization that variously facilitate or impede the realization of grand schemes that are posited on large-scale land control and conversion.

In addition to imperial and Cold War legacies and the role of different levels of government action, Dwyer also considers the variable ways Laotians are included as citizens, and the tenuous ways in which uplanders lay claim to social recognition and legal protection. Thus, the study distinguishes different layers of socio-spatial unevenness while revealing how the layers work across and through each other to produce multiscalar processes and understandings of land struggles and modes of expropriation. One of the signal achievements of the book, then, is to show how different levels of government work with and against each other to control the allocation of land to commercial and social development projects in service of different interpretations of the public good and local authority.

viii FOREWORD

The Chinese-funded rubber boom in northwestern Laos is the initial field of inquiry for this study, which was conducted over a decade of place-based and broader research. Dwyer shows how the legacies of wartime resettlement, earlier forest management programs, and more recent state efforts to control local authorities shape current land policies in and around rubber cultivation. This work emerges then as a study in state formation, shifting strategies of land control by foreign and domestic actors, and the facilitation and obscuring of land transfers often too simply characterized as land grabs. As Dwyer observes, the apparent messy and arbitrary nature of the land deals is not a sign of chaos or anarchy, but part of the very process by which different agencies struggle to retain influence on outcomes that seem overdetermined by global capital or national governments. His approach is timely because this way of connecting land policy to state formation has emerged as a topic of renewed interest."

Dwyer contributes an original, well-researched, clearly written case study of land politics, and thereby offers portable analytical frameworks for the study of land grabs—a growth industry, I might add—that include historical shifts in the constellation of geopolitical forces at work in any location and the imprint of these histories on contemporary land struggles. Along the way he offers some new conceptual tools, such as the calibration of enclosure to citizenship, the role of land deals in upland population management work, and the way that formal geography helps manage the legal optics of land control. In combining these, Dwyer stresses the importance of not simply discerning a process of enclosure getting underway but of studying how that process is legalized, managed, and presented as ostensibly imbued with some social purpose.

Tensions have often surrounded special economic zones where, too, large swaths of land are earmarked for foreign investment unencumbered by tariffs or social protections for local communities. Identifying similar frictions in Laos’s upland hinterland, Dwyer reveals the fraught politics of shifting land out of local control and use without stoking widespread resentment and a legitimacy crisis in the government. In these parts of Asia, proximate to China, agribusiness—built around rubber plantations in this case—converges on mega-infrastructure projects. This amounts to the global integration of land and its productive potential as it combines with the influx of foreign capital and expertise. Ultimately new relations of dependence are forged in nations only recently released from the grip of European colonial domination and American imperial influence. Studies in the style Dwyer has devised will likely uncover such convergence and external

FOREWORD ix influence on other continents. A similar pattern might unite these phenomena into what may be a global problem, but each case will require discovering the specific historical development of conditions that fomented and furthered a twenty-first-century land rush.

K. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN YALE UNIVERSITY x FOREWORD

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The bulk of the research for this book was conducted during a period of regulatory reform in Laos, when central-government institutions were taking a series of steps to address mounting concerns about large-scale land deals. Resource concessions had long featured in the socialist development arsenal, but the ramping up of land concessions in the boom years of the early 2000s created a set of distinctly new problems. The Lao government was pursuing numerous large-scale and often interacting hydropower, mining, and infrastructure projects, all of which demanded detailed and up-to-date knowledge of the rural social landscape. In such a context, worries about out-of-control concession-granting carried a mix of social, economic, environmental, and political dimensions. Numerous individuals and institutions—many connected directly or indirectly to Laos’s newly created National Land Management Authority—welcomed me into this regulatory milieu. As my research interests overlapped with their work, they generously offered me unique access to study concession-making in practice, both on the ground in northern Laos and within the Lao capital of Vientiane.

