Early Communist China

Contents

"The Fu-t'ien Incident, December 1930", by Ronald S. Suleski

Open Revolt The Rebels Organize Pro-Maoists React with Unity

The Central Bureau is Formed and Pleads for Unity Removing the Rebels: Public Trials

Introduction

The widening schism between Mao Tse-tung in Kiangsi and the Central Committee in Shanghai was clearly evident in 1930. Mao grew ever stronger in his conviction that a stable, secure guerrilla base was an absolute necessity if the communist movement in China was to succeed. He argued for an extensive organization of guerrillas, composed of loyal peasants, which would eventually expand to engulf the cities. Slowly he began building up his personal power and more determinedly defended his thesis.

Opposition from the Central Committee, then controlled by Li Li-san, likewise mounted. Li Li-san's official directives called for concentrated Red Army strength to attack key cities in central China, and further to precipitate a revolutionary situation by encouraging political strikes and local uprisings. In April, after Li had made his disapproval of Mao's policies clear, Mao was instructed to attend a conference:in Shanghai. Li Li-san's probable plan, as Mao must have realized, was to reorganize the leadership within the Kiangsi Soviet, to censure Mao for his refusal to implement fully Central Committee directives, and possibly to attempt to remove him from the Soviet areas entirely. Without any sort of official reply, Mao ignored the summons and instead remained in the forested hills of central Kiangsi.

Initially neither Mao Tse-tung nor Chu Teh were willing to repudiate Central Committee orders openly. Mao realized that, given enough time, it would be possible for him quietly to assume complete leadership of the movement in Kiangsi and insure that Red Army units were under the firm control of trusted subordinates. Because of the Central Committee's insistence that armed attacks on key cities be launched immediately, however, Mao was denied the time needed to centralize his power within the relative safety of Kiangsi. Major attacks on Nanch'ang and Ch'angsha, ordered by the Central Committee, were launched by Mao and Chu Teh in July 1930. But the Red armies, as Mao had predicted, were unable to hold the cities or to spark revolutionary support from the populace. These failures decided Mao's future course of action. Openly opposing the Central Committee, Mao and Chu Teh called off the attacks and shortly thereafter Mao began moving to eliminate political rivals within the Kiangsi Soviet.

It is in the context of these failures that the Fu-t'ien incident

can best be understood. The events after September 1930 represent Mao's first dramatic steps to gain control over the Chinese communist movement, although at that time his goal was limited to Kiangsi and there is

no evidence that he was hoping to get supreme authority over the entire movement. Actions taken to face the crises of the following seven months were certainly under the direct control of Mao, thus providing an example of the methods employed by Mao when not confined by directives from a higher authority.

To exercise his control over the civilian governmental structure, Mao was able to work through the General Front Committee, a legitimate organization whose membership was composed largely of pro-Mao communists. Serious opposition to Mao's leadership was presented by the Kiangsi Provincial Action Committee, which had been organized in the Soviet areas by Li Li-san to counteract the pro-Mao Front Committee.

The entire Fu-t'ien incident and its aftermath centers most strongly around Mao's efforts to remove the Action Committee from power and the Action Committee's continued support for official policies of the Central Committee. Mao was successful in removing the Action Committee from leadership, but factors beyond his control (chiefly the KMT encirclement campaigns and the Central Committee's move from Shanghai to Kiangsi) were responsible for delaying his accession to complete control of the Chinese communist movement.

INITIAL ARRESTS: THE HUANG-P'O INCIDENT

With the bulk of the Red Army back inside the Soviet regions after their unsuccessful efforts to hold Nanch'ang and Ch'angsha, Mao was able to take the market town of Kian. Built on the banks of the Kan River, Kian would serve as an excellent administrative center for the areas Mao hoped to consolidate.

Shortly after the occupation of the town, documents concerning activities of the notorious Anti-Bolshevik (AB) Corps were discovered by the Red Army. Supposedly organized by and receiving funds from the KMT, AB Corps members operated as spies within communist organizations, collecting strategic information and sending it up through secret

AB Corps channels, or organizing dissatisfied communists to perform disruptive functions within the Soviet areas. It was possibly known that the Corps was active in the area, but the extent of its penetration into communist organizations had not been discovered until the documents were found.

