The Blurring of Boundaries in Bioscientific Discourse

Front matter

The Blurring of Boundaries

in Bioscientific Discourse

Jana Tomasovicova (ed.)

Contents

Robogenesis: The Automation of Human Reproduction

Is It Still Me? The Self, Memory, and the Relevance of the First-Person Perspective

The Origin of Rules

Chapter 1 Robogenesis: The Automation of Human Reproduction Juraj Odoréak

Abstract: Today artificial intelligence is being used experimentally to predict embryo viability. Some research teams have been also looking into the idea of the automation and robotization of other procedures that are frequently used in assisted reproduction. For a long time, other groups of researchers have been working on biotechnological devices that could ensure ectogenic gestation (ectogenesis). It is therefore imaginable that a synergistic combination of these and other reproductive technologies could one day lead to a complex procedure that would enable fully automated external human reproduction (herein referred to as robogenesis). This chapter aims to introduce the basic conceptual and ontological aspects of robogenesis. The first part is dedicated to defining robogenesis and situating it within the third wave of the reproductive revolution. The second part focuses on the analysis of theoretical, technological, and narrative assumptions about robogenesis. The final part presents arguments in favour of practising robogenesis. I will argue that a complete automation of human reproduction may be acceptable from the perspectives of humanism, transhumanism, and posthumanism, albeit for diametrically different ontological reasons.

Keywords: Reproduction, reproductive revolution, artificial intelligence, automation, robotization, ectogenesis, ontology, humanism, transhumanism, posthumanism.

Ideas about diverse technological interventions in human reproduction have been part of various literary, philosophical, and ethical analyses for quite some time (e.g. Haldane 1924; Russell 1924). Some technological interventions in human reproduction have also been the subject of long-standing scholarly disputes (e.g. Deech and Smajdor 2007; Ross and Moll 2020). Such analyses usually focus on the topic of technological reproduction of some aspects of human reproduction (e.g. in vitro fertilization); however, a gradual change of parts can also lead to a change of the whole. Therefore, perhaps the most curious idea about technological modification of human reproduction is a vision of a complete technological reproduction of human reproduction. Such a hypothetical form of human reproduction will be herein referred to as robogenesis? (for an explanation of the term, see Section 1). We are still far away from achieving robogenesis; nevertheless, even today some research teams are working on experimental systems that could

? The term “robogenesis” is taken from the title ofa science fiction work by D. H. Wilson (2014). Wilson uses the term to refer to the complicated genesis of robots. In this chapter, robogenesis refers to the complicated genesis of humans who would come into existence with the use of robots (robotic technologies, automation, and AI).

automate and robotize procedures related to assisted reproduction and gestation (Meseguer et al. 2012; Partridge et al. 2017; Varghese and Charalampos 2019; Casciani et al. 2021). Certainly, it is difficult to predict whether these experimental approaches will ever make it into clinical practice; however, it is not impossible to imagine a future where a synergistic combination of advanced reproductive technologies could enable fully automated external human reproduction (robogenesis). The strange character of robogenesis is related to unusual technologies as well as to possible extraordinary effects on the subject of robogenesis. It is precisely this subject which is the prime target of this chapter.

An analysis of the implications of a hypothetical technology requires conditional reasoning; therefore, the examination of robogenesis will proceed in the following manner: Section 1 outlines the definitional and situational background of robogenesis. It will point out how the conceptual assumptions about robogenesis relate to the direction of the ongoing reproductive revolution. The subsequent parts (Sections 2 and 3) analyse the science fiction and scientific assumptions about the direction of the reproductive revolution and robogenesis. A combination of visionary (literary) and technical (scientific) sources are used to identify both explicit and implicit assumptions associated with ideas about the radical transformation of human reproduction. Section 4 then explains the basic arguments in favour of practising robogenesis, which are related to different perceptions of the value of the origin of the human being itself. Indeed, it is the diverse understanding of the nature of the human being that is the main theme of this chapter. For this reason, I will move away from the bioethical aspects of robogenesis and instead focus on its ontological presuppositions and implications. I will argue that different ontological assumptions about humans (humanism, transhumanism, and posthumanism) can in fact lead to a positive evaluation of robogenesis (Section 5). From a humanist perspective, the main reason for applying robogenesis may be the desire to protect humanity's exceptional ontological status. For transhumanism, the primary reason for applying robogenesis may depend on the legitimization of the idea that there is a need to change the current status of human beings and enhance the human species. Posthumanism may see robogenesis as further evidence of the fundamental ontological openness of human beings. In the conclusion, I will argue that this ontological multiplicity of robogenesis implies a new argument about the inadequacy of the usual dichotomy between “natural” and “unnatural” (i.e. artificial) human reproduction.

