Power, Protection, and Free Trade

Front matter

Power, Protection, and Free Trade

INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF U.S.

COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939

Part II. American Trade Strategy

. The Politics of Opportunistic Accommodation, 1912—1930 . Protection, Retaliation, and Response, 1930—1939

Appendix: Relative Labor Productivity: Definitional and Operational Considerations

119 148

Preface

I began this project in the late 1970s seeking to explain the contradictory mixture of cooperation and conflict then present in the international economy. All of the advanced industrialized states were caught in the web of stagflation, oil prices were skyrocketing for the second time in less than a decade, and nontariff barriers to trade were rising. Yet the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had just reduced tariff levels once again, and the leaders of the Western world were undertaking a unique and historic attempt to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. I was attracted by, but ultimately dissatisfied with, the “theory of hegemonic stability,” which in many ways adequately captured the problems of the late 1970s but not the successes. What was needed was a theory that could account for both conflict and cooperation in nonhegemonic international economic systems. This book is the distant descendant of that original quest.

After developing an early version of what is now Chapter 1, I beganto search for “least likely” cases that would allow for a rigorous elucidation of the theory. The problems associated with the decline of the Pax Americana no longer seemed to me appropriate to that end; examining an era of structural change in which the future is not yet known renders theory testing difficult, if not wholly meaningless. Although it possessed little intrinsic interest at first, American trade strategy in the prehegemonic era appeared to be a good “hard” case for the theory. I chose it for that reason. The deeper I delved into the case, the more fascinating it became.

In this book, I develop and test a systemic-level theory of national trade strategy, a theory that abstracts from domestic-level characteristics and focuses exclusively on how nation-states stand in relation one to

PREFACE another. In doing so, I deviate from classical theories of international trade, draw upon several less widely accepted literatures in international economics, and make strong generalizations. The theory is also intentionally parsimonious. As a consequence, I slight systemic variables not directly related to international trade and alternative explanations at the national and individual levels of analysis. Throughout, I seek to probe the limits of the systemic approach. This probing is not only analytically important, it is empirically fruitful as well. Applying the theory to the case of American trade strategy between 1887 and 1939 leads to an interpretation that differs from and challenges the current historiography.

I have benefited from the criticisms and support of numerous advisers, colleagues, and friends. Richard Rosecrance encouraged my interest in systemic theories of international politics and taught me the value of history for such an approach. Peter Katzenstein, first as adviser and later as editor, was an indefatigable critic whose suggestions are reflected throughout the book. Walter LaFeber, an exemplar for any young scholar, questioned my interpretations of American trade strategy and in the process led me through a voluminous history. I am grateful to all.

I had the good fortune to spend 1981—82 as a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution with G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno. Their friendship and support made a difficult writing job easier. Much of what is now Chapter 2 was stimulated by our loud discussions in the library corridors and our subsequent collaborations. Jeffry Frieden, a good friend and colleague, has read and commented on virtually every word I have written over the last four years. In return for his efforts, I always let him win at tennis.

Robert Keohane, John Odell, and several anonymous reviewers read and commented on the complete manuscript. In addition, many colleagues have provided useful comments on various portions of the book: John Conybeare, David Dollar, Glenn Fong, Robert Gilpin, Judith Goldstein, Joanne Gowa, Lori Gronich, Stephan Haggard, Thomas Ilgen, Bruce Jentleson, Stephen Krasner, Fred Lawson, Charles Lipson, Timothy McKeown, Kenneth Oye, Ronald Rogowski, Arthur Stein, Kenneth Waltz, Beth Yarbrough, and Robert Yarbrough. Selected portions of the manuscript have been presented at annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association; at the University of California, Davis; Stanford University; the University of California, Berkeley; and the Program on Interdependent Political Economy at the University of Chicago. I thank the participants in these meetings for their often enlightening comments.

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Preface

I am grateful to the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the Brookings Institution, the UCLA Office of International Studies and Overseas Programs, and the UCLA Academic Senate for financial assistance. Deborah Shapiro, Joel Rothblatt, and Scott James all served as outstanding research assistants. Bess Karadenes assisted with the final proofreading. Roger Haydon guided the manuscript through the publication process with remarkable ease. Trudy Calvert greatly improved the prose. None of the individuals or institutions noted above, however, is responsible for any remaining errors.

Earlier versions of portions of this book were published as “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887—1934,” World Politics, vol. 35, no. 4 (July 1983), copyright © 1983 by Princeton University Press, adapted with permission of Princeton University Press; “Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures,” adapted from the International Studies Quarterly, vol. 28 (1984) with permission of the International Studies Association, Byrnes International Center, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA; and “American Trade Strategy in the Pre-Hegemonic Era,” International Organization, vol. 42 (Winter 1988), adapted with permission of the MIT Press and the World Peace Foundation.

