Principled Pragmatism: VOC Interaction with Makassar 1637-68 and the Nature of Company Diplomacy

Front matter

Principled Pragmatism

VOC Interaction with Makassar 1637-68, and the Nature of Company Diplomacy

Carl Fredrik Feddersen

Section 2: The respective General Instructions 1609-50, and

diplomacy's role in them w.ccccscscsssscsscscssscscsscscsssssssscscsssscssscscssssssussesesusseseesesssusssseesessansesseesessans 119 URE GO OM MS tH Gtl ONS enteren eeen 119 Issues, concerns, and diplomacy in the 1609 Instructions … nanne 120

The 1613 Instructions Context and general contents … nun nnenensenenseenenseneneneenens 122 General presentation of the contents in the 1613 Instructions weet teeta 122 On diplomacy in the 1613 Instructions siccin 126 ArH CIE BS rennende en eenden een.

Article 10

AMC S etna A epee 129 ANCES eana E EEEE 129 Hierarchy of concerns by structure Of exposition … nnn aaenanreneneereneneeneneneeneneneeneneenen 131 The role of and approach to diplomacy ...ccccccscsscscssssescssssesssssstsssstssssessscsessssessesseenssesneeees 132 ne 1632 InStructiONS raster a benenden 132 Contents and structure of the 1632 Instructions ……..….nannannensensensenensensenennensensenenenn: 133 TMG MOI CCAS er tensiden nen an 133 The treatment of diplomacy in the 1632 Instructions … ananas eeeneneeeneneen 134 The Moluccas: Political concerns and diplomacy.. oh The 1650 Instruetions aanvnementende na R dta The-context of the 1650 [nStruUCtiONSsessnsana na Textual analysis, the 1650 Instructions … nnn sanensneeneneerenensenenenrenenenneneneeneneneenenennsneneen The balance between war and diplomacy regarding

independent Asian pfine®S.sannrnrandanendennmnrdnnadanbedeneen 139 Treaties and negotiations in category 3..nnnnnneneneeeneereneneeenenreneneneneneenenenenenensneneen 139

Adaptation, accommodation, and pragmatism as

the general principle in diplomatic interaction

with rulers in category Sruammntententerveboendaba anderen Cultural-accommoódation.nrn rennen EG Means of diplomacy: The diplomatic gift Notions of cultural relativism and pragmatic accommodation to local ways in the pre-1650 General Instructions … enn. 144

International law and “treaty” in the 1609 Instructions … nnen eneen eeens 146

Conclusion: The Directors’ model of overseas diplomacy

in the General Instructions, 1609-50 wove cscsseceesessssssessssseseesesesesseesereevens Section 3: Commerce, diplomacy, and ideology … nonsense senen ensensenensensensenensenns

The Company's success as providential blessing Section 4: Approaches to diplomacy in the entries on Makassar in the particular patriase letters to the High Government 1634-1669 … nnen. 154 SECHONINEFOGUCTI ON zn eeens te ternet 154 Letters containing politico-diplomatic implications or direct advice on diplomatic approach … nnn aneneneenenenenenrenenensenenseneneneneneeneneneenenennen 155

The nature of the Directors’ advice on approach towards Makassar in the particular patriase letters … nnn unnsnseeneneenenseneneneenenseneneneenenenens 159 ChapterGontlusiofasmanmsmennnnenmminsiterterednertedsnttte itis de 159

4 Culture and Treaty: Leonard Andaya's model of conflicting treaty conceptions and the June 26, 1637 treaty between Sultan

Alauddin and the Company …..nnnnnunnennsnnnnnnnennennnennsnnnennnennennnennmannsnnmennennnennennnennwennennenn 161

Section 1: Presentation of the June 26, 1637 treaty of peace between

the:Company:and Makassar arningnatmantnamantantidendi deet 162 Background and context of June 1637 treaty … nn nnnneneneneneenenseeneneenenseneneneenensenens 162 The nature of the 1637 treaty: Historiographic positions and MY PhOPOSIU OMS rar nennen

Plan of exposition..

SOUC ES E E E E E

Section 2: Perspective in South-Sulawesian thinking on diplomacy and treaty: Andaya’s positions and my counter-propositiOns … nanasan 164 Andaya's structural approach to overseas treaty making wesc 164 Local imprints in the Company-Makassar treaty record … nanne eeneneneenenenens 165 Andaya on the protection of sovereignty as a “typical South Sulawesian feature,” and its imprint onthe 1637 treaty wesc 166 Problems in the analysis ...ccccsccscssssssessssessssesessesesssseseesesessssssssssssssssseessssssssseassssstscsesacsneessees 167 Alauddin's claim of perceptions of perpetuity as typical of the South Sulawesi treaty tradition … unne ennenenenensenensueenensenenensenensuenensenensnnenansenensnenans: 168 Antagonistic notions of “breach of contract” ……....nnenaneneneneneneeenenvensnenssneneenenenerneneen 169 The swearing ritual as an example of local imprint … nn anenenenenseneneneeneneneeneneenens 171 SEH OM CONCIUSI O Rises verevenen rennende meten tatie 172