1. The third wave of the reproductive revolution

The previous century was a period of intense scientific research in the field of reproductive biology, and research-based knowledge gradually led to the development of diverse reproductive technologies that modified biological aspects of the reproductive process of organisms (Frith 2012, 766). Organisms are time-limited entities; therefore, reproduction (and the potential modification of reproduction) is quite important for them in order to maintain the continuity (and potential change in continuity) of further life. Humans are also organisms, and thus it is not at all surprising that new insights in reproductive biology have led to the relatively rapid and widespread application of reproductive technologies to modify human reproduction. For this reason, some authors began to refer to this change as a “new revolution" (Lamm 1970). For example, John MacInnes and Julio Pérez Díaz (2009) have suggested that the rise of modernity is directly related to the economic and political transformation of human societies along with a revolution in human reproduction (henceforth referred to as the "reproductive revolution"). Admittedly, the exact theoretical boundaries of this revolution are disputed, as there are disagreements concerning the different views on the demographic, social, economic, historical, legal, and other definitions of the concept of the reproductive revolution (Robey et al. 1992; Nowak 2007; Daar 2017). From a technical perspective, however, the reproductive revolution can be defined through various ways of applying reproductive technologies.?

In the first wave of the reproductive revolution, reproductive technologies were typically used to temporarily prevent human reproduction (e.g. hormonal contraception). The second wave ofthe reproductive revolution was characterized by the application of new reproductive technologies that enabled people to reproduce when they otherwise — for a variety of reasons — would not have been able to do so (e.g. assisted reproduction). Both waves initially encountered a degree of misunderstanding (e.g. the derisive phrase “test-tube baby”), but the relevant reproductive technologies are now commonly used in many countries to modify human reproduction in various ways.’ For this reason, the empirical results of

? [n this chapter, the term "reproductive revolution" is understood only in the basic sense. This means that the reproductive revolution is a concept that approximately describes changes in human reproductive capabilities. A critique of the theoretical assumptions and possible normative implications of this concept is not the focus of this chapter; the reproductive revolution is used here mainly as a heuristic tool for determining different ways of applying reproductive technologies. The same rationale applies to the definitional demarcation of the boundaries of the different waves of the reproductive revolution.

^ For example, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is now legal in all countries around the world. For a long time, Costa Rica had been the only country that did not allow it; however, since 2017 IVF has been allowed there following a Costa Rican Supreme Court ruling that invalidated a previous regulation banning it (Valerio et al. 2017, 366). The consideration of the case of the legality of IVF in Costa Rica shows that these aspects of the reproductive revolution have also been relatively well documented (Daar 2017, 11—20); however, it is also true that the evaluations of some of the assumptions and implications of the application of these technologies are still subject to a relatively intense scholarly debate (Benagiano and Maurizio 2009; LeMoncheck 2020). This chapter will not outline a summary, interpretation, or ethical assessment ofthe application of known reproductive technologies of the previous waves of the reproductive revolution. Instead of the past or present, this chapter focuses on the possible future of human reproduction.

The third wave of the reproductive revolution will certainly depend in some way on a modification of the previous approaches of the reproductive revolution. Previous applications of reproductive technologies have often led to securing desired outcomes, but in some cases the use of these approaches has been associated with certain shortcomings and problematic consequences (Prudil and Pilka 2002; Pennigs and De Wert 2003, 397; Chatzinikolaou 2010). It is therefore likely that the third wave of the reproductive revolution will seek to avoid the shortcomings of the application of reproductive technologies used to date. One of the reasons for the failed application of reproductive technologies is the complexity of the biology of human reproduction and the ambivalence of human psychological reactions to technology. To put it another way, one of the problems with the application of reproductive technologies are human beings themselves. This is the case for two reasons. Humans make decisions about the application of reproductive technologies; however, because of the limits of their decision-making abilities, they sometimes make the wrong decisions. In other cases, people may make the right decisions, but the actual limits of human physiology may not allow these decisions to be implemented. The solution offered to these shortcomings is relatively simple but also controversial for that very reason. It consists of eliminating the cause of the shortcomings, i.e. limiting the (failing) human factor. If one is only concerned with the outcome, the third wave of the reproductive revolution could be directed towards the implementation of innovative reproductive technologies that would completely eliminate the shortcomings of human decision-making processes and fully externalize the biological aspects of human reproduction.