I also thank my parents, Edward and Gloria Lake and Samuel and Sylvia Krieger, for their confidence and encouragement over the years. Although Brenden Manker Lake, whose birth coincided with the final revision of the manuscript, was too late to offer much support, his pending arrival helped bring this project to a timely conclusion. Finally, my greatest debt of gratitude is to my wife, Wendy Krieger Lake, to whom this volume is dedicated. The book is as much hers as mine, for I would never have contemplated—far less completed—this endeavor were it not for her love, support, and encouragement. This is a debt I look forward to repaying for many years to come.

Davin A. LAKE Los Angeles, California xi

Power, Protection, and Free Trade

In May 1930 more than a thousand members of the American Economic Association issued a petition urging Congress to vote down the tariff bill then pending in the conference committee and the president to veto the measure should it come to him for signature. One month later, Herbert Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Act into law. Economists have long recognized the benefits of free trade, first articulated by Adam Smith in 1776 and extended by David Ricardo in the early nineteenth century. Yet trade protection occurs and recurs, often in phases and perhaps even in cycles. Even today, after nearly forty years of strong American support for free trade in the world economy, protectionism is once again an important political issue in the United States.

The dominant explanation for protection is one of domestic political failure. Because restrictions on trade benefit relatively small groups of producers whereas the mass of consumers benefit from free trade, producers have a greater incentive to organize and influence the political process. Pressured by failing industries unwilling to bear the costs of economic change, politicians promote trade-restrictive measures that benefit the few at the expense of the many. The problem, according to this explanation, lies not in a misidentification of political objectives or in the value of economic openness but in the unwillingness or inability of politicians to adhere to the goal of free trade.!

1For classic studies of the tariff which take this view, see Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 8th ed. (New York: Putnam, 1931); and E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935). The argument is developed more formally in the public choice literature on tariffs, also referred to as “endogenous tariff theory.” See in particular Richard E. Caves, “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure,” Canadian Journal of Economics 9, (May 1976): 278—300;

I

Drawing upon an equally old historical tradition associated with Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, this book advances an alternative explanation that conceives of both protection and free trade as legitimate and effective instruments of national policy. Like the early mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Hamilton and List believed that power and wealth are proper and, in the long run, harmonious goals of national policy; that nation-states—rather than individuals or global society—are the most important actors on the international stage and the appropriate unit of analysis; and that nation-states pursue national interests defined in terms of power and wealth.? Yet unlike their predecessors, who focused narrowly on the sovereign’s gold stocks, Hamilton and List recognized that the sources of national power and wealth are many and varied and that different policies are necessary at different stages in a country’s development. Although neither Hamilton nor List set forth a fully developed theory of international trade, both attempted to identify the conditions under which free trade and protection would best serve the national interest. Hamilton argued that national wealth and power could be enhanced by protecting certain “infant industries,” which could not otherwise survive the rigors of international competition. List attempted a more general indictment of free trade. Considering the practices of several European nation-states, List denounced free trade as the instrument used by the leading commercial power to maintain its dominance over others. To break free from the leading power’s grasp and become an international power in its own right, List argued, a country needed to protect its economy and stimulate the process of industrialization.4

Jonathan J. Pincus, Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and Robert Baldwin, The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). Many more studies are reviewed in Real P. Lavergne, The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs (New York: Academic, 1983). The only such study to focus on the period covered here is Bennett D. Baack and Edward John Ray. “The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the United States,” Explorations in Economic History 20 (January 1983): 73—93.

2See Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics 1 (October 1948): 1—29; E. F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro, rev. 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1955); and Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (New York: Longmans, Green, 1957). For an alternative view that explains mercantilism as a form of rent-seeking by societal groups, see Robert B. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, eds., Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981).

Documents Relating to American Economic History: Selections from the Official Reports of Alexander Hamilton, arr. Felix Flugel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929).

4Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (London, 1885; rpt. New York:

In this same spirit, Part I of this book develops a deductive, systemic-level theory of national trade interests which attempts to specify the conditions and circumstances that stimulate rational power- and wealthseeking nation-states to pursue free trade, protection, or some combination of both. My central proposition is that the national trade interests, political choices, and ultimately trade strategies of individual countries are fundamentally shaped and influenced by the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure. Protection and free trade, then, are not simply the result of domestic political pressures but the considered response of self-seeking nation-states to varying international structures.

