A History of Japan’s Government-Business Relationship

Front matter

A History of Japan’s Government-Business Relationship

A HISTORY OF JAPAN’S GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP

The Passenger Car Industry

Chapter 2: The Industry’s Early Years

Origins The Meiji Era The Early Entrepreneurs The Military Subsidy Program The Arrival of Ford and General Motors Impact of the Early Era Government Intervention Economic and Political Context The "Isuzu" Standardized Car The Emergence of Toyota and Nissan The Automobile Manufacturing Law Summary Wartime Controls Conclusion

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The Factors Cultural and Historical Lessons Administrative Rules Competitiveness Economic Importance Summary

Competitive Implications

Policy Implications vii

142 145 147 152 155

PREFACE

Interdependence between the United States and Japan increases daily and with it concern over the relative economic role of each country during the 1990s. As a result, the two countries will remain high on each other’s corporate and public policy agendas for the foreseeable future.

Concern increasingly is being expressed differently than in the past as the United States and Japan reach a new stage in their trade relationship. American domination of the relationship has ended, and overt Japanese tariff and nontariff barriers have been largely eliminated. The outstanding issues now revolve around deeper structural and cultural issues, including how industrial policies and government-business relationships affect global competitiveness and flexibility. At the beginning of the 1980s, it was the U.S.-Japan automobile crisis that presaged the new stage of bilateral trade relations by bringing the issue of industrial policy, and with it that of government-business relationships, to the forefront of the trade debate.

Despite the economic and political importance of the U.S.- Japan relationship and the extensive attention paid to automotive trade, few American scholars or policy makers are familiar with the history of Japanese government-business relations, either generally or for specific industries such as passenger cars. This book hopefully helps in a small way to fill that gap in our knowledge and, thus, to help strengthen the foundation from which we make public policy decisions about bilateral trade.

The few existing English-language books about the Japanese automobile industry contain little discussion of government-business relations. Japanese-language books contain even less. Michael Cusumano’s book, The Japanese Automobile Industry, focuses primarily on the development of corporate strategies and technology. It is valuable in helping us understand how business positioned itself but tells us little about the formation of public policy. While C.S. Chang’s study, The Japanese Auto Industry and the U.S. Market, briefly discusses certain policy actions, it contains no framework of how Japan arrived at decisions. In addition, it does not cover the important events of the American Occupation. Other books such as William Duncan’s U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy and David Halberstam’s The Reckoning provide useful information on particular aspects of the industry’s history.

This book represents with some minor modifications my doctoral dissertation. I particularly acknowledge the support and guidance of Eleanor M. Hadley, to whom I owe the great majority of my knowledge about the Japanese economy. I am indebted to my other professors at George Washington University, especially Gaston Sigur and Benjamin Nimer, who helped oversee my dissertation. I also thank Takafusa Nakamura for sponsoring my study at the University of Tokyo and for allowing me to be part of his graduate seminar.

In addition, I am grateful for the support received from my friends and former colleagues at the Japan Economic Institute who generously allowed me the time necessary to pursue my doctorate and later provided needed workspace to write the original dissertation after I returned from Japan.

I also appreciate the generosity of many people in Japan who made my research possible: the Matsumoto and Takasaki families who allowed me to share their homes, Yoshio Nakamura and others at Keidanren, Kazuko Maekawa, Kyoko Nakamura, and Hiroshi Ando. Many individuals in the Japanese government, automobile industry, and academia willingly shared their time and knowledge with me.

My dissertation also could not have been completed without the support provided by a Fulbright Fellowship that funded my research in Japan. I am especially proud to have received one of the first two grants funded by the GARIOA/Fulbright Alumni Association of Japan. The Association for Asian Studies aided by providing a travel grant for research in Michigan.