The captured documents revealed, after the KMT code had been broken, that five high-level CCP members, some of them Red Army commanders, had connections with the AB Corps. 2 Instead of immediate arrests, Mao and Chu Teh decided to initiate an investigation that might eventually uncover the entire organization and expose its membership.

Shortly thereafter, while the Soviet government was still establishing itself in the city, it was decided at a conference held by the General Front Committee that Kian must be evacuated. Increasing numbers of KMT troops were headed toward Kiangsi to attack the Soviet areas and Kian was likely to be a target of their attacks. The Front Committee resolved to adopt the strategy, developed by Mao and Chu Teh, of luring the enemy to penetrate deeply into the Soviets, where small communist guerilla units would have the advantage over KMT divisions.3 The first step would be to lure the enemy into the Kian area. Members of the Provincial Action Committee, who had already located themselves in Kian, were informed of the decision and instructed to move their organizations from the city.

Some Action Committee opposition to the evacuation probably followed. The Committee favored Li Li-san's policies, which called for attacks on major cities, so they could hardly agree with voluntarily surrendering Kian. In addition, they saw the city's potential as a base for developing their power and disseminating propaganda. But the Committee could not defend the city alone, and during the first weeks of November, possibly after having resisted the move for a few days, they moved to the town of Fu-t'ien and Kian was retaken by the KMT.

We might expect that after the evacuation, while the Soviet government was relocating itself, the investigation into AB Corps activity continued. In late November, possibly because the investigation had been completed, Mao ordered mass arrests of suspected AB Corps members. Perhaps more than 4,000 officers and men of the 20th Army, including the political commissar, Hsieh Han-ch'ang, were arrested. These arrests, carried out in the Huang-p'o district of Yung-feng county, became known as the Huang-p'o incident.

Outwardly the Soviet government was acting to supress the AB Corps. More significant, however, were those arrests which took place at the same time in Fu-t'ien, seat of the relocated Action Committee. Many members of the Action Committee were accused of membership in the AB Corps and arrested. They included the secretary-general, Tuan Liang-pi, and leading members such as Li Wen-lin, Ts'ung Yunchang, and Chin Wan-pang. 2 Soon all but two members of the Action Committee were under arrest.

Little information is available concerning the Huang-p'o incident. One account credits Li Shao-chiu, Ch'en Cheng-jen, and Tseng Shan, all Mao supporters with organizing the arrests. 6 (Tseng Shan had recently been elected chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet.) Many pro-KMT accounts, although they fail to cite convincing evidence, claim that large numbers of Red Army personnel were executed at Huang~p'o. T It is certain, however, that none of the Action Committee members were executed, though they were arrested and held in the prison at Fu-t'ien, Perhaps Mao planned eventually to place them on public trial.

Official charges placed against those arrested accused them of falling prey to the influence of the AB Corps, being members of the Liquidationists, Social Democrat Party members --all political factions known to be operating within the Soviet areas. 8 Subsequent statements issued by Mao regarding the arrests referred to the entire charge and made little attempt to emphasize the AB Corps. But the charge that drew an immediate emotional response was that of possible AB Corps connections. Among the spectrum of anti-communist organizations, the AB Corps was the most feared. It was invisible, unlike the KMT armies, and it was said to be well organized and ruthless, unlike, for instance, the Social Democrat Party.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the charges Mao placed against the Action Committee began with an accusation of membership in the AB Corps. If the Corps thrived on lies and subversion, what acceptable proof could the Committee members offer of their innocence? Moreover, in the midst of high tensions and ever-present dangers, the charges were themselves sufficient to condemn the Action Committee.

The Action Committee had been caught in a wide net of purges, and with charges that elicited an emotional rather than a rational response. The stage was set for the drama of the Fu-t'ien incident which unfolded in December.

THE FU-T'IEN INCIDENT

Open Revolt

On either the 7th or 8th of December 1930, perhaps only a week after the initial mass arrests at Huang-p'o and Fu-t'ien, a battalion of the 20th Army rose in revolt. About 400 men stationed at Hsing-kuo, less than thirty miles from Fu-t'ien, rallied to the call of Liu Ti, their political commissar. The commander of the 20th army, Liu T'ieh-ch'ao, was arrested by Liu Ti, who then led the rebels on a march to Fu-t'ien. Attacking the prison at Fu-t'ien, Liu Ti's men set free some twenty members of the Action Committee, including Li Wen-lin.? Apparently they had moved so quickly that no serious resistance had been offered by pro- Mao Red Army units.