A second theoretical proposition developed in Part I concerns the relationship between systemic incentives and the domestic political process. Chapter 2 addresses the question of how the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure are communicated or translated into national trade strategies. A disaggregated conception of the state is presented in which the principal domestic political cleavage is between the foreign policy executive, concerned with national power and wealth, and the representative element of the state, responsive primarily to the rent-seeking interests of society. The clash between these two sets of interests ultimately determines trade policy. Domestic politics is not seen as unimportant, but I argue that the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure are influential and that domestic political factors, normally granted analytic autonomy from systemic incentives, are best understood as interacting with these constraints.

Part II of this book tests the systemic theory of international economic structures in a “hard” or least likely crucial case study of American trade strategy between 1887 and 1939.5 During this period, the United States possessed a large domestic market, low levels of economic interdependence, an isolationist ideology, and strong societal pressure groups within a highly permeable political process. Consequently, it could be argued that American trade strategy would have been unlikely to respond to the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure. As I demonstrate in Chapters 3 through 6, however,

5On least likely case studies see Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science, 8 vols. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 7:79—-137.

that strategy was shaped in important ways by these systemic incentives, thereby offering strong support for the theory.

Trade Strategy Defined

Trade strategy is a government plan or method for obtaining one or more objectives within the international economy related to the import or export of tangible goods. All trade is strategic, or characterized by interactive decision making, at the most basic level: every import is another country’s export. Thus, almost by definition, trade strategy refers to government policies that are contingent upon the actions of other nation-states or intended to manipulate the preferences and policies of others.

Trade strategy has two dimensions (see Figure I.1). The first, international market orientation, indicates a country’s willingness to permit the international market to control its trade flows. A liberal, open, or free trade strategy, as traditionally defined in the literature on international political economy, relies upon the market as the principal determinant of the pattern of international trade. A protectionist or mercantilist strategy, on the other hand, regulates trade flows through government fiat in the form of tariffs, nontariff barriers to trade, barter arrangements, or centrally planned trade. The second dimension, the degree of international political activity, denotes the desire of a country to influence the international economic order and the policies of others. In a passive strategy, policies are typically directed inward at the country’s own domestic economy. An active strategy seeks to influence the economic order and the policies of other countries.

In the period 1887—1939, no formal statements of American trade strategy were offered on a regular or periodic basis. Rather, trade strategy must be inferred from the debates over tariff policy, the central trade issue of the era and the principal instrument through which

Figure I.1. Two dimensions of trade strategy and characteristic indicators

Liberal low, low, nonnegotiable, negotiable, International and nondiscriminatory tariffs and nondiscriminatory tariffs Market Orientation high, high, nonnegotiable, negotiable, Protectionist and discriminatory tariffs and discriminatory tariffs

Passive Active Degree of international political activity strategy was implemented.® Trade strategy is, however, distinct from and more general than tariff policy; two (or more) tariff acts may differ in their particulars yet reflect a single trade strategy.

Eight tariff acts were passed by Congress and signed into law during the period examined in this book.” Each can be classified within the dimensions of the international market orientation and degree of international political activity in two ways. Tariff policies can be categorized by their substantive legislative provisions. Three elements are of particular importance: the average rates of duty, their “negotiability,” and the extent of discrimination between countries. Higher rates of duty are more protectionist, lower rates more liberal. Tariff acts that do not discriminate between countries are more liberal than those that do, although discrimination may also indicate an active trade strategy. Similarly, measures that fix rates irrespective of the actions of other countries or contain flexible provisions that are not implemented are more passive than acts that allow the legislature or the executive to bargain with other countries over duties and other provisions.

Tariff policies can also be classified by their stated purposes. Declarations of intent, especially by politicians, are often misleading. Yet during the tariff debates, policy makers appear to have been quite explicit when discussing the purposes of the legislation. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the tariff was a politically divisive issue. The perspectives of both the “protectionists” and “free traders” were highly developed and neither group appeared to believe it necessary to disguise its objectives in passing any tariff bill. Moreover, in nearly all cases there is a Close correspondence between the first and second means of classifying the trade acts. Tariff acts that sought to close the United States off from the international economy are classified as protectionist and passive. Conversely, those acts which sought to stimulate trade both at

®Because I am testing hypotheses rather than writing history, not all of the historical record is necessary. Only such information is gathered as is necessary to disconfirm or support the hypotheses developed in Chapters 1 and 2. I consulted first the public record, such as the Congressional Record and congressional hearings and reports, then published primary materials, including memoirs and collected papers, and finally unpublished primary material, largely private papers of the individual decision makers and government documents.

