European Immigrations

Front matter

RESEARCH

Trends, Structures and Policy Implications

MAREK OKOLSKI (ED.)

Table of Contents

Introduction Marek Okólski

Transition from emigration to immigration Is it the destiny of modern European countries?

Marek Okólski

Introduction

Not long ago, Europe was symbolically reunited — at least, such might be the perception of the first eastward enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004. The accession of eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU gave rise to further dismantling of those barriers between East and West that had been erected in the Cold War era. What followed was a softening of divisions across European societies and an intensification of mutual contacts and flows of knowledge and ideas. Many varied social phenomena in the East were expected to converge with those in other parts of the continent. Migration patterns, regimes and policies ranked among those phenomena.

At the beginning of 1989, when the Poles — and slightly later, citizens of other CEE countries — were granted unlimited freedom of international travel, a considerable part of western public opinion and western states reacted with anxiety, if not phobia. It was feared that freedom of movement — a basic human right that for decades prior to 1989 the West had unstintingly supported — could result in excessive flows of people from CEE to the West.

The East-West exodus did not happen, however. This was because the former communist countries of Europe, still aptly perceived in the late 1980s as politically and economically similar, set different goals for themselves and chose various strategies for transition to democracy and market economy, thus undergoing massive change. An important outcome of that change was a growing capacity to contain within the region itself the vast migration potential that had accumulated over the period of communist repression. This is why in the early 1990s, tens of thousands of Bulgarians, Romanians, Ukrainians and other CEE nationals opted for migration to other former communist countries, notably to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, instead of following in the footsteps of their fellow countrymen who (in much smaller numbers than expected) headed for the West.' In comparison with Western Europe, the Czech Republic and some other economically booming CEE countries were both geographically and culturally closer for the migrants and thus involved less risk for the pioneers of international mobility of people from Ukraine, Romania or other source countries.

Over the 1990s the inflow of foreigners to CEE countries continued. Its forms became more mature; the earlier dominant form — the movement of petty traders and irregular workers engaged in various odd jobs — gave way to the flow of predominantly regular contract workers or small-scale entrepreneurs. By attracting considerable numbers of migrants from faraway countries, such as China (in Hungary and the Czech Republic) or Vietnam (in the Czech Republic and Poland), the national and ethnic composition of incoming foreigners became more diverse. At this time, communities of settled migrants began to appear, especially in large cities.

It appeared that those CEE countries in the forefront of political and economic transition were undergoing changes similar to those experienced a few decades earlier by four Southern European countries — namely, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. These southern countries, along with the process of economic integration with Western Europe, rather rapidly changed their migration statuses. Having been important source countries for guest worker migration to many western economies in the 1950s and 1960s, while suffering from excess labour supply, they shifted to become new major European destinations for immigrant workers.

Since almost all Western European countries had also undergone such a transition, albeit at least a quarter of a century earlier, it seemed rather natural to predict that once Eastern Europe became economically integrated with the rest of the continent, the migration patterns in that region would change accordingly. Or, at least, to profoundly consider such a hypothesis.

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Indeed, large scope of geographical coverage, long duration, high volume of migratory movements and a shift in migration balance from negative to positive on the European soil seem to be an unprecedented social phenomenon of modernity.* The beginning of mass emigration from Europe is usually dated to the early nineteenth century. Jean-Claude Chesnais (1986) argues that over a whole century, in the period 1815-1914, more than 60 million inhabitants of Europe (one fifth of its 1850 population) abandoned the continent of origin and, according to Russell King (1996), approximately 50 million Europeans moved to other continents between 1850 and 19142 In roughly the same period (1861-1920), the United Sates, alone, saw the arrival of 30 million immigrants, 27 or 28 million of whom were probably of European origin (Miller & Castles 1993 after Borjas 1990).* In addition, many millions of European people migrated to other countries within the continent. For instance, between 1876 and 1920, from a total of fifteen million Italian immigrants, nearly seven million went to other European countries, notably to France, Switzerland and Germany. Similarly, a considerable proportion of Irish migrants moved to England and Scotland, whereas Germany was a destination of a large number of

Poles (Castles & Miller 1993). In a sharp contrast, until the late 1940s intercontinental migration to Europe did not match the emigration figures. It predominantly included returning emigrants whose proportion relative to the out-migrants was usually well below 50 per cent (King 1996).