After opening the prison, the rebels began searching for Mao's supporters in the area, particularly those such as Li Shao-chiu, Ch'en Cheng-jen, and Tseng Shan, who held official positions. 10 The provincial Soviet government, which included many pro-Mao individuals, was overthrown and many members were arrested, with the exception of the chairman, Tseng Shan, who allegedly was allowed to escape.

The reasons that originally prompted Liu Ti's revolt have never been made clear. According to one account, Liu Ti had been visited by Li Shao-chiu shortly after the Huang-p'o arrests, when Li suggested that political issues as well as membership in the AB Corps had been the cause of the arrests. Many of the high-ranking cadre who had been victims of the arrests, such as Tuan Liang-pi, Li Wen-lin, Hsieh Han-ch'ang and Chin Wan-pang, had outwardly worked hard for the success of the communist movement and, probably in Liu's eyes, if political issues were an important factor in the arrests, he, too, might be subject to arrest. John Rue has suggested that Li Shao-chiu's visit to Liu Ti was designed to incite Liu to revolt and provide further cause for pro-Mao elements to move against their opposition. 12

This is a plausible interpretation, but still open to question. If Mao and Chu Teh were then engaged in an investigation into possible AB Corps activities and were able to arrest members of the Action Committee on unproven charges, why could they not take similar action against Liu Ti, if he was mistrusted by the Maoists? Secondly, even if Mao had wished Liu Ti to revolt, why weren't Red Army units waiting to suppress the rebels after Liu Ti had demonstrated his disloyalty? Although an armed revolt may not have been the action Mao expected Liu Ti to take, 13 it is unlikely that Mao would have been willing to gamble with such a dangerous possibility, especially considering the success of the initial Huang-p'o arrests.

There are some further interesting possibilities that have thus far been overlooked. Liu Ti was stationed at Hsing~kuo, not far from the village of Tung-ku. The family homes of Tuan Liang-pi and Li Wen-lin, arrested by Mao a week prior to the revolt, were in Hsing-kuo and Tung-ku. Both men had recruited peasants from the surrounding areas to form a guerrilla band that probably had been active in the communist movement since 1928.14 It is reasonable to assume that both men enjoyed a degree of status and support form families in the area. Perhaps Liu Ti, if not some of his officers and men, was a local man who felt a personal loyalty to the two arrested men. In addition, Li Wen-lin's father was a fairly wealthy and influential landlord who might have put Some pressure on Liu Ti to take action. 15 The scarcity of information regarding the people involved in the initial stage of the revolt makes these merely speculations. The most likely, and logical, possibility is that Liu Ti sided with the Action Committee in its policy debate with Mao Tse-tung.

The revolt at Fu-t'ien underscored a basic difference of opinion among communist leaders in Kiangsi: whether to follow the radical innovations of Mao Tse-tung, who had decided to implement his policies by gaining supreme control of the communist movement in Kiangsi, or whether to remain loyal to the established and "legitimate" policies of the Central Committee in Shanghai. The revolt caused a crack in the Red Army at a time when KMT divisions were already enroute to attack the Soviet areas, and thereby threatened both the immediate and long term future of the communist cause. Mao had the opportunity to consolidate, in fact probably to increase, his power if immediately after the revolt he had been able to defeat the rebels decisively. But the rebels had gained the initiative.

The Rebels Organize

In spite of their success in attacking Fu-t'ien and releasing the . Action Committee members, the rebels must have been aware that Mao still held the balance of power and that they would be unable successfully to defend the town. After carrying out arrests of pro-Maoists, and pos- Sibly after some executions, the rebels retreated later the same day across the Kan River to the district of Yung-yang, 16

Once in the relative safety of Yung-yang, Li Wen-lin summoned a "People's Conference" to explain the rebels' position on various issues and, as the meeting developed, to demand the overthrow of Mao. While discussing all of the policies that had caused a gap between the Front Committee and the Action Committee throughout 1930, criticism tended to center on Mao.!7 Mao's class background was analyzed. His father was labeled a wealthy landlord, and it was argued that Mao possessed traits common to that class: self-interest, narrow-mindedness, and conservatism.!8 To the rebels this analysis explained many of the policy differences they had with Mao.