For privacy reasons, I can only thank a handful by name of the many who helped me navigate this fieldwork setting. First and foremost, a few dozen anonymous key informants deserve my greatest thanks. Without them, the land deals, maps, and hinterland geographies that comprise the bulk of this book would have remained hopelessly beyond my reach. Jerome Whitington, who was himself in the field when I made my first trip to Laos, provided essential early help and inspiration. Numerous others, including Ian Baird, Andrew Bartlett, Khamouane Boupha, Charlie Carroll, Sean Foley, Yayoi Fujita Lagerqvist, Richard Hackman, Andreas Heinimann, Nick Hogarth, Chanthaviphone Inthavong, Melody Kemp, Souphab Khouangvichit, Stuart Ling, Chantha Luanglath, Pete Messerli, Garry Oughton, Khamla Phanvilay, Florian Rock, and Peter Vandergeest, opened key doors for me, both xi conceptual and practical. Fellow researchers Keith Barney, Antonella Diana, Glenn Hunt, and Weiyi Shi provided essential comradery and discussion in the field, while subsequent collaborations with Ian Baird, Naomi Basik Treanor, Cornelia Hett, Phil Hirsch, Micah Ingalls, Miles Kenney-Lazar, Juliet Lu, Vong Nanhthavong, Natalia Scurrah, Thoumthone Vongvisouk, Jerome Whitington, and Kevin Woods have improved my work in numerous ways.

The National University of Laos’s Faculties of Environment and Forestry Sciences provided me with institutional homes away from home at key points, while a number of other institutions in Vientiane helped me contextualize and understand what I was seeing in the field through a mix of library materials and informal discussions with staff. These included the Asian Development Bank, CIDSE-Laos, German Technical Assistance, Helvetas, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the Japan Volunteer Center, the Land Issues Working Group, the Lao Department of Forestry, Laos’s National Forestry Research Institute, the United Nations Development Program, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and WWF-Laos. Outside Laos, Texas Tech University’s Vietnam Center provided a key source for archival materials from the 1980s.

At the University of California, Berkeley, the Energy and Resources Group provided an ideal home for the early stages of this project, allowing me the support and flexibility to learn slowly and deeply across multiple related disciplines. Nancy Peluso, Michael Watts, Jeff Romm, and Nathan Sayre provided an invaluable mix of guidance, inspiration, patience, and critique; I also learned so much along the way from Gillian Hart, Dan Kammen, Dick Norgaard, and Isha Ray. Nancy Peluso’s Land Lab provided a forum to develop key ideas among a revolving cast of amazing scholars. Mez Baker- Médard, Catherine Corson, Dan Fahey, Derek Hall, Alice Kelly, Juliet Lu, Christian Lund, Johannes Stahl, Dan Suarez, Kevin Woods, and Megan Ybarra all read early versions of some of the material presented here, as did Sapana Doshi, Rozy Fredericks, Asher Ghertner, Tracey Osborne, and Malini Ranganathan. Thank you all!

The later stages of this project have benefited from my time as a researcher at the University of Bern’s Center for Development and Environment (CDE) and the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), as well as my time as a university faculty member in geography, first at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and currently at Indiana University, Bloomington. At these institutions, Rebecca Lave, Pete Messerli, Tim Oakes, Krystof Obidzinski, Scott Robeson, and Emily Yeh have each helped this project develop in crucial ways for which I remain deeply grateful.

xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have also been lucky enough to workshop portions of this book in various stages of its development. The comments I have received, and in many cases the ongoing discussions I have had with the following colleagues, have been immensely valuable: Zach Anderson, Sarah Besky, Erin Collins, Jason Cons, Rodolphe De Koninck, Michael Eilenberg, Jamey Essex, Jennifer Fluri, Tyler Harlan, Cheryl Holzmeyer, Reece Jones, Julie Klinger, Jean Lave, Philippe Le Billon, Christian Lentz, Christian Lund, Ashwin Mathew, Duncan McDuie-Ra, Ellen Moore, Josh Muldavin, Galen Murton, Gustavo Oliveira, Jonathan Padwe, Nancy Peluso, Alessandro Rippa, Anu Sabhlok, Annie Shattuck, Melanie Somerville, Janaki Srinivasan, Yaffa Truelove, Yang Yang, Emily Yeh, and Wen Zhou. Special thanks go to Jun Borras, who read an early version of the text with graduate students in the Agrarian Studies Program at The Hague’s International Institute of Social Studies; Jim Scott and K. Sivaramakrishnan, whose invitation and gracious hosting allowed me to present a version of what became chapter 5 at the Yale Agrarian Studies Colloquium; and Elizabeth Dunn, who generously read the full text as it was nearing completion.