Chapter 1 Government-business Relationships In Global Competition

During the 1980s, American policy makers repeatedly raised the issue of the Japanese government-business relationship as part of the industrial policy debate. Some portrayed the relationship as more effective than that of the United States and stressed the Japanese government’s ability to intervene in, and restructure, the economy. At the same time, other policy makers continued staunchly to defend the separation of government and business as the essential ingredient of a strong market economy. They claimed that Japanese industrial policies with their special government-business relationship have been ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. These opposing perceptions were used to help to justify both interventionist and free trade policies in the United States. By doing so, a debate arose over whether or not certain government-business relationships can provide advantages in global competition by making public policies more effective and business more competitive.

This book examines the debate by investigating interactions between the Japanese government and the Japanese automobile industry from the industry’s origins to the implementation of voluntary restraints on automobile exports to the United States in 1981. It starts with the premise that government-business relationships exist and are far more complex than usually depicted by those who attempt to use them either to justify or to counter government intervention. It defines the relationships as institutional structures within which states and private companies interact and work together, or fail to work together, to formulate and implement commercial policy. It finds that, while relationships differ across nations and across industries within nations, the need to define competition globally necessitates understanding how and why specific interactions occur.

The Japanese automobile industry’s experience adds to our understanding of the role and competitive implications of government-business relationships. This book sheds light on the effects of Japanese government and automobile industry interactions over time on Japanese economic development and thence on global competition.

The Automobile Industry

Although there are inherent limitations in using a single industry to understand Japanese government-business relations overall, it is only possible to understand these complex interactions when individual industries are studied in enough detail to create a broad base of knowledge. And, it is the discovery of interactive patterns in individual industries through which the nature of government-business relationships are revealed.

The Japanese automobile industry is important to investigate because it is central to American and Japanese manufacturing economies. As such, it exerts tremendous influence on both nations’ economic health. In addition, automobiles and automotive parts have grown increasingly important in U.S.-Japan trade since the early 1960s and are currently the most important items, in monetary terms, in bilateral trade. The United States imported approximately $33.7 billion of these products in 1989, which accounted for 68.7 percent of the $49 billion U.S. trade deficit with Japan.! Thus, the automotive industry also exerts a tremendous influence on the health of the U.S.-Japan bilateral trade relationship.

Another reason to investigate government-business relations in the Japanese automobile industry is this issue’s close ties to the U.S. debate over industrial policy. Although The Economist broached the industrial policy issue as early as 1962 in a series of articles and some Japan specialists studied it, the issue did not become popular in the United States until the time of the automobile crisis in 1979.?

Industrial policy became a trade issue at the time of the automobile crisis in large part because of the existing hostile relationship between the U.S. automobile industry and the press—and thus consumers—that grew out of earlier conflicts over safety and emissions standards. Automobiles are also visible consumer products that create feelings of economic vulnerability that earlier conflicts over textiles and steel had not. The importance of the automobile industry to the economy and the mystique that makes the industry the ultimate symbol of American capitalism added to the depth of the shock. It was reasoned that, if the automobile industry was in trouble, perhaps something more was wrong than simply the unfair trade practices of other nations; maybe the American system needed to be revamped.

The concept of industrial policy that initially emerged out of the automobile crisis focused on what was seen as one of the elements of Japan’s success—the existence of a close, cooperative government-business relationship that led to increased competitiveness through judicious use of public policies. An immediate result of the new perception was the Carter Administration’s attempt to set up a tripartite committee between government, business, and labor in 1980 to address the U.S.-Japan automobile trade issue. Exemplifying an introspective use of the concept, attempts such as this sought the basis for the U.S. automobile industry’s lack of competitiveness within the U.S. economy, and a number of articles, books, and conferences on learning from Japan were published. While this perception of Japanese industrial policy has not disappeared, it has been supplemented by the negative connotations applied to industrial targeting.*

The targeting argument was a new basis for blaming trade problems on factors outside the United States and for protecting its market. In the industrial policy context, it rejected introspection and returned to the more conventional view that the major source of U.S. trade problems was external. Despite this fundamental difference, the targeting argument also assumed that cooperative and state-directed government-business relationships in Japan affected international competitiveness. For example, the “successful targeting” of the Japanese automobile industry was seen as reason enough to impose import restrictions on U.S.-Japan automotive trade. At a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Trade in March 1980, Chairman Charles Vanik stated:

Japan has a great auto industry and it grew to strength and prosperity behind some of the most protectionist walls in modern industrial history.