Such advanced reproductive technologies do not yet exist, so currently one can only speak of a hypothetical third wave of the reproductive revolution. On the the reproductive revolution does not proceed in just one direction, since from 1995 to 2000 IVF had been legal and practised there (2017, 366). It should also be noted that the legality of a reproductive technology does not necessarily imply its availability or social acceptability and vice versa. Aspects of the reproductive revolution are subject to change, and these changes are the prime focus of this chapter.

other hand, some technologies that are used for similar purposes in other areas of life are already being considered for application in support of human reproduction. One of the current topics in reproductive medicine is testing the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) (i.e. the automation of decision-making processes) into some procedures related to assisted reproduction (Varghese and Charalampos 2019; Zaninovic and Rosenwaks 2020; Casciani et al. 2021). It 1s also a fact that many research institutions are in the process of developing and refining procedures that would ensure the earliest and best possible extracorporeal development of foetuses (Partridge et al. 2017; Bulletti and Simon 2019; Segers 2021). These technologies are now primarily used to modify animal reproduction (Wilkinson and Di Stefano 2020, 43). If it turns out that these experimental procedures are also effective for human reproduction, then a combination of the two (i.e. fully automated and external human reproduction) is quite conceivable.

It is not at all difficult to suppose that this form of reproduction may cause a certain degree of caution and feelings of alienation or dismay. This is why I will refer to this hypothetical reproductive technology that would combine reproductive technologies with robotics, AI, and other advanced technologies by using the strange-sounding neologism “robogenesis”. There are four reasons for making this unusual terminological decision. Firstly, the exotic tinge to the term “robogenesis" is meant to suggest quite bluntly that the topic of this chapter is not the current reproductive technologies of the first and second waves of the reproductive revolution but rather the potential reproductive technologies of the next possible reproductive revolution. And this includes the arguments for and against these technologies? Secondly, the technological aspect of robogenesis is meant to refer quite explicitly to the idea of a possible integration of automation technologies (AI, robots)? with reproductive technologies. Thirdly, robogenesis is a combined term which in its first part refers to a technology but which in its second part refers to a process of creation and to an origin (genesis). This neologism is

? The thematic focus of this chapter is on the synergy of individual reproductive technologies, but the assessment of the outcome of this synergy (robogenesis) may have no bearing whatsoever on the assessment of the acceptability or otherwise of the assumptions of this synergy (1.e. Al in IVF). The neologism “robogenesis” is also intended to avoid the unnecessary argumentative contamination of those reproductive technologies that are already commonly used today for modifying human reproduction.

é The term robot (robotic) is used in its broader technological sense. It is also used here in a form that is closer to the original meaning given to it by Karel Capek (1920). In R.U.R., Capek associates robots with mechanical and biological properties (protoplasm). Furthermore, R.U.R. ends with an overlooked reference to a text from the Book of Genesis. For an interpretation of Capek's definition of robots in the context of the preservation of the human species, see Odoréak (2020) and Odoréak and Bakošová (2021).

therefore also an allusion to the established term “ectogenesis”.’ Ectogenesis refers broadly to technologies that aim to ensure extracorporeal gestation (Singer and Wells [1985] 2006, 9-10); however, some consider this term to be inaccurate, as the technologies in question only provide external (ecto-) gestation (development) (Kingma and Fin 2020, 356). These authors also point to the ambiguity of the term "origin" (genesis, emergence/development). This ambivalence of genesis is also a key aspect of those technologies that would automate human reproduction (1.e. robogenesis).

In short, robogenesis is the personification of a futuristic vision on where the development of reproductive technologies may eventually lead and a representation of a future where “every step of the reproductive cycle will be automated” (Haroon 2021). In this chapter, robogenesis will therefore refer to a hypothetical reproductive technology that will effectively provide fully automated external human reproduction. This definition refers to the combination oftwo fundamental aspects of robogenesis: automated reproduction and external human reproduction. In the case of robogenesis, human reproduction would be carried out through advanced automation technologies that would autonomously carry out the activities necessary for embryo formation and viability. At the same time, this technology would ensure gestation of the embryo (and the foetus) in an automated extracorporeal manner. Simply put, robogenesis combines the automation of assisted reproduction with the automation of gestation (externalization; ectogenesis). The automation (Casciani et al. 2021), robotization (Sroga et al. 2008), or mechanization (Meseguer et al. 2012) of assisted reproduction is a relatively new idea. On the other hand, visions of externalizing human reproduction have been part of the popular discourse on reproductive technologies for a relatively long time. Some have even suggested that the discourse on reproductive technologies itself is determined by reactions to popular science-fiction ideas about the possibilities of externalizing gestation (Aristarkhova 2005, 44). In the following sections, I will delineate the basic narratives about the externalization of human gestation and then turn to contemporary proposals for automating human reproduction.