At the University of Washington Press, Lorri Hagman and K. Sivaramakrishnan offered a wonderful combination of ongoing support and critical review. Likewise, two anonymous reviewers provided excellent feedback that has helped me sharpen the book’s ideas as well as its execution. Ben Pease did an outstanding job with the book’s cartography, which was often anything but straightforward, while John Crowley’s photo editing worked miracles on images taken under less-than-ideal field conditions. Chad Attenborough and Joeth Zucco helped guide the manuscript through production, while David Hornik and Chris Dodge, respectively, expertly provided copyediting and indexing.

Funding for the research on which this book is based was generously provided by the Social Science Research Council (International Dissertation Research Fellowship, with funds from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation), the National Science Foundation, the University of California, the University of Bern, Indiana University, and the Academy of Finland.

Portions of chapter 1 appeared in articles published in the journals Political Geography and Territory, Politics, Governance, while an earlier version of chapter 4 appeared in Geopolitics. Short sections of chapters 3 and the conclusion appeared, respectively, in the Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia and Development and Change.

For multiple reasons, my family will be happy that this book is done. My parents (all of them!) have been endlessly supportive of this project in its

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii various stages, and in both my father Eugene Dwyer and my wife Annie Shattuck, I have models to emulate in disguising serious scholarship as good storytelling. With Annie and our son Rubin, I look forward to the next project, whatever that turns out to be.

This book is dedicated to the memory of Professor Khamla Phanvilay, ajaan, teacher, scholar, and mentor to so many at the Faculty of Forestry Sciences, National University of Laos.

xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

NOTE ON LAO SPELLING AND PRONUNCIATION

This book follows a relatively standard approach to rendering Lao-language names and terms into English. A few explanations are helpful up front, however, for readers not familiar with Lao- or Thai-language transliteration.

The word Lao can be used as a noun or adjective, but more often appears as the latter, as in “Lao territory” or “Lao people.” If used as a noun, Lao refers to the language while Laos refers to the country.

A number of common place names (e.g., Vientiane and Luang Prabang) follow older French spellings rather than precise renderings of how they are pronounced in Lao (Vieng-chan, Luang Phabang). I use the conventional spellings throughout. I also split some longer place names into two words to help readers new to Lao geography; for example, Vieng Phoukha rather than Viengphoukha and Luang Namtha rather than Luangnamtha.

Lastly, a note on pronunciation. The letter 4 appears in many Lao words immediately after the letters k, p, and t. This stems from different but similar-sounding source letters in the Lao alphabet: the harder 2 (A) vs. the softer, aspirated © (kh), for instance. For the present purposes, however, this h should be regarded as silent. For example, the words Phoukha and Namtha should be pronounced with hard p and k sounds (Pou-ka) and hard t sounds (Nam-ta), respectively.

XV

O 20 kilometers ? CHINA By, 5 (0) 20 miles 5 Kunming G 9 J j CHINA K

BOKEO “ OUDOMXAI PROVINCE. J PROVINCE 3

Gulf of Tonkin

Phitsanulok [0]

THAILAND

Ne 50 100 kilometers x Bangkok ® A CAMBODIA ie == Major roads in Laos

\ === Chinese-built roads 1961-73

t Northern Economic Corridor (NEC) Former special military zones

Gulf of Thailand

Key locations in the book. Map by Ben Pease.

UPLAND GEOPOLITICS

Introduction Governing the Global Land Rush just outside Vieng Phoukha, a rural district capital in northwest-

ern Laos. Taking up much of the second-story wall of the nursery’s main building, its title is long and formal: “Land-use map of the 3,000-hectare rubber planting promotion project, Vieng Phoukha District, of Bolisat Ltd., Yunnan Province, People’s Republic of China.” Despite its size and prominent display, however, the map itself is easy to miss. Aside from its thickly painted title, little else is visible. Its thin black lines and faded yellow patches blend in with the weathered off-white background. The legend, lightly sketched out in the map’s bottom-right corner, has yet to be filled in.

