Managing Great Power Politics

Front matter

GLOB POLITICAL TRANSITIONS

“i Managing Great

Power Politics

Preface

ROLE OF REGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS UNDER POWER SHIFTS

The ongoing power shift in the global geopolitical landscape has created strategic uncertainty in the future configuration of the balance of power. In the post-Cold War era, the United States as the sole superpower largely shaped an international order based on its “liberal” principles—democratic system of governance, rule of law, and fundamental rights, notably human rights—but it increasingly faced a number of strategic challenges in the twenty-first century. Most notably, China’s increasing economic and military presence in East Asia and beyond has become the most significant geopolitical phenomenon in the world. While the preponderance of the United States is expected to remain in the near future, its individual capabilities to define an international order would likely decline in relative terms.

In this power shift, realists argue that the most important variable is strategic rivalry and alignment between great powers. From the 2010s, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States can be considered existing and potential great powers; thus, examining their shifting relations would offer us important implications for the global strategic outlook. Nevertheless, what is missing in the examination of these relationships is the role of non-great powers and their institutions—regional security institutions (RSIs).

y vi PREFACE

Existing in many places around the world, RSIs explore ways to shape the regional order by nurturing the region’s own principles, norms, and rules. They can assume such a role simply because great powers cannot always reach every corner of the world to install their aspirational global order. Under a power shift, great powers’ tendency to do the latter becomes less acute because they prioritize the protection of their own national interests over regional order-building. As a result, great powers are unable to provide sufficient public goods for security in less prioritized regions. It is in this context that RSIs play a significant role in constructing and reconstructing regional order with its own political resources.

Indeed, RSIs—such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union, Economic Community of West African States, Gulf Cooperation Council, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation—have attempted to nurture their respective region’s interstate relationship and increase their capacities to address regional political and security issues. Some institutions, like the Asian and Pacific Council and the 1967 East African Community, failed to sustain themselves, but the survivors have contributed to stabilizing regional security when they face security crises ranging from political tensions among member states to internal conflicts in regional states to non-traditional security.

Too often, their success has been dismissed quickly. This is largely because RSIs do not have material capabilities to enforce rules and norms, and the achievements are attributed to other factors such as a change in great powers’ behavior. However, military and economic punishment is not the only means to measure institutional effectiveness. While great-power-led institutions with substantial material capabilities often fail to enforce their rules and norms, RSIs navigate or direct members or nonmembers to comply with or to not violate the rules. This is why many regional states invest their time and resources in nurturing their own institutions despite a lack of material capabilities.

Under a power shift, RSIs move toward safeguarding their own interests because as great powers compete with each other over international rules, norms, and standards, this can potentially marginalize the role of non-great powers in the rule-making process. To this end, RSIs act as a bloc of international constituencies who have a casting vote to legitimize the rules and norms that serve their member states’ interests. Accordingly, while RSIs do not have the authority to determine regional rules and

PREFACE vii norms, they have sufficient diplomatic influence to shape great powers’ behavior and preferences.

In this context, this book focuses on ASEAN as an RSI in Asia and explores institutional strategies that ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions have employed to manage great-power politics in the South China Sea (SCS). Constructing a theoretical model of institutional strategy, the analysis aims to contribute both academically and practically. Academically, the analysis fills a critical gap between international institutions and strategic behavior in international relations (IR) literature. Traditionally, most IR literature focuses on great-power politics because great powers have material capabilities, and often soft power, to shape international politics. However, RSIs can no longer be ignored in international politics, as secondary powers collectively act through the institutions to influence regional security affairs, setting their security agendas, and legitimizing their rules and norms. In this sense, an analysis of the strategic utility of RSIs contributes to the advancement of the theoretical model of institutional strategy and provides an in-depth understanding of regional security dynamics.

