The Ethical Spirit of EU Values

Front matter

Markus Frischhut

The Ethical Spirit of EU Values

Status Quo of the Union of Values and Future Direction of Travel

Preface

In September 2019, the Jean Monnet Chair on “EU Values & DIGitalisation for our CommuNITY (DIGNITY)”, kindly supported by the European Commission under Erasmus+, was launched, comprising teaching, research, and related activities in this field (all information available under https://jeanmonnet.mci.edu). The research necessary for this book has been conducted within the comprehensive activities of this Chair.

This Chair and this book are consecutively based on the previous Jean Monnet Chair on “European integration & ethics”, equally kindly supported by the European Commission under Erasmus+, which started in September 2016. The research outcome of this 2016-2019 Chair resulted in the open access book entitled “The Ethical Spirit of EU law”. Depicting the status quo of ethics in EU law, I have argued to fill these concepts, which are often not sufficiently determined in terms of content, with reference to the EU’s common values, as well as the fundamental rights, especially of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

As a well-known funding requirement, also this book is published open access. Even if this requirement would not exist, it makes a lot of sense for the content presented here, as I will argue that public debate in this field is of utmost importance and must be based on active citizen participation.

This book will analyse the EU’s common values, as well as those in specific fields, such as digitalisation. By relating more abstract values to legal and ethical principles, this book will elaborate the “ethical spirit of EU values”, focussing both on the status quo of the “Union of values” and on the future direction of travel.

This book was mainly written during (summer) 2021, where the author wants to thank his home institution (MCI | The Entrepreneurial School”), the department to which he is affiliated (Management & Law), and especially its head Ralf Geymayer and department colleagues, for making this possible.

The author wants to thank the following colleagues (in alphabetical order) for valuable feedback and discussions during the drafting process of this book: François Biltgen (Court of Justice of the European Union, Judge); Doris Dialer (Permanent viii Preface

Representation of Austria to the EU, Attachée), André den Exter (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Law); Christian Felber (Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies [IASS], Affiliate Scholar; Initiator of the Economy for the Common Good); Matthias Fuchs (Mid-Sweden University, Ostersund, Professor of Tourism Management & Economics); Brad Glosserman (Pacific Forum, Senior Advisor); Göran Hermerén (Lund University; 2002-2011 president/chairperson of the “European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies” [EGE]); Tamara K Hervey (City University London, Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law); Eva Lichtenberger (former Member of the European Parliament); Andreas Th. Miiller (University of Innsbruck, Department of European Law and Public International Law); Matthias Pirs (MCI alumnus; Executive Assistant to COO AT&S); Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna, Department of Political Science; EGE member; Member of the Austrian Bioethics Commission); Andreas Semrajc (voestalpine High Performance Metals); Philipp Weinkogl (MCI, Management & Law). However, the usual disclaimer applies.

Forming the Advisory Board of this Jean Monnet Chair on teaching and research in this field, the author wants to thank the members (Biltgen; Dialer; den Exter; Hermerén; Hervey; Lichtenberger) for valuable support, exchange of thoughts, guest-lectures at MCI, as well as mentoring.

The author also thanks the participants of the following events (in reverse chronological order) for valuable discussions and suggestions: The 8th European Conference on Health Law at the University of Ghent (21 April 2022); “EU law higher seminar” at Uppsala University (17 February 2022); International Conference “COVID-19 Pandemic: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues” at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (11 November 2021); the “Health in Europe” seminar series at Lancaster University (3 November 2021); the 14th EHFCN International Conference “How to enhance integrity in the health sector in changing societies” (20 October 2021); “EUPHA Law and Public Health Section” launch event (20 May 2021); presentation of my study “Strengthening transparency and integrity via the new ‘Independent Ethics Body’ (IEB)” for the European Parliament (19 November 2020); International Conference “New technologies in health: medical, legal and ethical issues”, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (21 November 2019). The author would also like to thank his students at MCI and at the University of Bologna for valuable discussions.

The author would also like to thank his colleagues Susanne Kirchmair and Christof Köstl from MCI Library Services for their continuous support in accessing books and articles, as well as all technical questions (Citavi). The author would also like to thank Janine Kiechl (MCI) for the visualisation of Fig. 1.1.

The author is also thankful for “www.DeepL.com/Translator”, which was a useful support in translating certain terms and (parts of) sentences, as well as for Trinka proofreading.