Section 3: The significance of communicative performance in

Brief chronology of events from June 22-June 26 and their implications … … 173 Section propositions: tenet nennen entered

Events of June 22: Determining the sultan’s intentions Events of June 23: The Achenese ambassadors as communication link and mediators … nnn anennsnennenenreneneeeneneeneneneeveneeneneneneneeneneneen 174

Morning JUNE 232225 ttc a a Se ee al cease 174 Negotiating for negotiations, June 23 ……...nunnununsenensnenenseenseneneneevensneensnenvensnenneneneensneneen 176 Initial negotiations on board the ship, June 23 v.ccceccccsesessssesestsseseesesestssessesssesceeseaeeeees 177 Events of June 24: A simple “misunderstanding”? … …...…..nnnnunenenseeneneenensenenenseneneneens 179 Negotiations of substance, June 24 nnn ennanenenenreneneneeneneeneneneeneneenenevernenseneneneeneneneens 180 Alauddin's first response, June. 24 u ssieccecssactviestisveisdveectisiansivsescestacttaneseadtent kanaals 181 Dutch deliberations and swift response on the ship, June 24 nnen: 184 Alauddin's amendments and continued negotiations, June 25... 184

TheJune 26 neésotiationSwicrciemneineaieed annaiviadeiwaen waded Geni 186 Thesecond negotiations, JUNE 26 narmaenermnnnentntent annen een 188 Conclusion Secom kanran an a a a a A 189 Section 4: Text, meaning, and nature of the June 26 treaty... 191

Section introduction The typical Company treaty as opposed to the South Sulawesian tradition, according to:Andayansnnnimarmnanmnnennrenenn N ERN 191 Accommodation as the exception to the rule ...ccccccccscscsssssssesesestesssesssessssscetsssarsseens 192 Andaya on antagonistic interpretative frameworks as the rule nnen. 193 Comments: The nature and form of the treaty ..c.ccccccscscssesssessesesessscsssssesssssseseereseees 196 The issue of “sovereignty” ….….nnnnunnnsnreensneeneneeneneneeneneeneneneeneneeneneveenenenneneteeneneneneneeneneneenens 197 Explications and implications of secular, defensive “sovereignty” vce 198

Chapter conclusion: Treaty compromise by context and meaningful communication, not cultural collision and MUS COMMU CATIOM EN 201

5 Policy Discussions and the 1655 Treaty with Makassar—A Matter of Trust and Belief

Section 1: Chapter introduction w..ccccccsscscsscssssssssesssscssssssssssesssssssecsssssssscsssseesessscsessescsssssseeess MMENG55°COMLEX scares conserve eestscrss acute aed ER sie O e Chapter sections and propositions s:n SOUPCES snaren denken detentie eenen neten ended A comment on the Generale Missiven as a source for understanding “overseas diplomatic culture” …..nnnneneneneneenenenrenenensenensenenensensnenn 206

Section 2: Conflicting assumtions of diplomatic performace 1650-1655 … nn. 206 A brief chronology of diplomatic interaction, 1650-55... 206 Makassar as a category 3 territory in the 1650 General Instructions … nn 208 Implications in the Directors’ advice on Makassar, 1650 … nennen eeneneneen 210

Section 3: The De Vlaming-Maetsuyker Controversy Concerning When to End the War: the shared pragmatic mode of thinking about overseas diplomacy, and the assumptions in Maetsuyker's * torn Tool dor: Len 211 Section topic and pro bleiene aaa aera aa aa EREE E EAE E EEE 211

Maetsuyker: Career and historiographic evaluation … nanne eenenenseneneneenen. 211 De Vlaming van: OudShoObni mmm attended 212 PROPOSITIONS tears teen GEE E Ae es 212 Textual analysis, Maetsuyker's advocacy for the negotiation option in the missive of December 24, 1655 nana enenenreneneneneneenen sneren eeneneneenenennen 213 On De Vlaming's excessive use of force as counterproductive I ENA E T las Arte nende bnl anai E 214

The basic assumptions in De Vlaming's argument for

prolonged war until total ViCtOTy starring De Vlaming's cost-benefit argument … nan aneenenseneneneenenserenensevensneeneneneensnensneneensnenenn Maetsuyker on De Vlaming's cost-benefit argument for war nnee De Vlaming and Maetsuyker on whether to trust the Makassarese nn. Maetsuyker's counter-arguments to De Vlaming's “grand strategy” De Vlaming's grand strategy for Makassar rejected—a matter of differingexpectations unten Aid Ae ae ane, 217 Rejecting De Vlaming's war plan as costly, reckless and likely counterproductive—advocating soft diplomacy as an alternative … cscs 218 Opposing De Vlaming’s grand strategy for its lack of