In relative terms, (overseas) emigration per 1,000 resident population was very high in almost all European countries. In certain decades of the 1850-1910 period, it exceeded five per 1,000 on a yearly basis. In countries such as England, Scotland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain and Portugal, it accounted for a large part of their natural increase (Baines 1991; Hatton & Williamson 2008).

The recent picture is strikingly different. Europe has become a continent of net immigration. From 1960 to 2010, the overall positive migration balance was around 32.9 million, that is approximately one fourth of the total 128.3 million increase in the European resident population in that period (UN 2009). According to the United Nations estimate, between 1960 and 2005, the number of international migrants in three of four major parts of the continent (northern, southern and western) rose from 10.3 million to 39.3 million or, in relative terms, from 2.8 per cent to 9.0 per cent of the total population (UN 2006).°

A growing importance of immigration to Europe can be best illustrated by the following observation: the first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rate of net migration close to (plus) 3.5 per 1,000 population in the group of 27 member countries of the European Union, whereas the respective rate of natural increase was below one per 1,000 (Eurostat 2009).

Corrado Bonifazi (2008) attempted to establish the time when Europe attained its status of net immigration. In the 1950s, the migration balance was still strongly negative (-4.8 million over the decade). In the 1960s, the net loss continued, but at a substantially lower level (-600,000). In the next decade, the balance became positive (+3 million). Thus, the 1970s witnessed a breakthrough. Since that time the gap between immigration and emigration in favour of the former has been systematically growing. Bonifazi, however, also stressed distinctive differences in migration trends between major groups of countries and individual countries themselves.

Western Europe turned to a net immigration regime in the 1950s, whereas Northern and Southern Europe only did so in the 1970s.° In turn, if the Russian Federation was excluded, Eastern Europe remained a net emigration region until the end of the century, if not beyond that date.’ On the other hand, Belgium, France, Switzerland and Germany became a net immigration area as soon as in the 1950s,° while Italy only did so in the 1990s. In 1950, many countries of Europe which nowadays are perceived as immigration areas, hardly hosted foreign residents; in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, their share in the total population was below 1 per cent (in some of them — below 0.3 per cent). After a half-century or so, the proportion of foreign residents in those countries multiplied by a factor five to ten (Bonifazi 2008).

Those simple empirical facts, besides the authors’ intuition, became the inspiration for a research project from which this volume emanated.”

The emergence of ever-new immigration countries in Europe in recent decades makes the question of a common European migration pattern pertinent and indeed topical. Cultural proximity and common cultural heritage, comprehensive political, economic and historical links between societies and regions, similar contemporary socio-economic and demographic challenges and convergence of institutions and policies (partly through accession to the EU) can offer a provisional justification.

On the other hand, the succession of European countries in assuming the status of immigration area resembles the phenomenon of gradual entrance by those countries of the mass migration era over several decades in the nineteenth century. From a cross-country and inter-regional perspective, mass emigration from Europe in the period from the 1820s until the outbreak of World War I (and in some cases until the early 1950s) was by no means a uniform process, either in terms of its overall volume or time distribution. Similarly, in the period of intensified immigration, after World War II, European countries and their regions significantly differed with respect to the size and persistence of inflows over time. What particularly mattered in the later period from the European viewpoint were also the differences in forms of flows, the conditions of migrants’ stay and employment and thus immigrants’ propensity or ability to settle and integrate in the host society. Those differences notwithstanding, a general tendency appears clear and indeed unquestionable: until the mid-twentieth century, a great majority of European regions and Europe as a whole were primarily a sending area, whereas, since the second half of that century, they have gradually become a net receiving area. °

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This volume is dedicated to a broadly conceived European migration pattern, to a unique coincidence and interplay of mass migration and the formation of modern Europe. Taking such a long and general view, the analyses in the ensuing chapters, however, focus on relatively recent (or future) phenomena transpiring in the group of countries that belong to the EU.

An underlying assumption is that a typical feature for modernising European countries is the change of a migration balance from net emigration to net immigration. In addition, two basic hypotheses explicitly mark the conceptual framework.

