Parliaments’ Contributions to Security Sector Governance/Reform and the Sustainable Development Goals

Front matter

SSR Paper 21

Parliaments’ Contributions to Security Sector Governance/ Reform and the Sustainable Development Goals: Testing Parliaments’ Resolve in Security Sector Governance During Covid-19

Wilhelm Janse van Rensburg, Nicolette van Zyl-Gous and Lindy Heinecken

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms SSR Papers

About the Authors

Declaration

Chapter 2: Parliaments and SSG-Contributing to Stability for Sustainable Development Military contributions to SDG16

Parliaments’ role in enhancing military contributions to SDG16

Police contributions to SDG16

Parliaments’ role in enhancing police contributions to SDG16

Private security contributions to SDG16

Parliaments’ role in enhancing private security contributions to SDG16

Chapter 3: Parliaments and Security Sector Governance—-Contributing to Just and Peaceful Societies

Introduction Security sector transparency How do parliaments ensure security sector transparency?

Security sector accountability

ON DD HT WwW WwW NY

N N e e HF Ee eR E O ON UT WO a a

N eS)

N N NN N UU & W

Parliamentary focus areas to ensure security sector accountability Parliaments’ budgetary function and oversight of related performance aspects Oversight of security sector policy Oversight of security sector human resources Oversight of security sector utilisation

Chapter 4: Covid-19 and the Security Sector Response—Testing Parliaments’ Resolve and Sustainable Development Contribution

Introduction Covid-19 and the varying utilisation of the security sector South Africa The Philippines The United Kingdom Parliaments’ varying capacity during Covid-19 South Africa The Philippines The United Kingdom Exercising parliamentary oversight of the security sector during Covid-19 Security sector transparency during Covid-19 Security sector accountability during Covid-19 Linking Covid-19 responses and SDG16

Conclusion Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations to Parliaments

Introduction Conclusions Confirming the security sector contribution to SDG16 Confirming parliaments’ shortfalls in emergencies Highlighting the link between continuous oversight, accountability and the SDGs Human security theory and the concept of executive dominance Recommendations to parliaments Parliaments’ legislative function Parliaments’ representation function Parliaments’ budgetary function

Parliaments’ oversight function

30 30 31 32 33 34

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

COA Commission on Audit

Covid-19 Coronavirus Disease of 2019

CPBRD Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department CSF Covid Support Force

DCAF DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

DCC Defeat Covid-19 Ad-Hoc Committee

DILG Department of Interior and Local Government DMA Disaster Management Act

DOD Department of Defence

ECQ Enhanced Community Quarantine

GAA General Appropriations Act

GOCC Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty IPCC Independent Police Complaints Commission IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union

LGU Local Government Unit

MDG Millennium Development Goals MDP Metro Police Department

MP Member of Parliament

NAO National Audit Office

North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Government Agencies Non-Governmental Organisation National Health Service

National Police Chiefs Council

Office of the United National High Commissioner for Human Rights

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Open Researcher and Contributor ID Parliamentary Monitoring Group

Philippine National Police

Personal Protective Equipment

Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Responsibility to Protect

Republic of South Africa

South African Broadcasting Corporation South African National Defence Force

South African Police Service

Sustainable Development Goals

Sustainable Development Goal 16

Security Industry Authority

Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa Security Sector Governance

Security Sector Reform

United Nations

United Nations Development Programme United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Kingdom

United States of America

SSR Papers

The DCAF SSR Papers provide original, innovative and provocative analysis on the challenges of security sector governance and reform. Combining theoretical insight with detailed empirically driven explorations of state-of-the-art themes, SSR Papers bridge conceptual and pragmatic concerns. Authored, edited and peer reviewed by SSR experts, the series provides a unique platform for in-depth discussion of a governance-driven reform agenda, addressing the overlapping interests of researchers, policy-makers and practitioners in the fields of development, peace and security.

DCAF the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance is dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and gender equality. Since its founding in 2000, DCAF has contributed to making peace and development more sustainable by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states, to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms. It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity-building of both state and non-state security sector stakeholders.

About the Authors

Dr Wilhelm Janse van Rensburg is a Researcher at the Parliament of South Africa that specialises in parliamentary defence oversight, and a Research Fellow at the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University.