Preface ix

The author would also like to thank Anja Trautmann, Manuela Schwietzer, and Daniel Ignatius Jagadisan at Springer for the professional and pleasant cooperation, as well as the three anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback. The usual disclaimer also applies here.

Innsbruck, Austria Markus Frischhut May 2022

Contents

1 Setting the Asenda . 62566545 ¢hb 454465 neip Eb BSE ER RRR R ERA

1.2 Objective and Limitations of This Book... 0060000088460

1.5 Introduction to Key Terminology. 24.222.204 2 ved d

Chapter 1 A Setting the Agenda ga

These essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, ina ‘process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.

This legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premiss implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected.—Court of Justice (2014)'

1.1 Point of Departure (and ‘Ethical Spirit of EU Law’)

There are various approaches of determining the right behaviour via normative standards. These normative standards can be found both within and outside the ‘legal turf’. Especially if law lags behind certain technical developments, we can often observe a tendency” in law of increasing references to non-legal concepts such as ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that these concepts could of course also be assigned to the legal sphere as in the case of

TECI opinion of 18 December 2014, Adhésion de l’Union a la CEDH, Avis 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 167-168 (emphases added).

*Especially since the 1990s; Frischhut (2019), pp. 3, 144.

© The Author(s) 2022 1 M. Frischhut, The Ethical Spirit of EU Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12714-4_1

‘public morality’,’ which is a concept of EU law. The intention of referring to non-legal concepts is presumably mainly to have a more flexible set of instruments at hand, which is also not subject to the sometimes time-consuming adjustment procedure of a legislative process. We have seen this phenomenon in the fields of biotechnology," patient mobility," and in the field of digitalisation.°

In enacting legal provision, the EU is bound to the ‘rule of law’’ (Art 2 TEU®).” According to the European Commission (EC)’s communication,'” one element of the rule of law is legal certainty, which, according to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU''), requires amongst other things that “legislation must be clear and predictable for those who are subject to it”!*.'* Therefore, a missing determination of legal, but especially also non-legal concepts, can be a challenge,'* especially if triggering legal consequences. The research conducted within the first Jean Monnet Chair (2016-2019) was published in the book entitled the ‘Ethical Spirit of EU law’.!° Although the book is available ‘open access’ and was summarised in 28 theses,'’ this concept shall be briefly recapitulated as follows.

3 Art 36 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), consolidated version: OJ 2016 C 202/47.

*Tallacchini (2015).

5Frischhut (2015).

7See also infra, Sect. 3.2.1.3.

Treaty on European Union, consolidated version: OJ 2016 C 202/13.

° See also Frischhut (2019), p. 2.

10EC communication ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’, COM (2014) 158 final/2 19.3.2014, p. 4 and Annex I.

' This abbreviation refers to the Court of Justice of the EU in the sense of Art 19(1) TEU, which comprises not only the Court of Justice (ECJ), but also the General Court (GC). When in the following reference is made to the GC, this should be understood as also comprising the formerly Court of First Instance.

'2ECJ judgement of 12 November 1981, Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others, joined cases C-212 to C-217/80, EU:C:1981:270, para 10. See also ECJ judgement of 29 April 2021, Banco de Portugal and Others, C-504/19, EU:C:2021:335, para 51 (“[. . .] that principle requires, on the one hand, that the rules of law be clear and precise and, on the other, that their application be foreseeable for those subject to the law, in particular, where they may have adverse consequences for individuals and undertakings. Specifically, to meet the requirements of that principle, legislation must enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations imposed on them, and those persons must be able to ascertain unequivocally their rights and obligations and take steps accordingly”).

13 However, as the Austrian Constitutional Court has emphasised, the constitutional requirement of certainty (“Bestimmtheitsgebot’) does not mean that the legislature may not also use indeterminate legal terms; VfGH judgement of 11.12.2020, Prohibiting any form of assisted suicide without exception is unconstitutional, G 139/2019, para 111.

'4With regard to the rule of law, cf. Schroeder (2016), pp. 19-21.

' Again, with regard to the rule of law, cf. Schroeder (2016), p. 25.