Now, the industry has been unleashed; it is surging all over the world, wrecking havoc on our industry which for fifty years has been totally supportive of world trade.®

At the same hearing, Douglas A. Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers union at the time, after quoting George Ball that Japanese trade responds to government decisions and not simply to the decisions of industry, stated, “Unfortunately, our auto industry must also be included in the list of industries ‘incisively targeted’ by Japan.”® Although first gaining prominence in U.S. trade policy during the debate on U.S.-Japan automobile trade, the targeting concept was refined and used again quite effectively in later debates over machine tool, semiconductor, computer, and other sectoral issues.

A third reason the Japanese automobile industry’s case is particularly provocative and instructive from a policy perspective is that it has become an example of an industry that reveals the effectiveness as well as the ineffectiveness of Japanese industrial policy.

One side argues that government-business interactions in the Japanese automobile industry are characterized by an adversarial relationship and the triumph of the private market.’ The automobile industry in Japan did receive much less government attention, especially financial, than other industries such as steel. Automobiles are the consummate consumer good in a society that values saving more than spending, and the industry does have many exemplary entrepreneurs such as Shoichiro Honda. In addition, the industry’s experience in the 1960s has been used as the prime example of the triumph of the private market over the attempts by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITD to change Japan’s industrial structure.

The other side cites the Japanese government’s. successful targeting and protection of the automobile industry as the prime reason for the industry’s postwar success. The government had forced the American automobile companies out of the market in the 1930s through extensive restrictions. After World War II the automobile industry was identified as a key industry by the Japanese government. In the 1950s and 1960s the Japanese government carefully controlled technology inflow and foreign direct investment to try to influence the character of the industry. These factors support the primacy of the government, not of the market, in economic development.

It has been possible to use this government-business relationship to support opposing positions in the trade debate and in analyses of the role of industrial policy in Japanese economic development precisely because interactions in the Japanese automobile industry reflect so many different patterns. Thus, it is possible to understand government-business relations only as complex interactions between government and business and not primarily as the ability of government to influence business or the ability of business to resist government intervention.

For these three reasons, the automobile industry is a prime example of how the issue of government-business relations is used in the U.S.-Japan trade debates and, further, how industrial policy and government-business relations became one and the same issue in the minds of many policy makers.

Perspectives on Government-Business Relationships

The differing perceptions about industrial policy and the role of government-business interactions are rooted in the way we analyze the nature and role of the international, American, and Japanese economies. These analyses provide a foundation from which to explore the complex interactions between the Japanese government and the Japanese automobile industry. They approach the issue from several different perspectives, each of which contributes to our understanding.

Since the late 1960s, awareness of international economic issues has increased substantially among American scholars and policy makers. Attention focused first on how the activities of global actors, such as multinational corporations and regional economic associations, affected the power of nations. For example, writers argued over whether there was a newly emerging phenomena of economic interdependence that might partially supplant the nationstate.’ A few writers pointed out that the economic issues always existed; awareness had simply increased. Yet, there was an implicit assumption by most policy makers that economic issues were important because they affected political relationships. In the study of international relations, economic issues were not assigned the same importance in and of themselves as were political and defense issues. This assumption has been accepted by many scholars and policy makers and has reemerged in discussions over appropriate trade policies and the weight that should be given to economic versus political considerations in relationships between nations.

As a result, policy makers paid little attention to how interactions between government and business within nations affected global trade competition or to how the international economy in turn affected such interactions. There was little recognition that such interactions changed over time or of the factors that led to change.

When attention did turn to these interactions during the industrial policy debate, another conceptual problem arose. Many scholars were unable to separate their study of government-business relationships in global competition from their preferences concerning the role of the government in the American economy. Many studies sought proof of existing preferences rather than looking at how and why interactions occurred in Japan at different times. Again, these studies dealt primarily with the ability of government to influence business or the ability of business to resist government intervention.