Arguing the lack of realism in the belief in obtaining local allies Arguing permanent residency and information gathering by way of treaty as opposed to war u...scsecsssessesessesesessesesssscsussesessesesessescsnsssseessssansseseesessaseesees 220 The concluding appeal to the Directors nnen nenenseneneneenensenenensenenseensnsenensnsenaneene 220 Considerations of context primary to considerations of law wesc 221 The significance of dismantled trust after 1655 and its significance in interpreting the 1655 context … u nnnnensnneneneenenseneneneevensaeneneeveneneenanns 222 Opposing standpoints within a shared conceptual framework—the source of differences in policy preferentes... 222

Section 4: Analysis of the 1655 treaty as a typical product of

“SORE DPI OMI ACN verteren renee nennen treten Historiographic POSITIONS … nana enenenreneneneeneneeneneneenenenneneneeneneveenenseneneneenenseneneneenenennens Propositions, analysis of the 1655 treaty Textual AMalySiS..cccccccscscsssscsscsssscssssscsessssesessssessssssesssssssssssesssssssssssesssssssssscesessscsusscacsnsessssecases COMMENTS PreambDlEnntetemntemetebhemmntentntnttrtt CONCESSION Sey tetten manden Article: 21655 treaties ntt Articles Sandi Arent tende eia e i naria Aia anite AUGER A brief speculation on Hasanuddin’s use of the religious argument in articles 2-5 nnn nananeneenenrenenensenensuneneneenensveenenseneneveenenennenaneenensanenansenenanenans: 228 Prestige and religion as motives in Company diplomaCy… nn nnnnanennensenenensenenenens 229 Articles 6 and 7: Regulating relations with the Portuguese alc other thi parti®S.nnmnmntenmnn mennen a dk 229 Comments on the regulation of the Makassar-Company positions in the multilateral interaction regime set down inrarticles:6 and Aertsen end E E E 230 Securing the Company's monopoly and Sovereignty by treaty:

AFLIOIE S EEEE EEEE E lerenden ada eter 231 The-conclusion:of the 1655 treaty eena 231 Chapter conclusion ...c.cscccsscscsscsssssscssssscsssscsussescsnsscsusscsesssscsssscscsnsesssessscausesseesessansesssansseseeeess 232

6 The Pragmatic Dynamics of the Batavian Diplomatic Mode—Shifts and Fluctuations in the High Government's Approach towards Makassar as Presented in the Generale Missiven, 1656-61 …..nnsnansnnrennnnenennennennennnnnnensnnnnennnnnn 233 Section 1: Introduction to the: chapter to pie wiciiscicielcioh naan deiou saints 233 Contextual Considerations and factors ....ccccccssesessesessesesesseseesssssessssescsssscsseseesssssseesseaeseees 234 PrOPOSILIONS weereens Focus and plan of exposition Comments: on the SOUrCeS annen manen erdee Section 2: The missive of December 4, 1656—blaming Van der Beeck ....cccscccsscsesssscssssssssssscssssssssscsesssscsusscsessesesuescsessssesusassesesscsceeeseenees 237 The 1656 context—the reversal of positive expectations of Hasanuddin … ………. 237 Textual an alysis, Makassar in the missive of December 4, 1656 annae 237 Comments Summing up positions and their implications in the missive of December 4, 1656 … nnee eneen enenneneneneneneneenenenenenenrnvenenenenevennnenen 239 Section 3: The missive of December 17, 1657—full explication of an offensive policy towards Makassar nnee eeneneneeneneeneneneeneneeeneneeneneneeneneenens 239 Conen tarn nnmn antenna a e 239 Makassar in the missive of December 17, 1657 … annen eneen 240 Textual analysis, missive of December 17, 1657: Validating Hasanuddin’s hostile intentions and deceitfulnesS nnn nnnenenrenenenneneneenenensenenenn 240 Comment: The emotional aspect of the turn from trust to distrust… 241 Explaining the probability of Makassarese plans for war and conspiracy against the Company nnn snneneneenenseenensenensneeneneeeneneenenseensneeensneensnes The commercial conspiracy, already at work = The explanation of the post-1655 strategy ..cccccccscesssssesestessscsssssrsssssssssscsesssstsssssseeeaees Arguing the case for war by referring to the deceitful nature of Hasanuddin and the MakassareSe....c.cccscssssesssessesessesssessesessssssessssssnsscsteesseeeess 243 The presentation of Hasanuddin as an unreliable partner in:tieaty-making nternet tenten hehe teddies 244 Assurance of the commitment to fend off a Makassarese attack on Ambon and Banden veder graven eneen 244 A return to, and turnaround of, the 1655 cost-benefit arguments LOUIE WV Mle tenten A E 245 Comment tt en aces cos eee ees ee es Sl 245 The argument concerning the excessive costs of war countered… nnen. 246 Reassuring that the security of Ambon and Banda is not jeopardised and arguing the soundness of the war plan … nnn uuennenrenenenrenenseneneneeneneneneneenenenn 246 Inscribing Makassarese deceit towards the Company as structurally embedded eternet enen etende 247 The cultural-religious argument …....nnnenenennensenensnrenenseeeneneeneneneenenenneneneeneneneenenenneneneen 247