16 Frischhut (2019).

1.2 Objective and Limitations of This Book 3

The concept of the ‘ethical spirit of EU law’ concerns the EU’s approach towards ethics. It refers to the entire EU legal system, not only to single legal provisions. Every legal provision has a literal meaning and an intention. The notion of ‘spirit’ is more than just the mere intention. It is the holistic coming together of different elements, or as Montesquieu called it, the “relations [which] together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws”.'* Dratwa has referred to a ‘lattice’ as “set of bodies and texts, of products and processes”.'? The concept of the ‘ethical spirit of EU law’ is based on the following understanding of ‘spirit’, namely “the intention of the authors of a legal system, which is reflected in a lattice of various different provisions”.”°

One could argue, in a metaphorical sense, this ‘spirit’ can be described as a ghost that maybe cannot be seen, but which is nevertheless present in terms of this lattice; or the discovery of acommon approach which can serve as a basis of understanding of the underlying philosophy of EU law (towards ethics). This “ethical spirit of EU law’ requires some clarification. First, having analysed the relationship of EU law to ethics, references”! to all three normative theories (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics) support the claim for a distinct ‘ethical spirit of EU law’. It would not be sufficient to merely refer to one of these normative theories here. Second, such a spirit of a legal system obviously can change over time, for instance when in 2009 the EU became a Community or Union of values. Hence, it can be qualified as ‘in statu nascendi’, following a step-by-step approach. Finally, there is a need to fill this ‘ethical lattice’, both in case of gaps that still exist within this lattice, but equally in case of other references to ethics and morality. My key argument in this book was to fill this ‘ethical spirit’ with life via the EU’s common values, their corner stone of human dignity and fundamental rights. Both this corner stone of human dignity, the other values of Art 2 TEU and fundamental rights can be seen as a bridge between the legal and the philosophical ‘world’.

1.2 Objective and Limitations of This Book

Various books have been written on single values, often focussing on the rule of law. The objective of this book is to provide an overview on all general (Art 2 TEU), and some selected specific values. In doing so, the holistic concept of the above-mentioned ‘ethical spirit of EU law’ shall be complemented with this focus on EU

18 This quotation has been retrieved from “The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1. 27.8.2018”, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/837#Montesquieu_O1 71-01_115; book I, ‘chapter III, of positive laws’.

9 Dratwa (2014), p. 113 et passim.

?1f EU law refers to non-legal concepts, the latter need to be imported in a relative way, as they need to be reflected in EU law itself (i.e., a relative approach), and not be imported in an unaltered way (i.e., absolute approach); see also infra, Fig. 1.1.

values. As mentioned above, a ‘spirit’ is more than just the mere intention, but the holistic coming together of different elements, hence “the intention of the authors of a legal system, which is reflected in a lattice of various different provisions”.”” By covering all EU values, the underlying philosophy of EU values shall be identified by applying, amongst others, the perspective traditionally used in EU law for the economic fundamental freedoms, i.e. the scope ratione temporis, materiae, personae and limitis. This book also strives for a holistic view in the sense of shedding more light on the relationship of the Art 2 TEU values to each other, but also in relation to other provisions of EU law. The spirit of values clearly surpasses the information comprised in two sentences of Art 2 TEU and has to be linked to the other relevant provisions of EU law. Likewise, based on the identified status quo, it is also the aim of this book to suggest how the values of the EU should be further developed for all the current and possible future crises (i.e., the ‘future direction of travel’).

Against this background, the following questions need to be answered, to depict the ‘ethical spirit of EU values’:

e Which values affect which levels, namely, from a vertical perspective, the EU, the Member States and finally the individuals (objective 1)? Especially the importance of values for individuals is key if searching for a ‘soul’ for the EU integration process.”

e Which general values (Art 2 TEU, but also beyond this legal basis) and which specific values, respectively, application of these general values to specific fields can we identify?” What is the content of the different values (i.e., scope ratione materiae, objective 2.1) and who is entitled (only EU citizens or humans?), respectively, obliged (only Member States or also individuals?) by these values (i.e., Scope ratione personae, objective 2.2)?

e References to ‘common values’ in the recent Brexit deal” raise the question of the scope ratione limitis, i.e., the internal and external perspective (objective 2.3). The ‘ethical spirit’ of EU law identified in the first book has been qualified as ‘in statu nascendi’, following a step-by-step approach, comparable to the Schuman declaration.”° The same question must be addressed regarding these values and the fundamental rights. This latter scope ratione temporis will have to answer the question to what extent the values and the fundamental rights can be seen as a ‘living instrument’, the evolutionary perspective so to say (objective 2.4).