The Domestic Perspective

Scholars who study American government-business relations often refer to the relationship as a static condition facilitating or hindering economic development by positing a fundamentally adversarial relationship in the United States versus a cooperative relationship in Japan.? These scholars tend to transfer the way the relationship is dealt with as a domestic issue—primarily as the effect of regulatory policies on the economy—to the international arena. Since regulatory relationships involve the imposition of costs to achieve social goals or to control undesirable behavior, the studies do not have the tools to analyze instances of mutual cooperation. They are helpful in looking at interactions that occur when legislated regulatory solutions to social problems exist by pointing out that such interactions tend to be adversarial.

In depicting U.S. government-business relations as adversarial, scholars almost exclusively discuss interactions as effects of the domestic environment—legislation, culture, and historical experience. This perception leads them to trade policy options that stress that if weaknesses resulting from domestic, social, and technological changes are resolved, American businesses would be competitive and as such would resolve any international trade problems.

Because of the emphasis on the domestic environment, some of these scholars discount the relevance of comparative studies of government-business relations in foreign countries altogether. Michael Blumenthal stated:

A comparative study of business-government relationships in other countries is a fascinating field of study, but I doubt that many insights useful in the United States could be derived from it. Whether one considers Japan, or France, or another nation, the business-government relationships are part of the total fabric of their societies. They reflect their own histories, philosophies, and social structures, and would not be a guide to action in the United States. 1°

This perception reflects a weakness in using concepts developed in studies of American government-business relations to study the effect of such relationships in trade because they ignore the impact of the international environment and disregard relevant experiences in foreign countries.

Thus, while the traditional approach to studies of American government-business relations does shed light on regulatory interactions, it is not suitable by itself to a study of the role of government-business relations in international trade. It is limited in its ability to incorporate variables external to the domestic environment and to deal with other than regulatory policies. It shows that interactions can be adversarial but fails to discuss instances of cooperation or the existence of mutual goals. It also assumes an idealized laissez-faire environment with static relationships that do not change over time.

The Japan Perspective

Scholars have discussed government-business relations in the context of U.S.-Japan relations. For the purpose of examining and simplifying concepts that help to understand government-business interactions, these studies fall into three basic groups. The first group views the relationship as a reflection of cultural and historical factors. The second group concentrates on the concept of industrial policy and the role government plays in economic growth. The third group looks at Japanese government-business relations as an interactive partnership.

Historical and cultural determinants. Studies in the first group describe the relationship as the “missing element” that explains Japan’s postwar economic performance.!! They stress the “special and unique way in which the Japanese government has guided the economy’s development,” a way influenced by Japan’s history and culture. 12

Historically, it is the close communication between the government and the business community that these writers believe has existed since the Meiji era (1868-1912). Because Japan was forced to open its market, it had to design policies to achieve the rapid and forced growth of industry to avoid being partitioned like China. Thus, the unique relationship between government and business—a special coalition between the bureaucracy and the private sector—grew out of the Meiji government’s attempts to foster modern industry through various subsidies such as the sell-off of government factories.

The cultural elements stem from Confucianism and native traditions. They often are behind references to “consensual decision making,” the “group spirit,” or “the vertical society.”!5 In the context of government-business relations, this view implies that Japanese leaders are conditioned by their culture to preserve harmony in their relations, as for example in the postwar practice of consensual decision making, ringi sei. It also implies that horizontal mergers are difficult to achieve because they go against cultural predispositions toward vertical relationships and group cohesiveness.

This group of studies, like the studies of American government-business relations, provides only a partial insight into government-business interactions as a trade issue, but policy makers are guided to some extent by cultural norms and historical experiences. These factors offer insights into such practices as the formation of coalitions, provide policy makers with historical lessons, and remind us that culture can affect how events and concepts are perceived. But, if cultural and historical contexts are the primary shapers of the government-business relationship, we would expect the relationship to change quite slowly and we would be able to explain all current behavior as extensions of some previous patterns. These patterns, however, are often overridden by other considerations.