— Patterns of immigration in ‘new’ destination countries (latecomers) recall historical patterns observed in ‘old’ destination countries (early starters)!"

— Each individual country — in the process of transformation from net emigration to net immigration — displays a number of important distinctive characteristics that are dependent on geographic location, previous migration links and routes, as well as the historical time of the transformation and international migratory context at the time.

Through systematising and examining the available body of knowledge about mass migration in Europe, the analyses in this volume seek to reconstruct immigration patterns in individual countries and groups of countries and identify major similarities and differences across those patterns. They also aim to link specific migration patterns with their root causes, historical contexts and structural factors. In particular, an attempt is made to evaluate the impact of migration policies on the course of immigration. Last but not least, the volume includes an exercise on the projection of immigration trends in the ‘foreseeable’ future that exploits the knowledge about past migration and innovative analytical tools.

These aims are to be achieved by in-depth analyses of causes, characteristics and effects of past and current migration flows to EU countries, especially those located in the southern and eastern rims of the European Community. A special importance is to be given to comparing and assessing the political background of immigration in the countries of destination, including its institutional and administrative setup.

The countries included in the analysis represent three parts of Europe that obviously differ according to geographic location and the time when net positive immigration status was (or will be) reached. The countries where the change in migration balance was accomplished before or during the third quarter of the twentieth century are named ‘old’ immigration countries. Those where such change occurred in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century are named ‘new’ immigration countries; and the remainder (the change to be completed some time in the twenty-first century) are named ‘future’ immigration countries. The respective breakdown of those countries is presented in Table 1.

The main concept underlying the framework and the method of analysis is that of country migration status. Migration status, perceived in terms of migration balance and inflows/outflows volume, became a crucial category in the analysis of migration transition — the process of a former emigration country acquiring the attributes of a new immigration country. In turn, those concepts and categories were framed by a more general conception of the migration cycle.

‘Migration cycle’ is an analytically useful, but by no means innovatory idea. For instance, as early as 1954, Brinley Thomas examined long swings

Table 1 Breakdown of countries with respect to their migration status

Part of Europe Time Early 4th quarter of Late the twentieth century West Austria, France South Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain East Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland in trans-Atlantic migration (and urban development) in the period 1870- 1910 within the concept of ‘migration cycle’,'* while Castles and Miller (1993) suggested a cycle-like four-stage ‘model’ of migration as a tool for systematising and identifying the time-dependent internal dynamics of immigration.'? Similarly, and also in 1993, Anthony Fielding argued that mass migration to, from and within Europe changes ‘in tune with the stages of the business cycle’ (Fielding 1993: 10). He distinguished four stages of the cycle, each being distinctly different with respect to basic migration characteristics. As economic activity fluctuates in a regular pattern, from an expansion (up to a peak) to a recession (down to a trough), and from a recession to an expansion, mass migration behaves in the way that is presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Stages of a migration cycle dependent on the business cycle

Stage 1 (expansion) Immigration starts low and rises rapidly; emigration starts high and falls rapidly; net immigration replaces net emigration.

Stage 2 (peak) Immigration peaks high; emigration bottoms out low; high net immigration Stage 3 (recession) Immigration starts high and falls rapidly;

emigration starts low and rises rapidly; net emigration replaces net immigration.

Stage 4 (trough) Immigration bottoms out low; emigration peaks high; high net emigration

Source: Fielding (1993: 11)

Moreover, the ‘migration cycle’ underlies such concepts as ‘mobility transition’ (Zelinsky 1971), ‘migratory transition’ (Chesnais 1986) and ‘transition from trickle to flood’ (Hatton & Williamson 2008), and has been exploited in many empirical studies. Some of those applications are referred to in chapter 1 of this volume. It might be mentioned here, however, that no universal or unequivocal sense and meaning is attributed in the literature to the concept of migration cycle.