COMMENTS mannenstemmen 248

Summing up the break with the 1655 assumptions and positions in

the Generale Missiven of December 1656 and 1657 ..c.ccccscscsssstssesestesesteeseeesssteeeseees Section 4: The missive of December 14, 1658

The fear of a Makassar-Mataram alliance, and the implications for the Spice Islands annen Avene wend aida Aina databank 250 Deliberating on the nature of religion in Makassar's expansion efforts … 250 COMMEN ianei a deanna RE RE E dian Adee nananueniis 251 The High Government's change of view on the mix and hierarchy among the pursuits of power, prestige, and profit … nnn annnensnnenensenensenenenseensneenenn: 252 Concluding the analysis of the December 14, 1658 letter: The difference of tone in the 1657 and 1658 letters... cesses 253 Shared characteristics of the 1656, 1657, and 1658 missiven ii contrast to that of 1655.20 sunnanmmandaeenakeddnnnm neten 253 Section 5: The December 16, 1659 missive: Reporting on Negotiations with Low Expectations ....cccccccsssscssscsesssscsesssssssssssessesssssssesssssssssseesssssnsesseees extial Anasi ER ARA

Section 6: The December 16, 1660 missive Brief diplomatic chronology, January-December 1660

The: Bugis rebellion; 1660 aren earns aen sertenventen err etna benden Topics and issues in the missive December 16, 1660 … naan anrenaneeenenreneneneeneneen The contextual imprint in the December 16, 1660 missive on Makassar—and the slide from realism towards CYNICISM … nn annannneneneenensneenenn: 259 Textual analyses, the December 16, 1660 missive on Makassar: Defending the decision to go to war viccccssssssestsssscsssestsssscssssssssssssssssasssscsssscstsssscstsacacenes 260 Advocating the grand Strategy ...ccccscsscscssssscsssssssssscsssssssssscsessssssnsssseessssssesseerssssneesseees 260 Commented ennen 261 Policy preferences fluctuating as to information about context uo... eects 261 Comments ten nn 262 Bending treaty agreements on Fort Panakkukang in the hope of implementing the grand strategy … nnn ennen enneneneeneneeneneneeneneneeneneenenenernenseneneneenenennens 262 Comments eaan a a 263 Section 7: The Missiven of January 26 and December 22, 1661:

The plans for the post-1660 commercial regime and its political implications … Commêéntsn nn tetra Ae oe let leah le te SUNS UD eeen tenen nf Chapter Conclusion ...cccccccscscsscscessscssssssssscsssscssessscsssscsscsssssssssssssacsusscssssssssusscassscacsusacacsnsasaeacases

7 Learning to contract, 1: From contractual regulations of interaction towards construction of a relational regime 1637-1660 …....nnnnssnansennnnrnenennnnensensnnnenannennnnnnnnn

Section: Chapter introduction sissiccsc dace nanienawn ainda den TOPIC kesian e eee eee ene scent PROPOSITIONS 2:.4i4a. eine eend wad chain alain hued iid Continuities and breaks in the dynamics of treaty making....

Section 2: A recapitulation of the 1637 and 1655 treaties as “soft” treaties … 271 The 1637 and 1655 treaties: Different, but still two Of akind… neen 272

Section 3: The switch to contractual constructivism:

The dual nature of the 1660 Tre@aty...cccccssccscsssssssssscsssscsssscscssssssssscscsscsssesscscsessessscsssnsssseeees 273 Section introduction: Topic and propositions … nnn anannansenenserenensenenenvenenseeneneenenennn 273 Plan Of exposition … nnn annananeneneeneneneenenseneneneeneneenenenn …274

Section 4: Textual analysis of the August 1660 treaty ……..…..nnnnnansennennnensensenens ensen: 274

A treaty to be honoured, make no mistake about it … nnen enneneneneneneneneneenen 274 Reconstructing the political regime: 1—Limiting Makassarese claims of sovereignty outside Makassar to secure the Company's interests in the Moluccas (articles 1, 2, and 3) wu... 275 Comment: Idioms of “sovereignty” in articles 1, 2, and3 and