Industrial policy perspective. This category of study examines the Japanese government-business relationship within the context of industrial policy and the role of government policy in economic development. It asks whether government or business is primarily responsible for Japan’s rapid economic development. This category includes two perspectives; one supports the supremacy of the state, the other the importance of the market.

The statist perspective often presents political institutions, such as MITI, as the primary determinants of the government-business relationship.!4 Proponents of this point of view attribute a large role to the state in economic development and see a world “in which bureaucrats wield exceptional power and influence.”!5 Some want the United States to learn from the Japanese government’s perceived success in facilitating development; others use the concept as justification for an activist U.S. trade policy to offset the effects on world trade caused by the intervention of the Japanese state. 18

Political institutions can help predispose a relationship to be cooperative or adversarial and can place constraints on business actions. As such, they offer insights into how the government perceives and attempts to carry out its role in economic development. However, these studies often fail to pay sufficient attention to the actions and initiatives of the private sector and so fail to fully account for variations in government-business relationships across industrial sectors and for instances in which public policies fail to achieve their stated purposes.

Advocates of the market perspective depict political institutions as playing only a small role in promoting economic development. 1" Their studies correctly point out the existence of a strong private sector in Japan and the developmental effects of competition. They stress that Japan’s economic development resulted from a free market typified by intense competition and successful entrepreneurs and cite instances where the Japanese government failed to impose its ideas on business. In this context, the only legitimate government roles are the creation of a macroeconomic environment conducive to business and the imposition of regulations to achieve social goals. However, in their attempt to demonstrate the supremacy of the private sector, they discount the role of states, and thus the importance of government-business interactions in shaping economic development.

The separation of politics and economics reflects an academic tradition dating to eighteenth-century classical economic theories and to late nineteenth-century neoclassical economists such as Alfred Marshall.!8 Theorists separated the two disciplines by arguing that while economics is a system based on production, distribution, and consumption that operates under natural laws, politics is a system of power, influence, and public decision making that disrupts natural laws but is necessary to provide essential services such as defense. Therefore, the disruptive influence of government should be excluded from the harmonious economy. This underlying assumption obviously hinders the study of government-business interactions by imposing an ideal in which there is as little interaction as possible.

Interaction perspective. This group looks at interactions between government and business over a period of time. Richard Samuels terms this interaction “the politics of reciprocal consent,” in which a partnership exists in a constant state of negotiation and renegotiation.!9 Yasusuke Murakami’s theory of compartmentalized competition recognizes interactions between “the economy, the polity and the culture” in creating economic development during Japan’s high growth period.2°

Two other studies employ an interactionist perspective. David Friedman’s case study of the Japanese machine tool industry, while centering on flexible manufacturing and the role of small-scale firms in Japan, defines political economy broadly. He states that “politics is much more than just the actions of the state” and records instances of political conflict and compromise among government, business, and other affected actors.21 Frank Upham discusses attributes conducive to cooperative Japanese government-business relations that include a consultative policy-making process.22

These studies record instances of government and private initiatives that result in market transformations but try not to presuppose the supremacy of the state or the market. They rely heavily on a detailed knowledge of interest group interactions within specific industries. They propose that no monolithic government or business exists; rather there are many players and levels of interaction. Because a detailed knowledge of each industry is necessary, these studies sometimes are dismissed as presenting concepts that are unique to a specific industry and not transferable to others or to economic development in general.

By looking at specific case studies, however, they do delineate factors that place constraints on, or encourage, interaction. They recognize that no single factor, such as culture or the market, can explain fully either the interactions themselves or economic development. They also indirectly imply that changing circumstances can alter both the interactions themselves and the role of individual factors in determining outcomes. Thus, the case studies taken together provide a framework within which to analyze interactions.

This book complements the third group of studies by adding a case study of government-business relations in the Japanese auto industry to previous work on other Japanese industries, including energy, machine tools, and textiles.23 It attempts to systematically present the circumstances in the automobile industry that surrounded public policy actions. By doing so, it finds that Japanese government-business relations in the case of the automobile industry were interactive, that government and private initiatives existed, and that relations changed with variations in needs and the external environment.