Practically, the theoretical model provides policymakers with an analytical tool to clarify how RSIs, particularly ASEAN, are able to shape the regional strategic environment and construct a regional order. While many question whether ASEAN’s strategic posture tilts toward one particular great power—the United States or China—the question does not consider the diplomatic power of ASEAN to prevent its member states from making such a choice. This book contributes to a better, more nuanced understanding of RSIs’ strategic role and behavior, which helps policymakers assess the degree to which ASEAN is capable of managing great-power politics.

Singapore Kei Koga

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is the outcome of my research project on ASEAN’s institutional strategy for the South China Sea disputes. To date, there are many studies on both ASEAN and the South China Sea, but there is scarce literature on the role of regional institutions led by non-great powers in managing traditional-security issues including territorial disputes. Starting from this question, I published the article, “ASEAN’s Evolving Institutional Strategy: Managing Great Power Politics in South China Sea Disputes,” in The Chinese Journal of International Politics in 2018, with very helpful comments and suggestions that I received from the Association for Asian Studies in 2016 and the International Studies Association annual convention in 2017. But since the article only focused on the role of the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), and the ADMM-Plus, I expanded my research by broadening the time span to 1990-2020, contextualizing the strategic dynamics of the South China Sea from the end of the Cold War, and including other important ASEAN-led institutions, namely, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN-China dialogues, and the ASEAN Regional Forum in addition to the EAS and the ADMM/ADMM.-Plus.

As a result, extensive research was necessary, and I am indebted to many for their valuable comments and suggestions, particularly Tan See Seng and Collin Koh, and to Han Wen Chou, Mathew Yeo Jie Sheng, Melvin Ho, Ng Jiaming Jeremy, Patwardhan Nandini Rajesh, Tan Kai Wen Aaron, Teo Ang Guan, and Wang Shuqi for their dedicated research ix xX ACKNOWLEDGMENTS assistance. I also thank Fiona Lim for meticulously editing my draft, and Vishal Daryanomel, the editor of Palgrave Macmillan, who has been extremely patient about the prolonged delay of this book manuscript. This work is supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education AcRF Tier 1 Grant.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Nozomi, and my son, Shota, for being patient and for their encouragement. This book could not have been completed without their generous support.

PRAISE FOR MANAGING GREAT POWER POLITICS

“Kei Koga is one of Asia’s most thoughtful observers of regional security architecture. At a time when commentators question ASEAN’s effectiveness and the viability of multilateralism more generally, he demonstrates its ability to shape great power behaviour in one of this region’s most intractable flashpoints - the South China Sea. Theoretically rigorous and empirically rich, this book is required reading for Asian security scholars

and practitioners alike.”

—Prof. Brendan Taylor, Professor of Strategic Studies, Australian National University, Australia

“An empirically rich and distinctive study of small-state agency at the group level. Focusing on the “quasi-division of labor” among the ASEAN-led mechanisms, the book unpacks the ASEAN states’ institutional strategy of maintaining stability in the South China Sea. A timely contribution to understanding weaker-state hedging and the debate on the roles and limits of regional multilateralism amidst the growing big

power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific era.”

—Prof. Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Associate Professor, National University of Malaysia (UKM), Malaysia xi xii PRAISE FOR MANAGING GREAT POWER POLITICS

“The South China Sea literature is increasingly dominated by the role of the great powers with too little attention given to other actors. This book fills this gap by bridging security studies and the role of regional institutions. It offers conceptual innovation and convincingly studies the strategic utility of the ASEAN-led institutions in managing great power

politics and curbing their ambitions in the disputed waters.” —Prof. Ralf Emmers, Dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Contents

Introduction: ASEAN’s Strategic Utility Redefined References

2.1 Theoretical Approach: Agent-Centered Historical Institutionalism

2.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of Institutional Strategy

Index

XV

187 188 189

190 192 195

212 214 216 219

222 223

247 258

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2.1 Radical and moderate change in institutional strategy

Fig. 2.2 Growth of military expenditure in East Asia, 1989-2020 (Source SIPRI, 2021)

Fig. 2.3 GDP growth in East Asia, 1989-2020 (Source World Development Indicator, 2020)

a3

Table 1.1

Table 1,2

Table 1.3

Table 2.1 Table 2.2

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 5.1

LIST OF TABLES

Discussions on the SCS issue in ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions, 1990-1999