When my Lao colleagues and I first came across this map in 2007, it was barely legible. This was not simply because it was hard to see. Even when the image came into view, it was still impossible to read. Maps make sense because they contain symbols that tie or “index” them to the real world.’ This map had no visible indices—at least none that our team, a research delegation from Laos’s National Land Management Authority, could make out. The cartography itself gave few visual clues about what the various lines or patches might represent, and no obvious symbols for roads, rivers, villages, or prominent landmarks linked its faintly drawn polygons to the landscape around us. The missing legend didn’t help either. It was as if the whole thing had been drawn to announce the project’s presence without actually giving away anything about its operations.

Our confusion stemmed from the fact that we were seeing this formal geography of rubber plantation “promotion” for the first time. We were from Laos’s national capital, Vientiane, and, for reasons I will get into later, we had few details about either this or other plantation development projects in the

A LARGE, hand-painted map greets visitors to the rubber-tree nursery area. For us, the map thus lacked the meaning it carried for local officials and company representatives, who had seen the fleshed-out paper version in the local government Agriculture and Forestry office. They knew two things that we did not: first, that the map’s lines represented the boundaries of local villages and land-use zones derived from an earlier generation of land-use planning maps (which we were not familiar with); and second, that the areas shown faintly in yellow corresponded to the roughly 8,400 hectares that, during this earlier process, had been zoned as agricultural land (din kasikam) in the map’s twelve villages.

Because we knew none of this, we were limited to the sorts of inquiries reserved for unprepared visitors: What was the project doing? Where was it working, and with whom? How far along was it? When would the rubber trees mature? Had we understood the map, we might have asked why the project was targeting agriculturally zoned land for conversion to industrial tree crops, a violation of central-government food-security policy designed to prevent the replacement of food crops by industrial tree plantations. We might also have asked how the project was impacting local landholdings since, as we would later learn, the project’s greatest conversions of foodproduction land to rubber plantations were in the district’s poorest and most socially vulnerable villages. Finally, we might have pushed harder to find out exactly what project planners and local authorities meant by rubber plantation “promotion” (songserm), since later we would discover that this term meant different things in different places.

These were the questions that mattered. As it was, however, the map confronted us as an inscrutable black box.’ Unable to open it, we could only ask the polite questions reserved for visitors.

REREADING TRANSNATIONAL LAND ACCESS

Over the last decade, the proliferation of transnational land deals like those my colleagues and I had been investigating has become increasingly recognized as a coherent, if complex, phenomenon. Sometimes termed a new “global land grab”—or more properly but less captivatingly, a new global land rush (since only some of the land targeted has actually been acquired)—the linking of individual land deals to a larger pattern of transnational land access entered public consciousness around the time of the 2008 global financial crisis.* Embodying a more explicitly interventionist, state-managed model of international cooperation, transnational land deals have generated concerns about land dispossession and foreign land access across the global

South, as well as more specific questions about the new geopolitics of development aid and infrastructure exemplified by China’s rise. As these concerns have remained current in the post-2008 landscape, they have helped re-center attention to geopolitics in the sense discussed by critical geographers and other scholars: as not just about geostrategic relations among states, but also about how land and the social relations that surround it shape the reconfiguration of political space, both sub- and transnationally.®

In the first decade of the 2000s, the economic and institutional linkages between agriculture, property, and finance deepened as sovereign and private wealth increasingly entered the global agribusiness arena.’ This coincided and overlapped with the emergence of more explicitly state-managed approaches to development, taking different forms in different contexts but, in general, reacting to the social instability created by the dominant marketfundamentalist (or neoliberal) approach of the preceding decades. China figured centrally here, having embraced a more regulated form of state capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s and, with the turn of the millennium, having begun to mobilize its substantial economic power into state-backed foreign investment and development cooperation abroad.’ This all came together in the buildup to the 2008 financial crisis, as private investors increasingly diversified into commodities as a way to hedge against stock market volatility, and a number of countries—worried about the effects of this hedging on their own commodity imports (both food and otherwise)—began to pursue direct land access abroad.” When GRAIN, an organization allied with the global peasant movement La Via Campesina, helped break the “global land grab” story in late 2008, there was a sense among many people I knew in Southeast Asia that the rest of the world was finally starting to catch up with what had already been going on there for a few years.