2. The automation of gestation Probably the most famous work that discusses the possibilities of an external form of human reproduction is Aldous Huxley's dystopian novel Brave New World

7 Ectogenesis is a term that is a compound of the Greek ecto (external) and genesis (origin) (Vallverdú and Boix 2019, 107).

([1932] 2018). In this novel, the externalization of human gestation is portrayed as one of the conditions that enable the political, social, psychological, and technical manipulation of individuals through a global authoritarian state system. Huxley himself understood his “negative utopia" (1963, 232) as a critique of the “horrors of the Wellsian Utopia" (Smith 1969, 348). The place (topoi) and actual content of this dystopia are debated, but one common interpretation is that it is a critique of political projects in the United Kingdom in the interwar period (Von Miese 1944, 110). In addition to its political aspects, Huxley's novel also reflected on the philosophical and scientific assumptions of modern society. It is therefore not surprising that Huxley did not address the topic of ectogenesis for the first time in Brave New World. Huxley's original depiction of the externalization of human gestation can actually be found in his first novel, Crome Yellow ([1921] 2018). In this novel, Huxley introduces ectogenesis through the views of a character named Mr Scogan — who, according to some scholars, personifies Bertrand Russell? (Montgomery 1974; Moran 1984). Mr Scogan proposes the “‘industrialization" of pregnancy as one of the possible solutions to the shortcomings of human society (Tripp 2015, 32). Although Huxley satirically points out the absurd consequences of Mr Scogan’s reductive philosophy,’ the augmentation of the possibilities of human reproduction through “gravid bottles" ([1921] 2018, 47) is also presented as a hope!’ that “biologists may educate society by enabling it to use science wisely" (Lewicky 2008, 213). This narrative!! portrays the externalization of reproduction as a tool that enables the development of some hidden human

* Huxley met Russell while studying at the University of Oxford. His attitude towards Russell was initially critical, as he disapproved ofthe closed nature of the community that brought together Russell and other prominent intellectuals of the United Kingdom (the “Garsingtonians”). Huxley faulted this community for preferring to carry out its own slogan of “saving England” as a trip “to a kind of rustic Bloomsbury to avoid reality and live the life of the mind" (Meckier 2003, 87). After the First World War, Huxley's relationship with Russell changed, probably under the influence of Huxley's attendance at lectures at the Cambridge Heretics’ Society (Saunders 2019, 35). In this period, Huxley’s work contains explicit references to theories put forward by Russell himself (Marovitz 2003, 145).

? Huxley described Mr Scogan as follows: *In appearance Mr Scogan was like one of those extinct birdlizards of the Tertiary... His movements were marked by the lizard's disconcertingly abrupt clockwork speed; his speech was thin, fluty, and dry... Mr Scogan might look like an extinct saurian" (2018, 21). 10 Huxley described this hope in the following way: “An impersonal generation will take the place of Nature's hideous system. In vast state incubators, rows upon rows of gravid bottles will supply the world with the population it requires. The family system will disappear; society, sapped at its very base, will have to find new foundations; and Eros, beautifully and irresponsibly free, will flit like a gay butterfly from flower to flower through a sunlit world. ‘It sounds lovely’, said Anne. ‘The distant future always does’” ([1921] 2018, 47).

!! Some authors (e.g. Thody 1973, 50) have suggested that Brave New World is merely a literary adaptation of Russell’s The Scientific Outlook ([1931] 2001). In his review of Brave New World, Russell praised Huxley’s literary talent (Russell [1932] 1997, 210) but also argued that popular opposition to ectogenesis stems mainly from man’s desperate longing for the illusion of free will ([1932] 1997, 212).

characteristics. Ectogenesis and reproductive technologies only magnify" and approximate the essential characteristics of humanity.