Discussions on the SCS issue in ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions, 2000-2009

Discussions on the SCS issue in ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions, 2010-2021

ASEAN documents on the SCS, 1992-2020 Establishment of ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions and the four phases

Major strategic events, 1988-2002

Major strategic events, 2003-2012

Major strategic events, 2013-2016

Major strategic events, 2017-2020

Evolution of institutional strategies in ASEAN

and ASEAN-led institutions

Xix

Chapter 1

Does ASEAN play a role in managing security issues in Southeast Asia and beyond? ASEAN is considered one of the most successful regional security institutions (RSIs), particularly after the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War created a power vacuum in East Asia, and there was political momentum in the region to establish multilateral economic and security organizations to fill that vacuum. Indeed, non-ASEAN member states, such as Australia and Japan, have successfully created a multilateral economic institution, the Asia—Pacific Economic Cooperation. However, it was ultimately ASEAN that shaped the regional multilateral architecture in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. Building on ASEAN’s Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) to interact with external actors, it started to establish a number of affiliated institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in 1997, East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM.-Plus) in 2010. This was possible because the 1992 ASEAN Summit decided to expand its institutional agenda by including political and security issues in ASEAN forums (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992). In short, ASEAN, as the core of regional multilateralism, encompassing small, medium, and great powers in the region, became the RSI in East Asia.

Nevertheless, the strategic environment created by ASEAN through the construction of regional multilateral architecture in East Asia has been gradually changing because of the emerging strategic competition

© The Author(s) 2022 1 K. Koga, Managing Great Power Politics, Global Political Transitions, https: //doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-2611-2_1 between China and the United States. China’s vast economic market attracted regional states and created significant trade and financial dependence on the country. Its Belt and Road Initiative provided an alternative development assistance to developing states that were unable to meet the high international standards set by global institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. China’s increasing military presence in East Asia also placed strategic pressure on regional states, such as Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, particularly over the East and South China Seas. Institutionally, China proactively established non-ASEAN institutional frameworks, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. As such, China’s military, economic, and political rise has altered the US unipolar system in the region.

The United States, on the other hand, has long considered ASEAN’s multilateral institutions in Asia—Pacific to be “supplementary” to the US-led bilateral security arrangement, the hub-and-spokes system (Goh, 2004). However, facing new security challenges in the 2000s, particularly the rise of international terrorism after September 11, 2001, and China’s strategic challenges in the 2010s, the United States and its allies began to transform its hub-and-spokes system into a more networked system, so that the “spokes” can cooperate more deeply. Examples include the US—Australia—Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the US—India—Japan framework, and the US—Australia-Japan—India quadrilateral framework, the so-called “Quad.” These trilateral and minilateral frameworks began to comprehensively enhance cooperation among major powers in the region. In fact, the United States has pushed for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept since 2017, expanding its geostrategic focus from the traditional “Asia-Pacific” to the area ranging from the “west coast of India” to the “western shores of the United States” (The White House, 2017, pp. 45-46).

As new strategic groupings such as the Quad emerge, new, non- ASEAN institutional frameworks would be further created in the region based on these trilateral and minilateral frameworks. While the United States, China, and other major powers have repeatedly highlighted the importance of “ASEAN centrality’—the principle that ASEAN plays a central role in regionalism—the newly emerged frameworks, if fully developed, would potentially marginalize ASEAN’s institutional raison d’étre (Koga, 2022). In other words, the current great-power rivalry between the United States and China would diminish the diplomatic viability of

ASEAN as the RSI in Asia, and ASEAN would risk losing its central position.

Considering the increasing importance of these geopolitical and traditional-security trends, is ASEAN destined to be institutionally marginalized? Or can ASEAN continue to play a significant role in shaping the regional security landscape? Responding to these questions, scholars and practitioners have long debated over the effectiveness and utility of ASEAN, particularly in the political-security field, and their opinions are divided.