CiplomatiGimMOde:, sanne ANA EEA 275 Issue: Ambon, the Spice Islands—banning interference and

Comments: A further turn towards treaty formulations in

the concrete and specific .cccceccccsscssessssssestsseseesessssssseessssscssssssvssssssusscstsesscssscsssesscscensssanseees 277 Securing and protecting the Company's monopoly in the

Spice Islands (articles 6 -9)… nanne enensenseneenensensennenensensenennensensensenensensensenensensanennens 277 Comment: constructing a defence for the monopoly by treaty „sssri 279 Power politics and the expulsion of the Portuguese (articles 9-12) nnen 279 Articles 9-11: Neutralising the threat from the Portuguese in

Solor and Timor and making it a general rule … nnn aanannensensenenensensenneensensenennensen 280

Summing up: Restrictions on Makassar's foreign policy and autonomy in the precautions to protect the monopoly The expulsion of the Portuguese (article 12) … ...nnnnnenneneenenenrenenseenensenensnrenenenseneneenen

A proposition for a reconfiguration of Makassar-Company

relations following the expulsion of the Portuguese ……....nnnnnnnsnnenseensnrenenseeeneneeenennn 281 The blame and shame in damages and debt:

1—Implications of prestige distribution

(articles 1315 Gi 18) ern eenden enn 282 PIL G B ee ee en 282 COMMEN Etenen a a 283 Articles 14 arid 15: mannenteams eendaadse nad 283 Courting Makassar in distrust: Articles 23-26 nnen enenenrenenenneneneeenenseneneeenevenn 284 Article 25: Evacuation of Fort Panakkukang … …...nnnsansennenenensennenensensensenensensenseenn: 285

Correcting the mistakes of 1655: Regulations on runaways and converts (articles 16 and 17) … nnn auenensenenensenenreneneneenenseneneneenenennens 285 A 1660 ‘Convert CONCESSION ancse a an ade de 286 Article Tiense N R a 286 ChäpterContclüsiofanmenmmmnnnmneneneidei GEELEN 287 Section 1: Chapter introduction 1:40 caw cua diAdhainiannkeinakdnee ia nnendnd 289 Section propOSitiONSveAventwsasiwieadiniewniiniediiwaeaideieninendinaniius 289 Plan:of exposition er cain eniahnadinahuaaahd inenen 290 Section 2: The outer islands treaties January-June 1667: Articulation of bonds of vassalage wicecsesccssscsssessessscssssesssssssssssssssssscsusscassssessssseacsnsecscescscsneeeas

Buton as an exception confirming the rule Securing political dominance and stability in Buton by control over SUCCESSION ananas ensensensenenseneenensensensenenensansnnnnsensenennensensensen ennen: 292 Conclusion: Buton and the other outer islands: Exception and rule... 293 The meaning of sequence … nnn unennanreenensenen saneren senenevernensenenenenenenneneneenensnnenaneenensnenenen: 294 Section 3: Company hegemony in the November 18, 1667 treaty T E EE T E T A AE AAE A AN AE E EAA TEE 294 Presentation of the November 18 treaty „...s..ses.ssssssessnserissrrnsnrinrrnsnrisnnrennrinnrrnnnrinnrrnnnrennn 294 Contents by categories ..cccccccscscsssssssessssscstssescsssscsesessssssssesssscsssssssssscsusssseeesssansesseesssasesees 295 Hegemony in the explicit political regulations of the 1667 treaty: Getting rid of the other Europeans … nanne eeeneneeneneaenenseneneneeneneeneneneeneneenenenn 296 Comment: A moral legitimation of politics nn snnnensenenenenensenenensenensaenenseeneneenenss 297 Comment: form and content in the exclusion articles... 298 Article 10: The regulations for military backup and security „ssie 298 The outer security circle: Bima sendri 299 Article 16: BUUÖM eternet annette niente 300 Article 17 Ternate nnen eene mennen 300 Summing up and comments: The articles cutting bonds of alliance to the Makassarese and transferring them to the Company nen. 301 Section 4: Restructuring the political geography of South Sulawesi by treaty … nnen ennenensenensaeenensenensneenensenenaneenenaevenansenenaneensneneneneneananeenen 302 Article 18: Rewards to the Bugis allies and Makassarese Article 19: The punishment of Laijo and Bancala for siding with Article 20: Elaborating territorial rearrangements as legitimate by rights Of WAP ...scccccsscsssscssesestsssscssssesssssscssesssssssscssssesssssscessssssssssascscassusssassssassusscaseusasaueacasenes 303 Summing up: Transfers of sovereignty and territory ...ccccsccsescsesesescssessssssesteseseseeees 303 Sanctions against local petty states that had sided against the:Companyrandiits:allieS nnen nbr bert erenettm ne di 304 Configuring the respective polities into a hegemonic system (articles 23-25) …. 304