Ms Nicolette van Zyl-Gous is a Researcher at the Parliament of South Africa and specialises in parliamentary oversight of the police and policing statutory bodies.

Prof Lindy Heinecken is a Professor of Sociology in the Sociology and Social Anthropology Department, Stellenbosch University.

Competing Interests

There was no conflict of interest in producing this research report. As the research method was documentary analysis, ethical approval was not required. However, given the affiliation of the researchers to the Parliament of South Africa, institutional permission to conduct the research was obtained to ensure that there were no competing interests.

Declaration

The views expressed in this publication do not in any way reflect the opinion or views of DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.

This book has been peer reviewed by multiple experts within the subject area.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all those who provided input and feedback on the manuscript, notably Professor Mario Aguja at Mindanao State University, Nadia Dollie from the Parliament of South Africa and William McDermott, Alexandra Preperier and Merle Jasper at the DCAF. We also thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their constructive and valuable feedback on the publication. The research would also not have been possible without the institutional support from the Parliament of South Africa and the Parliamentary Research Unit.

Executive Summary

The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls for the establishment of peaceful, just and inclusive societies. The security sector has the potential to contribute to SDG16 through the fulfilment of its traditional and non-traditional security tasks. However, the security sector can also detract from SDG16 when it acts outside the confines of the law. Good governance of the sector is therefore a prerequisite to achieving SDG16, and parliaments can make an important contribution to accountability and good governance. Parliaments contribute to both transparency and accountability of the sector through their various functions and act as a counterweight to executive dominance, including in the executive's use of security forces. Yet, in times of crisis, states run a risk of executive dominance and executives are often quick to resort to the use of the security sector to address an array of challenges. This risk also emerged. during the global Covid-19 pandemic where states used the security sector, notably the military and police, in various ways to respond to the pandemic. This study reviewed the utilisation of the security sector in South Africa, the Philippines and the UK during the first year of the Covid-19 outbreak, resulting in varied outcomes ranging from positive humanitarian contributions to misconduct and brutality that led to the death of citizens. The initial lockdowns in these countries constrained parliamentary activity, resulting in a lack of adequate parliamentary oversight of security sector utilisation when it was most needed. Parliaments did recover oversight of the sector to varied degrees, but often with limited depth of inquiry into the Covid-19 deployments. To prevent the security sector from detracting from SDG16, the study identified a need for a rapid parliamentary reaction capability to security sector utilisation, especially in cases of extraordinary deployments coupled with an elevated risk of executive dominance.

CHAPTER |

The United Nation’s (UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls for the establishment of peaceful, just and inclusive societies, demonstrating clear links to the security sector. However, the security sector’s contribution to these outcomes are predicated on it being an accountable, effective and inclusive sector with human rights and the rule of law as points of departure (OSCE 2019: 1). The security sector therefore requires careful management to maximise its contribution to the establishment and maintenance of peaceful and just societies, demonstrating a need for effective Security Sector Governance (SSG). The ideals postulated in SDG16 of just and inclusive societies, as well as the requirement for an accountable security sector based on the rule of law, align closely with the ideals of liberal democracy such as individual rights, political pluralism, constitutionalism and the separation of powers (Heywood 1997: 26-32). This raises the question as to what contribution the institutions of democracy can play not only in SSG, but in contributing to SDG16?

This research is founded on two overarching contributions of the security sector to peaceful, just and inclusive societies. First, the security sector directly contributes to the achievement of peace, security and stability, which the UN notes as a prerequisite for sustainable development itself. This contribution requires an effective and professional security sector. Second, the security sector contributes to peace and stability through accountability. In the absence of accountability, abuse of power by the security sector undermines the attainment of peaceful and just societies. For the security sector to positively contribute to SDG16, effective systems of governance and checks and balances are required. Parliaments, as democratic institutions and pivotal actors in the separation of state powers, play a key role in governments’ contribution to SDG16 through the security sector. This has particular relevance to three security sector role-players, namely the military, police and private security, that represent the direct contact points with the populace. Parliaments’ impact on SSG is largely carried out through its key functions, specifically legislation, oversight, representation and budgeting. The execution of these functions form part of broader SSG, thus impacting on the security sector contribution to SDG16.