Those who view ASEAN’s utility positively focus on intra-regional relations, regional norms, and non-traditional security issues. First, they attribute to ASEAN the long-lasting, peaceful relationship among member states. Since ASEAN’s establishment in 1967, there has been no major conflict among member states despite the political and military tensions among them (Kivimaki, 2012; Mahbubani & Sng, 2017; Natalegawa, 2018). While ASEAN has yet to resolve the fundamental interstate problems, it has facilitated stability through conflict management (Acharya, 2014; Collins, 2007; Koga, 2014; Scott, 2012). Second, they argue that the diffusion of ASEAN’s institutional norm, the “ASEAN Way,” transcends Southeast Asia to East Asia and beyond through ASEAN-led institutions. The ASEAN Way includes norms and practices of informality, the non-interference principle, consultation, non-use of force, and consensus decision-making process. This set of norms has been nurtured and practiced by ASEAN member states and diffused to regional states, including the great powers, through regional institutions (Acharya, 1997; Ba, 2006, 2009; Katsumata, 2004, 2006; Nabers, 2003; Roberts, 2012; Severino, 2006; Shambaugh, 2005; Suzuki, 2021; Tan, 2013; Terada, 2003). Third, ASEAN facilitates economic cooperation and provides forums for regional states to conduct multilateral dialogues, build confidence, coordinate policy, and create norms and rules (Ba, 2006; Kawasaki, 2006; Shoji, 2012; Simon, 1998; Tang, 2012; Yoshimatsu, 2006). In this context, non-traditional security issues, such as natural disasters, piracy, and international terrorism, which are transnational in nature and require international cooperation, become an important cooperative agenda in ASEAN meetings. These are the essential utility of ASEAN in shaping the regional order in Southeast Asia and beyond.

On the other hand, those who view ASEAN’s utility negatively tend to focus on ASEAN’s political disunity and its lack of capabilities.

They argue that the member states’ pursuit of their own national interests, mutual distrust, limited material capabilities, the inflexible “ASEAN Way” as an institutional norm, and the shallow cooperative framework create the illusion of, or at best conditional, cooperation among member states and with external states (Haacke, 2003; Hsueh, 2016; Jetschke & Ruland, 2009; Leifer, 1999; Narine, 2008; Nischalke, 2000, 2002; Odgaard, 2003; Ruland, 2000; Sharpe, 2003; Yuzawa, 2006). Even for non-traditional security issues, ASEAN was unable to reach a deeper agreement among member states, such as information- and intelligence-sharing against disease, international terrorism, and environmental matters including Indonesia’s haze issue (Collins, 2013; Funston, 1998; Jones & Smith, 2007; Nurhidayah et al., 2015; Simon, 2008). Most fundamentally, critics argue that ASEAN has never been capable of addressing traditional-security issues, such as great-power politics and territorial disputes (Beeson, 2019; Buszynski, 2003, 2012; Buzan, 2003; Emmers, 2003, 2014; Emmers & Tan, 2011; Goh, 2011; Heller, 2005; Kausikan, 2017; Koga, 2010; Lim, 1998; Narine, 1997; Yates, 2017). They argue that great powers, such as China, Japan, and the United States, accepted ASEAN?’s central role in regional multilateralism not because they considered ASEAN the best actor to facilitate interstate cooperation, but because ASEAN was convenient for preventing any one great power from dominating regional institutions (Caballero-Anthony, 2014; Sukma, 2010). In other words, it was the great-power strategic rivalry that pushed ASEAN to the center, not its effectiveness.

Debates between these two camps on the strategic utility of ASEAN have become a tradition of ASEAN studies. Questions range from whether ASEAN needs to relax the ASEAN Way, such as the principles of non-interference and consensus decision-making; to whether ASEAN has become a security community; to whether ASEAN can maintain unity among its member states (e.g., Ba, 2020; Beeson, 2020; Stubbs, 2020). To be sure, scholars and practitioners are generally cautious in evaluating ASEAN?’s utility in Southeast Asia and beyond and thus do not categorically reject or affirm its strategic utility. Their analyses provide a more nuanced and balanced understanding of ASEAN, taking into account the historical development of its objectives, functions, and raison d’être. These multiple perspectives generate alternative theoretical analyses and different assessments of ASEAN, which enable us to examine the association multidimensionally.