The authors of the present volume apply ‘migration cycle’ in a flexible manner, in its narrower or wider meaning, according to analytical needs, aspect of migration or time-horizon of analysis. For instance, one of those applications followed the pioneering effort of Felice Dassetto (1990), who himself understood the cycle as a combination of cross-generation processes making migrants from poor countries enter and settle in a rich country. In this volume, it is exploited in the analysis of European countries passing to ever-greater ‘maturity’ with respect to immigration (see chapter 2 by Joaquin Arango in this volume). Another example was the application of the ‘migration cycle’ to the systematisation of stages in the change in country migration status, where the fundamental and constitutive process of the cycle comes to be the migration transition (see chapter 1 by Marek Okólski and chapter 3 by Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger in this volume). The principal difference between the approaches adopted by the authors is that some of them (mainly chapter 1 and, to a lesser degree, also chapter 3 plus some others) take a very long view and reach as far back as to the origins of mass emigration, while others (mainly chapter 2) focus on relatively recent developments in European migration history, namely, the stage when European countries were experiencing sizeable and sustained flows of immigrants. The reason of this distinction seems obvious and it is purely functional. The former enables us to capture and compare the change in migration patterns in virtually all countries of Europe; the latter serves as an in-depth analysis of similarities and diversity in the establishment and maturing of the area and pertains exclusively to the present (‘old’ and ‘new’) net immigration countries.

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This volume is organised as follows. The first two chapters focus on the recent history of European migration and the conceptual underpinnings of the analyses presented later in the volume. The next part (chapters 3 through 8) consists of three syntheses that test the concept of a regional immigration pattern in each of the three groups of countries and inquire into similarities and differences in migrant flows, immigrant integration and migration policies in those groups. It becomes clear that a synthetic perspective is more appropriate and manageable for countries with relatively long histories and rich experiences of immigration, as opposed to countries where immigration is a rather new phenomenon.

In the synthesis depicting immigration in ‘old’ immigration countries (chapter 3), the authors take a rather long and general view and offer stylised facts about migration. A corresponding chapter 5, related to ‘new’ immigration countries, while also attempting to draw a general picture, pays more attention to details and specificities of time, country and context of immigration. In contrast to these two, chapter 8, devoted to ‘future’ immigration countries — adhering to the cross-country comparative approach — mainly describes trends and patterns in individual countries; the author here is rather cautious in pointing to common regional characteristics of the analysed processes. The first two of those syntheses are accompanied by chapters 4, 6 and 7 presenting either different perspectives on the virtue of a ‘regional’ model of immigration or discussion of some of the key findings of those syntheses. The inclusion in the volume of these three critical chapters seems to have enriched the body of arguments in the debate on a ‘European pattern of immigration’.

The next part of the volume (chapters 9 and 10) deals with migration forecasts. First, past attempts at migration forecasting, focusing mainly on inadequate data and techniques, are critically assessed and, in turn, an innovative approach to improving those forecasts is developed. Such a view is challenged and, to some extent, balanced in a brief rejoinder that follows. The final part of the volume (chapters 11 and 12) concentrates on lessons that can be learned from a comparative analysis of migration policies carried out in the individual countries and the groups of countries, as well as from recent trends in the management of migration in the context of European integration. In its conclusion, this part identifies the major challenges faced by the EU in the area of migration and immigrant integration policy. The volume closes with a brief account of major conclusions and an appraisal of the degree to which the authors’ objectives have been accomplished. Here the hypothesis of European migration pattern is critically reassessed.

Turning to a more detailed look at the chapters, the first, by Okolski, deals with the premises of migration status change in European countries. It is based on the hypothesis that, in the long run, migration results primarily from the degree of disequilibrium between population and other resources, which at times manifests itself in various degrees of overpopulation or underpopulation. He points to the circumstances under which countries of Northern and Western Europe transformed from sending masses of their population overseas to receiving large numbers of people from all around the world and, consequently, from net emigration to net immigration. He also suggests that a similar shift in the migration pattern and balance, albeit after a certain time lag, occurred in a number of Southern European countries. This leads him to elaborate some considerations about the present migration status of Central and East European countries and basic prerequisites for their change of migration status in the near future. Okolski concludes that such a change in any country requires, above all, the outflow of excess population and, secondly, embarking on the path of sustained modern economic growth. When this is coupled with the completion of the demographic transition (natural increase close to zero and advanced ageing of the population), emigration starts to decline. On the other hand, economic competition and the search for cheap labour by employers induce segmentation of the labour market and increase demand for foreign workers. In effect, in the course of time the inflow of people becomes larger than the outflow.