Much of the initial urgency came from a public intervention by the director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Jacques Diouf, in late 2008. A few months earlier, in June, the FAO had hosted a Conference on World Food Security in Rome aimed at addressing the recent spike in global food prices and the associated wave of unrest across the global South.” At the time, Diouf had called for “innovative new solutions” to the chronic problem of agricultural underinvestment in the global South, including “partnership or joint-venture agreements” between, “on the one hand, those countries that have the financial resources and on the other, those that possess land, water and human resources.”’” Summer 2008 had seen the announcement of numerous transnational farmland deals across sub- Saharan Africa and Central, South, and Southeast Asia, mostly involving state-linked companies from across Asia, and often in the tens to hundreds of thousands of hectares each.” In October of the same year, in a widely quoted article on “The Food Crisis and the Wrong Solutions,” Diouf used some very blunt language to clarify his earlier remarks. Criticizing these new land deals as “unequal international relations and short-term mercantilist agriculture,” he worried publicly about the creation of “a neocolonial pact” for the provision of raw materials to the rest of the world.“

Diouf’s comments circulated widely. It was one thing for the head of the FAO to advocate increased investment in agricultural development, and quite another to warn of an emerging neocolonial pact targeting poor countries across the global South. Lending official legitimacy to what might have been otherwise dismissed as activist concerns, his comments also helped cement an explicitly geopolitical framing onto the new land rush. Exemplified by headlines invoking “the new farms race” (Toronto Globe and Mail), “agricultural imperialism” (New York Times Magazine), and a “great land grab to safeguard [rich countries’] food supply” (the Guardian),’ this discourse reflected the resonance of the new land deals with the land grabs of the late-colonial era. Decrying a new scramble for Africa and beyond, many Western observers were particularly worried about the global rise of China and other emerging economies like India and Brazil; more than a few preferred to focus their concerns here rather than on the linkages to Wall Street and the 2008 financial crisis that also figured centrally in GRAIN’s initial missive. The Economist, for instance, published a piece in May 2009 on “outsourcing’s third wave” that wondered whether farmland might be the next logical step in globalization via comparative advantage. But in the same breath—and highlighting the tension between optimistic and more critical takes on the new land deals—the magazine readily rolled them into what it criticized as “Chinese neocolonialism” in Africa, described in a pointed example as “going down well with Mozambique’s elite.”””

Laos became caught up directly in this discourse. Barely a month after GRAIN’s report and Diouf’s article, the Guardian published a multipart feature with the headline, quoted above, about the “great land grab.” This included a map based on GRAIN’s data that purported to show over 7.5 million hectares that had been purchased by governments and private companies from South Korea (which had allegedly bought 2.3 m ha), China (2.1 m ha), Saudi Arabia (1.6 m ha), the United Arab Emirates (1.3 m ha), and Japan (0.3 m ha). The locations of this “world land grab” included Indonesia (1.6 m ha), Madagascar (1.3 m ha), the Philippines (1.24 m ha), Sudan (1.1 m ha), Pakistan (900,000 ha), Laos (700,000 ha), and Mongolia (270,000 ha); Laos’s numbers, given its relatively small size, made it the most “grabbed” country shown."