However, there is one common understanding between both camps: ASEAN’s inability to effectively manage great-power politics. They recognize that ASEAN’s strategic utility in great-power politics is extremely limited, and that even if ASEAN is able to shape the behavior of great powers, the effect is rather marginal and it is for non-strategic issues. In this sense, a general, long-held consensus is that ASEAN’s strategic utility rests not on material—military or economic—capabilities, but at best the normative power of the ASEAN Way, the ideational factor that constructivists emphasize, in shaping great powers’ behavior. Some realists who analyze the strategic utility of institutions concur with this limitation, highlighting the normative element by devising strategic concepts such as “soft balancing” and “institutional balancing” (He, 2008; Paper, 2005; Paul, 2005). Among them, He (2008) specifically analyzes the strategic utility of international institutions and provides three types of institutional strategy—inclusive institutional balancing, exclusive institutional balancing, and inter-institutional balancing—whereby a group of states attempts to prevent existing or emerging great powers from attaining more power to dominate a region or the world. As such, the strategic role of international institutions is generally based on normative and diplomatic elements, and these analyses, particularly He’s conceptual frameworks, help us gain a deeper understanding of the utility of ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions.

Still, there remain unanswered questions regarding both the theoretical framework and the ASEAN-specific case. The theoretical issue is two-fold. First, the concept of institutional balancing does not take into account the entirety of institutional strategy. While “balancing” is an imperative component of state strategy, the existing literature’s sole focus on balancing excludes other important strategies—notably, bandwagoning and hedging—employed by international institutions. Conceptual clarification of these strategies is thus necessary to comprehend the strategic utility of international institutions. Second, the logic of institutional balancing largely neglects the degree of flexibility in strategy shifts, considering the dynamics of intra-institutional politics on decision-making. This is partly because strategies are either given or considered easy to formulate in the face of a rise of strategic threat. However, it is always difficult for any international institution to come to an agreement quickly because of the diverging interests among member states, particularly if they employ a consensus decision-making process.

Also, in the existing literature on ASEAN, there is a gap between theoretical explanations and empirical evidence. On the one hand, constructivists assert the importance of ASEAN’s role in norm creation and diffusion in Southeast Asia and beyond, but if they are correct, it is puzzling why ASEAN has yet to concentrate its diplomatic and financial resources on one pivotal institution to consolidate and diffuse its institutional norms. Many examine the role of one particular ASEAN-led institution, such as the ARF, yet there is little literature that conducts a comparative analysis of the role of each ASEAN-led institution, such as the EAS and the ADMM.-Plus. On the other hand, realists emphasize ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in managing and resolving traditional-security issues, but they do not explain why ASEAN member states and major powers have been discussing both traditional and non-traditional security issues since 1992 and continue to do so. In fact, the number of ASEAN-led institutions that discuss security issues increased significantly—from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) to the ASEAN Summit to the ARF, APT, EAS and the ADMM.-Plus. These two sets of facts—the proliferation of ASEAN-led institutions and the spread of security agendas among them—need to be clearly explained because both relate to the strategic utility of ASEAN.

The other important factor that is often neglected in the literature is ASEAN’s institutional change and its strategy shifts. Simply put, ASEAN as an RSI has changed significantly since its inception. ASEAN today is not the same as ASEAN in 1967 (Koga, 2017). Its institutional format and strategy evolved over time. During the Cold War, its geopolitical scope was confined to Southeast Asia, and its strategic influence in the region was very much limited because of the strong presence of great powers, namely the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. However, in the post-Cold War era, ASEAN’s functionality and geopolitical scope expanded to East Asia by including the Indochina states as members and by creating political and security linkages with external powers through institution-building. ASEAN member states now have more strategic tools than before to shape the broader Asian regional order. Admittedly, this is not to say that ASEAN has transformed into a completely different institution. There still is institutional continuity, and the origin of ASEAN’s fundamental institutional principles and raison d’étre is imperative for understanding the potential and limitations of its institutional and strategy changes. However, it is also important to acknowledge ASEAN’s institutional changes and strategy shifts that reconstruct itself and create new affiliated institutions.

