Power of Freedom

Front matter

HU SHIH’S Wott POLITICAL AE oe

WRITINGS

Chih-p’ing Chou and Carlag Kai Lin, Editors A

Contents

Introduction I. A Chinese Diplomat in the Cold War: Hu Shih’s View on International Politics Carlos Yu-Kai Lin

Introduction I. Hu Shih’s Anti-communist Thought Chih-p’ing Chou t Do We Need or Want Dictatorship? 2 Family of Nations The New Disorder in East Asia and the World at Large

Ambassador Hu Shih Describes China’s Ten-Year Fight for Freedom, Struggle against Aggression

Conclusion

Over the past forty years, there has been a revived interest in Hu Shih’s works in Chinese intellectual communities. New editions of Hu Shih’s works have been published every year, and new research about him had also been conducted. In many bookstores in Beijing, one can find a display section that features his works. This demonstrates that Hu Shih’s works are still being read nowadays and have a great appeal to the general readers. He has not been forgotten in today’s China and has instead made the successful comeback that has been long anticipated.

Many scholars have argued that Hu Shih criticized the Communist Party only to win the favor of the Nationalist government. This is a great misunderstanding and misinterpretation of his works. For Hu Shih, the survival of a nation is more important than the survival of a political party, and the concept of a nation also outlives any regime. The same scholar who was once denounced as a “running dog of imperialism” and the “sworn enemy of Marxism” has become a best-selling author, now widely considered one of the foremost scholars in the history of modern China. His uneven fate in modern Chinese history not only reveals the historical rise and fall of “Hu Shih studies,” but also demonstrates, as Hu Shih himself repeatedly pointed out, that the deeply rooted humanist and liberal tradition in Chinese thought and culture since the pre-Qin era cannot be eliminated.

On January 14, 1953, Hu Shih spoke on a radio broadcast to mainland China. The interviewer, Zeng Xubai, asked him, “Will the Communist Party’s efforts to eliminate your thoughts be successful?” Hu Shih replied: “I believe their efforts to eliminate my thoughts will ultimately fail. There is an ancient saying that goes, ‘A wild fire cannot deplete the land; when the

65. Chen Yuan, Correspondence of Chen Yuan, 191-195.

spring winds blow, grass will sprout again.’ The Communist Party simply cannot understand this common sense.” More than seventy years have passed since the Party sought to eliminate any idea or practice that might jeopardize its ruling position. Yet the idea of a democratic China that Hu Shih has hoped for and fought for still persists in China. Perhaps the spring winds of the twenty-first century will germinate the seeds of freedom and democracy that Hu Shih planted in China in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER I Do We Need or Want Dictatorship?!

On November 27 last President Wang Ching-Wei and General Chiang Kai- Shek issued a joint circular telegram to the nation, the concluding part of which read as follows:

The state of affairs and the trend of events in China today do not point to any necessity and possibility for her to institute the kind of political systems now in vogue in Soviet Russia and Italy.

On the same day, in the course of an interview given to a representative of the Osaka Mainichi, General Chiang made a similar statement:—

As China’s position differs from that of Germany, Turkey, and Italy, so there is no need for a dictator.

In an atmosphere clouded by politicians and scholars publicly advocating dictatorship for China, these two statements deserve the careful attention of the whole nation.

That the actual state of affairs and general trend of events in China today, as explicitly stated in the Wang-Chiang manifesto, do not point to any necessity for, or possibility of, the institution of a dictatorship, is no doubt very unpleasant to the ears of those who speak so enthusiastically in favour

I. This article was originally published under the title of “Zhongguo wu ducai de biyao yu keneng” (FRR VEJE) in Duli pinglun yzati (Independent critic) in 1934. It was later translated into English and published in the People’s Tribune in 1935. The translation was presumably done by Hu Shih himself, as the English article was published under his name. See People’s Tribune 8 (February 16, 1935): 89-95. Also see Duli pinglun 130 (December 9, 1934): 2-6.

of having a dictator, but we must admit that the conclusions arrived at are quite correct.