Article 23: Reconfirming the Company's political hegemony... 305 Article 24: Incorporating Makassar's vassalage position into the

new local and regional treaty system …..…...nnnnannannannanenrensenenensensenreensensenseensensenennensen 306 Article 25: The hierarchy of hegemony senccccredenrcscisconcaiecscandanganik 306 Summing up: The Company as hegemon by treaty … nnee ensennenensensenenens 307

The language of Big Brother Section 5: The 1668 treaty with Tello: Paternalism as the cement of loyalty vsc.cciiwdiwknincwiiakeaiid N RER NEAR 308 Hegemony ‘by patrimony vacwiewisenssitien ied cdi da E 309 Section conclusion: The 1667 and 1668 treaties of hegemony „s.s 310

ChapterconelusiOnsaserserserertensnarendatterdenn desse 310 in Cornelis Speelman's Notitie aaan eenoenenseneneeneneeneneenenenneneenevennenanns 313

Section 1: Chapter introduction … nnen eneeneneeneneneeneneeneneneeneneeneneneenenenneneveeneneneneneeneneneens 313 The challenge of preserving the Company's hegemony by diplomacy … en. 313

Section 2: Cornelis Speelman, a brief diplomatic- military biography... 314 The Java ÇamMpai EMi iiti n a a R a aia aias 317 The conquest of Banten .ic.cccccccscsscscsesessssescsssssessssesussssessssssussssssussssssssssssessssusssarsesssaessassees 319 Preliminary negotiations: The issue of letters of delegation „s.src 320 TENG SA COMTACE. nanne snee ene 323 The Company as the “Good guy”... nennen senenensenensenenenseeneneenenenenensenensneenenenneneneenen 324 The other foreigners in general and the English in particular as tme Bad OU YS) aa a

Tokens of gratitude Section 3: Analysis, the Notitie On the Notitie as a source for

Speelman's thinking about overseas diplomacy ....essessesscsestssessectestesessessstsstsseenesessnsseensesees 327 PFODOSIUONS Brenner idee idiaanangdentedacatstaesdadcnnenseytadearaessadideeinaeteieses 328 A methodological reminder … nn nnsannanenrensennenrenensensenensensennenenvensensensenensenennensensensenenn: 328 Pläfof EXPOS itl OM eere tdha 328 The limitations of treaty agreements in upholding the hegemonic regime … …… 329 Speelman’s account of the Company's interaction with Makassar

On diplomacy's role in upholding the Company's hegemony in general … 332 Bugis=MakassanfelallonS: neten 333 Implications ee PA EAEE E EE E 334

The importance of acquiring precise information on local conditions as

the general foundation of the Company's diplomatic performance... 334

On Karunrung's VICES v.ccccscscsccssssssscsssssssssssescscssssssusscscsussssssscssaucscsusucscanssssseusssaneesscaneseaceesscers 336 Karaning SVU Sense R AE 338

The:youns king of Makassaraaunmannuuarmsntarse tenen Wa eee a 340 A shared implication in Speelman’s characterisation of Karunrung and the young sultan of Makassar nnn annaneneenenseneneneenenseneneneeneneeens 342 Mheskingof Tello.smstnmatnennhennkre hed 342 Advice on how to approach the king of Tello. ...nnnnnnennanenneneneenenenvensnenseneneensnenenneneen 343 Summing up: The implications of Speelman's assessments of the:Makassarese 10@S::assaceindeitietad aad ad ani chiara waitin adn tinea 344 A return to the information dimension … nnen ensensenrenensensenenrensensensevensensenensensenns 345 Three aspects of keeping the alliance with Arung Palakka unne enneneneenen eenen. 346 Legitimacy by dynastic claims and historical tradition... 346 Surveying local political power relations … nsu ansenensenenensenenseenensenensaenensenensneenans: 347 The concern over Arung Palakka's lack of legitimate heirs … nnen: 349

Establishing an agreed succession procedure Arung Palakka's personal charisma and the hazards of going public with his religious speculations … nnn uunenenennenrenenenseneneveenenseneneneenenseneneneenenenens 355

Speelman’s handling of the two obstacles and the diplomatic

Section 4: The personal prowess argument … nnn anenenennenreneneneeneneneeneneenenenenneneenenenenneneen 358 Thesis Conclusion sicssieiisisccsiesscasncscsesscessesicadaccsneveacesescendcassctvasasncsccssstcasesisadcecsnasncsaneis 361 Bibliography ccciicccccecscsctacsescteseescweiisesidsssusaceteadecasadecsesteasteccsesncccnessccvedsucesaseveattecsedscteis 369 Primary Printed Sources aiseria riranin iiair iniii ii 369

Secondary Literature

Acknowledgements

This book is a revised version of my doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Leiden September 2016. I have revised the text with a special focus on some of the points and objections that were raised during the promotion, such as the role of religion in the politics of Makassar, the role of international law in the diplomatic thinking of the Company; and enlargement of the historiographic section with a special eye to the treatment of Jurrien van Goor.