2 Frischhut (2019), p. 90. 3Cf. Frischhut (2019), p. 139, referring to de Winter (2004), p. 158.

?4While one could reflect on specific values in various fields, Sect. 2.3 will focus on a selection of these examples, where relevant EU documents exist.

Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (TCA), OJ 2020 L 444/14 (Art COMPROV.4); see now: OJ 2021 L 149 (and L 150).

26 Frischhut (2019), p. 145, in thesis No 18.

1.3 Methodology 5 e What are the legal effects of these values and under which circumstances can these values be restricted (objective 2.5)?

e While so far, the focus of these questions was on (general and specific) values, I have also argued that the ‘ethical spirit’ requires further input from both values and fundamental rights, as well as corresponding principles. The ‘ethical spirit of EU law’, as I have argued, should also embrace ‘principlism’, as different principles might render abstract”’ values more easily applicable to different challenges in different sectors.”® Hence this book will also have to address the relationship (objective 3) not only of these values to each other (i.e., the ranking of values), but also the relationship between values and fundamental rights (especially of the CFR),”” as well as legal and or ethical principles. Talking about connections, likewise the relationship between values on the one side and economic or political objectives on the other will have to be envisaged.

e Finally, integrating this evolutionary perspective, the question of a possible ‘future direction of travel’ as the overreaching objective must be addressed (de lege ferenda), based on the identified status quo (de lege lata) of this Union of values” (objective 4).

Besides these questions to be answered by the end of this book, certain limitations must be emphasised.

Covering both the general and some specific values, this contribution cannot cover all possible details concerning each single value, as single books have been written, for instance, on one value only.” :

While this book also focuses on human rights and (ethical and legal) principles, they will only be covered insofar as they matter in their relationship with the EU’s values, respectively, being mentioned as one of the EU’s values.

1.3 Methodology

The book on the ‘ethical spirit’ was located at the interface of law and ethics, where the latter is a branch of practical philosophy.** Therefore, this book was about an ‘import’ from one discipline into another. The present book is primarily located

27Cf. also Lenaerts (2017b), p. 640 “notwendigerweise abstrakt und unbestimmt” (necessarily abstract and undetermined).

?® Frischhut (2019), p. 146, in thesis No 25.

°° Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, consolidated version: OJ 2016 C 202/389. It has to be mentioned that most of these CFR articles entitle not only EU citizens (even within title V ‘citizens’ rights’), but all human beings. Therefore, in the following this book will also refer to “human rights’.

31 On solidarity, see, for instance, Prainsack and Buyx (2017).

32 Cf. Fig. 1.4 in Frischhut (2019), p. 9.

Fig. 1.1 Relationship law and ethics, focussing on values and human rights [Further developed from Frischhut (2019), p. 3. The Values &

author wants to thank his Human Ethics colleague Janine Kiechl for rights

the graphic realisation of this illustration. ]

if ea I Morality within the legal field. Even if values and human rights are displayed in Fig. 1.1 between the two disciplines, they also pertain to the legal field. As mentioned earlier, values can be seen as a bridge” between the legal and the philosophical “world’,* where human rights also play an important field in both disciplines. Hence, this book will mainly take a legal perspective, while also integrating some philosophical literature.”

For the relationship between law and morality, Habermas has emphasised, “at the post-metaphysical level of reasoning, legal and moral rules simultaneously differentiate from traditional morals [Sittlichkeit] and appear side by side as two different but complementary varieties of norms of action”.*° As he continues, “[d] espite the common point of reference, morality and law prima facie differ in that post-traditional morality is only a form of cultural knowledge, while law simultaneously acquires binding force at the institutional level. Law is not only a system of symbols, but also a system of action.”

Within this primarily legal perspective, this book will cover both legal literature and the law, as it stands today (de lege lata). This inductive approach evaluates the current situation of EU law regarding values (general and specific ones), as well as related human rights and principles. EU law considered will cover both primary EU

33 AG Tanchev opinion of 6 May 2021, Commission vs. Poland (Régime disciplinaire des juges), C-791/19, EU:C:2021:366, para 69, has referred to a “‘constitutional passerelle’”, in the context of Art 19(1) TEU and Art 47 CFR; see, infra, Sect. 4.2.1. Based on Böckenförde (2004), p. 1225, Sommermann (2020), pp. 265-266 has referred to values as “Schleusenbegriffe”; see also Sect. 3. SA,

34Frischhut (2019), p. 144, in thesis No 10.