First, let us take the point that there is, today, no necessity for China having a dictator.

Among the scholars who have recently advocated the contrary opinion Dr. Tsiang Ting-Fu (#%£ik) and Dr. Chien Tuan-Sen ($47) are outstanding. In an article contributed to Eastern Miscellany (RIXTE) (Vol. 31, No. 1) entitled “Democracy or Totalitarianism?,” Dr. Chien said:—

Iam of opinion that what China needs today is a powerful and ideal dictator. It is of imperative necessity that China become, within the shortest time possible, a powerful nation with great strength behind it. . . . In the course of ten or twenty years the coastal provinces must be made to undergo a high degree of industrialization, so that agriculture in the interior provinces can become mutually dependent with the industries along the coast. . . . In order to achieve this industrialization of the coastal provinces, it is absolutely necessary that the Government possess all the powers of a totalitarian State, and in order that the Government may enjoy possession of such powers, it is also necessary to have a dictatorship that commands the whole confidence of the people.

The end which Dr. Chien seeks—industrialization of the coastal provinces—is in itself questionable, because few of these provinces possess the essential requirements of an industrial district, such as coal and iron. Moreover, in view of the world situation today, a country which does not possess an adequate navy simply cannot protect its coast-line, and this is why people of foresight have urged the establishment of economic centres in the interior. Furthermore, the industrialization of China is by no means dependent on Government authority alone, for the essential conditions are most complex. However great may be its powers, the Government cannot, to speak metaphorically, produce congee without rice, make horses out of paper, nor create an army out of a handful of beans. Can the Government secure capital, technical experts, or raw materials merely by the possession of wide administrative powers? Let us dwell on the question of technical experts alone. The Five-Year Plan of Soviet Russia requires the participation of 1,500,000 technical experts. Manifestly, these cannot be well turned out merely by the establishment of a dictatorial totalitarianism. Therefore, if the need of a dictator is only for the purpose of industrializing the coastal provinces, we cannot agree that such a step is necessary.

Do We Need or Want Dictatorship? 57

The reason Dr. Tsiang advocates the establishment of a dictator is for the sake of political solidarity. His views are set forth in the Independent Critic (SB) XLi¥ii@)

Nos. 80 and 83, and the essential ideas expressed therein are as follows:—

We must have a strong centralized Government. The present condition of China is an autocracy of scores of individual autocrats. What I am proposing is to have a stronger hand to take over the power from all the weaker ones. The men who stand in the way of national unification today are really the minor militarists, hence the problem of national unification becomes a problem of how to dispose of these men. . . . who can only be eliminated by a stronger military force. Since personal fidelity among Chinese as a rule outweighs public spirit, it is comparatively easy to institute a strong military authority by having an outstanding personality as the central dynamic force.

This briefly explains why Dr. Tsiang advocates military unification of the country by some powerful personality, and such proposals have been dealt with at greater length in an earlier number (85) of the Independent Critic.

Generally speaking, however, the problem is not so simple as Dr. Tsiang believes it to be. He has himself admitted that “the whole trouble does not rest with the militarists, but in the mentality and material conditions of the Chinese people.” If, then, the trouble does not rest wholly with the militarists, we cannot say that the problem of national unification is simply a matter of eliminating the minor militarists. It is true that in the brief space of two months the Kwangsi faction was suppressed, and it is also true that within six months the powerful Feng-Yen combination was overthrown, but has the experience of the past five years taught us nothing? The true reason for the disunity which existed lies precisely where Dr. Tsiang himself has stated—“in the mentality and material conditions of the Chinese people.” Paradoxical though it may seem, what resort to military force fails to achieve can be sometimes brought about by the creation of a certain “mentality.” For example, the overthrow of the Manchu regime was certainly not the result of military success, but the sequel to the irresistible tendency of the times. The collapse of Yuan Shih-Kai’s dreams of Imperial power also was not an achievement of military force, but of the irresistible power of a new “mentality.” The withdrawal of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin beyond the Great Wall in 1928 was not due so much to military necessity as to the prevalence of a certain “mentality” which made it necessary for him to retreat. The obstacles to national unification today are not to be found solely in the armed resistance of the minor militarists; the disruptive influence of certain “mentalities” is just as powerful, to say nothing of the influence of the Communists. A feeling of opposition to any dictator “on principle,” so to speak, is one of the important factors accounting for national disunity today.