Janse van Rensburg, W., van Zyl-Gous, N., and Heinecken, L. 2022. Parliaments’ Contributions to Security Sector Governance/Reform and the Sustainable Development Goals: Testing Parliaments’ Resolve in Security Sector Governance During Covid-19. Pp. 1-9. London: Ubiquity Press. DOI: https://doi.org /10.5334/ber.a. License: CC-BY-NC

Using the two overarching contributions of the security sector to SDG16, this research explores how parliaments use their key functions to assist government, through the security sector, to achieve SDG16. This is analysed by focusing on the role the security sector has played during the global Covid-19 pandemic in selected countries. The UN noted security sector power abuses in several states, often resulting in violence that disproportionately affected marginalised groups (Namugwe 2020). Analysing the roles that parliaments played during the pandemic provides insight into their potential contribution to the maintenance of peaceful, just and inclusive societies.

Aim and research methodology

The primary aim of the study is to review the potential contribution of parliaments to SDG16 through its contribution to SSG, with the following objectives. First, to review parliaments’ impact on ensuring the security sector’s contribution to peace and stability (Chapter 2). Second, parliaments’ contribution to security sector accountability is reviewed (Chapter 3). These contributions by parliaments to SDG16 are then practically evaluated by referring to the role of the security sector during the Covid-19 pandemic in three case studies (Chapter 4). The potential contribution of the study is reflected in recommendations to parliaments on the institutional contributions to SSG and SDG16 (Chapter 5).

In terms of methodology, a comparative case study design was adopted. This approach involves the detailed and intensive analysis of a few exemplary cases that provide suitable context for the research questions. Cross-national research is particularly valuable as it allows one to examine particular issues by comparing the different socio-cultural, political and military settings, while at the same time seeking explanations for similarities and differences to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena studied (Bryman 2008: 54-58). In this regard, the cases selected enabled us to compare and contrast the role of the different parliaments, the methods of accountability and role of the security sectors during the Covid-19 pandemic and ultimately to establish the institutional contributions to SDG16. While an inductive approach was adopted, the aim was also to see to what extent the data supported broader theoretical arguments related to civil oversight of the security sector and enabled us to generalise by drawing on the findings from the comparable cases.

The comparative case study design was conducted in two phases. First, a theoretical foundation was established by locating SSG, the SDGs and parliaments within theory. This section relied on the analysis of existing theory and analysis, specifically on the roles of parliaments. Second, three countries were selected for a study, namely South Africa, the Philippines and the United Kingdom (UK). This selection was considered of comparative value in terms of the security sector's involvement in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic (See Chapter 4). However, the unit of analysis was the different parliaments in these countries, how they provided oversight and held the security forces accountable. The research method for the case studies was primarily documentary analysis. This was considered the most efficient way to gather data on the subject under review and insight into security sector roles during the global Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the interplay thereof with parliamentary oversight.

A wide range of documentary sources were consulted on how states, and particularly parliaments, dealt with the issue of Covid-19 in relation to the security forces. These included research articles and publications, official documents deriving from the state, mass media outputs and virtual outputs such as internet sources. Issues of authenticity, credibility, representativeness in terms of views, and evidence were guiding criteria informing document selection. In terms of official documents deriving from the state, these included Acts of Parliament and official parliamentary reports on the security forces, their deployment, conduct and mechanisms of accountability. This included parliamentary debates, questions and answers and other documentation related to the

Introduction 3 reporting on security sector utilisation during Covid-19. In addition, a heterogeneous group of additional sources were consulted, some of which are in the public domain such as annual reports, press releases and minutes of meetings. Another important source of information were massmedia releases, especially those pertaining to the use of force and abuse by the security forces in the respective countries.

In interpreting the documents and sources of information, a qualitative approach was adopted in terms of the content analysis. The aim was to establish the underlying themes to discern what issues were raised in relation to the security forces deployment during the Covid-19 pandemic, and overlay this with existing themes around SSG and parliamentary oversight, in order to do a thematic analysis. Throughout, as researchers, we were mindful of the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of the different opinions and views expressed in the documents in terms of our interpretation of the data generated from the texts.