The changes in and the types of interactions depended on several major factors, which will be discussed further in the conclusion and which are revealed in the history of the relationship from its origins to the 1980s. These factors are (1) cultural and historical lessons that influenced the behavior and decisions of policy makers; (2) administrative rules, the perimeters agreed to by consensus or imposed by force within which the government made and carried out policy; (3) the competitiveness of an industry; and (4) the importance, real or perceived, of an industry to economic development.

As international economic policy is accorded a significance equal to political and security policies, policy makers must step back and come to terms with how interactions between government and business affect the strength and competitiveness of nations.

This book seeks insights into government-business relations as interactions, and thence as possible factors in economic development. As new nations emerge and challenge the supremacy of older industrialized countries in technology-intensive products, perceived differences in government-business relationships and their roles in economic development have become an important aspect of the trade debate that rarely has been examined. Because policy makers frequently use these perceived differences to support domestic industrial policies and to justify protectionist or free trade actions, it is essential to examine and to understand the realities involved. The realities in turn help determine how and if the Japanese government-business relationship is relevant for other nations’ economic development policies and what role, if any, it should play in trade policy.

1U.S. Department of Commerce.

2“How Japan Does It,” The Economist, 24 March 1962, pp. 1,140-41 and 31 March 1962, pp. 1,261-62.

3An unpublished review by this author of auto-related articles from approximately twenty-five U.S. newspapers for the first six months of 1980 revealed that the American press, particularly editorial writers, took an antagonistic position toward the U.S. auto industry. These articles frequently cited safety problems with the

Ford Pinto and GM Corvair, the Chrysler bailout, and the industry’s lack of response to pollution and fuel efficiency problems as evidence that problems in the U.S. industry were internally generated.

4The industrial targeting debate can be symbolically traced to the December 1981 publication of “Japan’s Ominous Chip Victory,” in Fortune. One of the industry’s most polished espousals of the targeting argument is the Semiconductor Industry Association’s publication, The Effects of Japanese Government Targeting on World Semiconductor Competition, released in February 1988.

5U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Trade, Hearings, World Auto Trade: Current Trends and Structural Problems, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., March 1980, (Serial 96-78), p. 2.

8Tbid. M

7For example, see Philip Tresize, “Politics, Government and Economic Growth in Japan,” in Asia’s New Giant, ed. Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 753-811.

8For example, see George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

9For example, see Alfred A. Marcus, The Adversary Economy (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1982); Damodar Gujarati, Government and Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984); and Neil H. Jacoby, ed., The Business-Government Relationship (Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1975).

10Jacoby, ed., The Business-Government Relationship, p. 162.

11S. Department of Commerce, Japan, The Government- Business Relationship, ed. Eugene J. Kaplan (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1972) and case studies prepared by the Boston Consulting Group.

12Tpid.

13For example, see Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Ronald Dore, British Factory- Japanese Factory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957).

M4For example, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

15David Halberstam, The Reckoning (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986), p. 27.

16For example, see Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) and Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich, Minding America’s Business (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: Law and Business, 1982).

1/Toshimasa Tsuruta, Sengo Nihon no sangyo seisaku {Japan’s postwar industrial policy] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1982), pp. 1-287.

18Many liberal economists, who espoused the preeminence of the market mechanism and price competition, trace their ideas to the work of the British philosopher, John Stuart Mill. Mill emphasized the primary value of liberty [individualized choice]. Therefore, he preached that the power of government in any form should be minimized, stating that “laissez-faire should be the general practice; every departure from it, unless required by some greater good, is a certain evil” (idem, Principles of Political Economy {London, 1864], p. 569).

19Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 1-290.

20Yasusuke Murakami, “Sengo Nihon no keizai shishutemu” [Japan’s postwar economic system], Economisuto, 14 June 1982, pp. 38-54 and Yasusuke Murakami, “Toward a Socioinstitutional Explanation of Japan’s Economic Performance” in Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy, ed. Kozo Yamamura (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 3-46.

21David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 201-27.

22Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 164-204.