Dr. Tsiang has also said:—“Whenever there looms a possibility of national unification, the minor militarists immediately join hands and proceed to defeat it under the pretext of fighting autocracy.” Now, the fact that the slogan “down with autocracy” is powerful enough to render national unification impossible indicates the irresistible nature of the new mentality of a new age, which cannot be imposed upon by the same old trick practiced by Liu P’ang and Chu Yuan-Chang, founder and first emperor of the Han and Ming Dynasties respectively. Professor Wu Ching-Chao, after completing an analytical study of the civil wars in Chinese history, established what he calls “the eight stages of Chinese civil wars,” and also holds the view that only military force can accomplish the task of national unification (see Independent Critic No. 84). But he forgets that in his analysis of the eight stages of civil war there was never any such thing as a stage of “Down with the dicta-

1?

tor!” New ideas cannot forever be subjugated by military force. In the present age, when new ideas have become irresistible, the resort to a dictatorship cannot be countenanced as a proper means of attaining political solidarity. Therefore, from the standpoint of political consolidation, we cannot believe that a dictatorship is necessary.

Next let us discuss whether there is any possibility of having a dictator in China. In the Independent Critic No. 82, I advanced three points to show why a dictatorship is impossible in China today. First, I do not believe that there is in China any outstanding personality capable of becoming a dictator, nor is there any political party or any class of people capable of shouldering the responsibility of a dictatorship. Secondly, I do not believe there is in China today any vital problem of such a nature as to call for the sentimental and reasoned support of the whole of the Chinese people, which would enable the whole nation to accept the leadership of any one single individual, or of a certain political party, or of a certain social class, in order to re-establish the regime of a new order of autocracy. Thirdly, I do not believe that either the intelligence or experience of the Chinese people today is capable of carrying successfully into operation a modern dictatorship, which requires superior intelligence and highly specialized technique for its execution. I have not up to now received a single satisfactory answer to any one of the three points I raised, and of which I think the third ranks as most important. I have said, “Looking over the political systems of the world during the past several

Do We Need or Want Dictatorship? 59 decades, I feel that Republican Constitutionalism is a form of elementary politics best suited to training a people lacking in political experience. The essence of democracy lies in the facts that it does not call for exceptional talent; that political rights can expand gradually with a great degree of flexibility; that it promotes the welfare of all by seeking the advice of many, so that the multitudes of O Tou? can also put up a good showing with an assemblage of their mediocrity; and in that it affords the mass of mediocre men the opportunity to participate in administrative affairs, so that they may be taught to protect and to further their own interests and rights.”

Generally speaking, democracy is a political system of common intelligence, while enlightened despotism is a system of special talents. Exceptional ability is not always easy to get; on the other hand, common intelligence is comparatively easy to train. In a country like ours, which is remarkably lacking in really great talent, the best political expedient is one of Republican Constitutionalism in which the political rights of the people can be gradually expanded. I have also said, “Few of those who are dreaming of an enlightened despotism (modern dictatorship) realize that a despotic political experiment is really the most complicated and most difficult of human enterprises. ... To assume that a vast country like China, with 400 million O Tou can be made into a new nation, is no small task, and its accomplishment cannot even be dreamed of by a group of militarists or politicians who have never had any rigorous training for the work.”