Conceptual demarcation: SSG and the SDGs

Linking SSG and the SDGs requires defining the two concepts, as well as locating them within broader security paradigm shifts. Of particular importance in terms of global security thinking is the shift from state-centric thinking on security to the concept of human security. The post-Cold War period has been characterised by a change in the concept of national security and its specific focus on external military threats. Societal, economic and ecological threats became increasingly important in maintaining national security (Buzan 1991: 122-134). Given that these threats pose dangers to individuals, the concept of security expanded to include individual or human security. The shift in security thinking also manifested in the UN approach to development, specifically in the post-Cold War context. The 1994 UN Human Development Report highlighted human security thinking as a revolutionary shift. It noted human security’s unique features as posing a universal concern, requiring early intervention, that it is people-centred and that its components are interdependent (UNDP 1994: 22-23). These features of human security thinking have specific implications for the interpretation of the SDGs and broader SSG.

The Sustainable Development Goals

The SDGs stem from the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), set in place in 2000, with eight specific goals aimed at alleviating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combatting disease; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing global partnerships for development. At the conclusion of the MDG in 2015, the UN stated that the programme revealed the success of global action networks. The UN expressed that ‘[a] bold new agenda is emerging to transform the world to better meet human needs and the requirements of economic transformation, while protecting the environment, ensuring peace and realizing human rights. At the core of this agenda is sustainable development...” (United Nations 2015: 9). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was subsequently developed for implementation from 2016, aiming to build on the MDGs to eradicate extreme poverty while simultaneously focusing on economic, social and environmental facets of sustainable development. The programme set 17 SDGs that encompass the various facets of sustainable development, each with a set of targets for implementation (United Nations 2016).

In its 2015 concluding report on the MDGs, the UN found that despite successes in achieving some of the targets, progress was not universal and vulnerable societies and/or segments of societies lagged behind. Specifically, the UN noted that conflict remains a major impediment to human development (United Nations 2015: 8). The eight MDGs lacked specific focus on conflict reduction and the need for security and, as such, the Agenda for Sustainable Development addressed this requirement with the inclusion of a specific related goal. SDG16 was developed to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Factors underpinning the development of SDG16 included conflict in several parts of the world, varying global homicide rates, high levels of unsentenced prisoners, the non-registration of births and human trafficking, specifically children (United Nations 2016: 40-42). These factors clearly demonstrate the broadening of the scope of security to include human security. Human security as a theme transcends the 10 targets set under SDG16:

e 16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.

e 16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.

¢ 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.

e 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime.

e 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.

e 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

e 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

e 16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance.

e 16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.

e 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.

In addition to the 10 targets, two ‘means of implementation’ targets are also included in SDGI16:

e 16A Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

¢ 16B Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

Viewed through the human security lens, a number of role-players are involved in SDG16 including individuals, civil society, international organisations and state institutions. This conglomerate of role-players adds to the notion that human security is people-centred rather than state-centred (Ferreira 2007: 239). However, while all these role-players contribute to human security, the function of the state is often central. The state’s role in security is amplified by the fact that traditionally it has been viewed as the sole provider of security against internal and external threat and that it maintains a monopoly on the legal use of force (Born 2003: 69). The power of civil society also varies among countries, specifically between developed and developing states, as does the potential contributions of private institutions to security (Hyden et al. 2003).

To achieve the envisaged outcomes of SDG16, specific attention ought to be paid to the function of the state in ensuring human security, both from an implementation and accountability point of view. Furthermore, the contribution of other role-players to human security requires attention, including the coordination of cooperation among such role-players involved in the security sector. Effective management of the security sector is therefore essential and there is an irrevocable link between SSG and the attainment of SDG16.