7These eight acts are the McKinley Tariff (1890), Wilson-Gorman Tariff (1894), Dingley Tariff (1897), Payne-Aldrich Tariff (1909), Underwood Tariff (1913), Fordney- McCumber Tariff (1922), Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930), and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934). The last was not a completely new tariff act but an amendment to the 1930 act. Tariff bills are named for the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who is principally charged with writing the bill, and in some cases, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, if the Senate revises the measure substantially. For the Smoot- Hawley bill, the normal order is reversed because of the Senate’s important role in nearly rewriting the entire bill.

home and abroad are classified as liberal and active. The specific reasons for the classification of each of the eight bills are discussed in Part II.

Historical Overview

Rapid and dramatic changes occurred in American trade strategy in the period 1887—1939. After the Civil War and before 1887, the United States was a relatively passive and highly protectionist nation-state. Tariffs were high, nonnegotiable, and nondiscriminatory. During World War II, the United States shed the last vestiges of its nineteenth-century strategy. By 1945, it had emerged as an active world leader strongly supportive of universal free trade. The transition from America’s passive protectionism of the mid-nineteenth century to its active liberalism of the mid-twentieth is the substantive focus of this book. Within this period, four phases can be identified.

President Grover C. Cleveland, a northern Democrat, broke the dominant post—Civil War protectionist consensus in his 1887 Annual Message to Congress by calling for duty-free status for raw materials. In the ensuing debate, the tariff was internationalized or reconceptualized as a more active instrument for promoting exports. Although maintaining the essential structure of protection at home, both the McKinley Act of 1890, passed under the Republican administration of Benjamin Harrison, and the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, enacted during Cleveland’s second term, pursued special trading relationships with the countries of Latin America by lowering duties on a selected and limited number of raw materials. Both parties hoped these relationships would expand American exports to the region at the expense of British and other European traders. Thus the United States sought and, as will be seen in Chapter 3, easily obtained both protection for imports and expansion of exports.

Between 1897 and 1912, the second phase of American trade strategy, the United States continued to pursue highly protectionist policies and became more active in the international economic arena. Specifically, the strategy of bilateral bargaining first adopted in the McKinley Act was expanded to include the increasingly protectionist countries of continental Europe. In the Dingley Act of 1897, the United States offered the continental Europeans reciprocal reductions in duties for the first time and threatened penalty duties against selected Latin American countries unless they granted trade concessions to American exporters. Reflecting new confidence in the ability of the United States to compete on equal terms in world markets, the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 granted lower duties to all countries that did not unduly discriminate against American goods. Despite their differences, however, both tariff acts rejected liberal free-trade principles and actively sought to exploit the national trade strategies of other countries.

Between 1912 and 1930, the United States departed from its historic policy of protection. The Underwood Act, passed under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson in 1913, drastically lowered tariff rates and endorsed the principle of freer international trade. A decade later, in an international economy still unsettled by the war, the United States increased its tariff moderately in the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922. Nonetheless, tariff rates remained far below those of earlier phases. This modest increase from the low levels of 1913 was partially offset by a more active trade strategy and adoption of the nondiscriminatory most-favored-nation principle. Throughout this third phase of trade strategy, then, American policy was characterized by tariff restraint and a high degree of international activism.

Finally, during the period from 1930 to 1939, the United States took a dramatic turn toward renewed protection in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, only to reverse course and adopt the liberal and extremely active Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934. Although the latter signaled an important departure in American trade strategy, it was not a radical break with past practice. Rather, the 1934 act was intended as a complement to protection, enabling the United States to reopen foreign markets to its exports. Not until after 1945 did the United States fully endorse the principle of free trade at home and abroad.

Chapters 3 through 6 examine these four phases of American trade strategy. Each chapter analyzes the constraints and opportunities the United States confronted in the international economic structure; how these constraints and opportunities shaped the national trade interest and, in turn, trade strategy; and the role of the foreign policy executive in the policy-making process. The Conclusion summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the theory as revealed in the case study.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

American trade strategy between 1887 and 1939 is typically explained by a combination of interest-group politics and competition among political parties. The interest-group argument is well-known. Producers have concentrated interests in protection, and consumers have diffuse interests in free trade. As a result, producers organize more easily and bring greater pressure to bear on the political process. The decentralized and relatively open American political process, moreover, contains many points of access for motivated petitioners, ensuring that their voices will be heard. At least in the omnibus tariff acts passed by Congress in the period examined here, the almost infinitely divisible nature of the tariff, which often allowed duties to be tailored to specific producers, created a norm of mutual noninterference and a process of legislative logrolling in which virtually all claimants could be satisfied. As a result, the American tariff tended toward equality and uniformity in duties and universality in application.§

The role of political parties is often superimposed on this interest-group explanation. The Republicans, with an electoral base in the Northeast and Midwest, are identified as the party of protection, and the Democrats, drawing on the traditionally trade-dependent South, the party of free trade. Fluctuations in tariff rates, in this view, are explained by changes in party dominance.’