Optimism about the science and accomplishment of ectogenesis can also be found in another classic work which is usually considered the inspiration for visions of a new reproductive world. J. B. Haldane's Daedalus; or, Science and the Future (1924) is considered to be the first work to introduce the term “ectogenesis" into wider public discourse (Ferreira 2017, 136). Haldane attempted to estimate the most likely development of scientific progress and its predicted impact on human society (Berenbaum 2012, 123). Daedalus; or, Science and the Future is therefore constructed upon the basis of a retrospective narrative approach, 1.e. from a future perspective on the present (or past). Haldane places ordinary human reproduction, among other things, in the past. He predicts ectogenesis and cloning as the most common and secure forms of future human reproduction (Haldane 1924, 63). However, Haldane also links these reproductive technologies to the selection of “ancestors for the next generation based on their genetic superiority"? (Jeffreys 2001, 140). In Haldane's prognosis, ectogenesis itself is defined both as an "ordinary" reproductive technology as well as a conceptual tool that allows us to depict the mutable nature of the human species. Haldane presents the transformation of humans and their reproduction as a possibility and as an existential necessity. In Daedalus; or, Science and the Future, reproductive technologies are proposed to address human infertility as measures to overcome the fragility and contingency of human reproduction (Haldane 1924, 63). Within this narrative, the technologization of reproduction is thus primarily an expression of the rational pursuit of (species) self-preservation. For Haldane, ectogenesis and reproductive technologies are primarily ways to overcome the unsuitable biological limits of humans and are therefore tools for the improvement of humanity.'^

A more extravagant approach to ectogenesis (and technology in general) can be found in J. D. Bernal's provocatively entitled The World, The Flesh and

12 This is why Huxley portrays ectogenesis and reproductive technologies differently in different works. 13 One of the first responses to Daedalus; or, Science and the Future was a critical essay by Russell. In Icarus, or the Future of Science (1924), Russell criticizes eugenics because of the risk of its misuse by state or private actors. In a joint review of both works, an anonymous contributor for Nature expressed his *hope that Mr Haldane's booklet will not lack readers" (Anonymous 1924, 740) and described Russell as a writer who “dislikes present-day Western civilization” (1924, 742).

^ Haldane presents this view explicitly in his essay entitled The Last Judgment ([1927] 2017). This essay discusses the future end of the Earth and the extinction of humanity. Haldane, from the perspective of a narrator from the future, warns against the use of technology to stop evolution. According to Haldane, the fundamental mistakes of Earthlings were (or are) the application of technology to the perfection of human subjective qualities (happiness) and the attempt to technologically preserve (the limits of) humanity ([1927] 2017, 292).

the Devil ([(1929] 2017). Unlike Huxley and Haldane, Bernal posits that science and technology will not only define (Huxley) and improve (Haldane) humanity but also radically change it. Bernal starts from the idea that the enemy of the rational soul (i.e. scientific knowledge and creative thinking) is the tendency of humans to limit science and technology to theories and applications that are seen only from the perspective of humans as individuals ([1929] 2017, 42). He points out that science is both valuable to humans as well as in itself ([(1929] 2017, 42). This is also true of the change of reproduction. In this approach, alongside other technologies, ectogenesis is portrayed as one of the steps that aim at the thorough destruction of all the usual biological determinations of human beings. The externalization of human reproduction, which Bernal characterizes through a vision of modifying “the germ plasm or the living structure of the body, or both together" (Bernal [1929] 2017, 35), however, does not merely aim at liberating humans from the "requirements" of conventional reproduction. Bernal sees the real purpose of externalizing reproduction in the ontological liberation of creativity itself.?^ One form of creativity's liberation may be the emergence of a new species that uses both habitual and seemingly unusual ways (ectogenesis) of reproducing and sustaining its own life. Other forms of ontological personification of creativity can take forms that far exceed our most fanciful expectations and ideas of what is human, reproduction, species, nature, science, technology, and their interrelationships. In this sense, ectogenesis is just one conceptual tool that depicts the relativity of humans and the inadequacy of species-oriented conceptions of humanity. Bernal's approach to ectogenesis is thus more radical than Huxley's and Haldane's visions. He proposes reasons for the modification of human reproduction that are (perhaps paradoxically) independent of the biological assumptions, demands, and sentiments of ordinary human individuals. In this narrative, reproductive technologies are an example that points to the need to transform and transcend humanity itself.