Central among these policy differences was the question of the correct land policy. Mao favored a gradual approach to the problem of land confiscation and redistribution. His policy would allow middle and rich peasants to continue owning their land temporarily, until the party could investigate the peculiarities of each case and reach a decision. Because Mao faced the problem of finding adequate numbers of literate men who could assist in the administration of the Soviet areas, he was willing to give official appointments to landlords and rich peasants who would renounce their evil past and pledge to work for the peasants’ benetit, 19 To the rebels, such ideas were tantamount to a betrayal of the revolution and they promptly issued slogans which explained their stand on the issue: "Oppose the Rich Peasants!", "Divide the Land Equally! ", and "Oppose the Capture of the Government by Landlords and Rich Peasants! ", 20

Other criticisms were also made. Mao was accused of basing policy decisions upon his own opinions, thus failing to follow the correct policies of the Central Committee. His refusal quickly to launch attacks against key cities was a case in point. He was accused of using politics for his own ends, erroneously criticizing and censuring party members. Eventually the discussions reached the crux of the dispute. Mao was accused of trying to become a "Party Emperor." The rebels charged that by skillful political manipulation Mao had placed himself in a powerful position and was now deviating from the correct revolutionary policy, carrying out instead policies of his own making. 21 The outlines of the actual picture, that of Mao moving away from the Central Committee's control and maneuvering to consolidate his own power, are reflected in these charges.

The conference closed by issuing a 'Decision Concerning the Fu-t'ien Incident, "22 which contained these criticism. The rebels decided to dispatch Tuan Liang-pi to Shanghai to inform the Central Committee of their actions. 25 Shortly thereafter, Li Wen-lin organized a Provincial Communist Party Committee with which to administer the rebel Soviet. 24

A rival Soviet existing just beyond the Kan River certainly meant that Mao could no longer hide the split that had been dividing the party in the Kiangsi Soviet since the beginning of the year. The issues in question, and the rationale behind each stand, were now in the open. Although he no doubt would have been willing to defend his investigation of the AB Corps activities, Mao was later saved from explaining his actions during November and December by the first KMT encirclement campaign, which turned the Red Army's attention toward the immediate need for defense, and also by Li Li-san's fall from power. After Li's removal, Mao was able openly to criticize Li's unworkable policies. The Fu-t'ien incident has since been interpreted by Mao as having been the result of Li's unwholesome influence on the rebels. 25

The actions of the rebels, initially within the Action Committee prior to the arrests and later at Yung-yang after the revolt, are important because they so closely followed accepted communist procedure.

As members of the Action Committee, they had worked hard to oppose Mao's policies and had attempted to gain the support of the Central Committee, but always by proceeding through the proper channels. In Yung-yang they retained the communist governmental structure and methods of public discussion. Convinced of the correctness of their actions, they dispatched a representative to Shanghai to gain the Central Committee's support.

Although they opposed the growing power of Mao--they put forth the slogan of "Crush Mao Tse-tung"--they continued to support the Kiangsi communist movement, evidenced by the second half of the above slogan: "Support Chu, P'eng and Huang." (Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai and Huang Kung -lüeh. 26 Their actions appear to have been just as sincere as Mao Tse-tung's.

Pro-Maoists React with Unity

A little more than a week after the revolt at Fu-t'ien, the three principal army commanders in the area, Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, and Huang Kung-lüeh took a united stand unconditionally supporting Mao. Two public letters signed by all three men were issued, one on December 17th and the other on December 18th, 1930. 27

Both letters contained accusations against the rebels and generally covered the same points. The second letter, intended for distribution to men of the 20th Army, seems also to have been rather clearly aimed at the rebels. It contained a stronger defence of Mao's policies and spent less time accusing the rebels. Historically the letters are very revealing, for not only do they recount the events at Fu-t'ien, but they also discuss policy questions and charges made by the rebels.

The army commanders fully defended Mao's military policies which, they said, were designed to bring about the victory of the communist revolution. 28 It was inferred that Tuan Liang-pi and Li Wen-lin had attempted to acquire personal military power. 29 Perhaps they had succeeded to some degree and, as earlier suggested, the rebellious 20th army troops lead by Liu Ti were members of their personal power organization. The rebel leaders were also accused of being officers in the AB Corps.

Mao's land policies were confirmed by the generals as correct. Countering the rebels' charges, the letter stated that Tuan and Li both had rich peasant backgrounds and had opposed the equal redistribution of land. It was asserted that Mao had always favored politically and economically opposing the rich peasants.