The feature also included a feature story from Laos, which was arguably the most important piece of the set since it helped ground the almost unbelievably large numbers shown on the map.” Echoing The Economist’s concern with national elites benefiting from foreign land deals at the expense of local citizens, the Guardian feature implied that Lao officials had abdicated their public duties and were instead giving away land to line their own pockets. “The situation is completely out of control,” it quoted one foreign adviser in Vientiane as saying; “It’s a fire sale. People in power are just desperate to get their hands on the money so they don’t miss out. For the companies coming in it’s a massive land grab.” The feature also quoted a prominent historian of modern Laos, who described the situation as “simply a matter of greed. Officials are grabbing what they can. Companies need land and are prepared to pay well. It all goes under the table.””°

These passages exemplify a common way of talking about transnational land deals. Using what I call an “authority gap” narrative, they examine the interests and motivations of companies and governments that seek land abroad, but focus exclusively on corruption and elite self-interest when trying to explain the actions of host states. The phrase itself comes from a 2010 story in the Asia Times Online, a widely read English-language media outlet in Southeast Asia, that decried what it termed “Chinese expansionism” across northern Laos, in special economic zones, corporate rubber plantations, and the growing (and allegedly underestimated) Chinese population in northern Lao cities. The article bemoaned what it called “the authority gap in a growing number of areas in the country where Vientiane has effectively ceded sovereignty to Beijing.””' In this narrative, as in the other pieces quoted above, local elites and corrupt officials are the ones in charge: foreign land deals and actually governing are framed as mutually incompatible. The authority-gap narrative has a number of variants, including references to “weak governance”—a staple of the development industry—or, in some cases, “anarchic” or “frontier” development.”* Whatever the language, the message is the same: “The situation is completely out of control.”

Despite their popularity, these explanations miss a lot. First of all, they ignore the significant role of host states in creating both the legal and the economic feasibility for large-scale land deals. By conjuring a weak or absent state, authority-gap narratives ignore the histories of progressively stronger state ownership of rural hinterlands, first during the colonial era and, more recently, by newly independent countries of the global South, whose nationalization of untitled lands during the 1950s, 60s, and ’7os reflected both elite self-interest and the prevailing socialist winds of Third World nationalism.” Authority-gap narratives likewise miss the more recent policy changes, often from the 1990s, that drastically lowered taxation rates (on land, profits, and commodity exports) and altered national land laws in a bid to attract greater foreign investment to poor countries.** While often implemented by Southern governments under pressure from Northern lenders—whether as part of structural adjustment packages or more “voluntary” alternatives—these adjustments imply strategic state action under conditions of structural duress, not the absence of governing per se.”°

Most importantly, authority-gap narratives ignore the socio-spatial unevenness that transnational land deals invariably manifest. Because they are negative descriptions—accounts of what is missing rather than what is actually going on—authority-gap narratives have little to say about why foreign land deals have been targeted into certain regions with good farmland but not others, or why they achieve large-scale enclosures in some places yet run up against prohibitively strong resistance elsewhere.”° As researchers have studied the global land rush over the last decade-plus, they have become increasingly convinced that, as one senior scholar put it, “an accelerated process of dispossession is clearly in motion.””’ Yet as agriculture, energy, and finance merge, and as sovereign wealth becomes an increasingly global force,” questions of how and where this “accelerated dispossession” is taking place are increasingly intertwined. If accelerated dispossession is “clearly in motion,” what enables that motion to gain traction on the ground? What makes a land rush into a land grab in some cases, but not others?

GOVERNING ENCLOSURE

Echoing earlier studies of globalization, scholars have been quick to point out that transnational land deals complicate traditional notions of territorial sovereignty, especially when the areas involved—some exceeding tens of thousands of hectares—are large enough that they spill from economic space (property) into political space (territory).”® The legal scholar Liz Alden Wily, for instance, offers an excellent account of the new land rush’s enabling conditions, from colonial land law to postindependence hinterland nationalization to neoliberal-era structural adjustments of national tax and land policy.” Similar ingredients drive anthropologist Pal Nyiri’s theorization of Chinese land deals abroad in the wake of the country’s “Going Out” policy, announced in 2000. Positing a “return of the concession”—a colonial-era model of outsourced political space aimed at stimulating global trade—Nyiri builds on anthropologist Aihwa Ong’s studies of “graduated sovereignty” in the special economic zones created during the 1990s across the global South.” Nyíri emphasizes the sharing or blurring of national sovereignty by large-scale Chinese land deals in sub-Saharan Africa and the Southeast Asian borderlands; the difference now, as compared to the 1990s, is that zonal exceptions, formerly limited in size and number, have become so extensive that they seem to be changing the fabric of “normal” political space itself.