Introduction 5

Security Sector Governance

SSG as a concept consists of two components, namely the ‘security sector’ and ‘governance’. Defining the security sector is important due to the development of human security as a concept that has broadened the parameters of the ‘security sector. Given the focus of the UN on human security, and the focus of this paper on the UN SDGs, it is of value to consider the UN’s definition of the security sector. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Human Development Report categorise the security sector as follows (UNDP 2002: 87):

e Organisations authorised to use force including, inter alia, the armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, gendarmeries and intelligence services.

e Civil management and oversight bodies including, inter alia, presidents or prime ministers, security advisory bodies, legislatures and legislative select committees.

e Justice and law enforcement institutions including, inter alia, judiciaries, justice ministries, prisons, prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudspersons.

e Non-statutory security forces including, inter alia, liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias.

e Non-statutory civil society groups including, inter alia, professional groups, the media, research organisations, religious organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

From the categories identified by the UNDP, the shift away from state-centred security (as reflected in the first two security sector categories) is evident and the inclusion of non-state security actors emerges. This broadening has implications for the governance of the security sector. Governments still play a key role in the governance of the security sector through, for example, policy and strategy formulation as well as funding. However, the fact that other actors influence the security realm implies that governments now perform governance of the security sector in cooperation with non-state actors. “Considering security from the perspective of governance is useful because it includes the roles and responsibilities of government, but it also highlights how different kinds of state and non-state actors influence security provision, management and oversight in both positive and negative ways’ (DCAF 2015b: 2). The multi-actor character of governance extends to various levels of governance, reflected in local, national and regional or global governance. SSG at regional or global level is largely driven through inter-governmental cooperation, along with other transnational actors (Hanggi 2003: 6).

As an expanding concept, SSG has transformed into a multi-faceted, multi-actor and multi-level endeavour. However, Hanggi (2003: 8) reminds us that ‘[s]ecurity sector governance combines the concepts of “security” and “governance” at the state level, thus emphasising the centrality of the state or at least a central political authority. This is premised on the reality that all aspects affecting human security are, at some level, subject to a governance system affected by formal or non-formal political authorities (Hanggi 2003: 7). The degree of influence of non-state security actors in SSG and the centrality of the state will therefore differ vastly between countries. In addition, a comparative study by Ghebali and Lambert (2004) demonstrates that SSG differs between countries and regions, largely influenced by what they term a ‘democracy deficit’ and limited regional integration. Despite this apparent disjuncture in the SSG architecture, there are overriding principles that enables broad-based analysis thereof. These principles are based on the concept of good governance, which UN Resolution 64/2000 includes as being ‘transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. These values also underscore the principles of good SSG that include accountability, transparency, the rule of law, the participation of all in decision-making, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency (DCAF 2015b: 3).

The correlation between good governance and the principles of good SSG further manifests in the increased focus on the democratic governance of the security sector. The focus on democratic SSG is reflected in UN literature such as the UNDP Human Development Report (2002: Chapter 4) that highlights the non-violent nature of democracies and the fact that it presents opposing groups with a myriad of conflict resolution means. The Report proposes several principles of democratic SSG, with an overarching theme for ‘a demand for accountability. Hanggi’s (2003: 14) review of the norms and standards of democratic SSG developed by various international and regional bodies also emphasises ‘accountability’ as fundamental. Although no singular SSG oversight model exists, DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) identified key features of such oversight, including that the executive branch of government determines security policy, but remains accountable to citizens. The security services execute government security policy within the confines of the law as ensured through a constitutional judicial authority, while transgressions by security personnel or political decision-makers are dealt with through the justice system. Parliaments ensure accountability through oversight, deliberation and budgetary control and special statutory oversight bodies to oversee specific security aspects are created. Individuals, the media and civil society contribute to research and debate around security matters and reflect a variety of views and platforms for security sector accountability (DCAF 2015b: 15).

Locating the role of parliaments Parliaments, democracy and ensuring accountability

The previous section noted the role of parliaments in SSG, but parliaments are located differently depending on varying political systems. Fuior (2011: 3-6) highlights the different structures in relations between the parliaments and the executive in presidential systems, semi-presidential systems and various forms of parliamentarism and that these relational structures impact on studies of the role of parliaments in SSG. Nonetheless, some commonality can be found in the three core functions of democratic parliaments including legislation, representation and scrutiny. In the context of modern democracies, the functions of parliaments have largely shifted to scrutiny, while the executive increasingly takes responsibility for drafting legislation (Olson et al. 2008: 201). The scrutiny function is achieved through the practice of parliamentary oversight which, in itself, is closely linked to democratic theory. Oversight is intrinsically linked to the principle of representation, which underpins parliaments as institutions. Obiyo (2006: 4) states that parliaments ‘enable the People to acquire a perception of itself, of how “it” qua represented in the executive branch, is carrying out its Will. Oversight can therefore be seen as a crucial component of ensuring effective rule by the people. It represents the practical means of ensuring a system of checks and balances and guaranteeing executive accountability and responsiveness.