The strongest point made in both letters was the complete unity of Chu, P'eng, Huang, and the Red Army with Mao and his policies. "The authors affirmed that Mao's policies followed the correct Bolshevik line and were in accordance with directives of the Central Committee, and charges that Mao engaged in political manipulation or was implementing his own policies were staunchly denied. Policy differences within the communist movement, the authors emphasized, could be solved at formal meetings; there was no need to resort to armed rebellion. 90 Finally the authors put forth what might have been a slogan of their own:

"... Chu, Mao, P'eng and Huang, united to the end. "31

Until the middle of January 1931 the situation between the Maoists and rebels appears to have remained the same. Most likely the rebels continued attempting to win Red Army units over to their side and possibly they also exchanged notes with Mao and Chu, 32 but each must have been unable to move decisively against the other. Mao and Chu could take no action because they urgently needed the Red Army to combat KMT divisions, and the rebels, who remained outnumbered and relatively isolated, had little power. It is interesting to note that Mao still failed to denounce the Central Committee or Li Li-san. Perhaps both sides, feeling that the Central Committee would soon learn of these events, waited for word from Shanghai.

THE REBELLION IS SUPRESSED

The Central Bureau is Formed and Pleads for Unity

In January 1931 word arrived from the Central Committee in Shanghai that both the General Front Committee and the Action Committee had been abolished and were to be replaced by a Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas. The Central Bureau, to be governed by a nine-man board, was to coordinate the consolidation and strengthening of all Soviets. Among the individuals named to the board, only three were then physically present in the Kiangsi Soviet: Mao, Chu Teh, and Tseng Shan, who had escaped arrest by the Fu-t'ien rebels early in December. These appointments unquestionably increased Mao's ability to exercise legitimate authority throughout the Soviet areas, and both Chu Teh and Tseng Shan could be expected to follow Mao's wishes.

From his new position of power, Mao Tse-tung, in the second circular issued by the Central Bureau, published a "Decision on the Fu-t'ien Incident. "24 This document represented at least the fourth time since the revolt that pro-Maoists had recounted the incident and put forth their criticisms of the rebels. 39 The most significant remark about the rebels was an admission that ". . . it has not yet been proven that they [the rebels] were all members of the AB Corps or Liquidationists. . .".?Ó Thus far the pro-Maoists had painted a very strong connection between the AB Corps and the Fu-t'ien rebels. This link, in fact, had been justification for the initial arrests and constituted the most effective charge for removing the Action Committee from power. Had Mao backed down on his original charges because he knew they could never be proven? Perhaps Mao no longer needed the charges. After their prison break, arrests, and open opposition to Mao, the Action Committee and their cohorts could legitimately be condemned as rebels who had split the communist movement. Such charges were easy to prove and Mao would still be able to accomplish his removal of the former Action Committee members.

Capitalizing on these facts, Mao stated that the rebels had aided counter~revolutionary forces by their action and had followed a "right opportunist" line. To insure that all signs of legitimacy were denied the rebels, they were expelled from the Party. Specifically named in the ll circular were Tuan Liang-pi, Li Wen-lin, Hsieh Han-ch'ang, Liu Ti, and Chin Wan-pang. 37 Mao had succeeded in exercising his new authority to undermine the rebels and their arguments.

Emotional responses to the existence of an AB Corps network within the Soviet areas, and the fears and suspicions which produced these responses, had been growing since the Huang-p'o arrests. By January and February 1931, with the first KMT Encirclement and Annihilation campaign only recently ended and with the continued physical presence and activities of the rebel Soviet, tensions in the communist areas reached unmanageable proportions. In many areas the civilian population had been upset by the mass arrests, charges of subversive activity, and the Fu-t'ien revolt. This was particularly true in the areas surrounding Tung-ku and Fu-t'ien, where the people grew hostile toward the Red Army. 38 Fora time during the first KMT campaign, the Red Army cautiously avoided maneuvering through this area. 39 Soon the air was filled with charges and counter charges as individuals and committees discovered suspected AB Corps agents. Party committees and individuals began issuing independent statements setting forth their own view of the Fu-t'ien incident, thus creating possibilities for conflicts that quickly threatened to undermine party discipline and authority. 40 Speeches and lectures directed against the rebels were often carried to extremes, 4! and after a time probably few were free from suspicion.