The thesis has a long history, beginning with my approaches to Professor Leonard Blussé in the spring of 1996. For a number of reasons — some of them having to do with health — some of them with teaching commitments — it has taken me over fifteen years to complete the work. Over these years, four institutions have made this possible. First, I would like to thank the Research Council of Norway for awarding me a Doctoral grant for the years 1997-2000. Second, I would like to thank the Department of History of Leiden University and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) at the University of Leiden, where a grant enabled me to stay as a guest researcher from 1997-98.

Returning to Norway, my ability to work was hampered by health problems over longer periods. This situation was relieved by the University of Agder’s willingness to lighten my teaching load, and this meant that I finally could finish the thesis. I would like to thank the University of Agder for that and especially the then Dean at the Faculty of Letters at that time, Ole Letnes.

Professor Leonard Blussé, who is something of an institution all by himself, has guided me through this work with a mix of scholarly suggestions and friendly scolding. He possesses a unique ability to never miss an opportunity for presenting anecdotal digressions, where the digressions, paradoxically, were always to the point. If it were not for Professor Blussé, there would have been no thesis. And, had there been no Blussé, it would not have been half the fun writing it.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many of the people that I met during my year in Leiden have become good friends, and more than they probably know, they have been a great support. So, a big thank you and a smile go to Martha Chaiklin, Cynthia Vialle, and Paul A. Van Dyke. Lincoln Paine corrected my first English draft, and later proofreadings have been conducted by translators from the Portal Publishing House of Kristiansand. Thanks go to them too.

A special thank you goes to Editor Lars Aase at the Cappelen Damm Akademisk for helping and facilitating in the process of publishing my thesis.

At the beginning of the writing of my thesis, and over the years, I have contacted a lot of people for advice. I have never met a person in this field who has not been forthcoming and helpful. All deserve my thanks, but I would like to mention two especially, Professor Jurrien van Goor of Utrecht University, who perhaps without knowing it, helped me pursue the matter, and Professor John E. Wills Jr., who helped get the project back on the right track at a time when it might have crashed. I have also over the years been in regular contact with Professor Peer Vries, and although we have not discussed my thesis in particular, our exchanges on global history have influenced my thinking about history.

A few words must also be said about Agder University and my colleagues there. I am grateful for having had the opportunity to discuss drafts of chapters with my colleagues at the History department. Special thanks go to Professor May-Brith Ohman Nielsen in this connection for her observant reading and to-the-point comments. Professor Ole Riis must also be included in this special list. I appreciated his merciless critical enthusiasm! Special thanks go to Professor Jonathan Baker, for his encouragement during more than three decades.

Finally, I would like to thank my three daughters, Kate, Frida, and Birgitte Maaike, first for just being there, second for never asking why I kept on doing this and just accepted that my writing about the Dutch and Makassar was a basic fact of our family life. And not only that; as the work finally started rapidly progressing, they showed genuine enthusiasm for it!

Last but far, far from least: My thanks for supportive understanding go to my love, Ruth Wangberg.

Kristiansand, July 2017

Summary, English

This thesis explores the nature of VOC diplomacy using the seventeenth century interaction between the Company and the sultanate of Makassar on the western coast of South Sulawesi as its case.

There has, but for some recent exceptions, been a noticeable trend in the historiography of the Company’s diplomacy to consider its diplomatic practice as based on dogmatic assumptions either of a legalist or cultural-Eurocentric nature. Implicit in both is that the diplomatic interaction between the Company and its Asian counterparts was a miscommunication as the meeting of the two represented a clash of cultures.

Against these propositions I argue that both the Director’s concerns and the determining factor in policy decisions in Batavia were predominantly based on contextual considerations. By its very nature such an approach begged for precise and accurate information about local conditions and affairs.

Working top down I start by arguing that the respective Generale Instructies sent from the Heeren XVII from the Republic to the High Government in Batavia from 1609 to 1650 either implicitly or openly entailed a message to the High Government to gather information about be local customs and conditions and base its conduct of diplomacy on such knowledge. This approach is also reflected in the Directors’ particular advice on Makassar.

As for the nature of mutual understanding in the diplomatic interaction between the Company and Makassar, the negotiations leading up to, and the formulations in the actual contract text of the first treaty between the two in 1637 bear witness to that the Company were playing the diplomatic game along compatible rules.