The rise of democratic SSG and the focus on accountability arguably provides an elevated role for parliaments in SSG. This connection can largely be attributed to parliaments’ democratic nature as they link to the well-established theories of democracy in two key ways. First, parliaments historically originated through the need for a consultative process in governance. Second, parliaments embody the notion of representation, with Members of Parliament (MPs) authorised to represent communities and to act on their behalf (Damgaard 2000: 3; Hague & Harrop 2007: 305). Representation ensures that the will of the people is reflected at governmental level, albeit mostly a majoritarian will (Lijphart 1999: 30). The value of these traditional views on the role of parliament in SSG is echoed by Fuior (2011: 7), stating ‘parliaments provide the needed democratic legitimacy to decisions that affect peoples lives. People must have confidence in the democratic system and must believe that democracy will create the conditions which will open the door to improvements in their security..” A further feature of parliaments’ democratic

Introduction 7 nature can be found in the pluralist view of democracy that emphasises the stabilising role of legislatures that constantly work against authoritarianism (Alford & Friedland 1992: 71-73; Rozenberg 2018: 158-160). Stability is ensured through a balance of power founded on the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. By ensuring that no segment of government assumes outright power, the separation of powers doctrine creates scope for accountability.

While the theoretical link between democracy and parliaments’ accountability function is apparent, it raises the question as to how these institutions practically effect accountability. As indicated, parliaments play a role in legislation, even when this function has largely shifted to the executive. Parliaments remain vested with the interrogation and approval of such legislation and, as such, introduce a stage of accountability in the legislation process (although the power and willingness of parliaments in this regard varies widely between countries) (Heywood 1997: 298). Nonetheless, parliaments can still be considered effective oversight institutions given the unique set of tools they have to oversee executive action. General consensus exists among scholars on the main oversight tools available to parliaments, which commonly include committee hearings; hearings in the plenary; commissions of inquiry (including ad hoc committees); parliamentary questions; question time in the plenary; and interpellations (Izah 2013: 6; Olson et al. 2008: 10; Pelizzo et al. 2004: 4; Yamamoto 2007: 11). In addition, oversight visits or fact-finding missions to review actions on the ground serve as a potential valuable tool in parliamentary oversight (Cover & Meran 2013: 43). The utilisation of these oversight tools, or the lack thereof, provides a framework within which to analyse parliamentary oversight.

Linking parliaments, SSG and SDG16

Parliaments’ three core functions can be expanded in the context of SSG. DCAF extrapolates these into five key parliamentary functions that influence SSG, namely parliaments’ legislative, oversight, representative, budgetary and elective functions (DCAF 2015a). Key to discussions around SDG16 is determining how parliamentary functions apply to SSG. Parliaments’ budgetary function relates to the approval, amendment or rejection of the budget for the security sector, which is essential to ensure transparency and accountability (Born 2003: 131-135). In terms of oversight, several important focus areas can be identified, specifically in relation to the security sector. First, debate around security sector legislation and policies are reflected in reviews of parliamentary oversight of the security sector (Cover & Meran 2013: 40; Yamamoto 2007: 76). Second, ensuring accountability in security sector procurement is crucial, specifically in large scale military procurement (Born 2003: sec. VII). Third, ensuring professionalism of human resources in the security sector links to democratic SSG (Born 2003: sec. VII). Fourth, the actual employment of the security sector requires oversight. The latter also relates to parliaments’ legislative function, ‘that determine the mandate, function, organisation and powers of security providers, management and oversight institutions’ (DCAF 2015a). When parliaments have no role to play in this regard, it represents a severe limitation to security sector oversight (Born 2003: 119-120). Finally, some parliaments also play an elective role in terms of the appointment of, or scrutiny of, top security sector appointments. While the elective function represents an important facet of SSG, the direct impact on the implementation of SDG16 is likely to be limited as it relates moreover to policy approaches that are better served through the remaining four parliamentary functions.