In the following chapter, Arango seeks an answer to the question: Do different migration realities and experiences among European countries stem from historical factors (e.g. the moment when the migration pattern or regime started to change) or from structural socio-economic differences? In order to do so, he develops an analytical framework that serves as a basis for identification of distinct groups of immigration countries and a tool for the analysis of intra-group similarities and inter-group differences. This framework refers to the notion of a migration cycle conceived as a multistage process through which immigrants become better adapted to and (ultimately) integrated in the receiving society, and the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants increasingly resemble those of the native population. It also implies the following four criteria of grouping and analysis of the immigration countries: age (stage of the migration cycle), generation (historical context of initial and formative phases of the cycle), historical precedence and socio-economic regime. In the next step, Arango applies that framework to examine the distinctiveness of the immigration patterns and characteristics of immigrant populations in the three groups of European countries. He concludes that the set of analysed countries presents great complexity and variation with respect to migration. This notwithstanding, the three different migration regimes in Europe seem to be a reality, where four Southern countries represent the highest degree of internal homogeneity and three CEE countries represent the lowest.

In the volume’s first chapter devoted to a specific group of European countries, Fassmann and Reeger describe in a detailed manner the migration patterns observed in ‘old’ immigration countries. In doing so, they extensively use the concept of a migration cycle composed of three distinct stages: initial (pre-transformation), intermediate (transition) and adaptation (post-transformation). They also consider four characteristics of each stage: historical time, quantities (flows, stocks, pace of growth, fluctuations), public perception and legal measures. In their analysis, they include Germany and the UK in addition to Austria and France, and contrast those countries with Spain (as an example of a ‘new’ immigration country). Accounting for the differences between the countries at any given time, Fassmann and Reeger come to a straightforward final conclusion: with regard to immigration, European countries are developing in the same direction and in a similar way.

Godfried Engbersen’s chapter widens the scope of analysis that deals with ‘old’ immigration countries. The author argues that the long-run approach adopted by Fassmann and Reeger, which he calls ‘path-dependent’, fails to recognise the importance of contemporary (or current) migration flows to Western countries, whose nature seems significantly different from the bulk of flows observed in the past. The essence of that new mobility, exemplified by the case of flows of people from CEE to the Netherlands, is a fluid (liquid) form of labour migration. In an institutional context entirely different from that of the old guest worker system of the 1960s and 1970s, the migration pattern in ‘old’ countries now seems to be deviating from the path depicted by the concept of a migration cycle. New migrations are, among others, characterised by a regular status of migrants’ employment, temporary stay, individualised life strategies, multiplicity and multidirectionality of movements and loosely defined aspirations and options of migrants. All of this makes rather pertinent the question put forward by Engbersen: Are we witnessing a shift from the adaptation stage (according to Fassmann and Reeger, the final in the migration cycle) to a new initial stage?

The three succeeding chapters deal with the specificity of the so-called Southern (or Mediterranean) model of immigration, pertaining to ‘new’ countries of immigration. In the opening chapter, João Peixoto and six co-authors skilfully synthesise the immense research and new findings pertaining to four countries — Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal (Arango, Bonifazi, Finotelli, Peixoto, Sabino, Strozza & Triandafyllidou 2009). They refer to earlier comparative analyses of immigration experiences in Southern European countries with the intention of testing their validity and updating them. In their analysis, Peixoto et al. focus on the phenomenon of irregular migration, the mechanisms of migrant workers’ insertion in the labour market and migration policy responses. Special attention is paid to regularisation policies, executed — typical for Southern countries — ex post, as well as to their effectiveness and social costs. Through cross-country analysis, the authors scrupulously examine various aspects of migration-related experiences, tracking signs of both regional homogeneity and diversity. Despite the differences with regard to timing, quantity and types of migrant flows or to policy tools, ultimately, they seem to be convinced that a ‘Southern model’ does exist. They stress, however, that the model is dynamic because with time it acquires ever-new dimensions and meanings and includes new social frameworks and new policy instruments.