The Central Bureau had intended its "Decision on the Fu-t'ien Incident" to bring a halt to these extra-party activities concerning subversives. The Decision had called for all party members to unite behind the "correct line" in the face of the KMT threat, 42 but the circular had not stopped anxiety among the people, and by February the situation was almost beyond control. On 19 February 1931, in light of the dangers present, the Central Bureau issued a circular which emphasized more strongly than previous directives the urgent need for unity within the party ranks.43 The importance of "democratic centralism" was cited as a theme requiring that decisions of higher authorities receive absolute obedience. Various party headquarters were warned that failure to obey directives of the Central Bureau might result in disbandment. These remarks were aimed at reasserting party discipline. By its references to the Fu-t'ien incident, its stress on the immediate need for unity, and its remarks admitting again that the rebels may not all have been AB Corps members, the circular clearly reflected the disruption that fear of the AB Corps had caused within the Kiangsi Soviet.

In spite of his positive efforts to quell the AB Corps hysteria, it must be said that Mao Tse-tung was partly responsible for the explosive situation of February 1931. His mass arrests and his use of the AB Corps charge had played on the fears of the populace. Reacting from fear, the people's behavior burst out of control. Mao's attempt to manipulate popular fear of the AB Corps and turn it against members of the Action Committee had seriously backfired.

Removing the Rebels: Public Trials

Between May and July of 1931, Red Army units began moving against centers of rebel activity within the Soviet areas. These operations were undertaken in Fukien and Kiangsi, 44 where revolts against the Central Bureau's authority had supposedly occurred. In each of the three cases, Mao blamed the influence and activities of the AB Corps. Capturing the leaders of each revolt was recognized as an important goal. Agnes Smedley has written of the capture of the Fu-t'ien rebels. According to her account, Mao proposed that he and the rebel leaders hold a conference in Yü-tu to discuss differences and to integrate the rebels into the Central Bureau's authority. The conference was a trap. The rebel leaders and their bodyguard were arrested by the Red Army. Physically reclaiming the rebel areas was probably an easy task after the leaders had been arrested. It is reported that by July 1931 up to 4,000 "counter revolutionary elements" had been captured, 46 and the decision was made to hold mass public trials at the town of Po-sha. 4T Late in the summer of 1931 the trials were convened. A Revolutionary Tribunal was elected, with Mao Tse-tung as its chairman, and many civilians attended the open air proceedings.

Each of the captured rebel leaders (including Li Wen-lin) were placed before the audience and charged with their crime. They were then given the opportunity to plead to the charges and to speak out in their own defense. As might have been expected, the defendants tried to gain the sympathy of the audience, but no doubt they also spoke fairly and honestly about the reasons for their actions. After their defence, the tribunal began questioning the defendants and offering documents or calling witnesses as proof of their charges. The old KMT documents, captured a year earlier at Kian, were brought out and placed against the rebel leaders as evidence. During this time members of the audience were permitted to make statements or ask questions of the rebel leaders.

The spectators soon became emotionally involved in the proceedings as more and more peasants yelled out to condemn or curse the rebelleaders. Then the tribunal brought out the charge of membership in the AB Corps. In spite of earlier statements issued by the Central Bureau refusing to condemn all of the rebels on this charge because of lack of proof, the rebel leaders were confronted with this original accusation. Like all subversives, the tribunal intimated, the rebel leaders were not speaking truthfully when defending themselves, but were lying to cover the truth of their treachery. The spectators grew very excited, accusing or yelling at the rebels, and the tribunal continued pressing its case, urging the rebel leaders to confess. 49 Tribunal members then turned to the audience and asked what the sentence should be. The people yelled, "death!". Although the trial lasted a week, the other rebels (soldiers and cadre) must in some cases have been tried in groups, considering the large numbers involved. Some were sentenced to imprisonment while others were reprimanded and released.

Five men, among them Li Wen-lin, were accused of being rebel leaders and received death sentences, but their sentences were not immediately carried out. 50 Instead they were sent, under guard, to tour the Soviet areas. In the small villages and towns they were forced to stand on platforms while speakers called the people together and told the story of the trial at Po-sha. After being so expertly used for their propaganda value, three of the rebel leaders were executed, while two of them were reportedly still in prison in 1934. 51