In other words, the way I look at it is that democracy is government of the kindergarten, while a modern dictatorship may be said to be the politics of graduates. For a whole year this view has not seemed to attract the attention of political experts in this country, perhaps due to the fact that it is out of harmony with the views commonly expressed in books of political science. My contention, terrible though it may sound, is derived nevertheless from patient observation of actualities. Take, for instance, the democracy of Great Britain, which is, as has always been the case, government based upon common intelligence, yet the British people have always regarded their method of government as one of “muddling through.” Not until the last few decades did a group of keen observers begin to emphasize the importance of expert knowledge and special technique in government. The activities of the Fabian Society may be taken as best representing such a new realization.

2. The term (Ff) is used to indicate the mass of ignorant and incapable people. O Tou was the dull son of a brilliant father, Liu Pei, Emperor during the Three Kingdoms, and the term is frequently applied to persons notoriously stupid.

During the latter part of the World War, and during the recent economic crisis, when there was an unusual extension of administrative powers, the principle of government by experts had for the first time an opportunity to be experimentally tested on a large scale. Again, look at the American Commonwealth. In what respect is this not a government of an elementary nature? Only since a year and a half ago have we seen in operation what is known as government by a “Brain Trust.” This is due simply to the fact that in normal times democracy does not call for special expert knowledge and technique, and it was not until the recent threat of economic collapse that Congress was compelled to confer upon the President such extensive powers as to make possible an experiment in modern dictatorship. Not until the economic crisis did the people feel the necessity of a “Brain Trust.” Great Britain and the United States are both homes of democracy; and the very fact that government by experts (or by a “Brain Trust”) has made its appearance only in recent years is concrete proof that democracy is but an elementary form of government, and that modern dictatorship, which calls for highly developed technical skill in its execution, belongs really to the politics of the most advanced seminary.

This is why I say that a people such as ours, with poor knowledge and very little training, will not be capable in the near future of experimenting with modern dictatorship. It must be pointed out, however, that modern dictatorship is not dependent on the wisdom of the leader alone—although strong leadership is of primary importance—but on the numerous technical experts around him. Some time ago we heard Dr. V. K. Ting, one of China’s foremost geologists, say that the Bureau of Geological Survey and Mining Investigation of Soviet Russia had in its service 3,000 active geologists, and in actual field-work there were 2,000 corps. We cannot help feeling amazed at such figures. In the last number of the Independent Critic Professor Chen Si-Ying declared that since the inauguration of the Five-Year Plan in Soviet Russia, there had been need for 1,500,000 technical experts, of whom 440,000 were engineers and technicians functioning in industrial projects, 90,000 high-grade and 36,000 medium-grade agriculturists; 11,000 high-grade and 27,000 second-grade specialists engaged in forestation, and 30,000 high-grade and 120,000 medium-grade technical experts functioning in transportation work. Such formidable figures should not be lost sight of by those who clamour so loudly for a modern dictatorship in China. Democracy only asks of those who are eligible to vote that they exercise their right of suffrage without fear or abuse. Such political training is not at all dif-

Do We Need or Want Dictatorship? 61 ficult. I have witnessed two national elections and a great number of local elections in the United States, and have noticed that citizens of poor intelligence and low general standards are quite capable of exercising their voting power. Modern dictatorship not only calls for a vast “Brain Trust” to function as its brain, but for hundreds of thousands of technical experts to serve as its limbs and senses. Such a demand cannot be easily met.

Neither Soviet Russia nor Italy is easy of imitation. In Italy there are two universities each having a history of 1,000 years, and universities of 500 years standing and more are found practically everywhere. In Soviet Russia universities 200 years old can also be found. Besides, these two countries enjoy the advantage of having the whole continent of Europe as their training-ground of learning. How about China? We claim that our country has a civilization 5,000 years old, yet there is not a single university in China which has a history of over 40 years! Where can we get the training for specialists? Where are we going to obtain training for leadership? Obviously the capable and ideal dictator of whom Dr. Chien dreams, and the enlightened despotism which Dr. Tsiang speaks of, are alike unattainable in China today.

CHAPTER 2 Family of Nations?