These explanations are widely accepted, but they appear inadequate. As discussed in more detail in Part II, the industrial structure of the American economy did not change in tandem with trade strategy. The dependence of American manufacturers on exports rose dramatically over the 1890s, yet the tariff remained highly protectionist. This dependence increased only slightly before World War I, but the tariff was drastically lowered in 1913. American dependence on exports and foreign investment continued to rise during the war, but tariffs were increased in 1922. Explanations of trade strategy based on political parties are also open to question. In the early 1890s, there were important commonalities in policy despite changes in party. Conversely, party platforms changed significantly over time, even though the electoral bases remained similar. These anomalies should not necessarily lead us to dismiss the importance of interest groups and political parties, but they should call into question the narrowness of explanations derived entirely from domestic political factors.

The most important international alternative to this domestic-level explanation is the theory of hegemonic stability, although it focuses principally on international economic regimes and is never applied to

8See Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, and Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics 16 (July 1964): 667-715. On interest groups see William H. Becker, The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations: Industry and Exports, 1893—1921 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920—1933 (Boston: Beacon, 1 ).

Eom E. Terrill, The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874—1901 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), presents the clearest argument on the importance of party competition. Party competition is also important to Taussig (Tariff History); and Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903).

American trade strategy before World War I.!° There are two principal variants of this theory. The first, associated with Charles P. Kindleberger, focuses on the provision of the collective good of international stability, with instability defined as a condition in which small disruptions (for example, the 1929 stock market crash) have large consequences (the Great Depression). Assuming that markets are inherently unstable—or nonhomeostatic systems—and tend toward stagnation and fragmentation, Kindleberger argues that the international economy will be stable only if a single leader is willing to assume responsibility for “(a) maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods; (b) providing counter-cyclical long-term lending; and (c) discounting in a crisis.”!! Kindleberger has subsequently added that the leader must also undertake to “manage, in some degree, the structure of foreign exchange rates and provide a degree of coordination of domestic monetary policies.”!2

The second variant, found in the writings of Robert Gilpin and Stephen D. Krasner, attempts to explain the strength and content of international economic regimes. Both authors share Kindleberger’s assumption that markets are nonhomeostatic systems. Yet according to this view, liberal international economies collapse not only as a result of inherent flaws in the self-regulating international market mechanism but also because nation-states pursue goals other than aggregate national income and welfare. Krasner posits three additional goals: social stability, political power, and economic growth.!5 Gilpin takes a similar position, arguing that “other than in a few... exceptional circumstances, societies throughout history have placed much greater emphasis on security values such as social stability or self-sufficiency than on income gains from the free operation of markets.”!4 The political tasks in this variant, therefore, involve not only curing market dysfunc-

10This label was coined by Robert Keohane in “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967—1977,” in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview, 1980), pp. 131-62.

Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 292.

12Charles P. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981): 247.

18Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); “Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective,” in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977); and Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (April 1976): 317-47.

14Gilpin, “Economic Interdependence,” p. 22.

tion through hegemonial intervention but also creating an international order that meets the security needs of nation-states so that they can pursue the gains from freer trade. Both Gilpin and Krasner argue that strong liberal international economic regimes are most likely to be created when a single hegemonic leader dominates the international economy.

With the growing popularity of the theory of hegemonic stability, the views of these three authors have been reduced to a simpler and more deterministic form which draws a direct and causal link between hegemony, regime stability, and economic openness. Robert Keohane, for example, states that the theory “holds that hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed. According to the theory, the decline of hegemonic structures of power can be expected to presage a decline in the strength of corresponding international economic regimes.” !5 This simplified version of the theory of hegemonic stability, which draws heavily upon the example of Britain’s hegemonic decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has been subjected to several varied tests, with mixed results.!6 Most important, the continued openness of the international economy in the 1970s and early 1980s despite America’s declining hegemony has been widely perceived as a major shortcoming or anomaly of the theory.

Since its “discovery,” this anomaly has guided several important research projects in the field of international political economy. The recent volume on international regimes edited by Krasner and Keohane’s After Hegemony both use this shortcoming as a rationale for studying international regimes. Likewise, Judith Goldstein argues that the continued openness of the United States is a result of the frozen or rigid American state structure created through past success.!7