This book aims to fill these theoretical and empirical gaps on the evolution of ASEAN’s institutional strategy for managing great powers with regard to a regional traditional-security issue—the SCS disputes. Here, institutional strategy refers to the collective policy that RSI member states pursue under the belief that such a policy can enhance their security. RSIs employ four types of institutional strategy—institutional balancing, institutional bandwagoning, institutional hedging, and institutional co-option—in order to mitigate the negative effects from the regional strategic environment. The strategy likely shifts when member states expect either a radical or moderate change in the regional balance of power.

With this concept of institutional strategy, the book’s core argument is that, since the 1990s, ASEAN and ASEAN-Ied institutions have individually devised and/or shifted their own institutional strategy to manage the great-power politics pertaining to the SCS disputes, and that each institutional strategy aims to constrain great powers’ behavior and avoid being entrapped by their strategic competition so as to ensure member states’ interests. Strategy creation or shifts generally occur when member states perceive a change in the strategic environment relating to the SCS. But when ASEAN faces difficulty changing its strategy, it establishes a new institution to expand its strategic tools, which assumes a different functionality, geopolitical scope, and raison d’étre. In doing so, ASEAN nurtures a quasi-division of labor among its institutions to manage the great-power politics in the SCS, creating a “strategic institutional web.”

The rest of this book consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 conceptualizes the types of institutional strategy and constructs a theoretical model based on agent-centered historical institutionalism to understand the timing of its strategy shifts. This theoretical model analyzes how RSI member states perceive and assess their immediate security environment and create or change the institutional strategy. Since member states’ perception is generally affected by the regional distribution of power, the chapter emphasizes the importance of analyzing the regional strategic environment as well as agent’s decisions. The methodology of the analyses is briefly discussed through case studies on the role of ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions regarding the SCS issue. The chapter also provides an overview and assessment of the general trend of the strategic environment in East Asia from 1990 to 2020 over four phases: 1990- 2002, 2003-2012, 2013-2016, and 2017-2020. These four phases will be used as a principal indicator to understand the change and continuity of institutional strategies employed by ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions.

Chapter 3 chronologically explores the strategic trend of the SCS situation from 1990 to 2020 over four phases as discussed in Chapter 2. The main purpose of this chapter is to understand the timing of changes in the subregional power configuration in the SCS in a more nuanced way. Of course, environmental changes are not the sole determinant of institutional strategy shifts among RSIs. However, without understanding the subregional trends in the context of China’s increasing military and economic capabilities, it becomes difficult to clarify the responses or non-responses of ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions to the changing environment. The chapter serves as a useful reference for institutional strategy shifts, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4 examines the institutional strategy of each ASEAN and ASEAN-led institution: (1) AMM, (2) ASEAN Summit, (3) ASEAN- China dialogues, (4) ARF, (5) EAS, and (6) ADMM and ADMM- Plus. All these frameworks, either formally or informally, discuss salient traditional-security issues in East Asia, including the SCS disputes (see Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). Moreover, these institutions experience different institutional growths, and the specific timing and function of their institutional development highlight the divergences in the evolution of institutional strategy. The APT and the ASEAN-PMC are excluded in the analysis because the APT has not been actively discussing the SCS issue while the ASEAN-PMC only began to touch on the issue since the mid-2010s.

Chapter 5 discusses the validity of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of institutional strategy, providing a quick overview of all the cases. It also compares the six cases and analyzes how the institutional division of labor among ASEAN member states was operationalized. The conclusion then discusses the future of the role of ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions vis-a-vis the SCS situation as well as the strategic implications of an emerging geographical concept—the Indo-Pacific.

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