Turning to discussions on policy within the High Government itself, a disagreement arose between Governor-General Maetsuyker and Superintendent Arnold de Vlaming in 1655 on whether to take a hard- or a soft stand towards Makassar. That the issue was the subject of discussion in Batavia, and that the

SUMMARY, ENGLISH arguments from both sides were presented to the Heeren XVII, show that the Company’s decision process on diplomacy was flexible and reactive rather than dogmatic.

As for dynamics and trends in the High Government's deliberations on Makassar, there is a decisive break after 1655 away from “soft diplomacy.” After the conclusion of the 1655 treaty there developed a growing belief that a lasting contractual order with Makassar could not be established unless accompanied by a complete military victory. A close reading of the sections on policy towards Makassar in the Generale Missiven after 1655 reveals how Batavian decisions on diplomacy towards Makassar formed a “learning process” based on shifting interpretations of the situation and Makassarese intentions.

When analysing the texts of the treaty record between the Company and Makassar, one is struck by an impression that the Company's diplomatic approach is moving in a direction towards a more constructivist perception of “treaty” after 1655. This could be seen as an element in the learning process that characterised the High Governments diplomatic practice towards Makassar after the 1655 treaty.

The Bongaya Treaty of 1667 and its follow up contracts in 1668 formed parts of a treaty complex that included not only Makassar but the other states in South Sulawesi and the outer islands. Taken together these treaties made up a system whereby the Company attained a hegemonic position in South Sulawesi. When looking at the construction of Company as hegemon by contract it is striking that appeals to principles of international law plays a limited and very narrowly defined role. On the contrary the primary political functions of the contracts were formulated not with references to international law, but in detailed, concrete and specific phrases pointing to the relevant issues at hand.

In addition to dealing with the Directors’ reflections on diplomacy and Batavian reports on and records of treaty making, as well as discussions within the Company on policy, and analyses of the implications of treaty formulations, I have also analysed reflections on policy by ‘the man on the spot, Cornelis Speelman who in his memorie van overgave of 1669 pondered how to maintain the hegemonic position created by the Bongaya treaty complex. The text not only presents us with an implicit model of overseas diplomacy, but Speelman’s explicit statements on his diplomatic exploits during his campaign

SUMMARY, ENGLISH in Makassar 166-68 also show how Company diplomacy was actually performed by one of the most able practitioners in the field.

Two factors stand out as general traits of Speelman’s approach towards overseas diplomacy. Firstly, he advocates a case study approach. Decisions and choice of action must be based on as extensive empirical information as possible. The other trait is his emphasis on agency and personal diplomacy. Speelman’s analysis is primarily focused on local power networks and the personal relations connecting them, and the tactical options that are left for Company influence and control. Personality traits of men who are in, or aspire to, power therefore form a prominent part in Speelman's text.

This personalised approach may be explained by the overall purpose of preempting the rise of foes and keeping the bonds of alliance with old and new allies in a political environment built on personal charisma and bonds. ‘This emphasis on information gathering and the personalised approach seem to conform with the mode of diplomacy practiced by Company diplomacy at large.

Targeted gathering of information was consistently stressed in the General Instructions by the Gentlemen XVII, it was characteristic of the High Government's deliberations on policy in Batavia, and it marked the conduct of diplomacy on site. Awareness of and adaptation to local particularities thus formed the basis for the conduct of pragmatic diplomacy. The Company’s practice of diplomacy towards Makassar conformed to this empirical and flexible rather than dogmatic Real Politik.

Consequently, this thesis refutes the proposition of a structural miscommunication in the Company’s diplomatic dealings with Asian rulers. Obviously there occurred some misunderstandings, but these were not of an insurmountable nature, and generally speaking, there was sufficient understanding to make functional communication possible. Contributing to this was the fact that Makassar, in the first decades of contact and interaction with the Company, was ruled by very able and open-minded men, who showed particular interest in things European and a very strong will to innovate.

In conclusion, if in the Company’s diplomatic mode, contextual considerations trumped a dogmatic approach to legal principles, this does not mean that it resulted in anarchy. What happened was that a pragmatic approach shaped the conceptualisation and the application of international law. On the one hand, this led to a constructivist perception of “treaty,” whereby treaties were

SUMMARY, ENGLISH particularly designed for the specific context to which they were applied. On the other hand, appeals to general principles of international law were applied in instances where this was considered to best serve the Company’s interests. In the final instance, both were based on pragmatic considerations. In this pragmatic approach was also an element of dynamism.

Section 1: Chapter Introduction

In 2006, Martine van Ittersum could write “With one or two exceptions, the VOC's ideological and political dimensions have been neglected for a long time by both Dutch historians and specialists in the history of South East Asia” But for some exceptions,” Ittersum’s statement still holds true. This thesis is one of the exceptions. My topic is the nature of the diplomatic mode of the Company and I use the Company's diplomatic interaction with the sultanate of Makassar in the seventeenth century as my case.