To all lovers of peace and international order, the twenty-first anniversary of Armistice Day must be sad occasion indeed. A great war has been going on in East Asia for twenty-eight months; a greater war has been developing in Europe for seventy days, while the League of Nations, the great symbol of the postwar world order, has practically ceased to function. The dreams of the years of Wilsonian idealism seem now to have been completely shattered.

It profits us little to lament the failures and errors of the past. The bygone is beyond recall.

It may be more useful for us to reflect on the lessons which we should learn from these past failures so that the dreamers and builders of a future world order may be benefited by them.

In a remarkable address of two weeks ago, the new British Ambassador to the United States, the Marquess of Lothian, said:

One of the mistakes the democracies made after the last war was to think that the peace would come in the main through disarmament. Disarmament ona large scale, of course, is necessary. But peace comes from there being overwhelming power behind law, as you found when you had to deal with gangsters within your boundaries.

I think Lord Lothian has drawn the most important lesson that can be drawn from the recent history of international relationship and govern-

1. This address was originally broadcast through the Columbia Broadcasting System in New York on Armistice Day, November 11, 1939. In this address, Hu Shih envisions a future world government, to be structured in the form of regional federations in which each country or government will take responsibility according to its ability, strength, and strategic position.

Family of Nations 63 ment. The future League or Union of Nations must be a “League to Enforce Peace.” An international government that cannot enforce its law and order is illusory and unreal.

In order to make this fundamental idea workable, a few guiding principles seem to be quite necessary:

First, the future world order must be built up on the basis, not of vague generalistics and abstractions, but of definite and precise commitments by the states. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris is an example of vague generalization. The British and French pledges to Poland, Rumania, and Greece in 1939, on the other hand, are definite commitments. The Earl of Lytton once said, “It is broadly true, however paradoxical it may sound, that the greater and the more precise are the commitments of a country, the less is its liability to be drawn into war.” He cited the Monroe Doctrine as a case of a definite commitment.

Second, the old idea of formal equality among the nations must be greatly qualified and supplemented by the principle of Graded Responsibility according to the ability, strength, and geographical or strategic position of the states. It is absurd, for instance, to expect Denmark to undertake the same responsibility as Great Britain in a given international situation. Why not therefore frankly recognize the fact and apportion the responsibilities according to their respective abilities?

Third, a necessary corollary from the idea of graded responsibility is the principle of Regional Leadership and Cooperation. The fatal mistake of the League of Nations is that it could not effectively function even as a League of Europe. Its pretensions as a world government were largely responsible for the failure to set up regional machineries to deal effectively with important local conflicts. The historic part played by the United States in the Western Hemisphere best illustrates what I mean by the idea of Regional Leadership and Cooperation. The future world government should be a superfederation of some such regional setups as the League of Europe, the Conference of American States, the British Commonwealth, the Conference of Pacific States, the Conference of Western and Southwestern Asiatic States, etc.

A world state of regional federations and confederacies with definite and precise commitments according to the graded responsibilities of the states or groups of states—this is the formula which I wish to recommend to the serious reflection of all dreamers of a better and more workable world order.

CHAPTER 3 The New Disorder in East Asia and the World at Large!

On the 3rd of November, 1938, the Japanese Government announced to the world that “what Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order that will insure the permanent stability of East Asia.” Two weeks later, on November 18, in a note to the US Government, the Japanese Foreign Minister said, among other things, that “Japan at present is devoting her energy to the establishment of a new order based on genuine international justice throughout East Asia, the attainment of which is not only an indispensable condition of the very existence of Japan, but also constitutes the very foundation of enduring peace and stability in East Asia.”

To this ambitious declaration, the American Government, in a note dated December 31, replied, “This Government is well aware that the situation has changed. This Government is also well aware that many of the changes have been brought about by action of Japan. This Government does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of ‘a new order’ in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.” The undeniable fact is that there ain’t no such animal as “a new order in East Asia.” Instead there is only anarchy, war, wanton slaughter, and indescribable misery—all brought about by the acts of aggression on the part of Japan, which have completely destroyed some semblance of international order that had been

I. A speech in which Hu Shih discusses how Japan’s invasion of China led to the breakdown of the international order in East Asia. He mentions that he was in Switzerland “last summer.” Since Hu Shih visited Switzerland in 1938, this speech must have been delivered in 1939.