It is therefore not surprising that these science fiction visions of human (reproductive) change have sparked a rather large wave of both specialized and general interest in the direction of reproductive technologies. Haldane's prediction caused a sensation and had an exceptional readership (Adams 2000, 462). However, speculation about ectogenesis also generated determined public opposition to the possible application of such reproductive technologies right from the start (Ball 2011, 202). The idea of externalizing reproduction led to a long list of highly

15 Some authors therefore interpret Bernal’s conception of creativity as a science-fiction personification of Eros (Hassan 1979, 130; Ferreira 2011, 122).

critical, albeit variously motivated, responses (e.g. Ludovici 1924; Brittain 1929). It has also led to ectogenesis becoming a fairly common dramatic trope in many works of popular culture. Not only did the term “ectogenesis” become a part of the lexicon, but so did problematic expressions such as “test-tube baby"! “artificial womb", and even “abnormal reproduction”.'* Many therefore assume that it was these visions that led to the public’s initial reserved stance also towards other reproductive technologies (e.g. IVF) (Franklin 2013, 75; Ball 2013, 339). The problem lay in the public's persistent perceptions of the intertwining of reproductive technologies with specific political and national goals. Some authors have suggested that it is precisely such problematic perceptions that have led to the emergence of the non-state reproductive healthcare provider model in some countries (i.e. the United Kingdom) (Ferber et al. 2020, 257—258).

Beyond the straightforward political critique, these visions of ectogenesis also foreshadowed the problem of correctly depicting the meaning of the application of science and technology. The trope of the “mad scientist" producing “decanted monsters" may be more of a topic of fringe literature and dubious Internet forums in the present day, but real-world depictions of the results of scientific teams currently working on ectogenesis still lead to repeated references to some "brave new worlds" (Derbyshire 2019, 1; Zimmer 2021, 29). The enduring allure of the symbolism of these (now quite old) science fiction visions of reproduction is thus probably also related to the compelling portrayal of the idea of the human world as a purely scientific and technical problem. In such a depiction, the world is just an experimental factory and a precisely organized laboratory.'? This causes interest among recipients and dismay among critics. In other words, the appeal of these visions of ectogenesis lies in the pregnant expression of the simple and thus precisely controversial idea that reproduction is only production (Lucke 2019, 345). And if it is true that in this approach to reproduction human children are not

16 France Winddance Twine assumes that the term “test-tube baby" had been introduced by Huxley in Brave New World (Twine 2015, 6); however, other authors point out that the term had been used much earlier in connection with artificial insemination and embryo culture (Wilson 2011, 53). Moreover, in addition to being misleading, the term is also inaccurate; it would be “more correct" to speak of embryos from a Petri dish.

17 There is currently an ongoing controversy over the use of this term. Elselijn Kingma and Suki Finn suggest that it may express the power and political implications of the technology (2020, 361). Others argue in favour of using the term due to the fact that it is quite well established and easily understood (Romanis et al. 2020, 1).

18 This curious expression was pointed out by George Annas in his analysis of the various names for assisted reproduction (1984, 1415).

1 [n this context, Federico Neresini speaks of a “laboratization of the world" (2011, 67). He defines laboratization as practice where "science is constantly engaged in an attempt to transform the natural/social environment according to its needs" (2011, 67).

begotten but made (Kigozi 2018, 42), then the human itself is also understood here as a peculiar product. In this sense, these visions and their critiques express understandable political concerns as well as various ontological assumptions about humans and the world. The dispute between the proponents and opponents of these technologies then mainly lies in which of the geneses and ontologies they consider to be more existentially stable. Other things being equal, opponents usually assume that the “providence of" nature (in the broad sense) is a more stable phenomenon, whereas proponents usually assume that the better option is the prudent use of science and technology. In both cases, the human being is a kind of creation in a sense, but the question is who is the better creator: nature mediated to humans or human culture? Having said that, in this binary perception there is a fundamental flaw to these visions and their critics. From today's point of view, they are based on presuppositions about anachronistic modes of creation or production. Therefore, they also start from an incomplete number of possible geneses and an incomplete set of ontologies of human origins.

3. The automation of reproduction Even the most radical vision of ectogenesis assumed that humankind's future would be the result of its creative choices. Bernal did argue that the biology of human reproduction would change (or, paradoxically, be lost; [1929] 2017, 41) but only in order to preserve the human spirit ([(1929] 2017, 42). Even in this fantastical approach, human modification (nature) is proposed mainly in order to develop human rationality and creativity (culture) in unbridled (and possibly grotesque) forms. In this respect, however, these science fiction notions of the modification of human reproduction are proportionally outdated, since even such exotic visions (be they perceived as utopias or dystopias) have failed to estimate with complete accuracy the present possibilities for the transformation of humans and the world. It seems no longer obvious that it is not only (in Bernal's vocabulary) the flesh that is automatable but the soul as well. This “soul” then does not need to be human at all, and this 1s what is now also considered to be its fundamental advantage.