35 While the author has tried to include the most relevant literature, this selection of course always remains subjective to a certain extent.

37Habermas (1992), p. 137; translated with DeepL.

1.3 Methodology 7 law (e.g., Art 2 TEU, CFR), and secondary EU law, covering both hard-law as well as soft-law, e.g., political resolutions of the European Parliament (EP). From the perspective of Montesquieu’s*® “separation of powers’,”” this book will cover mainly legislation“? (EP and Council of the EU) as well as CJEU case-law. The relevant documents have been identified by means of the open access databases of EUR-Lex and Curia (for CJEU case-law).

These various sources of law will contribute to the above-mentioned objectives in the following way:

e Objective 1 (various levels) will be answered based on an interpretation of various legal bases (e.g., Art 2 TEU), covering both hard- and soft-law, and case-law insofar relevant.

e Objective 2.1 (scope ratione materiae) will also be answered based on an interpretation of various legal documents (Art 2 TEU, soft-law) and the relevant case-law. If necessary, these legal documents also comprise the ECHR,"! which is also mentioned in Art 6(3) TEU.

e Objective 2.2 (scope ratione personae) will also be answered based on an interpretation of various legal documents (Art 2 TEU, soft-law) and the relevant case-law.

e Objective 2.3 (scope ratione limitis) will be answered both on the internal (do values require a cross-border requirement as in the case of the economic“? fundamental freedoms of the EU’s single market) and the external (e.g., Brexit TCA) legal documents.

e Objective 2.4 (scope ratione temporis) will mainly be covered based on literature (for the historic view) concerning the pre-Amsterdam Treaty“? timeframe, and documents of the European Convention concerning the Constitutional Treaty,

3° While the EU is clearly not a nation state and accepting that there are certain differences when applying this state-related concept, we can still use it to differentiate the legislative from the administrative and the judiciary branch; cf. Frischhut (2019), p. 7. On the separation of powers at national level, see ECJ judgement of 19 November 2019, A. K., joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982, para 124, “in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary must be ensured in relation to the legislature and the executive”; see also ECJ judgement of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C-896/19, EU:C:2021:311, para 54; ECJ judgement of 15 July 2021, Commission vs. Poland (Régime disciplinaire des juges), C-791/19, EU:C:2021:596, para 96.

“Besides secondary EU law, primary EU law will also be covered, as mentioned above.

41 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), ETS No 5.

“Tt is important to emphasise the attribute ‘economic’ (i.e., activities in return for remuneration), as the Court also refers to Art 21(1) TFEU (EU citizens’ right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States) as a ‘fundamental freedom’; ECJ judgement of 15 July 2021, The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland, C-709/20, EU:C:2021:602, para 84.

“The Amsterdam Treaty has referred to certain principles, which have been enshrined as values by the Lisbon Treaty; cf. infra, at note 98.

leading to the Lisbon Treaty. The ‘living instrument’ character will be mainly answered based on case-law.

e Objective 2.5, i.e., the possibility of restrictions of these values will mainly be addressed based on CJEU case-law on the ‘essence’ of fundamental rights, etc. The justiciability of these values will be answered based on EU law, including case-law.

e Objective 3 (relationship of values) will be based both on the status quo of EU law as well as legal and philosophical literature.

By putting all these findings together, this inductive research will try to identify a general proposition, which can be derived from these specific examples. While objectives 1-2.5 represent the status quo of the ‘Union of values’ (de lege lata), the future direction of travel (objective 4) will be based on this status quo and include my arguments de lege ferenda. Objective 3 (relationship) is located at the interface of de lege lata and de lege ferenda.