The New Disorder in East Asia and the World at Large 65 evolving in the Western Pacific during the last four decades. The historic mission which the Japanese military has accomplished during these last eight years is therefore the replacement of a long-existing international order by the present new disorder in East Asia.

In order to better understand this historic transition from some form of international order to disorder, I must invite you to go back with me a few decades in history to a time when the Colonial Empires of the West were seeking concessions, leased territories, and colonies on the continent of Asia. This struggle for colonies and concessions became most acute during the last decade of the last century. Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain all succeeded in obtaining footholds on the coast of China. Japan, the rising militaristic Power of Asia, fought the Sino-Japanese War and won territorial annexations and a huge indemnity from China. By the last few years of the last century, the international situation was so grave that farsighted observers could see that a world war might break out at any time on the soils of China.

And a miniature world war actually broke out in the year 1900, when the armed forces of eight Powers marched on Tientsin and Peking and Russian armies were pouring into Northern Manchuria. There were serious talks about the partitioning of China.

But, by the tum of the century, a new idealism in international relations had been dawning on the world. And there were idealists in England and America who were trying to influence the American and British Governments for some constructive policy that might save China from the aggressors and the world from an imminent conflagration. In the year 1899 and again in 1900, the American Government, under the leadership of John Hay, proclaimed to the world this policy of the “Open Door” in China.

The “Open Door Policy” has been usually understood as a merely economic doctrine, meaning the equality of opportunities for all nations trading in China. But the Open Door Policy is in reality more important as a political doctrine. It emphasizes the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of China as a necessary condition for the maintenance of the equality of trading opportunities to all nations.

It is this political aspect of the Open Door Policy which has been of the greatest importance to China during the last four decades. Its implications were more explicitly and unmistakably restated in the “Nine-Power Treaty” of the Washington Conference, under which, as we all know, the eight Signatory Powers solemnly pledged themselves to respect the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and to give to China the freest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop for herself a stable and effective government. And they further pledged not to take advantage of conditions in China to further their own economic or territorial aims.

It is these political aspects of the Open Door Policy, reinforced by the Nine-Power Treaty, that has not only saved China from the fate of being partitioned among the imperialistic Powers, but has also given the Chinese people thirty years to work out their own problems of political and social reorganization. I have no hesitation to recognize the historical fact that China has survived largely as a result of a semblance of international order brought about first by the Open Door Policy as proclaimed by John Hay in 1899 and 1900, and later more explicitly in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922.

And since the last world war, there has grown up a more general world order, not only in the form of the League of Nations, but more generally supported by a host of idealistic international treaties and agreements, such as the treaties of the Washington Conference, the “Treaty of Locarno,” and the “Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.” To this general world order, the international order of the Far East, as above described, was intimately linked as one of its integral parts.

For a period of twelve years, the war-weary world thrived under this new world order, under which, not only the small and weak nations prospered in peace, but even the great Powers were the greatest beneficiaries. The naval powers, under the Washington Treaties, actually stopped their mad rivalries in naval armaments and fortifications. France never felt more secure than in those years; even Japan enjoyed the highest prestige as one of the “Big Four” at Geneva and as the acknowledged leader in the Western Pacific.

China, undoubtedly, was one of the nations that profited most under this new world order. During these years, China succeeded in bringing about a Nationalist Revolution and in establishing for the first time “a stable and effective government,” which in the course of a few years was able to unify the major portions of the country, to increase by a hundred times the modern means of transportation and communication, and to modernize the country in education, national defense, and social reconstruction. The dreams of the founders of the Open Door Policy for an independent and modern China were at last being realized, and a modern national state of China was emerging as an indisputable reality.