In turn, Martin Baldwin-Edwards presents a sceptical view about the utility and validity of a ‘Southern model’, identified in earlier years by the author himself and several others, especially when it comes to analyses of ongoing migration processes in the respective countries. Further, he adds a number of factors that — according to him — could enrich the analysis by Peixoto et al.; these include the role of local governance in policy directed at integration of immigrants, the role of NGOs and civil society in providing social support and acceptance of immigrants and the dependence of migration policy on political ideology and the operation of political parties.

In conclusion, Baldwin-Edwards suggests that a ‘Southern model’ might be too simple and too broad to adequately grasp all complexities and experiences acquired to date by the Mediterranean countries.

The last in the series of three chapters devoted to Southern European countries limits itself to Portugal and Spain, to what is called the ‘Iberian model of labour migration’. Author Jorge Malheiros takes an in-depth look at a major feature of that model: the low degree of regulation of migration flows ‘in a society characterised by practices marked by familiarism, informality and patrimony-based traditions’. He finds a close match between economic interests and migration policies that bring about a specific pattern of foreign worker recruitment, insertion and, ultimately, integration in the labour market. He argues that in this respect, Portugal and Spain, which are similar, differ significantly from Italy and radically from Greece.

The next chapter is devoted to immigration trends and patterns in three CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In this chapter, Dušan Drbohlav draws extensively from a comprehensive cross-country analysis pertaining to the three countries (Grabowska-Lusinska, Drbohlav & Hars 2011). He points out that the three ‘future’ immigration countries, although expected to be experiencing similar migration-related processes, are in fact strongly differentiated. Migration flows to the Czech Republic are rather strong, emigration is low and the migration balance is clearly positive; Hungary has little immigration and hardly any emigration, resulting in a tiny surplus of immigrants; and in Poland emigration by far exceeds immigration, leading to a negative migration balance. On the other hand, Poland has a strong inflow of circular or short-term migrants (a good proportion of those migrants fit the concept of liquid migration, introduced in chapter 4) whereas in the Czech Republic and Hungary, long-term immigration is the predominant type. Drbohlav concludes that all three countries are undergoing migration transition, an intermediary stage between being an emigration country and being an immigration country, but find themselves in different phases of the transition. Poland is in its incipient phase, whereas Hungary and the Czech Republic, especially, are considerably further on in that process. Those differences notwithstanding, all three are at the moment too ‘young’ as immigration countries to justify a meaningful search for a ‘regional model’ of immigration or to draw a parallel between those countries and the rest of Europe.

The following two chapters deal with the issue of immigration in the future, or, strictly speaking, with the limits to migration forecasting. Arkadiusz Wisniowski and his three co-authors argue that the relevant forecasts yield inevitably uncertain results if only for three reasons: the inability to adequately define migration, difficulty in its precise measurement and imperfections in knowledge about the nature of the processes involved. A considerable part of these weaknesses is attributed by them to the deterministic character of population forecasts, in general, and migration, in particular. In order to alleviate at least some of the weakness of migration forecasting, they suggest using a stochastic approach and, in particular, Bayesian statistics. This leads them to apply the concept of migration forecasting in a flexible manner, complementing official immigration data with expert data derived from a series of Delphi surveys. In turn, with help of autoregressive models and vector autoregressive models, Wisniowski et al. present numerical results from that approach for a number of immigration countries representing various parts of Europe. Summing up, they seem to be confident that migration is mostly an unpredictable phenomenon and claim that ‘precise forecasting of the exact values of immigration flows is virtually impossible’. Although the application of stochastic models to the forecasting of migration flows enables researchers to quantify and account for a degree of uncertainty, the lesson for policymakers is clear: any migration forecast must be viewed with great caution and all the more caution for longer time horizons.

Leo van Wissen, in the second chapter in this section, applauds the approach adopted by Wisniowski et al., which he describes as innovative and elegant. However, he disagrees with their main message, namely that migration is hardly predictable. To support his view, Van Wissen discusses in a rather technical way a handful of factors that — in favourable circumstances — might make the results less uncertain. Thus, room for improvement can be found in the following: a better translation of expert ideas into distributions of the parameters of the forecasting model; more careful assumptions about the interdependency of model parameters; a lengthening of the time series for explanatory variables included in the model; a more accurate (‘optimal’) mathematical formulation of the model; and more internally consistent data on migration extracted from official statistics.