1.4 Structure

After a definition of some key terms (Sect. 1.5), the book will start with a brief introduction (Chap. 2) of what will be depicted in further details in the following chapters. The four above-mentioned scopes are part of Chap. 3, starting with the historic development so far and the evolutionary character of these values (scope ratione temporis) in Sect. 3.1, followed by the scope ratione materiae (content) in Sect. 3.2. The scope ratione personae (Sect. 3.3) addresses both those entitled, and obliged by the different values. Sect. 3.4 takes a closer look both inside and outside the EU27 (scope ratione limitis). Finally, Sect. 3.5 focuses on the possible impact of values, that is to say justiciability and restrictions. Chapter 4 addresses the relationship of values to each other, but also the relationship between values and other goals of European integration (economic and political dimension), and the relationship between the more abstract values and more concrete principles or certain human rights. These chapters depict EU law as it stands today (de lege lata). In order to clarify the red thread of this book, Chaps. 2, 3 and 4“* are each summarised with the essential facts.

This evolutionary character leads to Chap. 5 and the future direction of travel (de lege ferenda), addressing the question of an additional narrative (Sect. 5.1), new values (Sect. 5.2), respectively, a stronger emphasis on existing concepts (Sect. 5.3). The debates about the ‘soul’ of the EU integration process, an evolving “EU identity’ and the objective of closing the gap between the EU and individuals will also have to address to question of values of EU individuals (Sect. 5.4).

1.5.1 Ethics (Normative Theories) and Morality

As mentioned above, values can be seen as bridge between the two disciplines of law and philosophy, as they pertain to both of them. While ethics, morality and values might all strive to determine right and wrong behaviour, they nevertheless need to be differentiated.

‘Ethics’ is a branch of practical (as opposed to theoretical) philosophy, which deals with what is morally right or wrong.“ According to the Oxford Dictionary, ethics is “the branch of knowledge that deals with moral principles”, respectively, “moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour of the conducting of an activie This includes normative ethics (as opposed to meta-ethics), which can be sub-divided in applied ethics and normative theories. The latter comprise deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics.*” In a simplified way, one could say that deontology focuses on the act itself, consequentialism on the outcomes of this act, and virtue ethics on the agent of this act. Deontology, from the “Greek deon, that which is binding”, has been defined as a “type of moral theory that asserts that certain acts or types of act exhibit intrinsically [!] right-making features in themselves, regardless of the consequences that may come after them”.*® In contrast, consequentialism is described as “[a]ny ethical theory that argues fundamentally that right action is an action that produces good results [!] or avoids bad results” and is a teleological type of theory, which refers to a telos”” (goal, purpose).”” The most prominent example is ‘utilitarianism’, an “altruistic variety of consequentialism that holds that good results are results that maximize benefits and minimize harms, even if this entails self-sacrifice”.°' Finally, virtue ethics is defined as “[a]n ethical theory that says that the central concept for ethical theory is that of a virtue, a disposition

* Alternatively, as O’Neil (2002), p. 281 defines it, “the philosophical science that deals with the rightness and wrongness of human actions”.

#7 See Fig. 1.4 in Frischhut (2019), p. 9.

#Cf, Aristotle’s example of the lyre-player: “for the characteristic activity of the lyre-player is to play the lyre, that of the good lyre-player to play it well”; Aristotle (2000), p. 12, 1098a. N.B. In the following, besides the page, also the “numbers followed by letters (e.g., 1094a)” are indicated, which “are those of the pages and columns of Immanuel Bekker’s Greek text of 1831”; Aristotle (2000), p. xli.

>! Hallgarth (2012), p. 602, where “[u]sually, ‘benefits’ is translated as ‘pleasure,’ and ‘harm’ is translated as ‘pain’”. On the other hand, as Chappell (2012), p. 343 defined it: “An ethical theory, the central conclusion of which is that agents should always act in a way calculated to bring about the best possible outcomes overall, where the goodness of any outcome depends on the amount of happiness realized in that outcome”.

needed for human excellence or flourishing”.”” In a negative way it has been defined as “any approach to ethics that puts the virtues first, before analyses of acts or their consequences”, where virtues are to be understood as “traits of character that are judged to be morally admirable or valuable”.*? In defining virtues°® it is essential to emphasise “rightness in character and [!] conduct”, as these character traits need to be exercised in constant behaviour. A virtuous person does “not simply do the right thing by accident, begrudgingly, or because they will get something out of er According to Aristotle, “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions”.°’ As Zhang argues, “the cultivation of personal virtues through common moral practice seems to be necessary for holding a society together and bringing about social harmony and cooperative actions”.”® Although these normative theories are tied to different criteria, it cannot be ruled out that they all come to the same conclusion.””